Jonathan A. Silk
Buddhist Cosmic Unity
An Edition, Translation and Study of the Anūnatvāpūrṇatvanirdeśaparivarta
Jonathan A. Silk

Buddhist Cosmic Unity

An Edition, Translation and Study of the
Anūnatvāpūrṇatvanirdeśaparivarta

Hamburg University Press
Publishing house of the Hamburg State and University Library
Carl von Ossietzky
Imprint

Bibliographic information published by the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek (German National Library).
The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data are available on the Internet at http://dnb.d-nb.de.
The online version is available online for free on the website of Hamburg University Press (open access). The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek stores this online publication on its Archive Server. The Archive Server is part of the deposit system for long-term preservation and availability of digital publications.
Available open access on the Internet at:
Hamburg University Press – http://hup.sub.uni-hamburg.de
Persistent URL: http://hup.sub.uni-hamburg.de/purl/HamburgUP_HBS04_Silk

ISBN 978-3-943423-22-8 (printed version)
ISSN 2190-6769 (printed version)

© 2015 Hamburg University Press, Publishing house of the Hamburg State and University Library Carl von Ossietzky, Germany

Printing house: Elbe-Werkstätten GmbH, Hamburg, Germany
http://www.elbe-werkstaetten.de/

Cover design: Julia Wrage/covers layout: Benjamin Guzinski, Hamburg, Germany

Figure on cover: Photograph of Buddha from Borobodur, courtesy of Prof. dr. Marijke Klokke, Leiden University ©
## Contents

**Foreword** vii  
**Preface** ix  

**Introduction**  
  - Textual History 3  
  - Doctrine 14  

**Edition and Translation** 55  

**Appendices**  
  1: Is the Mind Originally Pure or is it Luminous? 135  
  2: On *amuktajña* 141  
  3: *Sāramati* 149  
  4: Reading Text and Translation 159  
  5: A Hypothetical Reconstruction of an Indic Form of the AAN 181  
  6: Citations of the AAN 191  

**Literature** 219  

**Indices** 241
Foreword

About Hamburg Buddhist Studies

Buddhism has enjoyed a prominent place in the study of Asian religious ideas at the University of Hamburg for almost 100 years, ever since the birth of Buddhist Studies in Germany. We are proud that our program is housed in one of the pioneering academic institutions in Europe at which the study of Buddhism has become a core subject for students focusing on the religious dimensions of South and Central Asia.

With this publication series, the Numata Center for Buddhist Studies at the University of Hamburg aims to honor this long-standing commitment to research and share the results of this tradition with the academic community and the wider public. Today, Buddhist Studies as an academic discipline makes use of a broad variety of approaches and methods. The field covers contemporary issues as much as it delves into the historic aspects of Buddhism. Similarly, the questions shaping the field of Buddhist Studies have broadened. Understanding present-day Buddhist phenomena, and how such phenomena are rooted in a distant past, is not a matter of indulgence. Rather, it has become clear that fostering such an understanding is one of the many crucial obligations of modern multicultural societies in a globalized world.

Buddhism is one of the great human traditions of religious and philosophical thought. The Hamburg Buddhist Studies series aims to discuss aspects of the wide variety of Buddhist traditions that will be of interest to scholars and specialists of Buddhism, but it also wants to confront Buddhism’s rich heritage with questions whose answers might not be easily deduced by the exclusive use of philological research methods. Such questions require the penetrating insight of scholars who approach Buddhism from a variety of disciplines building upon and yet going beyond the solid study of textual materials. We are convinced that the Hamburg Buddhist Studies series will contribute to opening up Buddhist Studies to those who are not necessarily trained in the classical languages of the Buddhist traditions but want to approach the field with their own disciplinary interests in mind. We
very much hope that this series will encourage a wider audience to take interest in the academic study of the Buddhist traditions.

About this publication

It is my great pleasure to introduce the fourth volume in the *Hamburg Buddhist Studies* series. The *Anūnatvāpūrṇatvanirdeśaparivarta*, extant in its entirety only in Chinese translation, is, to judge from its use as a proof-text in the seminal treatise *Ratnagotravibhāga*, one of the fundamental scriptures expressing ideas about the nature of *samsāra* and *nirvāṇa*, and the individual’s innate capacity for awakening, called in this text and elsewhere ‘*tathāgatagarbha*’, ‘embryo of the tathāgatas.’ While the text also deals extensively with notions such as the *dхarmakāya*, it centers most of its attention on the term *dhātu*, especially in the terms *sattvadhātu* and *dхarmadhātu*. The former term is particularly important and, Jonathan Silk argues, crucially changes meaning within the text, from ‘realm of beings’ to ‘quintessence of beings.’ In fact, perhaps in part because we have access to only portions of the text in its original Sanskrit, it remains often rather difficult to understand.

Buddhist scriptural literature, despite a century and a half of study, remains, truth be told, largely terra incognita. Slowly, however, scholars are beginning to prepare critical editions based on the best available sources, be they manuscripts or printed editions, make translations with sufficient scientific annotations, and attempt to comprehensively interpret their sources in a global context. The present edition, translation and study is intended as such a contribution to scholarship. We are especially pleased that its publication chronologically overlaps with the forthcoming fifth volume of the Hamburg series, with which it is conceptually so closely coordinated, Michael Radich’s *The Mahāparinirvāṇa-mahāsūtra and the Emergence of Tathāgatagarbha Doctrine*. These works may be fruitfully read together, as offering related though slightly different views of one of the interesting areas of Indian Buddhist scriptural literature.

Michael Zimmermann
The first dated version of an annotated translation and short study of the AAN I find in my files dates to 1984, when I submitted it (written on a typewriter!) as a piece of work at the end of my first year of graduate study at the University of Michigan. Prof. Luis Gómez awarded it the generous mark of 92, with the notation: “I expected the notes and the intro. to be a little bolder and [more] comprehensive in matters of meaning and interpretation.” I do not know whether the present result of my having revisited the text thirty years on fulfills those unsatisfied expectations; it is certain that still, in matters of meaning and interpretation, it falls far short of what is possible. But as I write these words I feel confident that I have done all that I, at least, wish to do with this text, as interesting and as challenging as it no doubt remains.

I picked up the text again after so many years soon after my parents died, thinking I would work on something simple and quick, which did not require a terrific amount of sustained attention. Boy was that a miscalculation! For long stretches over the last two years the work has absorbed my energies and taxed my abilities. What is worse (or from another perspective, better), much of what I once thought I understood now seems to me highly fragile and tenuous. There is however, I believe, some value in the work, and thus I dare to publish it even in its present form, however imperfect.

I have been very fortunate in the process of this project to profit from the advice of a number of friends and colleagues, among whom the place of honor must go to Michael Radich, who sent me pages and pages of detailed and extremely helpful corrections and suggestions. The book would have been much the poorer without his generously shared insights. Stefano Zacchetti looked carefully at the translation and much else, sharing his profound knowledge of Buddhist Chinese and, as ever, his much treasured friendship. Likewise I have received very helpful notes and corrections from Kazuo Kano, and a few from Seishi Karashima. The indices of technical terms which close the volume were graciously prepared by my student Li Channa. I received help with materials from many colleagues, including
Funayama Tōru and Prof. Ochiai Toshinori. It is thanks to the kindness of Prof. Ochiai and the permission of the Nihon Koshakyō Kenkyūjo 古写経研究所 of the International College for Postgraduate Buddhist Studies, the Amanosan Kongoji 天野山金刚寺 and the Iwayaji 岩屋寺 that I was able to make use of several old copies of the text preserved in Japan. I had the opportunity to present this work some time ago at the Ekō-haus in Düsseldorf, and for this and for his advice I thank Hermann-Josef Röllicke, as well as all who participated in the seminar on the theme of tathāgatagarbha Dr. Röllicke arranged. I am very grateful to Michael Zimmermann for his generous suggestion to include this volume in the series he edits.

Although it is pro-forma for one to say so, with utter sincerity I avow that it is only the errors in what follows that I take credit for, and it is these which belong to me alone.

Leiden
October 2013

Addendum

Due to some serious misunderstandings, for which I take full responsibility, the production of this book was delayed by almost precisely one year. I very much regret this, and the attendant fact that in the end I have been reduced to typesetting it myself. I apologize for the infelicities that have resulted. In this regard, I am very grateful to Andrea Schlosser for valuable advice on typesetting, and for her precious friendship, and to Pu Chengzhong for some last minute corrections.

November 2014
Introduction

The Anūnatvāpūrṇatvanirdes aparivarta (AAN) is a short Mahāyāna sūtra in which the Buddha preaches about, most centrally, the sattvadhātu, dharmakāya and tathāgatagarbha, and their ultimate equivalence, in the framework of a critique of false views.¹ It has been grouped with texts like the Tathāgatagarbha-sūtra and the Śrīmālādevīśīnhanāda, although its exact historical relation to these texts remains unclear.² Both of the latter texts have been studied, the former especially well,³ but the AAN has yet to receive its due.⁴ Modern scholarly attention directed at the text has empha-

---

¹ I use the following abbreviations here and in the notes to the translation:
AAN: Anūnatvāpūrṇatvanirdes aparivarta
MDN: *Mahāyānadharmaṭunirviśeṣa
RGV: Ratnagotravibhāga

² One expression used to refer to these texts, ‘Nyoraizō sambukyō 如来藏三部經, “triad of Tathāgatagarba sūtras,” though now used also by others, was invented by Takasaki Jikidō (Takasaki 1982: 27), no doubt on the basis of the expression Jōdo-sambukyō, “triple Pure Land sūtra,” which itself, however, has an older, medieval, pedigree. Note that at the same time, Takasaki (1974: 768–769; 1996: 42) considers the AAN to be “almost śāstra-like (an opinion shared by Matsumoto 1983: 64/389n38). For India we have no evidence other than the RGV and MDN, but the citations in these treatises do implicitly group the AAN with the Tathāgatagarbha-sūtra and a number of others, although basing any argument upon this fact is bound to lead to circularity. Whether it makes sense to speak of “tathāgatagarbha sūtras” as a class (at least in an Indian context), and how this might be historically meaningful, are questions which remain to be explored.

³ For the first, see the fine study of Zimmermann (2002). The Śrīmālādevi has been studied more often, but awaits a critical edition and good (at least Western language) translation. For an edition I have used Tsukinowa 1940, which however of course lacks reference to the extant Sanskrit portions of the text (all of which were published only after the war), and moreover is not presented in a form convenient for citation. The translation of Wayman 1974 is inadequate for a number of reasons, not the least of which is that it avowedly conflates distinct versions.

⁴ Since I first began to pay attention to this text (in 1984), a number of works have appeared, including Watanabe (1984), Tsai (2004) (unfortunately not useful to me due to my ignorance of modern Chinese), Wakiya (2005) (a very short summary of his unpublished thesis), Shiu (2006), and Sirisethaworakul (2010), adding to the older and still seminal studies of Takasaki, in particular (1965, 1974, 1975a). See also Shimamura (2007) which, however, I find rather hard to understand. In addition, at least one translation is to be
sized its second half, almost entirely ignoring its discussions of wrong views, primarily because interest in and awareness of the text has for the most part been motivated by its identification as a scriptural source representing an earlier stage and aspect of the tradition later codified in the philosophical treatise Ratnagotrabhāga-(mahāyānottaratantra) (RGV), a work focused on the fundamental notion of the tathāgatagarbha.\(^5\) In seeking, however, to study and appreciate the standpoint of influential scriptures, a fundamental challenge remains that of trying to gaze on them free from the intervening filter of later scholastic configurations, one implication of which is that the focus of study should be wholistic, rather than concentrating on aspects singled out or elaborated upon by later authors. If we wish to explore the intrinsic ideological or doctrinal position of a given text (which is itself also an essential step in the progress toward appreciating how later authors utilized their sources), we should endeavor to read the text—in so far as this is possible—on its own terms. With this in mind, the short study presented here as an introduction to an edition and annotated translation of the Anūnatvāpunātvanirdeśaparivarta attempts to treat the sūtra more on its own terms, and in the context of other scriptures to which it might be conceptually related,\(^6\) than through its interpretation in the RGV and other later, systematizing works, although naturally the RGV cannot and should not be ignored.

---

\(^5\) By the abbreviation RGV I aim to include the commentary Ratnagotrabhāgavyākhyā, which Ruegg and others call RGVV. Since the RGV consists only of verses, while all quotations occur in the commentary, it seems to me unnecessary in this particular context to distinguish the mūla from the commentary in my abbreviations. Since both RGV and RGVV equally postdate the AAN, even taking account of the chronological layers within the former, I do not hesitate to use one overarching abbreviation.

\(^6\) By this I mean to point particularly to the Tathāgatagarbha-sūtra and the Śrīmālādevisiṃhanāḍa, and not to obviously related but (as I now believe) more advanced texts like the *Mahābherihāraka* and the Mahāyāna Mahāparinirvāṇa-mahāsūtra.
Textual History

The Anūnatvāpūrṇatvanirdeśaparivarta survives as a whole in a single Chinese translation, with several quotations preserved in Sanskrit in the Ratnagotravibhāga. No Tibetan version of the sūtra is known to exist, or to have ever been made. The Chinese bears the title Fóshuo bù zēng bù jiǎn jīng and is credited to Bodhiruci, translated in Luoyang in 520. This date is well established. In addition to the AAN, Bodhiruci trans-

7 Not only was the AAN apparently never translated into Tibetan, but it seems that the canonical Tibetan translators of the RGV did not even recognize the title of the text as a title. They render it twice in the RGV (Nakamura 1967: 3.7 and 14; Derge Tanjur Tōh. 4025, sms tsam, phi 75a3–4 and 6–7), without consistency and without any indication that a text name is meant. First we find 'gro[pa me]d pa dang 'phel ba med pa nyid bstan pa, almost immediately followed by 'gro[pa me]d cing 'phel ba med pa nyid bstan pa. The translation of Obermiller (1931: 114–115), an incredible work of scholarship achieved before the discovery of the Sanskrit text of the RGV (and without reference to the Chinese translation), demonstrates this. Obermiller rendered, respectively, “Such do we know to be the fourth adamantine topic which is not subject to augmentation and decrease as it is demonstrated in Scripture,” and “The 6th diamond subject is thus demonstrated as something which can neither increase, nor become diminished.” If correct, this is curious since one of the translators was an Indian who also wrote a short commentary on the text, Sajjana (Kanō 2006a; on the other translator, Rngog Blo ldan shes rab [1059–1109], see Kramer 2007). Later authors were, however, evidently aware of the text as a sūtra. 'Gos lo tsā ba Gzthon nu dpal (1392–1481), for instance, cites it under the name 'gro[pa me]d pa dang | 'phel ba med pa'i mdo (Mathes 2008: 440n275; sic the punctuation in the middle of the title!), Mkhās grub rje Dge legs dpal bzang (1385–1438) has 'phel ba dang 'gro[pa me]d par bstan pa'i mdo (Lessing and Wayman 1968: 48,14–15), while Go rams pa Bsdod nams seng ge (1429–1489) refers to it with the shorter title 'phel 'gro[pa me]d par bstan pa'i mdo (Cabezón and Dargyay 2007: 74). See below note 14. These versions of the title seem to me perhaps to have been influenced by the title of the Chinese translation, though I am not aware of any uses of the sūtra in Tibet drawing from passages other than those cited in the RGV, such as we might expect if authors had some access to the complete sūtra. It is also possible that, since the RGV was translated into Tibetan as many as six times (Kano 2006b: 89–111), these authors were aware of different renderings of the title of the AAN. Despite the Tibetan unfamiliarity with the AAN as a whole, I do not think that we must necessarily assume, with Ogawa 2001: 24, that the sūtra was already lost in India by the eighth century. In our present state of knowledge, we simply cannot know why it was not translated into Tibetan.

8 Lidai sanbao ji 历代三寶紀 T. 2034 (XLIX) 45a11: 庚子 普通元 … 正光元 … 不增不減經二卷。… 並菩提流支。為司州牧汝南王於第出。See also T. 2034 (XLIX) 85c24: 不增不減經二卷。正光年於洛陽譯。或一卷. The Kaiyuan Shijiao lu 開元釋教錄 (T. 2154 [LV] 541a07) points out that the attribution of 2 juan to the text is an error: 不增不減經一卷。正光年於
lated many other seminal texts including the *Vajracchedikā*, *Viśeṣacinti-brahmapariprcchā*, *Laṅkāvatāra*, *Sandhinirmocana*, *Dharmasamāgiti*, and *Daśabhūmika*. As for the date of the Indian scripture itself, it is notoriously difficult to date any Indian Buddhist text, and scriptures all the more so. However, given that the AAN clearly predates the *Ratnagotravibhāga*, and that the *Ratnagotravibhāga* may date to the early fifth century, or even the middle of the fourth, we will not be far wrong to suggest that the AAN must be older than the early fifth century. On the other hand, given its doctrinal standpoint and style of presentation, I believe that it post-dates the *Tathāgatagarbha-sūtra* and *Śrīmālādevī*.

The Sanskrit title *Anūnatvāpūrṇatvanirdeśaparivarta* is found in the *Ratnagotravibhāga*, and the Chinese rendering *bù zēng bù jiǎn jīng* 不増不減。See also 604c21; 688b23; 712a06. Almost certainly only an error misreading 元 as 兩 lies behind the *Zhenyuan xinding shijiao mulu* 贞元新定釋教目録 (T. 2157 [LV] 839b06) dating to 525: 不増不減經卷者, 正光六年於洛陽出, 七紙。云二卷者, 誤. According to Fuse 1937: 128–129, the name Bodhiruci was written 菩提流支 before the Sui period, in the Sui 菩提留支, in the early Tang both forms were used, and in the middle Tang once again 菩提流支 became the standard.

9 For biographies, see T. 2154 (LV) 541b4ff.; T. 2157 (LV) 839c3ff.; T. 2060 (L) 428a22ff. A systematic comparison of translation techniques would be useful, but is beyond the scope of this study. In the meanwhile see Oda 1993, which is, however, more a doctrinal than a terminological investigation.

10 Takasaki (1966: 61).


12 The AAN is quoted three times in T. 1668, the *Shi moheyan lun* 釋摩訶衍論, which is by tradition attributed to Nāgārjuna and *Vṛddhimata* (筏提摩多, 384–417). If this were correct, it would push back the date of the AAN considerably. The *Shi moheyan lun*, however, is a Chinese apocryphon, a commentary on the *Dasheng qixin lun* 大乘起信論, itself an apocryphal composition. Therefore, the alleged early date of these quotations may be dismissed.

13 A Sanskrit manuscript fragment of the *Śrīmālādevī* has been published by Matsuda (2000); Sander (2000: 293) dates this manuscript to the fifth century. Since however we already have both a fifth century Chinese translation, and quotations in the RGV, this does not push back the date of the *Śrīmālādevī* past what was heretofore known. Zimmermann (2002: 15) offers “the middle of the fourth century CE” as a *terminus ante quem* for the *Tathāgatagarbha-sūtra*. The relative chronology must from almost any perspective be postulated on internal grounds.

14 A variant, *Anūnāpūrṇatvanirdeśaparivarta* (Johnston 1950: viii; 3n1), is, despite Johnston’s hesitation, probably a scribal error, although it is understandable. According to the kind information of Madhav Deshpande (email 20 September 2012), Sanskrit commen-
減經 corresponds well to this Sanskrit.\textsuperscript{15} As is habitual, the Chinese label the text jīng 經, whereas the Sanskrit instead calls it a nirdeśa-parivarta. It may have been this word parivarta, ‘section, chapter,’ which led Johnston, the editor of Ratnagotravibhāga, to speculate that the sūtra “is possibly a section of some larger work.”\textsuperscript{16} If this were ever so, no trace remains of its situation within any larger compendium.\textsuperscript{17}

Our only Indian evidence aside from the translated sūtra itself is its quotations in the Ratnagotravibhāga and in the *Mahāyānadharmadhātunirviśeṣa (Dasheng fajie wuchabie lun 大乘法界無差別論, for which see below). All other texts known to cite the AAN are either native Chinese works, or commentaries in Tibetan on the RGV.\textsuperscript{18} Since the latter can provide no more

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{15} Note that, of course, this terminology is not the only possible. In the Yogācārabhūmi, for instance, 不増不減 (T. 1579 [XXX] 285b24) corresponds to na … ārdhvaṁ nārvāk (Bhattacharya 1957: 31.5).
\item \textsuperscript{16} Johnston (1950: viii); Takasaki (1965: 88). Note that the Tibetan translations (see above notes 7 and 14) also only render nirdeśa (= bstan pa), ignoring parivarta (usually le’u). It is theoretically possible that a translation of the AAN is included under a different title within some larger work. If this were so, however, this fact also seems to have escaped the attention of all Tibetan scholars who have written on the RGV. This seems to me most unlikely.
\item \textsuperscript{17} Concerning the combination of nirdeśa-parivarta, we do find two texts titled -nirdeśaparivarta in the Mahārātnakūṭa collection, namely Trisamvara-nirdeśaparivarta and Ananta-mukhapariśodhana-nirdeśaparivarta, alongside which we find quite a number of simple -nirdeśas and simple -parivartas. For a brief study beginning to address the naming practices of Mahāyāna sūtras, see Yonezawa 2012.
\item \textsuperscript{18} Examples include the work of Bu ston (Ruegg 1973: 135–136; 63n2), or the Theg pa chen po rgyud bla ma’i ṭikā of Rgyal tshab rje (Jiang 2008). See also Bernert (2009), Shiu (2006: 70n116). For a listing of Tibetan commentaries on the RGV, see the unpublished Kanō (2006b: 593–600) and Burchardi (2006); the latter, though extensive, remains incomplete. For instance, the discussion list H-Buddhism on 4 September 2012 carried a note by Karl
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
evidence for the sūtra than that already to be found in the RGV, I do not devote further attention to them.\(^{19}\) The Chinese works, however, may be of some interest for studies on the reception of the sūtra. Appendix 6 therefore provides a list of citations of the AAN in Sanskrit and in Chinese sources.\(^{20}\)

Three commentaries on the AAN in Chinese may once have existed, though none is (known to be) extant.\(^{21}\) These are (or were):

1. **Fuzōfugengyō kaihōtsu** 不増不減開合 by Saichō 最澄.
2. **Bujūngbulgamgyōngso** 不増不減経疏 by Wŏnhyo 元曉.\(^{22}\)
3. 不増不減経疏 by 榮業.\(^{23}\)

Brunnhölzl making reference to the existence of a 172 folio commentary called *Rgyud bla ma'i ’grel pa* by Paṇḍita *Ratnavajra*, grandfather (or uncle?) of the Kashmirian Sajjana, credited himself as a commentator on and one of the translators of the RGV into Tibetan (this commentary already mentioned by Kanō, 2006b: 53n140; 594). See van der Kuijp Forthcoming.

\(^{19}\) Note however that the RGV was translated into Tibetan repeatedly, and careful study of the citations of AAN passages in the works of Tibetan authors might uncover renderings of these quotations different from those now found in the Tanjur translation of the RGV credited to Sajjana and Rngog lo tsā ba. For one example, see the remark of Ruegg (1969: 360n3; 1973: 104) on Bu ston’s rendering of the technical term *jñānaguṇa as ye shes kyis bsdus pa'i yon tan* rather than *ye shes kyi yon tan*, mentioned below in Appendix 2.

\(^{20}\) There is at least one putative quotation of the AAN which does not in fact appear in the sūtra as we have it. In the *Jin’gangxian lun* 金剛仙論, falsely attributed to Vasubandhu, we find (T. 1512 [XXV] 803b18–19): 不増不減經中明: 性地菩薩畢竟不墮地獄. See Otake (2003–2004: I.72). (The same in T. 1708 [XXXIII] 394b16–17 and T. 2196 [LVI] 661c21.) In view of this apparent misattribution I do not list this in Appendix 6. I likewise cannot identify the passage cited by Morita (1922: 16) as from the *起信教理抄:* 4.12a (a Chinese or a Japanese work?), which cites paragraphs §4i and 15ii of the AAN by name, as do for example other commentaries on the “Awakening of Faith” such as the *Kishinron Shōshutsu* of Sonben, and thus even if I cannot identify Morita’s text, its genre is recognizable.


\(^{22}\) T. 2180 (LV) 1139a12; T. 2181 (LV) 1141b07; T. 2183 (LV) 1152c10; T. 2184 (LV) 1171b16. Although no copy has been discovered, the existence of manuscripts of this text in Japan at an early period is well documented: see Fukushi 2004: 130–163. I am grateful to my friend Funayama Tōru for informing me of this study and sending me a copy of the relevant pages.

\(^{23}\) T. 2183 (LV) 1152c11. I do not transcribe the text title or author’s name since I do not know whether the author is Korean or Japanese; I doubt that he is Chinese. Thomas Sung Eun Kim, a post-doc working in Leiden, informs me that he is unable to trace such a name in Korean sources. Thus: the author may be Japanese, he may be unknown, or the
Nothing further is known of these works, although both Saichō and Wŏnhyo do quote the sutra in their extant works.

A question connected with the date of the AAN translation arises in relation to the Chinese rendering of the Ratnagotravibhāga, the Jiujing yisheng baoxing lun, since the latter contains quotations which clearly demonstrate familiarity with the Chinese translation of the AAN, and not just its Indic text. The dating of the Chinese translation of the Ratnagotravibhāga, therefore, is pertinent to the question of the date of the translation of the AAN, which catalogues agree on dating to 520, as mentioned above. However, the attribution and dating of the RGV translation, which modern scholarship generally attributes to Ratnamati (Lenamoti 勒那摩提), is fraught with problems.

The oldest extant post-Bodhiruci catalogue of Chinese Buddhist literature, the Zhongjing mulu, attributes the translation to the self-same Bodhiruci who translated the AAN. Almost immediately thereafter, in 597, another catalogue, the Lidai sanbao ji, on the contrary credits what appears to be the same translation to Ratnamati, initially assisted, however, by Bodhiruci. They then quarrelled, and each translated independently.

---

24 Wŏnhyo's use of the sutra may be discussed in Lee 1988, a work I have not been able to see. For the citations in question, see the author index to Appendix 6.

25 Ui (1959: 3–21) gives an extensive discussion, although I cannot always agree with his interpretations.

26 T. 2146 (LV) 141b14: 寶性論四卷 後魏世菩提留支譯.

27 T. 2034 (XLIX) 86b23–24: 究竟一乘寶性論四卷 亦云寶性分別七乘増上論，或三卷。於趙欣宅出，見寶唱錄，listing it as a translation of Ratnamati (86b26–c1); 梁武帝世。中天竺國三藏法師勒那摩提。或云婆提。魏言寶意。正始五年來在洛陽殿內譯。初菩提流支助傳。後以相爭，因各別譯。沙門僧朗、覺意侍中崔光等筆受。Ui (1959: 3), followed by Takasaki (1999: 19), is wrong to say that this catalogue is the oldest record of the translation of the RGV.

28 See Takasaki (1966: 7–9; 1999: 18–20). At T. 2154 (LV) 541b2, the text states there to have been a translation by Bodhiruci: 寶性論四卷, and that it was translated by Ratnamati from the same original as the first: 五卷。五, 初出，與寶意出者同本。已上並見長房錄及內典錄。However, it also attributes a translation with another title to Bodhiruci: T. 2154 (LV) 540b6: 究竟一乘寶性論四卷, 亦云: 寶性分別七乘増上論，或三卷，或五卷。於趙欣宅出，見寶唱錄第二譯與菩提留支譯同本. The final attribution here, that an earlier and now lost
may be that there either never existed a translation by Bodhiruci, or that what was essentially a joint product ended up bearing only a single name. This leaves us with the question of the date of what we might, by convention, term Ratnamati’s translation. Since Ratnamati arrived in China in 508, the translation must date to this year or later. Takasaki claims the date of translation as “c. 511,” without providing any reason. If this were to be correct, we would have the difficulty of explaining how a translation of, let us say, 511 could cite passages from a scripture the translation of which was ‘published’ by Bodhiruci only nine years later in 520. However, it is clear that there was at least at one point a very close working relationship between Bodhiruci and Ratnamati, and whatever the date of translation—or perhaps better, publication—of the Jiujing yisheng baoxing lun, there is no question that in its redaction the Chinese translation of the AAN was closely consulted.

Very clear evidence for this relation between the Chinese translation of the Ratnagotravibhāga and the AAN is found in the latter’s §§11–12. In the first place, while the Sanskrit quotations corresponding to the sūtra here are found widely separated in the Sanskrit text of the Ratnagotravibhāga, the Chinese translation of the Ratnagotravibhāga gives both passages continuously, and almost verbatim with the Chinese text of the AAN as we have it. Moreover, in §12 of the transmitted text of the AAN we find the term shìjiān dēng 世間燈, representing the Sanskrit *loka-pradīpa. The Sanskrit Ratnagotravibhāga here has merely pradīpa (and the Tibetan rendering has the corresponding mar me), while in this context no sense could be derived from loka-pradīpa, an epithet of the Buddha (“lamp of the world”). The Chinese translation of the Ratnagotravibhāga, however, like the AAN, has here shìjiān dēng 世間燈. It is significant to note that both Chinese translations of the *Mahāyānadharmadhātunivīṣeṣa have dēng 燈, which suggests, if it does not indeed prove, that the Indic texts known to the author and

---

29 Takasaki (1966: 7). Funayama Tōru suggests to me that he may have taken this idea from Tsukinowa (1935), or Ui (1959: 21), who suggests on dubious grounds that the RGV may have been translated between 511–515, the latter date hinging on suppositions about Ratnamati’s date of death.

30 The best discussion I have seen of the working relationship between the two, with special focus on the Shidi jing lun 十地經論, is Otake (2005: 20–29).
both Chinese translators of this text also read *pradīpa. Another piece of evidence presents itself in §21i, where the Sanskrit text of the *Ratnagotravibhāga corresponds only to the latter portion of the Chinese of the AAN, while the Chinese of the *Ratnagotravibhāga corresponds to the entirety of the AAN text. In the following section §21ii, the Chinese text of the AAN introduces the notion of the *icchantika, something absent from the *Ratnagotravibhāga’s quotation in Sanskrit. All of these points taken together indicate that Bodhiruci’s translation of the AAN was known to the translator(s) or redactor(s) of the *Ratnagotravibhāga in Chinese.31

Aside from the RGV, our sole independent Indian source for the AAN is the *Mahāyānadharmadhātunirviśeṣa (MDN), extant in two Chinese translations.32 The relation between this text and the RGV raises a number of questions. Although Takasaki accepts the traditional attribution to the putative author of the RGV itself, *Sāramati,33 there is some confusion about the Chinese translator of the MDN. Both Chinese translations are ascribed to the late-seventh century Khotanese monk *Devendraprajña 提雲般若, though the two are clearly by different hands,34 and only the first, T. 1626, is to be attributed correctly to *Devendraprajña.35 In any event, there can be

31 It is not likely that the Sanskrit text of the RGV available to its Chinese translator(s) itself contained these variations, in light of the overall pattern of dependence seen throughout.
32 Found in T. 1626 (MDN₁) and T. 1627 (MDN₂), both of which bear the same title, Da-sheng fajie wuchabie lun 大乘法界無差別論. Perhaps the most detailed discussion of the text to date is Takasaki (1999: 36–48). See also, inter alia, Tagami (1965, 1986). Note that the Sanskrit title, often given as *Mahāyānadharmadhātunirviśeṣaśāstra, is a complete invention, which could correspond to the Chinese, but for which, as far as I know, there is no evidence. Johnston (Johnston and Bailey 1935: 79) writes Dharmadhātvaviśeṣaśāstra, which (without Mahāyāna, of course) would equally well correspond to the Chinese. (He, as others [e.g., Péri 1911: 353], apparently follows Nanjio (1883, number 1258), who was more cautious than others, writing Mahāyāna-dharmadhātv-aviseshatā (ʔ-)śāstra.) I would at least suggest, in any event, that the element śāstra is unlikely to be correct. Zimmermann (2002: 89) writes that this text “is based on the 佛性論”, but the Foxing lun 佛性論 was composed in China (Hattori 1955); this must be a misprint for 寶性論 = RGV.
33 Takasaki (1999: 37) considers the common authorship of the two texts to be obvious (magiremonai), while earlier (1966: 45–46) he was considerably less conclusive. On this author and his name, see Appendix 3.
34 According to Forte (1979: 297n3), referring implicitly to T. 1627 (XXXI) 896b18–19, T. 1627 must post-date the compilation of the Kaiyuan Shiji jiao lu 開元釋教錄 catalogue in 730; so also Takasaki (1999: 46).
35 Takasaki (1999: 40) and elsewhere takes the name to be Devaprajña, but see Forte (1979: 289–290) (apparently unknown to Takasaki).
no question that the MDN is both an authentic Indian work, and to some extent independent of the RGV. In the narrow frame of reference of the AAN, that evidence comes not only from the manner of translation of quotations, but from the fact that, corresponding to our §17ii, the MDN quotes a passage from the sūtra not quoted in the RGV. When the MDN quotes the AAN, however, it nowhere does so by name; it is therefore interesting to note that while the commentary on the MDN by a direct student of the translator *Devendraprajña, Fazang 法藏 (643–712) (Dasheng fajie wuchabie lunshu bing xu 大乘法界無差別論疏并序, T. 1838), does quote the AAN by name (see §§ 10iii, 13ii, 14i in Appendix 6), these citations are all based on the Chinese translation of the RGV, and not on the MDN.

While these clues tell us something about the existence and state of the AAN in India, as I suggested earlier, little can be said with certainty about the absolute chronology of the text. Moreover, despite some efforts to offer hypotheses concerning the chronologies of the so-called Tathāgatagarbha-sūtras as a group, even relative determinations are often fraught with difficulties. However, based on considerations of style and presentation, it seems to me most likely that the AAN does not represent a particularly early phase of the development of the ideas it discusses. The primary ground for this conclusion is the terse manner in which it introduces each of its key terms, almost without exception free from explanation or argument. The authors of the AAN evidently felt no need either to explain or defend their use of technical terms, which they consequently obviously expected their audience to already understand. The terms I have in mind here start with the basic term sattvadhātu, “realm of beings,” which the Buddha uses in answer to Śāriputra’s question concerning “the mass of beings, the ocean of beings” (§§2–3ii). While one might argue that the context sufficiently explains what the Buddha means here by “realm of beings,” his immediately following “single dharma-realm” (§4i) remains opaque. However, one could once again argue that it is indeed clarified when the text, beginning at §8ii, discusses the “single realm.” This term in its turn is ‘clarified’ as equivalent to the ultimate truth, paramārtha, and to the tathāgatagarbha and dharma-kāya, both of which appear here without further explanation (§10iii). This term dharma-kāya is deployed in order to argue that the three modes of being—ordinary being, bodhisattva and buddha—are in fact one, but the basic idea of dharma-kāya appears to be assumed by the text. What I would
argue is most important, however, in terms of the likely relative chronology of the text is that the term *tathāgatagarbha* itself is entirely assumed by AAN.

When one compares the presentation in the AAN with those in the *Tathāgatagarbha-sūtra* and Śrīmālādeviśīrinhanāda, it is clear that these latter, albeit considerably longer, works indeed argue for their positions, while the AAN simply asserts them. Both the relation of the AAN with the *Tathāgatagarbha-sūtra* and the Śrīmālādevī and the fact that it post-dates these texts seem to me to be virtually certain.\(^{36}\) As is well known, the *Tathāgatagarbha-sūtra* provided the overall structural impetus of the RGV, but this very fact has also led to the *Tathāgatagarbha-sūtra* itself having been

\(^{36}\) So too Oda (1993: 576 [36]). The opinion is, however, not universal; Takasaki (1975b: 235) speaks of a sequence from the *Tathāgatagarbha sūtra* through the AAN to the Śrīmālādevi, and (pp. 242) offers as examples the reliance of the Śrīmālādevī’ś avidyāvāsabhūmi on the AAN’s discussion of the beginninglessness of āgantukakleśa, and (1974: 83) the Śrīmālādevī passage cited in the note to §15i(a) as another example of that text’s reliance on the AAN. Takasaki (1974: 111–121) elaborates his arguments for the priority of the AAN, but I remain unconvinced. Srisetthaworakul (2010: 63) probably simply follows Takasaki (and also adopts without caveat the term ‘*nyoraizō* sambukyo;’ for which see above note 2). I do not understand Matsumoto’s view in his 1983 paper. He says once (p. 404 [49]) that he shares Takasaki’s opinion of the relative chronology of the texts, as well as Takasaki’s view that the *Jñānālālokālaṁkārasūtra* was composed between the two (筆者もまたこの経を通訳して、『勝鬘経』以前との印象をもつ). However, in a note he later says (389 [64] n38) that he believes the AAN to be later than the Śrīmālādevī because of its śāstric, which is to say philosophically abstract, character (筆者が『不増不減経』を『勝鬘経』以後と見ることについて、その理由を説明しなければならないが、その最大の理由は、『不増不減経』の方がより論書の性格が強い、即ち、哲学的抽象度が高いという筆者の印象に他ならないので、論証はできない). I have not studied the *Jñānālālokālaṁkārasūtra*, now available in Sanskrit, but my initial impression is that it should post-date the AAN. Possible connections with the Mahāyāna Mahāparinirvāṇa-mahāsūtra are much harder to sort out, chiefly on account of the very complex textual history of this sūtra. At one point it was held that the Mahāyāna Mahāparinirvāṇa-mahāsūtra went so far as to quote the *Tathāgatagarbha-sūtra* by name (Zimmermann 2002: 88n190, 137n204[5], Takasaki 1974: 138), but new research indicates that the reference is rather to the *Mahāparinirvāṇa-mahāsūtra* itself (Radich 2015). Zimmermann (2002: 90) earlier held that two other texts also cite the sūtra, the *Aṅgulimāliya* and the *Mahābherihāraka*, but this too may be rather a generic reference. On the former text see Kanō (2000); for the latter, see Suzuki (2002), who terms it the latest of the “Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra group,” in which he includes the *Mahāparinirvāṇa-mahāsūtra*, Mahāmegha, Aṅgulimāliya and the *Mahābherihāraka*. The most detailed considerations on the relative dating of these related texts, including the AAN, are those found now in Radich (2015) which, however, deal primarily with questions of relative chronology with respect to the *Mahāparinirvāṇa-mahāsūtra*. 
read—not only by modern scholars—primarily through the lens(es) of the RGV. Even if Zimmermann is not right that the Tathāgatagarbha-sūtra is the first source of the term tathāgatagarbha,37 his archaeological dissection of the history of the text makes it abundantly clear that its various versions available to us in Sanskrit quotations, two Tibetan translations and two Chinese translations demonstrate the struggles its authors and/or editors had with defining and expressing their nascent and developing ideas. The very fact that not everything they say coheres with everything else they say, and that some of what they say appears to lead in directions they would not have wished (in particular, in regard to the implications of similes), suggests a state of evolution of ideas that is immature and in progress, still cooking, as it were.38 In contrast to this, the AAN is simple; it assumes a great familiarity with ideas, rather than arguing for any given stance. Moreover, although it makes ample use of highly pregnant doctrinal terminology, it never feels a need to explain any of it. This is manifestly not the case in the Tathāgatagarbha-sūtra. This contrast places almost beyond doubt the suggestion that the Tathāgatagarbha-sūtra predates the AAN. Although the matter is somewhat less clear, I believe that the case is the same with the Śrīmālādevī. Oda, for instance, points to the example of the AAN’s identification of the sattvadhātu and the dharmakāya through the intermediary of the tathāgatagarbha, saying that it “takes as a given what the Śrīmālādevī was at pains to define.”39 As is evident in the many cases in which I have cited passages from the Śrīmālādevī in the notes, there is frequently a close relation between the wordings of the two texts, suggesting to my mind that the authors of the AAN may have been familiar precisely with the Śrīmālādevī itself.

37 Zimmermann (2002: 32). If he is right about this, then there is no question that the Tathāgatagarbha-sūtra is the oldest tathāgatagarbha text. Radich (2015), however, argues very convincingly that it is instead the Mahāparinirvāṇa-mahāsūtra which should be considered the prime innovator or, as he explains, “our earliest tathāgatagarbha text,” in the sense that it is the earliest such text now available to us.

38 I include within this consideration Zimmermann’s suggestion (2002: 21) that mention of sattvadhātu and, as he writes, (citta)prakṛti/āgantukakleśa could be later additions to the text in the course of its development. This, if correct, suggests in its turn that the authors of the AAN knew a fuller, more developed form of the Tathāgatagarbha-sūtra rather than an earlier (?) or less developed form.

39 Oda (1993: 576 [36]).
All of this does not necessarily mean that the AAN post-dates the *Tathāgatagarbha-sūtra* and the *Śrīmālādevīśimhanāda*, for it could still theoretically be the case that some earlier literature, some ‘third source,’ which could no longer exist, provided the context lacking in the AAN itself, although one must confess that at a certain point such reasoning seems to become somewhat too fastidious. Be that as it may, what this necessary doctrinal background was will, I believe, become clear through an examination of the sūtra, as will the likelihood that the authors of the AAN were indeed familiar either with the *Tathāgatagarbha-sūtra* and the *Śrīmālādevīśimhanāda*, or with some very, very similar literature.

How to situate the AAN more broadly still remains unclear. Takasaki asserts that the usage of the category of the ten perfections (§14ii) places the sūtra in the lineage of the *Buddhāvatamsaka* sūtra, and associates it with the Yogācāra school.\(^{40}\) This, however, seems to me to be reaching too far. In the first place, as is typical of the text’s absence of elaboration of terminology which plainly is simply assumed by its authors, we have nothing more than a mere mention of “ten perfections,” without any specification of the itemization of these ten. Classical Buddhist doctrine knows at least two different sets, however, that associated most closely with the *Daśabhūmikā-sūtra* (included in the *Buddhāvatāṃsaka* corpus) and that belonging to the Theravāda.\(^{41}\) In the latter tradition the category of ten perfections is known already to the *Buddhavamsa* and to the *Vimuttimagga*,\(^{42}\) and therefore is probably chronologically prior to the composition of the AAN, or closely contemporaneous to it. However, even in Mahāyāna sources the term “ten perfections” is not limited to the *Buddhāvatāṃsaka* literature. Mention appears in a portion of the Large Perfection of Wisdom text translated into Chinese in the sixth century,\(^{43}\) and much more prominently in the *Aṅgāyatmati-paripṛcchā* of the Mahāratnakūṭa collection, where a set of ten is

---

40 Takasaki (1999: 325n22), and somewhat less assertively in (1975a: 378n24). I think there is little need to engage the suggestions of Shiu (2006: 82–87), which without any detectable logic suggest origins for the AAN from Andhra to North India to Central Asia (!).


42 Katsumoto (2002). The version found in the Jātaka commentary (Suzuki 1999, quoting from the *Nidānakathā*), is borrowed from the *Buddhavāṃsa* (Norman 1983: 79).

43 T. 231 (VIII) 705c10. The term is found in Sanskrit in the *Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā* (Dutt 1934: 225.8).
discussed at length.\textsuperscript{44} The category also appears in the \textit{Guṇāparyantastotra} of Triratnadāsa and its commentary by Dignāga, a text which otherwise shows no association with the \textit{Buddhāvatāṁsaka}.\textsuperscript{45} Knowing that we cannot necessarily associate the AAN with the \textit{Buddhāvatāṁsaka} traditions on the basis of the mere appearance of the term ‘ten perfections’ does not in itself help us locate the text more broadly, of course.\textsuperscript{46} Nevertheless, for other reasons Takasaki’s idea is not wholly fanciful; there are some cases in which the AAN does seem to have at least some doctrinal similarities with expressions in the \textit{Buddhāvatāṁsaka} literature, such as the reference to \textit{dharmavaśitā} in §4i(i). The question requires further study.

\textbf{Doctrine}

Turning now more directly to the contents of the AAN, the Buddha’s interlocutor is the ubiquitous Śāriputra who, however, as is usual in such Mahāyāna scriptures, speaks rarely, in fact only twice. The question which motivates the Buddha’s discourse at the outset concerns the extent of the mass of beings in the universe, the \textit{sattavadhātu}: does this expand or contract? In other words, the basic question which frames the discourse is, does the number of beings in saṁsāra increase or decrease?\textsuperscript{47} The short answer is that it does not, the reason lying in the fundamental nature of reality. The Buddha’s response, constituting the body of the scripture, falls into two logi-

\textsuperscript{44} T. 310 (45) (XI) 648c9–649b7.

\textsuperscript{45} See Uno (1992). The category appears from verse 12, and comprises: \textit{dāna, śīla, ksānti, virya, dhyāna, prajñā, upāya, praṇidhāna, bala} and \textit{jñāna}, indeed the same 10 as in the \textit{Buddhāvatāṁsaka}. The information that this text has no [other?] particular affinity with the \textit{Buddhāvatāṁsaka} I owe to Jens-Uwe Hartmann (personal communication), who is editing the text along with Michael Hahn.

\textsuperscript{46} It may be germane to mention that Zimmermann (2002: 56) considers the \textit{Saddharma-pūndarīka} and the \textit{Tathāgatotpattisanbhavanirdeśa} to be the texts “most closely related to the [\textit{Tathāgatagarbha-sūtra}]”; the latter of these forms part of the Buddhāvatāṁsaka collection. By “most closely related” here, Zimmermann means: as sources, since he earlier says (p. 54) that the \textit{Tathāgatotpattisanbhavanirdeśa} “may have been the prototype for the authors of the [\textit{Tathāgatagarbha-sūtra}].”

\textsuperscript{47} On the question of whether there is an end to saṁsāra, see, from a point of view filtered through the lens of Gelukpa scholasticism, Lopez (1992). For an extensive discussion of the question of the expansion or contraction of the two realms in East Asian Buddhist scholasticism, see Morita (1922).
cal halves, the first focusing on mistaken views (*mithyā-ḍṛṣṭī) which arise from the basic mistake in view about the sattvadhātu, the second taking up more directly the nature of this sattavadhātu, the realm of beings, and the concepts to which this is related, namely the dharmakāya, the dharma-dhātu, and the tathāgatagarbha. We might see the division between the two halves coming around §10i, where—I would suggest: not coincidentally—we find the first quotation of the text in the RGV. It is this limitation of quotations to the second half of the text which has led to scholarly disregard for the sūtra’s presentation of wrong views and, in my view, consequent misunderstanding of the overall nature of the text.

It is not my goal here in this Introduction to expound and explain the AAN in its entirety; the annotated translation should serve this function. Rather, in what follows I seek to highlight some of the interesting issues raised by the text, the first of which concerns its vision of ‘wrong views.’ A number of indications suggest that the AAN’s presentation of wrong views is indebted, perhaps even directly, to that in the Brahmajāla-sūtra and its well-known presentation of sixty-two wrong views (or rather, following Anālayo [2009: 190], sixty-two grounds for the formation of views). The first indication is visible in the version of the Brahmajāla-sūtra in the Dīrghāgama, preserved only in Chinese and generally agreed to be a Dharma-guptaka text. There, in the first three views of eternalism we find that some hold the self and the world to be eternal, śāśvata, 我及世間是常.48 They reach this conclusion on the basis of recalling, successively, twenty, forty and eighty aeons of the evolution and devolution of the cosmos, during which they observe that “beings in that [universe] did not increase and did not decrease,” 其中衆生不増不減.49 The same is found in the citation of the

48 T. 1 (21) (I) 90a11–12, 19, 27. Note that while this is clearly a negative thing for the authors of the AAN, they also assert the beginninglessness of the universe. These two notions are positively connected for example in a sentence from the Sūtrasthāna of the Caraka Samhitā 30.27, so ‘yam āyurvedaḥ śāśvato nirdīṣyate anāditvād ..., “this Āyurveda is taught as eternal since it is beginningless.”

49 T. 1 (21) (I) 90a14, 21, 29. See Anālayo (2009: 188) for a translation in English. Similar expressions are as old as the oldest Upaniṣads, as for instance we read in the Bhadāranyaka 6.2.2: vettho yathāsaṃ loka evaiḥ bahubhiḥ pūnaḥ pūnaḥ prayadbhir na sampūryatāḥ iti, “Do you know how the world beyond is not filled up, even as more and more people continuously go there?” (Olivelle 1998: 145). See also Bhadāranyaka 5.1.1 and Chāndogya 5.10.8.
section of the sūtra on views in the *Śāriputrābhidharma 舍利弗阿毘曇論, also perhaps a Dharmaguptaka text.\(^{50}\) Therefore, in the Dharmaguptaka recension of the Brahmajāla-sūtra, wrong views about the eternality of the world—views mentioned in the AAN—are directly connected to the absence of increase or decline in the number of beings in existence, providing precisely the connection taken as the basis of the Buddha’s preaching in the AAN. What is more, the AAN repeats for each set of views it sets forth the logical implication of one set for the next, saying “these … views and those … views are inseparable, like a gauze net,” that is, like a jāla, the very term appearing in the title of the Brahmajāla-sūtra.\(^{51}\) It seems abundantly clear, then, that both in the logic of its overall problematic and in a particular key term it employs as a metaphor, jāla, the AAN bases itself on the Bharmajāla-sūtra. What is of further interest is that while we can identify the particular wording with “increase and decrease” in the Dharmaguptaka Dīrghāgama version of the Brahmajāla-sūtra and in the *Śāriputrābhidharma, it is not found in the Pāli recension of the Brahmajāla-sutta, the (Mūla)-Sarvāstivāda version quoted by Śamathadeva in his Upāyikā Abhidharma-koṣṭikā,\(^{52}\) the independent translation of the scripture in Chinese (Fan-wang liushi’er jian jing 梵網六十二見經),\(^{53}\) or an independent translation of the sūtra in Tibetan.\(^{54}\) This might suggest a special connection of the AAN with the Dharmaguptakas, but, since we do not have access to versions of the Brahmajāla-sūtra from across the Buddhist sectarian spectrum, such a conclusion may be premature.

The section on views in the AAN begins in earnest in §5i and continues through §8i. As just mentioned, each set of views is said to lead further onwards to the next set, that indeed one view or set of views implies the next inevitably: they are intertwined like the threads of a gauze fabric, a jāla or

---

\(^{50}\) T. 1548 (XXVIII) 656c12–13, 20, 28. See Bareau (1950).

\(^{51}\) Anālayo (2009: 219) points out that jāla has been interpreted differently in various traditions which have transmitted versions of the Brahmajāla-sūtra, and that these do not always agree with each other. This disparity of interpretation does not, however, affect the point I am suggesting here.

\(^{52}\) Text 3050 (Honjo 1984: 38–39): Derge Tanjur 4094, mngon pa, ju 143b7; Peking Tanjur 5595, mngon pa’i bstan bcos, tu 165a1.

\(^{53}\) T. 21 (I) 266a16ff.

\(^{54}\) Tshangs pa’i dra ba’i mdo, Derge Kanjur 352, mdo sde, ah, 73a44.
net. Although the text repeats this poetic image again and again, I confess that, at least for me, while individual views may, in most cases, be identifiable, the implied logical linkage between these listed views often remains unclear.

The text begins with the view that the realm of beings, the *sattvadhātu*, decreases. The reason this comes about is that, hearing that the Buddha attained nirvāṇa, persons may conclude that this led to a decrease in the realm of beings, that is, that the number of beings in *samsāra* has decreased by at least one. This is the fundamental error, from which all else proceeds. It leads in the first place to a set of three views, namely “1. The view of annihilation, that is, there is absolute exhaustion. 2. The view that there is extinction, that is, precisely nirvāṇa. 3. The view that there is no nirvāṇa, that is, that this nirvāṇa is absolute quiescence.” The first view here seems to refer to the notion of *ucchedavāda*, while the second points to a “hīnayān-istic” view of nirvāṇa as complete cessation, but what the difference between these two views is remains unclear to me. What is meant by the third view, if I have even understood the laconic Chinese correctly, is moreover also not clear to me. Be that as it may, these views as a set lead toward a further set of two views, namely: “1. The view devoid of desire [for nirvāṇa]. 2. The view of the absolute nonexistence of nirvāṇa.” The first seems to mean that, having concluded that nirvāṇa is not real, beings cease to strive for it, while the second seems to repeat the third item of the former set, and as such once more remains unclear to me. These two lead onwards to a further two: “1. The view of attachment to practices and observances. 2. The inverted view through which one conceives of the impure as pure.” While these two are, on the one hand, well-known examples of error and as such clear in themselves, at the same time their connection to the previous set of two is far from obvious. Be that as it may, they in turn generate six views: “1. The view that the world has a beginning. 2. The view that the world has an end. 3. The view that beings are an illusory creation. 4. The view that there is neither suffering nor pleasure. 5. The view that beings [produce] no (karmically significant) activity. 6. The view that there are no noble truths.” Once again, these views, or at least most of them, are in and of themselves known and as such clear, while their logical connection to what precedes them is less so. The list begins with the old ideas that it is an error to think that the world either begins or ends (for this, see below), but goes on to list
ideas which seem to me to be, at least from a Mahāyānistic śūnyavādin point of view, on the whole correct doctrinal stances. If beings are not illusory creations, what are they?\footnote{See however the note to §6(f).} They can hardly be asserted to be real in any ultimate sense. The danger of the fourth view is obvious, as it can lead to antinomianism, but again, from a Mahāyānistic point of view aware of a śūnyavādin critique, it seems perfectly orthodox. The fifth view is very hard to understand, and I would not like to base an argument on my guess as to its meaning. The sixth view from one perspective seems equivalent to the claim that the Buddha’s message in toto is false. But once again, at least from some Mahāyāna standpoints, one might well say just this.

