

Yoke Meei Choong

Divided Opinion among Chinese Commentators
on Indian Interpretations of the
Parable of the Raft in the *Vajracchedikā*
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in memoriam

John R. McRae (1947-2011)

Divided Opinion among Chinese Commentators on Indian Interpretations of the Parable of the Raft in the *Vajracchedikā*¹

Yoke Meei Choong

1 Introduction

The parable of the raft in the *Vajracchedikā* stems from an early discourse, MN I 134-135.² At the climax of the parable, and as the moral of its story, the Buddha says, “You should abandon even [things that are] *dhamma* (Skt. *dharma*); how much the more so [things that are] *adhamma* (Skt. *adharma*)” (*dhammāpi vo pahātabbā, pageva adhammā*). In both MN and the *Vajracchedikā*, the denotations of *dharma* and *adharma* here are ambiguous. This ambiguity has led to a range of differing interpretations.

In the Pali tradition, the commentator to MN I 134-135, Buddhaghoṣa (Ps II 109), interprets *dharma* (*dhamma*) as concentration and insight, while *adharma* (*adhamma*) is interpreted as desire and attachment. Among modern scholars, Gombrich (1996: 24-26) differs from the commentator, and interprets *dharma* as the teaching of the Buddha and *adharma* as what is not taught by the Buddha. Jaini (1977: 412) is of the opinion that *dharma* denotes all the objects of the right view (*samyag-drṣṭi*), while *adharma* represents all the objects of false views (*mithyādrṣṭi*).

¹ I wish to express my heartfelt thanks to the participants in the project “Indian Buddhist Thought in 6th-7th Century China”, esp. Dr. Michael Radich and Prof. Dan Lusthaus, who have given me valuable suggestions and constructive comments on this paper. Thanks are also directed to the reviewer of this paper for the improvement of some renderings of Yijing’s translation.

² This *sūtra* is also extant in Chinese translations. See MA T1:26(200).764b18 ff.; EA T2:125 (43.5).759c29 ff.

Malalasekera (2003: 186) interprets *dharma* as “good things” and *adharma* as “bad things”. Coomaraswamy and Horner (2000: 31-32) take them to denote right behavior and wrong behavior respectively. In his translation of the *Vajracchedikā*, Conze (1973: 69) left these terms untranslated.

Variations in the interpretation of *dharma* and *adharma* are also seen in the Indian and Chinese commentaries on the *Vajracchedikā*. As we will see below, there are three main Chinese commentaries, by Zhiyi, Jizang, and Kuiji. These three authors base their commentaries on the same Indian commentary, but oddly enough, they nonetheless differ from each other in their interpretations of the root text. This divergence of views is further complicated by the fact that the Indian commentators (understood by the Chinese tradition to be Asaṅga and Vasubandhu) also differ. The purpose of this paper is to unravel the interrelationship of the Indian and Chinese interpretations of *dharma* and *adharma* in the parable of the raft in the *Vajracchedikā*, and thereby to reveal the attitudes and behavior of the Chinese commentators toward Indian *sūtras* and commentaries.

Consideration of this problem is further complicated by the fact that various versions of the *Vajracchedikā* parable of the raft contain variant readings of two passages about *dharma/adharma*. We find these variants not only in the Chinese translations of the *Vajracchedikā* itself, but also in citations of the text in the Chinese commentaries.³ Thus, in order to fully understand the nature and origin of Chinese interpretations of *dharma/adharma*, it will also be necessary to investigate the distribution and provenance of these various readings. On the basis of such an investigation, I attempt to show in the following discussion that the variants might have originated as early as Indic versions of the *Vajracchedikā*, and probably in a Yogācāra context.

In order to determine the extent to which the Chinese commentaries modify the Indian interpretations, then, the argument will proceed as follows: First of all, in Section 2, I will show which of the readings was the original reading in the Indian commentaries. Then, in Section 3, I attempt to show that the two variant readings probably stem from Yogācāra circles in India. In Sections 4 and 5, I will deal with the Chinese com-

³ As I will show below, two variants occur in the context of the parable of the raft.

mentaries, and show how the Chinese interpreted *dharma* and *adharmā* in two distinct directions, that is, Madhyamaka and Yogācāra. Then, in Section 6, I will show that the difference between the Madhyamaka and Yogācāra interpretations can also be discerned even in the Chinese translations of the *Vajracchedikā*. In Section 7, I will look into the interpretations of *dharma* and *adharmā* in the Indian commentaries; here I will also find a suitable definition for *dharma*, which is used to mean both “things” and “teachings”. Finally, in Section 8, I summarize the meanings of *dharma* and *adharmā* in various commentaries, and give an explanation for the variants in the context of the parable of the raft.

Before we turn to the argument proper, it will be useful to provide a list of the commentaries that will be discussed in this paper:

1. The commentary ascribed to Vasubandhu (Bodh/Yi) is extant neither in a Sanskrit original nor in a Tibetan translation. There are two Chinese translations :

— *Jin'gang banruo boluomi jing lun* (金剛般若波羅蜜經論), trans. by Bodhiruci in 508-534 C.E., T1511 (hereafter abbreviated as Bodh).

— *Nengduan jin'gang banruo boluomiduo jing lun shi* (能斷金剛般若波羅蜜多經論釋), trans. by Yijing in 635-713 C.E., T1513 (hereafter Yi).

2. The verse summary ascribed to Asaṅga:⁴

The Sanskrit has been edited in Tucci, 1956 (hereafter Tucci), which also incorporates a Tibetan translation.

There are two Chinese translations of the verse summary:

— The translation by Bodhiruci is incorporated into his translation of the Vasubandhu commentary (Bodh above) (hereafter Verse-Bodh).

⁴ This verse text is ascribed to Asaṅga by both the Chinese and the Tibetan traditions. Asaṅga's verses are also found in the prose texts *Asg-b*, *Bodh*, *Vaj* (the so-called commentary of *Vajrasī* [Jin'gangxian 金剛仙], T1512, see n. 6). Those verses in *Verse-Yi* have the same wordings as that in *Yi*, since they are both translated by Yijing.

- *Nengduan jin'gang banruo boluomiduo jing lun song* (能斷金剛般若波羅蜜多經論頌), trans. by Yijing in 635–713 C.E., T1514. This text is also incorporated in his translation of the Vasubandhu commentary (Yi above) (hereafter Verse-Yi).
3. The commentary ascribed to Asaṅga (hereafter Asg)
 — *Jin'gang banruo lun* (金剛般若論), trans. by Dharmagupta after 604 C.E.,⁵ T1510a and T1510b (hereafter Asg-a and Asg-b). There also exists a Tibetan translation.
4. Other Chinese translations of or lectures on Indian commentaries:
 — *Guṇādāna's (Gongdeshi 功德施) commentary on the *Vajracchedikā*, translated by Divākara 地婆訶羅 in the late seventh cent. C.E., T1515 (hereafter Gu);
 — *Jin'gangxian lun* (金剛仙論), the so-called “commentary of *Vajrarṣi” (Jin'gangxian 金剛仙), actually a “lecture text” composed in China,⁶ T1512 (hereafter Vaj).
5. Chinese commentaries on the *Vajracchedikā*
 — *Jin'gang banruo jingshu* (金剛般若經疏), composed by Zhiyi (智顓, 538-597) in 538-597 C.E., T1698 (hereafter Zhi);
 — *Jin'gang banruo jingxu* (金剛般若經序), composed by Jizang (吉藏, 549-623) in 549-623 C.E., T1699 (hereafter Ji);
 — *Jin'gang banruo jing zanshu* (金剛般若經贊述), composed by Kuiji (窺基, 632-682) in 630-682 C.E., T1700 (hereafter Kui).

It will also be relevant to bear in mind the access that the Chinese commentators had to the work of their Indian predecessors. Naturally, these Chinese authors were able to refer to the Indian commentaries only via translations. The three Chinese commentators make use of the two main

⁵ See T55:2151.366b20-24: 至煬帝定鼎東都。敬重隆篤。復於上林園內置翻經館。譯... 金剛般若經論(二卷)... “As emperor Yang established his Eastern Capital, Luoyang, he esteemed [Dharmagupta] very highly, and established a translation institute in the Shanglin Park (a royal park). [Dharmagupta] translated...*Jin'gang banruo jinglun*...”

⁶ Funayama Toru (2006: 48) considers *Jin'gangxian lun* to be not a pure translation, but rather a kind of lecture given by Bodhiruci regarding *Vajrarṣi's (金剛仙) sub-commentary on Vasubandhu's commentary on the *Vajracchedikā*. For a discussion of the reconstruction of the Sanskrit name corresponding to Jin'gangxian, see *Ibid.*, n. 40 and 41.

Indian commentaries by Vasubandhu and Asaṅga (Bodh and Asg above) as follows. Zhiyi (Zhi) referred to Bodh as he composed his commentary on the *Vajracchedikā*,⁷ but he was not able to consult Asg, because it was translated after him. The other two Chinese commentators rely on the Indian exegetes to a larger extent than Zhiyi. Jizang's commentary (Ji) shows close similarities at some points with Bodh, and as we will see, he might also have consulted Asg-b, because he comments only on a variant characteristic of Asg-b.⁸ Kuiji (Kui) consulted both Indian commentators, and follows Bodh/Yi more closely than Asg.

2 Variant readings in the Parable of the Raft in the *Vajracchedikā*

In the Taishō Edition there are six Chinese translations of the *Vajracchedikā*, listed below in chronological order:

- Kumārajīva, ca. 401 C.E. (T235, hereafter Ku)
- Bodhiruci, ca. 508-535 C.E. (T236, hereafter Ruci).⁹ There are two versions, T236a (Ruci-a) and T236b (Ruci-b).
- Paramārtha, ca. 557-569 C.E. (T237, Pa)
- Gupta, ca. 581-618 C.E. (T238, Gup)
- Xuanzang, ca. 600-640 C.E. (T220(9), Xuan)
- Yijing, ca. 635-713 C.E. (T239, Jing)

The terms *dharma* and *adharmā* occurs several times in the context of the parable of the raft, namely, in the following passages:

⁷ See Zhiyi's commentary on the *Vajracchedikā*, *Jin'gang banruo jingshu* (金剛般若經疏), T33:1698.76a19-20: 又後魏末菩提流支譯論本八十偈。彌勒作偈天親長行。"Furthermore, under the Later Wei (Eastern Wei, 534-550 C.E.) Bodhiruci translated the commentary of eighty verses, [of which] Maitreya composed the verses and Vasubandhu the commentary."

⁸ See Table 1 and the conclusion to Section 5; Jizang comments upon Variant (b) but Passage (c), which is characteristic of Asg-b.

⁹ These years of translation are given according to the *Gu jin yijing tu ji* (古今譯經圖紀), T55:2151.363c28-29: 沙門菩提流支...從魏永平元年歲次戊子至天平二年歲次乙卯譯; "The monk Bodhiruci translated...from [Northern] Wei the first year (Wuzi) of Yongping (508 C.E.) until [Eastern] Wei the second year (Yimao) of Tianping (535 C.E.)."

(Passage a:) The Buddha assures Subhūti that even 500 years after his complete *nirvāṇa*, there will still be persons who believe in the teachings of the Buddha. The Buddha sees and knows these persons to have attained immeasurable merits, because they no longer have any conceptions (*saṃjñā*) of a self, a living being, a soul or a person, nor of *dharma* and *adharmā* (無法相，亦無非法相). The reason is this: If these persons have conceptions of *dharma*, they will grasp at a self, a living being, a soul and a person. If these persons have conceptions of *adharmā*, they will [like-wise] grasp at a self, a living being, a soul and a person.

Ku: 何以故？是諸眾生無復我相、人相、眾生相、壽者相。「無法相，亦無非法相...若取法相，即著我、人、眾生、壽者。何以故？若取非法相，即著我、人、眾生、壽者。」

Skt: ...*nāpi teṣāṃ subhūte bodhisatvānāṃ dharmasaṃjñā pravartsyate nādharmasaṃjñā nāpi teṣāṃ saṃjñā nāsaṃjñā pravartsyate | tat kasya hetoḥ | sacet subhūte teṣāṃ bodhisatvānāṃ dharmasaṃjñā pravartsyate sa eva teṣāṃ ātmagrāho bhavet | satvagrāho jīvagrāhaḥ pudgalagrāho bhavet | saced adharmasaṃjñā pravarteta sa eva teṣāṃ ātmagrāho bhavet | satvagrāho jīvagrāhaḥ pudgalagrāha itī.*

(Passage b:) Therefore one should neither grasp at *dharma*, nor grasp at *adharmā* (不應取法，不應取非法).

Ku: 是故不應取法，不應取非法。

Skt: *tat kasya hetoḥ | na khalu punaḥ subhūte dharmodgrahītavyo nādharmāḥ.*

(Passage c:) Referring to this [teaching] the Tathāgata tells the parable of the raft, [which implies that] the wise one should abandon even *dharma*, not to mention *adharmā* (法尚應捨，何況非法).