The following set of views sets out the idea that it is erroneous to accept: “1. The view that nirvāṇa was initially produced. 2. The view that without causes or conditions suddenly [something nevertheless] exists.” The text itself analyzes the problem here: “These two types of views cause beings to lack the aspiration to desire and the aspiration to diligence [to cultivate] good qualities.” The two views that nirvāṇa was initially produced and that without causes or conditions suddenly something nevertheless exists produce all that is dangerous, “all forms of defilements caused by ignorance,” and in turn produce all other wrong views altogether. Here we come to the ultimate problem identified by the AAN with regard to these wrong views: holding wrong views will lead one to conceptualize reality in a wrong way, and this in turn will quench one’s energy to practice and cultivate oneself spiritually, and thus will vitiate the path itself. This seems to be the closest that the text comes to actually advocating practice, yet even here it does not directly advert to any specific areas of cultivation or suitable techniques. To reiterate this message, then: wrongly conceiving of the nature of the realm of beings—which is to say ultimately, of the single realm, the ekadhātu—leads to the utter rejection of all correct visions of reality, rendering the Buddha’s message and path null and void.

It is important to observe in this context that the opinions cited in the first half of the sūtra seem, in so far as I can identify them, to be positions which might be held equally by Buddhists and non-Buddhists. Some of the positions, such as “attachment to practices and observances,” seem ipso facto to refer to non-Buddhist positions. Whether the text was therefore intended as some sort of missionary document seems to me, however, to be
questionable, especially since so much of its overall dynamic assumes so much of the system-internal discussions found in other Buddhist texts such as the Tathāgatagarbha-sūtra and the Śrīmālādevī, as I have argued above.

One of the central points of this discussion is nothing other than the basic position of the realm of beings. What, then, is this realm of beings, this *sattvadhātu*, a correct understanding of which is so very vital for the AAN?

The term *sattvadhātu*, with the ordinary meaning of ‘the collectivity of living beings,’ is not particularly rare. Although it seems to be a primarily Buddhist term, it does occur in other contexts.56 A common-sense understanding of the nature of existence, of saṁsāra, is that beings, *sattva*, exist in saṁsāra and attain liberation in nirvāṇa. This, for instance, is certainly the notion underlying a passage in the Vajracchedikā:57

However many living beings are comprised in the total aggregation of living beings, be they born from eggs, or born from wombs, or born from moisture, or arising spontaneously, whether having physical form or being non-material, whether having apperception, or lacking apperception, or neither having apperception nor lacking apperception—however the realm of living beings [*sattvadhātu*] is defined when one defines it—I should bring all of them to final extinction in the realm of extinction [*nirvāṇadhātu*] without substrate remaining.

Here the *sattvadhātu* as the realm of beings is contrasted with the opposite state, that of the realm of nirvāṇa, without any hint of a commensurability between the two.

The question our sūtra raises implicitly occurs elsewhere explicitly, however, and is clearly not an innovation of the AAN. For instance, in the

---

56 At least I have noticed it in the royal inscription cited by Sanderson (2009: 71n85), in which the term *sakalasattvadhātu* appears to mean simply all persons, although technically we might understand it to mean all beings. There does not appear to be an term parallel to *sattvadhātu* in Pāli. Note however the parallel expression also found in inscriptions, *sakalasattvarāsi*, for which see Schopen (1979/2005: 228).

Mahāvastu, which certainly predates the AAN, we find Mahā-Kāśyapa asking Mahā-Kātyāyana the following:\(^{58}\)

If, Son of the Victor, there are a great number of Perfectly Awakened Ones, and each Perfectly Awakened One brought a limitless number of beings to nirvāṇa, would not they in a short time have brought all beings to nirvāṇa? In this manner this world would become entirely empty of everything, free from all beings.

The answer is that there is no limit (paryanta) to beings. The ‘arithmetic’ behind this ‘calculation,’ although left implicit, is quite simple: subtracting from infinity leaves infinity remaining, just as adding to infinity yields the same.\(^{59}\) Because the universe is beginningless and beings infinite, depletion and expansion are not possible. Similarly, the Saṅghāṭasūtra, although perhaps not for the usual reasons of politeness, asks substantially the same question three times:\(^{60}\)

There are beings, Sarvaśūra, who speak as follows: “Day and night the Tathāgata liberates many beings from samsāra, but still the realm of beings does not diminish. Many make vows toward awakening, many are reborn in the heavens, many attain extinction—so why do beings not diminish?”

---


\(^{59}\) The Abhidharmakośabhāṣya of Vasubandhu, in discussing the triple realm of desire, form and the formless, reflects this kind of thinking when it says (Pradhan 1975: 113.22–24, ad III.3): traidhātukānāṁ anto nāsti | yāvad ākāśam tāvanto dhātavāḥ | ata eva ca nātī apūrvasattvapraḍurbhāvah | pratibuddhotpādam cāsamkhyeyasattvaparinirvāne pi nāti sattvānāṁ parikṣaya ākāśavat, “There is no end to the triple realms. The realms extend as far as space, And precisely for this reason, there is no appearance of beings who did not exist previously, nor even in the face of the parinirvāṇa of uncountable beings when a buddha appears [in the world] is there the disappearance of beings, as with space.”

\(^{60}\) Canevascini (1993: §144; p. 63, the Sanskrit from von Hinüber’s unpublished edition): santi sarvaśūra satvā ya evaṁ kathayanti | rātrindivam tathāgato bahūni satvāni samsārāṁ parimocayati | adyāpi satvadhistuḥ kṣayaṁ na gacchanti [sic] | bahavo bodhāya praṇidhānāṁ kurvanti | bahavah svargaloka upapadyante | bahavo nirṛtim anupṛpnuvanti | atha kena hetunā satvānāṁ kṣayo na bhavati |
The question is asked again in almost the same terms:\(^{61}\)

[Some beings stood before the Buddha, and] they asked the Blessed One: “Day and night, Blessed One, the Tathāgata liberates many beings from saṁsāra, but still the realm of beings knows no decrease nor increase. What is the reason, Blessed One, what is the cause that these beings display arisal and destruction in equal measure?”

Finally, when the question is asked for a third time by the bodhisattva Bhaisajyasena, the Buddha offers some sort of answer, which however hardly seems coherent.\(^{62}\) The AAN for its part does offer a coherent, if indeed rather abstract, reason for its claim. Its answer, however, is not based on the type of arithmetical reasoning outlined above, but upon a revisionalization of the question—albeit, again, an implicit one.

The central concept of the AAN—or one of its central concepts—remains precisely the denial of the possibility that the grand total of the number of beings in the universe could increase or decrease. This is an old notion in Buddhist thought, although the reasoning which leads to the conclusion is not, as I have suggested, necessarily always the same. Although expressed in different terms, this denial appears to be the idea, or a parallel to

\(^{61}\) Canevascini (1993: §171; p. 70): bhagavantaṁ paripṛcchanti sma | bahūni bhagavam satvāni rātrindivas tathāgataḥ saṁsārāt parimocayati | na ca satvadhātor ānatvam vā pūrnatvam vā prajñāyate | ko bhagavan hetuḥ kah pratyayaḥ yat te satvā smānā utpāda-nirōdhāṁ dārsayanti |

\(^{62}\) For the passage see Canevascini (1993: §184–185; p. 74–75), and for a keen observation his comment on §144 (p. 144): “The answer the Buddha finally gives … certainly does not contribute to diminish the validity of the objection: his reply (after exhaustion of merit new merit is accumulated) can only imply that beings are reborn in good lives (for instance in some pure buddha-field) after having accumulated enough merit and that they are reborn in this world after the exhaustion of that merit. The answer does not meet the objection that beings who have become extinct cannot be reborn at all; it would be only acceptable if this text did not promise deliverance but only many good rebirths and this is certainly not the case as the question itself correctly states. The weakness of the answer might point to an author of these passages who had quite a confused idea of the Buddhist doctrine of salvation: he probably could not figure out that deliverance from saṁsāra, extinction means just the end of the process of rebirth. On the contrary, for him these terms probably meant a temporary condition of suspension of the rebirth process in saṁsāra ….” In fact, as a whole the Saṅghāṭasūtra is a baffling text, since whatever coherence it might have is far from immediately obvious. While such might be said of a number of Mahāyāna sūtras, the Saṅghāṭasūtra seems to present an extreme case.
the idea, expressed in the following passage from the Udāna, a text which belongs to the older strata of Pāli literature:63

As an example, monks, in the world rivers flow into the ocean and showers fall from the sky, but one does not thereby discern a decrease or an increase of the ocean. In precisely the same way, monks, although many monks attain perfect nibbāna in the realm of nibbāna without remainder [anupādisesa nibbānadhātu], one does not thereby discern a decrease or an increase of the realm of nibbāna.

The question underlying this discussion is whether the extent of nirvāṇa changes as beings attain liberation, or in other words, whether as beings transition from saṁsāra to nirvāṇa the latter, at any rate, grows larger, to which the Udāna responds in the negative.64 The correlate of this, however, would be a question about the extent of saṁsāra, that is to say, the number of existing beings, and this is the notion captured by the term sattvadhātu.

In contrast to the meaning of this term in its common usage, a usage in which it indicates in a straight-forward manner the entirety of beings, a number of texts, including the AAN, play (although certainly not humorously) with the term sattvadhātu, and especially with the polyvalency of the term dhātu, which has a rather wide semantic range. Here the relevant foci of the term are its sense of ‘realm’ on the one hand, and ‘element,’ ‘quintessence,’ ‘essential core’ and possibly ‘motivating factor,’ ‘cause,’ on the other. Indian Buddhist scriptures contain a number of examples of explicit manipulation of this key term. The Perfection of Wisdom literature, which

63 Steinthal (1885: 55,29–34 = 5.5.5): seyyathāpi bhikkhave yā ca loke savantiyo mahāsamuddām appenti yā ca antalikkhā dhārā papatanti na tena mahāsamuddassa ānattāṁ vā pūrattāṁ vā paññāyati evam eva kho bhikkhave bahū cepi bhikkhū anupādisesāya nibbānadhātuyā parinibbāyanti na tena nibbānadhātuyā ānattāṁ vā pūrattāṁ vā paññāyati. This passage is a bit more concise but otherwise virtually identical to that in the Aṅguttara-Nikāya, Mahāvagga 19.15 (Hardy 1899: iv.202–203); I thank Ven. Anālayo for pointing this out to me. He finds it significant that this expression does not occur in the Chinese parallels to the list found in Pāli, an issue which requires further research. Several of the passages cited in the following were brought to my attention by Shiu 2006.

64 Note that here and elsewhere, at least in part the logic is convoluted: there is no way that rivers flowing into the sea could cause the sea to grow smaller. The original form of the image must have conveyed the notion that the flow of water from a river into the sea does not diminish the river or cause the sea to grow larger, but somehow in the process of telescoping the metaphor, perhaps quite early on, the key distinction got lost.
When this had been said, the Crown Prince Mañjuśrī spoke to Śāradvatiputra saying: “Just so, Venerable Śāradvatiputra, it is as you say. This armor has been donned [that is, I have undertaken the bodhisattva path] in order that all beings attain final liberation, yet I apprehend no beings, I yearn for no beings whatsoever. [Thus] this armor, abounds in verbal and conceptual play, provides several good, if perhaps on occasion extreme, examples. The following passage is found in the Saptaśatikā Prajñāpāramitā.65

---

65 Masuda (1930: 197.3–200.10): evam ukte mañjuśrīḥ kumārabhūta āyuṣmantam śāradvatiputram etad avocat | evam etad bhadanta śāradvatiputra yathā kathayasi | sarvasattvaparinirvāṇaḥ sannāhaḥ caisa sannaddho na ca me kācit sattvopalabdhir vā sattvābhiniveso vā | nāyaṁ bhadanta śāradvatiputra sannāha eva sannaddhah | katham aham sattvadhātār umatvam vā kuryāṁ pūrṇatvam vā | saced bhadanta śāradvatiputra parikalpaṃ upādāya ekaikasmin buddhakṣetre gaṅgānadīvalukopamā buddhā bhāgavanto bhavyur ekaikas ca tathāgato gaṅgānadīvalukopamaṃ kalpāṃs tiṣṭhet | saratṛmī divam ca dharmān desayamāna ekakayā dharmadeśanayā yāvanto gaṅgānadīvalukāṣamair buddhār bhagavadbhīḥ sattvā vinītās tāvataḥ sattvān ekaikas tathāgata ekakayā dharmadeśanayā vinayed evam api kṛtvā naiva sattvadhātār umatvāṁ vā pūrṇatvāṁ vā prajñāyate ||
tat kasmād dhetoh | sattvavitaktvāt sattvāsattvād | bhadanta śāradvatiputra sattvadhātār na conatvāṁ vā pūrṇatvāṁ vā prajñāyate ||
evam ukte āyuṣman śāradvatiputro mañjuśriyaṁ kumārabhūtam etad avocat | yadi mañjuśriḥ sattvavitaktvāt sattvāsattvād sattvadhātār naivonatvāṁ vā pūrṇatvāṁ vā prajñāyate | tat kasyedānim bodbhām abhisambhūtya dharmān deśayasyati ||
evam ukte mañjuśrīḥ kumārabhūta āyuṣmantam śāradvatiputram etad avocat | yadā tāvad bhadanta śāradvatiputra atyantataya sattvānupalabdhiḥ | tat ko 'trabhisambhotsaya te | kasya vā dharmān deśayasyate | tat kasmād dhetoh | tathā hi bhadanta śāradvatiputra atyantatayar sarvadharmānupalabdhiḥ ||
atha khalaḥ bhagavān mañjuśriyaṁ kumārabhūtam etad avocat | yadā tāvan mañjuśrir atyantataya sarvadharmānupalabdhiḥ | tat kim idānīm sattvam api prajñāpayisyati | api ca sacen mañjuśrīgah kaścid evam pṛcchet | kiyantaḥ sattvā iti | kiṃ tasya tvam vadeḥ |
mañjuśrīḥ āha | tasyāhaṁ bhagavann evam pṛṣṭa evam vadeyam | yāvanta eva buddhādharmaḥ iti | saced bhagavan punar api pṛcchet | kiyatpramaṇah sattvadhātur iti | tasyāhaṁ bhagavann evam pṛṣṭa evam vadeyam | yatpramāṇo buddhaviṣayah ||
bhagavān āha | sace punar api te mañjuśrīḥ kaścid evam pṛcchet | kipaparyāpannah sattvadhātur iti | kiṃ tasya tvam vadeḥ |
mañjuśrīḥ āha | tasyāhaṁ bhagavann evam pṛṣṭa evam vadeyam | yatparyāpannānute pādācintyata ||
bhagavān āha | sace punar api te mañjuśrīḥ kaścid evam pṛcchet | kipapratisthitaḥ sattvadhātur iti | kiṃ tasya tvam vadeḥ |
mañjuśrīḥ āha | tasyāhaṁ bhagavann evam pṛṣṭa evam vadeyam | yatpratisthito 'nuptādadhātus tatpratisthitaḥ sattvadhātur iti ||.
Venerable Śāradvatiputra, has not actually even been donned, [for] how could I bring about the diminution or the expansion of the realm of beings? To take a hypothetical case, Venerable Śāradvatiputra, if, in each and every buddha-field, there were to be buddhas, blessed ones, as numerous as the sands of the Ganges river, and if each and every tathāgata were to remain there for aeons as many as there are sands in the Ganges river, teaching the teaching day and night, and each and every one of those tathāgatas were to guide with each and every instruction in the teaching as many beings as were guided by each instruction in the teaching by buddhas, blessed ones as numerous as the sands of the Ganges river—even accepting this case, no diminution or expansion of the realm of beings would be discerned.

“Why? Because of the fact that beings are isolated, because of the fact that beings have no be-ing. Venerable Śāradvatiputra, neither diminution nor expansion of the realm of beings is discerned.”

When this had been said, Śāradvatiputra said to the Crown Prince Mañjuśrī: “If, Mañjuśrī, due to the fact that beings are isolated and do not exist neither diminution nor expansion of the realm of beings is discerned, then, having awakened to what awakening will you expound the teaching?”

When this had been said, the Crown Prince Mañjuśrī spoke to Śāradvatiputra saying: “When, Venerable Śāradvatiputra, there is in the first place absolutely no apprehension of a being, who will fully awaken to that fact? To whom will he expound the teaching? Why? For, Venerable Śāradvatiputra, in this manner there is absolutely no apprehension of all existent things.”

Then the Blessed One spoke to the Crown Prince Mañjuśrī as follows: “When, Mañjuśrī, there is in the first place absolutely no apprehension of all existent things, how on earth can you now assertively speak of a being at all? Or if someone were to ask, Mañjuśrī, ‘How many beings are there?’ what would you say to him?”

Mañjuśrī said: “If, Blessed One, I were asked such a question, I would say that there are as many as there are teachings of the Buddha. If, Blessed One, I were again asked ‘How large is the realm of beings?’ Blessed One, I would reply that it is as large as the domain of the Buddha.”
The Blessed One said: “If once again, Mañjuśrī, someone were to ask ‘In what is the realm/quintessence of beings included?’ what would you say to him?”

Mañjuśrī said: “If, Blessed One, I were asked such a question, I would say that it is included in that in which are included nonarising and the inconceivable.”

The Blessed One said: “If once again, Mañjuśrī, someone were to ask ‘Upon what is the realm/quintessence of beings based?’ what would you say to him?”

Mañjuśrī said: “If, Blessed One, I were asked such a question, I would say that the realm/quintessence of beings is based upon that upon which nonexistent things are based.”

The same notion is found in the *Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrika Prajñāpāramitā*.66

Bodhisattvas who desire to awaken to unexcelled complete awakening for the sake of beings have obtained the perfection of great vigor. Why? If this great universe of three times many thousands of worlds67 were quite full of tathāgatas, like a thicket of reeds, a bamboo wood, a sugar cane forest, a forest of Saccharum Sara reed or like a rice field, and if these tathāgatas would teach the Teaching for an aeon or for the remainder of an aeon; and if each single tathāgata were to cause limitless, innumerable, uncountable beings to attain Nirvāṇa; still one

---


67 There are a number of ways of calculating what is meant by the term here, *trisāhasramahāsāhasro lokadhātus*, but since its precise meaning is clearly irrelevant, the sense of magnitude being the point, I offer an imprecise impressionistic rendering.
could not discern the decrease or increase of the realm of beings. Why? On account of the non-be-ing [a-sat] of beings [sat-tva], on account of the isolatedness of beings. (And the same would be true if all the world systems in all the ten directions were considered.)

An even more extreme version of more or less the same passage is found in another text belonging to the same genre, the Suvikrāntavikrāmiparipṛčchā, which offers a passage replete with wordplay and a sort of linguistic and conceptual deconstruction which comes across very poorly (or not at all) in translation. That said, the passage is worth presenting as an example of the deconstruction of the notions at play here. In the translation below I have translated dhātu as ‘realm’ or ‘quintessence’ according to my understanding of the particular context, but the reader should remember that in Sanskrit there is one and only one word being deployed here, and in a number of cases below it might have been better to give both renderings together, as I did above:

68 To a great extent my interpretation and identification of the semantics of dhātu in particular follows the Chinese rendering of Xuanzang, T. 220 (VII) 1070a17–b15. However, I have not attempted to record the differences between Xuanzang’s rendering and the Sanskrit text, which would require careful study.


idam ca me samādhāya bhāṣītam | na satvadhātora ṣaṁvānaḥ pūrṇavānaḥ pāyaḥ | pāvyate | tathāḥ kasmād dhetoḥ | asatvāt satvadhātora ṣaṁvānaḥ pūrṇavānaḥ pāyaḥ | yathā ca satvadhātora ṣaṁvānaḥ na pūrṇavānaḥ pāyaḥ | evaṁ sarvadharmānām api ṣaṁvānaḥ na pūrṇavānaḥ pāyaḥ | sarvadharmānāṁ hi na kācit parinispattīḥ | yenaīśāṁ ṣaṁvānaḥ pūrṇavānaḥ bhavet | ya evaṁ sarvadharmānāṁ ṣaṁvānaḥ sarvadharmānāṁ ṣaṁvānaḥ | sa ucyate sarvadharmānubodha iti |

iyāṁ ca mayā samādhāya vāg bhāṣītā | yathā satvadhātora ṣaṁvānaḥ na pūrṇavānaḥ pāyaḥ | evaṁ sarvadharmānām api ṣaṁvānaḥ na pūrṇavānaḥ pāyaḥ | tathāḥ kasmād dhetoḥ | asatvāt satvadhātora ṣaṁvānaḥ pūrṇavānaḥ pāyaḥ | pāvyate | tathāḥ kasmād dhetoḥ | sarvadharmānubodha iti |

| sarvadharmānubodha iti | yāś ca sarvadharmānubodha iti | tatra kasyacid dharmasya ṣaṁvānaḥ |
The ‘realm of beings’ is a synonym of the state of lack of being. For no be-ing exists in a being because of the fact of the present non-be-ing of the quintessence of beings. If there were to be a being in be-ing, one could not use the term ‘realm of beings.’ ‘Realm of beings’ is an indication of no realm, for the realm of beings has no realm. If there were a quintessence of beings within the realm of beings, then life would be the body. Then the quintessence would be free from the realm of beings, for the realm of beings has no quintessence. ‘Realm’ is used as a conventional designation, for no quintessence exists in the realm of beings, nor does there exist a realm of beings elsewhere than the quintessence of beings, for all things are without quintessence.

I say this with hidden intention: no diminution or expansion of the realm of beings is discerned.

Why? Because of the lack of be-ing in the realm of beings, because of the isolation of the realm of beings. And as no diminution or expansion of the realm of beings would be discerned, so too no diminution or expansion of all things would be discerned. For there is no perfection [and consequent disappearance in nirvāṇa?] whatsoever of all things, through which there would be this diminution or expansion. Such a profound understanding of all things is called ‘profound understanding of all things.’

I have spoken of this with a hidden intention, saying: As no diminution or expansion of the realm of beings is discerned, so too no diminution or expansion of all things is discerned. The absence of diminution and expansion of all things [sarvadharma] due to the absence of perfection is precisely the absence of diminution and expansion of the buddha-qualities [buddhadharma] as well. Because of such a profound understanding of all things, there is the absence of diminution and expansion of the buddha-qualities. Because of the absence of diminution and expansion of all things, they are called ‘buddha-qualities.’ Therefore this is a synonym of the buddha-qua-

\[\text{pürṇatvam vā | sarvadharma iti dharmadhātār etad adhivacanam | na ca dharmadhātār ūnātvam vā pūrṇatvam vā | tat kasya hetoh | ananto hi dharmadhātuḥ | na hi satvadhātōś ca dharmadhātōś ca nānātvam upalabhyate | nāpi satvadhātār vā dharmadhātār vā ūna-tvam vā pūrṇatvam vopalabhyate vā sānvidyate vā | ya evam anubodha iyum ucyate bodhir iti |} \]
ties, for no one can cause the buddha-qualities to diminish or expand. Why? This is the profound understanding of all things, and in the profound understanding of all things there is no diminution or expansion of any thing. ‘All things’ is a synonym of the dharma-realm \( \text{dharmadh}ā\text{tu} \). And there is no diminution or expansion of the dharma-realm. Why? For the dharma-realm is endless; for no distinction appears between the realm of beings and the dharma realm, nor does there appear or exist any diminution or expansion of the realm of beings and the dharma-realm. Profound understanding in this manner is termed ‘awakening.’

One of the things brought out by these, in some respects obscure, passages is the flexibility of the term \( \text{dhātu} \). It is very clear both that the polyvalency of the word—or at least its bivalency as both ‘realm’ and ‘quintessence’—is essential to the message of the authors of some scriptures, including the AAN, and that this built-in ambiguity presents a challenge to translators, modern and ancient. The solution of the translator of the AAN, Bodhiruci, was to maintain the identity of the term throughout by retaining a single translation equivalent, \( \text{jiè} \) 界, such that \( \text{sattvadh}ā\text{tu} \) in the sense of ‘realm of beings’ is indistinguishable in Chinese from \( \text{sattvadh}ā\text{tu} \) in the sense of ‘quintessence of beings.’ Other translators chose other solutions, including the translator of the RGV.\(^{70}\) In that text \( \text{dharmadh}ā\text{tu} \) is often \( \text{fǎjiè} \) 法界, but also \( \text{fǎxìng} \) 法性, \( \text{sattvadh}ā\text{tu} \) is usually \( \text{zhòngshēngjiè} \) 衆生界 but also \( \text{zhòngshēngxìng} \) 衆生性, \( \text{nirvāṇadh}ā\text{tu} \) is \( \text{nièpánnjìè} \) 涅槃界 while \( \text{buddhadh}ā\text{tu} \) is \( \text{fóxìng} \) 佛性 and \( \text{tathāgatadh}ā\text{tu} \) is \( \text{rúlái xìng} \) 如來性 (or an extended form, \( \text{rúlái zhī xìng} \) 如來之性).\(^{71}\) It is evident that while the RGV in Sanskrit makes full use of the broad semantic range of the term \( \text{dhātu} \), as do its sources, in its Chinese translation no consistent treatment was carried through. We

\(^{70}\) See, though too brief, Ichikawa (1960), and Takasaki (1966: 290–291n175, and the note to §10i[b–c]).

\(^{71}\) The following makes no pretension to completeness: \( \text{dharmadh}ā\text{tu} = \text{fǎjiè} \) 法界: Johnston 1950: 32.7 = T. 1611 [XXXI] 830a20; 32.9 = 830a22; 35.3 = 831a1; 39.4 = 831c19; \( \text{dharma-} \text{dh}ā\text{tu} = \text{fǎxìng} \) 法性: 9.18 = 823b1; 24.15 = 827c13; \( \text{sattvadh}ā\text{tu} = \text{zhòngshēngjiè} \) 衆生界 is common, but = \( \text{zhòngshēngxìng} \) 衆生性: 6.1 = 822a13; \( \text{nirvāṇadh}ā\text{tu} = \text{nièpánnjìè} \) 涅槃界: 58.13 = 836c3; 59.7 = 836c27; \( \text{buddhadh}ā\text{tu} = \text{fóxìng} \) 佛性: 5.5 = 821c27; 35.18 = 831a7; 36.2 = 831a11; \( \text{tathāgatadh}ā\text{tu} = \text{rúlái xìng} \) 如來性: 6.8 = 822a21–22; 54.3 = 835a26; = \( \text{rúlái zhī xìng} \) 如來之性: 72.8 = 839a13. Some unusual equivalents include: \( \text{anāsravadh}ā\text{tu} = \text{fǎliú fǎjiè} \) 無漏法界: 39.3 = 831c18, while at 56.10 = 835c18 the same Sanskrit is rendered 無漏界; \( \text{tathāgatadh}ā\text{tu} = \text{fǎliú fǎxìng} \) 如來性 at 72.10 = 839a16.
should not attribute this variety to sloppiness. As Suzuki points out, in the Mahāyāna Mahāparinirvāṇa-mahāsūtra, dhātu is both the cause within beings which enables them to attain buddhahood and at the same time the essence of the Buddha, the dhātu within each being which is like the dhātu of the Buddha which rests in a stūpa, the relic.72 In light of such a wide semantic range, it is simply impossible to expect an unannotated translation—whether it be into Classical Chinese or modern English—to convey anything like the full sense of the term. The broad scope of this key term in the AAN becomes all the clearer when we appreciate the pairing of sattva-dhātu with dharmadhātu.

The key term dharmadhātu is rich with significance and central to (not to mention, once again, polyvalent in) the AAN, as it was in some of the passages cited above. It is again paired with sattvadhātu in several other scriptures, such as the *Animiṣabodhisattvaparivarta (Bushun pusa pin 不眴菩薩品), a text from the Mahāsamnipāta collection.73

There may be bodhisattvas who perceive two realms, a realm of beings [sattvadhātu] and a dharma-realm [dharmadhātu]. They perceive the realm of beings as having the nature of the dharma-realm, and they perceive the dharma-realm as having the nature of the realm of beings. Apart from the dharma-realm there is no realm of beings. In both the dharma-realm and the realm of beings, nothing is produced and nothing is destroyed. If one is able to penetrate this thoroughly, this is called insight into the fact that nothing is produced. Insight into the fact that nothing is produced is precisely the intellectual tolerance of the fact that nothing is produced (anutpattika-[dharma]kṣānti).

---


73 T. 397 (7) (XIII) 43c19–23: 若有菩薩觀二種界：一衆生界，二者法界。以法界性觀衆生性，以衆生性觀法界性，若離法界無衆生界，法界衆生界無生無滅。若能如是通達知者，名無生智。無生智者即無生忍. The passage is translated in Shiu (2006: 107). No version other than the Chinese translation is known to exist.
Such passages could be multiplied, but the point is clear: numerous texts are aware of the issue of the extent of the sattvadhātu, and the question whether it increases or decreases, it being virtually universally denied that this is the case. Several texts, in fact, go on to state a position also maintained by the AAN, namely the identity of the realm of beings with the dharma-realm. In the Buddhāvatamsaka, for instance, we read, “There is ultimately no distinction between the dharma-realm and the realm of beings. To thoroughly understand all realms is to understand the domain of the tathāgata.” A passage in the Trāyastrinīsaptaparivartavarta extends the identity of the dharma-realm and the realm of beings to all existence: “Just as the dharma-realm, so is the realm of beings. Just as the realm of beings, so too is the domain of the buddha. All dharmas are also like that.” The Ratnacūḍaparipṛcchā says the following:


75 As an aside, as Ruegg (1969: 265n2) points out (his reference to Catuḥśataka is a slip for Catuḥstava), this identity is expressed in Nāgārjuna’s Acintyastava verse 42 (Lindtner 1982: 154), as follows: buddhānāṁ sattvadhātoś ca tenābhinnatvam arthataḥ | ātmānaḥ ca pareṁ ca samatā tena te matā ||, “Thus in truth there is no distinction between buddhas and the realm of beings, thus you believe in the equality of self and others.” (The citation in the Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā [La Vallée Poussin 1901–1914: 590.14–15] has yena for tena in b, which may be better: “since … thus …”). The Tibetan translation renders here not sattvadhātu but dharmadhātu, chos dbyings, while in the Tibetan version of the Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā we have instead (Derge Tanjur 3872, dbu ma, la, 281b6–7): sangs rgyas rnams dang sams can kham || don gyis de dang tha dad med || bdag nyid kyang ni gzan rnams kyang || de dang mnyam par khyod bzhed legs ||, in contrast to the version of the Acintyastava: sangs rgyas dang chos dbyings || des na don du tha mi dad || bdag nyid dang ni gzan rnams dang || des na mnyam par khyod bzhed legs ||.


77 T. 279 [X] 69a21–22: 法界衆生界 究竟無差別 一切悉了知 此是如來境. Derge Kanjur 223, mdo sde, dza 146a1: chos kyi dbyings ji lta ba bzhin du sams can gyi kham kyang de dang ’dra’o || sams can gyi kham ji lta ba bzhin du sams rgyas kyi yul yang de dang ’dra’o || chos thams kad kyang de dang ’dra’o ||

78 T. 279 [X] 69a21–22: 法界衆生界 究竟無差別 一切悉了知 此是如來境. Derge Kanjur 91, dkon brtsegs, cha 230a1–3: rigs kyi bu de ltar chos rnams la chos kyi rjes su lta zhing dran pa nye [xylograph prints nyi] bar gzhag pa la gnas pa’i byang chub sams dpa’ de ni chos kyi dbyings dbyer med pa’i phyir dran pa la gnas te | de chos thams cad chos
Noble devotee, examining in this way objects of mind in terms of objects of mind (*dharme dharmānu√dṛś-) the bodhisattva who dwells in the foundation of mindfulness (*ṣmṛtyupasthāna) dwells in mindfulness because it is inseparable from the dharma-realm (*dharma-dhātvasambhinna). He knows that all things (dharma) are included in the dharma-realm. The dharma-realm is precisely the realm of beings. He comprehends that because the dharma-realm is inseparable [from the realm of beings?], the realm of beings is inseparable [from the dharma-realm?]. He understands that that dharma-realm and the realm of beings are both equivalent to the realm of space (*ākāśadhātu). Knowing that all things belong to a single realm (*ekadhātu), even while examining objects of mind in terms of objects of mind, there will be neither attachment to nor views (*dṛṣṭi) regarding the objects.

Finally, an interesting pair of verses found both in the Pūrvaśailanikāyānu-varttanā-gāthā—whence it is quoted in the Prasannapadā and Madhyama-kāvātāra, and in the Lokānuvarttanā-sūtra—seems to come part way toward the position of the AAN, or to surpass it, in that it accepts only the dharma-dhātu, relegating the sattvadhātu to the realm of notions taught by the Buddha only in conformity to the expectations of the world:79

Introduction 31

kyi dbyings su ’du bar rab tu shes so || chos kyi dbyings gang yin pa de nyid sens can gyi kham so || de chos kyi dbyings dbyer med pas sens can gyi kham dbyer med par khong du chud do || chos kyi dbyings gang yin pa dang sens can gyi kham gang yin pa de gnyi ga yang nam mkha’i dbyings dang mtshangs par rab tu shes so || des chos thams cad dbyings gcig tu shes naschos mnams la chos kyi rjes su lta zhing gnas kyang chos la mgon par chags shing lta bar yang mi ’gyur ro ||. The Chinese versions appear to differ substantially: T. 397 (11) [XIII] 178a18–23: 復次，善男子，菩薩摩訶薩觀法法念，不分別法界。如法界，衆生界亦如是。如是二界名虚空。一切諸法悉入法界。夫法界者，即衆生界，衆生界者，即無分別。是名觀察一切法等。見一切界，即是法界。衆生界者，即無分別。於彼法界，亦無所壞不毀人界。人界法界，此二事者，等如空界。彼以一界普見諸法. See Katō (2000) who observes another connection between this sūtra and the AAN.

79 Harrison (1982: 225–226), Yonezawa (2010: 139). The verse, evidently really only understandable in Prakrit, is badly transmitted and has not so far been reconstructed convincingly. I more or less follow the translation of Harrison, while aware that it is far from definitive. For what it is worth, the verse might look something like: na vinaddhaṁ na upaṇṇaṁ dharmadhāsasamantam jagāṁ | sattadhāuṁ cedāṁ sēśi eṣa loāṇuvattanā || tīsu adhvāsu sattanāṁ pākatī nopalambhati | sattadhāuṁ cedāṁ sēśi eṣā loāṇuvattanā ||.
Not destroyed, not produced, the world is equivalent to the dharma-
realm,
But he taught this realm of beings; this is [only] in conformity with
the world.
He does not apprehend the original nature of beings in the three
times,
But he taught this realm of beings; this is [only] in conformity with
the world.

If these verses have been understood at least minimally correctly, the first
asserts that while the *dharmadhātu* is all that there really is, the Buddha
spoke also of the *sattvadhātu* because common language end expectation
lead us think in these terms. This seems to be a position equally radical to
that of the AAN, although going in a slightly different direction. At least for
the AAN, the ‘identity’ of the *sattvadhātu* with the Absolute (if we may term
it that) is the very heart of its message. This is, however, for the AAN less an
ontological assertion than a soteriological promise: and here lies the power-
ful vision of the AAN. All of reality is unitary—what the AAN calls the
‘single realm,’ *ekadhātu*. But this identity of reality is not mere description.
This unitary foundation appears in several guises. Arguably the central
philosophical notion of the AAN, though one which appears not to be an
innovation of the text, is precisely that these three modalities, or perhaps
better, ‘aspects,’ through which this single realm appears provide the ground
for spiritual cultivation. A common ground underlies the realm of ordinary
beings, bodhisattvas and awakened buddhas, and consequently, the map of
reality is by definition also fundamentally a map to liberation: ordinary
beings, those perhaps not very far along the spiritual path, are less pure
than bodhisattvas, who in turn are less pure than those who have achieved
the goal, buddhas. These three, however, belong not to different realms but
to a single realm, although they appear as if they are distinct, not because of
their nature, but because—as will be explained—adventitious defilements
prevent realization of this inherent unity. Despite the prominence of this
three-fold division, it is well to note that the bodhisattva plays only a very
small part in this scheme. In fact, one might even say that, structurally
speaking, the place of the bodhisattva in the AAN is somewhat akin to that
of the lone buddha (pratyekabuddha) in the classical Mahāyāna scheme of
auditor (*śrāvaka*), lone buddha and bodhisattva, in which the lone buddha
receives almost no attention, and seems to exist in the scheme for purely formal reasons. One can see this clearly in the AAN §15ii, when after discussing the three it states (in the Sanskrit version): “Therefore the quintessence of beings is not different from the dharma-body. The quintessence of beings is precisely the dharma-body. The dharma-body is precisely the quintessence of beings. This [pair] is nondual with respect to meaning; only the designations differ.” Perhaps as a result of this relative unimportance, the sentences devoted to the bodhisattva in the tripartite scheme in the AAN are very hard to understand.

The terminology inherited by the authors of the AAN speaks of ordinary beings and of dharmakāya, dharmaḍhātu and tathāgatagarbha, all of which share in the essential identity of all existence. Although it is not possible to posit one of these terms as being most potent, the word dharmakāya is certainly a highly pregnant term which has several distinct semantic ranges. In modern scholarship the most well-known of these is as one of the three bodies (trikāya) of the Buddha, and in that context its meaning has been taken to indicate something like ‘transcendental buddhahood.’ As Paul Harrison (1992) has demonstrated, however, it more originally had the sense of ‘totality of dharmas,’ ‘the body of dharmas’ in the sense that a buddha is one who embodies his teachings, or more broadly, the ultimate truths of reality.

The reified dharmakāya as the matured, completed state of Buddhahood may be, Harrison proposes, an innovation of the Yogācāra school, assuming that the term in scholastic contexts has been properly understood. While it is hard to be certain of the exact sense intended by dharmakāya in the AAN, its depiction as equivalent to the fundamental ground of reality suggests that it was imagined in a sense closer to a reified ‘absolute’ than as a (mere?) ‘totality of dharmas.’ The AAN posits its dharmakāya as appearing under different aspects—impure, part-pure and part-impure, and pure—and thus as constituting the ground of all being, both defiled and pure, both ‘ordinary’ and transcendent. These three aspects are equated, respectively, with (ordinary) beings, bodhisattvas, and tathāgatas. This presentation seems to assume some kind of monistic standpoint, which may well justify a reified interpretation of dharmakāya as ‘body of the buddha’ in the sense of an absolute principle of transcendent reality. Although I refer here to ‘monism,’ this is not necessarily to be understood in precisely the sense intended by Obermiller, who sometimes used this term to point to śūnyatā-
based Madhyamaka ideas. The monism of the AAN consists in its vision of an essential unity to all (sentient) existence: the basic reason why there is no increase or decrease in the realm of beings, despite the attainment of awakening by beings, is that the domain of existence is fundamentally unitary. This is the meaning of the ekadhātu propounded by the AAN.

By means of its absolutely monistic standpoint, the AAN logically sidesteps questions such as those concerning the beginning and end of saṃsāra, and such views are castigated as among those doomed to lead one astray. Much debate is recorded on the question of the origin of saṃsāra and its eventual end, but none of this is at all relevant for the authors of the AAN since, for them, saṃsāra is nothing more than a mode of overall being. There is no question of beings “being” in saṃsāra and then undergoing some “nirvanization,” after which they no longer inhabit saṃsāra, and equally no question of the swelling of the realm of nirvāṇa, a possibility also considered (and rejected) by traditional scholastics and by authors of scriptures, as discussed above. There is only one reality, one state of “the way things are,” termed among other things dharmatā or dharmadhātu, not in any reified sense of another mode of being, but rather as the absolute ground of being, of “is-ness.” While it states this three-fold reality within which ordinary beings, bodhisattvas as those progressing toward awakening, and tathāgatas differ only subjectively, so to speak, what the AAN does not address is how one may transform oneself from ordinary being afflicted by defilements to purified awakened one.

The reality of the three modes is something beyond the ken of ordinary beings, and even of auditors and lone buddhas. This underlying reality, the dharma-body, is by definition the full collection of the qualities which

---

80 Obermiller (1931: 95, 104). However, when he states (p. 106): “We see that Āryāsanga in his last work has come to a fully monistic and pantheistic conception. The statement that ‘the fundamental element of a living being and the Cosmical Body of the Buddha are the same, there being a difference only in the names,’ is a very pregnant expression of his standpoint,” Obermiller is doing nothing other than quoting the AAN. His immediately following reference to a further passage also refers to an expression of the AAN, and therefore one might well argue that as far as the RGV is concerned, what Obermiller saw as monism was indeed the doctrine of the AAN. His overall stance is a bit confusing, however, since he also translates Dignāga for instance (1933, 1936: 247) saying “Prajñā-pāramitā is the pure monistic spiritual principle,—the Divine Wisdom which is devoid of every differentiation into subject and object.” This śūnyavādin idea seems not quite the same as what the AAN is saying. Cp. Ruegg (1969: 3–4, 268n5).
identify, and indeed constitute, a buddha. In other words, the dharma-body is buddhahood, and this is the most fundamental reality, not only of awakened existence but of all modes of existence. But we must take care: to use the word ‘existence’ here may lead to confusion if it were to be read to imply existence as opposed to non-existence, saṃsāra as opposed to nirvāṇa. No such dichotomy is possible for the vision of the AAN.

One and ‘the same’ dharma-body manifests or appears as ordinary beings when it is covered by defilments, in which case it transmigrates, or seems to transmigrate—the sūtra does not attempt a distinction here—through realms of existence. It appears as one on the path, as a bodhisattva, when it has attitudes indicative of dissatisfaction with transmigration and of attraction to the path set forth by the Buddha. It is plain that this characterization of the dharma-body as bodhisattva is not precisely parallel to that of the dharma-body as ordinary being, since the latter portrays an essence concealed beneath shrouds of negative elements while the former refers explicitly to volition, attitude and activity (§14ii). Final perfection, buddhahood, is the same dharma-body free from all negativity, on the one hand, and perfect in all of its aspirations on the other. The AAN’s repetition (§§10iii and 15ii) of its complete identification of ordinary existence with buddhahood frames its discussion of this topic, which it then elaborates with its three-fold typology.

Ordinary beings are qualified thus (§14i, in the Sanskrit): “This very dharma-body, hidden by tens of millions of sheaths of limitless defilements, borne along by the current of transmigration, wandering through deaths and births in the destinies of beginningless and endless transmigration, is termed ‘The quintessence/realm of beings.’” Bodhisattvas (§14ii) are described as follows: “That very dharma-body, being disgusted with the suffering of the currents of transmigration, indifferent to all objects of pleasure, practicing the practice which leads to awakening, by means of the eighty-four thousand teachings which include the ten perfections, is termed ‘bodhisattva.’” Finally, buddhas are described (§15i) in these terms: “This very dharma-body, thoroughly freed of all sheaths of defilements, having transcended all sufferings, the stains of all defilements vanished, well and truly pure, fixed in the Absolute Reality that is ultimately pure, risen to the stage looked forward to by all beings, having attained peerless heroic strength with respect to all spheres of knowledge, perfected in sovereign
power over all things free of all hindrances and unobstructed—this is termed "Tathāgata, Arhat, Perfect Buddha." There follow in §§17i~19i three descriptions of the variant natures of the embryo of the tathāgatas, obviously meant to correspond to these three types. However, it is extremely difficult to understand these precisely. On the assumption that their ordering corresponds to that above, namely ordinary being, bodhisattva and buddha, they seem to identify the modes of the embryo of the tathāgatas as follows:

ordinary being: “The nature of the embryo of the tathāgatas which from the very beginning is in its intrinsic nature associated [with it] and has a pure nature is in accord with reality, is not illusory, is inseparable and indivisible from the dharma-realm of insight and pure thusness, and the quality of being inconceivable. From the beginningless beginning exists this reality which is both pure and associated [with it].”

bodhisattva: “The embryo of the tathāgatas which from the very beginning is in its intrinsic nature unassociated [with it], is covered with defilements, and is an unpurified thing, is from the very beginning free and released, not associated [with it], covered by defilements and is impure. It can only be cut [free] by the Tathāgata’s bodhi-wisdom.”

buddha: “The nature of the embryo of the tathāgatas which is equal to the future limit, constant, and existing is precisely the basis of all qualities [definitive of a buddha]. It is furnished with all [such] qualities, joined with all [such] qualities, and while engaged in worldly affairs it is inseparable and indivisible from the truth and from all [such] qualities, it maintains all qualities, it embraces all qualities.”

I frankly admit that, although this is arguably one of the most central portions of the AAN, much remains obscure to me. The overall point, however, should be clear, namely that the three modes are nothing more than modalities of the embryo of the tathāgatas, variously related to ultimate Reality. Upon this basis, to conceptualize reality as limited in one way or another, as would be required in order to speak of an increase or decrease in the number of beings, makes no sense at all.
The complete failure to find increase in any one realm or decrease in another—to conclude that the realm of nirvāṇa does not expand nor the realm of beings contract—despite spiritual ripening, despite the attainment of buddhahood by beings who, once defiled, purify themselves through cultivation as bodhisattvas, is both true and, as the AAN concedes, inconceivable. While this may seem to be little more than a rhetorical slight of hand, intended to salve an audience which might sense some discontinuity in the text’s logic, it is also something more. Starting from a standpoint in which defilements require purification, and perfection consists in the complete absence of defilements, it is hard to logically argue both that the defiled and the pure are fundamentally equivalent and that, simultaneously, practice is necessary. The AAN does not argue solely for the essential unity of samsāra and nirvāṇa. Rather, it takes a classical Mahāyāna position in which ontology and soteriology fuse.

Much that would be required to more precisely understand the AAN’s fine philosophical position is, it seems to me, missing from the text itself, which is to say, it is assumed by its authors. An example is evident in the AAN’s deployment of the preexisting technical term dharmakāya. While the AAN presents the dharmakāya as the fundamental, unitary ground of all existence, in which ordinary beings then appear as the defiled, transient aspect of the unitary and real existence, it makes not the slightest effort to explain the terminology of the notion itself. Bodhisattvas are in turn a kind of pivotal, dynamic aspect, wherein the defiled is in the process of becoming the pure but, as discussed above, this is hardly expanded upon. Finally, the state of buddhahood is the realization of the pure, undefiled essence, the accomplishment of the original, pure, essence. Before we consider this process of purification in more detail, however, we should turn our attention to the other key terms employed here.

The term tathāgatagarbha, here rendered as “embryo of the tathāgatas,” has given rise to much discussion. In brief, following Zimmerman, it may

---

81 Ruegg (1969: 268): “La non-dualité (advaya) du tathāgatagarbha (ou sattvadhātu) et du dharmakāya [in the AAN] doit sans doute s’expliquer de la même manière que la doctrine de la non-dualité du samsāra et du nirvāṇa.”

82 Important studies include Ruegg (1969: 499–516), Zimmermann (2002: 42–46), and many of the studies by Takasaki, but to these much could be added. While most scholarship, to be sure, concentrates on later systematic analyses, rather than scriptural presentations, the portrayals in the Tathāgatagarbha-sūtra, Śrīmālādevīsīmhanāda and Mahāyāna
be said that when beings are characterized by the term *tathāgatagarbha*, the word may have the sense of the “embryo of a/the tathāgata(s) within all living beings” or living beings as “the womb of the tathāgata,” understanding the compound as a tatpurusa, while as a bahuvrīhi one may understand that “living beings contain a tathāgata,” or “living beings contain a tathāgata as an embryo.”

Zimmermann concludes that the best interpretation is as a bahuvrīhi, “containing a tathāgata.” If he is right, and if his results hold also for the AAN, then when the text says that the *sattvadhātu* (here to be understood as “quintessence of beings”) is *tathāgatagarbha*, the meaning is that beings contain the nascent state (embryo) of buddhahood. In other words, the quintessence of beings is to contain a tathāgata; their nature is to be loci of future buddhas. As Zimmermann states, for the *Tathāgatagarbhasūtra*, beings carry a full-fledged tathāgata within themselves; “the nature of living beings is not different from that of the Buddha and these living beings will become buddhas themselves once the sheaths of defilements have been removed.”

This stance fits perfectly with what is presented in the AAN and, as I have suggested above, seems to have been assumed as a basis by its authors, although they nowhere trouble themselves to explain anything like this.

Perhaps the least problematic of the central terms used with reference to the totally pure are, ironically, *dharmadhātu*, the dharma-realm or the quintessence of the dharma, and *dharmatā*, an abstract noun from *dharma* whose meaning is even less evident, but probably should be understood in the AAN as something like ‘the nature of reality as it is.’ I find this situation ironic both because here again the AAN does not trouble itself to explain either term, and because both terms are abstract to the point of virtually defying translation or clear definition. What the AAN does devote slightly more attention to is the question of the ultimate equivalence of absolute and mundane from the point of view of essential nature.

In §17ii, we read: “Regarding this dharma-realm of pure thusness, I expound for [ordinary] beings the intrinsically pure mind, which is an incon-

---

83 Takasaki (1973: 297) asserts that the AAN (as the Śrīmalādeviśimhanāda and the Mahāparinirvāṇa-mahāsūtra) never uses the term as a bahuvrīhi, but he does not defend this assertion.

84 Zimmermann (2002: 50).
ceivable teaching.” This sentence as quoted in MDN presents the idea slightly differently: “This pure dharma-nature (*dharmatā) is precisely the dharma-realm. Regarding this intrinsically pure mind, I expound it as an inconceivable teaching.” Soon after, in §18ii, the text speaks of “the intrinsically pure mind stained by adventitious defilements.” There is a long history of this idea of the intrinsically pure or naturally luminous mind and its (apparent) defilement,85 going back to a much discussed passage in the Aṅguttara Nikāya (I.6.1–2) which reads,86 “Luminous, monks, is this mind, but sometimes it is defiled by adventitious defilements. … sometimes it is free from adventitious defilements.” In fact, this expression is often cited, and an argument can be made that the authors of the AAN were familiar with it in a form close to what we find here, since the full form of the first phrase just cited is: “Luminous, monks, is this mind, but sometimes it is defiled by adventitious defilements. Ignorant common people do not understand this in accord with reality,”87 and this second portion is nearly exactly what we read in the AAN §4i, which begins “Because all foolish common people do not know the single dharma-realm in accord with reality ….”88


86 Morris (1885: i.10,11–16): pabhassaram idam bhikkhave cittān tañ ca kho āgantukehi upakkilesehi upakkiliṭṭham ... tañ ca kho āgantukehi upakkilesehi vippamuttam. The same position appears, according to scholastic sources, to have been held by the Mahāsāṃghikas, Vibhajyavāda and by the (Dharmaguptaka) Śāriputrābhidharma, for which see Bureu (1955: 67–68, 175, 194), respectively, and the discussions in Takaoka (2007). Some of the theological problems related to this issue concern the nature of mind, including whether it exists more than momentarily; see Shih (2009) for a detailed discussion. See also Gethin (1994). Earlier discussions of the Theravāda tradition include Mizuno (1972). The discussion in what is probably the oldest scholastic source, the Spitzer manuscript, is studied in Franco (2000: 94–98). Ruegg (1969: 411–454) discusses later Madhyamaka and Yogācāra scholastic sources, as well as the RGV. For considerations on still later developments, see Serra (1999).

87 tañ assutavā puthujjano yathābhūtaṁ nappajānāti.

88 I do not mean that the authors of the AAN were necessarily familiar with a tradition like that transmitted in Pāli. However, as far as I know, so far no version of this whole expression has been found in other sources.
The expression for the intrinsically pure mind in the AAN is *zìxìng qìng-jìng xìn* 自性清浄心, potentially a rendering of something like *prakṛtiparīśuddhacitta* or *prakṛtiprabhāsvara* but, as demonstrated in Appendix 1, it is not possible to determine precisely what term stood in the Vorlage of the AAN. While we might expect a difference between a mind that is pure or purified and one that is luminous, in actual fact, it seems not to matter.

In brief, the general idea is that mind is fundamentally, originally, and naturally pure and undefiled. It is only by the accumulation of so-called incidental or adventitious defilements (*āgantukakleśa*, *kèchén fánnǎo* 客塵煩惱) that this natural purity and luminosity of the mind is obscured. What this means is not constant through the tradition, as Shih Ru-nien points out: Unlike the Mahāyāna theory of tathāgatagarbha, which claims that the innately pure mind possesses all the virtues of the Buddha and that the revelation of this mind is the attainment of the Buddhahood, statements in the Pali texts only emphasize the knowledge of the innate purity of the mind as a prerequisite step in the cultivation of the mind and the restoration of the purity of the mind is not the end of religious practices. As a matter of fact, after the removal of the defilements, the mind is not only pure, tranquil, and luminous but also soft, pliant, and adaptable. It then becomes suitable for the destruction of all the āsavas or the cultivation of the seven limbs of wisdom, and the like. This means that the tranquil, luminous, and pliable mind is just the basis for further religious practice.