Ku: 以是義故，如來常說：「汝等比丘，知我說法，如筏喻者，法尚應捨，何況非法」。

Skt: *tasmād idaṃ saṃndhāya tathāgatena bhāṣitaṃ kolopamaṃ dharmaparyāyaṃ ājānadbhiḥ dharmāḥ eva prahātavyāḥ prāg evādharmāḥ.*

(Passage d:) The Buddha asks Subhūti whether the Tathāgata attained the supreme perfect Awakening and gives teachings. Subhūti gives a ne-

gative answer, and explains that what the Buddha teaches is not to be grasped and not to be spoken of; it is neither *dharma* nor *adharmā* (非法、非非法).

Ku: 何以故？如來所說法，皆不可取，不可說，非法，非非法。

Skt: ...yo 'sau tathāgatena dharmo deśitaḥ | agrāhyaḥ so 'nabhilapyah | na sa dharmo nādharmah.¹⁰

As mentioned above, the translation of the *Vajracchedikā* by Bodhiruci (Ruci) exists in two versions, Ruci-a and Ruci-b. Ruci-a differs from all the other versions in two readings:

Variant (b): In place of Passage (b), viz., “one should neither grasp at *dharma*, nor grasp at *adharmā*” (不應取法，不應取非法), the text has “one should neither grasp at *dharma*, nor not accept *dharma* (不應取法，非不取法)”;

Variant (c): In Passage (c), in place of “one should abandon even *dharma*, not to mention *adharmā*” (法尚應捨，何況非法), the text has “because these *dharmas* should be abandoned, [but] not rejected [altogether] (是法應捨，非捨法故)”

Not only do these variants occur in Ruci-a; they are also found in the citations of the *sūtra* in some of the Indian commentaries. The variants, as they appear in all these various sources, are listed below:¹¹

Variant (b)

Ruci-a: 何以故？須菩提，不應取法，非不取法 (Why is it so? Subhūti, one should neither grasp at *dharma*, nor not accept *dharma*).

¹⁰ It is noteworthy that the terms *dharma* and *adharmā* are singular in Passages (b) and (d), while they are plural in Passage (c), and their number in Passage (a) is not explicit, because there they occur as the first element of a compound. For Sanskrit see HW 115. 14-117.13. The above citation and all citations that follow are taken from the website <http://www2.hf.uio.no/polyglotta/index.php?page=person&bid=2&vid=81&entity=81&kid=81> (last accessed 18 June 2013). Gregory Schopen's edition of the Gilgit fragments does not contain this portion of the *Vajracchedikā*; see GM: pp. 89-139. For the Chinese, the earliest translation, Ku, is given here; see T8:235.749b4-6, 7-11, 15-16.

¹¹ For Ruci-a see T8:236a753b14-16; for Bodh see T25:1511.783a25-27; for Asg-b see T25:1510b.770b24-25; for Ji see T33:1699.107a18-21.

Bodh: 何以故？須菩提，不應取法，非不取法 (Why is it so? Subhūti, one should neither grasp at *dharma*, nor not accept *dharma*).

Asg-b: 「須菩提，不應取法，非不取法」者... (Subhūti, one should neither grasp at *dharma*, nor not accept *dharma*).

Ji: 第三「何以故」云「不應取法，非不取法」。此明理教之義。以得理忘教，得月捨指故。故云「不應取法」。而藉教悟理，因指得月，故「非不取法」 (The third [question:] “What is the reason” that [the Buddha] preached: “one should neither grasp at *dharma*, nor not accept *dharma*”? This explains the purpose of the teachings. Because, having attained the truth, one forgets the teachings, [just as] having got the moon, one sets aside the finger [that pointed to the moon]. Therefore [the *sūtra*] says: “One should neither grasp at *dharma*...” On the other hand, one realizes the truth in reliance on the teachings, [just as] one depends upon the finger to apprehend the moon, [and] therefore [the *sūtra*] says: “...nor not accept *dharma*”.)

Variant (c)

Ruci-a: 以是義故，如來常說筏喻法門：「是法應捨，非捨法故」 (Referring to this, the Tathāgata always expounds the parable of the raft: “These *dharmas* should be abandoned, [but] not rejected *dharmas* [altogether]”)

Bodh: 以是義故，如來常說筏喻法門：「是法應捨，非捨法故」 (Referring to this, the Tathāgata always expounds the parable of the raft: “These *dharmas* should be abandoned, [but] they should not be rejected [altogether]”).

Thus, the *sūtra* citations in Bodh support Variants (b) and (c) (see discussion below). Of the two versions of Asg, Asg-b cites Variant (b). Ji also comments on Variant (b), which shows that he is obviously following Asg-b.

There is no mention in the Chinese sources of how the two versions of both Ruci and Asg, i.e. Ruci-a, Ruci-b and Asg-a, Asg-b respectively, came into being. However, it is at least clear that someone must have emended the translations, either from Ruci-a to Ruci-b, or the other way around. The same too is true of Asg-a and Asg-b. Since Jizang, the earliest commentator who consulted Asg, has the same reading as Asg-b, Asg-b must

be the original. However, it is not so straightforward in the case of Ruci. Though Ruci and Bodh were both translated by Bodhiruci, Ruci need not contain the same variants as Bodh, because Ruci, a translation of the *Vajracchedikā*, does not necessarily show the same influence of the Yogācāra commentary, Bodh. As shown in Table 2 below (p. 451-452), no translations of the *Vajracchedikā* other than Ruci-a contain the variants, and it is therefore most probable that Ruci-b, without the variants, could be the original.

Significantly for our purposes, this means that at least within the limits of the Chinese evidence, Variants (b) and (c) are the original readings in Asg (only Variant (b)) and Bodh. The next question we must address is whether all the various readings were also known in the Indic tradition, and if so, which readings were original in that context. To that end, it is necessary for us now to look more closely into both Asg and Bodh/Yi.

3 Chinese translations of Asaṅga's verses of Passages (b) and (c)

The discussion in Section 2 has shown that in the Chinese translations, Variants (b) and (c) were original. However, there are two possible reasons that the variants might occur in the Chinese translations: One is that the variants could have existed already in the Indian sources; the other is that they were inserted at the time that Bodh was translated, and Asg-b was later influenced by this earlier translation. Since we possess neither a Sanskrit version nor a Tibetan translation of Bodh/Yi, it is worth looking into Asaṅga's verses twelve and fourteen, and the corresponding Chinese translations, in order to determine which variants were original in the Indian contexts.

Sanskrit verse 12, corresponding to Passage (b), reads as follows:

Verse Twelve (Passage and Variant b)

Out of strong inclination [and] out of faith, they have correct conception (12ab)/ Because of not grasping [things] as they are in speech, and because of the correct apprehension of what has been correctly taught (12cd).

adhimuktivaśāt teṣāṃ bhūtasamjñā prasādataḥ | (Tucci 12ab)

yathārutāgrahāt saṃyagdeśitatvasya codgrahāt || (12cd).

彼人依信心，恭敬生實相。聞聲不正取，正說如是取 (Verse-Bodh).

由彼信解力，信故生實想。不如言取故，取為正說故 (Verse-Yi).¹²

The verse compares the difference between one who has faith (12ab) and one who follows insight (12cd). The former gains correct conception of the truth through faith; the latter, by contrast, obtains it by grasping the teachings, but not according to concepts induced by words. Only the latter (12cd) is crucial for the discussion of Passage (b) and its variant.

In this verse, “apprehension” (*qu* 取) is the translation of *udgraha* “grasping”. Interestingly, Asaṅga’s verses here mention thus “grasping” what is correctly taught. It is necessary to look into the two Chinese translations of Vasubandhu’s commentary on Asaṅga’s verses, Bodh and Yi, in order to ascertain what they understand this verse to mean. Bodh and Yi each give a different explanation of Verse 12cd.

Bodh: The statement “one should neither grasp at *dharma*...” means one should not grasp things according to [the literal meanings of] words. The statement “...nor not accept *dharma*” describes one who is in accordance with the knowledge of absolute truth and “grasps it in the manner of the proper teaching”, because the *bodhisattva* gains true understanding by hearing the teachings of the *sūtras*.¹³

Yi: Having said this, the Buddha said “One should neither grasp as *dharma*, nor grasp as *adharmā*.” This means one should neither take the literal meanings of words to be things [in reality], nor should one be entirely wedded to the view that there is non-existence of things.¹⁴

¹² Tucci, 1956: 59, v. 12; Ruci T25:1511.783c22-23; Yi T25:1513.876b14-15.

¹³ T25:1511.784a3: 「不應取法」者，不應如聲取法。「非不取法」者，隨順第一義智，「正說如是取」，彼菩薩聞說如是修多羅章句生實相故。

¹⁴ Since *dharma* and *adharmā* here refer to attachment involving words (and thus concepts), through which false imagination of self-nature is superimposed on things, these terms imply ontological existence or non-existence. The interpretation of (*a*-)*dharma* as ontological (non-)existence is further supported by Yi elsewhere (see n. 51), where *dharma* is interpreted as existence and *adharmā* as emptiness. Thus it is deemed proper to render these terms as the ontological existence and non-existence of things.

By the [avoidance of these extremes] one is able to comply with the knowledge of absolute truth [and so, the verse] “Because one does grasp by reason of that which is correctly taught”, which refers to the sentence in the *sūtra* where [Subhūti] asks “whether one would give rise to true understanding having heard this *sūtra*”.¹⁵

It is interesting to note that the two translations of the same commentary, Bodh and Yi, deviate from each other in their attempts to explain this verse, not only in the version of the *dharma/adharma* formula they cite, but also in their attempts to explain what it means. Bodh gives the explanation of the verse in terms of Variant (b), while Yi interprets in terms of Passage (b). According to Bodh, taking things according to the literal meanings of words is wrong, so that “one should [not] grasp at *dharma*”; but apprehending them in the manner of the proper teaching is in accordance with the knowledge of absolute truth, and so nor should one “not accept *dharma*”. Yi, by contrast, renders correct grasping as follows: “one should neither take the literal meanings of words as things [in reality], nor should one be entirely wedded to the view that there is non-existence of things”. In other words, Bodh and Yi deviate from one another by rendering the object of correct grasping differently. Nevertheless both renderings advocate “grasping” that is in compliance with the supreme insight, in support of Variant (b).

The same difference is also observed in their renderings of verse 12:

Bodh: With the support of faith and respect, one gives rise to true understanding. Grasping at the spoken word is incorrect, [whereas, by

¹⁵ See T25:1513.876b19-22: 說彼之後，便云：「不應取為法，不應取為非法」。不應如言所說將以為法，亦復不即執為非法。由此是能隨順勝義智，「取為正說故」，即是經云聞說是經生實信（read 實想）不。According to the passage (T25:1513.876b17-18) immediately before this passage, the two sentences 由此是能隨順勝義智，「取為正說故」 are two reasons for the true understanding: 由具慧者不如言而取；及由隨順勝義智故，取為正說故，名為實想。“Because a wise one does not grasp [literally] according to words; and because (及由...) he complies with the knowledge of absolute truth and grasps it in the manner of the proper teaching, it is called a true understanding...” It is clear from the sentence structure that the two parts of the passage are connected by “and” (及).

contrast one should] apprehend in accordance with what is correctly taught.

Yi: Due to the power of their strong inclination, and due to their faith, true understanding arises, because one does not grasp literally, and because one does grasp by reason of that which is correctly taught.¹⁶

Both translations speak of “grasping” in the correct manner. The discussion above shows that correct grasping is implied in Verse-Bodh, Verse-Yi, Bodh and Yi. In view of the fact that Variant (b) appears in commentaries by different Indian commentators (Verse-Bodh/Yi, Asg and Bodh/Yi) and in translations by different Chinese translators (Bodh and Yi), and in one version of the second early translation of the *Vajracchedikā*, Ruci-a, it is obvious that the variant does not stem from translations; Variant (b) stems from India.

Verse 14, corresponding to Passage (c), reads as follows:

Verse Fourteen (Passage and Variant (c))

Because of not abiding in phenomena and because of conformity with attainment, the intention with regard to the teaching is considered as similar to the abandonment of the raft.

*asthānād ānukulyāc ca dharmeṣv adhigamasya hi |
kolasyeva parityāgo dharme saṁdhis tato mataḥ ||* (Tucci 14).

彼不住隨順，於法中證智，如人捨船筏，法中義亦然 (Verse-Bodh).

證不住於法，為是隨順故，猶如捨其筏，是密意應知 (Verse-Yi).¹⁷

Asaṅga does not comment on the verse in his self-commentary (Asg). In the first half of the verse, the relation between the four elements – not abiding, conformity, attainment and phenomena – is grammatically ambiguous, and this results in different translations in Verse-Bodh and Verse-Yi. Verse-Bodh translates the verse in the same word-order as the Sanskrit as follows:

¹⁶ See n. 12.

¹⁷ See Tucci, 1956: 60, v. 14 and the footnote immediately following.

Verse-Bodh: He does not abide in, and conforms to, attainment with respect to *dharmas*. The meaning with respect to the teaching is just as [it is with respect to] the person abandoning the raft.

In Verse-Yi, “not abiding” and “conformity” are not treated as two parallel reasons, unlike in Sanskrit, where they are connected by the connective particle *ca* “and”. Verse-Yi renders the verse as follows:

Verse-Yi: “Because attainment without abiding in *dharmas* conforms, the concealed intention is to be understood on the analog to abandoning raft.”

When we turn to the explanation that Bodh/Yi gives for this verse, moreover, “conformity” is explained in connection with “attainment”.¹⁸ Bodh reads as follows:

Bodh: After one has attained insight, one abandons the *dharma*, just as one abandons the raft after having reached the other shore. [The phrase] “in conformity with” refers to *dharmas* in conformity with the attainment of insight, which is to be grasped (彼法應取), just as one who has not reached the other shore should grasp the raft.¹⁹

Yi too has a very similar reading:

One should abandon the *dharmas*, just as one abandons the raft after having reached the other shore. Because [the *dharmas*] conform with the highest attainment, one should grasp [them], just as one who has not reached the other shore should grasp the raft. This is called “the concealed intention”. It is called “concealed”, because there is grasping and abandoning with regard to the same raft.²⁰

According to both the Bodh and Yi translations, Vasubandhu takes “not abiding” in the verse as corresponding to the first part of the sentence in the *sūtra*, viz. “these *dharmas* should be abandoned (是法應捨)”; and

¹⁸ T25:1511.784b4: 隨順者，隨順彼證智法; and T25:1513.876c15: 於增上證是隨順故。

¹⁹ Bodh, T25:1511.784b2-4: 得證智捨法故，如到彼岸捨筏故。隨順者，隨順彼證智法，彼法應取，如人未到彼岸取筏故。

²⁰ Yi, T25:1513.876c13-15: 應捨彼法，如到彼岸，捨棄其筏。於增上證是隨順故，應須收取，如未達岸必憑其筏。是名密意，一筏之上有其取捨故名為密。

“conformity” as referring to the second part of the sentence “[but] they should not be rejected [altogether] (非捨法故)”. Obviously Vasubandhu, in both Bodh and Yi alike, is explaining Variant (c) instead of Passage (c). Since Verse-Bodh, Verse-Yi, Bodh and Yi support Variant (c), Variant (c), like Variant (b), is the original reading in these texts.

Thus, the investigations in this section have shown that both Variants (b) and (c) in Asg and Bodh/Yi can be traced back to India, and probably originated in Yogācāra circles, as evidenced by the fact that they are witnessed by commentaries ascribed to Asaṅga and Vasubandhu. In this and following sections, we turn to tracing the ways these variant formulations of *dharma/adharma* passages, and interpretations of them, played out in the Chinese commentaries.

4 The Chinese Madhyamaka interpretation

In their treatment of variant readings of the *dharma/adharma* passages, Chinese sources pertaining to the parable of the raft in the *Vajracchedikā*, including both translations and commentaries, display an intriguing set of relationships. In considering the distribution of these variants, it is relevant to bear in mind the fact that Zhiyi and Jizang were affiliated with the Madhyamaka, while Kuiji, like the Indian commentators Asaṅga and Vasubandhu, was associated with the Yogācāra. Before looking at each commentator in detail, it will be useful to have a brief overview of the distribution of variants among the commentators.

Among the Chinese commentators, Zhiyi seems to have no knowledge of any variants in the parable of the raft. Jizang, by contrast, explains Variant (b), doing so with reference to the Madhyamaka interpretation of the division between the two truths. Interestingly enough, however, Kuiji interprets the parable of the raft just like Bodh/Yi, which explains Variants (b) and (c); but the variants are absent from both of the texts upon which Kuiji comments, namely, Kumārajīva’s (401-413 C.E.) and Xuanzang’s (602-664 C.E.) translations of the *Vajracchedikā*.

The above divergence of views is complicated further by differences between the Indian commentaries. Vasubandhu’s commentary (Bodh/Yi) displays stronger Yogācāra thinking than Asaṅga’s commentary (Asg). The Chinese commentators assimilated both Asaṅga’s and Vasubandhu’s

interpretations, but not to the detriment of their own schools of belief. As a result, they arrived at various and conflicting interpretations of the Indian commentaries.

With this overview in hand, we will now look in detail at the two Mādhyamika commentators in China, Zhiyi and Jizang. As we proceed, we will also keep an eye on how their interpretations relate to those of the Indian commentators.

As we saw above, the two terms *dharma* and *adharmā* are repeated in Passages (a), (b), (c) and (d). The meaning and interpretation of these terms differs not just between the Chinese commentators, but even within the same commentary – particularly in the case of Jizang.

It will be helpful to start from Zhiyi, as a point of comparison. Zhi comments on Passages (a), (b) and (c) together:

Zhi: Next, the list of the emptiness of phenomena is enumerated, and there are only two items: *dharma* and *adharmā*. First, “*dharma*”: the statement that the five aggregates are empty is *dharma*, whereas [grasping at the] characteristics of the five aggregates is *adharmā*. To take the aggregates as empty is like medicine, and thus, that is called *dharma*; while taking the aggregates as existing is like sickness, and so is called *adharmā*; once the sickness of the aggregates is cured, the medicine of emptiness will also be removed. When *adharmā* falls away, *dharma* cannot exist either. Furthermore, upholding the precepts is *dharma*, and breaking the precepts is *adharmā*. Another view: either upholding or breaking [precepts] is *adharmā*, neither holding nor breaking is *dharma*; this is the middle way.²¹

Zhi understands *dharma* and *adharmā* in several ways: 1) *dharma* denotes medicine, that is emptiness, and stands in opposition to *adharmā*, that is sickness, i.e. grasping at the characteristics of the five aggregates; 2) *dharma* denotes behavior that conforms with the teaching of the Buddha, such as upholding the precepts, vs. *adharmā*, which is breaking them; and

²¹ T33:1698.78a21-26: 次列法空，但有兩句：法、非法也。今言法者，說五陰空為法；五陰相為非法。即以陰空為藥，名法；陰有為病，名非法；陰病既除，空藥亦遣。非法既謝，在法亦亡。又持戒為法，破戒為非法。次若持若犯並非法，非持非犯為法，是中道義。

3) *dharma*, the Middle Path, is neither holding to nor breaking the precepts, whereas *adharma* is grasping at extremes, like holding or breaking precepts. Despite the different meanings he thus gives to *dharma* and *adharma*, there is one thing common to all these understandings, that is, Zhi understands *dharma* as positive, and *adharma* as immorality or unrighteousness according to the Buddha's teachings; that is, he understands *adharma* as a *tatpuruṣa*.

On the basis of these interpretations of *dharma* and *adharma* Zhi interprets the parable of the raft as follows:

Zhi: First, citation of the *sūtra* as evidence: The simile tells of someone who wishes to cross a river and constructs a raft to carry himself across, and then, once he arrives at the other shore, abandons the raft and goes away. This is similar to one who wishes to cross the round of birth and death, and makes use of innumerable practices, but then abandons all wholesome acts once he has attained *nirvāṇa*. If even those things/*dharma*s that are in accordance with the path should thus be abandoned, how much the more is that true of those not in accordance with it? First, one makes use of things that are wholesome in order to abandon the unwholesome; subsequently, both should be abandoned.²²

Here, Zhi explains the parable of the raft with *dharma* denoting wholesome acts or practices taught by the Buddha, and *adharma* defilements or unwholesome acts that are to be eliminated by *dharma*. Interestingly, Zhi seems to have ignored the variants, though the Bodh translation, which he mentions in his commentary, contains these variants. He might have instead followed Passages (b) and (c) as given in Ku. The reason he gives for the abandonment of both *dharma* and *adharma* is a totally Mādhyamika one. Since wholesome acts and right views are merely antidotes for unwholesome mental and physical factors that do not conform with the Buddha's teachings, they are like medicine, which is no more real than sickness. Thus, once the sickness is cured, the antidotes cannot exist either. With this, Zhi emphasizes the emptiness of wrong grasping (*nādharm-*

²² T33:1698.78b1-4: 第一引經為證者，譬欲濟河搆筏自運，既登彼岸棄筏而去。將度生死假乘萬行，既到涅槃萬善俱捨。道法尚捨而況非法，初以善捨惡後則俱捨。

ma) as well as the emptiness of emptiness (*na dharma*), a typical Mādhyamika view. According to Zhiyi's Mādhyamika view, both *dharma* and *adharmā* should be abandoned.

When we turn to Jizang, we find a more complex picture. Ji makes selective use of various readings of the root text, and positions himself variously in relation to the interpretations of other commentators (especially Asg), in order to construct his own unique interpretation of the terms at issue.

First, we see that in the interpretation of *dharma* and *adharmā* in Passage (a), Ji is very close to Zhi:

Ji: [The sentence in the *sūtra*:] "...they have conceptions of neither *dharma* nor *adharmā* (無法相，亦無非法相)" is the second sentence that expounds the emptiness of phenomena. [Someone may think that] although [*bodhisattvas*] do not see [the existence of] the self, they may still see the existence of phenomena, that is, of the five aggregates; therefore, [in order to clear away any such doubts,] it declares, "They have conceptions neither of *dharma*..." [On the other hand,] since phenomena, that is, the five aggregates, do not exist, [the fact that] the five aggregates never existed in the first place²³ is called *adharmā*. [However, because *bodhisattvas* do not have] even the sickness of emptiness, therefore it is taught: "...nor [do they have conceptions of] *adharmā*".²⁴

In this interpretation of the negation of *dharma* as the abandonment of the concept that phenomena exist, and the denial of *adharmā* as eliminating the sickness of emptiness, i.e. grasping at non-existence, Ji also stands close to Asaṅga. The corresponding passage in Asg reads as follows:

²³ *Benwu* (本無) carries the meaning of "being non-existent" elsewhere in the same commentary, where Jizang uses *benwu* to explain the wrong view of arising and perishing: "Some hold [the view that something which] originally did not exist now comes into existence;" T33:1699.89c10; 解是本無而今有。

²⁴ T33:1699.106b16-20: 無法相、無非法相者。第二句明法空：雖不見我，猶見有五陰之法，故今明「亦無法相」。五陰之法既無，五陰本無，名為非法。空病亦空故，云「無非法相」。

Asg-b: First, the giving rise to the conception of the self, etc.; second, giving rise to the conception of *dharmas*; third, giving rise to the conception of impurity – [all] these still consist in grasping at *dharmas*. “[However,] because grasping at *dharmas*” [also] means grasping at no-*dharmas* [too, therefore, additionally:] fourth, giving rise to the conception of existence; and fifth, giving rise to the conception of non-existence – the *bodhisattva* gives rise to none of these.²⁵

And again,

Asg-b: In terms of the conventional truth, there are Awakening and attainments; [that is to say,] for the purposes of helping [sentient beings] by skillful means, both exist. According to the intention of the teachings of the Buddha, [however,] neither exists.²⁶

Obviously, Ji uses *dharma* to denote phenomena, that is, the five aggregates, and *adharmas* to denote the non-existence of *dharmas*, or emptiness. This is similar to Asg, where the *bodhisattva* grasps at neither *dharmas* nor no-*dharmas*. Like Asg, Ji interprets *adharmas* as a *bahuvrihi*, meaning no-*dharmas*, but adds further something that is not said in Asg: that not only are phenomena empty, but emptiness itself is empty too. In this way, though he accepts Asg’s explanation of Passage (a), he reinterprets it in line with the Middle Way. In so doing, he stands close to Zhi’s first interpretation, insofar as he ascribes emptiness to both *dharma* and *adharmas*, that is, holds that neither are ultimately real. Further, however, and exactly contrary to Zhi, he employs *dharma* to denote phenomena and *adharmas* as emptiness, whereas Zhi treats *dharma* as emptiness and *adharmas* as existence.