In the AAN, in line with a Mahayānistic approach, ultimately the intrinsically pure mind is identified with the *dharmadhātu* itself. It is inconceivable, the AAN says, that this mind which is so fouled by defilements is actually pure and luminous just as is the *dharmadhātu*, the pure ground of being itself, virtually identical with buddhahood. To say that this is inconceivable means that one cannot logically conceive how the ordinary mind of beings is identical with the purity of the *dharmadhātu*, the pure *dhammatā*. In other words, the initial and innate state of the mind is equivalent to awakening, and realizing this means that no further practice is necessary.

89 See Takasaki (1975b).

However, as stressed above, this is beyond ordinary imagination, which leads the text to offer that those who do not understand—all save buddhas—can do nothing but have faith.

This idea of intrinsic purity is intimately linked, as we just saw, with the notion of adventitious defilement, the condition in which we find ourselves. In the AAN as in the Śrīmālādevī, the connection between the pure originary state of being and defilements is that the latter are temporarily associated with the former; the AAN goes on, however, to emphasize that there is something which is intrinsically associated with this originary state, namely the qualities of a buddha, that is to say, the nature of awakening itself. It is this of which the sutra speaks when it associates dharmadhātu, dharmatā and dharmakāya with the tathāgatagarbha.91

While the AAN is noticeably silent on the question of practice, offering no practical or direct guidance for the practitioner who might wish to become awakened, it makes clear the necessary beginning point. One cannot simply jump to buddhahood; that is, one cannot simply leap to an understanding of the underlying unity of the three aspects of being. Rather, the AAN teaches that the profound meaning of its teaching cannot be understood by auditors and lone buddhas, much less ordinary beings, and that the only recourse for those who have not achieved the necessary insight is to have faith (śrāddha) in its meaning, saying (§10ii): “It is indeed only the wisdom of the buddhas and tathāgatas which can examine, know and see this purport. (Despite) the wisdom possessed by all auditors and lone buddhas, Śāriputra, with respect to this purport, they can only have faith; they are not able to know, see or examine it in accord with reality.” A similar passage from the Śrīmālādevī reads:92 “[You, goddess, can understand the doctrine being preached, as can advanced bodhisattvas]. For the rest, goddess, all the auditors and lone buddhas, these two teachings are to be embraced only through faith in the Tathāgata.” The notion of faith as a fundamental element in Buddhist spiritual cultivation is far from unexpected, and it plays, moreover, a crucial role even in the RGV.93 What it might have meant to the authors of the AAN, however, is not clear, beyond the

91 On this complicated question, see Appendix 2.
92 See the note to §10i(b–c).
93 In the specific context of the tathāgatagarbha teaching, concentrating in the RGV see Takasaki (1964), and more briefly but also more broadly Ichikawa (1976).
obvious observation that they consider the essential truth they are preaching to be beyond the grasp of virtually all who might encounter it. Their deployment of faith can certainly be read—if a bit subversively—to signal their own lack of faith in the transparency of their message, and its lack of intuitive appeal. Seen from another perspective, however, it is also puzzling. For what it avers is that while the message of the AAN is offered to, presumably, ‘ordinary beings,’ they will never understand it as long as they are not awakened. At the same time, at least when read in light of the parallel expression in the Śrīmālādevī, the rejection of auditors and lone buddhas is a common Mahāyāna trope, and the Śrīmālādevī says explicitly that advanced bodhisattvas—the ‘middlemen’ of the AAN’s scheme—are capable of understanding, a reassuring and doctrinally expected assertion.

Is the possibility of spiritual progress held out to all equally? In §21ii of the sūtra, we encounter the term icchantika, identified as one who holds the view that the realm of beings increases or decreases. The originality of this reference in the AAN is questionable, however, in the first place because the term does not occur in the Sanskrit quotation of the passage, despite the fact that the concept and the term icchantika are well known to the RGV. In the absence of any citation of this passage in the MDN it is hard to be sure, but it seems most likely that the reference occurred either in a recension of the sūtra different from that known to the compiler of the RGV, or that it was added in China. Much has been written on this term, which is sometimes understood to refer to a category of individual who is forever debarred from reaching awakening, and thus identified with the agotraka, the individual who lacks the ‘genetics’ of buddhahood. This notion is not only unknown to the AAN, but would appear to be incoherent with its overall stance, suggesting that however icchantika in the AAN may have been understood by whomever added it (as I suppose), it was not meant to imply the permanent impossibility of buddhahood. Regarding the meaning of the term, the hypothesis of Karashima Seishi is quite convincing. Suggest-

---

94 It might be possible to argue that the author of the RGV simply felt no need to cite the AAN’s reference to icchantika in his citation of the passage, but the immediate context in the RGV within which the AAN is quoted, in which precisely icchantika is the topic of discussion, argues strongly against this. Takasaki (1975a: 379n33) also believes the reference not to have belonged to the original sūtra.

95 The presence of the term in the Chinese translation of the RGV is easily explained in light of that translation’s demonstrably close reliance on the Chinese translation of the AAN.
ing that the Mahāyāna Mahāparinirvāṇa-mahāsūtra “is probably the first text to contain this word,” he proceeds to argue that “[a]ccording to the Mahāyāna Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra, an ichchantika … is a monk who, claiming (or fanc[ying] …) himself to be an Arhat, rejects the teaching of the Vaipulya—namely the Mahāyāna Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra itself—as told by Māra.” In this perspective, an ichchantika is one who rejects a certain version of the Mahāyāna teaching, namely that espoused by the authors of (at least portions of) the Mahāyāna Mahāparinirvāṇa-mahāsūtra. From a rhetorical point of view, the term might then fall into a class similar to the term hīnayāṇa, which I understand to mean something like (roughly) “those idiots who refuse to accept that we are right.” However, in Karashima’s view, from this apparent beginning, an evolution in the meaning of ichchantika takes place, one in which the earlier sense “one who claims (to be an authority),” thereby rejecting the authority of the Mahāyāna Mahāparinirvāṇa-mahāsūtra, becomes “one who desires (transmigration),” this based in part at least on a reestimation of the etymological sense of the root √iṣ. Like some other texts, the RGV assumes this latter sense, as when it says, for instance, ye nāpi saṁsāram icchanti yathecchantikā, “[Those beings] do not wish for transmigration, as do the icchantikas.” For the Laṅkāvatāra, some beings, icchantika, simply do not desire deliverance. To return to the AAN, however, given the isolation of the term, we simply do not possess any context which would help us to understand what the term might have meant to the scripture’s author or, as I would suggest, to those who added the term to the scripture at some later time.


97 Karashima (2007: 76). Note that although the internal chronology of the Mahāyāna Mahāparinirvāṇa-mahāsūtra is complex, if it is correct that the AAN was composed earlier than the Mahāyāna Mahāparinirvāṇa-mahāsūtra (see note 36, above), this might serve as another argument for the secondary addition of the mention of icchantika in the AAN.

98 Karashima (2007: 78). I am not quite sure whether every step in Karashima’s reasoning is as strong as his overall point.


100 See Ruegg (1969: 75). The exact reading of the Sanskrit text is not clear, but it involves something like anicchantikatā mokṣe. More details on this sūtra’s presentation are found in Ruegg (1969: 75–77); see the translation in Silk (2007: 270–271).
In addition to those aspects discussed above, the rhetoric of the AAN conveys its message in a number of rhetorically interesting ways. Time, for example, is an idea which percolates in the background of a number of Buddhist scriptural presentations. One might think, for instance, of the multiple layers of the Sukhāvatīvyūha-sūtra, in which the framing action takes place in the Buddha’s time, since he is the preacher, while he narrates the time of Amitābha, the distant past as well as the present, and finally, though still simultaneously, the text works in the time of the listener, the audience, as well, since the narration of Amitābha and his vows is something that is active and valid in every present in which the text is heard.\textsuperscript{101} In a similar but somewhat different fashion, the notion of time is also fundamental to the AAN and its ontology (if it is indeed best understood as an ontology). The text speaks of ‘beginningless time,’ (anavarāgra, §§2, 14i[b]), of the present and the future (§§3i[d], 3ii[c], [e]), and of the long time during which one travels through transmigration. Likewise, it speaks of the time when the Tathāgata was in the world (the historical ‘present’ of the narration, but clearly the ‘past’ from the perspective of any intended audience) and of an age to come, 500 years after the death of the Buddha (§4i[b], [c]). As tempting as this may be, it is not possible to decide whether by this expression, the numeration of which is a stock example, the compilers of the scripture necessarily meant to indicate their ‘present day,’ and thus whether they intended the (again, stock) accompanying warning about degeneration of the teaching to serve as a comment on their contemporaneous circumstances.

The text identifies as erroneous views the idea that the world has a beginning or an end (§6[d], [e]), and speaks of the ultimate reality (variously named, for example as the dharmakāya) which is unlimited in both the past and the future (§13i[b]). The expression of this last term in particular is a bit problematic, since the text also says that the dharma-body is equal to this future limit (aparāntakotisamatā, §§13ii[b], 16[f]).

A very important term related to time is anāditva, beginninglessness (Tola and Dragonetti 1980). Most fundamentally, beginninglessness is essential for Buddhist cosmology (and soteriology) because all that exists,

\textsuperscript{101} Much has been written on concepts of time in Buddhism, but I mention below only that most relevant for our narrow discussion. See specifically Takasaki (1966: 232n242; 1989: 280–281n3); Ruegg (1969: 205n3) does not add to Takasaki’s considerations.
which is to say saṃsāra itself, is motivated by karma, action and its results. All existence is driven by karmic energy, such that, for instance, the circumstances of the individual, and of even the world or the universe as such, are created as a result of earlier actions (this karmic ‘savings’ surviving even the periodic devolution of the cosmos itself). If one thinks of karma in terms of inertia, the logic becomes clear: it is not possible to imagine an initial state of rest out of which motion begins on its own. Since beings qua saṃsāric entities are the sum-total of their karma, or karmic momentum, it is not possible to posit a state of rest ab initio out of which inertia or momentum could arise ex nihilo: there would have been no saṃsāra, no existence, before there was karmic energy, and thus one cannot posit a time before there was karma. The AAN says, “All beings wander in the six paths from beginningless time” (§2), just as later it asserts that the dharmakāya rides the waves of saṃsāra from beginningless ages (§14[i]). Given this logic of karmic inertia, Buddhist theorists were forced to assume beginninglessness as an ‘initial condition.’ This is a soteriological conclusion as well, directing attention away from any initial cause (since the search will lead only to infinite regress) and toward a future solution of the problem of saṃsāric cycling. If the cause of saṃsāra is karma, the solution is the future non-production of karma. This is standard Buddhist doctrine.

Beginninglessness is closely related to the notion of nitya, often translated as ‘permanent’ or even ‘eternal.’ As Tola and Dragonetti (1980: 2) point out, however, although later it acquires the notion of eternality through all time, in its early meaning this term refers to “permanency or eternity in the future” (my emphasis), and not to the idea of beginninglessness. Rather, nitya(tva) probably is best understood in English with terms such as ‘stable,’ ‘intransient,’ and ‘constant,’ since the notion is not one of eternal permanence. In fact, the key background for the use of the pair nitya/anitya is not ontology but soteriology. Therefore, the refusal to accept nitya(tva) is at basis an assertion of the possibility of spiritual progress, although perhaps needless to say this makes sense only in the broader context of the overall nature of the world. From that perspective, attention is paid to the origins of things—most of all, individuals—only from the standpoint of their possible future liberation. The AAN’s assertions about the nature of temporal reality likewise should be seen against this backdrop.
In the AAN a key term is anavarāgra, a word with special significance to the Yogācāra school, but which can be traced in Pāli as well to the form anamattagga. In fact, however, the history of this word is complex, and it is not a trivial task to determine how the authors of the AAN might have intended their use of it. Although he was not the first to do so, Sasaki has offered a suggestion for an etymology of the Pāli form anamattagga which makes sense of both word and meaning. A canonical passage, mentioning only the past, reads:

102 See for example Sasaki (1942), which takes as its starting point Mahāyānasamgraha I.1 (although the key term there is rather anādikālika); see the note to §16(d).

103 The Pāli form anamattagga has been subjected to various analyses. Much of what follows in this note has been summarized by Sasaki (1978, 1984, 1986); see also Takasaki (1996). Pischel, in discussing the change of m > v (1981 §251), cites Ardhamāgadhī anavadagga, listing Jaina Māhāraṣṭrī “anayagga = Pāli anamatagga = anamadagra, from √nam.” His note suggests that this term as an adjective of sāṃsāra “probably means ‘whereof the beginning is not bent off,’ = ‘what does not change’ = ‘endless.’” He goes on, “The scholiasts explain the word as ananta, aparyanta, aparyavasāna and mostly consider avadagga, avayagga as Deśi words used in the sense of ‘end,’ and, therefore, analyse the word as an+avadagga.” A Critical Pāli Dictionary (Trenckner et al. 1924–: 156) writes the word as an-amat'-agga. It begins by citing Sanskrit anavarāgra, for which it cites the Tibetan equivalent thog ma dang tha ma med pa, “taking avara and agra as lowest and highest limit.” It goes on “anavarāgra is an adaptation of ≠ A[r]d[h]a[m][a]g[adh]i anava(d)agga,” citing a commentary which understands an+avayagga, or an+avanatagra or an+avagata- gra. The entry goes on to refer to Helmer Smith’s suggestion (1928–1966: 396n10 [§520]) “an+amuto+agga = ‘of which you cannot say that it begins from there or there.” Edgerton (1953, s.v. anavarāgra) considers anavarāgra to be probably a hyper-Sanskrit form of anavayagga. He goes on to say that “it may, and probably does, mean without beginning and end,” but it appears as if the “it” in this sentence refers to the Sanskrit form as used in the texts studied by Edgerton. And indeed, there is a strong argument to be made that the meaning of the term—canonical and yet not well, or perhaps not at all, understood—shifted over time.

104 I do not know if his is the first discussion, but see already Bapat (1955: 234–235).

105 Feer (1884–1898: ii.178,8–10 [15.1.1.3]): anamataggāyāṁ bhikkhave sāṁsāro pubbhā kōṭī na paññāyati avijñānaranjañāṇāṁ sattānaṁ tanhāsamyojanañāṇāṁ sanbhavatam sanśara- tanāṁ. Very similar passages appear elsewhere. Among Chinese equivalents, see T. 99 (II) 240b20–21: 衆生無始生死, 無明所蓋, 愛繫其頸, 長夜生死輪轉, 不知苦之本際. I owe this reference to Li (2012: 200–201n106), who discusses it in the context of Candrakīrti’s Prasannapadā citation in regard to Mūlamadhyamakakārikā XI.1, for which see the note to §17i(b).
Monks, saṁsāra has a completely unthought-of beginning (anamatagga). Its prior limit is not discerned by beings running and revolving [through existences], hindered by ignorance and bound by thirsts.

Sasaki suggests that, rather than taking the initial an- of the term anamatagga as a negation, it should be understood as an-a-mata-agga from *anu-a-mata-agga. In support of this understanding, Sasaki cites a gloss by Buddhaghosa from his commentary to the Saṁyutta-Nikāya, the Sārattha-ppakāsini, in which the key term is amata, a negation of √man, ‘to think’:106

anamataggo: ‘completely unthought-of beginning.’ Even if one seeks it with knowledge for one hundred years or one thousand years, its beginning is unthought-of, its beginning is unknown; it is impossible to know its beginning as from here or from there. [So] it means its former and latter extremes in time cannot be determined.

If this solution is adopted, it would imply that the original term referred only to the past, to the beginning, and indicated that the beginning was inconceivable, although Buddhaghosa also associates the term with the future limit as well. It is important to note that here the focus is on epistemology and not ontology: the beginning is not recognized, and the prior limit is not discerned.

The eventual Sanskritization of this term followed the course visible in Buddhaghosa’s interpretation (although it is not necessarily chronologically later), the sense being: without both lower—that is to say, beginning—and higher—that is to say, final—limit. In other words, in their attempt to understand the term, at some point those who transmitted the texts and led

106 I cite from Sasaki’s citation, which he attributes to iii.149, namely the commentary on Saṁyutta-Nikāya 15.1.1.3 (Nidāna-vagga, Anamatagga-saṁyutta, paṭhama vaggo, Tiṇakatṭham): anamataggo ti anu-amataggo, vassasataṁ vassasahassam ſāṇena anugāntvāpi amataggo aviditaggo, nāsa sakkaṁ ito vā etto vā aggam jānitum, aparicchinnapubbāparamoktiko ti attha. As Bhikkhu Bodhi (2000: 795n254) points out, there is an etymological gloss here with anu-gantvā and amatagga. He is also correct that grammatically speaking the subject of the passive sentence is ſāṇena in the instrumental, but this seems to me to produce odd English, namely “Even if it should be pursued by knowledge for a hundred or a thousand years, it would be with unthought-of beginning, with unknown beginning. It wouldn’t be possible to know its beginning from here or from there; the meaning is that it is without a delimiting first or last point.” My English is probably not much better, however.
them through linguistic transformations added to the notion of an inconceivable *beginning* the idea of an unattainable *ending* as well. However, the sense of focus on the origin (or lack thereof) is maintained in the Chinese translation *wúshǐshílái* 無始世來 for *anavarāgra*, which clearly refers only to the origin, although it is hard to imagine how the Sanskrit word itself could mean this from an etymological point of view. Moreover, it alters the epistemological focus to an (apparently) ontological one. Sasaki argues that the Pāli expression at least is not ontological, and refers to the (un)knowability of the origin, and not to its (non)existence. While the Sanskrit expression, at least as understood by the Chinese translation, does seem to be ontological, the expression *pūrvakoṭīr na prajñāyate*, “its prior limit is not discerned,” found in the passage above in Pāli, and adopted by sources including the Śrīmālādevī and the RGV, emphasizes the subjectivity of the notion of prior limit, in contrast to its objective, ontological status.

Time, then, is an important notion underlying the vision of the AAN, whose authors posit a world in some sense almost without time: there is no beginning, and no end, for in contrast to the early Buddhism of a beginningless universe which nevertheless does have an end in nirvāṇa, for the ‘cosmology’ of the AAN this dichotomy has vanished. Although the text does certainly speak of purity and impurity, and of the presence of defilements which obscure the innate purity which characterizes a tathāgata, it appears—although the text is not explicit on this point—that spiritual progress within this timeless realm consists not in transforming oneself from an impure to a pure state so much as it does in recognizing one’s innate purity.

In light of the above, it seems an obvious conclusion that the authors of a text like the AAN would have held a world-view permeated by notions of equality. After all, their fundamental message is one of the unitary ground of being. And yet, what Michael Zimmermann has to say about the *Tathāgatagarbhā-sūtra* applies equally, mutatis mutandis, to the AAN: “The fact … that nowhere in the sūtra are there ethical conclusions drawn on the basis of this *ekāyānist* theory of equality somehow comes as a surprise.”

---

107 This duality is reflected in the Tibetan translation, *thog ma dang tha ma med pa*. Cp. the observation of Takasaki (1996: 49), who offers as an explanation the association with the term *anādikālika* on the one hand and *pūrvakoṭīr na prajñāyate* on the other.

108 See the note to §17i(b).
the AAN, if we read ekadhātu in place of ekayāna, the point is the same. It seems to be the case that neither for the authors of the AAN nor at least for those of its precursor the Tathāgatagarbha-sūtra was the ethical implication of real-world equality arising from abstract philosophical identity a matter of concern. In this respect, even in details, the close relation between the AAN and the Tathāgatagarbha-sūtra is evident. A passage from the Tathāgatagarbha-sūtra reads as follows:\(^\text{110}\) “Sons of good family, apply energy without giving in to despondency! It will happen that one day the tathāgata who has entered and is present within you will become manifest. Then you will be designated ‘bodhisattva,’ rather than ‘ordinary sentient being (sattva).’ And again in the next stage you will be designated ‘buddha,’ rather than ‘bodhisattva.’” Regarding this, Zimmermann writes:\(^\text{111}\)

In the [Tathāgatagarbha-sūtra] it is this message alone that directly urges the people to draw consequences from the fact that they possess the buddha-nature. The call is not very detailed, and we cannot know what exactly the authors had in mind when they put these words into the mouth of the Buddha. Nevertheless … the passage suggests that energy (vīrya) was considered a central element to be employed. Obviously it was not the purpose of the authors to deal with the question of how to realize one’s buddha-nature in detail. Nor did they draw any ethical conclusions. This is surprising for the modern reader, since the tathāgatagarbha theory would seem to be an ideal ground for establishing an ethical system, namely one based on the principle that all living beings are equal by virtue of their buddha-nature. This absence of ethical implications indicates that the (early) buddha-nature theory centered on the importance of the individual’s


\(^{110}\) Zimmermann (2002: 76). In note 155 Zimmermann writes: “Ethical implications in the texts propounding tathāgatagarbha thought are found, for example, in RGVV I.157ff. which, on the basis of the buddha-nature doctrine, calls for the same respect for other living beings as for a teacher. In the Angulimāliyasūtra, the doctrine of tathāgatagarbha is used to argue for a life of chastity and continence, against killing, and against the consumption of meat … Seyfort Ruegg supposes that tathāgatagarbha thought provided the decisive motive for the appearance of vegetarianism in Buddhism.” The title of Takasaki (1997) would lead one to believe that he addresses similar issues, but at least to my mind he never fully engages the problem.

\(^{111}\) Zimmermann (2002: 76).
inclusion in the “family of the buddhas” rather than on a doctrinal basis for ethical behavior. Even in later texts of this strand, direct ethical implications continue to be rather [infrequent], in contrast to the prevailing worldly orientation of some of the sutras propounding the *tathāgatagarbha* theory.

In fact, the AAN’s authors do not even go as far as did the authors of the *Tathāgatagarbha-sūtra*, since they do no more than describe a situation, without advocating action. But of course, the AAN should not be read in a vacuum, and there are other Indic sources which more directly bring out the ethical implications of the *tathāgatagarbha* and *ekadhātu* idea, texts like the *Mahābherihāraka*, which appears to post-date the AAN and which deserves its own study.112 When it comes to East Asia, the situation is clearer, because ideas of universal buddhahood took hold there and widely influenced the development of Buddhist ideology from relatively early times. However, here again modern expectations (and for some, hopes) are apt to be disappointed, as became clear in the debates raised by the ‘Critical Buddhism’ (*hihan bukkyō* 批判仏教) movement, which focused originally on Japanese issues of Social Justice.113 Although the AAN was not singled out as a central topic of discussion in these controversies, many of the issues raised do relate to the question of the ethical implications of the ideas found in this sūtra. Outside the context of debates over ‘Critical Buddhism,’ Suzuki Takayasu (2000) raises the question of the ethical standpoint of the *tathāgatagarbha* sūtras as a class, from the standpoint of the question why, if everyone is ultimately fated for buddhahood, one should nevertheless both be moral and work toward spiritual cultivation, precisely parallel to the question which has drawn, at least from the time of Hōnen and Shinran, so much attention in Pure Land traditions, in which one’s salvation is assured by the fulfillment of Dharmākāra’s vows by Amitābha’s buddhahood. It is in sum interesting that, although we cannot deny any recognition of an issue to be addressed in terms of morality and ethics, there seems to have been surprisingly little traditional consideration of the ethical implications of these potent ideas—although one should rush to say that this critique prob-

---

112 Suzuki Takayasu published several papers on this text, but apparently has not continued along this line. See http://suzuki.ypu.jp/research.html.

113 For a selection of papers on the topic, see Hubbard and Swanson (1997).
ably applies to much of Buddhist literature of any stripe, in which attention to issues of importance to many moderns is often conspicuously absent.\footnote{114}

Despite all that we might say about the location of the scripture within a pre-existing discourse, and its debts to earlier materials and articulations—all important contextualizations—the vision of the authors of the AAN remains a truly awesome one, a vision of a universe, a reality in which the immanence of buddhahood is strongly emphasized. Future studies may be expected to more carefully take into account how this vision may have influenced later developments.

\footnote{114 It is perhaps not necessary to add that in discussing such things one must avoid the ‘teleological fallacy’ of imagining one’s own moral standpoint, for example, to be applicable to the past, final and complete, or necessarily ‘higher’ than that held by others, whom one then is entitled to judge harshly for not being as sensitive as oneself.}
Edition

and

Translation
Edition and Translation

What follows is an edition of the text, below which are citations of first-hand sources: the two Indian texts, RGV and MDN (in two versions), which quote the AAN. Below this is a translation, and annotations. The printed text represents my attempt to establish a critical edition, which is to say, I have tried to reconstruct what I believe may have left the brush of the translator. However, in this policy with respect to emendations, I have not been entirely consistent, and some possible emendations are relegated to the annotations. I have tried to translate the Chinese text I print, placing observations on possible Indic background in the notes. However, the translation of the Chinese does assume it to be a rendition from Sanskrit (or some Indic language, although I see no evidence that the AAN ever existed in anything other than [Buddhist] Sanskrit). In other words, I do not assume either a naive Chinese reading, nor do I directly render what I imagine the Indic source text should have meant. I offer separately, in Appendix 5, a picture of what I imagine the ‘original’ of the AAN may have looked like in its Indian context. While this is to be considered highly speculative, nevertheless I believe such a venture may be helpful in trying to approach a form the text may have had in its homeland.

The sources for the Chinese text printed here, with their respective sigla, are as follows:

F1: Fangshan 房山 285, volume 3, page 597. A single stele, carved in the Tang 唐 dynasty, damaged in its lower portion and thus only partially legible.

F2: Fangshan 房山 635, volume 14, pages 53-55, carved in the Jin 金 dynasty.

K: Korean 高麗 (Second Koryō edition) 490, volume 13, page 1309–1311. Also reproduced in the Zhonghua Dazangjing 中華大藏經 as 542, volume 24, page 270–273 (with notes of variants which are not, however, entirely reliable). The Jin 金 edition normally reproduced in these volumes was not available.

1 The text is of course also printed in the Taishō Shinshū Daizōkyō, T. 688.

Li: A Dunhuang manuscript collected by Li Shengduo 李盛鐸 (1859–1937), now in the collection of Takeda Seiyaku 武田製薬 (Takeda Pharmaceutical Co.). Facsimiles were published in Koizumi (2010: 255–259, Item 201, frames 1–7). On the collection see Takata (2007), and earlier Rong (2002, in which this manuscript is listed as number 201).


The collation of these sources reveals few transmissional errors. However, I believe that there occurred, probably early on, several corruptions in the text. In §9ii we must remove an expression, as I have detailed in my emendation note. A second instance occurs in §12, where, as I have discussed above in the Introduction, we find a contextually impossible word, shìjiān dēng 世間燈. Another problem arises in §4ii, in which it seems that the repetition of a formula has led a number of copyists to repeat variations on an error. I print, thus, what I believe to be the text closest to the original which left the translator’s brush.

Portions of this text have staunchly resisted my attempts to fully understand them. In this attempt, however, I have studied in particular the renderings of Tokiwa (1932) and Takasaki (1975a) with much profit, though I refrain from noting all instances of disagreement. Although the following constitutes, to my knowledge, the most extensive treatment of this sūtra so far, I am keenly aware of how much more remains to be done.
The Anūnatvāpūrṇatvanirdeśaparivarta

The Scripture on the Absence of Increase and the Absence of Decrease [in the Realm of Beings].
Translated by the Northern (Yuan) Wei Dynasty Tripiṭaka Master from Northern India, Bodhiruci.

Northern India: variant: India
1

a) 如是我聞: 一時婆伽婆住王舍城，耆闍崛山中，b) 與大比丘衆千二百五十人俱，諸菩薩摩訶薩無量無邊不可稱計。

a) Thus I heard: At one time the Bhagavat was dwelling in Rājagṛha on Mount Črīḍhakūṭa, b) together with a large assembly of one thousand two hundred and fifty bhikṣus, and with an immeasurable, infinite and innumerable number of bodhisattva-mahāsattvas.

a-b) Perhaps rendering something like *evam mayā śrutam ekasmin samaye bhagavān rājagrhe viharatī sma ādhrakūṭe parvate mahatā bhikṣusam-ghena sārdham ardhatrayodaśabhir bhikṣuşataiḥ sambahulaiś ca bodhisatt- tvair mahāsattvaiḥ …

a) Bhagavat: Since the Chinese transcribes this, I do as well, but we might better translate as ‘Lord’ or ‘Blessed One.’

b) immeasurable, infinite and innumerable number: 無量無邊不可稱計：*aparimāna- aprameya- asamkhya-?
a) 爾時，慧命舍利弗於大衆中即從坐起，前至佛所。b) 到已，頂禮佛足，退坐一面。合掌白佛言: c) 「世尊，一切衆生從無始世來周旋六道，往來三界，於四生中輪廻生死，受苦無窮。d) 世尊，此衆生聚、衆生海為有增減，為無增減。e) 此義深隱，我未能解。f) 若人問我，當云何答。」

a) 即從坐起 ] Kongo: 即從生起; SX: 即從座起

a) At that time, the venerable Śāriputra got up from his seat in the great assembly and approached the Buddha. b) Bowing his head to the Buddha's feet, he withdrew and sat to one side. Placing his palms together reverentially, he spoke to the Buddha, saying: c) “World-honored One! All beings wander in the six paths from beginningless time, transmigrate in the three realms and, repeating the cycle of birth and death through the four types of birth, experience pain without exhaustion. d) World-honored One! Does this mass of beings, this ocean of beings, undergo increase and decrease, or does it not undergo increase and decrease? e) The purport of this is profound and mysterious, and I am not yet able to understand it. f) If someone asks me about it, how should I respond?”

a) the venerable: Chin. huiming 慧命, Skt. āyuṣmat.
   got up from his seat …: The most stable part of the set phrase is something like *yena bhagavāṁs tenāñjaliṁ praṇamya bhagavantam etad avocat.

b) six paths: gatiṣ. These are the realms of possible rebirth within samsāra, namely: (1) Hell, naraka (2) Hungry Ghosts, preta (3) Animals, tiryagyoni (4) Asuras (5) Men, manuṣya (6) Gods, deva.

c) beginningless: Takasaki (1975a: 45): いつはじまったとも知れぬ昔から. See the Introduction.

d) three realms: (1) of desire, kāmadhātu (2) of form, rūpadhātu (3) the formlesss realm, ārūpyadhātu.

e) four types of rebirth: Birth from (1) a Womb (2) an Egg (3) Moisture (4) by Transformation.

f) without exhaustion: should this be understood distributively with each verb in this sentence?
d) mass of beings: *sattvanikāya?
   ocean of beings: *sattvasāgara?

e) The purport of this is profound and mysterious: See §9ii.
a) At that time the World-honored One said to Śāriputra: b) “Good! Good! Śāriputra, you ask me about this extremely profound purport in order to pacify all beings, to bring happiness to all beings, to show compassion for all beings, to benefit all beings, to avail and bring happiness to all beings, gods and men. c) If you were not to ask the Tathāgata, Arhat, Perfectly Awakened One about such a purport as this, Śāriputra, there would be many faults. d) How so? In the present age and in future ages all beings—gods, men, and so on—would suffer and be harmed for an extended time, and would forever lose all that is beneficial and brings them happiness.

b) you ask me ...: 乃能問我. In the Laṅkāvatāra we find the following expression: 佛告大慧: 善哉, 善哉。善哉, 大慧。汝能哀愍一切天人, 多所安樂多所饒益, 乃能問我如是之義。善哉, 善哉, 善哉, 大慧。諦聽, 諦聴 (T. 671 [XVI] 531b23–26) = 佛告大慧: 善哉, 善哉, 善哉, 大慧。汝能問我如是之義, 多所安樂多所饒益, 哀愍一切諸天世人。佛告大慧: 諦聴, 諦聴, 善思念之 (T. 670 [XVI] 491a1–4). This corresponds to the Sanskrit bhagavān āha | sādhu sādhu mahāmate sādhu khalu punas tvam mahāmate yat tvam etam artham adhyeṣitavyam manyase bahujanahitāya tvam mahāmate prati-panno bahujanasukhāya lokānukampāyai mahato janakāsyaśārthāya hitāya sukhāya devānām ca manusyaṁnaṁ ca (Nanjio 1923: 89.12–16). The Sanskrit sādhu ... yat tvam etam artham adhyeṣitavyam manyase means something like “It is good that you think that you should ask about this point.’ Generally speaking néng 能 indicates ‘can’ in the sense of ‘have the ability to,’ ‘be competent to,’ or may just indicate agency, in contrast to dé 得 which suggests ‘can’ in the sense of ‘have an opportunity to.’ In this
light, I translate 乃能問我 simply ‘you ask me’; would a rendering like ‘you are competent or qualified to ask me’ understand manyase as pointing to something like ‘you judge that I should be asked’? Takasaki (1975a: 46) has simply “asked.”

extremely profound purport: See the note to §9ii(a).

to pacify …: a version of a very frequent stock expression, appearing perhaps most commonly as bahujanahitāya bahujanasukhāya lokānu-kampāyai arthāya hitāya sukhaṇḍa devamanaśyanām. See the note above.

gods and men: probably this is meant to qualify the realm of beings in the sense of ‘comprising the world of gods and men.’ Notice that just below in (d) the wording is “all beings—gods, men, and so on.” The expression is inclusive rather than exclusive.

c) Takasaki (1975a: 46) takes this in the past tense, “if you had not asked … there would have been,” which is equally possible.
a) “It is a greatly mistaken view, Śāriputra, to see the realm of beings as increasing or to see the realm of beings as decreasing. b) Because of these views, Śāriputra, beings who hold these greatly mistaken views are born blind and sightless. c) Consequently, for a very long time they errantly tread mistaken paths, and therefore in the present age they fall into evil destinies. d) It is great disaster, Śāriputra, to cling to and grasp at [the notion of] the realm of beings as increasing, or to cling to and grasp at [the notion of] the realm of beings as decreasing. e) These beings, Śāriputra, cling to and grasp at [these notions]. Consequently, for a very long time they will errantly tread mistaken paths, and therefore in future ages they will fall into evil destinies.

a) greatly mistaken view: dàxiéjiàn 大邪見. See the expression in the Samyuktāgama: 時有一梵，起大邪見 (T. 100 [109] [II] 412c20) = Sañyutta-Nikāya : tena kho pana samayena aññatarassa brahmuno evarūpaṁ pāpakāṁ diṭṭhigataṁ uppannaṁ hoti (Feer 1884–1898: i.144,11–12). However, at least the term xiéjiàn 邪見 is rather common as a rendering of mithyā-ḍṛṣṭi, kudṛṣṭi and so on.

the realm of beings: zhòngshēngjiè 衆生界, sattvadhātu.

b) blind and sightless: I have translated the Chinese as if it contained two words, shēngmáng 生盲 and wúmù 無目 (lit. ‘eye-less’), but the whole is probably simply pleonastic (or a hendiadys?): ‘blind.’ In Dharmarakṣa’s translation of the Lotus Sutra, we find 生盲無目 (T. 263 [IX] 79a15) where
the Sanskrit has *kāṇāṇḍha* (vs. III.122c: Kashgar, Toda 1983: 50 = Gilgit, Watanabe 1975: 220), which appears again to be a pleonasm for ‘blind.’ The term *shēngmáng* 生盲 may reflect Sanskrit *jātyandha*, as in *Mahāvyutpatti* §8874. However, note that in *RGVC* itself *shēngmángrén* 生盲人 corresponds to *acakṣusman* (Johnston 1950: 74.3 = *RGVC* T. 1611 [XXXI] 839b19). Takasaki (1975a: 47) interprets the second term metaphorically as meaning one is not able to see things correctly: ものを正しく見る目をもたず. For an excellent detailed study of the term *andha* and related vocabulary, see Hara (2006), who argues that in many cases the operative notion is not that of complete blindness but something closer to ‘short-sighted’ or ‘dim-sighted,’ that is, an inability to see the correct object or the big picture. In this light, it might be better to render loosely “beings who hold these greatly mistaken views are of impaired vision” or some similar expression. It is not the utter blindness of the individuals in question which causes them to wander down mistaken paths, but their inability to see correctly, as Takasaki suggests.

c) **for a very long time:** *dirgharātra:* lit. the long night. A common expression.

c-e) **present age … future ages:** 現在世, 未来世. The reference is to incarnations within sāṃsāra. There is no indication how far into the future is meant by the second term, and in this sense English ‘ages,’ which may be read to imply a distant future, might not be the best rendering.

d) **great disaster:** Takasaki (1975a: 47) has 越すに越されぬ大難所, which seems stronger: the ultimate or unsurpassable disaster. I do not read the Chinese as making such a comparative claim. There is a very clear example here of the disposal construction with *qū* 取 - object - verb. See Cao and Yu (2000).
a) 舍利弗，一切愚癡凡夫不如實知一法界故，不如實見一法界故，起邪見心，謂衆生界増，衆生界減。b) 舍利弗，如來在世，我諸弟子不起此見。c) 若我滅後，過五百歲，多有衆生愚無智慧。d) 於佛法中雖除鬚髮，服三法衣，現沙門像，然其內無沙門德行。e) 如是等輩非沙門，自謂沙門。非佛弟子，謂佛弟子。f) 而自説言：「我是沙門，真佛弟子」。 如是等人起增減見。何以故。

a) "Because all foolish common people, Śāriputra, do not know the single dharma-realm in accord with reality, because they do not see the single dharma-realm in accord with reality, they entertain ideas informed by mistaken views, thinking that the realm of beings increases or that the realm of beings decreases. b) While the Tathāgata is in the world, Śāriputra, my disciples will not entertain these views. c) (However,) when five hundred years have passed after my nirvāṇa, there will be many beings who are foolish and lack insight. d) [Being] within the Buddhist community, although they will remove their beards and hair, put on the three dharma robes, and manifest outwardly the appearance of śramaṇas, nevertheless inwardly they will lack the virtuous behavior of śramaṇas. e) Such people, although actually not śramaṇas will call themselves śramaṇas, although not disciples of the Buddha will call themselves disciples of the Buddha. f) Still they themselves will say: ‘I am a śramaṇa, a true disciple of the Buddha.’ This sort of persons will entertain the view that there is increase or decrease. Why?

a) foolish common people: yúchī fánfū 愚癡凡夫, bālapṛthajana, this Sanskrit equivalent attested in §10i(d), below (although in several other instances in the RGV it appears to render only bāla, 13.2 = 842b3, 13.8–12 = 842b10–14, 84.18 = 842b21). I am uncertain whether, or rather how far,
to understand this word as a technical term. It comes to have a special significance in path theories, in which it designates the being at the lowest stage of spiritual development, the details of which however differ according to system. On the concept and term, see, with reservations, Haneda (1979: 6–24), and from another perspective Hakamaya (2006). Haneda makes the important point that formulations such as that in Jñānaprasthāna, which state that the prthagjana will never, in the past, present or future, obtain holy states (云何異生性。答: 若於聖法、聖暖、聖見、聖忍、聖欲、聖慧諸非得已, 非得, 當非得, 是謂: 異生性 [T. 1544 (XXVI) 928c5–7]) come very close to the idea of the icchantika, for which see the Introduction. It is equally interesting to note that in early sources including the Theragāthā and the Saṁyutta-Nikāya we find, respectively, andhabalaputhujjanā and bālam puthujjamam andham (Oldenberg and Pischel 1883: verse 575b and Feer 1884–1898: iii.140,2). This is very suggestive in light of the expression above in 3ii(b) that speaks of those who are born blind, clearly the same individuals as these foolish common people. I do not understand Takasaki (1975a: 47), さまざまの生まれをもつすべての凡夫たち, which seems either to skip what I take as 'foolish,' or to somehow extend the plain sense of ‘all’ to mean ‘belonging to various modes of rebirth’.

**the single dharma-realm:** *ekadharmadhātu.* See below §8ii.

**in accord with reality:** *yathābhūtam.

**thinking:** this meaning for 講 is quite common in this literature; it might also on occasion be rendered ‘to wit,’ which would also be possible here.

c) **when five hundred years ... after my nirvāṇa:** In the Kāmāpavākā-sūtra quoted in the Śikṣāsamuccaya, Chinese 若我滅後, 正法欲没 corresponds to yadāham parinirvṛto bhavāmi saddharmaś cántarhito bhavati (T. 1636 [XXXII] 91b8 = Bendall 1897–1902: 78,3–4), referring to the destruction of the teaching after the nirvāṇa of the Buddha. Here in the AAN, however, we have no reference to the disappearance of the teaching as a whole. I am not sure if there is any significant difference here between nirvāṇa and parinirvāṇa.

(Note that the Kāmāpavākā-sūtra is called the Hēyūjing 詞欲經 in the Chinese translation of the Śikṣāsamuccaya. However, this is not the same as T. 615 菩薩詞色欲法經, translated by Kumārajiva, a very short text, despite the fact that this text is cited under the title 詞欲經 by the Sifenlü xingshi-chao zichi ji 四分律行事鈔資持記 (T. 1805 [XL] 275b7ff.). The Lidai sanbao ji 歷代三寶紀 of 597 cites a 菩薩詞欲經一卷 (T. 2034 [XLIX] 92a1), which it attributes to Guṇabhadra 求那跋陀羅, while the Kaiyuan shijiaolu 開元
of 730 also refers to a 菩薩訶欲經一卷 (T. 2154 [LV] 528c17) which, however, it identifies as the same as Kumārajiva’s translation. Whatever lack of clarity there might be in the catalogues, for the moment we must conclude that we cannot otherwise identify the Kāmāpavāka-sūtra quoted in the Śiksāsamuccaya.)

d) [Being] within the Buddhist community: I remain slightly uncertain whether to understand 佛法 as referring to Sanskrit buddhadharma (in which case we should understand “many beings who are foolish and lack insight into the Buddha’s teaching[s],” connecting the clause to sentence [c]), or whether we should see in 於佛法中 buddhaśāsanā, as I understand it here. In the Sarvadharmāpravruttinirdeśa, the expression 於佛法中 corresponds to de bzhin gshegs pa'i bstan pa la (Braarvig 2000: 134.13–14 = T. 650 [XV] 0753c7), no doubt buddhaśāsanā. However, when it occurs in the RGV, it reflects rather Sanskrit ihadhārmika (Johnston 1950: 28.2 = RGVc T. 1611 [XXXI] 828c11; 29.7 = 828c20). (Although the Sanskrit here is nominal, the Chinese appears to rephrase the meaning.) Both Tokiwa (1932: 105) and Takasaki (1975a: 48) attach the clause to (d), and indeed when we consider that the expression is followed by sui 虽, there do not appear to be examples in which the sense of ‘teachings of the Buddha’ is to be preferred. In a sūtra passage quoted in the Pratijñāpradīpa (T. 1566 [XXX] 131b2–3), we find 愚癡衆生於佛法中雖得出家, “foolish beings renounce the world into the Buddhist community”; the same is quoted in the Prasannapadā (La Vallée Poussin 1903–1913: 540.12–541.1): tadbime bhagavan mohapurūṣā [ye] svākhāye dharmavīnaye pravrajya, and in the Chinese versions of the sūtra we find (T. 585 [XV] 4c7): 天中天, 於正法律而行出家; (T. 586 [XV] 36c28–29): 世尊, 是諸比丘於正法出家; (T. 587 [XV] 66c16–17): 世尊, 是諸比丘已於如來正法出家. In the Sāryagarbhasūtra (T. 396 [XIII] 291b23–25) we find: 我等憶念過去世時, 於佛法中雖得出家, “we remember in a past age when, although we renounced the world into the Buddhist community, we still performed a variety of such bad actions.” The same syntax, however, can also appear when the meaning of the phrase is rather clearly ‘the Buddha’s teaching,’ as in the Da zhidu lun 大智度論 (T. 1509 [XXV] 320b4–5), when several monks are mentioned as excellent with respect to the teachings of the Buddha, but not so with respect to those of the non-Buddhists: 富樓那、迦迦那、阿那律等於佛法中雖大, 於外法中不如.

e) although actually not śramaṇas … disciples of the Buddha: See the passage in Ratnaraśi §I.3c (Silk Forthcoming): “in the future will there be some monks who destroy the Tathāgata’s awakening perfected over uncountable aeons, who are not śramaṇas but will falsely claim to be
śramaṇas, who are not followers of the practice of purity but will falsely claim to be followers of the practice of purity?” (ma mchis pa’i dus na gang dag de bzhin gshegs pa’i byang chub bskal pa grangs ma mchis par yang dag par bsgrubs pa nub par bygig pa dge sbyong ma lags la dge sbyong du mchid kyis ’che zhiṅ | tshangs par spyod pa ma lags par tshangs par spyod par mchid kyis ’che ba’i dge slong la la dag ’byung bar ’gyur lags sam; 若未来世有諸沙門非實沙門自言我是沙門，非梵行人自言我有梵行). In Sanskrit we see an example of the stock phrase in a passage of the Kṣitigarbhasūtra quoted in the Śikṣāsamuccaya: yo mahābrahman mamoddiśya pravrajito duhśilapāpasamācāro bhikṣur anubhūtaḥ kaśambakajāto āśramaṇaḥ śramaṇapratijñāḥ abhayacāri brahmacāripatijñāḥ (Bendall 1897–1902: 67.19–20), and see Mahāvyutpatti §§9143–9144. There are numerous other examples of the same (e.g., Śūryagarbhasūtra [Derge 257, mdo sde, za 103b5], T. 721 (XVII) 286b2–3:實非沙門，而自説言: 我是沙門. In T. 1462 (XXIV) 709b11: 非沙門者，自言我是沙門 ≠ Pāli Samantapāsadikā (Takasaki and Nagai 1924: i.195,19–20): te hi assamanā va hutvā samanapatiṁñatāya paresam paccaye corenti).

f) I am a śramaṇa: Takasaki (1975a: 48): われこそは沙門であり. I do not think the Chinese contains the emphasis and exclusion implied by こそ, which seems to convey the sense that ‘while I am a śramaṇa, others are not.’

increase or decrease: Takasaki (1975a: 48 and 374n6) translates ないものをあるとする見方 (増見)やあるものをないとする見方 (減見)を起こすことである. His note explains that he takes these to refer to adhyāropa (samāropa) and apavāda, with the view that beings become greater (the view of increase) being one example of the former type. I have grave doubts about whether it makes sense to apply such notions as adhyāropa (or even the older form, samāropa) to a sūtra like the AAN. At least according to Tanji (2000: 347), “The word samāropa is used together with apavāda, the pair forming a dual category, for the first time in the Vijñānavāda school.”
a) 此諸衆生以依如來不了義經，無慧眼故；b) 遠離如實空見故；c) 不如實知如來所證初發心故；d) 不如實知修集無量菩提功德行故；e) 不如實知如來所得無量法故；f) 不如實知如來無量力故；g) 不如實知如來無量境界故；h) 不信如來無量行處故；i) 不如實知如來不思議無量法自在故；j) 不如實知如來不思議無量方便故；k) 不能如實分別如來無量差別境界故；l) 不能善入如來不可思議大悲故；m) 不如實知如來大涅槃故。

b) 遠離如實空見故] S: 離如實空見故
d) 不如實知修集] Q, S, SX: 不如實知修習
i) 不思議] Kongo: 不思可議
k) 不能如實分別] F1, 2: 不能如實分別; Li: 不能如實分別; Q, S, SX: 不如實知分別
l) 不可思議] Li: 不思可議
m) 大涅槃] Kongo: 火涅槃

a) “[They entertain the view that there is increase or decrease] because these beings, having resorted to the Tathāgata’s sūtras of provisional meaning, lack the wisdom-eye; b) because they are remote from the view of emptiness in accord with reality; c) because they do not know in accord with reality the initial aspiration (to awakening) realized by the Tathāgata; d) because they do not know in accord with reality the practices which accumulate immeasurable merits for bodhi; e) because they do not know in accord with reality the immeasurable qualities attained by the Tathāgata; f) because they do not know in accord with reality the Tathāgata’s immeasurable power; g) because they do not know in accord with reality the Tathāgata’s immeasurable sphere (of knowledge); h) because they do not believe in the Tathāgata’s immeasurable range of action; i) because they do not know in accord with reality the Tathāgata’s inconceivable, immeasurable mastery of the Teachings; j) because they do not know in accord with reality the Tathāgata’s inconceivable, immeasurable skillful means; k) because they are not able to distinguish in accord with reality the Tathāgata’s immeasurable sphere of discrimination; l) because they are not good at penetrating into the Tathā-
gata’s inconceivable great compassion; m) because they do not know in accord with reality the Tathāgata’s great nirvāṇa.

a) sūtras of provisional meaning: *neyārthasūtra. I do not know precisely how old this term is, but we do find already in the Aṅguttara Nikāya the sentences yo ca neyyattham suttantam nītattho suttanto ti dipeti. yo ca nītattham suttantam neyyattho suttanto ti dipeti (Morris 1885: 60,13–14; II.iii.5). Here the two bad positions are declaring a sermon as of final meaning when it really is provisional, and vice versa. That is, in this passage nītattha is not given priority; the problem is simply confusing the categories. For the AAN, however, priority is clearly to be given to nītārtha. Takasaki (1975a: 48) takes the second expression somewhat more positively, understanding ‘who have not yet opened the eye of wisdom.’ However, he also (1965: 89) interpreted the reference to neyārtha scriptures to point to Hīnayāna texts, although I see no reason this should be so.

b)-c): Takasaki (1975a: 48) considers these two items to be one reason, understanding our (b) as the reason for (c), but he offers no explanation for the connection he sees here. I do not see any. Earlier (1965: 89) his division of the items corresponds to that given here.

d) Takasaki (1975a: 48) understands immeasurable practices which lead to the attainment of the merits termed (?) bodhi: (如来が）菩提という功徳を得るために無量の修行を積み重ねたということをありのままにしないから. I do not see how the syntax of the Chinese would permit this understanding. I render pūtí 菩提 in English as bodhi, rather than Awakening, because the Chinese transliterates the term, but I admit that I am not consistent in this practice.

g) immeasurable sphere (of knowledge): In §15i(g), with note, jìngjiè 境界 is to be understood as jneyabhūmi. If this same terminology applies here, the insertion in parentheses is thereby justified. Takasaki (1965: 89) also identifies this as the sphere of knowledge: 境界 (*viśaya) すなわち智の対象. Takasaki (1975a: 48) however translates: 如来の（無量）のはたらきの対象（境界）が無量であることをありのままに知らないから. ‘The object of the Tathāgata’s work is infinite’ does not make much sense to me, unless this would refer to salvific work. See also §10i(b) where we find 如來智慧境界.

i) **inconceivable, immeasurable mastery of the Teachings:** 不思議無量法自在. I understand the reference here to be to one of the ten masteries, *daśa-vāsītā*, namely (*Mahāvyutpatti* §777) *dharmavaśītā*. In the *Daśabhūmika-sūtra* it is said that the bodhisattva “attains the mastery of the Teachings because he displays the radiance of the teachings which are without middle or extremes,” *dharmavaśītāṁ ca pratilabhate | anantamadhyadharmamukhālokasaṁdarśanatayā* (Kondo 1936: 143,6). Precisely the same expression is found in a variety of texts. The ordering of the ten can differ; that the AAN refers to *dharmavaśītā* suggests that it referred to a list in which this was the final item. See Funahashi (1977) for a brief discussion, with references.

k) **the Tathāgata’s immeasurable sphere of discrimination.** This is a curious expression, since ‘discrimination’ is usually a negative notion. For example, the *Acintyabuddhaviśayanirdeśa* uses precisely the Chinese expression we have here, 差別境界, when it says 無如是等差別境界, 是乃名為諸佛境界 (*T. 340 [XII] 108a18–19*), which is paralleled in the Tibetan translation with: *bcom ldan ’das yul khyad par ma mchis pa ni sangs rgyas kyi yul lags te* (Derge Kanjur 79, *dkon brtsegs*, ca, 267a7–b1). The meaning is that the domain of the Buddha is not a domain of discrimination as was explained in the preceding sentences, namely, there is no discrimination of eye, ear and so on. In our passage here in the AAN, therefore, where the discrimination must be taken positively, it may be that this discrimination refers to the Tathāgata’s skillful means or something similar. This may be what is intended by Takasaki (1975a: 49): 如来のはたらきの対象の無量の差異種別をありのままに理解できないから.