Ji and Zhi again agree with one another in the interpretation of *na dharma* and *nādharmas* in Passage (d):

Zhi: All phenomena are empty and inexpressible [not to be spoken of]. [The words] “not *dharma*” (*na dharma*) mean that phenomena do not

²⁵ T25:1510b.770b6-10: 第一者我等想轉，第二法相轉，第三者無淨想轉，此猶有法取。有法取者，謂取無法故。第四者有想轉，第五者無想轉，是諸菩薩於彼皆不轉也。

²⁶ T25:1510b.770c17-19: 世諦故，有菩提及得，是為欲願攝持以方便故，二俱為有。若如世尊意說者二俱無有。

exist, while “not not *dharma*” (*nādharma*) means that it is also not the case that they do not exist [altogether].²⁷

Ji: This sentence concludes the above [discussion of] the meaning of imperceptibility and inexpressibility. The true nature of all phenomena is neither to exist nor not to exist. Since they do not exist, “not *dharma*” (*na dharma*) is taught; neither do they not exist, and so “nor not *dharma*” (*nādharma*) is taught.²⁸

This negation of both existence and non-existence is a typical Mādhyamika mode of negation. The Mādhyamika mode of negation to which Ji and Zhi resort here is conducive to the interpretation of *dharma* and *adharma* as opposite pairs, such as wrong views vs. right views; existence vs. non-existence; or extremes vs. the middle way. For Zhiyi and Jizang both conventional and ultimate truths “do not stand for two objective ‘realms’”, but “serve in the teaching of the Buddha mainly as tentative devices to negate standpoints”.²⁹

However, Zhi’s interpretation of *dharma* in Passage (d) to mean existence does not correlate with his previous use of *dharma* to denote emptiness and medicine in Passage (a). Neither does *adharma* as non-existence fit well with unwholesome acts and wrong views. By contrast, Ji’s interpretation of Passage (d) is consistent with his interpretation of *dharma* and *adharma* in Passage (a), because *dharma* is grasped as existence, and *adharma* as non-existence, which serves as an antidote against such grasping.

However, though Ji may thus be self-consistent in his interpretation of Passage (d), this time, he precisely does not follow Asg, which reads as follows:

Asg-b: ...“not *dharmas*”, because [*dharmas*] are of the nature of discrimination; “not *adharmas*”, because *dharmas* are without self.³⁰

²⁷ T33:1698.78b13-14: 諸法空不可說，非法即不有，非非法即不無。

²⁸ T33:1699.107c9-10: 此句成上不可取不可說意。諸法實相非有非無。非有故非法。非無故非非法。

²⁹ See Liu, 1993: 660, 662.

³⁰ T25:1510b.770c24-25: 「非法」者分別性，「非非法」者法無我故。

For the Yogācārins, the nature of No-self itself exists. At this point, Ji (naturally enough) deviates from the Yogācāra interpretation.

When we turn to Passage (b), we find that Ji again picks and chooses to suit his own commentarial purposes. This time, Ji selects actively among different readings of the root text; he follows Bodh/Yi, and comments upon Variant (b), “nor not accept *dharma*” (非不取法).

Ji: Therefore [the *sūtra*] says, “One should neither grasp at *dharma*, nor not accept *dharma*.” This clarifies the meanings of the truth and the teachings. When one has attained the truth, one forgets the teachings, just as when one sees the moon, one leaves behind the finger [that pointed to it]. Therefore [the *sūtra*] says, “One should neither grasp at *dharma*...” On the other hand, one depends on the teachings in order to realize the truth, just as it is thanks to the finger that one apprehends the moon. Therefore [the *sūtra*] says, “...nor not accept *dharma*”. This is just as one should not take the raft [away with him], because the raft is to be abandoned when he arrives at the shore; [but] he should [also] not *not* take the raft, because he wishes to cross the river.³¹

Here, Ji uses *dharma* to denote the teachings of the Buddha, and takes the first and second part of the statement “one should neither grasp at *dharma*, nor not accept *dharma*” to denote two attitudes toward *dharma*, on the ultimate level and the conventional level respectively. His explanation here is very similar to the exposition of the two truths of the Mādhyamaka, as can be seen from the following passage from *Piṅgala’s commentary on the *Mūlamādhyamaka-kārikā*:

The supreme [truth] is [made known] entirely through speech, and speech is [a kind of] mundane [object]. Hence, [it is said that] without having recourse to the mundane [truth], the supreme [truth] cannot be taught. And without obtaining the supreme [truth], how can *nirvā-*

³¹ T33:1699.107a19-22: 故云不應取法非不取法，此明理教之義。以(read 已)得理忘教，得月捨指故，故云不應取法。而藉教悟理，因指得月，故非不取法。如到岸捨筏故，不應取筏。為欲度河故，非不取筏也。

na be attained? Hence, although *dharmas* are non-originating, there are [two forms of] truth.³²

This shows that Ji follows Bodh/Yi on Passage (b) because the interpretation of the parable of the raft at this point is in line with some Mādhyamika commentaries on the two truths.

For Passage (c), however, Ji adopts a different strategy again. This time, instead of commenting on the variant (Variant c), he comments on the normal reading (法尚應捨，何況非法)：

Ji: [The statement:] “One should abandon even *dharma*, not to mention *adharmas*” clarifies that even existence, which is the support of the senses, should be abandoned; how, then, can one grasp at non-existence, which is not an object of the six senses?³³

Here, Ji deviates from Bodh and yields to the traditional reading. In so doing, he also gives a different meaning to *dharma* and *adharmas* from that we just saw him use in application to Passage (b), interpreting them as “existence” and “non-existence” or “nothing” respectively.

This is also very different from the Indian interpretation of the same passage (Passage b). In Asg-a, the sentence in the *sūtra*, “One should neither grasp at *dharma*, nor grasp at *adharmas*” (不應取法，不應取非法) is interpreted as referring respectively to the nonduality of the entity (*ti* 體)³⁴ in the phenomenon and the nature of No-self in the phenomenon.³⁵ That means Asg takes *dharma* as the phenomenon and *adharmas* as the nature of the phenomenon; but the nature of the phenomenon is the

³² T30:1564.33a4-7: 第一義皆因言說。言說是世俗。是故若不依世俗。第一義則不可說。若不得第一義。云何得至涅槃。是故諸法雖無生。而有二諦; translation from Liu, 1993: 658.

³³ T33:1699.107a26-28: 「法尚應捨，何況非法。」明有是物情所安，尚應須捨；無非六情所對，豈可執也。

³⁴ The usual translation of *ti* (體) is “essence” or “substance”. This is appropriate in ontological discussions, but the sentence here refers to ordinary people who take phenomena to appear in just the way that they are named or designated. For this reason, I render it “entity”.

³⁵ T25:1510a.761a8-9: 不應取法、非法者，於法體及法無我並不分別故。

highest truth, and this means that *adharmā* is not reduced to a tentative device, as it was in Ji's reading of Passage (b).

In short, Ji is selective and strategic in his acceptance of both Asg and Bodh. He follows Asaṅga for Passages (a) and (d), and uses *dharma* and *adharmā* to mean the "existence" and "non-existence" of phenomena respectively, where the latter is equivalent to "emptiness". Meanwhile, he follows Bodh/Yi for Variant (b), and interprets *dharma* as the "teachings of the Buddha". (The interpretation of *dharma* in Variant (b) differs from that of other passages, because Variant (b) does not feature the opposition of *dharma* to its opposite, *adharmā*.) In all passages other than Passage (b), however, Ji is consistent in the interpretation of *dharma* and *adharmā*, that is, he aligns himself more closely with Asg's interpretation of Passage (a), which seemed to be more acceptable to the Chinese *Mādhyamaka*.

We now turn to examine the interpretation of the same material put forward by Kuiji, whom we will take as representative of Chinese *Yogācāra*.

5 The Chinese *Yogācāra* interpretation

In his commentary on the *Vajracchedikā* (Kui), Kuiji interprets *dharma* and *adharmā* in conformity with *Yogācāra* philosophy. In the context of Passages (a) and (d), he apparently understands *dharma* and *adharmā* in the same way as they are understood in Passage (d) by his predecessors, Zhiyi and Jizang. He accepts the interpretations of Ji with regard to *na dharma* and *nādharmā*, that is, "not *dharma*" means the non-existence of phenomena and their characteristics, while "not non-*dharma*" means not to grasp at non-existence.

There is a twist, however: Kui ascribes grasping at non-existence to persons who hold that the perfected nature does not exist. As we know, according to the *Yogācāra*, the perfected nature (*pariṇiṣpannasvabhāva*) is the ultimate reality. In this way, Kui seems to follow his predecessors, that is, he also states that grasping at non-existence is to be abandoned; but his actual intention is to advocate the *existence* of the perfected nature:

Kui: The “conception of *dharma*” (*faxiang* 法相)³⁶ is so-called because fools, out of false imagination (*wang* 妄), grasp the self of phenomena as an existent. As soon as this is understood to be empty, one knows that the entity (*ti* 體) of the phenomenon does not really exist, and this is called “without the conception of *dharma*” (*wufaxiang* 無法相). The “conception of non-*dharma*” (*feifaxiang* 非法相, *adharmasaṃjñā*), which means “[the conception] of something empty (*kong* 空) and without entity (*wu youti* 無有體)”, is so-called because fools claim that the perfected nature (*yuancheng* 圓成) is non-existent. Since the wise comprehend this perfected nature as existing, [it is called] “without the conception of non-*dharma*” (*wu feifaxiang* 無非法相, *nādharmasaṃjñā*), because there is no conception of emptiness (*kongxiang* 空相) that is grasped by them. The truth of the twofold Selflessness (*erwuwo li* 二無我理) truly exists.³⁷

Like his predecessors, Kuiji employs *dharma* and *adharmā* to denote two extreme views, viz. grasping at existence and non-existence respectively. In contrast to Zhiyi and Jizang, however, he understands “nor not *dharma*” to imply not simply a negation of non-existence, but rather, an affirmation of the existence of the perfected nature. This twist of interpretation is influenced by Bodh/Yi. The corresponding passage in Bodh/Yi on Passages (a) and (d) reads as follows:

Bodh: (Passage a:) What is the meaning of this? Since all phenomena [which are considered to be] existent, [both those that are] grasped and [those that] grasp [i.e. object and subject], do not exist, it is said: “There is neither conception of *dharmas*...” because nothing [of the

³⁶ Here, *faxiang* (法相) is translated as “conception of *dharma*”, because it refers to *dharmasaṃjñā* in the root text. Sanskrit *saṃjñā* means “imagining or images superimposed by concepts”. For Skt., see HW: 115, 15f.: *nāpi teṣāṃ subhūte bodhisatvānāṃ dharmasaṃjñā pravartsyate nādharmasaṃjñā nāpi teṣāṃ saṃjñā nāsaṃjñā pravartsyate*. For a detailed discussion of the terms *fa* (法) and *xiang* (相) in the *Vajracchedikā*, cp. Takehashi, 1999.

³⁷ T33:1700.134c16-21: 無法相者：調凡情妄執，執法我為有，名為法相。既達為空，知法體而非實故，云無法相，無其所執實有法相故。愚者妄情撥圓成，而是無，名非法相。空無有體故，智者了此圓成是有，故無非法相，無其所執為空相故。二無我理是實有。

sort] exists. Since the [nature of] No-self and emptiness exists in these phenomena, it is said: “...nor is there conception of *adharmā*”.

Bodh: (Passage d:) [The text] states, “neither *dharma*...” because all phenomena have no substantial nature. On the other hand, it also states, “...nor *adharmā*”, because the [ultimate] nature, that is, Suchness and No-self, truly does exist.³⁸

Thus, the claim in Kui that *adharmā* denotes the nature of No-self, which is wrongly thought to be non-existence, derives from Bodh/Yi.

The interpretation of Passage (d) in Kui is in the same vein:

Kui: The reason “it can neither be described as not *dharma* (*fei fa* 非法, *na dharma*) nor as not non-*dharma* (*fei feifa* 非非法, *nādharmā*)” is as follows: “*dharma*” is so called, because fools grasp at the existence of the person and phenomena; “*adharmā*” is so-called, because they assign non-existence to the perfected nature. Since the wise person comprehends the non-existence of the person and phenomena, the text speaks of “not *dharma*” (*fei fa* 非法, *na dharma*); since he understands the perfected nature as existing, therefore the text speaks of “not non-*dharma*” (*fei feifa* 非非法, *nādharmā*). The *Dharma*-body (*fa-shen* 法身) is calm and pure, and can be spoken of neither as not *dharma*, nor as not non-*dharma*.³⁹

Though Kui is seemingly in line with the first interpretation of Zhi in the explanation of *dharma* and *adharmā* in Passages (a) and (d), he follows Bodh/Yi and adds a twist to the interpretation of the ultimate purpose of this parable of the raft. It is clear that Kuiji preferred Bodh/Yi to Asg. Despite the fact that the Chinese ascribe both Indian commentaries to Yogācārins, namely, Asaṅga and Vasubandhu respectively, the way Kuiji gives more weight to “Vasubandhu’s” commentary (Bodh/Yi) shows that

³⁸ For Passage (a) see T25:1511.783c11-13: 此義云何？有可取、能取一切法無故，言「無法相」，以無物故。彼法無我空實有故，言「亦非無法相」。For Passage (d) see T25:1511.784c2-3：「非法」者，一切法無體相故。「非非法」者，彼真如無我相實有故。

³⁹ T33:1700.135c10-14: 不可說非法非非法者。調愚夫執人法為有，名之為法。撥圓成是無，名非法。聖者達人法為無，名為非法。了圓成為有，名非非法。法身寂淨不可說非法。亦不可說非非法也。

he considered it a stronger support for the Yogācāra perspective. In other words, Kuiji subtly admits that Asg contains less Yogācāra thought.