Note (by examining the variant readings) that this expression created great problems for the copyists of the sūtra, who probably were so used to writing 知 in this series that they automatically inserted it here as well, against the required sense.

l) **not good at:** For the term *néngshàn* 能善, see Ōta (1988: 41).

m) For Takasaki (1965: 90), misunderstanding the nature of the Tathāgata’s nirvāṇa (which he takes as equivalent to misunderstanding the nature of the *dharma-kāya*) leads directly to the error of concluding that there is a decrease in the realms of beings. In this he bases himself on the *Tathāgatotpattisambhava-nirdeśa* (*Xingqī 性起* chapter) of the *Buddhāvataṃsaka* sūtra.
"Śāriputra, because foolish common people lack [even that] insight which comes from hearing [the teachings], hearing of the Tathāgata’s nirvāṇa they entertain the view that it is annihilation and the view that it is cessation. Because they entertain the notion that it is annihilation and the notion that it is cessation, they consider that the realm of beings decreases, and this creates the extremely heavy evil karma of a greatly mistaken view.

a) insight which comes from hearing: wénhuì 閣慧, śrutamāyī-prajñā.
Probably what is meant is that foolish common people lack even the most basic of the three forms of insight, that obtained by (mere) listening, that is, learning from a teacher, not to mention that obtained through rational thinking (cintāmayī-) or the highest form, that obtained through meditative contemplation (bhāvanāmayī-). Because they do not even know the doctrine as it is taught, they confuse the nature of nirvāṇa with that of nirodha, extinction. In Sanskrit, learning is aural, and thus to say that one is bahuśruta, ‘one who has heard much,’ is to express what we mean by saying someone is ‘well read.’ Therefore, it would be more technically correct to render the expression ‘insight which comes from learning,’ but the connection with the following ‘hearing of the Tathāgata’s nirvāṇa’ would then be lost.
Tokiwa (1932: 105n9) rejects the identification of wénhuì 閣慧 with śrutamāyī-prajñā and appeals instead to the pair yǎnjian 眼見 and wénjiàn 聽見 in the Mahāyāna Mahāparinirvāṇa-mahāsūtra. There (T. 374 [XII] 527c–528a) bodhisattvas and buddhas see through eyes and know that all beings have the buddha-nature. Bodhisattvas of the tenth stage are in-between, while those in the ninth and lower stages see by hearing. Those who hear that all beings possess the buddha-nature, but do not believe it, do not have even this seeing through hearing. Thus, while it is possible to see why this passage came to Tokiwa’s attention (and perhaps he knew it since it is quoted by Shinran in his Kyōgyōshinshō 教行信証 [T. 2646 (LXXXIII) 624a1–25]), as the category does not seem to be known elsewhere, I do not believe that we can reasonably apply it here.
annihilation and ... cessation: Takasaki (1975a: 49) interprets this to refer to the annihilation of transmigration and that there is nothing after death. In RGV we find *duānjiàn* 斷見 as *ucchedāṛśti* (Johnston 1950: 34.20 = RGV_C T. 1611 [XXXI] 830c28). See §13i(b).

b) entertain the notion: For the construction with 以起 ... 想, Stefano Zacchetti points to Edgerton’s discussion (1953, s.v. saṃjñā [5]) concerning an object, generally in the locative, followed by *saṃjñā* and the verb *utpādayati*, with the meaning ‘conceives an idea.’

extremely heavy evil karma: In the *Suvarṇabhūṣottama*, 極重惡業 corresponds to *kṛtam pāpaṁ sudārunam* (Nobel 1937: 28; Skjaervø 2004: 3.38b = T. 663 [XVI] 337b5). Later in the AAN (§20ii), those who hold the views of increase and decrease will be called *icchantika*. In the *Zhufo jingjie shézhenshi jing* 諸佛境界攝眞實經 (T. 868 [XVIII] 276c11–12), we find the expressions *icchantika* and ‘extremely heavy evil karma’ connected: 若凡夫人修此觀門, 雖造五逆、一闡提等極重惡業, 皆悉消滅, “If common persons practice this visualization, although they commit extremely heavy evil karma such as the five sins of immediate retribution, [those of] the *icchantika*, and so on, all [their evil] will be wiped out.” As written this sentence makes it look like *icchantika* is something one can ‘do’ *zào* 造, which does not seem to make sense, but the overall sense of the association between being an *icchantika* and ‘extremely heavy evil karma’ is clear, and my rendering attempts to make logical sense of the expression.

Takasaki (1975a: 49) understands two things, greatly mistaken views and extremely heavy evil karma. This is also possible, I suppose.
a) “Once again, Śāriputra, on the basis of the view that there is decrease, these beings further entertain three types of views. b) These three types of views and that view that there is decrease are inseparable, like [the threads of] a gauze net. c) What are the three views? d) 1. The view of annihilation, that is, that there is absolute exhaustion. e) 2. The view that there is extinction, that is, precisely nirvāṇa. f) 3. The view that there is no nirvāṇa, that is, that this nirvāṇa is absolute quiescence. g) These three types of views, Śāriputra, fetter [beings] in this way, grasp [beings] in this way, and cling [to beings] in this way.
atyantaksayatvāt sarvadharmānāṁ (Vorobyova-Desyatovskaya et al. 2002: §148 [75r1 = p 52.27–28] = T. 659 [XVI] 282c9–10). In the Jñānā-lokālanikāra, the manuscript reading should be confirmed, but in any event certainly nearly the same sort of equivalent is found (Study Group on Buddhist Sanskrit Literature 2004: 138,3 = T. 359 [XII] 262a25–26). However, in the Vimalakirtinirdeśa, 不壊慈畢竟盡故 correspoids to what the extant Sanskrit has as akopyamaitry atyantaḥṣṭhāna (Study Group on Buddhist Sanskrit Literature 2006: 66.13, 40b2, §VI.2 = T. 475 [XIV] 547b18). This demonstrates that while the vocabulary is stable, it is not invariant.

e) extinction: This term mièjiàn 滅見 seems hard to distinguish from the previous one duànjiàn 断見. The term miè 滅 may render nirodha, but in the Karunāpuṇḍarika we find instead (with a slight difference in vocabulary) 若有衆生於三寶中起斷滅見, 聞佛説法即得諸寶莊嚴三昧 equivalent to triratnocchedadrṣṭīnāṁ ratnavyūhavyāhāreṇa (Yamada 1968: II.254.10–11 = T. 157 [III] 210a27). In the Viṣṇuṣṭhāna we find the sequence 有見、無見、斷滅見、常在為斷大見 equivalent to bhavadrṣṭi, vi-bhavadrṣṭī, uchchedadrṣṭī, šāsvatadrṣṭī, and svakāyadrṣṭī, and thus it looks like the last term misses an equivalent (T. 225 [VIII] 480c8–9 = Wogihara 1932–1935: 80.26–81.1). (When we find 滅見 in Mūlamadhyamakakārikā V.8d, it corresponds to draṣṭavyopaśama, ‘pacification of visible objects [that is, what can be experienced].’ [Saigusa 1985: 144–145] It is intriguing to notice, however, that Candrakīrti comments draṣṭavyopaśamaṁ śiva-laksanaṁ sarvakalpanājālarahitaṁ, ‘characterized by calm, the pacification of visible objects is free from the net [jāla] of all conceptualization’ [La Vallée Poussin 1903–1913: 135.3]. Here note especially the use of the key term jāla.) How exactly to sort out the terms here is not clear, but it does suggest that the vocabulary in question requires further investigation.

Incidentally, what seems to be the view criticized here has been repeated in modern times, for example by Oldenberg (1882: 273): “The Nirvāṇa is annihilation,” and La Vallée Poussin (1917: 117): “It may therefore be safely maintained that Nirvāṇa is annihilation.”

f) absolute quiescence: bijìng kòngjì 畢竟空寂. In the Ratnacūḍa quoted in the Śikṣāsamuccaya, we find corresponding to this Chinese term atyantopaśama (Bendall 1897–1902: 272.10 = T. 1636 (XXXII) 127c4), with the same in the Mahāyānasūtrasūtraṅkāra (Lévi 1907: XVIII.77cy; and see Nagao 1958: 7). Takasaki (1975a: 375n8) suggests rather *atyanta-vivikta, in which vivikta has the original sense of ‘separated’ as in ‘pure,’ separated from stain, or ‘quiet,’ separated from activities, such as a busy village; or
‘empty,’ ‘nul,’ separated from the substantial. Here he suggests that the reference is to nirvāṇa as quiessence understood as empty or nothing.

g) It is not clear whether this sentence should rather be attached to the following section §5iii.

fetter in this way, grasp in this way, and cling in this way: Seishi Karashima points out to me that the grammatical construction with 如 is x, 如 is y, 如 is z is found in a famous expression in the Lotus Sutra (T. 262 [IX] 5c11–13): 所謂諸法如是相。如是性。如是體。如是力。如是作。如是因。如是緣。如是果。如是報。如是本末究竟等. For an interesting discussion see Robert (2011). In the Dīrghāgama (T. 1 [I] 90b11–12) we find 唯有如来，知此見處，如是持，如是執，亦知報應, translated by Sueki (2002: 43): ただ如来だけが，この説がこのように維持執着されることを知り，またその報いを知る.
a) "Through the forceful influence of these three views, [those beings] in their turn further entertain two types of mistaken views. b) These two types of views and those three views are inseparable, like a gauze net. c) What are the two views? d) 1. The view devoid of desire [for nirvāṇa]. e) 2. The view of the absolute nonexistence of nirvāṇa.

d) **devoid of desire [for nirvāṇa]:** I follow Takasaki (1975a: 375n9) here in understanding the reference to be to nirvāṇa. He reaches this conclusion based on the following §5iv, which he understands to suggest that one does not seek nirvāṇa because one rather 1) follows other paths, and 2) confuses the pure and impure. He then—to me it seems like a leap—connects this with the Lokāyata doctrine. Srisetthaworakul (2010: 67) understands “they have no interest in nirvāṇa,” 涅槃に興味を持たない. These suggestions seem to me be more or less guesses, and since the expression does not appear elsewhere, so far as I can tell, its meaning is not obvious.

When the words 無欲見 appear in the *Madhyamāgama* (T. 26 [198: Dantabhūmi] [I] 757b11, 22, c12) they are to be understood as “seeing the absence of sensual pleasures” (Anālayo 2006: 7), or as Ven. Anālayo now writes to me, ‘dispassionate vision.’

e) **the absolute nonexistence of nirvāṇa:** In *Mahāyānasūtra-laṅkāra* we find the expression 畢竟無涅槃法 corresponding to *atyantāparinirvāṇadharma* (Lévi 1907: III.11c7, and see Nagao 1958: 7), where, however, it refers to those who absolutely do not have the capacity for attaining nirvāṇa at all, ever. On this see (with some reservations) D’Amato (2003).
5iv

a) 舍利弗，依無欲見，復起二見。 b) 此二種見與無欲見不相捨離，猶如羅網。 c) 何謂二見。 d) 一者，戒取見； e) 二者，於不淨中起淨顛倒見。

b) 猶如羅網

a) “On the basis of the view, Śāriputra, devoid of desire [for nirvāṇa], [those beings] further entertain two views. b) These two types of views and the view devoid of desire [for nirvāṇa] are inseparable, like a gauze net. c) What are the two views? d) 1. The view of attachment to practices and observances. e) 2. The inverted view through which one conceives of the impure as pure.

d) The view of attachment to practices and observances: In the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya, Vasubandhu offers this explanation for śīlavrataparāmarśa: “Falsely viewing what is not a cause as a cause and falsely viewing what is not a genuine path towards salvation as a genuine path towards salvation is what we call attachment to practices and observances. For example, [Śiva] Mahēśvara is not the cause of the different worlds, but one nonetheless views him, or Prajāpati, or another one, as their cause. Practices such as [voluntarily] entering fire or water [so that death ensues] are not the cause of heaven, but one nonetheless views them as its cause. Mere practices and observances as well as things such as the knowledge of Sāṅkhya and Yoga are not a genuine path to salvation, but one nonetheless views them as a genuine path to salvation,” ahetau hetudṛṣṭir amārge mārgadrṣṭih śīlavrataparāmarśah | tadyathā maheśvaro na hetur lokānām | taṁ ca hetum paśyati praṣāpatim anyāṁ vā | agnijalapravesādayaś ca na hetuḥ svargasya tāṁś ca hetum paśyati | śīlavratamātrakaṁ sāṅkhya-yogajñānādayaś ca na mārgo mokṣasya tāṁś ca mārgaṁ paśyati (text Pradhan 1975: 282,8–12, ad V.7, trans. Eltschinger Forthcoming, with extensive removal of brackets).

e) inverted view: *viparyāsa. The view mentioned here is the last of the four inverted views, at least as old as the Āṅguttara-Nikāya: asubhe ... subhan ti saññāvipallāso cittavipallāso diṭṭhivipallāso (IV.V.49.1, Morris 1888: ii.52,7–8), apparently without Chinese equivalent, although the category is well known (for an extensive examination, see Watanabe 1987). In the RGV conceiving the impure with respect to what is pure is detailed as one of four inverted views: ... asubhe ūbham iti sañjñā | ayam ucyaśe caturvidho viparyāsaḥ = 於不淨中起於淨想。是等名為四種顛倒應知 (Johnston
1950: 30.11–12 = RGVc T. 1611 [XXXI] 829b19–20), with almost the identical expression found in the Wushangyi jing 無上依經 (T. 669 [XVI] 471c16), a Chinese work composed under the influence of the RGV, where as the fourth in a list of inverted views we find 於不淨中而生淨見. Note that the Indic wording may slightly differ, as illustrated by a passage from the Ugradattaparipr̥cchā (quoted in the Śikṣāsamuccaya, Bendall 1897–1902: 198.12): aścucau śucir iti viparyāsabhayabhīto.
a) "On the basis of the view, Śāriputra, of the absolute nonexistence of nirvāṇa, [those beings] further entertain six types of views. b) These six types of views and the view of the nonexistence of nirvāṇa are inseparable, like a gauze net. c) What are these six views? d) 1. The view that the world has a beginning. e) 2. The view that the world has an end. f) 3. The view that beings are an illusory creation. g) 4. The view that there is neither suffering nor pleasure. h) 5. The view that beings [produce] no (karmically significant) activity. i) 6. The view that there are no noble truths.

d-e) These first two views represent the first of the avyākṛtavastu, the unresolved questions to which the Buddha declined to offer an answer as both unfruitful and incomprehensible, namely ‘Is the world eternal?’ This category is widely discussed in Buddhist literature.

f-i) While the first two views are clearly problematic for Buddhism as a whole, views 3–6 could be doctrinally acceptable from a śūnyavādin point of view, or even a Mahāyānistic point of view more generally.

f) **illusory creation:** In the Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā we find 幻師幻化所作 = māyākāranirmita (T. 228 [VIII] 674a13–14 = Wogihara 1932–1935: 965.19), while in the Vimalakīrtinirdeśa 幻化所作 = nirmita (§XI.2: T. 476 [XIV] 584c8–9, Study Group on Buddhist Sanskrit Literature 2006: 111.4). The doctrinal point in the Vimalakīrtinirdeśa is that asking about rebirth makes no sense because all beings are no different from illusory creations. As the Da zhidu lun makes clear (Lamotte 1944–1980: I.357–360, in the note), all conditioned things are indeed nothing but māyā. However, is the point here rather about the ontological (?) status of nirmita (Lamotte 1944–1980: I.468–469n)? I do not see the direct connection here with nirvāṇa and its nonexistence, but perhaps I am being too literal.
h) **activity**: *shi* 事 is very difficult to understand here, and I am not at all sure of this rendering, which is in fact a guess. Takasaki (1975a: 51), 衆生のよりどころはない. Ogawa (2001: 228n22) uses precisely the same wording, adding 仏道を求める意味がない; neither explains this understanding. Generally *yoridokoro* means something like ‘authority,’ ‘ground (upon which one can rely).’ See the entirely context-free expression in the *Samādhirāja*: 不得衆生事 = *vastu nopalabhe* (Dutt 1953: 346.14–15 = Vaidya 1961: 167.1 = T. 639 [XV] 586a6–7), although this hardly makes things clearer. Dr Pu Chengzhong brings to my attention a passage in T. 468 [XIV] 494a22ff., in which Mañjuśrī asks the Buddha 若如來無心意識, 云何当作衆生事. While I am not certain this would necessarily be relevant, in any case, the Buddha’s answer does not clarify the precise sense of the expression here.

i) **no noble truths**: I do not know what stance this is meant to represent. While on the one hand to deny the Noble Truths is to deny Buddhism tout court, this seems like a very elementary point and not in keeping with the tenor of the rest of the discussion. In the *Śrīmālādevī* the “profound teaching” of the Noble Truths is identified with the tathāgatagarbha (Tsukinowa 1940: 120–122), and perhaps it is this discussion which was in the mind of the AAN’s authors.
a) “Once again, Śāriputra, on the basis of the view of increase, these beings further entertain two views. b) These two views and the view of increase are inseparable, like a gauze net. c) What are these two views? d) 1. The view that nirvāṇa was initially produced. e) 2. The view that [nirvāṇa] exists suddenly without causes or conditions.

d) **initially produced**: The *Milinda pañha* has Nāgasena state: “Nībbaṇa … is unarisable, therefore a cause for the arising of nībbaṇa has not been pointed out,” *anuppādanīyaṁ … nībbaṇam tasmā na nībbaṇassa uppādāya hetu akkhāto ti* (Trenckner 1880: 269.17–18, trans. Horner 1964: 88), and further, “It should not be said of nībbaṇa … that it is born of kamma or born of cause or born of physical change; or that it has arisen or has not arisen or is arisable; or that it is past or future or present,” *nībbaṇam pana mahārāja na vattabbam kammajan ti vā hetujan ti vā utujan ti vā uppānnaṁ ti vā anuppānnaṁ ti vā uppādanīyan ti vā atītan ti vā anāgatan ti vā paccuppannam ti vā* (Trenckner 1880: 271.13–16, Horner 1964: 90).

e) **suddenly without causes or conditions**: Takasaki (1975a: 51) takes this to refer to nirvāṇa, translating: (涅槃は) 因も縁もなくて突如として出現するという見方である. If the emphasis is on the point that nirvāṇa is unconditioned (*asaṃskṛta*), this cannot be a false view. In fact, this seems to be backwards (I owe the observation to Robert Sharf): nirvāṇa is by definition unconditioned. I wonder, therefore, whether the sense of the sentence may be that it is an error to believe that anything other than nirvāṇa, that is to say, any *saṃskṛta dharma*, exists without conditions. In the *Brahma-jāla-sūtra*, we read of the category of claims that “this world has come into existence without a cause,” 無因而出有此世間 (*Dirghagama*, T. 1 [21] [I] 92a15–16). Or is the sense, as we might gather from §7ii, that either (d) nirvāṇa already exists, and therefore need not be sought, or (e) will come to exist without one creating the conditions for it oneself? Is there an important contrast between *shí* 始 and *hūrán* 忽然, ‘at first, initially,’ and ‘suddenly’?
a) “These two types of views, Śāriputra, cause beings to lack the desire and the zeal [to cultivate] good qualities. b) Because, Śāriputra, these beings entertain these two views, even if the seven Buddhas, Tathāgatas, Arhats, Perfectly Awakened Ones were successively to appear in the world to expound the Teachings for them, c) it would be impossible for them to produce the desire and the zeal [to cultivate] good qualities.

a) the desire and the zeal [to cultivate]: Notice the parallelism between 於善法中無願欲心、勤精進心 in (a) and 於善法中若生欲心、勤精進心 in (c). The expression 願欲心 appears in Bodhiruci’s 十地經論 (T. 1522 [XXVI] 138a11), but its correspondence to the Tibetan version of the text is not entirely clear (Ōtake 2005: 163n22). It is conceivable that we should look here to categories 1 (信, faith) and 3 (精進, energy) in the list of 10 faiths (十信), for which see Nakamura (1981: 594a), but if so I do not know why only these two items would be adduced here. The overall expression remains unclear. Takasaki (1975a: 51) translates the two phrases: 望み願う心 and 得ようとつとめ努力する心, respectively.

b) the seven Buddhas: Probably a reference to the standard list: Viśāyin, Śikhin, Viśavīthu, Krakucchanda, Kanakamuni, Kāśyapa, Śākyamuni. Compare the expression in the Mahāsāṁghika Vinaya referring to the spiritual chances of a patricide: 正使七佛一時出世爲其説法，於正法中終不生善，“Even if the seven Buddhas were to appear in the world simultaneously to expound the dharma, he would ultimately not be able to produce [roots of] good with respect to the true teaching.” (T. 1425 [XXII] 417c4–5).

c) impossible: 無有是處, perhaps rendering asthānam… anavakāśaḥ, naitat sthānāṁ bhavati, nedāṁ sthānāṁ vidyate or a similar idiom.
a) “These two views, Śāriputra, are nothing other than the foundation of all forms of defilements caused by ignorance. b) [‘These two views’] means the view that nirvāṇa was produced in the beginning, and the view that [nirvāṇa] exists suddenly without causes and conditions.

a) the foundation of all forms of defilements: See the expression 爲我斷除疑惑根本諸見之病 = vicikicchākathaṅkathāsalla (in the *Śakraparipūcchā, T. 15 [I] 249b23 ≈ Sakkapañhasutta, Dīgha-nikāya 21, Rhys Davids and Carpenter 1890–1911: ii.283,26–27).
a) “These two views, Śāriputra, are nothing other than the teaching of fundamental great calamity brought about by extreme evil.” b) On the basis of these two views, Śāriputra, [beings] give rise to all views. c) All these views and those two views are inseparable, like a gauze net. d) ‘All views’ means all sorts of views, of inner and outer, gross and subtle, and in-between, that is, it refers to the view that there is increase and to the view that there is decrease.

a) teaching: I am unsure of the sense of fǎ 法 here. Takasaki (1975a: 375n13) takes it as ‘notion, idea, concept’ (概念).

fundamental great calamity: In the Vimalakīrtinirdeśa, dàhuàn 大患 corresponds to mahāvyādhi (Study Group on Buddhist Sanskrit Literature 2006: 49.22 [MS 29b6] §IV.12 = T. [XIV] 475 545a7; T. 476 [XIV] 568c1–2). We might also understand: ‘nothing other than the root of great evil and an extremely calamitous thing.’

d) inner and outer …. The expression is common; see the Lamotte (1944–1980: II.730, translating Da zhidu lun T. 1509 [XXV] 148a03): 色若麁若細若内若外, with reference to canonical sources and quoting Pāli atitānāgatapaccuppannam aßhattaṁ vā bahiddhā vā olārikaṁ vā sukhamānā vā …. In the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya we find likewise: atitānāgatapraty-utpannam ādhyātmikabāhyam audārikaṁ vā sūkṣmaṁ vā … (ad I.20ab, Pradhan 1975: 13.5). In light of these expressions, Takasaki’s (1975a: 52) understanding of ‘inner and outer’ as Buddhist and non-Buddhist seems unlikely.
8ii

a) 舍利弗, 此二種見依止一界, 同一界, 合一界。 b) 一切愚癡凡夫不如實知彼一界故, 不如實見彼一界故, 起於極惡大邪見心, 謂: 衆生界增, 謂: 衆生界減。」

b) 一切愚癡凡夫 ] Q, S, SX: 一切愚夫. Note that in §9i all have 一切愚癡凡夫.

a) “These two views, Śāriputra, rely on the single realm, are the same as the single realm, are united with the single realm. b) Because all foolish common people do not know that single realm in accord with reality, because they do not see that single realm in accord with reality, c) they entertain ideas of extremely evil greatly mistaken views, that is, that the realm of beings increases or that the realm of beings decreases.”

a) the single realm: This most probably corresponds to *eka(dharma)dhātu.
See above §41(a).

b) Because … in accord with reality: Takasaki (1965: 90, 1975a: 376n15) is right to draw attention to the passage in the RGV which, while not a quotation, certainly presents precisely the idea found here in the AAN: bālānam ekasya dhātor yathābhūtam ajñānād adarśanāc ca pravartate, “[various problems] develop because fools do not know and see the single realm in accord with reality” (Johnston 1950: 13.11–12).

c) extremely evil greatly mistaken views: See the passage in the Perfection of Wisdom: 曼殊室利, 假使碎此四大洲界悉為極微, 一一極微各為一佛, 有一極惡邪見衆生起毒害心殺爾所佛, 劫奪一切法財資財, 破滅世上間法王法藥 (T. 220 (6) [VII] 959a6–9), “Mañjuśrī, suppose one were to smash this realm of four continents into atoms, and each atom became a buddha. A being with extremely evil mistaken views might have malevolent intention to kill all those buddhas. Plundering all the dharma treasures and material treasures, he might destroy the medicine of the worldly law and the royal law.” According to Hikata (1958: xv), there exists no Tibetan correspondent.

that is: I understand wèi 謂 to function here, as elsewhere, as equivalent, at least functionally, to yad uta.
9i

a) At that time the venerable Śāriputra spoke to the Buddha, saying: b) “World-honored One! What is this single realm of which it is said: c) ‘All foolish common people, because they do not know that single realm in accord with reality, because they do not see that single realm in accord with reality, d) entertain ideas of extremely evil greatly mistaken views, that is, that the realm of beings increases or that the realm of beings decreases’? 

b-c) Takasaki (1975a: 53) translates: 世尊よ、ただ一つの根元とはいったいなんですか。なぜ愚かな凡夫たちはすべて …. I think the Chinese syntax does not support this. Moreover, the sūtra is no longer interested in why beings would hold the wrong views—it has already addressed this in detail. Now the questions is not why some might understand this single realm wrongly, but how it should be correctly understood.
9ii

a) 善哉，世尊。此義甚深，我未能解。b) 唯願如來為我解說，令得解了。」

a) **Emendation:** The transmitted text reads: 舍利弗言善哉世尊此義甚深我未能解. Since Śāriputra is already speaking, 舍利弗言 seems unnecessary or even impossible (already noticed by Takasaki 1975a: 376n16). Therefore, I delete 舍利弗言. For the interjection which begins the paragraph, see below.

b) 唯願如來 ] Q, S, SX: 唯願如來

a) “Good, World-honored One! The purport of this is extremely profound. I am not yet able to comprehend it. b) Would the Tathāgata please expound it for me, causing me to be able to completely comprehend it.”

a) **Good, World-honored One!** The Chinese 善哉, 世尊 probably represents something like śādhu bhagavā. The expression is very frequent, even, as here, in the midst of a statement.

**The purport ...**: Compare §2e, where we find 此義深隱, 我未能解, and note that in §3i(b) we find 甚深義 (which may suggest *gambhirārtha*). Here we have shěnshēn 甚深 where §2e has shēnyīn 深隱. That the phrasing with 此義甚深 is much more common does not necessarily indicate that the other is incorrect, however. The expression 甚深義, “extremely profound purport,” can also be equivalent, apparently, merely to artha, as in the Jñānalokālāmkāra (Study Group on Buddhist Sanskrit Literature 2004: 20.2 [6] = T. 357 [XII] 240a28). It seems to me most likely that we have to do in these cases with some sort of elegant variation.
At that time the World-honored One said to the venerable Śāriputra: “This extremely profound purport is exactly the Tathāgatha’s sphere of insight and it is the range of the Tathāgatha’s mind. Śāriputra, such a profound purport as this cannot be known by the insight of all the auditors and lone buddhas, cannot be seen, cannot be examined. Still how much less could all foolish common people fathom it.

The RGV Sanskrit version has: “b) For this purport, Śāriputra, is the Tathāgatha’s sphere, the Tathāgatha’s range. c) Even all the auditors and lone buddhas are not able through their own insight to correctly know, see or examine this purport to such an extent, Śāriputra, d) still how much less foolish common people.” I agree with Takasaki (1975a: 376n17) that the inclusion of insight and mind, respectively, as in the Chinese, is better, or at least clearer. Takasaki (1989: 5 and note 216n2) understands ‘purport’ as paramārthasatyā. (tāvat indicates that the auditors and lone buddhas cannot do this as far as the Tathāgata can.)
b-c) the Tathāgatha’s sphere of insight: In the Śrīmālādevī we read: bcom ldan ’das de bzhin gshegs pa’i snying po ni de bzhin gshegs pa’i spyod yul lags te | nyan thos dang | rangs sangs rgyas thams cad kyi spyod yul ma lags so || (Tsukinowa 1940: 122.4–7), “Blessed One, the embryo of the tathāgatas is the sphere of the Tathāgata, not the sphere of all the auditors and lone buddhas.” On this and the role of faith (in §10ii, below), see Ruegg (1971).

Note that at least in some contexts, other expressions may be found. In the Bodhisattvagocaropāyaviśayavikurväñanirdeśa we read that sems can gyi kham kyi mtha’ ni rtags par nus srīd kyi, “although it is possible to comprehend the end of the realm of beings ….” (Derge Kanjur 146, mdo sde, pa 133b1).

Takasaki (1974: 215) suggests that the relationship between the single dharma-realm and the realm of beings here in the AAN is of the same type as that portrayed in the Aṅgulimālīya, in which we read: ’jam dpal sems can thams cad kyi dbyings yin pas na | srog gcod pa spangs pa ni sangs rgyas so || rigs kyi bu ji ltar bdag gsd na ltar ’jig rten na srog gcod pa yang de bzhin te | bdag nyid kyi dbyings ’joms pa’o ||, 文殊師利白佛言: 世尊，以一切衆生界是一界故，諸佛離殺生耶。佛言: 世間殺生如人自殺，殺自界故（Derge Kanjur 213, mdo sde, tsha 196b2–3 = T. 120 [II] 540c2–4), [Chinese] “Mañjuśrī said to the Buddha: ‘Do the buddhas refrain from killing living beings because the realm of all beings is the single dharma-realm?’ The Buddha answered: ‘Yes, killing living beings is like suicide, because it is killing one’s own quintessence [or: the quintessence of the self?]’” [See Schmithausen (2003: 24n14), who reconstructs *sarvasattva-<dhātveka>dhātutvāt prāṇātipātāt prativiratā buddhāḥ.] A few lines below we find: gzhon yang ’jam dpal sems can thams cad kyi dbyings nischos kyi dbyings te | dbyings gcig tu gyur pa’i sha za bar ’gyur bas | sangs rgyas rnam sha mi gsal lo ||, 彼次，文殊師利，一切衆生界我界即是一界。所食之肉即是一肉。是故，諸佛悉不食肉（Derge Kanjur 213, mdo sde, tsha 197a5–6 ≠ T. 120 [II] 540c26–27, with Ogawa 2001: 156n4), “Again, Mañjuśrī, the realm of all beings is [Chinese: my quintessence; or: the quintessence of all beings is the quintessence of the self, that is, precisely] the single quintessence. The flesh which is eaten is precisely a single flesh. Therefore all buddhas eat no flesh at all.” (Tib. “Again, Mañjuśrī, the realm of all beings is the dharma-realm; since it is the flesh of the single realm that is eaten, all buddhas do not eat flesh.” Schmithausen [2003: 25n14] translates the Chinese: „Der Wesenskern (dhātu) aller Lebewesen und mein eigener Wesenskern sind ein [und derselbe] Wesenskern. Das Fleisch [der anderen], das man ißt, [und das eigene Fleisch: das] ist
[somit] ein [und dasselbe]. Deshalb essen die Buddhas keinesfalls Fleisch. “For the Tibetan he offers: „Der Wesenskern aller Lebewesen ist der dharmadhātu. Weil man [somit stets] das Fleisch von [etwas,] das eines Wesens [mit einem selbst] ist (*ekadātubhūta?), essen würde, essen die Buddhas kein Fleisch.“ Takasaki (1974: 232n83) remarks that the notion of ‘one’s own realm’ is unique to this sūtra, explaining that while contextually it is clear that this refers to the buddha nature, it is unclear to whom the ‘own’ (*bdag or rang in Tibetan) refers, but that in any event it does not refer to ātman. (Note that in this text Tibetan dbyings, *dhātu, sometimes corresponds to Chinese 性, sometimes to 界, a variation discussed in the Introduction.) Michael Radich points to a passage in the Mahāyāna Mahāparinirvāṇa-mahāsūtra (T. 374 [XII] 409b12–17; T. 376 [XII] 884b12–14; Derge Kanjur 120, mdo sde, tha 107a) in which the sūtra apparently speaks of an *ātmadhātu. On the Āṅgulimāliya see Kanō (2000: 68), who suggests that both the idea of the single realm and that of the purity and impurity of mind in the Āṅgulimāliya are related to presentations in the AAN. The Sanskrit text’s svaprajñāyā is not represented in AAN; is RGV’s zhèngzhìhuì 正智慧 *suprajñā < svaprajñā? Or does zhèng 正 represent *samyak?

Sanskrit has sarvaśrāvakapratyekabuddhair āpi, in RGV一切聲聞、辟支佛等. Was āpi misunderstood as °ādi (děng 等)?

d) Takasaki’s rendering (1975a: 53) seems to merge the Sanskrit and Chinese: ましていわんや、あらゆる愚かな凡夫たちにとってをや。彼らは推測することすらできない.
10ii

a) 唯有諸佛如來智慧乃能觀察、知、見此義。 b) 舍利弗, 一切聲聞、緣覺所有智慧, 於此義中, 唯可仰信; c) 不能如實知、見、觀察。

a) 唯有諸佛如來 | Q, S, SX: 唯有諸佛如來
b) 唯可仰信 | S, SX: 唯可仰信
c) 知見觀察 | S: 觀察

2.10–11: [anyatra tathāgataśraddhāgamanataḥ | śraddhāgamanīyo hi śāri-putra paramārthaḥ | ]

RGVc T. 1611 (XXXI) 821a23–25: 於此義中唯信如來。是故, 舍利弗, 隨如來信此衆生義。

a) “It is indeed only the insight of the buddhas and tathāgatas which can examine, know and see this purport. b) (Despite) the insight possessed by all auditors and lone buddhas, Śāriputra, with respect to this purport, they can only have faith; c) they are not able to know, see or examine it in accord with reality.

a-b) RGV here quotes (?) something quite different, syntactically connected with the sentence cited above in §10i: “Except through embracing faith in the Tathāgata—for, Śāriputra, the supreme truth is to be embraced through faith.” Takasaki (1989: 5): ただ、如来に対し信仰をもつ者の場合を除く。けだし、シャーリプトラや、最勝の義理（第一義[諦]）はただ信仰を通してのみ達せられる。This interpretation introduces a limitation (“the supreme truth is to be penetrated only through faith”) that I simply do not see in the Sanskrit, and which seems to me—if this is not going too far—to be distinctly Japanese, although it is interesting to observe that Prof. Takasaki himself belonged to the Sōtō Zen sect, and not to one of the Pure Land schools, in which I would have been more inclined to discover such a view.

We read in the Śrīmālādevī, quoted in Sanskrit: śeṣānāṁ devi sarvaśrāva-kratypākarudhānāṁ tathāgataśraddhāgamanīyāv evaitau dharmāv iti, in RGV: sangs rgyas kyi s ni chos ’di gnyis de bzhin gshigs pa la dad pas rtogs par bya ba nyid do zhes gsungs pa yin no, in the sūtra: lha mo lhag ma nyan thos rnams ni chos ’di gnyis la de bzhin gshigs pa la dad pas ’gro bar zad de |, “[You, goddess, can understand the doctrine being preached, as
can advanced bodhisattvas]. For the rest, goddess, all the auditors and lone buddhas, these two teachings are to be embraced only through faith in the Tathāgata.” (Johnston 1950: 22.3–4 ≈ Derge Tanjur 4025, sems tsam, phi 86a1 = Tsukinowa 1940: 154.1–3).

a) examine, know and see: This understanding of 觀察知見 is confirmed by §10i(c) (不能知, 所不能見, 不能觀察), pace Tokiwa (1932: 107) = Ogawa (2001: 229), who understand 觀察知見 as two verbs, 觀察 and 知見. Note in addition the passage in the Śrīmālādevī: 此經成就無量無邊功德。一切聲聞縁覺不能究竟觀察、知、見 = nyan thos dang rang sangs rgyas thams cad kyis kyang mdo sde ’di’i don thams cad ma lus par shes pa ’am | blta ba ’am nye bar brtag par mi nus na sems can gzhain dag gir lta ci smos | (T. 353 [XII] 223a23–24 = Tsukinowa 1940: 164–166).
10iii

a) 舍利弗，甚深義者，即是第一義諦。 b) 第一義諦者，即是衆生界。 c) 衆生界者，即是如來藏。 d) 如來藏者，即是法身。

2.11–13: b) paramārtha iti ūrīputra sattvadhātor etad adhivacanam | c) sattvadhātur iti ūrīputra tathāgatagarbhasyaitad adhivacanam | d) tathāgatagarbha iti ūrīputra dharmakāyasyaitad adhivacanam |

56.2–3: d) tathāgatagarbha iti ūrīputra dharmakāyasyaitad adhivacanam iti |

RGVc T. 1611 (XXXI) 821a25–27: a) 舍利弗，言衆生者，即是第一義諦。 b) 舍利弗，言第一義諦者，即是衆生界。 c) 舍利弗，言衆生界者，即是如來藏。 d) 舍利弗，言如來藏者，即是法身故。

RGVc T. 1611 (XXXI) 835c9–10: d) 舍利弗，言如來藏者，即是法身故。

a) “The extremely profound purport, Śāriputra, is precisely the supreme truth. b) The supreme truth is precisely the quintessence of beings. c) The quintessence of beings is precisely the embryo of the tathāgatas. d) The embryo of the tathāgatas is precisely the dharma-body.

a) the supreme truth: Note that while Chinese has *paramāṛthasatya, 第一義諦, the Sanskrit in (b) has only paramārtha. There are, however, several examples in the RGV in which 第一義諦 appears to render something other than paramāṛthasatya. In one case 第一義諦攝 corresponds to paramāṛthasāṅgara (Johnston 1950: 89.18 = RGVc T. 1611 [XXXI] 843c11), and shortly thereafter we find 第一義諦身 corresponding to paramāṛthakāya (Johnston 1950: 91.5 = RGVc T. 1611 [XXXI] 844a3). What di 諦 = *satya is doing in these expressions I do not know.

b-d) The RGV in Sanskrit has: “b) The supreme, Śāriputra, is a synonym for the quintessence of beings. c) The quintessence of beings, Śāriputra, is a synonym for the embryo of the tathāgatas. d) The embryo of the tathāgatas, Śāriputra, is a synonym for the dharma-body.” See Ruegg (1969: 265n2) on Tibetan scholastic interpretations of the significance of the term adhivacana here.

b) quintessence: the key word dhātu here shifts its locus from the semantic domain of ‘realm’ to that of ‘essential core,’ ‘quintessence,’ though the Chinese translator chose to maintain the same translation, jiè 界, the sense of which is rather ‘realm.’ I suspect that by doing so the translator made
things as difficult for his Chinese audience as it would be for an English audience to keep the rendering ‘realm’ throughout. The authors of the AAN were clearly playing with the polyvalency of the term dhātu, for which see the Introduction.

c) **embryo of the tathāgatas**: tathāgatagarbha
d) **the dharma-body**: dharmakāya. Cp. the Śrīmālādevī, quoted in the note to §15i, below.

The Śrīmālādevī is also quoted in RGV as follows: *nānyo bhagavāṁs tathāgato ’nyo dharmakāyaḥ | dharmakāya eva bhagavāṁs tathāgata iti | duḥkhanirodhanāmnā bhagavann evaṁguṇasamanvāgatas tathāgata-dharmakāyo deśita iti | nirvāṇadhātur iti bhagavāṁs tathāgatadharmakāyasyaitad adhivacanam |*, “Blessed One, the Tathāgata is not other than the dharma-body, and the dharma-body itself, Blessed One, is the Tathāgata. Through the designation, Blessed One, ‘destruction of suffering’ is indicated the Tathāgata’s dharma-body endowed with such good qualities. The realm of nirvāṇa, Blessed One, is a synonym of the Tathāgata’s dharma-body.” (Johnston 1950: 56.3–6). The passages are not sequential in the sūtra itself; see for the first and third Tsukinowa (1940: 108), with the third preceding the first on the same page. As for the second passage, although Takasaki (1966: 261n463) locates it on T. 353 (XII) 222a, I wonder if it is not to be connected with the passage quoted in the note to §15i(a) instead, where we find *duḥkhanirodhanāmnā bhagavann anādikāliko ... gaṅgāvalīkāvyatīrtytaiv avinirbhāgaiv acintyair buddhadharmāiḥ samanvāgatas tathāgatadharmakāyo deśitaḥ*, corresponding to: 所言苦滅者, 名無始 ... 世尊, 過於恒沙不離、不脱、不異、不思議佛法成就說如來法身, T. 353 (XII) 221c7–10.
3.4–5: a) *yo ’yam śāriputra tathāgatanirdiṣṭo dharmakāyaḥ sa ’yam avinir-

bhāgadharma-vinirmuktajñanaguno yad uta gaṅgānadāvālikāvyatikrāntais 
tathāgatadharmaiḥ |

RGV T. 1611 (XXXI) 821b1–3: a) 舍利弗, 如來所説, 法身義者, 過於恒沙不離, 
不脱, 不思議佛法, 如來功德智慧。

a) “As I have expounded, Śāriputra, the meaning of the dharma-body is 
inseparable from, indivisible from, not cut-off from, not different from the 
inconceivable qualities definitive of a buddha, greater in number than the 
sands of the Ganges, [namely,] the merits and insight of a tathāgata.

a) The RGV in Sanskrit has: “a) This same dharma-body the Tathāgata has 
spoken of, Śāriputra, possesses qualities inseparable, and wisdom and 
attributes indivisible, from what it is, that is, [inseparable from the] quali-
ties definitive of a tathāgata, more numerous than the sands of the Ganges 
river.” Ruegg (1969: 360): “O Śāriputra, le dharmakāya enseigné par le 
Tathāgata a pour qualité d’être inséparable, et il a la propriété du savoir 
non séparé—[inséparable] des dharma et tathāgata dépassant [en leur 
nombre] les sables de la Gaṅgā.” This translation makes -dharma and 
-guṇa logically and semantically parallel, which I wonder about. See 
below.

as I have expounded: AAN has 如我所說 corresponding to Sanskrit tathā-
gatanirdeśa, which however means rather: “The dharma-body the Tathā-
gata has spoken of is ….” Although the meaning remains the same, the 
Chinese of the RGV reads here 如來所説, corresponding to the Sanskrit. 
However, even though the latter is much more common, as both expres-
sions are well attested there is no reason to emend the AAN’s reading. See 
also §16(a), below.

meaning of the dharma-body: I have some doubt about the sense and 
usage of yi 義 in fāshēnyī 法身義. Generally speaking, 義 represents some-
thing like artha, but I am not sure what that might mean here. There is no 
equivalent in the RGV, which has only dharmakāya, which seems to me to
be better. As far as I can see, the few times the term 法身義 appears in Chinese Buddhist scripture translations it is a grammatical predicate.

**inseparable from, indivisible from, not cut-off from, not different from:** The Sanskrit here, *avinirbhāgadharmāvinirmuktajñānaguno*, has occasioned some discussion, especially focused on the related term *amuktajñā*, on which see Appendix 2.

The RGV speaks of the wisdom and merits of the dharma-body, and has the qualities of the Tathāgata as greater in number than the sands of the Ganges. The AAN on the contrary seems to assume *acintyabuddhadharma-s* which are *gangānadīvikāvyatikrānta*, and more or less in apposition to this *tathāgatajñānaguno*. Cp. the *Śrīmālādevī: śūnyas tathāgatagarbhō vinirbhāgair muktajñāiḥ sarvakleśakośaiḥ | aśuṇyo gangānadīvikāvyatikrītaṁ avinirbhāgair amuktajñāir acintyair buddhadharmair*, “The embryo of the tathāgatas is empty of all separable casings of defilements unconnected to [buddha] knowledge. It is not empty of the inseparable, inconceivable buddha qualities, connected with [buddha] knowledge, greater in number than the sands of the Ganges river.” (Tsukimowa 1940: 130–131, Sanskrit quoted in RGV, Johnston 1950: 76.8–9.)

Chinese has: 空如来藏, 若離、若脱、若異一切煩惱藏。世尊, 不空如来藏, 過於恒沙不離、不脱、不異、不思議佛法 (T. 353 [XII] 221c16–18). See Ruegg (1969: 360), who in discussing the Tibetan translations of the RGV and the Śrīmālādevī says: “Il est possible que la tradition porte les traces d’une certaine tendance à interpréter le [Śrīmālādevī] à la lumière de la doctrine de l’[AAN] (ou d’un autre texte très proche de ce dernier).” Note that Ruegg is not here asserting that the AAN is in origin older than the Śrīmālādevi; he is speaking of (ipso facto, later) interpretive traditions.

**sands of the Ganges:** The syntactic position of 過於恒沙 within the sentence is extremely difficult to account for. Its meaning is obvious, but how it could relate to the rest of the sentence is less so.

**merits and insight:** I have taken *jñānaguno*, which in AAN corresponds to 功德智慧, as a dvandva, but I am not sure that this is right; Takasaki (1974: 82–84) understands it as a karmadhārāya. The Tibetan translation of the RGV appears to understand a genitive relation: *ye shes kyi yon tan*. This has been followed by most scholars (see above for Ruegg’s translation of the passage). However, see Appendix 2.

The Chinese 福德慧, without benefit of the Sanskrit, might have been taken otherwise, as in the *Gaṇḍavyūha: 喜放功德智慧故, 爲歡喜 = vipulapuṇyaajñānaprabhāpramūṇcanatayā paramapritikarā bhavati* (T. 278 [IX] 755a17–18 = Suzuki and Idzumi 1949: 388.3–4), where we find puṇya and jñāna.
12

a)舍利弗, 如燈所有明、色及觸不離、不脱。b) 又如摩尼寶珠所有明、色、形相不離、不脱。c) 舍利弗, 如來所説法身之義亦復如是, 過於恒沙不離、不脫、不斷、不異不思議佛法, 如來功德智慧。

a) 如燈 | All sources: 如世間燈. However, while 世間燈 is a rendering of loka-pradīpa, 'lamp of the world,' a well-known term, it gives no sense here. The Sanskrit quotation has only pradīpa, lamp, which I follow, and emend accordingly. Note that while MDN₁ and MDN₂ have 舍如燈, RGV₃ has 如世間燈, thoughtlessly copied from the Chinese translation of the sūtra.

c) 不思議佛法 | Q: 不思議無法

39.5–8:  a) tadyathā sāriputra pradipāḥ | avinirbhāgadharmanvinirmuktaguṇo yad utālokosṇavarṇatābhiḥ | b) manir vālokavarṇasamsthānaiḥ | c) evam eva sāriputra tathāgatanirdiṣṭo dharmakāyo ’vinirbhāgadharma’ ’vinirmukta-jñānāṅgag uṇo yad uta gaṅgānaḍīvālikāvyātiirtytais tathāgatadharmaṁ iti ||

RGV₃ T. 1611 (XXXI) 821b3–7: a) 舍利弗, 如世間燈, 明、色及觸不離, 不脱。b) 又如摩尼寶珠, 明、色、形相不離、不脫。c) 舍利弗, 法身之義亦復如是, 過於恒沙不離、不脫、不思議佛法, 如來智慧功德故。

MDN₁ T. 1626 (XXXI) 893b15–19: 如説: a) 舍利弗, 諸佛法身有功德法。譬如燈有光明熱色不離, 不脱。b) 摩尼寶珠光、色、形状, 亦復如是。c) 舍利弗, 如來所説諸佛法身智功德法不離, 不脱者。所謂: 過恒河沙如來法也。

MDN₂ T. 1627 (XXXI) 895c25–29: 如佛説言: a) 舍利弗, 警如燈無二法功能無異。所為光明及煢色等不相離故。b) 或如寶珠光明、形、色。c) 如是, 如是, 舍利弗, 如來所説法身不相離法, 智慧功能所為過於伽沙如來之法。

a) “It is like a lamp, Śāriputra, whose brightness, color and tactile sensation are inseparable and indivisible [from the lamp itself]. b) Again, it is like a mani gem whose characteristics of brightness, color and form are inseparable and indivisible [from the gem itself]. c) The meaning of the dharma-body expounded by the Tathāgata, Śāriputra, is also once again like this: It is inseparable from, indivisible from, not cut-off from, not different from the inconceivable qualities definitive of a buddha greater in number than the sands of the Ganges, the merits and insight of a tathāgata.
a-c) The RGV in Sanskrit has: “a) Take as an example, Śāriputra, a lamp. It possesses qualities and attributes inseparable and indivisible from it, namely brightness, heat and coloration. b) Or a gemstone [which is inseparable and indivisible from its] brightness, color and form. c) Just so, Śāriputra, the dharma-body spoken of by the Tathāgata possesses qualities inseparable, and wisdom and attributes indivisible, from it, namely the qualities definitive of a tathāgata, more numerous than the sands of the Ganges river.” In (c), Takasaki (1989: 68) understands ‘qualities inseparable from wisdom,’ 智と離れない徳性を有するものである.

a) lamp: The image is expressed in a verse in RGV as follows: pradīpavād anirbhāgaguṇayuktasvabhāvatāḥ, namely, “[The buddhagotra] is like a lamp, since its intrinsic nature is to be joined to qualities indivisible from it.” (Johnston 1950: 37.12; Nakamura 1967: 71.19 = Derge Tanjur 4025, sems tsam, phi 56b4: dbyer med yon tan dang ldan pa’i || ngo bo nyid phyir mar me bzhin ||; RGVc T. 1611 (XXXI) 831b12: 如燈明、觸、色 性功德如 是.) Note that here for guṇa, ‘qualities,’ Chinese has 明、觸、色, brightness, tactile sense and color; see next.

brightness, color and tactile sensation: Chinese 明色及觸 might be taken (as does Ogawa 2001: 229) as two things, 明色 and 触, but Sanskrit āloka-vṛna argues against this, although the word order is different: āloka = 明, uṣṇa ≠ 触 and vṛna = 色. The second is of course a problem; uṣṇa means heat, but chū 触 usually renders sparśa, contact or tactile sensation. MDN₁ and MDN₂ complicate matters further, the former having 光明熱色, and the latter 光明及煖色, this being particularly hard to understand. In the second example of the jewel, AAN has 明色形, Sanskrit āloka-vṛna-samāsthāna, RGVₐ (as usual copying AAN) has 明色形, while MDN₁ reads 光色形状, and MDN₂光明形色. These must be understood then as 光、色、形状 and 光明、形、色, respectively. (It seems unlikely that chū 触 is an error for zhú 燭, since the latter would still not give the required sense of ‘warmth.’)

b) mani gem: This expression is no coincidence, given that images of gems abound in discussions of the tathāgatagarbha and gotra. Ruegg (1976: 342–344) cites several pertinent examples from sūtras, among which one from the Dhāranīśvararāja (= Tathāgatamahākarunānirdeśa), cited in the RGV (Johnston 1950: 5,9–10; 6,1), provides the image of uncleaned mani gems (aparyavadāpitāni maniratnāni) and the impure sattvadhātu (aparī-śuddhaṁ sattvadhātum).

c) meaning: see the note to 11(a).