Kui again follows Bodh/Yi closely in his explanation of Passages (b) and (c):

Kui: “Grasping in accordance with [teachings] means that by relying on sayings [of the *sūtras*] one attains Awakening...When one wishes to realize the truth, he must depend on the words [of the *sūtras*].”⁴⁰

Here, Kui is obviously commenting on Variants (b) and (c) (非不取法, 非捨法故, the readings found in Ruci-a and Bodh), instead of the readings that actually appear in Ku (不應取非法, 何況非法, T8:235.749b7-8), the translation Kui is supposedly commenting upon.

In this commentary on the *Vajracchedikā*, it is not clear how Kui justifies Bodh/Yi’s explanation of the reliance on the teachings of the *sūtras* in the context of Passages (b) and (c); however, an answer to this question appears in his sub-commentary on Bodh/Yi, the *Jin’gang banruo lun huishi* (金剛般若論會釋). There, Kuiji comments again on these variants:

Vasubandhu explains as follows:

“The statement ‘one should neither grasp at *dharmā*...’ means that one should not grasp at things as [they seem according to] the literal meanings of words, because attachment is to be abandoned. The statement ‘...nor should one not accept *dharmā*’ describes one who is in accordance with the supreme insight, [and means] ‘grasping in accordance with what is rightly taught’” (Verse-Yi 12d).

Nor can supreme insight be obtained apart from the teachings, because supreme insight arises [in one who is] in accordance with the teachings. The meaning of this commentary is as follows: The statement “one should neither grasp at *dharmā*...” [means] there is no difference between grasping at the existence of phenomena and grasping at the nature of No-self in the phenomena; one should not grasp at any attachment [formed] in accordance with words. The statement “...nor should one grasp at *adharma*” [means this]: Although the com-

⁴⁰ T33:1700.135a24-26: 如是取者，謂必因言而悟真故...謂將欲證真必因言說。

mentary does not explicate this phrase, it emphasizes that conversely, [supreme insight] should also not be sought apart from the teachings, because supreme insight arises [in one, who is] in accordance with the teachings, and this is how the truth is attained. This [statement] is [thus] the same as the previous one. Another explanation for the statement “one should neither grasp at *dharmas*...” is as follows: One should grasp neither at the entity (*ti* 體) of *dharmas* nor take the *dharmas* exactly as it is designated. [As for] the statement “...nor should one grasp at *adharma*”: This teaching preaches that *dharmas* have the nature of No-self, and supreme insight arises [in one, who is] in accordance with this teaching; [thus,] supreme insight should not be sought apart from the teachings. One should not give rise to attachment in reliance on the teaching and conceive of an entity (*ti* 體) in *dharmas*, nor should one seek the nature of No-self in *dharmas* outside the teaching, and give rise to attachments and conceptions. This [statement] is [thus] the same as the previous one. Though the citation of the *sūtra* is abbreviated, and cites only the statement “one should neither grasp at *dharmas*...”, the statement “...nor should one grasp at *adharma*” is included in [Vasubandhu’s] explanation.⁴¹

Curiously, Kuiji here stubbornly insists that Passage (b) is the statement Bodh/Yi comments on, and fails to see that Bodh/Yi is explaining Variant (b). In the attempt to fit Passage (b) “nor should one grasp at *adharma*” into the interpretation of Bodh/Yi, Kui comes out with *adharma* meaning “the act of seeking the nature of No-self outside the teaching”. With this interpretation, Kuiji is obviously aiming at Jizang, the master of the Sanlun School (*sanlun zong* 三論宗), who advocates that the ultimate truth is inexpressible and unfathomable (*yan wang lü jue* 言亡慮絕); that all

⁴¹ T40:1816.739a21-b6: 天親解云：「『不應取法』者，不應如聲取法，除所執故。『非不取法』者，隨順第一義智，『正說如是取』。」又非離言說可求第一義智，第一義智順教生故。此論意言：「不應取法」者。若所執有法及法無我並不分別。如言執著，皆不應取。「不應取非法」者，論雖不解，翻顯離言說外亦不可求，順教便生第一義智證真義故。正與彼同。又解「不應取法」，謂取法體，如言執實，不應取故。『不應取非法』者，謂此教說法無我性，順教便生第一義智，不應離教以求真義證法無我故。不應依教而生執著法體分別，亦不應離教外覓法無我執著分別。亦與彼同。文牒經雖略但牒不應取法，解中便具不應取非法。

the teachings of the Buddha are intended only to deny what is false; that one can reveal the truth only by negation; and that one cannot take any positive position oneself (*wei po bu li* 唯破不立).⁴² In short, in Jizang's view, the purpose of all the *sūtras* is not to affirm the truth, but to negate what is false. Kuiji makes this position of Jizang's an object of ridicule, and compares it with seeking the truth apart from the teachings.

As Kuiji continues his critique against Jizang, he attempts a unique synthesis of Asg's explanations of Passages (c) and (d). As the occasion for this critique, Kui takes the fact that when Asg comments on Passage (c), he introduces the Dharma-body of the Buddha (*dharmakāya*). In his comment, however, Kui uses the wording of Passage (d), and thereby, unlike Asg, implicitly identifies the *dharmakāya* with the *dharma* in the wording of the *Vajracchedikā* itself. Thus, Kui begins by saying (as we already saw at the end of the passage cited above, p. 442):

Kui: The Dharma-body (*fashen* 法身, *dharmakāya*) is calm and pure, it should be spoken of neither as not *dharma*, nor as not non-*dharma* (不可說非法、亦不可說非非法).⁴³

However, in using the wording of Passage (d) here, Kui seems again to overlook the fact that in his own talk of the *dharmakāya*, Asg in fact comments on Passage (c) (何況非法). Not only that, but Asg's Passage (c) is different from Variant (c), which features in Bodh/Yi, the text that Kui usually follows. Thus, Asaṅga in fact comments on Passage (c) as follows:

Asg: It is said, "The wise one should abandon even *dharma*," because correct conception arises [in him]; [while the next statement says] "...not to mention *adharmā*", because that would be unreasonable. In short, it shows that the *bodhisattva*, who wishes to attain the so-called Dharma-body (*fashen* 法身, *dharmakāya*), should not give rise to incorrect conceptions.⁴⁴

Kui understands this passage as follows:

⁴² Zhao (1993: 44, 48) and Wang (1995: 126) have discussed Jizang's thought in detail.

⁴³ T33:1700.135c13-14: 法身寂淨不可說非法。亦不可說非非法也。

⁴⁴ See Asg-a T25:1510a.761a11-12; Asg-b T25:1510b.770b29c2: 法尚應捨，實想生故。何況非法者，理不應故。略說顯示菩薩欲得言說法身，不應作不實想故。

Kui: [The statement:] “‘The wise one should abandon even *dharma*’, because correct conception arises” [is explained as follows:] Correct conception arises by following the teachings. Having attained the truth [by means of] correct conception, the teachings are no longer necessary. These teachings are to be abandoned after having attained the truth – “...not to mention *adharma*”. It is reasonable not to hold to practices that are *adharma*, because seeking [the truth] outside the teaching would be contrary to the truth; thus it is reasonable that [these practices] are to be abandoned.⁴⁵

Here, Kui interprets the first statement of Passage (c), “The wise one should abandon even *dharma*,” to refer to one who has attained the truth, and interprets *dharma* as either the teachings of the Buddha, or specific items taught in the teachings, which lead to the truth; he then interprets *adharma* in the second statement, “...not to mention *adharma*”, as the act of seeking the truth outside the teachings, which would not lead to the truth, just as he interpreted *adharma* in Passage (b).

With this interpretation in hand, we can now see that his statement on the Dharma-body, already cited above, means something like this: “Since the Dharma-body is pure and tranquil, one should neither say that the Dharma-body is not existence, nor should one say that the Dharma-body is not non-existence.”

But this means that Kuiji has (purposely?) distorted the relevant passage in *Vajracchedikā* Passage (d), so that the phrase “not to be spoken of” (*bukeshuo* 不可說), which is used in the *Vajracchedikā* of the *dharma* itself (and even that is not exactly the same as the Dharma-body), instead is used of existence. What the *Vajracchedikā* itself actually says, let us recall, is this:

⁴⁵ T40:1816.739b17-21: 「法尚應捨，實想生故。」由依教法實相得生。實想證真已，更不須教故。此教法證真尚捨，「何況非法」。非法之事，理不應留教外別求。背真理故，理應除棄。

Ku, Passage (d): Whatever *dharmā* is preached by the Tathāgata, it is neither to be grasped nor to be spoken of; it is neither *dharmā* nor *a-dharmā*.⁴⁶

By means of this distortion, the expression “not to be spoken of” (*buke-shuo* 不可說) comes to be used to reject the application of any negation to the Dharma-body, rather than to mean, as it did originally in the *Vajracchedikā*, that one cannot speak of the Dharma[-body] itself, at all. Kuiji has turned the passage into an *affirmation* of the Dharma-body as pure and tranquil, and a *rejection* of the refutation of its existence and non-existence.

So how does all this work to continue Kuiji’s critique of Jizang? It is obvious that in making this move, Kuiji has Jizang in his sights. Jizang, or the Chinese Madhyamaka in general, had claimed that the ultimate truth is neither existence nor non-existence, and that none of the *sūtras* ever said anything about the ultimate truth; instead, the *sūtras* only ever refute what is *not* the truth.⁴⁷ According to Kuiji, when Chinese Mādhyamikas say this, it is equivalent to seeking the truth outside the teachings. Kuiji advocates, rather, that the ultimate truth should indeed be taught:

Kui: On this point, we should say that [it is susceptible to] “neither conception nor non-conception”. We say that it is “not [susceptible to] conception”, because the truth, that is to say, No-self, cannot be proclaimed by means of language to be either existent or non-existent. When immature *bodhisattvas* impetuously claim that [the truth of No-self] can be explained, this is called “conception”; when the holy ones (**ārya*) understand that it is not to be spoken of, we speak of “non-conception”. [The other statement, that] “...nor is it [susceptible to] non-conception” means “describing what is inexpressible by using speech and signs”. This is [further explained] as follows: Once the spiritually immature hear that [the truth] is not to be spoken of, they re-

⁴⁶ T8:235.749b16: 如來所說法，皆不可取，不可說，非法，非非法; T7.220.981a6-7: 世尊！如來、應、正等覺所證、所說、所思惟法皆不可取，不可宣說，非法非非法。For Sanskrit, see HW 117.7-13: *yo 'sau tathāgatena dharmo deśitaḥ | agrāhyaḥ so 'nābhipāyaḥ | na sa dharmo nādharmaḥ*.

⁴⁷ See n. 28 and n. 30.

ject all speech as wrong. Since the wise ones have thorough knowledge of the [truth], they teach [it] using words and speech, but they have no attachments [to it]. This is the reason that we say “nor is it [susceptible to] non-conception”.⁴⁸

According to Kui, though the ultimate truth, the Dharma-body, is inexpressible (“not to be spoken of”), it should still be taught by words and speech. This emphasis on teachings has close similarity to the reliance on teachings for liberation that features in Variants (b) and (c). This makes it clear that Kui incorporates the explanation of Variants (b) and (c) given in Bodh/Yi into the interpretation of the Dharma-body in Asg’s Passage (d). Though Kui cites Asg, then, he in fact bases himself on Bodh/Yi. This shows again that Kuiji indirectly acknowledges that Asg’s explanation is insufficiently Yogācāra, so to speak – that it stands closer to Madhyamaka than to Yogācāra.

Interestingly enough, then, Kuiji, like Jizang, makes use of Asg, but comes out with an interpretation that criticizes Jizang’s thought. Both follow Asg in claiming that ultimate truth is inexpressible, but Kuiji uses *adharma* to denote the false understanding of the Sanlun School, against Jizang’s treatment of *adharma* as a tentative device, which should be abandoned upon arriving at the ultimate truth. This shows that Jizang and Kuiji each uses Asg differently for his own interpretation of the parable of the raft. The Chinese commentators were more faithful to their respective schools than they were to the texts they based their commentaries on.