It is inseparable from …: See §15i(a) for a Śrīmālādevī passage paralleling this expression, and Takasaki (1999: 47–48).
13i

a) 舍利弗，此法身者，是不生不滅法，b) 非過去際，非未來際，離二邊故。c) 舍利弗，非過去際者，離生時故。d) 非未來際者，離滅時故。

a) “This dharma-body, Śāriputra, is one which has the quality of being unborn and unperishing. b) It is unlimited in the past and unlimited in the future, because it is free from the two extremes. c) It is unlimited in the past, Śāriputra, because it is free from a time of birth, d) and it is unlimited in the future because it is free from a time of perishing.

a) **one which has the quality of being unborn and unperishing**: or: is an unborn and unperishing thing? I would expect the underlying Sanskrit may be a bahuvrīhi. Here फळा may render an abstract suffix, °ता.

b) **unlimited**: In the Śrimālādevī we read: bcom ldan ‘das de bzhin gshegs pa rnams ni dus kyi mtha’ mchis pa la gnas pa ma lags te | bcom ldan ‘das de bzhin gshegs pa dgra bcom pa yang dag par rdzogs pa’i sangs rgyas rnams ni phyi ma’i mtha’i mur thug par gnas pa’i slad du’o || (Tsukinowa 110.4–7), “Because [—answering a question elided here] Blessed Ones, tathāgatas, do not dwell within the limits of time; Blessed Ones, tathāgatas, Complete and Perfect Buddhas dwell at the utmost [future] limit (aparrāntakoṭinīṣṭha).” As Takasaki (1966: 213n102) points out, in the Daśabhūtimika we find (in a bigger series) the following, obviously used synonymously: dharmadhātuvipulām ākāśadhūtyāravāyasānam aparāntakoṭinīṣṭham (Kondo 1936: 19.5–6). Once again in the Śrimālādevī we find: de bzhin gshegs pa’i snying po nyid kyi dbang du bgyis nas bcom ldan ‘das kyi sngon gyi mtha’ med do zhes bshad cing btags so ||, “Referring to this very embryo of the tathāgatas [which is the basis of samsāra], the Blessed One explained that it has no prior limit.” (Tsukinowa 144.10–12). See the note to §17i(b).

definition of the two extremes: In this context, perhaps the extreme of nihilism (ucche-davāda) and that of eternalism (śāsvatavāda), respectively. This is, of course, an idea of considerable importance to Nāgārjuna, but the ideas themselves are much older. This harks back to the views mentioned above in §6(d)(e). In the Brahmajāla-sūtra it is an error to claim that the self or the world does or does not have a limit, 我及世間有邊無邊 (Dirghāgama T. 1 [21] [I] 91a19, 26, b3).
13ii

a) 舍利弗，如來法身常，以不異法故，以不盡法故。 b) 舍利弗，如來法身恒，以常可歸依故，以未來際平等故。 c) 舍利弗，如來法身清涼，以不二法故，以無分別法故。 d) 舍利弗，如來法身不變，以非滅法故，以非作法故。

54.12–15:  a) nityo 'yaṁ śāriputra dharmakāyo 'nanyatvadharmāksaya-dharmatayā | b) dhruvo 'yaṁ śāriputra dharmakāyo dhruvaśaraṇo 'parānta-kōṭisamatayā | c) śivo 'yaṁ śāriputra dharmakāyo 'dvayadharmāvikalpadharmatayā | d) sāśvato 'yaṁ śāriputra dharmakāyo 'vināśadharmākṛtrima-dharmatayā |

12.2:  c) śivo 'yaṁ śāriputra dharmakāyo 'dvayadharmāvikalpadharmā

RGVc T. 1611 (XXXI) 835b8–13:  a) 舍利弗，如來法身常，以不異法故，以不盡法故。 b) 舍利弗，如來法身恒，以常可歸依故，以未來際平等故。 c) 舍利弗，如來法身清涼，以不二法故，以無分別法故。 d) 舍利弗，如來法身不変，以非滅法故，以非作法故。

a-d) The RGV in Sanskrit has: “a) This dharma-body, Śāriputra, is permanent because of its quality of immutability, because of its quality of inexhaustibility. b) The Tathāgata’s dharma-body, Śāriputra, is constant because it can permanently be taken as a refuge, because it is equal with the future limit (of saṃsāra). c) The Tathāgata’s dharma-body, Śāriputra, is tranquil because of its non-dual nature, because of its nature as free from discrimination. d) The Tathāgata’s dharma-body, Śāriputra, is unchangable because of its imperishable nature, because of its non-created nature.

a-d) The RGV in Sanskrit has: “a) This dharma-body, Śāriputra, is permanent, because of its quality of immutability and its quality of inexhaustibility. b) This dharma-body, Śāriputra, is constant, a constant refuge, because of its equality with the future limit (of saṃsāra). c) This dharma-body, Śāriputra, is tranquil, because of its nondual, nondiscriminative qualities. d) This
dharma-body, Śāriputra, is unchangeable, because of its imperishable and uncreated nature.” The logical structure of causality in the AAN seems to differ from that implied in the Sanskrit text quoted in the RGV. Cp. Ruegg (1969: 363), who seems to understand the Sanskrit syntax somewhat differently than I do. Takasaki (1989: 94) seems to read the grammar of the Sanskrit impossibly when he takes ananyatvadharma as an independent modifier of dharmakāya, although Tibetan gzhan du mi ’gyur ba’i chos kyi sku may support this understanding.

The well-known four topics of permanence, constancy, tranquility and unchangeableness—explicit inversions of the older categories of the impermanent and so on—are mentioned indirectly in verse 79 in RGV in a fashion that follows the AAN: ananyathātmākṣayadharmayogato jagacharanyo ’naparāntakotīḥ | sadādvayo ’sāv avikalpatvato ’vināśa-
dharmāpy akṛtasvabhāvataḥ ||, “This (Essence of the Buddha) possesses an unalterable identity because it is endowed with inexhaustible qualities. It is the refuge of the world because it has no future limit. It is always nondual because of its absence of discrimination. Likewise it is indestructible because its intrinsic nature is uncreated.” (Johnston 1950: 53.10–13; trans. Takasaki 1966: 256, modified.) This category is much discussed by, for instance, Tsuchihashi (1954), Nakamura (1966), Ruegg (1969: 362–392); Shimoda (1991 = 1997: 304–319, 618–629).

a) **permanent:** cháng 常, nitya. This is not a happy translation, but it is hard to find a term that will allow us to distinguish it from dhruva (note that in Pāli we frequently find the string niccaṁ dhuvam sassaat, probably used essentially synonymously). Nitya refers to constancy into the future (Tola and Dragonetti 1980: 2–3). Note that, for instance, in the Trinśikāvijñā-птimātratāśiddhi of Vasubandhu, in verse 30 dhruva is translated by 常 in Xuanzang’s translation. Moreover, in Sthiramati’s commentary it is glossed: dhruvo nityatvād aṣṭayatayā, translated by Deleanu (2012: 163n 50–51) as “[the word] stable [is used] because [the uncontaminated Realm (the topic in the verse, anāsraya-dhātu: JAS)] is permanent through its inexhaustibility.” Here in the AAN aṣayadharmatā is connected with nitya, not dhruva. This demonstrates that even in the hands of a careful philosopher like Sthiramati or Xuanzang, these categories are hard to distinguish.
a) When this very same dharma-body, Śāriputra, ensnared by limitless defilements greater in number than the sands of the Ganges, b) drifting on the waves of the world from beginningless ages, c) comes and goes through birth and death, d) then it is termed ‘Beings.’

a-d) The RGV in Sanskrit has: “a) This very dharma-body, Śāriputra, hidden by tens of millions of sheaths of limitless defilements, c) borne along by the current of transmigration, b) wandering through deaths and births in the destinies of beginningless and endless transmigration, d) is termed “The quintessence/realm of beings.”

a) dharma-body: Here, in §14ii(a) and 15i(a), MDN₂ has fājiè 法界 (dharmanadhātu) against fāshēn 法身 (dharmakāya) in other texts. Note that at RGVc T. 1611 (XXXI) 835c18 = Johnston 1950: 56.10, 如來法身 corresponds to tathāgatadhātu. Is the reading in MDN₂ merely a transmission error? A more systematic comparison of such equivalents would help clarify such questions.

greater in number than the sands of the Ganges: The Chinese translation of RGV has 過於恒沙, absent from the Sanskrit of RGV but found in the sūtra itself. MDN₁ lacks the term, which is found also however in MDN₂.
It is likely that the expression did not stand in the version of the sūtra known to the compiler of the RGV and MDN.

b) **beginningless ages**: 從無始世, anavarāga. See the Introduction.

c) **comes and goes through birth and death**: 往來生死 is found in one translation of the Kāsyaparivarta (§67, T. 659 [XVI] 279a4) as equivalent to samsāre bhrāmyanti. Further in §152 (283a3): 常習法船往來生死度諸群品 corresponds to yayā dharmanāvā sarvasatvā samsārāṇavapriptān uhyamānan utārayisyāmi.

d) **Beings**. The AAN terms the result of the process here ‘beings,’ while the RGV uses the term ‘quintessence/realm of beings,’ sattvadhātu. The Chinese translation of the RGV has only 衆生, sentient beings, while MDN has 衆生界, sattvadhātu (but again MDN2 has only 衆生). Once again, it is likely that the original of AAN known to the RGV and MDN read sattvadhātu.

This and the following two items are mentioned in verse 47 of the RGV, with prose commentary: aśuddho āuddhaśuddho ̵tha suviśuddho yathā-kramam | sattvadhātur iti proktā bodhisattvas tathāgataḥ, “[Depending on whether the jinagarbha is] impure, both pure and impure, and completely pure these refer in order to the realm of beings, the bodhisattva and the Tathāgata.” (Johnston 1950: 40.7–8; following Schmithausen 1971: 148). The commentary has: tisṛṣv avasthāsu yathākramam trināmanirdeśato nidistā veditavyāḥ | yad utāsuddhāvasthāyāṁ sattvadhātur iti | aśuddha-śuddhāvasthāyāṁ bodhisattva iti | suviśuddhāvasthāyāṁ tathāgata iti, “The explanation in three names is to be known as explained in sequential order in respect to the three states, to wit: the state of impurity refers to the realm of beings, the state of both purity and impurity refers to the bodhisattva, and the state of complete purity refers to the Tathāgata.” (Johnston 1950: 40.14–16).

This triad is not an innovation of the AAN. The connection between the realm of beings and the state of being a tathāgata is expressed in the Tathāgataagarbha-sūtra as follows: “In this connection the true nature (dharmatā) of a tathāgata, being in the womb (garbhā) inside the sheaths of such defilements as desire, anger, misguidedness, longing and ignorance, is designated ‘sattva.’ When it has become cool, it is extinct (nir-vṛta). And because it is then completely purified from the sheaths of defilements of ignorance, it becomes a great accumulation of knowledge in the realm of sentient beings (sattvadhātu). The world with its gods, having perceived that supreme, great accumulation of knowledge in the realm of sentient beings speaking like a tathāgata, recognizes him as a tathāgata,”
de la 'dod chags dang | zhe sdang dang | gti mug dang | sred pa dang | ma rig pa'i nyon mongs pa'i sbubs kyi nang na snying bor gyur pa de bzhin gshegs pa'i chos nyid de ni sens can zhes bya ba'i ming du chags so || de la gang bsil bar gyur pa de ni mya ngan las 'das pa ste | ma rig pa'i nyon mongs pa'i sbubs yongs su sbyangs pa'i phyir | sens can gyi khams kyi ye shes chen po'i tshogs su gyur pa gang yin pa de ni rnyed pa'o || sens can gyi khams kyi ye shes chen po'i tshogs dam pa de ni | de bzhin gshegs pa ji lta ba de bzhin du smra bar lha dang bcas pa'i 'jig rten gyis mthong nas | de bzhin gshegs pa zhes bya ba'i 'du shes su byed do || (Zimmermann 2002: §6B; trans. Zimmermann). See Zimmermann's extensive notes on this passage (2002: 127–129nn159–164), especially his speculation that the mention of sattvas and sattvadhātu may not have been present in an earlier state of the text represented by one of the Chinese versions. See also verses §6.3–4.
14ii

a) "When this very same dharma-body, Śāriputra, b) repels the anguish and suffering of birth and death in the world, c) banishes all desires, d) practices the ten perfections, e) collects the eighty-four thousand teachings, f) and cultivates the practices leading to bodhi, g) then it is termed ‘bodhisattva.’"

a-f) The RGV in Sanskrit has: “a) That very dharma-body, Śāriputra, b) being disgusted with the suffering of the currents of transmigration, c) indifferent to all objects of pleasure, d) practicing the practice which leads to awakening e) by means of the eighty-four thousand teachings d) which include the ten perfections, g) is termed ‘bodhisattva.’” So too Takasaki (1966: 222): “10 Supreme Virtues as including and representing all the 84 thousands groups [sic] of Doctrines,” noting in note 244 that antargata “lit. represented by or summarized in [the 10 pāramitās].” In (1989: 71) he translated: 十波羅蜜にまとめられる八万四千の法蘊によって．

RGV has past passive participles here, potentially indicating accomplished states, as I have translated, but also possibly active ones, while AAN has what can only be understood as active verbs.

c) banishes all desires: RGV has viraktāḥ sarvakāmāviśayebhyo, corresponding in the Chinese of RGV to 捨一切欲. MDN₁, however, has 捨於一
切諸欲境界 and MDN₂ 一切欲界中住, both of the latter rendering the term viṣaya, missing in both AAN and the Chinese translation of the RGV. However, they do this with the Chinese terms jìngjiè 境界 and jiè 界, respectively; while viṣaya should here mean not ‘domain’ but something like ‘object (of perception),’ it is possible that these standard Chinese equivalents are meant to be taken in this way. Tokiwa (1932: 108) = Ogawa (2001: 230) understand 一切の諸有の欲求を棄捨して, Ogawa adding in note 2: 諸有: 三有。詳しくは二十五有を数える。三界. This interpretation gives weight to the words 諸有, identifying them with twenty-five modes of existence in the three realms. In light of the extant parallel versions, however, I do not think this is correct. Moreover, one would expect the individual free of desire for all the realms to be already liberated, as is in fact claimed, for instance, by the Mahāyāna Mahāparinirvāṇa-mahāsūtra: 真解脱者, 亦復如是, 皆悉遠離二十五有, “the truly liberated one is also like this: completely distanced from the twenty-five [modes of] existence.” (T. 374 [XII] 393a11–12).

d) the ten perfections: certainly the more common accounting has six perfections, but several versions of ten also exist. See the discussion in the Introduction.

e) the eighty-four thousand teachings: This is a common expression indicating the totality of teachings.

f) cultivates the practices leading to bodhi: The text reads 修菩提行, while the Sanskrit has bodhāya caryāṁ caran. MDN₁ has 爲求菩提而修諸行, while MDN₂ has 行菩提示時 (which, perhaps not entirely incidentally, argues for its independent rendering of a Sanskrit source rather than simply rewriting MDN₁, since its duplication of xíng 行 reflects the Sanskrit caryāṁ caran). My slightly free rendering of the Chinese follows the meaning of the Sanskrit and MDN₁.

g) Compare the Tathāgatagarbha-sūtra: “Sons of good family, apply energy without giving in to despondency! It will happen that one day the tathāgata who has entered and is present within you will become manifest. Then you will be designated ‘bodhisattva,’ rather than ‘ordinary sentient being (sattva).’ And again in the next stage you will be designated ‘buddha,’ rather than ‘bodhisattva,” rigs kyi bu dag khyed bdag nyid sro shi bar ma byed par khyed brison ‘grus brtan par gyis shig dang | khyed la de bzhin gshegs pa zhus pa yod pa dus shig na ’byung bar ’gyur te | khyed byang chub sms dpa’ zhes bya ba’i grangs su ’gro bar ’gyur gyi | sms can zhes bya bar ni ma yin no || der yang sangs rgyas shes bya ba’i grangs su ’gro’i | byang chub sms dpa’ zhes bya bar ni ma yin no zhes chos ston to || (Zimmermann 2002: §8B; trans. Zimmermann).
a) Once again, Ārya, when this very same dharma-body is free from the covering of all the world’s defilements, b) beyond all suffering, c) and free from the stains of all defilements, d) it attains purity, it attains perfect purity, e) and dwells among the pure dharma of the other shore. f) It reaches the
stage of what is desired by all beings, it thoroughly penetrates all spheres (of knowledge), and there is none surpassing it. It is free of all hindrances, free of all obstacles, and it attains sovereign power over all things. [This then] is termed ‘Tathāgata, Arhat, Perfectly Awakened One.’

a-i) The RGV in Sanskrit has: “Once again, Śāriputra, this very dharma-body, thoroughly freed of all sheaths of defilements, having transcended all sufferings, the stains of all defilements vanished, well and truly pure, fixed in the Absolute Reality that is ultimately pure, risen to the stage looked forward to by all beings, having attained peerless heroic strength with respect to all spheres of knowledge, perfected in sovereign power over all things free of all hindrances and unobstructed—this is termed ‘Tathāgata, Arhat, Perfect Buddha.’”

a) **this very dharma-body ... all the world’s defilements:** Compare a passage quoted from the Śrīmālādevī: na khalu bhagavan dharmavināso duḥkhanirodäh | duḥkhanirodhanāmā bhagavann anādikāliko ’kṛto jāto ’nutpanno ’kṣayah kṣayāpagataḥ nityo dhruvah śivah śāsvataḥ prakṛtipariśuddhaḥ sarvakleśaśāśavinirmukto gaṅgāvālikāvayativṛttair avinirbhāgair acintyair buddhadharmaḥ samanvāgatas tathāgatadharmakāyo desītah | ayam eva ca bhagavāṁs tathāgatadharmakāyo ‘vinirmuktakleśa-kośas tathāgatagarbha ity ucyate, “The cessation of suffering, Blessed One, is not the destruction of the dharma (? dharmas?). The dharma-body of the Tathāgata, Blessed One, is taught under the name ‘cessation of suffering;’ being beginningless, uncreated, unborn, unarisen, inexhaustible, free from exhaustion, permanent, constant, peaceful, eternal, naturally pure, free from the casing of all defilements, accompanied by inseparable, inconceivable buddha qualities more numerous than the sands of the Ganges river. Just this dharma-body of the Tathāgata, Blessed One, when not liberated from the casing of defilements, is said to be the embryo of the tathāgatas.” (Tsukinowa 1940: 128–130, quoted in RGV 12.10–14, corr. Schmithausen 1971: 137). (Cp. Ruegg 1969: 267, 358; Takasaki 1974: 83; and see above §10iii[d] note).

c) **defilements:** Sanskrit has upakleśa, though as Edgerton (1953: s.v.) points out, this is functionally equivalent to kleśa. Although in (1966: 232) he understood it as a karmadhārya, in (1989: 71) Takasaki translated upakleśa-mala as a dvandva, 些細な煩悩や垢.

d) **purity ... perfect purity:** My distinction between jìng 淨 and qīngjìng 清淨 is perforce artificial, and faut de mieux I follow the Sanskrit. See the next note.
e) **dwell among the pure dharmas of the other shore:** 住於彼岸清淨法中. RGV has *paramaparīśuddhadharmatāyāṁ sthitah*, which Takasaki (1966: 232) translates: “abiding in the Absolute Essence which is the highest point of purity.” Bodhiruci here in his AAN translation has [mis]understood *parama* as *pāramitā*, ‘other shore.’ While the Chinese translation of RGV reproduces the AAN, MDN₁ has 最極清淨住於法性 and MDN₂ 最極清淨法性中住. Both of these render more literally the extant Sanskrit. Therefore, we may conclude that what the sūtra should express is “dwells in / fixed in the Absolute Reality [*dharmatā*] that is ultimately pure,” or something along those lines.

f) **reaches the stage of what is desired by all beings:** 到一切衆生所願之地. RGV has *sarvasattvālokaṇīyāṁ bhūmin ārūḍhaḥ*, RGVc has 到一切衆生所觀之地, MDN₁ has 至一切衆生所觀察地 and MDN₂ 一切衆生之所瞻仰. These parallels suggest that AAN might contain a mistake here, and 願 should perhaps be emended to 觀. Takasaki (1975a: 56) translates: すべての衆生から仰ぎ見られる地位に登り.

g) **all spheres (of knowledge):** the sūtra has 一切境界, corresponding to what RGV quotes as *sarvasyāṁ jñeyabhūmau*. RGVc as usual repeats the sūtra, but MDN₁ has 一切所知之地, corresponding to the Sanskrit of the RGV; MDN₂ likewise has here 一切爾焰地, in which *jñeya* is transcribed rather than translated. In the Śrīmālādevī (Tsukinowa 1940: 104,15 = T. 353 [XII] 220c10–11) the Tathāgata is characterized as one who *shes bya'i sa thams cad la thogs pa ma mchis pa'ichos kyi dbang phyug mdzad pa* = 於一切爾焰地得無礙法自在, “has become lord of the teaching (*dharmasvāra*) unobstructed in all spheres of knowledge (*jñeyabhūmi*).” The original text of the AAN most likely indeed contained the term *jñeya*, which either was absent in Bodhiruci’s exemplar or dropped out of his translation at some point. See §4ii(g).

**there is none surpassing it / peerless heroic strength:** I have understood *pauruṣa* in the RGV as ‘heroic,’ but is it possible that it is to be understood in a sense closer to ‘personal’? MDN₁ has 丈夫, while MDN₂ has 大勢力 (but see the next note). AAN has 更無勝者, a term which occurs in several texts but not, as far as I can see, as a particular technical term. Takasaki (1975a: 56) translated: それに次ぐもののない男性的な威力を獲得し. In (1966: 232) he offered “has attained the unexcelled, manly strength.”

h) I edit MDN₂ with 無障無著 in this clause, following the parallel versions, although it might be more natural to attach it to the previous item from the point of view of Chinese grammar.
i) One might compare here the following from the Tathāgatagarbha-sūtra: “When in this connection the bodhisattva-mahāsattvas who assiduously apply themselves to these Dhammas have completely become free from all defilements and impurities [upakleśa], then they will be designated ‘tathāgata, honorable one and perfectly awakened one,’ and they will also perform all the tasks of a tathāgata,” de la byang chub sems dpa’ sems dpa’ chen po chos de dge la mngon par brtson par gnas pa de dag gang gi tshe | nyon mongs pa dang | nye ba’i nyon mongs pa thams cad las yongs su grol bar gyur pa de’i tshe | de bzhin gshegs pa dgra bcom pa yang dag par rdzogs pa’i sangs rgyas shes bya ba’i grangs su ’gro ste | de bzhin gshegs pa’i bya ba thams cad kyang byed do || (Zimmermann 2002: §1B; trans. Zimmermann, with removal of brackets). The Chinese translations differ significantly here (Zimmermann 2002: 108n75).
15ii

a) 是故, 舍利弗, 不離衆生界有法身, 不離法身有衆生界。 b) 衆生界即法身。 c) 法身即衆生界。 d) 舍利弗, 此二法者, 義一名異。

a) 不離法身] Kongo: 不離身法身

41.15–17: a) tasmāc chāriputra nānyāḥ sattvadhātur nānyo dharmakāyāḥ | b) sattvadhātur eva dharmakāyāḥ | c) dharmakāya eva sattvadhātuḥ | d) advayam etad arthena | vyañjanaṁātrabhedaḥ |

RGVc T. 1611 (XXXI) 832b17–20: a) 舍利弗, 不離衆生界有法身, 不離法身有衆生界。 b) 衆生界即法身。 c) 法身即衆生界。 d) 舍利弗, 此二法者, 義一名異故。

MDN, T. 1626 (XXXI) 893a19–21: a) 是故, 舍利弗, 衆生界不異法身, 法身不異衆生界。 b) 衆生界即是法身。 c) 法身即是衆生界。 d) 此但名異, 非義有別。

MDN₂ T. 1627 (XXXI) 895c12–14: a) 是故, 舍利弗, 無別衆生界, 無別法身。 b) 衆生界即法身。 c) 法身即衆生界。 d) 此無二義, 文字差別。

a) “Therefore, Śāriputra, there is no quintessence of beings separate from the dharma-body, there is no dharma-body separate from the quintessence of beings. b) The quintessence of beings is precisely the dharma-body, c) the dharma-body is precisely the quintessence of beings. d) These two things, Śāriputra, have one meaning; [only] the names differ.

a-d) The RGV in Sanskrit has: “a) Therefore, Śāriputra, the quintessence of beings is not different from the dharma-body. b) The quintessence of beings is precisely the dharma-body. c) The dharma-body is precisely the quintessence of beings. d) This [pair] is nondual with respect to meaning; only the designations differ.”

d) [only] the names differ: “only” is added on the basis of mātra in the Sanskrit. MDN₁ preserves this sense with 此但名異, but—following a pattern evident elsewhere—it is absent in RGVc and MDN₂.
a) “Once again, Śāriputra, as I expounded earlier, within the realm of beings too there are three types of natures. b) All are true thusness, not distinct and not [mutually] separate. c) What are the three natures? d) 1. The nature that is the embryo of the tathāgatas which from the very beginning is in its intrinsic nature associated [with it] and is pure. e) 2. The nature that is the embryo of the tathāgatas which from the very beginning is in its intrinsic nature unassociated [with it] and, being covered with defilements, is unpurified. f) 3. The nature that is the embryo of the tathāgatas which is equal to the future limit (of saṃsāra), constant, and existing.

a) as I explained earlier: See §11 for the a very similar expression.

three types of natures: Here fā 法, therefore likely dharma, though other terms are also possible. Takasaki (1974: 78–79, 1975a: 379n32, 1996: 59n26) makes the intriguing suggestion that the three modes of the sattva-dhātu have as their background etymologies of sattva: 1. existence (nature), 2. sakta, defiled/polluted nature, and 3. good and pure thing. He connects these with 1) the dharmatā, 2) āgantukakleśa, and 3) the intrinsically pure mind.

b) true thusness: zhēnshírú 真實如 rendering *(bhūta)tathatā? Or is this to be understood as “true and thus”? Apparently this is how Takasaki (1975a: 56) takes it: 真実にして、真如と異ならず、無差別である. See also §19iii(a).

not different, not discriminated: 不異不差; RGV: ubhayam anāsrave dhātāv ādavayam iti draṣṭavyam abhinnaṃ acchinnaṃ, 此二種法於無漏法界中不異、不差別、不不同、不相離 (Johnston 1950: 56.13 = RGVc T. 1611 [XXXI] 835c21–22).

d) from the very beginning: Cp. here the first half of a verse quoted in the RGV (Johnston 1950: 72.13), Mahāyānasamgraha I.1, Trimśikāvijñapti-
bhāṣya (Buescher 2007: 116.1): anādikāliko dhātuḥ sarvadharmaśarayah, “The beginningless essence (dhātu) is the basis of all things.” The verse is attributed in the Mahāyānasamgraha and Trimśikāvijñaptibhāṣya to an “Abhidharma-Mahāyāna-sūtra” (Trimśikāvijñaptibhāṣya: abhidharmasūtra) which Nagao (1982: 28–33) believes to be an imaginary creation of Asaṅga, the author of the Mahāyānasamgraha.

d-f) RGV: etad aparāntakoṭisamadhruvadharmaśarāṇāvyāmānatām adhirṣṭya daśavidhenārthena tathāgatagarbha-vyavasthānam utkāntam | punānādisāmnidhyāsaṃbaddhāsvabhāvakleśakopāsātām anādisāmnidhyāsam-baddhāsvabhāvaśubhadharmaṭām cādhikṣṛtya navabhāva udāharaṇair aparyantarśakopāśkoṭigūḍhas tathāgatagarba iti, “With reference to the present existence of constant Reality as equal to the future limit [of existence], we have demonstrated the embryo of the tathāgatas from ten points of view. Again, with reference to the fact that the sheath of defilements is in its intrinsic nature unassociated [with the embryo of the tathāgatas], although joined with it from the beginningless past, and with reference to pure Reality, associated [with the embryo of the tathāgatas] from the beginningless past, and in its intrinsic nature joined [with the embryo of the tathāgatas], it should be understood by nine illustrations based upon the Scripture that the embryo of the tathāgatas is concealed by limitless sheaths of defilements.” (Johnston 1950: 59.11–14; trans. Takasaki 1966: 268, heavily modified. Tib. Nakamura 1967: 117.10–14 = Derge 106a7–b2: de ltar phyi ma'i mtha'i mu dang mtshungs pa rtag pa'i chos nyid rig par bya ba nyid kyis dbang du byas nas don rnam pa bcos | de bzhin gshegs pa'i snying po 'di rnam par gzhag pa bshad pa yin no || thog ma med pa'i dus nas nye bar gnas pa ma 'brel ba'i rang bzhin gyi nyan mongs pa'i ssubs nyid dang | thog ma med pa'i dus nas nye bar gnas pa brel ba'i rang bzhin dag pa'i chos nyid kyis dbang du byas nas | dpe dgus de bzhin gshegs pa'i gnyen po nyon po nyon mongs pa'i ssubs bye ba mtha' yas pas gtums pa ni | mdo ji lta ba bzhin rtogs par bya'o ||; Chn. RGVC T. 1611 [XXXI] 837a9–13). In the RGV, the subject is the pure nature of the sheath of defilements, to which something is attached or not, in adjectival relation; this may ultimately be the same thing as what the AAN is saying by having the tathāgatagarbha as subject, to which the pure nature or sheath of defilements are respectively attached or not. See Takasaki (1974: 81–82). In light of the above (following Takasaki 1965: 103, 1966: 39n66, 1974: 79, 90), we might suggest something like:

d) 如來藏本際相應體及清淨法 = anādisāmnidhyāsambaddhāsvabhāvas tathāgatagarbhaḥ śubhadharmaḥ

Buddhist Cosmic Unity
e) 如來藏本際不相應體及煩惱纏不清淨法 ≈ anādisāṁnidhyāsamboddha-svabhāvas tathāgatagarbho 'śubhadharmaśi kleśakośaiḥ

f) 如來藏未來際平等恒及有法 ≈ aparāntakoṭisamadhravas tathāgatagarbho [dhruva-]dharmatāsaṁvidyamānatayā

e) The distinction between the tathāgatagarbha and what is covered with a sheath (kośa) shows that here the Tathāgatagarbha’s garbha refers to what is inside being covered, and it is thus not the covering (hence not ‘womb’). Compare Zimmermann (2002: 48).
f) equal to the future limit: Literally ‘equality,’ píngděng 平等 representing an expression most probably with samatā. existing: yǒu 有. Evidently this corresponds to saṁvidyamānatā. Takasaki (1975a: 57) seems to skip it, as he does in §19i(a), below. However, in (1974: 74, 76, 79), he connects this with sattva, analyzed as sat-tva.
17i

a) 舍利弗，當知如來藏本際相應體及清淨法者，此法如實、不虛妄、不離、不脱智慧清淨真如法界，不思議法。b) 無始本際來有此清淨相應法體。

a) “You should know, Śāriputra, that the nature of the embryo of the tathāgatas which from the very beginning is in its intrinsic nature associated [with it] and has a pure nature is in accord with reality, is not illusory, is inseparable and indivisible from the dharma-realm of insight and pure thusness, and the quality of being inconceivable. b) From the beginningless beginning exists this reality which is both pure and associated [with it].

b) beginningless beginning: 無始本際: In the RGV, 無始本際不可得知 = pūrvakoṭīr na prajñāyate, “no earlier limit is discerned.” (Johnston 1950: 72.15–16 = RGV. T. 1611 [XXXI] 839a21–22) Takasaki (1966: 291n177) points out that the Chinese translation of RGV suggests this expression to belong to a quotation of the Śrīmālādevi: 世尊, 生死者, 依如來藏。以如來藏故。説本際不可知。世尊, 有如來藏故, 依如來藏。以如來藏故。説前際不可了知。世尊, 有如來藏, 得有生死。是名善説 = bcom ldan ’das de bzhin gshegs pa’i snying po ni ’khor ba na rton pa lags te | de bzhin gshegs pa’i snying po nyid kyi dbang du bgyis nas bcom ldan ’das kyis sngon gyi mtha’ med do zhes bshad cing btags so || bcom ldan ’das de bzhin gshegs pa’i snying po mchis na ’khor ba zhes mchi na ni tshig de rigs pa lags so ||, “Blessed One, the embryo of the tathāgatas relies on saṁsāra, and it was in reference to this very embryo of the tathāgatas that the Blessed One stated that ‘there is no earlier limit.’ Blessed One, it is reasonable to speak of ‘saṁsāra’ given that the embryo of the tathāgatas exists.” (T. 353 [XII] 222b5–7 = T. 310 [XI] 677c7–9 = Tsukinowa 1940: 144.9–13). As Takasaki also points out in the same note, the canonical source of the attribution to the Buddha is something like Aṅguttara-Nikāya XV.1.1.3: anamataggāyāṁ bhikkhave saṁsāro pubbākoti na paññati (Morris 1888: ii.178,8–9), to which the Śrīmālādevi has added the reference to the embryo of the tathāgatas. See the note to §13i(a). In the Mūla-madhyamaka-kārikā XI.1 we read: pūrvā prajñāyate koṭīr nety vāca
mahāmunih | saṁsāro 'navarāgro hi nāsyādir nāpi paścimam ||, “The great sage said ‘No earlier limit is discerned.’ Transmigration is indeed without beginning or end-point, it has no origin nor any finality.” In this context Candrakīrti quotes the Buddha as saying in a scripture: anavarāgro hi bhikṣavo jātijarāmaṇasaṁsāraḥ, “Transmigration, monks, consisting of birth, old age and death, is without beginning or end-point.” (La Vallée Poussin 1903–1913: 219.6). See Takasaki (1966: 232n242).

**reality:** fātī 法體, almost certainly a rendering of *dharmatā.*
17ii

a) 舍利弗, 我依此清淨真如法界, 爲衆生故説為不可思議法自性清淨心。

MDN, T. 1626 (XXXI) 892c19–21: 又如説: a) 舍利弗, 此清淨法性即是法界。我依
此自性清淨心, 說不思議法。

MDN, T. 1627 (XXXI) 895b19–22: 如經中説。 a) 舍利弗, 此善法如實眞如法界自
性清淨心相應法體。我依此自性清淨心, 爲衆生故説為不可思議。

a) “Regarding this dharma-realm of pure thusness, Śāriputra, I expound for
[ordinary] beings the intrinsically pure mind, which is an inconceivable

a) regarding: See the note to §5ii(a). Although not discussed in the sources
at my disposal, I believe that the construction yī 依 (... gù 故) renders San-
skrit adhikṛtya, ‘regarding,’ ‘concerning.’ This equivalence is found several
times in RGV. Although more examples could be cited, note: the expres-
sion caturo ’rthān adhikṛtya catvāro nāma paryāyā veditavyāḥ (Johnston
1950: 55,10–11) corresponds to 依四種義有四種名應知 (RGV T. 1611
[XXXI] 835b23). Again, tatra kenārthena kim adhikṛtya (17,14) corre-
sponds to 依何等義爲何等人 (825c21), and bhayanidānaprahāṇam adhi-
kṛtya (19,14) corresponds to 依遠離彼怖畏之處 (826b21). Finally, several
similar expressions appear: yam adhikṛtyoktam (55,14, 55,19–20) corre-
sponds to 依此義故 (835b27, c5), while yad adhikṛtyāha (50,10) corre-
sponds in the same way (834b28) (see also 10,15 = 823b24 and 13,22 =
824b28). This being as it may, it is also possible that a more causal relation
should be understood, in line with a rendering “Relying on/on the basis of
this dharma-realm.”

intrinsically pure mind: *prakṛtipariśuddhacitta or prakṛtiprabhāsvāra.
One and the same Chinese expression was used as an equivalent for both
Sanskrit terms; see Appendix 1.

an inconceivable teaching: I understand the expression 不可思議法 thus
to mean that the dharma-realm and the intrinsically pure mind are char-
acterized as inconceivable, but it is possible that fā 法 should be under-
stood otherwise, as ‘nature’ perhaps.
The MDS quotations differ, both from the sūtra and from each other.
MDN₁: “Śāriputra, this pure dharma-nature is precisely the dharma-realm. Regarding this intrinsically pure mind, I expound it as an inconceivable teaching.”

MDN₂ (which looks like it lies somewhere between the expression of the AAN and that of MDN₁): “Śāriputra, this dharma-realm of good qualities [善法?], pure thusness and the intrinsically pure mind are associated to the nature of reality. Regarding this intrinsically pure mind, I expound it for beings as inconceivable.”
a) “You should know, Śāriputra, that the embryo of the tathāgatas which from the very beginning is in its intrinsic nature unassociated [with it], is covered with defilements, and is an unpurified thing, b) is from the very beginning free and released, c) not associated [with it], d) covered by defilements e) and is impure. f) It can only be cut [free] by the Tathāgata’s bodhi-wisdom.

c) not associated: Is it possible that a character has dropped out (rhythmically this is possible) so that we should emend to 不相應體? In RGVc 相應煩惱 corresponds to saṃprayuktāḥ kleśāḥ, but always in compound with善根, kuśalamūla⁹. I am uncertain about the separation here of 不相應 (if we should maintain this reading) from 煩惱所纏. If they are to be read together, however, this would produce: “is not covered by associated defilement,” which doctrinally speaking is incorrect here. It seems best to assume a dropped 體 and emend. We should then understand “is not associated with its intrinsic nature.”

f) It can only be cut [free] by the Tathāgata’s bodhi-wisdom: RGV: ye 'rhatṣāntānīkā anāsravakarmaprayṛttihetavo vimalanomayātmabhāva-nirvartakās tathāgatabodhijnānavadhyāḥ = 又阿羅漢身中，所攝煩惱能作無漏諸業行緣能生無垢意生身果報，唯如來菩提智所能斷。The causes which motivate defiled actions and thus bring about polluted mind-bodies within the mental continua of Saints are to be destroyed by the Tathāgata’s bodhi-wisdom.” The Chinese translation states this with a qualification: “only the Tathāgata’s bodhi-wisdom can cut them off.” (Johnston 1950: 67.17–18 = RGVc T. 1611 [XXXI] 837c3–5).
a) “Regarding this non-associated and inconceivable dharma-realm, covered with defilements, Śāriputra, I expound for [ordinary] beings the intrinsically pure mind stained by adventitious defilements, which is an inconceivable teaching.

a) non-associated … covered with defilements: 煩惱所纒不相應不思議法界.

Takasaki (1965: 103–104, 1975a: 57) corrects the text to read *不相應煩惱所纒, namely: 本質的に結合していない煩惱の蔽いに纒われた不思議なる法の根元という点にもとづいて. Should we imagine something like *āgantukakleśagudhāśamprayuktičintyadharmaḥ? covered with defilements: As Zimmermann (2002: 53) points out in relation to the Tathāgatagarbha-sūtra, “whereas the figure of buddhas wrapped in the defilements of living beings was a fitting one, it is odd to describe buddhahood in such terms.” In the Tathāgatagarbha-sūtra we read in the simile of the kernels enclosed in husks that “tathāgatahood, buddhahood, svayambhūtv—a wrapped in the skin of the sheaths of defilements—is always present in every sentient being,” sems can thams cad la de bzhin gshes pa nyid | sansrgyas nyid rang byung nyid | nyon mongs pa’i sbubs kyi shun pas dkris shing gnas par … (Zimmermann 2002: §3B, trans. Zimmermann). In a similar fashion, the mention here of the dharmadhātu as covered by defilements is worthy of note.

adventitious defilements: *āgantukakleśa.

The entire expression may be compared with the following from the *Śāriputrābhidharma, a Dharmaguptaka text: 心性清淨, 煩惱染。凡夫未聞故, 不能如實知見, 亦無修心。聖人聞故, 如實知見, 亦有修心, “The nature of the mind is intrisically pure, stained by adventitious defilements. Because common people have not yet learned this, they are not able to know or see it in accord with reality, and they do not cultivate the mind. Because Nobles have learned it, they are able to know and see it in accord with reality, and cultivate their minds.” (T. 1548 [XXVIII] 697b18–20)
a) "You should know, Śāriputra, that the nature of the embryo of the tathāgatas which is equal to the future limit, constant, and existing is precisely the basis of all qualities [definitive of a buddha]. b) It is furnished with all [such] qualities, joined with all [such] qualities, c) and while engaged in worldly affairs it is inseparable and indivisible from the truth and from all [such] qualities, d) it maintains all qualities, it embraces all qualities.

a) existing: See the note to §16(f). Takasaki (1975a: 58) seems to skip yōufū 有法, but see his note (379n32) and the note above to §16(a). If this is equivalent to saṁvidyamānātā, then we should render something like “presently existing.” However, it may be that I have not understood Takasaki’s translation, which runs: 如来蔵は、未来永劫に堅固不変な本性があるとは、すなわち、この（如来蔵）が、（善・不善の）すべての諸性質の根本であり。According to this interpretation, the tathāgatagarbha is the basis of all qualities, good and bad. Immediately thereafter, however, Takasaki understands ‘all qualities’ to refer to those of the Tathāgata. I am afraid that I have also not well understood the discussion at Takasaki (1974: 76–77). His point seems to concern the present embryonic existence of future buddhahood within beings, this existence being sat-tva, the fact of presently existing. See Zimmermann (2002: 127–129n164). all things: sarvadharmā, the expression 一切諸法 apparently being a prosodic variant for 一切法.

c) from the truth and from all [such] qualities: I disagree with (or do not understand) Tokiwa (1932: 109) = Ogawa (2001: 231 真実の一切法) and Takasaki (1975a: 58 真実なる一切の徳性) who see here “all true qualities,” because I understand that if 真実 were to modify 法, we would expect *一切真実法 rather than the 真実一切法 of the text. Karashima Seishi (personal communication) is of the opinion that we should understand here “true sarvadharmas,” which I likewise do not understand. The text remains unclear to me. In line with my bracketed insertion in (a), however, I do understand ‘all qualities’ to refer to ‘all buddha qualities,’ those qualities constitutive of a buddha.
a) “Regarding this unborn, unperishing, eternal, tranquil, unchanging refuge, Śāriputra, the inconceivable, pure dharma-realm, I term it ‘beings.’ b) Why? c) To say ‘beings’ is (only) a synonym for precisely this unborn, unperishing, eternal, tranquil, unchanging refuge, (this) inconceivable, pure dharma-realm, and so on. d) With this intention, regarding those qualities, I term it ‘beings.’

a) eternal, tranquil, unchanging refuge: See §13ii, where the Sanskrit terminology is attested.

c) To say ‘beings’: The same grammatical construction, 言~~者, is found in RGV in §10iii, where for instance 言衆生者, 即是第一義諦 corresponds to paramārtha iti ... sattvadhātor etad adhivacanam. Here yìmíng 異名 renders adhivacana.

and so on: I do not know precisely what is meant to be elided here, but of course similar lists appear earlier in the text.

d) intention: yi 義, *artha, here not in the sense of ‘meaning’ or ‘purport’ but rather of ‘goal’.
20

a) 舍利弗, 此三種法皆真實如, 不異、不差。 b) 於此真實如、不異、不差法中, 畢竟不起極惡不善二種邪見。 c) 何以故。 d) 以如實見故。 e) 所謂: 減見增見, 舍利弗, 此二邪見, 諸佛如來畢竟遠離。 f) 諸佛如來之所呵責。

b) 於此真實如不異 ] F1: 於此真如不異 極惡不善 ] S: 極惡不善

e) 減見增見 ] F1, 2: 減見故增見故; Kongo, Li: 減見故增見

f) 呵責 ] Q, S, SX: 該責

a) “These three types of natures, Śāriputra, are all true thusness, not distinct and not [mutually] separate. b) With respect to these truly thus, not distinct and not [mutually] separate natures, one absolutely does not entertain the two types of extremely evil and bad views [that there is an increase or decrease in any of the three categories]. c) Why? d) Because this is a view in accord with reality. e) As for the views that there is increase or decrease, Śāriputra, the buddhas and tathāgatas absolutely distance themselves from these two mistaken views. f) They are criticized by the buddhas and tathāgatas.

a) true thusness: zhēnshírú 真實如. See the note to §16(b).
b) natures: It is possible that we should understand fǎ 法 here not to refer to the same 法 as in the preceding sentence, as I have taken it, but instead as ‘teaching,’ thus: “Regarding this teaching of true thusness as not distinct and not [mutually] separate.” But this seems to me not very likely.

extremely evil and bad: This is somewhat odd, but what the Chinese says: 極惡不善. It is apparently a very rare expression. Michael Radich wonders if these are the names of two views. I wonder if it is merely a stylistic hendiadys.

e) It is unusual in the AAN for 舍利弗 (Śāriputra) to occur as a vocative in the midst of a sentence. This suggests that we should perhaps put a full stop between 所謂: 減見增見 and 舍利弗. This leaves 所謂: 減見增見, however, pendant, since it cannot be attached to the preceding answer to the question ‘Why?’ Therefore, in the end I reject this solution and have
chosen the uncomfortable but otherwise possible mid-sentence vocative. Tokiwa (1932: 109) chose the same.

f) **criticized by the buddhas and tathāgatas**: Cp. the *Dīrghāgama*, T. 1 (I) 74c14–15 (et seq.): 此是如來至真等正覺之所呵責也. I wonder if we have to do with some expression with *avasādayati*, Pāli *apasādeti*, chastise, rebuke.
21i

a) “If, Śāriputra, there are bhikṣus or bhikṣuṇis, upāsakas or upāsikās, who entertain one or the other view, b) the buddhas and tathāgatas are not their teachers, and such people are not my disciples.”

28.3: b) *nāham teṣāṁ sāstā na te mama śrāvakāḥ*

RGV<sub>c</sub> T. 1611 (XXI) 828c12–14: a) “If, Śāriputra, there are bhikṣus or bhikṣuṇis, upāsakas or upāsikās, who entertain one or the other view, b) the buddhas and tathāgatas are not their teachers, and such people are not my disciples.”

a) Note that the Chinese translation of RGV cites the whole text of the sūtra, while in the Sanskrit only part (b) is quoted.

b) The RGV in Sanskrit has: “a) I am not their teacher; they are not my auditors.”

**The buddhas and tathāgatas are not their teachers, and such people are not my disciples:** The Chinese here is a bit odd in that it literally says ‘the buddhas and tathāgatas are not their bhagavant.” It is possible, as Vincent Tournier suggests to me, that this is based on some sort of expression like that found in the *Mahāvastu* (Senart 1882–1897: iii.3–4, quoted in Tournier 2012: 385n49): śāstā me bhagavāṁ śravako 'ham asmin sugate || evam ukte āyuṣman ānanda bhagavāṁ mama etad uvāca || evam eva kāśyapa ahaṁ kāśyapa śāstā tvain ca me śravako. See also Silk (2003: 183–184). For the negative formulation, as we have here in the AAN, cp. *Ratnārāsi* II.2 (Silk Forthcoming): ‘od srung gang la la zhigchos ’di dag dang mi idan la | bdag ni dge slong dge slong ngo snyam du khas ’che na bsam pas mo sp pa ma gtogs par nga yang de’i ston pa ma yin la de yang nga’i nyan thos ma yin no ||; 迦葉，若有比丘自知不成就如是之法及餘善法。又離是法行於餘道。迦葉，彼比丘非我弟子，我非彼師，“If there is someone, Kāśyapa, who does not possess these characteristics but falsely thinks “I am a monk, I am a monk,” rejecting zealous cultivation [of the path], I am not his teacher, nor likewise is he my disciple.”
21ii

a) 舍利弗，此人起二見因緣故，從冥入冥，從闇入闇。 b) 我說是等名‘一闡提’。

a-b) F1: This entire section is missing.

28.3–4: a) tān aham śāriputra tamasas tamontaram andhakārān mahāndhakāragāminas tamobhūyāṣṭhā iti vādāmi |

RGV C T. 1611 (XXXI) 828c14–17: a) 舍利弗，是人以起二見因緣，從闇入闇，從冥入冥。 b) 我說是等名‘一闡提’故。

a) “Because these people, Śāriputra, entertain these two views, from gloom they enter gloom, from darkness they enter darkness. b) I speak of these terming them ‘icchantika.’

a) The RGV in Sanskrit has: “a) I say, Śāriputra, that they, filled with pitch-darkness, go from pitch-darkness into pitch-darkness, from gloom into greater gloom.”

from gloom they enter gloom, from darkness they enter darkness: An old expression in India, found already in the Brḥadāranyaka-Upaniṣad 4.4.10 =Īśā-Upaniṣad 9 (cf. 12): andham tamaḥ praṇiṣantye vidyām upāsate | tato bhūya iva te tamo ya u vidyāyāṁ ratāḥ ||, “Into darkness enter those who serve ignorance; those who delight in knowledge [enter] a darkness seemingly greater than that.” [Saṅkara on BĀU: andham adarśanātmakaṁ tamaḥ sansāraniyāmakaṁ praṇiṣanti pratipadyante … tatas tasmād api bhūya iva bahutaram iva tamaḥ praṇiṣanti ....]. The Jaina Uttarajhayana 14.12 has: veyā ahīyā na bhavanti tānaṁ | bhuttā diyā ninti tamaṁ tamaṇaṁ || jāyā ya puttā na havantī tānaṁ | ko āma te aṇu-mannejja eyaṁ ||, “The study of the Vēdas will not save you; the feeding of Brahmans will lead you from darkness to darkness, and the birth of sons will not save you. Who will assent to what you said?” (trans. Jacobi 1895: 63).

The expression is also common in Buddhist texts, including the Madhyamāgama: 從冥入冥，從闇入闇 (T. 26 [I] 647a29), and the Samyuktāgama: 譬如士夫從闇而入闇，從冥入冥，從業刷出復業刷 (T. 99 [II] 72a15–16).

On the Sanskrit vocabulary of tamas and andhakāra, see the very interesting study of Hara (2006), who concludes (p. 299) that “there exists a grade
of darkness in the semantic content of *andha-kāra*, from gloominess to complete darkness. It is not like *tamas* (pitch darkness).”

b) *icchantika*: The RGV quotation does not mention *icchantika*, although as is typical it is found in the Chinese translation. This is not the only reason to doubt that the version of the AAN known to the author of the RGV contained any reference to *icchantika*, an issue discussed in the Introduction.
21iii

a) 因此，舍利弗，汝今應學此法，化彼衆生，令離二見，住正道中。 b) 舍利弗，如是等法汝亦應學，離彼二見，住正道中。

a) 因此舍利弗汝今應學此法 ] F1: 舍利弗此法? The stone is damaged, and the reproduction of the rubbing very difficult to read.

a) “Therefore, Śāriputra, you now should study this teaching and convert those beings, causing them to give up the two views and dwell in the correct path. b) You too, Śāriputra, should study teachings such as this, give up those two views and dwell in the correct path.”

b) The text here makes clear that Śāriputra is in need of further spiritual maturation.
The Buddha having expounded this sūtra, the venerable Śāriputra, bhikṣus and bhikṣunīs, upāsakas and upāsikās, bodhisattva-mahāsattvas, and the gods, nāgas, yakṣas, gandharvas, asuras, garuḍas, kinnaras, mahorāgas, men, non-men, and so on—the whole assembly—were all greatly delighted, in faith accepted and honored (the teaching), and bore it in mind.

a) Something like: *idam avocad bhagavān āttamanā āyusmān śāriputras te ca bhikṣubhikṣunyupāsakopāsikāḥ te ca bodhisattvamahāsattvās sā ca sarvāvati pariṣat sadēvanāgayāksagandharvāsura-garuḍakīṁnaramahoragamanusyāmanusyādipramukhā bhagavato bhāṣitam abhyanandann iti || bore it in mind: See Bingenheimer (2011: 51–56).
佛說不增不減經

The Scripture on the Absence of Increase and the Absence of Decrease [in the Realm of Beings].
Appendices
Appendix 1

Is the Mind Originally Pure or is it Luminous?

Sanskrit sources provide ample examples of characterizations of the mind as innately pure (prakṛtipariśuddha-citta) or innately luminous (prakṛtiprabhāsvaracitta), using two distinct Sanskrit terms. The difference between these expressions is not, as far as I know, anywhere made clear, and although Tibetan translators carefully distinguish them, at least as far as Chinese translators are concerned, the two terms (with their variations) appear to have been treated synonymously. Since the AAN exists as a whole only in Chinese, the challenge of looking backward from Chinese toward Sanskrit poses the question of what might have stood behind the AAN’s zìxìngqīng-jìng xīn 心自性清淨. The goal of the following is demonstrate that there is no clear correlation between the Chinese expression zìxìngqīng-jìng xīn 心自性清淨 and either of two possible Sanskrit counterparts, prakṛtipariśuddha-citta or prakṛtiprabhāsvaracitta (or grammatical variations thereon). Therefore it is not possible to hypothesize which Sanskrit term originally stood in the text.¹ However, since whatever differences might be assumed to be inherent in the different terminologies are not actually of much moment, our failure to be able to reconstruct the Sanskrit forms is not actually problematic.

Equivalences with pariśuddha or viśuddha (or variants thereof)


---

¹ For an earlier discussion relevant to this question, see Shinoda (1964).
² Johnston (1950: 71,12). For comparison see Tibetan in Derge Tanjur 4025, sems tsam, phi 111a6: sems kyi rang bzhin rnam par dag pa gnyis su med pa’i chos nyid. All Tibetan references below are to this text, so I give only the folio and line number, as references to the RGV in Sanskrit are to Johnston 1950.
³ When references below are to the Chinese translation of this text, I give only page, register and line numbers.
curiously as that ‘cittapraṇī, though it is śuddhi, still is advaya by nature; therefore …’ Since however 自性 plainly represents praṇī, it is very clear that viśuddhi here is rendered with 清淨, although this term appears twice (the source of Takasaki’s śuddhi is not clear to me).

A quotation from the Śrīmālādevī reads: atha ca punar bhagavan praṇīpariśuddhaśya cittasyopakśitartho dusprativedhyah,⁴ In Chinese we find 世尊, 然有煩惱有煩惱染心, 自性清淨心而有染者, 難可了知 (824c28–825a1). Here pariśuddha corresponds to 清淨. The RGV Chinese translation quotes exactly from Guṇabhadra’s translation of the sūtra (T. 353 [XII] 222b27–29). Another citation contains the Buddha’s answer to the statement just cited: dvāv imau devi dharmau dusprativedhyau | praṇīpariśuddhacittam dusprativedhyam,⁵ corresponding to: 天女, 自性清淨心而有染污難可了知。有二法難可了知。謂自性清淨心難可了知 (827a16–18). Here again Guṇabhadra’s translation is quoted (T. 353 [XII] 222c3–5).

Equivalences with prabhāśvara

In a passage in the Dhāraṇīśvararāja, also known as the Tathāgatamahākaraṇānirdeśa, the second text in the Mahāsamnipāta collection, quoted in the RGV, we find the expression praṇīprabhāśvaṁ cittam,⁶ corresponding to Chinese 心自性清淨 (827a23). In the sūtra itself, we find 知心性淨 (T. 397 [XIII] 20b25–26).