According to Kui, *dharma* and *adharma* in Passages (a) and (d) mean “existence” and “non-existence” respectively. Of these, *dharma* is the wrong conception that phenomena exist, exactly as it is interpreted in Ji; but *adharma* is assigned a meaning a little different from that in Ji. By “non-existence”, Kui means the wrong conception that the perfected nature (*pariṇiṣpannasvabhāva*) does not exist. However, in commenting on Passages (b) and (c), Kui actually comments on Variants (b) and (c) with-

⁴⁸ T33:1700.134c21-28: 此中更應云無相、亦非無相。言「無相」者，謂無我理不可以言宣說為有為無，諸小菩薩乍謂可說，名之為「相」。聖者了之為不可說故云「無相」也。「亦非無相」者，以於無言處依言相說也。謂愚者既聞不可說故，即謂有言皆非。智人達之故，依言辭而說，然不執著故，言亦「非無想」也。

out knowing it. Since Variants (b) and (c) do not feature the second part of the formula (i.e. the statement that like *dharma*, *adhama* is also to be abandoned – indeed, all the more so) where *dharma* actually means “the words of the *sūtras*”, Kuiji comes out with an interpretation of *adhama* as the act of seeking the nature of No-self outside the teaching.

At this juncture, it will be convenient to summarise the use of variant readings in all the commentators. As the discussion above has shown, the Indian Yogācāra commentaries comment on Variants (b) and (c). Zhi never mentions the variants, though Zhiyi could have consulted Bodh. Ji comments on Variant (b) but not Variant (c).⁴⁹ Kui, oddly enough, uses comments on Variants (b) and (c) from Bodh/Yi, but treats them as if they are explanations of the non-variant Passages (b) and (c). (Only a later commentary, Yan, actually contains Variants b and c.⁵⁰)

I summarize whether or not all the commentaries cite one or both variants, or show knowledge of them, in the Table below:

Table 1

	commentaries	Variant (b)	Variant (c)
Indian	Bodh	✓ +	✓ +
	Yi	+	+
	Verse-Bodh	+	+
	Verse-Yi	+	+
	Asg-a	∅	∅
	Asg-b	✓	∅
Chinese	Ji	✓	∅
	Vaj	✓	∅
	Yan	✓	✓

✓ citation of *sūtra*-wordings of the variants

⁴⁹ The same is true of Vaj, which contains also Variant (b). T25:1512.814c24-a1: 「不應取法」者，明雖藉詮而說，而亦理非名相，不應取聲教為證法，謂是有相也。「非不取法」者。聞言「不應取法」，便證法一向無名相，不可假教而說。若無名相不可假教說者，則復謂音聲言教令非是法，棄其能詮之義。為遣此疑故，言「非不取法」。

⁵⁰ T33:1704.242b30-c2: 「何以故？須菩提，「不應取法，非不取法。」以是義故，如來常說筏喻法門，是法應捨，非捨法故」。

+	arguments that imply the variants
∅	absent from the passage concerned
Yan	<i>Jin'gang banruo boluomi jing lueshu</i> 金剛般若波羅蜜經略疏, T1704, commentary by Zhiyan (智儼, 602-668)

Thus, though the Chinese commentators had access to Ruci-a and Bodh, which contain both Variants (b) and (c), Ji follows instead Asg-b, which contains only Variant (b), while Zhi and Kui give preference to Kumārajīva's translation, which gives the non-variant Passages (b) and (c). This shows how stubborn the Chinese commentators before Zhiyi are; although they either mention or consult Bodh, they are so familiar with the readings in earlier translations that they overlook the variants.

6 *Dharma* and *adharmas* in the Chinese translations

The division observed above into Madhyamaka and Yogācāra trends did not first appear in the Chinese commentaries; rather, it is already discernible in the Chinese translations of the *Vajracchedikā* itself. This is evinced in the rendering of Passage (a): *nāpi teṣāṃ subhūte bodhisatvānāṃ dharmasaṃjñā pravartsyate nādharmasaṃjñā*. While the phrase *na dharmasaṃjñā* is translated unanimously into Chinese as “no conception of *dharmas*” (*wu faxiang* 無法相), the rendering of *na adharmasaṃjñā* is divided into two groups:

- “not without the conception of *dharmas*” (*fei wu faxiang* 非無法相; hereafter Statement Y[ogācāra]);
- “without the conception of non-*dharmas*” (*wu fei faxiang* 無非法相; hereafter Statement M[adhyamaka]).

These two versions of this key phrase differ significantly in nuance. The first statement (Y) affirms that imagination itself does exist, while the second (M) denies the existence of the conception of even non-*dharmas*. These statements, further, are distributed among two groups of translators in a significant manner. The first group coincides with the translators who translated the Indian *sūtras* or commentaries containing one or both variants, that is, texts influenced by the Yogācāra. The other group is exactly the opposite, i.e. is free of such influence.

All translations and citations in the commentaries are grouped together in accord with their affinity with the Madhyamaka and Yogācāra in the Table below:

Table 2

<i>citation in commentaries</i>	Statement M	Variant (b)	Variant (c)	Statement Y
Bodh		✓	✓	✓
Vaj		✓	✓	✓
Yi				✓
Gu	✓			
<i>translations</i>				
Ruci-a		✓	✓	✓
Pa				✓
Ku	✓			
Ruci-b	✓			
Xuan	✓			
Jing	非非法想			
Gup	∅			∅

Statement M: Madhyamaka-influenced version: “without the conception of non-*dharmas*” (*wu fei faxiang* 無非法相)

Statement Y: Yogācāra-influenced version: “not without the conception of *dharmas*” (*fei wu faxiang* 非無法相)

✓ Presence of the variant

∅ Absence of the statement

Since Gup cites neither the passage with *dharmasaṃjñā* nor the one with *adharmasaṃjñā*, nothing can be said about this translation. Setting aside for the moment Pa and Yi, all other versions consistently show one of two patterns: 1. the Mādhyamika rendering of *adharmasaṃjñā*, without the variant readings of Passages (b) and (c); or 2. the Yogācāra rendering, coinciding with the variants.

The two exceptions to this pattern are Pa and Yi. In the case of Pa, we do find the rendering of *adharmasaṃjñā*; but we also find Passages (c) and (d), instead of the variants. This may be explained by the fact that Paramārtha, being a Yogācāra, shows a bias in rendering the term *adharma-*

saṃjñā, despite the fact that he had an original without the variants as the basis for his translation.

With regard to Yi, we find that Yijing in fact gave various translations, which are mutually inconsistent. In Jing (his translation of the *Vajracchedikā*), he renders the statement in question very differently from other translations: “not the conception of non-*dharmas* (*fei fei faxiang* 非非法想)”. In Yi, however (Yijing’s translation of Vasubandhu’s commentary), he gives the *Yogācāra* rendering: “not without the conception of *dharmas* (*fei wu faxiang* 非無法相)”. He further interprets this reading as follows:

Yi: This means that because no *dharmas*, either those that grasp or those that are grasped [i.e. subject or object], exist, the conception of *dharmas* does not arise; this is [called] “no conception of *dharmas*” (*wu faxiang* 無法相). The non-existence of these [*dharmas* is due to the fact that] *dharmas* have no intrinsic nature, [but] since emptiness exists, [thus the text says] “not without the conception of *dharmas*” (*fei wu faxiang* 非無法相).⁵¹

Yi thus expounds the phrase “not without the conception of *dharmas*” (*fei wu faxiang* 非無法相) as referring to the existence of emptiness, that is, from a *Yogācāra* perspective similar to that of Bodh, which has been discussed above.

Similarly, Vaj clearly interprets from the *Yogācāra* perspective. One passage of Vaj reads:

Vaj: The statement “no conception of *dharmas*” explains that the twelve bases (*āyatana*s), that is, the six consciousnesses that grasp, and the six objects that are grasped, are all empty and tranquil, and have not arisen...Furthermore, the statement “not without the conception of *dharmas*” acts as an antidote against “the conception of non-*dharmas*”. Having heard that the twelve bases are empty, doubt-

⁵¹ T25:1513.876b6-8: 此謂能取所取諸法皆無故，法想不生，即「無法想」。彼之非有，法無自性。空性有故，非無法想。

ers claim that Suchness, the Buddha nature, and unconditioned *dharmas* are all intrinsically empty.⁵²

It is clear that Vaj here interprets “not without the conception of *dharmas*” (非無法相) as meaning that it is not true that there are absolutely no *dharmas*.

In sum, the above discussion shows clearly that all those who follow the rendering we have called “Statement Y” also propound Yogācāra interpretations of the text. On the other hand, texts that adopt “Statement M”, viz., the rendering “without the imagination of non-*dharmas*” (無非法相), do not have such a clear Yogācāra inclination. For instance, Gu explains Passage (a) as follows:

Gu: In the ultimate sense, *dharmas* have not arisen, [and thus the text states] “no conception of *dharmas*”. Since they have not arisen, they have not ceased either. Therefore [the text states] “without the conception of non-*dharmas*”.⁵³

If “without the conception of non-*dharmas*” is interpreted as referring to the knowledge that there is no cessation of *dharmas*, then “non-*dharmas*” here denotes passing from existence to non-existence, which constitutes an opposite number to the notion of coming into existence. This interpretation shows no influence from the Yogācāra, but instead, is compatible with the Madhyamaka.

The discussion above shows that the Chinese translators rendered “not” (*fei* 非) and “no/without” (*wu* 無) with a keen awareness of the difference between them. In these choices of translation, the school to which the translator was affiliated played a decisive role.

⁵² T25:1512.813c22-27: 言「無法相」，明十二入能取六識可取六塵悉皆空寂本來不生故...亦「非無法相」者，對治「非法相」。疑者聞十二入一切法空，便謂真如佛性無為之法亦皆性空故。

⁵³ T25:1515.888c17-19: 第一義法本不生故，「無法想」。以不生故，亦無有滅故，「無非法想」。

7 Indian interpretations of *dharma* and *adharma*

In contrast with the Chinese commentators, the Indian commentaries sometimes treat *adharma* as referring to the ultimate nature of phenomena. As we shall see below, although this interpretation is unknown in China, it is true to the original sense of the term *adharma* as it was used in the *Prajñāpāramitā* literature, of which the *Vajracchedikā* itself forms such an important part.

For instance, Asaṅga occasionally⁵⁴ interprets *adharma* as referring to the true nature of phenomena or the ultimate nature, that is, No-self. This can be seen from the following passages in which Asaṅga discusses the four root passages mentioning *adharma*:

Asg-a on Passage (b): “One should grasp at neither *dharma* nor *adharma*,” because one does not discriminate between the entity (*ti* 體) of the phenomena and the nature of No-self in the phenomena.⁵⁵

It is clear that Asaṅga here interprets *adharma* as referring to the nature of No-self in phenomena.

Asg-b on Passage (a): This statement [means that whenever] there is inverted grasping, conception of *dharma* and *adharma* arises; [there is] conception of No-self, etc.,⁵⁶ because the conception of the self and the body does not arise.⁵⁷ But since the propensity to imagine a self has not yet been given up, there is still grasping at the self.⁵⁸

⁵⁴ As shown in Table 3 in Section 8, Asg also sometimes renders *adharma* as non-existence.

⁵⁵ T25:1510a.761a8-9: 不應取法、非法者，於法體及法無我並不分別故。 Given that there is no occurrence of *adharma* in Variants b and c in Asg-b, those passages cannot be used to ascertain what *adharma* means in the text. Only Asg-a discusses *adharma* in Passage (b).

⁵⁶ Here in Asg-b “Non-self (非我)” occurs instead of “No-self (無我)” in all the editions of the Chinese Tripiṭaka, see *Zhonghua dazangjing* (中華大藏經) 27:90b17-19. But considering the fact that Non-self never occurs in all the other root passages other than Passage (a) and similarly “No-self (*bdag med pa*)” instead of “Non-self” occurs in Tib. (see n. 60), “Non-self” in Asg-b could have occurred by error as early as the translation.

⁵⁷ I translate “body” here for *yizhi* (依止). In Tib. there is no equivalent for *yizhi*; see n. 58. My translation here has taken a previous occurrence of the same word into considera-

The statement, “There is conception of No-self, etc., because the conception of the self and the body does not arise” reads differently in the Tibetan translation: “Even though one does not (*sic!*) enter into conceptions of No-self etc., he still has the conception of the self...” Nevertheless, both translations explain “the conception of No-self” after having mentioned the conception of *dharma* and *adharma*. They could well be explaining how inverted grasping gives rise to the conception of *adharma*, that is, of No-self. In other words, Asaṅga uses *adharma* to denote No-self.

As shown above (see n. 44), when Asg comments on Passage (c), *dharma* and *adharma* are used differently from the way they are explained in Passages (a) and (d). There, *dharma* refers to the correct way of seeking the Dharma-body. As for *adharma* in Passage (c), Asg does not explain what is meant by the *adharma* which it is unreasonable not to abandon. So nothing could be said about *adharma* in Passage (c) in Asg. Nevertheless, *adharma* is used again in Asg to denote No-self in a passage immediately after the passages under discussion:

Asg-b on a passage immediately after the root passages: The statement “not abiding in *adharma*” has the following meaning: *Adharma* denotes No-self. In order to accomplish non-abiding, one should abide in neither *adharma* nor the nature of No-self in phenomena.⁵⁹

Here too, Asaṅga states clearly that *adharma* denotes No-self.

tion, see T25:1510b.770a27-28: 知者知名身，見者見色身。謂一切行住所作中知其心，見其依止故 (“The one who knows, knows the aggregate of thoughts; the one who sees, sees the physical aggregate. That is because he knows his mind and sees his body in all activities”). Here *yizhi* (依止) corresponds obviously to Sanskrit *ātmabhāva*.

⁵⁸ T25:1510b.770b11-13: 此言是中邪取，但法及非法想轉。非我等想，以我想及依止不轉故。然於我想中隨眠不斷故。則為有我取。For the Tibetan translation, see *Zhonghua dazangjing* (中華大藏經) 56:1282.23-1283.4: *de ci'i phyir zhe na zhes gsungs pa'i phyir gang dang gang log par 'dzin pa ni chos dang chos med pa'i 'du shes 'jug par 'gyur ba yin no | bdag med pa la sogs pa'i 'du shes nyid mi 'jug pa gang yin pa de yang bdag la sogs pa'i 'du shes te | de dag gis bag la nyal ma spangs pa'i phyir 'di nyid bdag tu 'dzin pa yin te.*

⁵⁹ T25:1510b.774b14-15: 不住非法者，謂非法無我也。於非法及法無我中皆不住故，為成就彼諸不住故。

However, this apparently clear picture is complicated by the fact that when he comments on Passage (d), Asaṅga seems to use *adharmā* to denote the negation of *dharma*, or non-existence:

Asg-b on Passage (d): It is “not *dharma*”, [because *dharma*] has the nature of discrimination; it is “not *adharmā*”, because the phenomena have no Self [as their nature].⁶⁰

Here, *adharmā* is denied. It therefore does not stand for No-self, but rather, for non-*dharma* or no-*dharma*, meaning probably “non-existence”. This means that Asaṅga is not univocal in his interpretation of *adharmā*, even though his dominant tendency is to read it as referring to the nature of No-self in phenomena.

In sum, in Passages (a) and (b) (the latter in Asg-a only), Asaṅga interprets *adharmā* as referring to the nature of No-self in phenomena; in Passage (d), he interprets *adharmā* as referring to non-existence. However, Asaṅga does not make himself clear about *adharmā* in Passage (c).

This interpretation of *adharmā* on Asaṅga’s part seems consistent with the most likely meaning of the term in the text under comment, that is, in the *Vajracchedikā* itself. The most widespread usage of the term *dharma* in early Buddhism is to denote simple mental and physical states.⁶¹ This usage continues into the early *Prajñāpāramitā* literature, where “*dharma*s” stands for the five aggregates,⁶² that is, corporeality (*rūpa*), sensations (*vedanā*), conceptions (*saṃjñā*), volitions (*saṃskāra*) and consciousness (*viññāna*). In the *Prajñāpāramitā*, the negation of these five aggregates is used to stand for the true nature of each; for example, for corporeality (*rūpa*), the formula takes the form of either *na rūpa* or *arūpa*, “not corpo-

⁶⁰ T25:1510b.770c24-25: 非法者分別性。非非法者法無我故。

⁶¹ The meanings of the term *dharma* have been widely discussed. See e.g. Gethin, 2004: 514.

⁶² In the early versions of the *Prajñāpāramitā* in 8,000 Lines the terms *dharma* and *skandha* (yin 陰 or yun 蘊, that is, the five aggregates) are used interchangeably; see Choong, 2006: 34, n. 1.

reality” or “no corporeality”, and is used to stand for the true nature of *rūpa*.⁶³

This being so, Asaṅga derives his interpretation of *adharmā* as the true nature of phenomena in the *Vajracchedikā* (except in Passage d) from the early Mahāyāna; and this true nature of phenomena, which is called No-self by the Yogācāra commentators, is something that is not/no phenomena, in the sense that No-self is not identical with phenomena produced by concepts, or it is without such phenomena.

Where this “*Prajñāpāramitā*-style” interpretation sees *adharmā* as referring to a *correct* understanding of the true nature of phenomena, however, as shown above, Bodh/Yi uses *adharmā* in Passages (a) and (d) to mean non-existence, which is understood to be a *false* conception.⁶⁴ Such a usage of *adharmā* does not accord with the original meaning of emptiness (*śūnyatā*) in the *Prajñāpāramitā*.⁶⁵

When it is opposed to *adharmā*, *dharma* is used consistently by Asg and Bodh/Yi to denote phenomena or existence. In Variants (b) and (c), however, in which *adharmā* does not occur, *dharma* is interpreted by Bodh/Yi as “the teachings of the *sūtras*”. Against the background of the meaning given to its opposite number, *adharmā* – that is, as meaning “not/no

⁶³ For example, in the *Prajñāpāramitā in 8,000 Lines* (Vaidya, 1960: 170.21-23) there is a statement: “When there is no corporeality, this is the profundity of corporeality;” *yatra...na rūpam, iyaṃ rūpasya gambhīratā*; where *gambhīratā* (profundity) aims at the inexpressible nature of all phenomena. At the corresponding locus, T226 reads: 有甚深者，非色之甚深，是為色之甚深 (T8:226.528c28-29), which corresponds to something like: **yā gambhīratā, [sā] arūpasya gambhīratā, iyaṃ rūpasya gambhīratā*. This expression, in which *gambhīratā* stands alone (in *yā gambhīratā*), i.e. neither in a compound, nor in connection with *rūpa* as a genitive attribute as in the “profundity of corporeality” (*rūpasya gambhīratā*), is exactly like the way *tathatā* is discussed in the *Prajñāpāramitā in 25,000 lines* (T8:221.89c23; T8:223.344a15; T7:220(3).635b20; T7:220(2).269b15; Kimura, 1990: 165.16): *yatra...tathatāyāṃ na rūpam, nānyatra rūpād tathatā*. This confirms that *gambhīratā*, standing alone exactly like *tathatā*, takes the place of the inexpressible nature of all phenomena. See also Choong, 2006: 44-45. Thus, the statement above identifies the non-existence of corporeality with the true nature of corporeality.

⁶⁴ Given that there is no occurrence of *adharmā* in Variants b and c in Bodh/Yi, those passages cannot be used to ascertain what *adharmā* means in the text.

⁶⁵ The five aggregates occur very frequently with the prefix *a/an* in the *Prajñāpāramitā* literature; see Choong, 2006: 51.

phenomena” – this interpretation certainly looks odd. Nonetheless, the apparent incongruity can easily be resolved by taking *dharmas* (*xiuduoluo deng fa* 修多羅等法, *jing deng fa* 經等法) to mean “objects like the aggregates, sense faculties, elements, concentrations, insights, paths and fruits that are taught in the *sūtras*”.

Asg and Bodh/Yi tend to interpret *adharmā* as meaning “non-existence”, in the sense of either (i) “the true nature of phenomena” (upon which only conceptions of phenomena are denied) or (ii) “extreme negation” (in virtue of which they do not in fact exist). According to Asg and Bodh/Yi, *dharma* in the *Vajracchedikā* bears the meaning of “all phenomena” or “all phenomenal and spiritual objects/items taught in the *sūtras*”. In the case of *adharmā*, Asaṅga, though he does not make it clear in Passage (c), explains it in Passages (a) and (b) as “the nature of No-self”, and in Passage (d) as a misconception of “non-existence”. The reason lies in the different sentence structure of Passage (d), which denies both *dharma* and *adharmā*. Bodh/Yi, however, comments on *adharmā* in only Passages (a) and (d), and assigns it the meaning of “non-existence”, which is wrongly attributed to the nature of No-self.

8 *Dharma* and *adharmā* in the *Vajracchedikā*

The discussion of the various commentaries above throws light on the interpretation of the parable of the raft in the *Vajracchedikā*. In order to find out which is the most plausible interpretation of the parable of the raft, it is necessary first to sort out the complicated meanings of *dharma* and *adharmā* in each of the commentaries discussed above.

The denotations of *dharma* and *adharmā* in the four passages discussed above can be summarized as in the Table below. For ease of comparison, I have tried to put similar meanings of *dharma* together; I have also ordered the Table to progress from Indian to Chinese commentaries:

Table 3: Indian and Chinese interpretations of *dharma* and *adharma* in Passages (a), (b), (c) and (d)

Version	Passage	<i>dharma</i>	<i>adharma</i>	implications
Asg-a	a, b	phenomena	nature of No-self	existence is misconception
Asg-a	d	existence	non-existence	both are misconceptions
Asg-b	d	existence	non-existence	both are misconceptions
Yi	b	existence	non-existence	both are misconceptions
Zhi	a, b, c	medicine	sickness	neither has reality
Ji	a	grasping	antidotes	neither has reality
Zhi	d	existence	no-existence	neither has reality
Ji	d	existence	no-existence	neither has reality
Ji	c	existence	no-existence	neither has reality
Bodh	a, d	existence	non-existence	both are misconceptions, denial of <i>adharma</i> with assertion of the existence of the true nature
Kui	a, d	existence	non-existence	both are misconceptions, denial of <i>adharma</i> with assertion of the existence of the true nature
Asg-b	Var (b)	phenomena and nature of No-self are nondual	∅	
Asg-a, Asg-b	(c)	teachings	meaning unclear	
Bodh	Var (b)	teachings	∅	
Bodh,	Var (c)	teachings	∅	

Yi				
Ji	Var (b)	teachings	∅	
Kui	b, c	teachings	∅	

∅ absent from the passage concerned

The above Table shows clearly that Kui comments on Variant (b) and Variant (c), although Passages (b) and (c) appear in his commentary. It is noteworthy that Ji comments on Variant (b), but features Passage (c), exactly like Asg-b. As shown in Section (4), the explanation Ji gives for Variant (b) follows that of Bodh, and not Asg-b. The above Table shows clearly that the commentators who explain *adharma* on the basis of Passage (b) are Asg-a, Yi and Zhi, while those who comment on *adharma* on the basis of Passage (c) are Zhi and Ji. Though Asg mentions *adharma* in discussing Passage (c), it does not explicate it. There is consistently no comment on *adharma* for Variant (b) and (c), because the Variants do not have them. Only in the Indian commentary Asg-a does *adharma* denote the true nature. Asg-b mentions the nature of No-self just as Asg-a, though Asg-a comments on Passage (b) and Asg-b on Variant (b). But Asg-b does not identify *adharma* with No-self:

Asg-a: The statement “Subhūti, one should grasp at neither *dharma* nor *adharma*” is clear; it refers to the time when one is absorbed in concentration and when one’s mind is distracted [respectively]. “One should grasp at neither *dharma* nor *adharma*,” because one does not discriminate between the entity (*ti* 體) of the phenomena and the nature of No-self in the phenomena.

Asg-b: The statement “Subhūti, one should neither grasp at *dharma* nor not grasp at *dharma*” is clear; it refers to the time when one is absorbed in concentration and when one’s mind is distracted [respectively]. “One should neither grasp at *dharma*...” because one does not discriminate between the entity (*ti* 體) of the phenomena and the nature of No-self in the phenomena.⁶⁶

⁶⁶ T25:1510a.761a6-9: 「須菩提，不應取法、非法」者是顯了，謂相應三摩鉢帝及攝散心時，「不應取法、非法」者，於法體及法無我並不分別故；T25:1510b.770b24-27:

According to Asg-a, Passage (b) means that one should grasp neither at *dharma*, that is, the phenomena, nor at *adharmā*, that is, the nature of No-self in the phenomena, both at the time when one is absorbed in concentration as well as when one is not in concentration. But Variant (b), according to Asg-b, means that one should not discriminate between phenomena and the nature of No-self in the phenomena when one is absorbed in concentration only; instead, one should follow the *dharma* when one is not absorbed in concentration. As shown in Section (2), Variant (b) in Asg is original, so the text in Asg-a must have undergone modification to fit it to Passage (b).