A verse in the RGV reads: ye samyak pratividhya sarvajagato nairātmya-kotīṁ śivāṁ taccittapraṇīprabhāśvaraṁāya kleśāsvabhāvēkṣanāt | sarvatrā-nugatam anāvṛtadhiyā paśyanti sambuddhatāṁ tebhyaḥ sattvaviśuddhy-anantaviśayajñānekaṇānebhyaḥ namah ||.⁷ Although there is certainly some

---

⁴ Johnston 15,6–7. For comparison see Tibetan 82b2 = bcom ldan ’das de lta lags mod kyi rang bzhin gis yongs su dag pa’i sans nye bar nyon mongs pa’i don rto gs par dka’o. In the Tibetan of the sūtra we find bcom ldan ’das rang bzhin gis yongs su dag pa’i nye ba’i myon mongs pa’i don ni khong du chud par dka’ ba lags te (Tsukinowa 152.4–5).

⁵ Johnston 22,1–2. Tibetan 85b6–7: gang gi phyir lha mo chos ‘di gnyis ni rto gs par dka’ ba ste | sans rang bzhin gis rnam par dag pa’i rto gs par dka’ ba dang | sans de nyid kyi nye bar nyon mongs pa’i rto gs par dka’ ba’o ||.

⁶ Johnston 22,6. For comparison see Tibetan 86a2: sans ni rang bzhin gis ’od gsal ba.

⁷ Johnston 14,1–4. For comparison see Tibetan 81b7–82a1: sans de rang bzhin ’od gsal ba na nyon mongs ngo bo med gzigs pas || gang dag ’gro kun bdag med || mtha’ zhi yang dag rto gs nas thams cad la || rdzogs pa’i sangs rgyas rjes zhugs gzigs pa sgrib pa med pa’i blo
problem in the correspondence of the Chinese rendering with the Sanskrit as a whole, we can see how prabhāsvara is rendered 清淨 (although viśuddhi may also have the same rendering here, and thus this passage should perhaps belong to the next category instead): 正覺正知者 見一切眾生 清淨無有我 寂靜真實際 以能知於彼 自性清淨心 見煩惱無實 故離諸煩惱 無障清淨智者 見煩惱無實 故離諸煩惱 無障清淨智者 如實見眾生 自性清淨 佛法身境界 無閡清淨智眼 見諸眾生性 遍無量境界 故我今敬禮 (824c1–8). Another example reads: cittasya yāsau prakṛtiḥ prabhā- svarāḥ na jātū sā dyaur iḥ vāti vikriyām,8 for which Chinese has: 如虛空清淨 心常明元轉變 (832c24).

A passage from the RGV reads: prakṛtiprabhāsvaratādārśanāc ca citta- syādikṣayanirodhadarśanāc ca taddupakleṣasya | tatra yā cittasya prakṛtipra- bhāsvaratā yaś ca taddupakeśa ity etad dvayam anārade dvātā kuśalakū- śalayoś cittayor ekacarakatvād dvitiyacittānasahānāvarahanyogena paramaduṣ- prativedhyam,9 corresponding to Chinese: 一者, 見性本來自性清淨。二者, 見諸煩惱本來寂滅。偈言: 以能知於彼, 自性清浄心, 見煩惱無實故, 离諸煩惱故。又自性清浄心本來清浄。又本來常為煩惱所染。此二種法於彼無漏真如。法界中善心不善心俱, 更無第三心。如是義者難可覺知 (824c20–25). It is curious that immediately after this, the RGV cites the Śrīmalādevī, discussed below, which states: atha ca punar bhagavan prakṛtipariśuddhasya citta- syopakleśartho dusprativedhyah. That is, the sūtra citation uses the wording with pariśuddha in place of the prabhāsva found in the immediately preceding passage. It is not only the RGV which displays this flexibility. A verse (Lévi 1907, verse 13.19) in the Mahāyānasūtraṁkāra, reads:10 mataṁ ca cittam prakṛtiprabhāsvaram sadā tadāgantukadoṣadūṣitam | na dharmatā- cittam rte ‘nyacetasaḥ prabhāsvaratvam prakṛtau vidhiyate ||,11 corresponding...

---

8 Johnston 43,9–10; Tibetan 97b5–6: sems kyi rang bzhin ‘od gsal gang yin pa || de ni nam mkha’ bzhin du ’gyur med de ||.

9 Johnston 14,15–15,2; Tibetan 82a5–6: sens rang bzhin gyis ‘od gsal ba mthong ba’i phyir dang | de’i nye ba’i nyon mongs pa gdod ma nas zad cing ‘gags par mthong ba’i phyir ro || de la sens rang bzhin gyis ‘od gsal ba gang yin pa dang | de’i nye ba’i nyon mongs pa zhes bya ba gang yin pa ’di gnyis ni dge ba dang mi dge ba’i sens dag las geig rgyu bas sems gnyis pa mtshams sbyor ba med pa’i tshul gyis zag pa med pa’i dbyings la mchog tu riogs par dka’ ba yin no ||.

10 On the relation between the RGV and the Mahāyānasūtraṁkāra in regard to this topic, see Ichikawa 1974.

11 Tibetan is in the Derge Tanjur 4026, sems tsam, phi 188b3–4: sems ni rtag tu rang bzhin
Instances in which Chinese appears to render both terms, or distinguishes them

The apparent disregard for any distinction between the two terms in question is seen in the following small passage in which both terms appear: viśuddho jñeyāvaraṇaprahānāt | prabhāsvaras tadubhayāgantukatāprakṛtitāḥ,12 for which we find: 清淨者，以離智障故。光明者，如自性清淨體。彼二是客塵煩惱 (831c15–17). Yet another example is found in a sūtra passage cited in the RGV, which reads: ayoniṣomanaskārah prakṛtipariśuddhiratiṣṭhitāḥ | tata ucyate prakṛtiprabhāsvaram cittam āgantukair upakleśair upakliśyata iti,13 corresponding to Chinese: 不正思惟依於佛性自性清淨心住。以是義故，經中説言：自性清淨心客塵煩惱染 (833a28–b1). According to Takasaki (1966: 239n292), the passage quoted here is found in the Gaganagaṇjapariṇācchā, where we find the sentence in question: 非如理作意依自性清淨心住，是清淨心不爲客塵煩惱所染 (T. 404 [XIII] 643c5–6).14

When the terms in question occur together, translators are able to differentiate them, although as we saw above, they may not do so. An example is found in the following verse: vaimalyād avikalpatvād yogināṁ gocaratvātah | prabhāsvarāṁ viśuddham ca dharmanāṁ svabhāvahḥ ||,15 to which corresponds: 以離一切垢 故聖人境界 清淨光明照 以法性如是 (843a8–9). On the other hand, a quotation from the Sāgaramatiparipṛcchā contains the following: evam eva sāgaramate bodhisattvah sattvāṇāṁ prakṛtiprabhāsvaratāṁ cittasya praṇāṇīti | tāṁ punar āgantukopakleśopakliśṭāṁ paśyatī | tatra bodhisattvasyavim bhavati | naite kleśāḥ sattvāṇāṁ cittaprakṛtipra-

---

12 Johnston 39,1–2; Tibetan 95b1: rnam par dag pa ni shes bya’i sgrīb pa spangs pa’i phyir ro || ’od gsal ba ni de gnyi ga glo bur ba nyid kyi rang bzhi ma yin pa’i phyir ro ||.
13 Johnston 45,1–3; Tibetan 98b1–2: tshul bzhi ma yin pa yid la byed pa ni rang bzhi gyis yongs su dag pa la gnas pa ste | des na sms kyi rang bzhi ni ’od gsal ba ste | glo bur gyi nyon mongs pas nyon ma mongs pa’o zhes brjod do zhe’o ||.
14 I could not find an equivalent in T. 397 (XIII) 124c.
15 Johnston 87,1–2; Tibetan 118b1–2: dri med rnam par rtog med dang || rnal ’byor rnams kyi yul yin phyir || chos dbyings nga bo nyid kyis ni || dag pa’i phyir ni ’od gsal ba ||.
bhāsvaratāyāṁ praviśṭāḥ | āgantukā ete kleśā abhūtaparikalpasamutthita-, corresponding to Chinese: 大海慧，菩薩摩訶薩亦復如是。如實知見一切眾生自性清淨光明淨心，而為客塵煩惱所染。大海慧，諸菩薩等生如是心：彼諸煩惱不染眾生自性清淨心，是諸煩惱客塵虛妄分別心起 (834b5–9). Here the first prabhāsvara corresponds in Chinese to 清淨光明淨，or perhaps even 清淨 and 光明 and 淨?

In another example from the RGV, we find both Sanskrit terms, viśuddhi and prabhāsvara, this time however corresponding identically to 清淨: tatra prakṛtīviśuddhir yā vimuktir na visaṃyogah prabhāsvarāyāś cittaprakṛtṛer āgantukamalayāṁ visaṃyogāḥ,17 自性清淨者，謂解脫無所捨離，以彼自性清淨心體不捨一切客塵煩惱，以彼本來不相應故。離垢清淨者，謂得解脫。又彼解脫不離一切法，如水不離諸塵垢等而言清淨，以自性清淨心遠離客塵諸煩惱垢更無餘故 (841b19–24). A final instance also seems to show this distinction, setting the two terms directly next to each other: sa khālīv eṣa tathā-gatadāḥtur buddhabhūmavat atyanvantimalaviśuddhaprabhāsvaratāyāṁ svaprakṛťau sthitāḥ pūrvāntam upādāya nityātvānaṃ punar jāyate mano-mayair ātmabhāvaitbhāvaḥ,18 corresponding to Chinese: 此偈明何義，明如來性於佛地時無垢清淨光明常住自性清淨。以本際來常故不生。以離意生故 (835a26–28).

In one passage we see what appears to be a clear distinction in Chinese between viśuddhi and prabhāsvara, respectively 清淨 and 光明: tadubhayā-

---

16 Johnston 49,9–12; Tibetan 101a2−3:

17 Johnston 80,16–19; Tibetan 116a5–7:

18 Johnston 54,3–4; Tibetan 103a6–7:
śrayasya cittapraṅtvimukter atyantavimalaprabhāsvaratayārkamaṇḍalaviśuddhisādharmyam,\textsuperscript{19} corresponding to: 三者，依止彼二自性清净心解脱，無垢離垢光明輪清净相似相对法应知 (836c11–12).

As is evident from the the evidence collected above, there is both no apparent pattern to differential usage in the Sanskrit terminology, and no clear distinction possible between prakṛtiṣuddhacitta and prakṛtiprabhāsvaracitta in the guise of Chinese translations. Therefore, while it is not possible to suggest a firm reconstruction of the Vorlage of the expression zi-xīng qīngjìng xīn 心自性清净 as it occurs in the AAN, it does not seem in the end that from a doctrinal, or perhaps even a rhetorical, point of view, this makes any difference.

\textsuperscript{19} Johnston 58,17–18; Tibetan 106a1–2: de gnyis ka’i rten sms kyi rang bzhin rnam par grol ba ni shin tu dri ma med cing ’od gsal ba nyid kyi nyi ma’i dkyil ’khor rnam par dag pa dang chos mtshungs so ||.
Appendix 2

On amuktajña

In 1958, Takasaki devoted an article to the question of the meaning of the term amuktajña. The same author later promised (in 1973: 298) to return to the issue in the light of critiques from Schmithausen (1971: 131–132) and Ruegg (1969: 360) of his treatment in his English translation of the RGV, but he apparently never did so.¹ In his English translation of the RGV he suggested understanding amukta-jña/jñāna as “inseparable/unreleased from Wisdom.” In a note on the question, discussing the sequence avinir-bhāgadharma-avinirmuktajñānaguna-, he wrote of the last item:²

For ‘avinirmuktajñānaguna’, T. ma-bral-bahi ye-śes-kyi yon-tan-can, which does not seem correct (it should be ‘ye-śes-daṇ ma-bral-bahi yon-tan can’); C. 不脱 … 智慧功德, but 智慧功德 is placed at the end, and probably the whole sentence could not be understood properly by [the] C[hinese] translator. The term ‘avinirmuktajñānaguna’, being appositional to ‘dharmakāya’, is a Bahuvrihi compound, in which the former part ‘avinirmuktajñāna’ is relating to the latter part ‘guṇa’ as an apposition. And hence, ‘avinirmuktajñāna’, being an adjective to ‘guṇa’ (which means ‘buddha-guṇah’ or ‘tathāgata-dharma’ i.e. the Qualities of the Buddha), forms again a kind of Bahuvihi compound. It should mean ‘unreleased from jñāna’. Here, ‘jñāna’ signifies ‘buddhajñāna’, i.e. the Wisdom, by which the Buddha has realized ‘bodhi’. Therefore, this term ‘avinirmuktajñāna’ is an attribute, exclusive to the Buddha’s Qualities. …

In other passages, ‘amukta-jñāna’ or ‘amuktajña’ is used as an attribute to ‘guṇa’. They are nothing but the abbreviated forms of ‘avinirmuktajñāna’ and seem to have the same sense as the latter.

The key sentence in question in the AAN appears in §11, and reads in Sanskrit: yo ‘yaṁ śāriputra tathāgatanirdiṣṭo dharmakāyaḥ so ‘yam avinirbhā-

² (1966: 144–145n23; see also 235n262).
gadharmāvinirmuktajñānaganuṇo yad uta gaṅgānadīvīlikāvyatīkrāntaṁ
tathāgatadharmaṁ. A parallel passage (although the connection is
cautiously questioned by Ruegg 1969: 360n3) in the Śrīmālādevī (quoted in the
note to AAN §11[a]) reads: śūnyas tathāgatagarbo vinirbhāgair muktajñāṁ
sarvakleśakośaiṁ | aśūnyo gaṅgānadīvīlikāvyatīvṛttair avinirbhāgair
amuktajñair acintyair buddhadharmair. Ruegg understood the AAN
passage as follows: “… le dharmakāya … a pour qualité d’être inseparable,
et il a la propriété du savoir non séparé — [inséparable] des dharma de
tathāgata dépassant [en leur nombre] les sables de la Gangā.” Ruegg notes
that the canonical translation of the Śrīmālādevī understands amuktajñān(a) to modify buddhadharma, while the Tibetan translation of the RGV
takes it in the AAN with dharmakāya, “qui a pour guṇa le savoir inséparable,” ma bral ba’i yes shes kyi yon tan can. Ruegg (1969: 360n3; 1973: 104)
remarks, however, that Bu ston understands jñānaganuṇa as ye shes kyi bs dus
pa’i yon tan, qualities included in wisdom. (It is not unlikely, although
Ruegg does not mention it here, that Bu ston had access to a Tibetan trans-
lation other than that of Rngog lo tsā ba.)

As Schmithausen observed, Ruegg saw that in the AAN avinirbhāga-
and avinirmuktajñāna- are qualifications of the dharmakāya, while in the
Śrīmālādevī these refer rather to the buddhadharma-s. Ruegg explicitly stat-
ed (1969: 361) that “le dharmakāya est donc qualifié d’avinirmuktajñāna-
guṇa et d’avinirbhāgadharman,” but when he cited the Sanskrit of AAN
§12, evidently by oversight he misprinted avinirmuktajñānaganuṇaḥ in place
of avinirmuktaganuṇaḥ. This elicited the following response from Takasaki
(1973):

Prof. Ruegg writes ‘avinirmuktajñānaganuṇaḥ’ for ‘avinirmuktaganuṇaḥ’
as a description of a lantern (pradīpaḥ) (p. 361, 1.11). It may be
merely a slip of the pen, but it is quite important to consider why the
term jñāna is added in the case of dharmakāya as part of its epithet,
and this point seems to be more or less related to the formation of the
terms amuktajñāna and amuktajñā. As to the application of the
term muktajña (muktajñāna) to the buddhadharmas in the second
Chinese translation of the Śrīmālāsūtra (at the beginning of the 8th
century A.D.) as well as in the Tibetan translation of the same text
(9th century A.D.), this is clearly a change caused by misunderstanding,
for example, muktajña as (vi)muktijñāna (knowledge of liber-
ation), which probably took place in the course of the transmission of the original text from the seventh century onwards. The first Chinese translation of the Śrīmālāsūtra (5th century A.D.) uses the term equivalent to amukta- in the parallel passage, which supports the term amuktajña (amuktajñāna) as the original reading.

Schmithausen’s critique was as follows:

It is, off hand, possible to translate the AAN passage as follows: “The dhammakāya … possesses inseparable qualities and merits which are … avinirmuktajñāna-⁴, that is, in the form of Buddha-qualities, which are more numerous than the sands of the Ganges river.” As for the terms (a)vinirmuktajñāna-, (a)muktajñāna- and (a)muktajña- (which surely are synonymous), I might remark that Takasaki’s rendering with ‘inseparable from the Wisdom’ … seems grammatically very problematic. As the term (vinir)muktajñāna- (and its opposite) always follows the expression vinirbhāga- (and its opposite)—in one spot asambaddha- (and its opposite sambaddha-) also precedes it—it is to be assumed that it had a significance closely associated with the idea of ‘inseparable’ (and its opposite, ‘separable’). This is

---

⁴ Schmithausen’s note: There is no reason why avinirbhāga- and avinirmuktajñāna- in the AAN should be tatpuruṣas and not bahuvihis as in the Śrīmālādevī.
also close to Bodhiruci’s Chinese rendering (bu)tuo 不脱 (‘not detached’). In my opinion, it is best to resolve the expression as (vinir)muktatvena jñānam (or jñā) yeṣāṃ (na) bhavati, understanding ‘in whom knowledge is not found separately,’ that is, ‘which (never) is found to be separated or removed [from the absolute truth].’ An analysis as (vinir)muktāṁ jñānam (or muktā jñā) yeṣāṁ (na) bhavati = ‘whose knowledge [can(not)] be separated [from knowledge of the absolute truth] ’ is also conceivable, that is, ‘without whose simultaneous recognition the absolute truth cannot be recognized.’

In light of this critique, it might make sense to try to understand Takasaki’s arguments for his understanding. Since his 1958 (Japanese) paper is the most detailed discussion of the issue, I will attempt to summarize his points here.

He begins with seven passages from the RGV in which the term appears, of which two are quotations from the AAN, four from the Śrīmālādevī, while one is a sentence of the RGV itself. In the AAN we find avinirmukta-jñāna, in the Śrīmālādevī both amuktajñāna and amuktajña, and in the RGV itself amuktajña. He states that amuktajña, appearing in sequence with avinirbhāga, acintya, and gaṅgānādīvālikā-vyatīrtta is a modifier of buddhadharma or buddhaguṇa. The term avinirbhāga, translated in Chinese as 不相捨離, 不捨, or 不相離, in Tibetan as rnam par dbyer med pa, frequently appears indicating the close relation between the dharmakāya and the buddhaguṇa or the dharmakāya and wisdom, etc. In the same fashion avinirmukta and amukta are used in expressions like sarvakleśakosavinirmukto … dharmakāyāḥ and avinirmuktakleśakosās tathāgatagarbhaḥ, or in the example of a gem stone or a lamp, the qualities of which are inseparable from the object.

One cannot say that the dharmakāya is separable from the buddhaguṇa. Thus we have the expression dharmakāyaḥ vinirbhāgadharmāvinirmuktajñānaguṇaḥ. Here avinirmuktajñānaguṇaḥ is an adjective modifying dharmakāyaḥ (in the same case), therefore a bahuvrihi with the former member being avinirmuktajñāna and the latter member guṇa, both also in the same case, such that the compound’s internal construction is that of a karmadhāraya. In other words, avinirmuktajñāna modifies guṇa, functioning as does amukta elsewhere.
In opposition to *avinirbhāga* and *amuktajña* we find *vinirbhāga* and *muktajña*. They modify *kleśakośa* or *sāṃskṛtadharma*. Here too, *vinirbhāga* and *muktajña* take the *buddhadharmacāya* as their reference and signify fundamental *non*attachment (*asaṁbaddha*). All *sāṃskṛta* dharmas are void (*mṛśaṁsādharma*) and *kleśas* are adventitious (*āgantuka*). In opposition to the *buddhadharma* which is *amuktajña*, all *sāṃskṛta* dharmas are *muktajña*.

It is possible that *mukta* was understood as *mukti*, then connected with *jñāna*, such that *muktijñāna* was liable to be confused with *vimuktijñāna-darśana*, as apparently happened in the Tibetan translation of the *Śrīmālādevī*. There we find the following sentences:  

5 I tacitly correct Takasaki’s transcription errors from Tsukinowa’s edition.

6 Takasaki inserts this on the basis of the Chinese translation of the RGV, and the Tibetan translation of the *Śrīmālādevī* along with both of its Chinese translations.
T. 353 (XII) 222b12–14: 世尊，不離不斷不脫不異不思議佛法。世尊，
斷脫異外有為法依持建立者。是如來藏。

T. 310 (48) (XI) 677c14–16: 如來藏者。與不離解脫智藏。是依是持。
是為建立。亦與外離解脫智諸有為法。依持建立。

de bzhin gshegs pa’i snying po nyon mongs pa thams cad kyi sbubs
dang tha dad du gnas pa ma grol bas shes pa rnams kyis stong pa
dang | ... sangs rgyas kyi chos tha dad du mi gnas shing grol bas
shes pa ... snyed dag gis mi stong pa lags so || (Tsukinowa 1940:
130,15–132,4)
śūnyas tathāgatagarbho vinirbhāgair muktajñaiḥ sarvakleśakosaiḥ |
asūnya gaṅgānādiśālikāvyatīrīttair avinirbhāgair amuktajñair
acintyair buddhadharmaiḥ

T. 353 (XII) 221c17–18: 若離若脫若異，一切煩惱藏。世尊，不空如來
藏，過於恒沙不離不脫不異不思議佛法。

T. 310 (48) (XI) 677a23–25: 所謂，離於不解脫智一切煩惱。世尊，不空
如來藏。具過恒沙佛解脫智不思議法。

Takasaki asserts that here the Tibetan translators have reversed amuktajña
and muktajña, attaching the first to kleśa or emptiness, and the second to
the buddhadharma or the non-empty. The same error appears in the second
Chinese translation of the sūtra, that contained in the Mahāratnakūṭa
collection, while the older translation has rendered the passages correctly.
He further discusses the Chinese translation of the RGV, judging it with
ambivalence. As for the Tibetan translation of the RGV, it correctly renders
the negations of the Sanskrit, with such expressions as bral ma shes pa and
bral shes pa, translating avinirmuktajñānagunā with ma bral ba’i ye shes kyi
yon tan can.

In this light, for Takasaki both the Chinese and Tibetan translations have
not correctly understood amuktajña. When the Chinese translations render
不離不脱, as far as the meaning of amukta goes, they are correct, but it is
not sufficient to speak of the inseparability of the buddha qualities
(dharmas or guṇas), raising the question of the position of jñāna. This is
not used in the discussion of the lamp, the qualities of which are inseparable
but in which wisdom is not at issue. The term amuktajñāna is used only
with relation to the buddhadharma, and the key to its understanding
comes from Sanskrit grammar.
Having suggested that *avinirmuktajñāna* is an adjectival karmadhāraya modifying *guna*, and that it was contracted to *amuktajña*, Takasaki suggests that *avinirmuktajñāna > amuktajña* was understood as a bahuvrīhi modifying *guna* or *dharma*, and that it was understood that one could split *avinirmukta* and *jñāna* and *amukta* and *jña*. Here both compounds have a past passive participle with negative prefix. According to Pāṇini ii.2.36, bahuvrīhis take the past passive participle as their prior member. In the case of a tatpurusa, a past passive participle comes second, in the same case as the prior noun, but in the case of a bahuvrīhi it must come first, and can be in a case relation with the latter element. Thus: *avinirmuktajñāna* is to be understood as *jñānad avinirmuktaḥ, ye shes las ma bral ba*. This is clear from the use of *avinirmuktakleśakośa* in the expression *dharmakāyo — avinirmuktakleśakośas tathāgatagarbhah sūcyate* [read: ity ucyate].

It is obvious that *jña* in *amuktajña* means the same as *jñāna*, *jña* merely being the nominalized root and agent of the action. It is adjectivalized as the latter member of a bahuvrīhi compound. However, -*jña* is only used as the latter element of a normal compound in verbal usage of ‘knowing’ the former element (Pāṇini iii.1.135), that is, as a tatpurusa. However, here that is not appropriate. It retains its verbal sense, to be sure, but although it is possible, there are not many examples.

Takasaki asserts that he has shown *amuktajña* to be used in the sense of ‘not separate from wisdom’ as a bahuvrīhi, modifying only *buddhadharma* or *buddhaguna*. It is obvious that *jñāna* refers to the Buddha’s wisdom, the wisdom through which the Buddha attained awakening. Without it there is no buddhahood, thus it is inseparable from buddhahood. One cannot imagine the *dharmakāya* separate from the *buddhadharmas*, nor from wisdom, thus the fundamental quality of the *dharmakāya* is wisdom as well.

It should be clear from this presentation of Takasaki’s views that he has, at least to some extent, started from a doctrinal standpoint rather than from the philology of the texts. At the same time, while we must give utmost respect to the classical translations of Buddhist texts, it is also true that sometimes their translators make mistakes, sometimes ideas change, and sometimes there are disagreements among authorities. Takasaki attempts to get to some ‘root’ meaning of the term in question, though it is not clear that he has been completely successful in doing so.
Appendix 3

*Sāramati

The name Sthiramati is well known, amply attested in Sanskrit in manuscripts and inscriptions. A number of works are attributed to (a, maybe not the same) Sthiramati, including the Abhidharmakośabhāṣyatīkā-Tattvārtha, Trimśikāvijñāntibhāṣya, Pañcaskandhakavibhāṣā, Madhyāntavibhāgaṭīkā, Dasheng zhongguan shilun (大乘中觀釋論, a Mūlamadhyamakakārikā commentary) and perhaps also (with various degrees of uncertainty) the [Mahāyāna]sūtraśāra-vṛtytibhāṣya, *Kāśyaparivartaṭīkā, Aṣāyamati-nirdeśaṭīkā, and Abhidharmasamuccayavyākhyā. All of these works are written from a Yogācāra point of view (or maybe more than one point of view).

A question, however, remains about the authorship of another work, not exactly classically Yogācāra in its orientation, namely the Ratnagotravibhāga-(mahāyānottaratantra). This work is composed of verses and commentary, of which the former are attributed in the Tibetan tradition to Ārya Maitreya (’phags pa mgon po byams pa) and the latter to Ācārya Asaṅga (slob dpon thogs med). A bilingual fragment from Khotan, dated on paleographical grounds to between the second half of the ninth and the beginning of the eleventh century, ascribes the first verse of the text explicitly to Maitreya demonstrating, as Takasaki has said, that the tradition of Maitreya as the author of the root verses was accepted in Central Asia

---

1 There do, however, remain, to my mind, questions about the identification of all the individuals who may have borne this name, and his or their date(s). See Silk (2009: 383-385), particularly regarding the insessional evidence. I was well on the way to preparing these notes when Leonard van der Kuijp shared with me his Forthcoming paper, in which most of what I have to say below is already said. However, at his urging I go ahead and offer what I have here anyway.

2 A number of these are known to be extant in Sanskrit, whether published yet or not, including the Abhidharmakośabhāṣyatīkā-Tattvārtha, Trimśikāvijñāntibhāṣya, Abhidharmasamuccayavyākhyā, Pañcaskandhakavibhāṣā, and Madhyāntavibhāgaṭīkā.

3 See Cordier (1915: 374 [$XLIV5-6$]).

4 Kano (2012).

5 Bailey and Johnston (1935: 87), and Skjaervo (2002: 484).
(perhaps better to say, at least in Khotan) and in Tibet in the period between the later ninth and eleventh centuries (when the text was translated into Tibetan). In Chinese sources, however, a different attribution is made. The translation of the Ratnagotravibhāga itself does not identify its author, but other sources have led to the suggestion that the name of the author is *Śāramati. Is this sustainable, and is this *Śāramati a different author from (some) Sthiramati?

Several sources provide information about Sthiramati. The historian Bu ston tells us that Sthiramati (slob dpon blo gros brtan pa) was born in Mtha’ khob ’dra ma to a śūdra family. We do not learn much more than this, and later Tibetan sources appear to be derivative from Bu ston’s account, or at least to agree with it on the whole.

The name Sthiramati is normally rendered in Chinese as Anhui 安慧, as found for instance in the Chinese versions of some of the works mentioned above, Pañcaskandhakavibhāṣā, Dasheng zhongguan shilun, and Abhidharmasamuccayavyākhyā, with the coordination of this name and its Sanskrit form being provided elsewhere by the transcription xīchīluómòdì 悉恥羅末底 or xīdi luómòdì 悉地羅末底. According to a reconstruction of Old Chinese (Schuessler 2009, MC omitting tone notation), this should produce something like sjet-tʰi-lâ-mwāt-tiei and sjet-di-lâ-mwāt-tiei, re-

---

6 Taking (1966: 7) actually writes ‘12th century’, for reasons I do not understand. The text was translated by the Kashmiri Sajjana together with Rngog Blo ldan shes rab (1059-1109). See note 7 in the Introduction.

7 For the date of this translation as around 520 CE, see the Introduction.

8 Lhasa edition (Lokesh Chandra 1971, folio 107b6ff.), translated in Obermiller (1932: II.147ff.). Since Schiefner (1869: 129), at least, this place name has been repeatedly ‘reconstructed’ by translators as Daṇḍakāranya, without any reason as far as I have been able to detect. I do not know what place name it is meant to represent. Note that not all sources agree that Sthiramati’s caste was śūdra.

9 T. 1613 (XXXI) 850c16 (the text however is not quite the same as that preserved in Sanskrit and Tibetan).

10 T. 1567 (XXX) 136a7.

11 T. 1606 (XXXI) 694b16; the Bhāṣya is by *Jinaputra and the Vyākhyā by Sthiramati. See now van der Kuijp (2013).

12 Respectively the Chengweishilun shuji 成唯識論述記 of [Kui]ji 基 (T.1830 [XLIII] 231c19-20: 梵云悉恥羅末底, 唐言安慧) and the Jushelun shiyishu 俱舍論實義疏 which attributes its authorship (T. 1561 [XXIX] 325a10) as follows: 尊者悉地羅末底造, 唐言安慧. Note that in the latter case hui is written 惠, not 慧, a common variant.
spectively. I am not sure on the basis of Chinese phonology alone whether one could thus conclude that behind these transcriptions stood the form Sthiramati, but given that we know this form with certainty from Indian evidence, the equivalences must be taken as sure. Probably, however, whatever apparent distance appears between the Sanskrit and reconstructed forms may be put down to the attempt to render the cluster s-thi on the one hand and the vagaries of phonological reconstruction on the other (even leaving aside the obvious facts of local pronunciation, shifts over time, and so on).

Another Chinese rendering said to correspond to Sthiramati is Jianhui 堅慧.\(^{13}\) The problem is further complicated by the appearance of yet another form (or another name altogether), Jianyi 堅意, the name under which, for instance, is recorded the authorship of the *Mahāyānāvatāra (Ru dasheng lun 入大乘論).\(^{14}\)

It is the name Jianyi 堅意 which draws us toward the hypothesized *Sāramati. According to de Jong, “[p]robably the earliest reference to Sāramati as the author of the Ratnagotravibhāga is to be found in Zhiyi [智顗 (538–597)]’s Mohe zhiguan [摩訶止觀],” in which we find the name Jianyi 堅意: 堅意寶性論云.\(^{15}\) Before we turn to the reason for this reconstruction of Jianyi as *Sāramati, we must consider another text also attributed to the same author, the *Mahāyānadharmadhātunirvīśa (Dasheng fajie wuchabie lun 大乘法界無差別論).\(^{16}\) This text is very closely related to the Ratnagotravibhāga, and there is to my mind no question that it is authentically Indian, as discussed in the Introduction. Moreover, the common authorship of this text and the Ratnagotravibhāga also seems to be clear.

Out of this mass of similar names there has apparently arisen some confusion, such that the conclusion of Hidenori Sakuma is far from unique.

---

\(^{13}\) If not the first in modern scholarship, one of the first to make this identification was Julien (1858: 46), and the table on 489, who referred to the Mahāvyutpatti as his source. (In the edition of Sakaki 1916, however, this item §3484 is given a Chinese equivalent of 意堅.)

\(^{14}\) T. 1634 (XXXII) 36a22. Note that this name is also attested as equivalent to a completely different Sanskrit form, namely Dhṛdhamati, in a quotation in the Śikṣāsamuccaya from the Śūraṅgamasaṁadhisūtra, T. 1636 (XXXII) 93c24 = Bendall (1897–1902: 91.8).

\(^{15}\) De Jong (1968: 37) referring to T. 1911 (XLVI) 31b18. I have given the Chinese in Pinyin.

\(^{16}\) See the Introduction.
when, without referring to the *Ratnagotravibhāga or to *Sāramati, he writes:\[17\]

Sthiramati (Anhui 安慧) … is said to have been based at Valabhi and to have been a contemporary of Dharmapāla. But the scholar mentioned by Xuanzang alongside Guṇamati (Dehui 德慧) in the *Datang xiyu ji in his accounts of Nālandā (9.3.5) and Valabhi (11.8.4) is not Anhui but Jianhui 堅慧. In the *Datang Daciensi sanzang fashi zhuàn his name is given as Anhui. Among works included in the Taishō edition, the author of the *Dacheng fajie wuchabie lun 大乘法界無差別論 (T. 31, nos. 1626 & 1627; neither translated by Xuanzang) is given as Jianhui, while the author of the *Dacheng apidamo zaji lun 大乘阿毘達磨雑集論 (T. 31, no. 1606; translated by Xuanzang) and *Dacheng guang wuyun lun 大乘廣五蘊論 (T. 31, no. 1613; translated by Divākara) is given as Anhui. While a detailed examination of this state of affairs will be omitted here, the original Sanskrit equivalent of both Jianhui and Anhui may be considered to have been Sthiramati.

Sakuma concludes his consideration by saying “On the assumption that this view [that Jianhui might be the same person as Anhui] has become established in academic circles, I have therefore decided to regard both Jianhui and Anhui as Chinese equivalents of Sthiramati.”\[18\] A careful look at the evidence, however, may demonstrate that this position cannot be upheld, at least as presented. As Sakuma’s formulation informs us, however, the key to the problem lies in Chinese forms of Indic names, and how they are to be understood. The focus in what follows is not on Sthiramati per se, although the name will not be forgotten.

A key piece of the puzzle is the *Mahāyānadharmadhātunirviśeṣa, translated into Chinese by the Khotanese *Devendraprajña. A commentary was authored by *Devendraprajña’s direct disciple, the great Fazang 法藏 (643–712), the *Dasheng fajie wuchabie lunshu bing xu 大乘法界無差別論疏并序, within which Fazang writes the following:\[19\]

---


\[18\] Sakuma (2006: 360n5).

\[19\] T. 1838 (XLIV) 63c5-21. My thanks to Chen Jinhua for his suggestions on the understanding of this passage. At the stage of preparing this manuscript for the press I came upon a
第八造論縁起者，堅慧菩薩者，梵名娑囉末底。娑囉，此云堅固。末底云慧。菩薩者，具云菩提薩埵。诸论通释有其三义。一從境為名，以此二法是所縁境故，如骨觀等。菩提云覺，即所求佛果。菩薩名有情，即所度衆生。以智悲内起，是以外縁二境。
一云：菩提是所求佛果，菩薩是能求行者，謂求菩提之菩薩，即內智和合目。
一云：菩提同前，菩薩云勇猛，謂有志有能，於大菩提勇猛求故。謂此論主，有稱理求佛堅固正慧，故以爲名。
三藏云：西域相傳，此是地上菩薩。於佛滅後七百年時，出中天竺大刹利種。聰叡逸群，備窮俗典。出家學道，慧解踰明。大小乘教，無不綜練。但以行菩薩行，留意大乘。以已所遊平等法界，傳示衆生，方爲究竟廣大饒益。是故造《究竟一乘寶性論》及《法界無差別論》等。皆於大乘捨權歸實，顯實究竟之説矣。

The eighth topic concerns the originator of the treatise, Jianhui pusa. In Sanskrit he is named Suōluōmòdǐ [Schuessler 2009: sā-lâ-mwât-tiei]. As for suōluō: Here [in China] we say ‘firm.’ For mòdǐ we say ‘wisdom.’ Púsà is, in full, Pútísàduǒ [bodhisattva].

Of the comprehensive explanations given in various treatises, there are three meanings. One is named from the external object, given that these two things (bodhi and sattva) are the object support, like the contemplation of bones and so on [is called that because its object is the bones]. ‘Bodhi’ is awakening, that is, the sought-after fruit of buddhahood. ‘Sattva’ indicates sentient beings, namely the beings who are saved. Because wisdom and compassion arise internally, they take the two objects (bodhi and sattva) as external supports.

A[nother explanation] says: Bodhi is the sought-after fruit of buddhahood, sattva indicates the practitioner seeking [bodhi], that is to say, the sattva who seeks bodhi, from the viewpoint of the combination of the object and wisdom.

A[nother explanation] says: Bodhi is the same as above. Sattva means heroic, that is, to have will and capacity, because one heroically

---

complete translation of this text published by Shimamura Daishin (2008-2009). My understanding of the present passage (translated by Shimamura at 2008: 29-30) differs from his, which in my opinion contains several very serious errors.
seeks great bodhi. That is to say, the author of the treatise possesses the firm correct wisdom [enabling him] to pursue Buddhahood in accordance with the truths, and so is given [this] name.20

The Tripiṭaka [Master Devendraprajña] says that according to an account of the Western Lands, [the author] was an upper level bodhisattva. He belonged to the time 700 years after the death of the Buddha. A great kṣatriya from Central India, he was of outstanding intelligence and insight. Already deeply familiar with the books of the non-Buddhists, he renounced the family and studied the way. With wise understanding and deep clarity,21 he thoroughly and completely studied the teachings of the Great and Little Vehicles. But he only practiced the practices of the bodhisattva, concentrating on the Great Vehicle. He transmitted to and showed beings the equal dharma dhātu he himself had already traversed, delivering ultimate and widespread benefits. Therefore he composed the Ratnagotravibhāga, the *Mahāyānadharma dhātunirviśeṣa, and others, all of which are about how to reject the provisional and return to the true within the Great Vehicle, manifesting the ultimate true doctrines.

What we find here, then, is Fazang offering the name Jianhui pusa 堅慧菩薩 as the author of the *Mahāyānadharma dhātunirviśeṣa. A portion of the phonetic analysis here is trivial: pūsā is an abbreviated transcription of bodhisattva. The remainder, however, appears to raise problems, to which I will return below. The text goes on to analyze the compound bodhisattva in three ways.

The text refers to the author as an “upper level bodhisattva” dishàng púsâ 地上菩薩，a technical designation of a bodhisattva in the level of the saint (ārya, shèng 聖), that is, in one of the final ten stages of spiritual ascent.22 He

20 Compare the presentation in the *Buddhabhūmi-śāstra 佛地經論, T. 1530 (XXVI) 300a19-24. See also the passage from the Madhyamakāvatāra translated in La Vallée Poussin 1911: 239.

21 Chen Jinhua suggests that the term yúmíng 超明 alludes to the following passage from the Dadaili 大戴禮: 孔子曰:「野哉!君子不可以不學,見人不可以不飾。不飾無貌,無貌不敬,不敬無禮,無禮不立。夫遠而有光者,飾也;近而逾明者,學也。譬如澇邪,水潦瀦焉,莞蒲生焉,從上觀之,誰知其非源泉也。」

22 The term dishàng púsâ 地上菩薩 is a technical category in path theory; as a translation equivalent it renders bhūmipraviśo bodhisattva. See Funayama (2003: 131, 123n11).
further and perhaps more historically considers him to have been a kṣatriya who lived in Central India 700 years after the death of the Buddha. One problem with appreciating this information comes from determining which system was used by Fazang for calculating the date of the Buddha. As demonstrated by Antonello Palumbo, such references must be to a calculation with ongoing centuries, and therefore should be understood to mean that *Sāramati lived during the seventh century of the Buddhist era. As Palumbo further points out, there are strong indications of a Buddhist era beginning in 530 BCE, giving dates in the seventh century between 70 and 169 CE.\(^{23}\) It is not at all clear to me how much weight should be given to such indications, and we should recall that a number of figures are placed by various authors in this time-frame, including Saṃgharaksṭa (as discussed by Palumbo), and Nāgārjuna, whose dating to the seventh century is cited by Fazang himself, although it is not clear whether he accepts it.\(^{24}\) All of this is relevant, perhaps, in that since such an early date for *Sāramati cannot be accepted, one might ask whether the rest of the information should be accorded greater credit.

Discussing the text of Fazang and related passages,\(^{25}\) Ui (1959: 89-97) takes up the question of the identity of the author of the Ratnagotravibhāga (and thus the *Mahāyānadharmadhūtunirviśeṣa as well). In the first place,

\(^{23}\) See Palumbo (2011). If the often cited date of 686 BCE is taken for the Buddha’s birth, that should mean that the seventh century after the nirvāṇa should produce a date something like 0~100 CE. If the dating of Daoxuan is adopted, however, the nirvāṇa is placed around 566 BCE, which provides a date closer to 50~150 CE. For the bases of these rough calculations, see Franke (1991).

\(^{24}\) In his Shi’ermen lun zongzhiyi ji 十二門論宗致義記, T. 1826 (XLII) 218c13, but in the same paragraph he also cites sources which date Nāgārjuna to the eighth, or on the other hand the third, century after the nirvāṇa.

\(^{25}\) Such as Fazang’s note in his Huayan jing zhuàn 華嚴經傳記 (T. 2073 [LI] 156c10-13), in which it is said, based on first-hand reports, that the same author wrote a compact commentary on a work by *Vajrasena on the Daśabhūmi[vibhāṣa?] which was not yet available in China, but was to be found in Khotan.: 近問西來三藏梵僧, 皆云: 金剛軍菩薩造十地論, 有一萬二千頌, 翻可成三十餘卷。又堅慧菩薩, 亦造略釋。今未傳此土, 于闐國見有其本. See Péri (1911: 353), who in this context also addresses the question of the existence of more than one Sāramati. See also the Hae simmil kyŏng so 解深密經疏 (Zokuzōkyō 21, 369, 173c16-17) by Wŏnch’ŭk 圓測 (613~696): 堅慧論師及金剛軍, 皆同此釋。堅慧論師, 即是舊翻寶性論主, 五印度北也. Here *Sāramati is said to be from North India; Fazang says Central India. Both Fazang and Wŏnch’ŭk worked directly with Devendraprajña, the translator of the *Mahāyānadharmadhūtunirviśeṣa.
based on Fazang’s ‘transliteration’ he proposes (or assumes), as had others before him, a form Sāramati, then going on the identify this individual with the well known Yogacāra author Sthiramati (generally Anhui 安慧, also Jianyi 堅意), whom he dates to between 350-400. This, to say the very least, would produce serious problems of chronology if we were to identify this author with the author of the well-known works associated with the name Sthiramati, since these seem to belong to a somewhat later period.

De Jong and others have claimed that Sāramati is a “somewhat unusual form,” and “[u]sually, personal names ending in -mati have as first element an adjective or participle.” De Jong does not offer examples, but one might think of Akṣayamati or Śuddhamati. However, Ui is of course quite right to appeal to well-attested names such as Sāgaramati, Ratnamati and Guṇamati, and to these we might add Dharmamati, Dharmākaramati and Prajñākaramati. In addition, one must point out that forms of the word (not name) sāramati occur in a verse found in the Dhammapada corpus, and in some Yogacāra texts such as the Mahāyānasūtrālamkāra, Abhidharmasamuccaya, and Mahāyānasamgraha.

One hypothetical objection to the suggestion of *Sāramati as the identity of the author of the *Mahāyānadharmadhātunirviśeṣa and the RGV might be that, this form being based solely on the report of Fazang, there might have been some misunderstanding between Devendraprajña and Fazang, since the former was a native speaker of Khotanese. However, Giuliana Martini informs me as follows:

The Old and Late Khotanese consonant group sth- cannot be simplified into *s-; that is, the group is preserved (even in Late Khotanese,

---

26 It is not possible to confuse Jianhui 堅慧 and Jianyi 堅意 phonologically: hui 慧 [OCM, Schuessler 2009] < wis, yi 意 < ʔak. There is overlap in their respective semantic ranges, however, leading to functional equivalence as elements of names (so already Péri 1911: 348n4). Likewise, the equivalence in meaning of jiàn with either sthira or sāra is quite possible.

27 De Jong (1968: 38n10), specifically engaging Ui. So already Johnston in Bailey and Johnston (1935: 81), who says: “Now the restoration of the name Sāramati from the Chinese seems to me doubtful. It is a somewhat unusual form ....”

28 Pāli Dhammapada 11a (= Patna 171a) asāre sāramatino, Udānavarga 29.3 asāre sāramati- yah, Gāndhāri Dhammapada 213a asari saravadiño.

the native language of Devendraprajña), and there is no phonetic reason for it to be simplified. Moreover, short -ī- cannot become long -ā- (though it could become short -ā-), even in an oral context, and it is possibly less likely in a highly “controlled” oral-cum-written context such as that of a careful and professional translation team (especially in the case of foreign monks present in the group, utmost attention and questioning would be expected).

Let us remember in this context that the *Ratnagotravibhāga* was known in Khotan, and the first published Sanskrit evidence of the text in fact came from a bilingual scroll from the Stein collection which has been dated to the second half of the ninth ~ eleventh century Khotan.³⁰ This suggests that there would have been little confusion about the accepted name of its author.

In conclusion, it is not possible at this moment to clarify with absolute certainty the name of the author of the RGV/MDN, but I doubt that it is possible that he is the same individual as the one responsible for works such as the *Madhyāntavibhāgaṭīkā* and so forth (leaving aside the question of whether this author is the same as the author of the commentary on the *Kāśyapaparivarta*, and so on).³¹ For this reason, there seems no good reason not to accept the validity of the form Sāramati.