With the above Table in mind, we turn first to the interpretation of the Variants, because they are more straightforward. Variants (b) and (c) in the parable of the raft in the *Vajracchedikā* should read as follows:

Why is it so? If these persons have a conception of *dharma*, they will grasp at a self, a living being, a soul and a person. If these persons have imaginings of *adharmā*, they will grasp at a self, a living being, a soul and a person. (Variant b:) Therefore one should neither grasp at *dharma*, nor not accept *dharma* (不應取法，非不取法). (Variant c:) Referring to this, the Tathāgata tells the parable of the raft, because these *dharmas* should be abandoned, [but] not rejected [altogether] (是法應捨，非捨法故).⁶⁷

This could be interpreted as follows:

On the one hand, if these persons falsely imagine that the items taught in the *sūtras* exist, they will grasp at a self, a living being, a soul and a person. On the other hand, if these persons wrongly imagine that these items do not exist, they will grasp at a self, a living being, a soul and a person. (Variant b:) Therefore one should neither imagine that these items taught by the Buddha exist, nor not accept these i-

「須菩提，不應取法，非不取法」者是顯了，謂相應三摩鉢帝及散心時。「不應取法」者，於法體及法無我並不分別。

⁶⁷ See Ruci-a, T8:236a.735b11-16: 何以故？須菩提！是諸菩薩，若取法相，則為著我、人、眾生、壽者。須菩提！若是菩薩有法相，即著我相、人相、眾生相、壽者相。何以故？須菩提！不應取法，非不取法。以是義故，如來常說筏喻法門，是法應捨，非捨法故。

tems by rejecting them as nothing. (Variant c:) Referring to this, the Tathāgata tells the parable of the raft, because these items taught by the Buddha should be abandoned at the ultimate stage, but not rejected at the stage of preparation.

On the other hand, Passage (b) and (c) in the *Vajracchedikā* read as follows:

Why is it so? If these persons have a conception of *dharma*, they will grasp at a self, a living being, a soul and a person. If these persons have imaginings of *adharmā*, they will grasp at a self, a living being, a soul and a person. (Passage b:) Therefore the *bodhisattva* should neither grasp at *dharma*, nor grasp at *adharmā* (不應取法，不應取非法). (Passage c:) Referring to this, the Tathāgata says: “If the meditator understands the parable of the raft, he should abandon even *dharma*, not to mention *adharmā* (法尚應捨，何況非法).⁶⁸

As for Passage (b) and (c) in the *Vajracchedikā*, there is no unanimity of interpretation. The interpretation depends on the actual meaning of *adharmā* in Passage (c). If *dharma* in Passage (c) bears the same meaning as it does in Variant (c), that is, “objects like the aggregates, sense faculties, elements, concentrations, insights, paths and fruits that are taught in the *sūtras*”, then *adharmā* should be the opposite of *dharma*, and, according to all the commentaries discussed above, could therefore mean either a) “items not taught by the Buddha”, that is, *adharmā* taken as a *tat-puruṣa*; or b) the “non-existence of these items”, when *adharmā* is taken as a *bahuvrīhi*. Furthermore, “non-existence” could stand either for (i) the non-existence of conceptual imaginations, that is, the term could still allow for the existence of the true nature of phenomena; or for (ii) extreme negation, that is, a position upon which all phenomena do not in fact exist. This being so, out of the three possible meanings, we have seen that Kui adopted the first meaning (a); Asg suggests (b i), the true nature of *dharma*; and Zhi and Ji, by contrast, are close to (b ii).

⁶⁸ See Ruci-b, T8:236b.758a1-5: 何以故? 須菩提! 是諸菩薩若有法想, 即是我執, 及眾生、壽者、受者執。須菩提! 是故菩薩不應取法, 不應取非法。為如是義故如來說: 『若觀行人解筏喻經, 法尚應捨, 何況非法。』

Against this, some might think that the term *adharma* could hardly mean the true nature of phenomena, because it is given in the plural in Passage (c).⁶⁹ There are two possible responses to this objection: First, *adharma* in the plural could mean the negation of each and every item taught in the *sūtras*; second, *adharma* in the plural could mean the nature of No-self in each and every item taught in the *sūtras*.

The implications of Passage (b) and (c) differ significantly, depending upon the meaning of *adharma*. As for *dharma*s, from all Buddhist perspectives, there can be no question that they in fact have no reality, since phenomena do not exist as they appear. However, as we have seen repeatedly, the denial of *adharma* is not so straightforward, because *adharma*, as summarized above, can mean either 1. items not taught by the Buddha; 2. the true nature of things whereby they are devoid of the conception of *dharma*; or 3. the misconception that something does not exist. In the first case, the denial of *adharma* is a claim that teachings outside Buddhism are not conducive to the realization of the truth; in the second case, even if *adharma* is comprehended correctly as the true nature of a *dharma*, no grasping of it is possible; in the third case, the denial of *adharma* is a refutation of the extreme negation that the *dharma* does not exist at all. Many scholars adopted the first meaning. The *Prajñāpāramitā* in general advocates the second one, which could mean the letting go of all concepts, including the concept of the truth. The third meaning, however, is close to the interpretation of Variants (b) and (c), where *dharma* should not be rejected altogether as non-existence. It is also similar to the interpretation of Passages (a) and (d) by Bodh/Yi and Kui.

Against this background, the differences between the various commentators emerge in their true light. Vasubandhu (Bodh/Yi) and Kui employ the second strategy, in which *adharma* denotes the misconception that the true nature does not exist. Among the three interpretations, the third obtains a slight twist in the Chinese Mādhyamikas, Zhi and Ji. According to them, *adharma* acts only as a provisional antidote against

⁶⁹ It is noteworthy that the terms *dharma* and *adharma* are in the singular in Passages (b) and (d), while they are plural in Passage (c), just as in MN I 135 25-26. In Passage (a), the syntactical number of the word *dharma* is not explicit, because it occurs there as the first element of a compound.

grasping, and as such, remains a concept, which should itself ultimately be denied. This interpretation of *adharmā* as an antidote, however, does not occur in the Indian commentaries under discussion.⁷⁰ This allows us to see that Zhi and Ji deviated from the (Yogācāra) Indian commentaries known to the Chinese tradition, proffering instead unique interpretations more in line with their own (Madhyamaka) doctrinal affiliations.

9 Conclusion

Close examination of the commentaries preserved in the Chinese Tripiṭaka shows that those affiliated to the Yogācāra tradition favor the Variants over the ordinary Passages (b) and (c). These Variants in the parable of the raft can be traced back to the Indian Yogācāra commentaries, which could have in turn initiated the change in the parable of the raft in the *Vajracchedikā*.

However, the change could not have been initiated by the actual meaning of the parable of the raft in the *Vajracchedikā*, because we arrived at an interpretation that is compatible with both the traditional parable of the raft and its variant in the *Vajracchedikā*. According to the interpretation of the Variants by the Yogācāra, the purpose of the parable of the raft in the *Vajracchedikā* is to admonish against falling into the two extremes of grasping at the items of the Buddha's teachings, and of annulling the items of the teaching altogether, with the consequence of not following the teachings. That is to say, not rejecting *dharma*, in Variants (b) and (c), means that the items taught by the Buddha should not be rejected altogether as nothing.

Along similar lines, the Yogācāra could have commented on Passages (b) and (c), if they had used *adharmā* in these passages to denote non-existence the same way as Asg-b on Passage (d), and Bodh/Yi and Kui on Passages (a) and (d). If *adharmā* was taken to denote non-existence, the

⁷⁰ The only case in the Indian commentaries where the nature of No-self is also said not to be grasped is the interpretation of Passage (b) in Asg-a, but here, there is no mention of *adharmā* as an antidote. *Adharma* is not denied; rather, the text just warns that it should not be grasped conceptually. See the discussion above (n. 66 and the translations in the main text).

denial of *adharmā* in Passages (b) and (c) would be a refutation of the extreme negation that holds that the *dharma* does not exist at all, and would thus be in line with the interpretation of the Variants. Thus, the traditional parable of the raft and its variant can be interpreted in just the way the Yogācāra wish to interpret it. This being so, the change of Passages (b) and (c) to their Variants could not have been initiated by the content of the parable itself, but rather, must have been initiated by the interpretation of the parable in some other schools like the Madhyamaka.

The reason for the change reveals itself clearly through observation of the usage of *adharmā* in the Indian and Chinese commentaries: First of all, the commentaries interpreted “not *adharmā*” in Passages (a) and (d) as the negation of non-existence, but with different implications. Bodh/Yi tries to explain non-existence as the wrong grasping of non-existence in regard to the doctrine of No-self; Asg uses *adharmā* to denote the non-separation of the true nature of phenomena, that is, No-self. It is clear that Asg and Bodh/Yi assume the existence of No-self. Ji, however, also uses *adharmā* to denote non-existence. But this non-existence, according to Ji, is not the same as the misconception to which *adharmā* refers for Asg and Bodh/Yi; rather, it is emptiness, an antidote against the misconception of existence, and it itself also does not exist ultimately. As shown above, Ji’s interpretation is close to the Mādhyamika’s position. It is exactly this interpretation of emptiness as an antidote that the Yogācāra commentaries try to avoid, because emptiness in the Mahāyāna is usually identified with the true nature of phenomena, which for the Yogācāra truly exists.

Second, the interpretation of *adharmā* as the true nature of phenomena begins already in the *Prajñāpāramitā*. This usage of *adharmā* to denote the true nature of phenomena continues into the later Mahāyāna. Asg-a, for example, used *adharmā* in Passage (b) to denote the nature of No-self. This shows that the *adharmā* of the parable of the raft could also easily be interpreted by the Madhyamaka in line with the *Prajñāpāramitā*. According to the Yogācāra, the true nature of phenomena, that is, emptiness or No-self, exists, whereas Passages (b) and (c) advocate the abandonment of *adharmā*, which could mean the abandonment of emptiness. This is an

other reason why the Yogācāra could have changed Passage (b) and (c) to the Variants.

As to the relation between those versions that contain the Variants: Verse-Bodh and Verse-Yi and their commentary Bodh/Yi are earlier versions, which contain Variants (b) and (c). On the other hand, Asg, as evinced by the favor it found among the Chinese Mādhyamikas, evinces weaker Yogācāra influence, and could have incorporated Variant (b) not from Bodh/Yi, since Asg shows no knowledge of Bodh/Yi, but most probably, from a lineage of the *Vajracchedikā* which has not been transmitted to us. Variant (b) in the original Asg (i.e. Asg-b) was then changed back to Passage (b), probably out of familiarity with the traditional parable of the raft, to give Asg-a. Last but not least, the Variants (b) and (c) in Ruci-a hint at the possibility of a lineage of the *Vajracchedikā* which contains the Variants instead of Passages (b) and (c).

Thus, it has been shown that the selective attitude in the Chinese translations of the *Vajracchedikā* and its Chinese commentaries has its precursor in the Indian transmission of the *Vajracchedikā* and the Indian commentaries.

Abbreviations

Asg	Dharmagupta's translation of Asaṅga's commentary on the <i>Vajracchedikā</i> , T1510
Asg-a	first version of Asg, T1510a
Asg-b	second version of Asg, T1510b
Bodh	Vasubandhu's commentary on the <i>Vajracchedikā</i> , trans. Bodhiruci, T1511
Bodh/Yi	Vasubandhu's commentary on the <i>Vajracchedikā</i>
Gu	Guṇadāna's commentary on the <i>Vajracchedikā</i> , trans. Divākara, T1515
Gup	Gupta's translation of the <i>Vajracchedikā</i> , T238
GM	Gómez and Silk, 1989
HW	Harrison and Watanabe, 2006
Ji	Jizang's (吉藏) commentary on the <i>Vajracchedikā</i> , T1699
Jing	Yijing's (義淨) translation of the <i>Vajracchedikā</i> , T239
Ku	Kumārajīva's translation of the <i>Vajracchedikā</i> , T235

Kui	Kuiji's (窺基) commentary on the <i>Vajracchedikā</i> , T1700
MA	<i>Madhyama-āgama</i> (中阿含經), T26
MMK	<i>Mūlamadhyamaka-kārikā</i>
MN	<i>Majjhima-nikāya</i>
Pa	Paramārtha's translation of the <i>Vajracchedikā</i> , T237
Ps	<i>Papañcasūdanī</i> (<i>Majjhimanikāya-aṭṭhakathā</i>)
Ruci	Bodhiruci's translation of the <i>Vajracchedikā</i> , T236
Ruci-a	first version of Ruci, T236a
Ruci-b	second version of Ruci, T236b
Skt	Sanskrit
T	The Taishō Edition of the Chinese Tripiṭaka.
Tucci	Sanskrit edition of Asaṅga's summary verses on the <i>Vajracchedikā</i> ; Tucci, 1956
Vaj	the so-called commentary of *Vajraṛṣi (Jin'gangxian 金剛仙), a "lecture text" composed in China, T1512
Verse-Bodh	Bodhiruci's translation of Asaṅga's summary verses on the <i>Vajracchedikā</i> , the verse portion in Bodh
Verse-Yi	Yijing's (義淨) translation of Asaṅga's summary verses on the <i>Vajracchedikā</i> , T1514 and the verse portion in T1513
Xuan	Xuanzang's (玄奘) translation of the <i>Vajracchedikā</i> , T220(9)
Yan	Zhiyan's (智嚴) commentary on the <i>Vajracchedikā</i> , T1704
Yi	Vasubandhu's commentary on the <i>Vajracchedikā</i> , trans. Yijing, T1513
Zhi	Zhiyi's (智顓) commentary on the <i>Vajracchedikā</i> , T1698

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