---


³¹ Note that Nguyen (1990) accepts that the author of the *Madhyāntavibhāgaṭīkā* and the *Kāśyapaparivarta* commentary are the same, although to my eyes perhaps rather more work is needed before reaching such a conclusion.
## Appendix 4

### Reading Text and Translation

| 0 | 佛説不增不減經
元魏北印度三藏菩提流支譯 | The Scripture on the Absence of Increase and the Absence of Decrease [in the Realm of Beings]. Translated by the Northern Wei Dynasty Tripitaka Master from Northern India, Bodhiruci. |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | a) 如是我聞: 一時婆伽婆住王舍城, 耆闍崛山中, b) 與大比丘衆千二百五十人俱,諸菩薩摩訶薩無量無邊不可稱計。
 | a) Thus I heard: At one time the Bhagavat was dwelling in Rājagṛha on Mount Grīḍhrakūṭa, b) together with a large assembly of one thousand two hundred and fifty bhikṣus, and with an immeasurable, infinite and innumerable number of bodhisattva-mahāsattvas. |
| 2 | a) At that time, the venerable Śāriputra got up from his seat in the great assembly and approached the Buddha.  
   | **b) Bowing his head to the Buddha’s feet, he withdrew and sat to one side. Placing his palms together reverentially, he spoke to the Buddha, saying:** c) “World-honored One! All beings wander in the six paths from beginningless time, transmigrate in the three realms and, repeating the cycle of birth and death through the four types of birth, experience pain without exhaustion.  
   | d) World-honored One! Does this mass of beings, this ocean of beings, undergo increase and decrease, or does it not undergo increase and decrease? e) The purport of this is profound and mysterious, and I am not yet able to understand it. f) If someone asks me about it, how should I respond?” |

---

a) At that time, the venerable Śāriputra got up from his seat in the great assembly and approached the Buddha.  
b) Bowing his head to the Buddha’s feet, he withdrew and sat to one side. Placing his palms together reverentially, he spoke to the Buddha, saying: c) “World-honored One! All beings wander in the six paths from beginningless time, transmigrate in the three realms and, repeating the cycle of birth and death through the four types of birth, experience pain without exhaustion. d) World-honored One! Does this mass of beings, this ocean of beings, undergo increase and decrease, or does it not undergo increase and decrease? e) The purport of this is profound and mysterious, and I am not yet able to understand it. f) If someone asks me about it, how should I respond?”
爾時，世尊告舍利弗：
「善哉！善哉！舍利弗，
汝為安隱一切衆生，安
樂一切衆生，憐愍一切
衆生，利益一切衆生，饒
益安樂一切衆生諸天人
故，乃能問我是甚深義。

舍利弗，汝若不問如來、應供、正遍知如
是義者，有多過咎。
所以者何。於現在世及
未來世，諸天人等一切
衆生長受衰惱、損害之
事，永失一切利益安
樂。

At that time the World-honored One said to Śāriputra: “Good! Good! Śāriputra, you ask me about this extremely profound purport in order to pacify all beings, to bring happiness to all beings, to show compassion for all beings, to benefit all beings, to avail and bring happiness to all beings, gods and men. If you were not to ask the Tathāgata, Arhat, Perfectly Awakened One about such a purport as this, Śāriputra, there would be many faults. How so? In the present age and in future ages all beings—gods, men, and so on—would suffer and be harmed for an extended time, and would forever lose all that is beneficial and brings them happiness.
a) “It is a greatly mistaken view, Śāriputra, to see the realm of beings as increasing or to see the realm of beings as decreasing. b) Because of these views, Śāriputra, beings who hold these greatly mistaken views are born blind and sightless. c) Consequently, for a very long time they errantly tread mistaken paths, and therefore in the present age they fall into evil destinies. d) It is great disaster, Śāriputra, to cling to and grasp at [the notion of] the realm of beings as increasing, or to cling to and grasp at [the notion of] the realm of beings as decreasing. e) These beings, Śāriputra, clinging to and grasping at [these notions]. Consequently, for a very long time they will errantly tread mistaken paths, and therefore in future ages they will fall into evil destinies.
| 4i | a) 舍利弗，一切愚癡凡夫
不如實知一法界故，不如實見一法界故，起邪見心，謂衆生界増，衆生界減。 b) 舍利弗，如來在世，我諸弟子不起此見。 c) 若我滅後，過五百歳，多有衆生愚無智慧。 d) 於佛法中雖除鬚髪，服三法衣，現沙門像，然其内無沙門徳行。 e) 如是等輩實非沙門，自謂沙門。非佛弟子，謂佛弟子。而自説言：「我是沙門，眞佛弟子」。如是等人起増減見。何以故。 |
| --- | --- |
|  | a) “Because all foolish common people, Śāriputra, do not know the single dharma-realm in accord with reality, because they do not see the single dharma-realm in accord with reality, they entertain ideas informed by mistaken views, thinking that the realm of beings increases or that the realm of beings decreases. b) While the Tathāgata is in the world, Śāriputra, my disciples will not entertain these views. c) (However,) when five hundred years have passed after my nirvāṇa, there will be many beings who are foolish and lack insight. d) [Being] within the Buddhist community, although they will remove their beards and hair, put on the three dharma robes, and manifest outwardly the appearance of śramaṇas, nevertheless inwardly they will lack the virtuous behavior of śramaṇas. e) Such people, although actually not śramaṇas will call themselves śramaṇas, although not disciples of the Buddha will call themselves disciples of the Buddha. f) Still they themselves will say: ‘I am a śramaṇa, a true disciple of the Buddha.’ This sort of persons will entertain the view that there is increase or decrease. Why?
a) “[They entertain the view that there is increase or decrease] because these beings, having resorted to the Tathāgata’s sūtras of provisional meaning, lack the wisdom-eye; b) because they are remote from the view of emptiness in accord with reality; c) because they do not know in accord with reality the initial aspiration (to awakening) realized by the Tathāgata; d) because they do not know in accord with reality the practices which accumulate immeasurable merits for bodhi; e) because they do not know in accord with reality the immeasurable qualities attained by the Tathāgata; f) because they do not know in accord with reality the Tathāgata’s immeasurable power; g) because they do not know in accord with reality the Tathāgata’s immeasurable sphere (of knowledge); h) because they do not believe in the Tathāgata’s immeasurable range of action; i) because they do not know in accord with reality the Tathāgata’s inconceivable, immeasurable mastery of the Teachings; j) because they do not know in accord with reality the Tathāgata’s inconceivable, immeasurable skillful means; k) because they are not able to distinguish in accord with reality the Tathāgata’s immeasurable sphere of discrimination; l) because they are not good at penetrating into the Tathāgata’s inconceivable great compassion; m) because they do not know in accord with reality the Tathāgata’s great nirvāṇa.
### 5i

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>a) 舍利弗，愚癡凡夫無聞慧故，聞如來涅槃，起斷見滅見。 b) 以起斷想及滅想故，謂眾生界減，成大邪見極重惡業。</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a) “Śāriputra, because foolish common people lack [even that] insight which comes from hearing [the teachings], hearing of the Tathāgata’s nirvāṇa they entertain the view that it is annihilation and the view that it is cessation. b) Because they entertain the notion that it is annihilation and the notion that it is cessation, they consider that the realm of beings decreases, and this creates the extremely heavy evil karma of a greatly mistaken view.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 5ii

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>a) 復次，舍利弗，此諸衆生依於滅見，復起三見。 b) 此三種見與彼滅見不相捨離，猶如羅網。 c) 何謂三見。 d) 一者，斷見，謂：畢竟盡； e) 二者，滅見，謂：即涅槃； f) 三者，無涅槃見，謂：此涅槃畢竟空寂。 g) 舍利弗，此三種見，如是縛，如是執，如是觸。</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a) “Once again, Śāriputra, on the basis of the view that there is decrease, these beings further entertain three types of views. b) These three types of views and that view that there is decrease are inseparable, like [the threads of] a gauze net. c) What are the three views? d) 1. The view of annihilation, that is, that there is absolute exhaustion. e) 2. The view that there is extinction, that is, precisely nirvāṇa. f) 3. The view that there is no nirvāṇa, that is, that this nirvāṇa is absolute quiescence. g) These three types of views, Śāriputra, fetter [beings] in this way, grasp [beings] in this way, and cling [to beings] in this way.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5iii</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 5iv | a) 舍利弗, 依無欲見, 復起二見。 b) 此二種見與無欲見不相捨離, 猶如羅網。 c) 何謂二見。 d) 一者, 戒取見; e) 二者, 於不淨中起淨顛倒見。 | a) “On the basis of the view, Śāriputra, devoid of desire [for nirvāṇa], [those beings] further entertain two views. b) These two types of views and the view devoid of desire [for nirvāṇa] are inseparable, like a gauze net. c) What are the two views? d) 1. The view of attachment to practices and observances. e) 2. The inverted view through which one conceives of the impure as pure.
| 6 | a) "On the basis of the view, Śāriputra, of the absolute nonexistence of nirvāṇa, [those beings] further entertain six types of views. b) These six types of views and the view of the nonexistence of nirvāṇa are inseparable, like a gauze net. c) What are these six views? d) 1. The view that the world has a beginning. e) 2. The view that the world has an end. f) 3. The view that beings are an illusory creation. g) 4. The view that there is neither suffering nor pleasure. h) 5. The view that beings [produce] no (karmically significant) activity. i) 6. The view that there are no noble truths. |
| 7i | a) "Once again, Śāriputra, on the basis of the view of increase, these beings further entertain two views. b) These two views and the view of increase are inseparable, like a gauze net. c) What are these two views? d) 1. The view that nirvāṇa was initially produced. e) 2. The view that [nirvāṇa] exists suddenly without causes or conditions. |
| 7ii  | a) श्रीपुत्र, द्विविध दृष्टियों का प्रत्येक विद्यमान प्रभाव है जिसने सब्जनियों को गुणों के अभाव में नहीं चाहने और प्रस्तावित करने के लिए प्रेरित करना। b) श्रीपुत्र, ऐसा दृष्टि है जो सब्जनियों को पारंपरिक दृष्टियों और निर्वाण के दृष्टियों के प्रति प्रेरित करता है। अंततः, यदि चार बुद्ध, उपवास्तु, अर्हता, विविधताः विद्विदः आदि सीकरणों को आकाश में मनुष्यों के लिए तोड़ देते तो यह विद्यमान गुणों के अभाव में नहीं चाहने और प्रेरित करने के लिए प्रेरित नहीं होगा। |

| 7iii | a) श्रीपुत्र, द्विविध दृष्टियों का प्रत्येक विद्यमान प्रभाव है जिसने सब्जनियों को गुणों के अभाव में नहीं चाहने और प्रस्तावित करने के लिए प्रेरित करना। b) श्रीपुत्र, ऐसा दृष्टि है जो सब्जनियों को पारंपरिक दृष्टियों और निर्वाण के दृष्टियों के प्रति प्रेरित करता है। अंततः, यदि चार बुद्ध, उपवास्तु, अर्हता, विविधताः विद्विदः आदि सीकरणों को आकाश में मनुष्यों के लिए तोड़ देते तो यह विद्यमान गुणों के अभाव में नहीं चाहने और प्रेरित करने के लिए प्रेरित नहीं होगा। |

a) “These two types of views, Śāriputra, cause beings to lack the desire and the zeal [to cultivate] good qualities. b) Because, Śāriputra, these beings entertain these two views, even if the seven Buddhas, Tathāgatas, Arhats, Perfectly Awakened Ones were successively to appear in the world to expound the Teachings for them, it would be impossible for them to produce the desire and the zeal [to cultivate] good qualities. c) “These two views, Śāriputra, are nothing other than the foundation of all forms of defilements caused by ignorance. d) [‘These two views’] means the view that nirvāṇa was produced in the beginning, and the view that [nirvāṇa] exists suddenly without causes and conditions.
8i  a) 舍利弗，此二種見乃是極惡根本大患之法。 b) 舍利弗，依此二見起一切見。 c) 此一切見與彼二見不相捨離，猶如羅網。 d) 一切見者，所謂：若內，若外，若麁，若細，若中，種種諸見，所謂：增見、減見。

8ii  a) 舍利弗，此二種見依止一界，同一界，合一界。 b) 一切愚癡凡夫不如實知彼一界故，不如實見彼一界故，起於極惡大邪見心，謂：衆生界增，謂：衆生界減。」

a) “These two views, Śāriputra, are nothing other than the teaching of fundamental great calamity brought about by extreme evil. b) On the basis of these two views, Śāriputra, [beings] give rise to all views. c) All these views and those two views are inseparable, like a gauze net. d) ‘All views’ means all sorts of views, of inner and outer, gross and subtle, and in-between, that is, it refers to the view that there is increase and to the view that there is decrease.”
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>9i</th>
<th>At that time the venerable Śāriputra spoke to the Buddha, saying: b) “World-honored One! What is this single realm of which it is said; c) ‘All foolish common people, because they do not know that single realm in accord with reality, because they do not see that single realm in accord with reality, d) entertain ideas of extremely evil greatly mistaken views, that is, that the realm of beings increases or that the realm of beings decreases?’</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9ii</td>
<td>“Good, Blessed One! The purport of this is extremely profound. I am not yet able to comprehend it. b) Would the Tathāgata please expound it for me, causing me to be able to completely comprehend it.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10i</td>
<td>“At that time the World-honored One said to the venerable Śāriputra: b) “This extremely profound purport is exactly the Tathāgatha’s sphere of insight and it is the range of the Tathāgatha’s mind. c) Śāriputra, such a profound purport as this cannot be known by the insight of all the auditors and lone buddhas, cannot be seen, cannot be examined. d) Still how much less could all foolish common people fathom it.”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### 10ii

| a)唯有諸佛如來智慧乃能觀察、知、見此義。 |
| b) 舍利弗, 一切聲聞、緣覺所有智慧, 於此義中, 唯可仰信; c) 不能如实知、見、觀察。 |

| a) “It is indeed only the insight of the buddhas and tathāgatas which can examine, know and see this purport. |
| b) (Despite) the insight possessed by all auditors and lone buddhas, Śāri-putra, with respect to this purport, they can only have faith; c) they are not able to know, see or examine it in accord with reality. |

### 10iii

| a) 舍利弗, 甚深義者, 即是第一義諦。 |
| b) 第一義諦者, 即是衆生界。 |
| c) 衆生界者, 即是如來藏。 |
| d) 如來藏者, 即是法身。 |

| a) “The extremely profound purport, Śāriputra, is precisely the supreme truth. |
| b) The supreme truth is precisely the quintessence of beings. |
| c) The quintessence of beings is precisely the embryo of the tathāgatas. |
| d) The embryo of the tathāgatas is precisely the dharma-body. |

### 11

| a) 舍利弗, 如我所説, 法身義者, 過於恒沙不離、不脱、不斷、不異不思議佛法, 如來功德智慧。 |

<p>| a) “As I have expounded, Śāriputra, the meaning of the dharma-body is inseparable from, indivisible from, not cut-off from, not different from the inconceivable qualities definitive of a buddha, greater in number than the sands of the Ganges, [namely,] the merits and insight of a tathāgata. |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
<th>Text</th>
<th>Translation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>a) 舍利弗, 如燈所有明、色及觸不離、不脫。 b) 又如摩尼寶珠所有明、色、形相不離、不脫。 c) 舍利弗, 如來所説法身之義亦復如是, 過於恒沙不離、不脫、不斷、不異不思議佛法, 如來功德智慧。</td>
<td>a) &quot;It is like a lamp, Śāriputra, whose brightness, color and tactile sensation are inseparable and indivisible [from the lamp itself]. b) Again, it is like a mani gem whose characteristics of brightness, color and form are inseparable and indivisible [from the gem itself]. c) The meaning of the dharma-body expounded by the Tathāgata, Śāriputra, is also once again like this: It is inseparable from, indivisible from, not cut-off from, not different from the inconceivable qualities definitive of a buddha greater in number than the sands of the Ganges, the merits and insight of a Tathāgata.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13i</td>
<td>a) 舍利弗, 此法身者, 是不生不滅法。 b) 非過去際, 非未來際, 離二邊故。 c) 舍利弗, 非過去際者, 離生時故。 d) 非未來際者, 離滅時故。</td>
<td>a) &quot;This dharma-body, Śāriputra, is one which has the quality of being unborn and unperishing. b) It is unlimited in the past and unlimited in the future, because it is free from the two extremes. c) It is unlimited in the past, Śāriputra, because it is free from a time of birth, d) and it is unlimited in the future because it is free from a time of perishing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13ii</td>
<td>a) 舍利弗，如來法身常，以不異法故，以不盡法故。 b) 舍利弗，如來法身恒，以常可歸依故，以未來際平等故。 c) 舍利弗，如來法身清涼，以不二法故，以無分別法故。 d) 舍利弗，如來法身不變，以非滅法故，以非作法故。</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>a) “The Tathāgata’s dharma-body, Śāriputra, is permanent because of its quality of immutability, because of its quality of inexhaustibility. b) The Tathāgata’s dharma-body, Śāriputra, is constant because it can permanently be taken as a refuge, because it is equal with the future limit (of saṁsāra). c) The Tathāgata’s dharma-body, Śāriputra, is tranquil because of its non-dual nature, because of its nature as free from discrimination. d) The Tathāgata’s dharma-body, Śāriputra, is unchangable because of its imperishable nature, because of its non-created nature.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>14i</th>
<th>a) 舍利弗，即此法身過於恒沙無邊煩惱所纏， b) 從無始世來隨順世間波浪漂流， c) 往來生死， d) 名為‘衆生’。</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
|      | a) “When this very same dharma-body, Śāriputra, ensnared by limitless defilements greater in number than the sands of the Ganges, b) drifting on the waves of the world from beginningless ages, c) comes and goes through birth and death, d) then it is termed ‘Beings.’
| 14ii   | a) 舍利弗, 即此法身, b) 歸離世間生死苦惱, c) 棄捨一切諸有欲求, d) 行十波羅蜜, e) 攝八萬四千法門, f) 修菩提行, g) 名為 ‘菩薩’。 | a) “When this very same dharma-body, Śāriputra, b) repels the anguish and suffering of birth and death in the world, c) banishes all desires, d) practices the ten perfections, e) collects the eighty-four thousand teachings, f) and cultivates the practices leading to bodhi, g) then it is termed ‘bodhisattva.’” |
| 15i    | a) 復次, 舍利弗, 即此法身, 離一切世間煩惱使纏, b) 過一切苦, c) 離一切煩惱垢, d) 得淨, 得清淨, e) 住於彼岸清淨法中, f) 到一切衆生所願之地, g) 於一切境界中究竟通達, 更無勝者, h) 離一切障, 離一切礙, 於一切法中得自在力, i) 名為 ‘如來、應、正遍知’。 | a) “Once again, Śāriputra, when this very same dharma-body is free from the covering of all the world’s defilements, b) beyond all suffering, c) and free from the stains of all defilements, d) it attains purity, it attains perfect purity, e) and dwells among the pure dharmas of the other shore. f) It reaches the stage of what is desired by all beings, g) it thoroughly penetrates all spheres (of knowledge), and there is none surpassing it. h) It is free of all hindrances, free of all obstacles, and it attains sovereign power over all things. i) [This then] is termed ‘Tathāgata, Arhat, Perfectly Awakened One.’
| 15ii | a) "Therefore, Śāriputra, there is no quintessence of beings separate from the dharma-body, there is no dharma-body separate from the quintessence of beings. b) The quintessence of beings is precisely the dharma-body, c) the dharma-body is precisely the quintessence of beings. d) These two things, Śāriputra, have one meaning; [only] the names differ. |
| 16 | a) “Once again, Śāriputra, as I explained earlier, within the realm of beings too there are three types of natures. b) All are true thusness, not distinct and not [mutually] separate. c) What are the three natures? d) 1. The nature that is the embryo of the tathāgatas which from the very beginning is in its intrinsic nature associated [with it] and is pure. e) 2. The nature that is the embryo of the tathāgatas which from the very beginning is in its intrinsic nature unassociated [with it] and, being covered with defilements, is unpurified. f) 3. The nature that is the embryo of the tathāgatas which is equal to the future limit (of saṁsāra), constant, and existing. |
| a) "Therefore, Śāriputra, there is no quintessence of beings separate from the dharma-body, there is no dharma-body separate from the quintessence of beings. b) The quintessence of beings is precisely the dharma-body, c) the dharma-body is precisely the quintessence of beings. d) These two things, Śāriputra, have one meaning; [only] the names differ. |
### 17i

**a)** 舍利弗，當知如來藏本際相應體及清淨法者，此法如實、不虛妄、不離、不脫智慧清淨真如法界，不思議法。

**b)** 無始本際來有此清淨相應法體。

**Translation:**

**a)** “You should know, Śāriputra, that the nature of the embryo of the tathāgatas which from the very beginning is in its intrinsic nature associated [with it] and has a pure nature is in accord with reality, is not illusory, is inseparable and indivisible from the dharma-realm of insight and pure thusness, and the quality of being inconceivable. **b)** From the beginning-less beginning exists this reality which is both pure and associated [with it].

### 17ii

**a)** 舍利弗，我依此清淨真如法界，為眾生故説為不可思議法自性清淨心。

**Translation:**

**a)** “Regarding this dharma-realm of pure thusness, Śāriputra, I expound for [ordinary] beings the intrinsically pure mind, which is an inconceivable teaching.

### 18i

**a)** 舍利弗，當知如來藏本際不相應體及煩惱纏，不清淨法者，**b)** 此本際來離脫，**c)** 不相應，**d)** 煩惱所纏，**e)** 不清浹法。**f)** 唯有如來菩提智之所能斷。

**Translation:**

**a)** “You should know, Śāriputra, that the embryo of the tathāgatas which from the very beginning is in its intrinsic nature unassociated [with it], is covered with defilements, and is an unpurified thing, **b)** is from the very beginning free and released, **c)** not associated [with it], **d)** covered by defilements **e)** and is impure. **f)** It can only be cut [free] by the tathāgata’s bodhi-wisdom.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>18ii</th>
<th>a) 舍利弗，我依此煩惱所纒不相應不思議法界，為衆生故説為客塵煩惱所染自性清淨心不可思議法。</th>
<th>a) “Regarding this non-associated and inconceivable dharma-realm, covered with defilements, Śāriputra, I expound for [ordinary] beings the intrinsically pure mind stained by adventitious defilements, which is an inconceivable teaching.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>19i</td>
<td>a) 舍利弗，當知如來藏未來際平等恆及有法者，即是一切諸法根本。 b) 備一切法，具一切法， c) 於世法中不離、不脫真實一切法， d) 住持一切法，攝一切法。</td>
<td>a) “You should know, Śāriputra, that the nature of the embryo of the tathāgatas which is equal to the future limit, constant, and existing is precisely the basis of all qualities [definitive of a buddha]. b) It is furnished with all [such] qualities, joined with all [such] qualities, c) and while engaged in worldly affairs it is inseparable and indivisible from the truth and from all [such] qualities, d) it maintains all qualities, it embraces all qualities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19ii</td>
<td>a) 舍利弗, 我依此不生、不滅、常恒、清涼、不變歸依、不可思議、清淨法界, 說名 '衆生'。 b) 所以者何。 c) 言 '衆生' 者, 即是不生、不滅、常恒、清涼、不變歸依、不可思議、清淨法界等異名。 d) 以是義故, 我依彼法, 說名 '衆生'。</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>a) 舍利弗, 此三種法皆眞實如, 不異、不差。 b) 於此眞實、如不異、不差法中, 畢竟不起極惡不善二種邪見。 c) 何以故。 d) 以如實見故。 e) 所謂: 減見增見, 舍利弗, 此二邪見, 諸佛如來畢竟遠離。 f) 諸佛如來之所呵責。</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a) “Regarding this unborn, unperishing, eternal, tranquil, unchanging refuge, Śāriputra, the inconceivable, pure dharma-realm, I term it 'beings.'

b) Why? c) To say 'beings' is (only) a synonym for precisely this unborn, unperishing, eternal, tranquil, unchanging refuge, (this) inconceivable, pure dharma-realm, and so on. d) With this intention, regarding those qualities, I term it 'beings.'

a) “These three types of natures, Śāriputra, are all true thusness, not distinct and not [mutually] separate.

b) With respect to these truly thus, not distinct and not [mutually] separate natures, one absolutely does not entertain the two types of extremely evil and bad views [that there is an increase or decrease in any of the three categories]. c) Why? d) Because this is a view in accord with reality. e) As for the views that there is increase or decrease, Śāriputra, the buddhas and tathāgatas absolutely distance themselves from these two mistaken views. f) They are criticized by the buddhas and tathāgatas.
| 21i | a) 舍利弗, 若有比丘、比丘尼、優婆塞、優婆夷, 若起一見, 若起二見, b) 諸佛如來非彼世尊, 如是等人非我弟子。 | a) “If, Śāriputra, there are bhikṣus or bhikṣuṇīs, upāsakas or upāsikās, who entertain one or the other view, b) the buddhas and tathāgatas are not their teachers, and such people are not my disciples. |
| 21ii | a) 舍利弗, 此人以起二見因縁故, 從冥入冥, 從闇入闇。b) 我説是等名‘一闡提’。 | a) “Because these people, Śāriputra, entertain these two views, from gloom they enter gloom, from darkness they enter darkness. b) I speak of these terming them ‘icchantika.’ |
| 21iii | a) 是故, 舍利弗, 汝今應學此法, 化彼衆生, 令離二見, 住正道中。b) 舍利弗, 如是等法汝亦應學, 離彼二見, 住正道中。 | a) “Therefore, Śāriputra, you now should study this teaching and convert those beings, causing them to give up the two views and dwell in the correct path. b) You too, Śāriputra, should study teachings such as this, give up those two views and dwell in the correct path.” |
22  a) The Buddha having expounded this sūtra, the venerable Śāriputra, bhikṣus and bhikṣūṇīs, upāsakas and upāsikās, bodhisattva-mahāsattvas, and the gods, nāgas, yakṣas, gandharvas, asuras, garuḍas, kinnaras, mahorāgas, men, non-men, and so on—the whole assembly—were all greatly delighted, in faith accepted and honored (the teaching), and bore it in mind.

| 22 | a) The Buddha having expounded this sūtra, the venerable Śāriputra, bhikṣus and bhikṣūṇīs, upāsakas and upāsikās, bodhisattva-mahāsattvas, and the gods, nāgas, yakṣas, gandharvas, asuras, garuḍas, kinnaras, mahorāgas, men, non-men, and so on—the whole assembly—were all greatly delighted, in faith accepted and honored (the teaching), and bore it in mind. | 22 | a) 佛説此經已, 慧命舍利弗, 比丘、比丘尼、優婆塞、優婆夷、菩薩摩訶薩, 及諸天、龍、夜叉、乾闥婆、阿修羅、迦樓羅、緊那羅摩睺羅伽、人、非人等一切大衆, 皆大歡喜, 信受奉行。 |
Appendix 5

A Hypothetical Reconstruction of an Indic Form of the AAN

The text printed here is nothing more than an extremely tentative attempt to explore what the AAN may have looked like in India. Based on the edition and its notes provided above, in one or two places I have speculated about mistranslations in the Chinese rendering, and tried to see through them, but more than that, when we have Sanskrit evidence, or evidence from the MDN, I have favored this in attempting to imagine a slightly more Indic text. I would not for a moment defend this methodologically, but since it does seem to me interesting to speculate on a (not the!) form the text may have had in India, I have gone ahead with this little game. I should emphasize that I do not for a moment propose this as representing anything that actually ever existed.

1 a) Thus I heard at one time the Blessed One was dwelling in Rājagṛha on Mount Gṛdhra-kūta, b) together with a large assembly of one thousand two hundred and fifty bhikṣus, and with an immeasurable, infinite and innumerable number of bodhisattva-mahāsattvas.

2 a) At that time, the venerable Śāriputra got up from his seat amid the large assembly and approached the Buddha. b) Bowing his head to the Buddha's feet, he withdrew and sat to one side. Placing his palms together reverentially, he spoke to the Buddha, saying: c) “Blessed One! All beings wander in the six paths from beginningless time, transmigrate in the three realms and, repeating the cycle of birth and death through the four types of birth, experience pain without exhaustion. d) Blessed One! Does this mass of beings, this ocean of beings, undergo increase and decrease, or does it not undergo increase and decrease? e) The purport of this is profound and mysterious, and I am not yet able to understand it. f) If someone asks me about it, how should I respond?”

3i a) At that time the Blessed One said to Śāriputra: b) “Good! Good! Śāriputra, you ask me about this extremely profound purport in order to pacify all beings, to bring happiness to all beings, to show compassion
for all beings, to benefit all beings, to avail and bring happiness to all beings, gods and men. c) If you were not to ask the Tathāgata, Arhat, Perfectly Awakened One about such a purport as this, Śāriputra, there would be many faults. d) How so? In the present age and in future ages all beings—gods, men, and so on—would suffer and be harmed for an extended time, and would forever lose all that is beneficial and brings them happiness.

3ii a) “It is a greatly mistaken view, Śāriputra, to see the realm of beings as increasing or to see the realm of beings as decreasing. b) Because of these views, Śāriputra, beings who hold these greatly mistaken views are born blind. c) Consequently, for a very long time they errantly tread mistaken paths, and therefore in the present age they fall into evil destinies. d) It is great disaster, Śāriputra, to cling to and grasp at the notion of the realm of beings as increasing, or to cling to and grasp at the notion of the realm of beings as decreasing. e) These beings, Śāriputra, clinging to and grasp at these notions. Consequently, for a very long time they will errantly tread mistaken paths, and therefore in future ages they will fall into evil destinies.

4i a) “Because all foolish common people, Śāriputra, do not know the single dharma-realm in accord with reality, because they do not see the single dharma-realm in accord with reality, they entertain ideas informed by mistaken views, thinking that the realm of beings increases or that the realm of beings decreases. b) While the Tathāgata is in the world, Śāriputra, my disciples will not entertain these views. c) However, when five hundred years have passed after my nirvāṇa, there will be many beings who are foolish and lack insight. d) Being within the Buddhist community, although they will remove their beards and hair, put on the three dharma robes, and manifest outwardly the appearance of śramaṇas, nevertheless inwardly they will lack the virtuous behavior of śramaṇas. e) Such people, although actually not śramaṇas will call themselves śramaṇas, although not disciples of the Buddha will call themselves disciples of the Buddha. f) Still they themselves will say: ‘I am a śramaṇa, a true disciple of the Buddha.’ This sort of persons will entertain the view that there is increase or decrease. Why?

4ii a) “They entertain the view that there is increase or decrease because these beings, having resorted to the Tathāgata’s sūtras of provisional
meaning, lack the wisdom-eye; b) because they are remote from the view of emptiness in accord with reality; c) because they do not know in accord with reality the initial aspiration to awakening realized by the Tathāgata; d) because they do not know in accord with reality the practices which accumulate immeasurable merits for Awakening; e) because they do not know in accord with reality the immeasurable qualities attained by the Tathāgata; f) because they do not know in accord with reality the Tathāgata’s immeasurable power; g) because they do not know in accord with reality the Tathāgata’s immeasurable sphere of knowledge; h) because they do not believe in the Tathāgata’s immeasurable range of action; i) because they do not know in accord with reality the Tathāgata’s inconceivable, immeasurable mastery of the Teachings; j) because they do not know in accord with reality the Tathāgata’s inconceivable, immeasurable skillful means; k) because they are not able to distinguish in accord with reality the Tathāgata’s immeasurable sphere of discrimination; l) because they are not good at penetrating into the Tathāgata’s inconceivable great compassion; m) because they do not know in accord with reality the Tathāgata’s great nirvāṇa.

5i a) “Śāriputra, because foolish common people lack even that insight which comes from hearing the teachings, hearing of the Tathāgata’s nirvāṇa they entertain the view that it is annihilation and the view that it is cessation. b) Because they entertain the notion that it is annihilation and the notion that it is cessation, they consider that the realm of beings decreases, and this creates the extremely heavy evil karma of a greatly mistaken view.

5ii a) “Once again, Śāriputra, on the basis of the view that there is decrease, these beings further entertain three types of views. b) These three types of views and that view that there is decrease are inseparable, like the threads of a gauze net. c) What are the three views? d) 1. The view of annihilation, that is, that there is absolute exhaustion. e) 2. The view that there is extinction, that is, precisely nirvāṇa. f) 3. The view that there is no nirvāṇa, that is, that this nirvāṇa is absolute quiescence. g) These three types of views, Śāriputra, fetter beings in this way, grasp beings in this way, and cling to beings in this way.

5iii a) “Through the forceful influence of these three views, those beings in their turn further entertain two types of mistaken views. b) These two
types of views and those three views are inseparable, like a gauze net. c) What are the two views? d) 1. The view devoid of desire for nirvāṇa. e) 2. The view of the absolute nonexistence of nirvāṇa.

5iv a) “On the basis of the view, Śāriputra, devoid of desire for nirvāṇa, those beings further entertain two views. b) These two types of views and the view that there is no desire are inseparable, like a gauze net. c) What are the two views? d) 1. The view of attachment to practices and observances. e) 2. The inverted view through which one conceives of the impure as pure.

6 a) “On the basis of the view, Śāriputra, of the absolute nonexistence of nirvāṇa, those beings further entertain six types of views. b) These six types of views and the view of the nonexistence of nirvāṇa are inseparable, like a gauze net. c) What are these six views? d) 1. The view that the world has a beginning. e) 2. The view that the world has an end. f) 3. The view that beings are an illusory creation. g) 4. The view that there is neither suffering nor pleasure. h) 5. The view that beings produce no karmically significant activity. i) 6. The view that there are no noble truths.

7i a) “Once again, Śāriputra, on the basis of the view of increase, these beings further entertain two views. b) These two views and the view of increase are inseparable, like a gauze net. c) What are these two views? d) 1. The view that nirvāṇa was initially produced. e) 2. The view that nirvāṇa exists suddenly without causes or conditions.

7ii a) “These two types of views, Śāriputra, cause beings to lack the desire and the zeal to cultivate good qualities. b) Because, Śāriputra, these beings entertain these two views, even if the seven Buddhas, Tathāgatas, Arhats, Perfectly Awakened Ones were successively to appear in the world to expound the Teachings for them, c) it would be impossible for them to produce the desire and the zeal to cultivate good qualities.

7iii a) “These two views, Śāriputra, are nothing other than the foundation of all forms of defilements caused by ignorance. b) ‘These two views’ means the view that nirvāṇa was produced in the beginning, and the view that nirvāṇa exists suddenly without causes and conditions.

8i a) “These two views, Śāriputra, are nothing other than the teaching of fundamental great calamity brought about by extreme evil. b) On the basis of these two views, Śāriputra, beings give rise to all views. c) All
these views and those two views are inseparable, like a gauze net. d) ‘All views’ means all sorts of views of inner and outer, gross and subtle, and in-between, that is, it refers to the view that there is increase and to the view that there is decrease.

8ii  
a) “These two views, Śāriputra, rely on the single realm, are the same as the single realm, are united with the single realm. b) Because all foolish common people do not know that single realm in accord with reality, because they do not see that single realm in accord with reality, c) they entertain ideas of extremely evil greatly mistaken views, that is, that the realm of beings increases or that the realm of beings decreases.”

9i  
a) At that time the venerable Śāriputra spoke to the Buddha, saying: b) “Blessed One! What is this single realm of which it is said: c) ‘All foolish common people, because they do not know that single realm in accord with reality, because they do not see that single realm in accord with reality, d) entertain ideas of extremely evil greatly mistaken views, that is, that the realm of beings increases or that the realm of beings decreases?’

9ii  
a) “Good, Blessed One! The purport of this is extremely profound. I am not yet able to understand it. b) Would the Tathāgata please expound it for me, causing me to be able to completely comprehend it.”

10i  
a) At that time the Blessed One said to the venerable Śāriputra: b) “This purport is exactly the Tathāgatha’s sphere of insight and the range of the Tathāgata’s mind. c) Even all the auditors and lone buddhas are not able through their own insight to correctly know, see or examine this purport to such an extent, Śāriputra, d) still how much less foolish common people.

10ii  
a) “It is indeed only the insight of the buddhas and tathāgatas which can examine, know and see this purport. b) Despite the insight possessed by all auditors and lone buddhas, Śāriputra, with respect to this purport, they can only have faith; c) they are not able to know, see or examine it in accord with reality.

10iii  
a) “The extremely profound purport, Śāriputra, is precisely the supreme truth. b) The supreme truth, Śāriputra, is a synonym for the quintessence of beings. c) The quintessence of beings, Śāriputra, is a synonym for the embryo of the tathāgatas. d) The embryo of the tathāgatas, Śāriputra, is a synonym for the dharma-body.
a) “This same dharma-body the Tathāgata has spoken of, Śāriputra, possesses qualities inseparable, and wisdom and attributes indivisible, from what it is, that is, inseparable from qualities definitive of a tathāgata, more numerous than the sands of the Ganges river.

b) “Take as an example, Śāriputra, a lamp. It possesses qualities and attributes inseparable and indivisible from it, namely brightness, heat and coloration. b) Or a gemstone which is inseparable and indivisible from its brightness, color and form. c) Just so, Śāriputra, the dharma-body spoken of by the Tathāgata possesses qualities inseparable, and wisdom and attributes indivisible, from it, namely the qualities definitive of a tathāgata, more numerous than the sands of the Ganges river.

a) “This dharma-body, Śāriputra, is one which has the quality of being unborn and unperishing. b) It is unlimited in the past and unlimited in the future, because it is free from the two extremes. c) It is unlimited in the past, Śāriputra, because it is free from a time of birth, d) and it is unlimited in the future because it is free from a time of perishing.

a) “This dharma-body, Śāriputra, is permanent, because of its quality of immutability and its quality of inexhaustibility. b) This dharma-body, Śāriputra, is constant, a constant refuge, because of its equality with the future limit of samsāra. c) This dharma-body, Śāriputra, is tranquil, because of its nondual, nondiscriminative qualities. d) This dharma-body, Śāriputra, is unchangable, because of its imperishable and uncreated nature.

a) “This very dharma-body, Śāriputra, hidden by tens of millions of sheaths of limitless defilements, b) borne along by the current of transmigration, c) wandering through deaths and births in the destinies of beginningless and endless transmigration, d) is termed ‘The quintessence/realm of beings.’

a) “That very dharma-body, Śāriputra, b) being disgusted with the suffering of the currents of transmigration, c) indifferent to all objects of pleasure, d) practicing the practice which leads to awakening e) by means of the eighty-four thousand teachings, f) which include the ten perfections, g) is termed ‘bodhisattva.’

a) “Once again, Śāriputra, this very dharma-body, thoroughly freed of all sheaths of defilements, b) having transcended all sufferings, c) the strains of all defilements vanished, d) well and truly pure, e) fixed in the...
Absolute Reality that is ultimately pure, risen to the stage looked forward to by all beings, having attained peerless heroic strength with respect to all spheres of knowledge, perfected in sovereign power over all things free of all hindrances and unobstructed—this is termed ‘Tathāgata, Arhat, Perfect Buddha.’

15ii a) “Therefore, Śāriputra, the quintessence of beings is not different from the dharma-body. b) The quintessence of beings is precisely the dharma-body. c) The dharma-body is precisely the quintessence of beings. d) This pair is nondual with respect to meaning; only the designations differ.

16 a) “Once again, Śāriputra, as I expounded earlier, within the realm of beings too there are three types of natures. b) All are true thusness, not distinct and not mutually separate. c) What are the three natures? d) 1. The nature that is the embryo of the tathāgatas which is from the very beginning in its intrinsic nature associated with the embryo of the tathāgatas and pure. e) 2. The nature that is the embryo of the tathāgatas which from the very beginning is its intrinsic nature unassociated with the embryo of the tathāgatas and, being covered with defilements, unpurified,. f) 3. The nature that is the embryo of the tathāgatas which is equal to the future limit of saṃsāra, constant, existing.

17i a) “You should know, Śāriputra, that the nature of the embryo of the tathāgatas which from the very beginning is its intrinsic nature associated with it and has a pure nature is in accord with reality, is not illusory, is inseparable and indivisible from the dharma-realm of insight and pure thusness, and has the quality of being inconceivable. b) From the beginningless beginning exists this reality which is both pure and associated with it.

17ii a) “This pure dharma-nature, Śāriputra, is precisely the dharma-realm. Regarding this intrinsically pure mind, I expound it as an inconceivable teaching.

18i a) “You should know, Śāriputra, that the embryo of the tathāgatas which from the very beginning is in its intrinsic nature unassociated with it, is covered with defilements, and is an unpurified thing, b) is from the very beginning free and released, c) not associated with it, d) covered by defilements e) and impure. f) It can only be cut free by the Tathāgata’s bodhi-wisdom.
18ii a) “Regarding this non-associated and inconceivable dharma-realm, covered with defilements, Śāriputra, I expound it for ordinary beings the intrinsically pure mind stained by adventitious defilements, which is an inconceivable teaching.

19i a) “You should know, Śāriputra, that the nature of the embryo of the tathāgatas which is equal to the future limit, constant and existing, is precisely the basis of all qualities definitive of a buddha. b) It is furnished with all such qualities, joined with all such qualities, c) and while engaged in worldly affairs it is inseparable and indivisible from the truth and from all such qualities, d) it maintains all qualities, it embraces all qualities.

19ii a) “Regarding this unborn, unperishing, eternal, tranquil, unchanging refuge, Śāriputra, the inconceivable, pure dharma-realm, I term it ‘beings.’ b) Why? c) To say ‘beings’ is only a synonym for precisely this unborn, unperishing, eternal, tranquil, unchanging refuge, this inconceivable, pure dharma-realm, and so on. d) With this intention, regarding those qualities, I term it ‘beings.’

20 a) “These three types of natures, Śāriputra, are all true thusness, not distinct and not mutually separate. b) With respect to these truly thus, not distinct and not mutually separate natures, one absolutely does not entertain the two types of extremely evil views [that there is an increase or decrease in any of the three categories]. c) Why? d) Because this is a view in accord with reality. e) As for the views that there is increase or decrease, Śāriputra, the buddhas and tathāgatas absolutely distance themselves from these two mistaken views. f) They are criticized by the buddhas and tathāgatas.

21i a) “If, Śāriputra, there are bhikṣus or bhikṣunis, upāsakas or upāsikās who entertain one view or the other view, b) I am not their teachers, and they are not my auditors.

21ii a) “I say, Śāriputra, that they, filled with pitch-darkness, go from pitch-darkness into pitch-darkness, from gloom into greater gloom.

21iii a) Therefore, Śāriputra, you now should study this teaching and convert those beings, causing them to give up the two views and dwell in the correct path. b) You too, Śāriputra, should study teachings such as this, give up those two views and dwell in the correct path.”
22 a) The Buddha having preached this sūtra, the venerable Śāriputra, bhikṣus and bhikṣunis, upāsakas and upāsikās, bodhisattva-mahāsattvas, and the gods, nāgas, yakṣas, gandharvas, asuras, garuḍas, kinnararas, mahorāgas, men, non-men, and so on—the whole assembly—were all greatly delighted, in faith accepted and honored the teaching, and bore it in mind.

The Scripture on the Absence of Increase and the Absence of Decrease [in the Realm of Beings] is complete.
Appendix 6

Citations of the AAN

The following listing limits itself almost entirely to citations of the AAN by name; especially since I have for the most part searched electronically, there are sure to be other citations which I have overlooked, and thus the following should in no way be considered complete. In particular, I have not had access to collections of Japanese works, although I know that the AAN is quoted by, for instance, Kūkai (Watanabe 1984). Finally, the punctuation of the citations was done without consideration of their context, and thus is sure also to contain errors (in addition to those due simply to my own inattention and poor understanding).

2

a) “爾時，慧命舍利弗於大衆中即從坐起，前至佛所。b) 世尊，一切衆生從無始來往來三界，於四生中輪迴生死，受苦無窮。c) 世尊，此衆生聚、衆生海為有增減，為無增減。d) 此義深隱，我未能解。e) 若人問我，當雲何答。”

_Huayan xuantanhui xuanji_ 華嚴懸談會玄記, Cangshan Purui 蒼山普瑞.

X0236 8.288c9114:

舍利弗問佛：一切眾生從無始來輪迴生死。此眾生聚為有增減，為無增減。此義甚深。若人問我，當云何答。

3ii

a) 「舍利弗，大邪見者：所謂，見衆生界增，見衆生界減。b) 舍利弗，此大邪見，諸衆生等，以是見故，生盲無目。c) 是故，長夜妄行邪道。以是因緣，於現在世墮諸惡趣。d) 舍利弗，大險難者：所謂，取衆生界堅著妄執；取衆生界減堅著妄執。e) 舍利弗，此諸衆生堅著妄執。是故，長夜妄行邪道。以是因緣，於未來世墮諸惡趣。」
Dasheng qi xin lun yiji 大乘起信論義記，Fazang 法藏· T. 1846 (XLIV) 243c25–26:
a) 大邪見者，見衆生界增，見衆生界減。

Huayan yisheng jiaoyi fenqi zhang 華嚴一乘教義分齊章，Fazang 法藏· T. 1866 (XLV) 487a19–20:
a) 舍利弗，大邪見者，所謂，見衆生界增，見衆生界減，乃至廣説。

Zongjing lu 宗鏡録，Yanshou 延壽· T. 2016 (XLVIII) 509b12:
a) 大邪見者，見衆生界增，見衆生界減。

Jōyuishikiron honmonsh 成唯識論本文抄，unknown author· T. 2262 (LXV) 412b24–25:
若見衆生界有増減者，是大邪見。

Yuishikiron dōgakushō 唯識論同學鈔，Ryōsan 良算· T. 2263 (LXVI) 27b25:
衆生界無増減。

Yuishikiron dōgakushō 唯識論同學鈔，Ryōsan 良算· T. 2263 (LXVI) 34a19:
衆生界増減者，是大邪見。

Kegonshū shushō gishō 華嚴宗種性義抄，Shin'en 親圓· T. 2328 (LXXII) 58c21–22:
a) 舍利弗，大邪見者，所謂見衆生界増乃至起邪見心。

Kegon gokyōshō mondōshō 華嚴五教章問答抄，Shinjō 審乘· T. 2340 (LXII) 697a4–5:
衆生界不増減。

Kegon gokyōshō shinishō 華嚴五教章深意抄，Shōsen 聖詮· T. 2341 (LXXIII) 10a29–b1:
a) 舍利弗，大邪見者，所謂，見衆生界増，見衆生界減。

Kegon gokyōshō kyōshinshō 華嚴五教章匡眞鈔，Hōtan 鳳潭· T. 2344 (LXXIII) 511a14–15:
a) 舍利弗，大邪見者，所謂，見衆生界増，見衆生界減。乃至廣説。

Shugo kokkaishō 守護國界章，Saichō 最澄· T. 2363 (LXXIV) 217b24–25:
若見衆生界有増減者，是大邪見。

Ichijō yōketsu 一乘要決，Genshin 源信· T. 2370 (LXXIV) 339c21–22:
若見衆生界有増減者，是大邪見。

Shūyō Kashiwabara anryū 宗要柏原案立，Teishun 貞舜· T. 2374 (LXXIV) 550a28–29:
a) 舍利弗，大邪見者，所謂，見衆生界増，見衆生界減。
佛言：大邪見者：所謂，見眾生界増，見眾生界減。以是見故，生盲無目。是故，長夜妄行邪道。於現在世墮諸惡趣。舍利弗，大嶮難者，所謂，取眾生界増減堅著妄執。於未來世墮諸惡趣。

Dasheng qi xin lun yiji 大乘起信論義記，Fazang 法藏 T. 1846 (XLIV) 243c26–27:

a) 以不如實知一法界故，於衆生界起增減見。

Huayan yisheng jiaoyi fenqi zhang 华嚴一乗教義分齊章，Fazang 法藏 T. 1866 (XLV) 487a25–27:

a) 一切愚癡凡夫不如實知一法界故，不能實見一法界故，起邪見心，謂衆生界増衆生界減。

Zongjing lu 宗鏡録，Yanshou 延壽 T. 2016 (XLVIII) 509b12–13:

a) 以不如實知一法界故，於衆生界起增減見。

Jōyuishikiron honmonshō 成唯識論本文抄，unknown author T. 2262 (LXV) 419b5–6:

a) 一切凡夫不如實知一界起大邪見故。

Kishinron shōshutsu 起信論抄出，Sonben 尊辯 T. 2283 (LXIX) 544b15:

a) 以不如實知一法界故。

Kishinron shōshutsu 起信論抄出，Sonben 尊辯 T. 2283 (LXIX) 544b28–29:

大邪見者，見衆生界増，見衆生界減。以不如實知一法界故，於衆生界起增減見。1

1 Telescoped with 3ii.
Kegon gokyōshō shiji 華厳五教章指事, Jurei 壽靈. T. 2337 (LXXII) 259b9–14:

b) 舍利弗, 如來在世, 我諸弟子不起此見。c) 若我滅後, 過五百歳, 多有衆生愚無智慧。d) 於佛法中雖除鬚髮, 服三法衣, 現沙門像, 然其內無沙門德行。[乃至如是等人。起增減見。何以故。4ii] a) 此諸衆生。以依如來不了義經。無慧眼故。乃至廣説。(includes 4ii).

Kegon gokyōshō shinshō 華厳五教章深意鈔, Shōsen 聖詮. T. 2341 (LXXIII) 10ab4:

起邪見心。

Kegon gokyōshō kyōshinshō 華嚴 五 教 章 匡 眞 鈔, Hōtan 鳳潭. T. 2344 (LXXIII) 511c6–8:

a) 一切愚癡凡夫不如實知一法界, 不如實見一法界故, 起邪見心, 謂衆生界増, 衆生界減。

Xianshou wujiao yi 賢首五教儀, Xufa 續法 (1641–1728), Zokuzōkyō X1024 58: 679c17120:

一切愚癡不如實知一法界故, 起邪見心, 謂眾生界増, 衆生界減。

Huayan yisheng jiaoyi fenqi zhang fuguji 華嚴一乘教義分齊章復古記, Shihui 師會. X998, 338c5:

一切愚癡凡夫不如實知一法界故, 不如實見一法界故, 起邪見心, 謂眾生界増, 衆生界減。

4ii

a) 此諸衆生以依如來不了義經, 無慧眼故; b) 遠離如實空見故; c) 不如實知如來所證初發心故; d) 不如實知修集無量菩提功德行故; e) 不如實知如來所得無量法故; f) 不如實知如來所量力故; g) 不如實知如來無量境界故; h) 不信如來無量行處故; i) 不如實知如來不思議無量法自在故; j) 不如實知如來不思議無量方便故; k) 不能如實分別如來無量差別境界故; l) 不能善入如來不可思議大悲故; m) 不如實知如來大涅槃故。

Kegon gokyōshō shiji 華嚴五教章指事, Jurei 壽靈. 華嚴五教章指事 T. 2337 (LXXII) 259b13–14:

a) 此諸衆生以依如來不了義經, 無慧眼故。
5i

a) 舍利弗，愚癡凡夫無聞慧故，聞如來涅槃，起斷見滅見。b) 以起斷想及滅想故，謂衆生界滅，成大邪見極重惡業。

Yuishikiron dōgakushō 唯識論同學鈔, Ryōsan 良算. T. 2263 (XLVI) 27c1–3:
衆生界不增減不生滅者，知無有畢竟入涅槃者，若有定性入無餘依，彼經應言衆生界滅。

Kegonshū shushō gishō 華嚴宗種性義抄, Shin'en 親圓. T. 2328 (LXXII) 59a2–5:
不増不減經説十二見: 一，減見。二，斷見。三，減見。四，無涅槃見。五，無餘見。六，畢竟無涅槃見。七，世間有始見。八，世間有終見。九，幻化所見。十，無滅無樂見。十一，無衆生界見。十二，無聖諦見也。²

10i

a) 爾時，世尊告慧命舍利弗。b) 「此甚深義乃是如來智慧境界。亦是如來心所行處。c) 舍利弗，如是深義一切聲聞、縁覺智慧所不能知，所不能見，不能觀察。d) 何況一切愚癡凡夫而能測量。

RGV (Johnston 1950: 2.8–10 [Nakamura 1961: 3.1–4]):

b) tathāgataviśayo hi śāriputrāyam arthas tathāgatatagocaraḥ | c) sarvaśrā-vakapratyekabuddhair api tāvac chāriputrāyam artho na śakyah samyak svaprajñayā jñātum vā draṣṭum vā pratyavekṣitum vā d) prāg eva bālapṛthagjanair |

Nakamura 1967: 3.1–3; Derge Tanjur Tōh. 4025, sens tsam, phi 74b7–75a2:

b) shā ri’i bu don ‘di ni de bzhin gshegs pa’i yul te | de bzhin gshegs pa’i spyod yul lo || c) shā ri’i bu don ‘di ni re zhig nyan thos dang | rang sangs rgyas thams cad kyis kyang rang gi shes rab kyis yang dag par shes pa’am | blta ba’am | brtag par mi nus na | d) byis pa so so ‘i skye bo dag gis lta ci smos te |

Jiujing yisheng baoxing lun 究竟一乘寶性論. T. 1611 (XXXI) 821a20–23:

如來經中告舍利弗言：舍利弗，言衆生者，b) 乃是諸佛如來境界，c) 一切聲聞、辟支佛等，以正智慧不能觀察衆生之義。d) 何況能證毛道凡夫。

² The identification of both citations here is problematic.
10ii

a) 唯有諸佛如來智慧乃能觀察、知、見此義。b) 舍利弗, 一切聲聞、緣覺所有智慧, 於此義中, 唯可仰信; c) 不能如實知、見、觀察。

RGV (Johnston 1950: 2.10–11 [Nakamura 1961: 3.4–5]):

[anyatra tathāgataśraddhāgamanataḥ | śraddhāgamanīyo hi śāriputra paramārthaḥ | ]

Nakamura 1967: 3.3–4; Derge Tanjur Tōh. 4025, sems tsam, phi 75a2:

debzhin gshegs pa la dad pas rtogs pa ni ma gtogs so || shā ri'i bu don dam pa ni dad pas rtogs par bya ba yin no ||

Jiujing yisheng baoxing lun 究竟一乘寶性論. T. 1611 (XXXI) 821a23–25:

於此義中唯信如來。是故, 舍利弗, 隨如來信此衆生義。

10iii

a) 舍利弗, 甚深義者, 即是第一義諦。b) 第一義諦者, 即是衆生界。c) 衆生界者,即是如來藏。d) 如來藏者, 即是法身。

RGV (Johnston 1950: 2.11–13 [Nakamura 1961: 3.5–8]):

b) paramārtha iti śāriputra sattvadhātor etad adhivacanam | c) sattva-dhātur iti śāriputra tathāgatagarbhasyaitad adhivacanam | d) tathāgata-garbha iti śāriputra dharmakāyasyaitad adhivacanam |

(Johnston 1950: 56.2–3 [Nakamura 1961: 109.18–19]):

d) tathāgatagarbha iti śāriputra dharmakāyasyaitad adhivacanam iti |

Nakamura 1967: 3.4–7; Derge Tanjur Tōh. 4025, sems tsam, phi 75a2–3:

b) shā ri'i bu don dam pa zhes bya ba 'di ni sems kan gyi khams kyi tshig bla dags so || c) shā ri'i bu sems can gyi khams zhes bya ba 'di ni | de bzhin gshegs pa'i snying po'i tshig bla dags so || d) shā ri'i bu de bzhin gshegs pa'i snying po zhes bya ba 'di ni chos kyi sku'i tshig bla dags so ||

Nakamura 1967: 109.13–14; Derge Tanjur Tōh. 4025, sems tsam, phi 104a7:

d) shā ri'i bu de bzhin gshegs pa'i snying po zhes bya ba 'di ni chos kyi sku'i tshig bla dags so zhes bya ba dang |
Jiujing yisheng baoxing lun 究竟一乘寶性論. T. 1611 (XXXI) 821a25–27:
a) 舍利弗，言衆生者，即是第一義諦。b) 舍利弗，言第一義諦者，即是衆生界。c) 舍利弗，言衆生界者，即是如來藏。d) 舍利弗，言如來藏者，即是法身故。

Jiujing yisheng baoxing lun 究竟一乘寶性論. T. 1611 (XXXI) 835c9–10:
d) 舍利弗，言如來藏者，即是法身故。

Dasheng fajie wuchabie lunshu bing xu 大乘法界無差別論疏并序, Fazang 法藏. T. 1838 (XLIV) 74a23–24:
d) 舍利弗，言如來藏者，即是法身。

Zongjing lu 宗鏡録, Yanshou 延壽. T. 2016 (XLVIII) 925b20–22:
a) 甚深義者，即第一義諦。b) 第一義諦者，即衆生界。c) 衆生界者，即如來藏。d) 如來藏者，即法身。

Jōyuishikiron honmonsh 成唯識論本文抄, unknown author. T. 2262 (LXV) 421c5–7:
一界者，即是第一義諦。b) 第一義諦者，即是衆生界。c) 衆生界者，即是如來藏。d) 如來藏者，即是法身。

11

a) 舍利弗，如我所說，法身義者，過於恒沙不離、不脫、不斷、不異不思議佛法，如來功德智慧。

RGV (Johnston 1950: 3.4–5 [Nakamura 1961: 3.15–17]):
a) yo 'yaṁ śāriputra tathāgatānirdiṣṭo dharmakāyaḥ so 'yam avinirbhā-
gadhamāvinīmukta jñānānu yo yad uta gāṇadivālikāvyatīrīntais
tathāgatadharmaḥ |

Nakamura 1967: 3.12–14; Derge Tanjur Tōh. 4025, sems tsam, phi 75a5–6:
a) shā ri'i bu de bzhin gshegs pas bstan pa'i chos kyi sku gang yin pa de ni 'di lta ste | gang gā'i klung gi bye ma snyed las 'das pa'i de bzhin
gshegs pa'i chos dag dang | rnam par dbeyer med pa'i chos dang ldan pa ma bral ba'i ye shes kyi yon tan can yin no ||

Jiujing yisheng baoxing lun 究竟一乘寶性論. T. 1611 (XXXI) 821b1–3:
a) 舍利弗，如來所說法身義者，過於恒沙不離，不脫，不思議佛法，如來智慧功德。
a) 舍利弗，如燈，所有明、色及觸不離、不脱。b) 又如摩尼寶珠，所有明、色、形相不離、不脱。c) 舍利弗，如來所説法身之義亦復如是，過於恒沙不離、不脫、不斷、不異不思議佛法，如來功德智慧。

RGV (Johnston 1950: 39.5–8 [Nakamura 1961: 75.15–20]):

a) tadyathā śāriputra pradīpah | avinirbhāgadharmanyvinirmuktagunoyad utālokoṇavārṇatābhiḥ | b) manīr vālokavārṇasāmsthānaiḥ | c) evam eva śāriputra tathāgatanirodhīṣo dharmaṅkāyo ‘vinirbhāgadharma ṣvinirmuktajñānagunoyad uta gaṅgānadiāvilāvikvyāvīvṛttais tathāgata-dharmair iti ||

Nakamura 1967: 75.12–15; Derge Tanjur Tōh. 4025, sens tsam, phi 95b3–4:

a) shā rī’i bu dper na mar me ni ‘di lta ste | snang ba dang dro ba dang mdog dag gis sam | b) nor bu snang ba dang mdog dang dbyibs dag gri rnam par dbyer med pa’i chos can dang ma bral ba’i yon tan can no || c) shā rī’i bu de bzhin du de bzhin gshegs pas bstan pa’i chos kyi sku ni ‘di lta ste | gang gā’i klung gi bye ma snyed ’das pa de bzhin gshegs pa’i chos rnam kyis rnam par dbye ba med pa’i chos can ma bral ba’i ye shes kyi yon tan can no ||

Jiujing yisheng baoxing lun 究竟一乘寶性論. T. 1611 (XXXI) 821b3–7:

a) 舍利弗，如世間燈，明、色及觸不離、不脱。b) 又如摩尼寶珠，明、色、形相不離、不脱。c) 舍利弗，法身之義亦復如是，過於恒沙不離、不脫、不思議佛法，如來智慧功德故。

Dasheng fajie wuchabie lun 大乘法界無差別論. T. 1626 (XXXI) 893b15–19:

如說：a) 舍利弗，諸佛法身有功德法。譬如燈有光明熱色不離，不脫。b) 摩尼寶珠光、色、形状，亦復如是。c) 舍利弗，如來所説諸佛法身智功德法不離，不脫者。所謂：過恒河沙如來法也。

Dasheng fajie wuchabie lun 大乘法界無差別論. T. 1627 (XXXI) 895c25–29:

如佛說言：a) 舍利弗，譬如燈無二法功能無異。所為光明及暖色等不相離故。b) 或如寶珠光明、形、色。c) 如是，如是，舍利弗，如來所説法身不相離法，智慧功能所為過殑伽沙如來之法。
a) 舍利弗，如來法身常，以不異法故，以不盡法故。b) 舍利弗，如來法身恒，以常可歸依故，以未來際平等故。c) 舍利弗，如來法身清涼，以不二法故，以無分別法故。d) 舍利弗，如來法身不變，以非滅法故，以非作法故。


a) nityo 'yam śāriputra dharmakāyo 'nanyatvadharmākṣayadharmatayā
b) dhruvo 'yam śāriputra dharmakāyo dhruvaśaraṇo 'parāntakotisama-
tayā
c) śivo 'yam śāriputra dharmakāyo 'dvayadharmāvikalpadharma-
tayā
d) śāśvato 'yam śāriputra dharmakāyo 'vināśadharmākṛtrimad-
harmatayā


c) śivo 'yam śāriputra dharmakāyo 'dvayadharmāvikalpadharmā

Nakamura 1967: 107.8–11; Derge Tanjur Tōh. 4025, sems tsam, phi 103b4–6:

a) shā ri’i bu mi zad pa’i chos nyid kyis na gzhan du mi ’gyur ba’i chos
kyi sku ’di ni rtag pa’o || b) shā ri’i bu phyi ma’i mtha’i mu dang
btsungs pa nyid kyis bstan pa’i skyabs su gyur pa’ichos kyi sku’i ni
bṛtan pa’o || c) shā ri’i bu rnam par mi rtog pa nyid kyis gnyis su med
pa’ichos kyi sku ’di ni zhi ba’o || d) shā ri’i bu ma bcos pa’i chos nyid
kyis ‘jig pa med pa’ichos kyi sku ’di ni g.yung drung ngo ||

Nakamura 1967: 21.2–3; Derge Tanjur Tōh. 4025, sems tsam, phi 80b1–2:

c) shā ri’i bu ’gog pa zhes bya ba ’di ni chos kyi sku ste | gnyis su med
pa’ichos can rnam par mi rtog pa’i chos so ||

Jiujing yisheng baoxing lun 究竟一乘寶性論 T. 1611 (XXXI) 835b8–13:

a) 舍利弗，如來法身常，以不異法故，以不盡法故。b) 舍利弗，如來法身恒，
以常可歸依故，以未來際平等故。c) 舍利弗，如來法身清涼，以不二法
故，以無分別法故。d) 舍利弗，如來法身不變，以非滅法故，以非作法
故。

Jiujing yisheng baoxing lun T. 1611 (XXXI) 824a7–8:

c) 舍利弗，如來法身清涼，以不二法故，以無分別法故。
Dasheng fajie wuchabie lunshu bing xu 大乘法界無差別論疏并序, Fazang 法藏. T. 1838 (XLIV) 70c16–18:

a) 舍利弗, 如來法身常, 以不異法故, 以不盡故, c) 以無分別法故。d) 如來法身不變, 以非滅法故, 以非作法故。

Bosatsukai honshū yōbu gyōmonshū 菩薩戒本宗要輔行文集, Eison 叡尊. T. 2356 (LIV) 80a8–10:

d) 舍利弗, 如來法身不變, 以非滅法故, 以非作法故。

14i

a) 舍利弗, 即此法身過於恒沙無邊煩惱所纏, b) 從無始世來隨順世間波浪漂流, c) 往來生死, d) 名為「衆生」。

RGV (Johnston 1950: 40.16–18 [Nakamura 1961: 79.7–10]):

a) ayam eva sāriputra dharmakāyo 'paryantakleśakośakoṭigūḍhaḥ | c) saṁsārasrotasā uhyamāno b) 'navarāgrasaṁsāragaticyutypapattiṣu samcaraṇa d) sattvadhātur ity ucyate |

Nakamura 1967: 79.6–8; Derge Tanjur Tōh. 4025, sans tsam, phi 96a7–b1:

a) shā ri’i bu chos kyi sku de nyid nyon mongs pa’i sbus bye ba mtha’ yas pas gtums pas | c) ’khor ba’i rgyun gyis khyer ba | b) thog ma dang tha ma med pa’i ’khor ba’i ’gro bar ’chi ba dang | skye ba dag tu ’khor ba ni d) sans can gyi kham zhes brjod do ||

Jiujing yisheng baoxing lun 究竟一乘寶性論. T. 1611 (XXI) 832a24–26:

a) 舍利弗, 即此法身過於恒沙無量煩惱所纏, b) 從無始世來隨順世間生死波, c) 去來生退, d) 名為‘衆生’。

Wushangyi jing 無上依經. T. 669 (XVI) 469c17–19:

a) 阿難, 是如來界無量無邊諸煩惱穢之所隱蔽。b) 隨生死流漂沒六道無始輪轉。c) 我說名‘衆生界’。

Jingang xian lun 金剛仙論. T. 1512 (XXV) 805c18–20:

惑覆法身全不淨者, 名為‘衆生’。修行斷惑半淨半不淨, 名為‘菩薩’。十地行滿斷惑障盡具足清淨者, 名之為‘佛’。

**Jingang xian lun 金剛仙論**. T. 1512 (XXV) 851b4–9:
又如不增不減經中明。就佛性法體上有衆生、菩薩、佛。故知凡聖雖殊，而同依佛性。若同一法界，所以有斯四法差別者，明未修行不斷惑者，名為‘衆生’。修行之中分別斷惑者，或為‘菩薩’。全修行滿足除二惑永盡故，名為‘佛’也。既得圓報法身。

**Jingang xian lun 金剛仙論**. T. 1512 (XXV) 861c14–15:
惑覆法身名為‘衆生’也。

**Dasheng fajie wuchabie lun 大乘法界無差別論**. T. 1626 (XXXI) 893a9–11:
a) 舍利弗，即此法身爲本際無邊煩惱藏所纒，b) 從無始來，生死趣中生滅流轉，d) 說名‘衆生界’。

**Dasheng fajie wuchabie lun 大乘法界無差別論**. T. 1627 (XXXI) 895c2–5:
a) 舍利弗，即此法界過於恒沙無邊煩惱所纒裏，b) 無始世來，常爲生死波浪漂流，d) 說名‘衆生’。

**Renwang huguo banruo boluomiduo jing shu 仁王護國般若波羅蜜多經疏**.
Liangbi 良賁. T. 1709 (XXXIII) 460b13–14:
a) 清淨法身爲諸煩惱之所漂動，c) 往來生死，d) 名爲‘衆生界’。

**Huayanjing tanxuan ji 華嚴經探玄記**. Fazang 法藏. T. 1733 (XXXV) 227b1–2:
衆生界法界無二無別。即此法身以惑汚故，流轉五道，名爲‘衆生’。

**Da fangguang fo huayan jing shu 大方廣佛華嚴經疏**. Chengguan 澄觀. T. 1735 (XXXV) 606a22–23:
即此法身流轉五道，名曰‘衆生’。

**Cp. Da fangguang fo huayanjing suishu yanyi chao 大方廣佛華嚴經隨疏演義鈔**. Chengguan 澄觀. T. 1736 (XXXVI) 593b1–4:
今當更釋初法身流轉五道，名曰‘衆生’。即不増不減經。法身即是眞如。流轉五道即是隨緣，名曰‘衆生’是差別義。

**Amituo jing shu 阿彌陀經疏**. [Kui]ji [窺]基. T. 1757 (XXXVII) 319b5–6:
此法身本性清淨，但爲恒沙煩惱所纒，隨順世間，往來生死，即名‘衆生’。

**Yŏlban chong’yo 涅槃宗要**. Wŏnhyo 元曉. T. 1769 (XXXVIII) 250b2–4:
a) 即此法身煩惱纒，b) 無始世來隨順世間波浪漂流，c) 去來生死，d) 名爲‘衆生’。

---

This appears to be a paraphrase of §§14i–15i; see Ōtake (2003–2004: II.454).
Dafangguang yuanjue xiuduoluo liaoyi jing líu shu zhu 大方廣圓覺修多羅了義經略疏訳, Zongmi 宗密. T. 1795 (XXXIX) 538a5–6 = 554a29:
法身流轉五道名曰‘衆生’。

Pōmmanggyōng kojōki 梵網經古述記, T’ae hyōn 太賢. T. 1815 (XL) 689c19–21:
即此法身流轉生死名曰‘衆生’。即此法身修行諸度名曰‘菩薩’。即此法身住於彼岸名曰‘諸佛’。 (= 14i–iii)

Dasheng fajie wuchabie lunshu bing xu 大乘法界無差別論疏并序, Fazang 法藏. T. 1838 (XLIV) 62c26–28:
a) 即是法身爲本際，無邊煩惱藏所纒，
b) 從無始來生死趣中，生滅流轉，
d) 說名‘衆生界’等。

Qi xin lun shu bixiao ji 起信論疏筆削記, Zixuan 子璿. T. 1848 (XLIV) 343c6–8:
a) 即此法身爲過於恒河沙無邊煩惱所纒，
b) 從無始世來隨順世間波浪漂流，
c) 往來生死，
d) 說名‘衆生’。

Dashengyi zhang 大乘義章, Huiyuan 慧遠. T. 1851 (XLIV) 486b21–22:
法身輪轉五道。名曰‘衆生’。

Dashengyi zhang 大乘義章, Huiyuan 慧遠. T. 1851 (XLIV) 530a29 = 551a17–18:
即此法界。輪轉五道。名曰‘衆生’。

Zhaolun xinshu 肇論新疏, Wencai 文才. T. 1860 (XLV) 203c4:
法身流轉五道云云。

Huayan youxin fajie ji 華嚴遊心法界記, Fazang 法藏. T. 1877 (XLV) 649a2–3:
法界身流轉五道，名曰‘衆生’等。

Zongjing lu 宗鏡録, Yanshou 延壽. T. 2016 (XLVIII) 518c6–8:
a) 舍利弗，即此法身過於恒沙無量煩惱所纒，
b) 從無始來隨順世間生死波流，
c) 去來生死，
d) 說名‘衆生’。

Huayan yanyi chao zuanshi 華嚴演義鈔纂釋, Tan’ei 湛叡. T. 2205 (LVII) 252c20–22:
a) 即此法身過於恒沙無邊煩惱所纒，
b) 從無始世來隨順世間波浪漂流，
c) 性[>往]來生死，
d) 說名‘衆生’。
Shakumakenron kanchū 釋摩訶衍論勘注, Raihō 頼寶. T. 2290 (LXIX) 793c20–22:
即此法身流轉五道, 名為‘衆生’。即此法身修行六度, 名為‘菩薩’。即此法身到於彼岸, 名為‘如來’。法性法身即是眞如異名。

Kegon gokyōshō fushin 華嚴五教章不審, Jitsuei 實英. T. 2343 (LXXIII) 223a2–4:
a) 此法身本性清浄。若為恆沙煩惱所纏, b) 隨順世間, c) 往來生死, d) 即名‘衆生’。

Kegon gokyōshō kyōshinshō 華嚴五教章匡眞鈔, Hōtan 鳳潭. T. 2344 (LXXIII) 507b9–10:
a) 即此法身過於恆沙無邊煩惱所纏, b) 從無始來, 生死趣中, c) 往來生死, d) 名為‘衆生’。乃至即此法身。離一切使纏, 名為‘如來’等。

Kegon gokyōshō kyōshinshō 華嚴五教章匡眞鈔, Hōtan 鳳潭. T. 2344 (LXXIII) 511b9–10:
衆生界無二無別。即此法身。以惑汚故。流轉五道。名為‘衆生’。

Bosatsukai honshū yōbu gyōmonshū 菩薩戒本宗要輔行文集, Eison 叡尊. T. 2356 (LIV) 80a10–12:
a) 舍利弗, 即此法身過於恆沙無邊煩惱所纏, b) 從無始來隨順世間波浪漂流, c) 往來生死, d) 名為‘衆生’。

Citations of the AAN 203
**Shingonshū kyōjī 眞言宗教時義, Annen 安然. T. 2396 (LXXV) 375c3–4:**
即此法身流轉五道名為衆生。

**Ōjōjūn 往生拾因, Eikan 永観. T. 2683 (LXXXIV) 99a27–28:**
即此法身輪轉五道名曰衆生。

14ii

a) 舍利弗, 即此法身, b) 歪離世間生死苦惱, c) 棄捨一切諸有欲求, d) 行十波羅蜜, e) 攝八萬四千法門, f) 修菩提行, g) 名為‘菩薩’。

RGV (Johnston 1950: 40.18–41.1 [Nakamura 1961: 79.10–13]):

a) sa eva śāriputra dharmakāyah b) saṁsārasrotoduḥkhanirvīṇno c) virak-taḥ sarvakāmāviśayebhyo d) daśāpāramitāntargataś e) caturaśītyā dharmaskandhasahasrair f) bodhāya caryāṁ caran g) bodhisattva ity ucyate |

Nakamura 1967: 79.8–11; Derge Tanjur Tōh. 4025, sans ṭam, phi 96b1–2:

a) shā ri’ibu cho s ky sk de nyd b) ’khor ba’i rgyun gya sdug bsngal las skyo bar gyur pa | c) ’dod pa’i yul thams cad la chags pa dang bral ba d) rol tu phyin pa bcu’i khongs su gtogs pa | e) chos kyi phung po brgyad khri bzhi stong gi f) byang chub kyi don du spyad pa spyod pa ni g) byang chub sans dpa’ zhes brjod do ||

**Jiujuing yisheng baoxing lun 究竟一乘寳性論. T. 1611 (XXXI) 832a26–28:**

a) 舍利弗, 即此法身, b) 歪離世間生死苦惱, c) 棄一切欲, d) 行十波羅蜜, e) 攝八萬四千法門, f) 修菩提行, g) 名為‘菩薩’。

**Wushangyi jing 無上依經. T. 669 (XVI) 469c19–21:**

阿難, 是衆生界於生死苦。而起厭離除六塵欲。依八萬四千法門, 十波羅蜜所修, 譬修菩提道。我説名‘菩薩’。

**Dasheng fajie wuchabie lun 大乘法界無差別論. T. 1626 (XXXI) 893a11–14:**

a) 復次, 舍利弗, 即此法身, b) 歪離生死漂流之苦, c) 棄於一切諸欲境界, d) 於十波羅蜜及 e) 八萬四千法門中, f) 為求菩提而修諸行, g) 說名‘菩薩’。

**Dasheng fajie wuchabie lun 大乘法界無差別論. T. 1627 (XXXI) 895c5–7:**

a) 舍利弗, 即此法界無邊, b) 歪離生死, 不住涅槃, c) 一切欲界中住, d) 行十波羅蜜, e) 攝八萬四千法門, f) 行菩提行時, g) 名為‘菩薩’。

204 Buddhist Cosmic Unity
Bosatsukai honshū yōbu gyōmonshū 菩薩戒本要輔行文集, Eison 叡尊. T. 2356 (LIV) 80a12–15:
a) 舍利弗, 即此法身, b) 厭離世間生死苦惱, c) 棄捨一切諸有, d) 欲求行十波羅蜜, e) 攝八萬四千法門, f) 修菩薩行, g) 名為‘菩薩’。

Shingonshū kyōjigi 眞言宗教時義, Annen 安然. T. 2396 (LXXV) 375c4–5:
即此法身, 修行六度, 名為‘菩薩’。

15i
a) 復次, 舍利弗, 即此法身, 離一切世間煩惱使繫, b) 過一切苦, c) 離一切煩惱垢, d) 得淨, 得清淨, e) 住於彼岸清淨法中, f) 到一切衆生所願之地, g) 於一切境界中究竟通達, 更無勝者, h) 離一切障, 離一切礙, 於一切法中得自在力, h) 名為‘如來應正遍知’。

sa eva punaḥ śāriputra dharmakāyaḥ sarvakleśakṣośaparimuktah b) sarvaduhkhātikrāntaḥ c) sarvopakleśamalāpagataḥ d) śuddho viśuddhah e) paramapariśuddhadharmatāyām sthitah f) sarvasattvālokaniyām bhūmim ārūḍhah g) sarvasyām jñeyabhūmāv ‘dvitiyāṃ pauruṣāṃ sthānaprāptah h) anāvaranadharmāpratihatasarvadharmāśvāryabalatāṁ adhigatas i) tathāgato ‘rhan samyaksambuddha ity ucyate |

Nakamura 1967: 79.11–15; Derge Tanjur Tōh. 4025, sems tsam, phi 96b2–4:
shā ri’i bu chos kyi sku de nyid nyon mongs pa’i sbubs thams cad las yongs su grol ba b) sduṅ bsngal ba thams cad las ‘das pa c) nye ba’i nyon mongs pa’i dri ma mtha’ dag dang bral ba d) dag pa rnam par dag pa e) mchog tu yongs su dag pa’ichos nyid la gnas pa f) sems can thams cad kyis blta bar bya ba’i sa la bzhugs pa g) shes bya’i sa thams cad la gnyis su med pa’i skyes bu’i mthu thob pa h) sgrī pa med pa’ichos can chos thams cad kyi dbang phyug gi stobs thogs pa med pa thob pa ni i) de bzhin gshegs pa dgra bcom pa yang dag par rdzogs pa’i sangs rgyas zhes brjod do ||

Jiujing yisheng baoxing lun 究竟一乗寶性論, T. 1611 (XXXI) 832a29–b4:
a) 舍利弗, 即此法身, 得離一切煩惱使繫, b) 過一切苦, c) 離一切煩惱垢, d) 得淨, 得清淨, e) 住彼岸清淨法中 f) 到一切衆生所願之地, g) 於一切境
界中，更無勝者，h) 離一切障離一切礙，於一切法中得自在力，i) 名為‘如來應正遍知’故。

Wushangyi jing 無上依經. T. 669 (XVI) 469c21–26:
a) 阿難，是衆生界已得出離諸煩惱穢。b–c) 過一切苦洗除垢穢。d) 究竟淡然清淨澄潔。為諸衆生之所願見。微妙上地一切智地一切無礙。h) 入此中住至無比能已得法王大自在力。i) 我説名‘多陀阿伽度阿羅訶三藐三佛陀’。

Dasheng fajie wuchabie lun 大乘法界無差別論. T. 1626 (XXXI) 893a14–19:
a) 復次，舍利弗，即此法身，解脫一切煩惱藏，b) 遠離一切苦，c) 永除一切煩惱隨眠燻垢，d) 清淨，極清淨，e) 最極清淨住於法性，f) 至一切衆生所觀察地，g) 盡一切所知之地，昇無二丈夫處，h) 得無障礙無所著一切法自在力，i) 說名‘如來應正等覺’。

Dasheng fajie wuchabie lun 大乘法界無差別論. T. 1627 (XXXI) 895c7–12:
a) 舍利弗，即此法界一切俱胝煩惱解脱，b) 度一切苦，c) 遠離一切煩惱隨眠纏垢，d) 證得清淨，e) 最極清淨法性中住，f) 一切衆生之所瞻仰，g) 住一切爾焰地，得大勢力，h) 無障無著於一切法得自在力，i) 說名‘如來應正等覺’。

Yŏlbann chong’yo 涅槃宗要, Wŏnhyo 元曉. T. 1769 (XXXVIII) 250b4–5:
c) 離一切垢，e) 住於彼岸，h) 於一切法得自在力，i) 名為‘如來應正遍知’乃至廣說。

Bosatsukai honshū yŏbu gyōmonshū 菩薩戒本宗要輔行文集, Eison 復尊. T. 2356 (LIV) 80a15–20:
a) 復次，舍利弗，即此法身，離一切世間頓惱使纏，b) 過一切苦，c) 離一切煩惱垢，d) 得清淨，e) 住於彼岸清淨法中，f) 到一切衆生所願之地，g) 於一切境界中究竟通達，更無勝者，h) 離一切障，離一切礙，於一切法中得自在力，i) 名為‘如來應正遍知’。

Shingonshū kyōjī 眞言宗教時義, Annen 安然. T. 2396 (LXXV) 375c5:
即此法身到於彼岸，名為‘如來’。

15ii

a) 是故，舍利弗，不離衆生界有法身，不離法身有衆生界。b) 衆生界即法身。c) 法身即衆生界。d) 舍利弗，此二法者，義一名異。
RGV (Johnston 1950: 41.15–17 [Nakamura 1961: 81.4–6]):

a) tasmāc chāriputra nānyaḥ sattvadhātur nānyo dharmakāyah | b) sattvadhātur eva dharmakāyah | c) dharmakāya eva sattvadhātuḥ | d) advayam etad arthena | vyañjanamātrabhedaḥ |

Nakamura 1967: 81.4–6; Derge Tanjur Tōh. 4025, sems tsam, phi 97a1–2:

a) shā rī’i bu de’i phyir na sems can gyi kham y khang gzhan la | b) chos kyi sku yang gzhan pa ni ma yin te | c) sems can gyi khams nyid chos kyi sku chos kyi sku nyid kyang sems can gyi khams te | d) ’di ni don gys gnyis su med de yi ge tsam dang tha dad par yin no ||

Jiujing yisheng baoxing lun 究竟一乘寶性論 T. 1611 (XXXI) 832b17–20:

a) 舍利弗，不離衆生界有法身，不離法身有衆生界。b) 衆生界即法身。c) 法身即衆生界。d) 舍利弗，此二法者，義一名異。

Dasheng fajie wuchabie lun 大乘法界無差別論 T. 1626 (XXXI) 893a19–21:

a) 是故，舍利弗，衆生界不異法身，法身不異衆生界。b) 衆生界即是法身。
c) 法身即是衆生界。d) 此但名異，非義有別。

Dasheng fajie wuchabie lun 大乘法界無差別論 T. 1627 (XXXI) 895c12–14:

a) 是故，舍利弗，衆生界不異法身，法身不異衆生界。b) 衆生界即法身。
c) 法身即衆生界。d) 此無二義，文字差別。

Huayanjing tanxuan ji 華嚴經探玄記 Fazang 法藏 T. 1733 (XXXV) 413c3–4:

b) 衆生即法身。c) 法身即衆生。d) 衆生法身，義一名異。

Da fangguang fo huayan jing shu 大方廣佛華嚴經疏 Chengguan 澄觀 T. 1735 (XXXV) 606a23–24:

c) 法身即衆生。b) 衆生即法身。d) 法身衆生，義一名異。

Dasheng qi xin lun yiji 大乘起信論義記 Fazang 法藏 T. 1846 (XLIV) 275a10–12:

c) 法身即衆生。b) 衆生即法身。d) 法身與衆生，義一名異也。

Taesŭng kisillon naeŭ nakt'angmi 大乘起信論內義略探記 T'ae hyŏn 太賢 T. 1849 (XLIV) 421a5–6:

c) 法身即衆生。b) 衆生即法身。d) 法身與衆生，義一名異也。

Nengxian zhongbian huiri lun 能顯中邊慧日論 Huizhao 慧沼 T. 1863 (XLV) 418b6–9:

a) 舍利弗，不離衆生界有法身，不離法身有衆生界。b) 衆生界即法身。c) 法身即衆生界。d) 此二法者，義一名異。
Huayan yisheng chengfo miaoyi 華嚴一乘成佛妙義, Jian Dengzhi 見登之. T. 1890 (XLV) 779a2–3:

b) 衆生即法身。c) 法身即衆生。d) 衆生法身, 義一名異。

Zongjing lu 宗鏡録, Yanshou 延壽. T. 2016 (XLVIII) 509b15–16:

b) 衆生即法身。c) 法身即衆生。d) 衆生法身, 義一名異。

Jōyuishikiron honmonsh 成唯識論本文抄, unknown authorship. T. 2262 (LXV) 412b19–22:

衆生即法身。法身即衆生。衆生法身, 義一名異。

Zongjing lu 宗鏡録, Yanshou 延壽. T. 2016 (XLVIII) 509b15–16:

b) 衆生即法身。c) 法身即衆生。d) 衆生法身, 義一名異。

Kegon gokyōshō kyōshinshō 華嚴五教章匡真, Hōtan 鳳潭. T. 2344 (LXXIII) 507b8–9:

衆生界不異法身, 法身不異衆生界。

Kegon gokyōshō kyōshinshō 華嚴五教章匡真, Hōtan 鳳潭. T. 2344 (LXXIII) 511b10–12:

c) 法身即衆生。b) 衆生即法身。d) 法身衆生, 義一名異。

Shingonshū kyōjigi 眞言宗教時義, Annen 安然. T. 2396 (LXXV) 375c5–6:

法性法身, 即是眞如異名。

Himitsu sanmaiya butsukaigi 祕密三昧耶佛戒儀, Kūkai 空海. T. 2463 (LXXVIII) 6c4–6:

a) 不離衆生界有法身, 不離法身有衆生界。b) 衆生界即是法身。c) 法身即是衆生界。

Shingatsurin hishaku 心月輪祕釋, Kakuban 覺鑑. T. 2520 (LXXIX) 41c12–14:

a) 不離衆生界有法身, 不離法身有衆生界。b) 衆生界即是法身。c) 法身即是衆生界。

Dasheng qi xin lun guangshi 大乘起信論廣釋, Tankuang 疊曇. T. 2814 (LXXXV) 1151a12–13:

c) 法身即衆生。衆生即法身。d) 法身衆生, 義一名異。

Huayan xuantanhui xuanji 華嚴懸談會玄記, Cangshan Purui 蒼山普瑞. X236 8.309c14235:

眾生法身眾生, 義一名異。
Hwaŏm–gyŏng Munũi Yogyŏl Mundap 華嚴經文義要決問答, P’yowon 表員.
X237 8.435a9–10:
眾生即法身。法身即眾生。眾生法身，義一名異。

Huayan yisheng jiaoyi fenqi zhang fuguji 華嚴一乘教義分齊章復古記, Shihui 師會. X998, 338b18:
法身即是眾生。眾生即是法身。法身眾生，義一名異。

16

a) 復次，舍利弗，如我上説，衆生界中亦三種法。b) 皆真實如、不異、不差。c) 何謂三法。d) 一者，如來藏本際相應體及清淨法；e) 二者，如來藏本際不相應體及煩惱纏不清淨法；f) 三者，如來藏未來際平等恒及有法。

Kūmgang sammaegyŏng non 金刚三昧経論, Wŏnhyo 元曉 T. 1730 (XXXIV) 968a6–13:

a) 衆生界中示三種法。b) 皆真實如、不異、不差。c) 何謂三法。d) 一者，如來藏本際相應體及清淨法。此法如實不虛妄。不離，不脫智，不思議法。無始本際來有此清淨相應法體。e) 二者，如來藏本際不相應體及煩惱纏不清淨法。此本際離脫不相應煩惱纏不清淨法。唯有如來菩提智之所能斷。f) 三者，如來藏未來際平等恒及有法。

17i

a) 舍利弗，當知如來藏本際相應體及清淨法者，此法如實、不虛妄、不離、不脫智慧清淨眞如法界，不思議法。b) 無始本際來有此清淨，相應法體。

Shi moheyan lun 釋摩訶衍論. T. 1668 (XXXII) 608c14–17:

a) 如來藏本際相應體及清淨法，此法如實、不虛妄、不離、不脫智、不思議法。b) 無始本際來有此清淨，相應法體故。

Zongjing lu 宗鏡録, Yanshou 延壽 T. 2016 (XLVIII) 871a1–3:

a) 如來藏本際相應體及清淨法，此法如實、不虛妄、不離、不脫智、不思議法。b) 無始本際來有此清淨，相應法體故。

17ii

a) 舍利弗，我依此清淨眞如法界，爲衆生故説爲不可思議法自性清淨心。
又如說。a) 舍利弗，此清淨法性即是法界。我依此自性清淨心，說不思議法。

如經中説。a) 舍利弗，此善法如實眞如法界自性清淨心相應法體。我依此自性清淨，為衆生故説為不可思議。

衆生界清淨。應知即法身。法身即涅槃。涅槃即如來。

如來藏未來際平等恒及有法者，即是一切諸法根本。b) 備一切法，具一切法，於世法中不離、不脱真實一切法，d) 住持一切法，攝一切法。

如來藏未來際平等恒及有法，則是一切諸法根本。b) 備一切法，具一切法，於世法中不離、不脫故。

如來藏未來際平等恒及有法，即是一切諸法根本。b) 備一切法，具一切法，於世法中不離、不脫故。

如來藏未來際平等恒及有法，則是一切諸法根本。b) 備一切法，具一切法，於世法中不離、不脫故。
19ii

a) 舍利弗，我依此不生、不滅、常恆、清涼、不變歸依、不可思議、清淨法界，
說名‘眾生’。b) 所以者何。c) 言‘眾生’者，即是不生、不滅、常恆、清涼、
不變歸依、不可思議、清淨法界等異名。d) 以是義故，我依彼法，說名‘眾生’。

Wuliangshou jing youpotishe yuansheng ji zhu 無量壽經優婆提舍願生偈註，
Tanluan 晃鸞。5 T. 1819 (XL) 831b23–24:

c) 言‘眾生’者，即是不生、不滅義。

21i

a) 舍利弗，若有比丘、比丘尼、優婆塞、優婆夷，若起一見，若起二見，b) 諸佛如
來非彼世尊，如是等人非我弟子。

RGV (Johnston 1950: 28.3 [Nakamura 1961: 53.15]):

b) nāhaṁ teśāṁ sāstā na te mama śrāvakāḥ |

Nakamura 1967: 53.9; Derge Tanjur Tōh. 4025, sms tsam, phi 89a6–7:

b) nga ni de dag gi ston pa ma yin la | de dag kyang nga’i nyan thos ma yin no ||

Wushangyi jing 無上依經. T. 669 (XVI) 471a26–27:

阿難，是等衆生非佛弟子，佛非大師，非歸依處。

Jiujing yisheng baoxing lun 究竟一乘寶性論. T. 1611 (XXXI) 828c12–14:

a) 舍利弗，若有比丘、比丘尼、優婆塞、優婆夷，若起一見，若起二見。b)
諸佛如來非彼世尊，如是等人非我弟子。

Yanggwŏn muryangsu kyŏng chongyo 兩卷無量壽經宗要, Wŏnhyo 元曉. T.
1747 (XXXVII) 129b26–28:

a) 若有比丘乃至優婆夷，若起一見，若起二見。b) 諸佛如來非彼世尊，如是
等人非我弟子。

21iii

a) 舍利弗，此人以起二見因緣故，從冥入冥，從闇入闇。b) 我説是等名‘一闡
提’。


a) तान अहम शरीपुत्रा तमासास तमोतःराम अन्धकारान महान्धकारान रगामिनस तमोब्हुयिष्ठा इति वदामः

Nakamura 1967: 53.9–10; Derge Tanjur Tōh. 4025, sems tsam, phi 89a7:

a) श्री री बु दे डाङ नी मुन पा बास क्याङ चें मुन पा | मुन पा नास मुन पा चें पर ‘ग्रो बा मुन पा चें पो दांग ल्दान पां झेस नग स्म्रां झेस ग्सुंग्स पां ||

Wushangyi jing 無上依經. T. 669 (XVI) 471a27–29:

如是人等已住愚盲。必墮嶮怖大闇之中。於曠野地更入黒穢棘刺稠林。

以生死縛作於後際，落闡提網，不能自出。

Jiujing yisheng baoxing lun 究竟一乘寶性論. T. 1611 (XXXI) 828c14–17:

a) 舍利弗，是人以起二見因縁，從闇入闇，從冥入冥。b) 我説是等名‘一闡提’也。

Kegon gokyōshō kyōshinsō 華嚴五教章匡眞鈔, Hōtan 鳳潭. T. 2344 (LXXIII) 511b12–13:

若有言眾生界法界有二有別者，我説彼人名‘一闡提’也。

Huayan yisheng jiaoyi fenqi zhang fuguji 華嚴一乘教義分齊章復古記, Shihui 師會. X998, 338b18:

眾生界法界無二無別。若言眾生法界有二有別者，我説彼人名‘一闡提’。

212 Buddhist Cosmic Unity
Indices to Citations of the AAN

By Taishō number:

T. 1512. *Jingang xian lun* 金剛仙論: 14i
T. 1611. *Jiujiang yisheng baoxing lun* 究竟一乘寶性論: 10i, 10ii, 10iii, 11, 12, 13ii, 14i, 14ii, 15i, 15ii, 21i, 21ii
T. 1626. *Dasheng fajie wuchabie lun* 大乘法界無差別論: 12, 14i, 14ii, 15i, 15ii, 17ii
T. 1627. *Dasheng fajie wuchabie lun* 大乘法界無差別論: 12, 14i, 14ii, 15i, 15ii, 17ii
T. 1668. *Shi moheyan lun* 釋摩訶衍論: 17i, 18i, 19i
T. 1730. *Kŭmgang sammaegyŏng non* 金剛三昧經論, Wŏnhyo 元曉: 16
T. 1733. *Huayanjing tanxuan ji* 華嚴經探玄記, Fazang 法藏: 14i, 15ii
T. 1735. *Da fangguang fo huayan jing shu* 大方廣華嚴經疏, Chengguan 澄觀: 14i, 15ii
T. 1736. *Da fangguang fo huayanjing suishu yanyi chao* 大方廣華嚴經隨疏演義鈔, Chengguan 澄觀: 14i
T. 1747. *Yanggwoń muryangsu kyŏng chong'yo* 兩卷無量壽經宗要, Wŏnhyo 元曉: 21i
T. 1769. *Yŏllban chong'yo* 涅槃宗要, Wŏnhyo 元曉: 14i, 15i
T. 1795. *Dafangguuang yuanjue xiuduoluo liaoyi jing lüeshu zhu* 大方廣圓覺修多羅了義經略疏註, Zongmi 宗密: 14i
T. 1815. *Pŏmmanggyŏng kojŏkki* 梵網經古述記, T’aehyŏn 太賢: 14i
T. 1819. *Wuliangshou jing youpotishe yuansheng ji zhu* 無量壽經優婆提舍願生偈註, Tanluan 晞鸞: 19ii
T. 1838. *Dasheng fajie wuchabie lunshu bing xu* 大乘法界無差別論疏并序, Fazang 法藏: 10iii, 13ii, 14i
T. 1846. *Dasheng qi xin lun yiji* 大乘起信論義記, Fazang 法藏: 3ii, 4i, 15ii
Buddhist Cosmic Unity

T. 1848. Qi xin lun shu bixiao ji 起信論疏筆削記, Zixuan 子璿: 14i
T. 1849. Taesŭng kisillon naeŭi yakt'angi 大乘起信論內義略探記 by T’aehyŏn 太賢: 15ii
T. 1851. Dashengyi zhang 大乘義章, Huiyuan 慧遠: 14i
T. 1860. Zhaolun xinshu 藻論新疏, Wencai 文才: T. 14i
T. 1863. Nengxian zhongbian huiri lun 能顯中邊慧日論, Huizhao 慧沼: 15ii
T. 1866. Huayan yisheng jiaoyi fenqi zhang 華嚴一乘教義分齊章, Fazang 法藏: 3ii, 4i
T. 1877. Huayan youxin fajie ji 華嚴遊心法界記, Fazang 法藏: 14i
T. 1890. Huayan yisheng chengfo miaoyi 華嚴一乘成佛妙義, Jian Dengzhi 見 登之: 15ii
T. 2016. Zongjing lu 宗鏡録, Yanshou 延壽: 3ii, 4i, 10iii, 14i, 15ii, 17i, 18i, 19i
T. 2205. Huayan yanyi chao zuanshi 華嚴演義鈔纂釋, Tan’ei 湛叡: 14i
T. 2262. Jōyuishikiron honmonsh 成唯識論本文抄, unknown author: 3ii, 4i, 10iii, 14i, 15ii, 21ii
T. 2263. Yuishikiron dōgakushō 唯識論同學抄, Ryōsan 良算: 3ii, 5i
T. 2283. Kishinron shōshutsu 起信論抄出, Sonben 尊辯: 4i, 15ii
T. 2290. Shakumakenron kanchū 釋摩訶衍論勘注, Raihō 頼寶: 14i
T. 2305. Hashiki gishō kenjūshō 八識義章研習抄, Chinkai 珍海: 14i
T. 2328. Kegonshū shushōgishō 宗要柏原案立, Teishun 貞舜: 3ii
T. 2337. Kegon gokyōshō shiiji 華嚴五教章指事, Jurei 寿靈: 4i, 14i, 15ii
T. 2340. Kegon gokyōshō mondōshō 華嚴五教章問答抄, Shinjō 審乘: 3ii
T. 2341. Kegon gokyōshō shinishō 華嚴五教章深意抄, Shōsen 聖詮: 3ii, 4i
T. 2343. Kegon gokyōshō fushin 華嚴五教章不審, Jitsuei 實英: 14i
T. 2344. Kegon gokyōshō kyōshinshō 華嚴五教章匡眞抄, Hōtan 鳳潭: 3ii, 4i, 14i, 15ii, 21ii
T. 2356. Bosatsukai honshū yōbu gyōmonshū 菩薩戒本宗要輔行文集, Eison 叡尊: 13ii, 14i, 14ii, 15i
T. 2363. Shugo kokkaishō 守護國界章, Saichō 最澄: 3ii
T. 2370. Ichijō yōketsu 一乗要決, Genshin 源信: 3ii
T. 2374. Shūyō Kashiwabara anryū 宗要柏原案立, Teishun 貞舜: 3ii
T. 2396. Shingonshū kyōjigi 真言宗教時義, Annen 安然: 14i, 14ii, 15i, 15ii
T. 2463. Himitsu sanmaiya butsukaigi 祕密三昧耶佛戒儀, Kūkai 空海: 15ii
T. 2520. Shingatsurin hishaku 心月輪祕釋, Kakuban 譽: 15ii, 17ii
T. 2683. Ōjōjūin 往生拾因, Eikan 永観: 14i
T. 2814. Dasheng qi xin lun guangshi 大乘起信論廣釋, Tankuang 曇曙: 15ii  
X236. Huayan xuantanhui xuanji 華嚴懸談會玄記, Cangshan Purui 蒼山普瑞: 2, 3ii, 15ii  
X998. Huayan yisheng jiaoyi fenqi zhang fuguji 華嚴一乘教義分齊章復古記, Shihui 師會: 3ii, 4i, 15ii, 21ii  
X1024. Xianshou wujiào yi 賢首五教儀, Xufa 續法: 4i

In Alphabetical Order of Text Title:

Amituo jing shu 阿彌陀經疏, [Kui]ji 窺基. T. 1757: 14i  
Bosatsukai honshū yōbu gyōmonshū 菩薩戒本宗要輔行文集, Eison 攫尊. T. 2356: 13ii, 14i, 14ii, 15i  
Da fangguang fo huayanjing suishu yanyi chao 大方廣佛華嚴經隨疏演義鈔, Chengguan 澄觀. T. 1736: 14i  
Dasheng fajie wuchabie lun 大乘法界無差別論. T. 1626: 12, 14i, 14ii, 15i, 15ii, 17ii  
Dasheng fajie wuchabie lun 大乘法界無差別論. T. 1627: 12, 14i, 14ii, 15i, 15ii, 17ii  
Dasheng fajie wuchabie lunshu bing xu 大乘法界無差別論疏并序, Fazang 法藏. T. 1838: 10iii, 13ii, 14i  
Dasheng qi xin lun guangshi 大乘起信論廣釋, Tankuang 曇曙. T. 2814: 15ii  
Dasheng qi xin lun yiji 大乘起信論義記, Fazang 法藏 T. 1846: 3ii, 4i, 15ii  
Dashengyi zhang 大乘義章, Huiyuan 慧遠. T. 1851: 14i  
Da fangguang fo huayan jing shu 大方廣佛華嚴經疏, Chengguan 澄觀. T. 1735: 14i, 15ii  
Da fangguang fo huayanjing suishu yanyi chao 大方廣佛華嚴經隨疏演義鈔, Chengguan 澄觀. T. 1736: 14i  
Dafangguang yuanjue xiuduoluo liaoyi jing lüeshu zhu 大方廣圓覺修多羅了義經略疏註, Zongmi 宗密. T. 1795: 14i  
Hasshiki gishō kenjūshō 八識義章研習抄, Chinkai 珍海. T. 2305: 14i  
Himitsu sanmaiya butsukaigi 祕密三昧耶佛戒儀, Kūkai 空海. T. 2463: 15ii  
Huayan xuantanhui xuanji 華嚴懸談會玄記, Cangshan Purui 蒼山普瑞: 2, 3ii, 15ii
Huayan yanyi chao zuanshi 華嚴演義鈔纂釋, Tan'ei 深叡. T. 2205: 14i,
Huayan yisheng jiaoyi fenqi zhang 華嚴一乘教義分齊章, Fazang 法藏. T. 1866: 3ii, 4i
Huayan yisheng jiaoyi fenqi zhang fuguji 華嚴一乘教義分齊章復古記, Shihui 師會. X998: 3ii, 41, 15ii, 21ii
Huayan yisheng chengfo miaoyi 華嚴一乘成佛妙義, Jian Dengzhi 見登之. T. 1890: 15ii
Huayan youxin fajie ji 華嚴遊心法界記, Fazang 法藏. T. 1877: 14i
Huayanjing tanxuan ji 華嚴經探玄記, Fazang 法藏. T. 1733: 14i, 15ii
Hwaŏm–gyŏng Munŭi Yogyŏl Mundap 華嚴經文義要決問答, P'yowon 表員. X237: 15ii
Ichijōyōketsu 一乗要決, Genshin 源信. T. 2370: 3ii
Jingang xian lun 金剛仙論. T. 1512: 14i
Jiujing yisheng baoxing lun 究竟一乘寶性論. T. 1611: 10i, 10ii, 10iii, 11, 12, 13ii, 14i, 14ii, 15i, 15ii, 21i, 21ii
Jōyuishikiron honmonsh 成唯識論本文抄, unknown author. T. 2262: 3ii, 4i, 10iii, 14i, 15ii
Kegon gokyōshō fushin 華嚴五教章不審, Jitsuei 実英. T. 2343: 14i
Kegon gokyōshō kyōshinshō 華嚴五教章匡眞鈔, Hōtan 鳳潭. T. 2344: 3ii, 4i, 14i, 15ii
Kegon gokyōshō mondōshō 華嚴五教章問答抄, Shinjō 審乘. T. 2340: 3ii, 14i
Kegon gokyōshō shiji 華厳五教章指事, Jurei 壽靈. T. 2337: 4i, 4ii, 14i
Kegonshū shushōgishō 華厳宗種性義抄, Shin’en 親圓. T. 2328: 3ii, 5i
Kishinron shōshutsu 起信論抄出, Sonben 尊辯. T. 2283: 3ii, 4i, 15ii
Kūmang sammaeyŏng non 金剛三昧經論, Wŏnhyo 元曉. T. 1730: 16
Nengxian zhongbian huiri lun 能顯中邊慧日論, Huizhao 慧沼. T. 1863: 15ii
Ôjōjūn 往生拾因, Eikan 永覩. T. 2683: 14i
Pommaanggyŏng kojŏkkī 梵網經古述記, T’aehyŏn 太賢. T. 1815: 14i
Qi xin lun shu bixiao ji 起信論疏筆削記, Zixuan 子璿. T. 1848: 14i
Ratnagotravibhāga: 10i, 10ii, 10iii, 11, 12, 13ii, 14i, 14ii, 15i, 15ii, 21i, 21ii
Renwang huguo banruo boluomiduo jing shu 仁王護國般若波羅蜜多經疏, Liangbi 良贊. T. 1709: 14i
Shakumakenron kanchū 釋摩訶衍論勘註, Raihō 類寶. T. 2290: 14i
Shi moheyen lun 釋摩訶衍論. T. 1668: 17i, 18i, 19i
Shingatsurin hishaku 心月輪祕釋, Kakuban 覺鍾. T. 2520: 15ii, 17ii
Shingonshū kyōjigi 眞言宗教時義, Annen 安然. T. 2396: 14i, 14ii, 15i, 15ii
Shugo kokkaishō 守護國界章, Saichō 最澄. T. 2363: 3ii
Shūyō Kashiwabara anryū 宗要柏原案立, Teishun 貞舜. T. 2374: 3ii
Taesëng kisillon naeūi yakt'âmgì 大乘起信論內義略探記, T’aehyŏn 太賢. T. 1849: 15ii
Wuliangshou jing youpotishe yuansheng ji zhu 無量壽經優婆提舍願生偈註, Tanluan 曇鸞. T. 1819: 19ii
Wushangyi jing 無上依經. T. 669: 14i, 14ii, 15i, 21i, 21ii
Xianshou wujiaying 賢首五教儀, Xufa 維法: 4i
Yanggwŏn muryangsu kyŏng chong’yo 兩卷無量經宗要, Wŏnhyo 元曉. T. 1747: 21i
Yŏlban chong’yo 涅槃宗要. Wŏnhyo 元曉. T. 1769: 14i, 15i
Yuishikiron dōgakushō 唯識論同學鈔, Ryŏsan 良算. T. 2263: 3ii, 5i
Zhaolun xinshu 肇論新疏, Wencai 文才. T. 1860: 14i
Zongjing lu 宗鏡録, Yanshou 延壽. T. 2016: 3ii, 4i, 10iii, 14i, 15ii, 17i, 18i, 19i

By Author:

Annen 安然: 14i, 14ii, 15i, 15ii
Anonymous: 3ii, 4i, 10iii, 12, 14i, 14ii, 15i, 15ii, 17i, 17ii, 18i, 19i, 21i, 21ii
Cangshan Purui 蒼山普瑞: 2, 3ii, 15ii
Chengguan 澄觀: 14i, 15ii
Chinkai 珍海: 14i
Eikan 永觀: 14i
Eison 叡尊: 13ii, 14i, 14ii, 15i
Fazang 法藏: 3ii, 4i, 10iii, 13ii, 14i, 15ii
Genshin 源信: 3ii
Hŏtan 鳳潭: 3ii, 4i, 14i, 14ii, 15ii, 21ii
Huiyuan 慧遠: 14i
Huizhao 慧沼: 15ii
Jian Dengzhi 見登之: 15ii
Jitsuei 實英: 14i
Jurei 壽靈: 4i, 4ii, 14i
Kakuban 覺鑲: 15ii, 17ii
[Kui]ji [窺]基: 14i
Kūkai 空海: 15ii
Liangbi 良寛: 14i
P’yowon 表員: 15ii
Raihō 頼鸞: 14i
Ryōsan 良算: 3ii, 5i
Saichō 最澄: 3ii
*Sāramati (?): 10i, 10ii, 10iii, 11, 12, 13ii, 14i, 14ii, 15i, 15ii, 21i, 21ii
Shihui 師會: 3ii, 4i, 15ii, 21ii
Shin’en 親圓: 3ii, 5i
Shinjō 審乘: 3ii
Shōsen 聖讞: 3ii, 4i
Sonben 尊辯: 4i, 15ii
T’ae hyŏn 太賢: 14i, 15ii
Tan’ei 湛叡: 14i
Tankuang 曙曠: 15ii
Tanluan 曙鸞: 19ii
Teishun 貞舜: 3ii
Wencai 文才: 14i
Wŏnhyo 元曉: 14i, 15i, 16, 21i
Yanshou 延壽: 3ii, 4i, 10iii, 14i, 15ii, 17i, 18i, 19i
Xufa 續法: 4i
Zixuan 子璿: 14i
Zongmi 宗密: 14i
Literature


Fuse Kögaku 布施浩岳. 1937. “Jūjikyōron no den'yaku to nanboku nidō no ranshō” 十地経論の傳譯と南北二道の濫觴 [The Daśabhūmikavyākhyā translation and the origins of the two schools of the Northern and Southern Dilun-zong]. Bukkyō Kenkyū 佛教研究 1/1: 126–142.


Hasegawa Takeshi. 1998. “‘Honrai jishōshōjō nehan’ ni tsuite no Eshō to Enjiki no kenka” 本来自性清净涅槃についての慧沼と円測の見解 [Huizhao and Yuance on Tathatā]. *Indogaku Bukkyōgaku Kenkyū* 印度学仏教学研究 46/2: 42–45.


Ichikawa Yoshiya. 1960. “Nyoraizō no kan’yaku gorei ni tsuite” 如来蔵の漢訳語例について [The vocabulary of the Chinese translations of...


Kanō Kazuo 加納和雄. 2000. “Ōkutsumarakyō no kenkyū: zentai no kōsei to naiyō gainen” 『央掘魔羅経』の研究—全体の構成と内容概観 [“A Study
of Aṅgulimāliyasūtra]. Kōyasan Daigaku Daigakuin Kiyō 高野山大学大学院紀要 4: 57–82.


——. Forthcoming. “A Note on the Transmission of the *Uttaratantra* and its Vyākhyā Commentary.”


Palumbo, Antonello. “What Chinese sources really have to say about the dates of the Buddha.” Paper presented at the XVIth Congress of the International Association of Buddhist Studies, Jinshan, Taiwan.


Schiefner, Anton. 1869. Tāranātha’s Geschichte des Buddhismus in Indien, aus dem tibetischen uebersetzt (St. Petersburg, Kaiserlichen Akademie der Wissenschaften).


Shimamura Daishin 島村大心. 2007. “Nyoraizō no iminaiyō” 如來蔵の意味内容 [The meaning of tathāgatagarbha]. *Buzan Kyōgaku Taikai Kiyo* 豊山教学大会紀要 35: 1–65. [I have been able to see this only via the web version posted by the author at http://www.h7.dion.ne.jp/~sdaisin/nyoraizo-buzan.htm.]


Study Group on Buddhist Sanskrit Literature. 2004. *Jñānalokālaṃkāra: Transliterated Sanskrit Text Collated with Tibetan and Chinese Transla-
tions (Tokyo: The Institute for Comprehensive Studies of Buddhism, Taisho University / Taisho University Press).


ron” 如来蔵思想の煩悩論, “The tathāgatagarbha theory on defilements.”).


——. 1940. Zō-Kan-Wa san’yaku gappeki Shōman-gyō Hōgatsu dōji shōmon-gyō 蔵・漢・和三譯合璧勝鬘經・寶月童子所問經 (Kyoto: Kōkyō Shoin 興教書院). [Author’ listed on first page as Hōtōkai 寶幢會]


Indices

Principally of Terminology Discussed in the Notes

Chinese

bijing kongji 畢竟空寂: 5ii(f)
chang 常: 13ii(a)
congmingruming 從冥入冥: 21ii(a)
dahuan 大患: 8i(a)
daxiejian 大邪見: 3ii(a)
duojian 斷見: 5ii(d),
fajie 法界: 14i(a)
fashen 法身: 14i(a)
fofa 佛法: 4i(d)
fin 法體: 17i(b)
Heyujing 訶欲經: 4i(c)
huiqing 慧命: 2(a)
die 界: introduction, 10iii(b), 14iii(c)
gingjie 境界: 4ii(g), 14iii(c)
luowang 羅網: 5ii(b)
miejian 滅見: 5ii(e)
mie jichu 名色及觸: 12(a)
qingjing 清淨: p. 135ff.
shengmang wumu 生盲無目: 3ii(b)

Indic

atyantopasa: 5ii(f)
atyantavivikta: 5ii(f)
adhivacana: 10iii(b-d), 19ii(c)
adhiqrya: 17ii(a)
adhyaro: 4i(f)
anavarga: introduction, 14i(b)
antargata: 14ii(f)
āyuṣmat: 2(a)  nirodha: 5i(a), 5ii(e)
icchantika: p. 42; 5i(b), 21iii(b)  nitārtha: 4ii(a)
ucchedavāda: 5ii(d)  neyārtha: 4ii(a)
upakleśa: 15i(c)  pauruṣa: 15i(g)
kāṇāndha: 3ii(b)  prakṛtipariśuddhacitta: p. 40; 15i(a), 17ii(a),
kāmāpavākasūtra: 4i(c)  p. 135ff.
kośa: 16(e)  prabhāsvaracitta: 17ii(a), p. 135ff.
jātyandha: 3ii(b)  bālapṛthagjana: 4i(a)
jāla: 5ii(b)  viparyāśa: 5iv(e)
jñeyabhūmi: 4ii(g), 15i(g)  viśuddhi: p. 135ff.
tamas: 21ii(a)  viṣaya: 14ii(c)
dirgharātra: 3ii(c)  śrutamāyi-prajñā: 5(i)
dharmakāya: 10iii(d), 14i(a)  sattvadhātu: 3ii(a), 14i(d)
dharmadhātu: 14i(a)  samāropa: 4i(f)
dhātu: 10ii(b)  Sāramati: p. 149ff.
nitya: 13ii(a)  Sthiramati: p. 149ff.

Buddhist Cosmic Unity

242