

Junjie Chu

On the Notion of *Kidaoyi* (**Avakāśadānāśraya*) as
Discussed in Xuanzang's *Cheng weishi lun*
pp. 271–311

in:

Chen-kuo Lin / Michael Radich (eds.)

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in memoriam

John R. McRae (1947-2011)

On the Notion of *Kaidaoyi* (**Avakāśadānāśraya*) as Discussed in Xuanzang's *Cheng weishi lun*¹

Junjie Chu

1 Introduction

In Xuanzang's (玄奘, 602–664) *Cheng weishi lun* (成唯識論, hereafter CWSL), a kind of digest of commentarial materials on Vasubandhu's *Triṃśīkārikā* (hereafter TrK), in the context of an explanation of the basis (*āśraya*) of the seventh awareness, i.e. the defiled mind, a general discussion of the three bases of thought and thought concomitants (*cittacaitta*) is presented, namely, **hetupratyayāśraya*, **adhipatipratyayāśraya*, and **samanantarapratyayāśraya* (cf. below §3.1. and n. 28). In the case of the third basis, the whole discussion is interestingly held under the heading of *kaidaoyi* (開導依, literally, “opening-leading basis”, or “basis in terms of opening the way for the subsequent awareness and leading it to arise”, cf. Kuiji's explanation quoted below in n. 5). Three different opinions concerning the interpretation of this special term are presented, with sources to back each up, and detailed argumentation on the issues at the center of the debate. This discussion is important because it concerns the way we should understand this technical term, which is otherwise called the “similar-immediate condition” (*samanantarapratyaya*), as it is in the Abhidharma system. That is to say, this discussion is related to the controversy about the function of the awareness in the antecedent mo-

¹ I am indebted to Ven. Prof. Dhammajoti, who read an earlier version of this paper and made valuable suggestions, especially on discussion relating to the Abhidharma system. I am also indebted to Dr. Michael Radich, whose numerous suggestions improved my English and made the presentation more clear and precise.

ment, in respect of the awareness subsequent to it, namely the controversy about the relationship between two kinds of awareness in a thought series (*cittasaṃtāna*), such as sensory awareness and mental awareness. This topic was hotly discussed in the Buddhist epistemological school beginning with Dignāga (c. 480–540), which flourished particularly with Dharmakīrti (c. 600–660).

The main purpose of this paper is to examine the meaning of the two elements of the term *kaidao*yi, namely *kaidao* and *yi*, analyzing their possible origin in the Indian sources of both the Abhidharma and the Yogācāra, and to propose a reconstruction of their original Sanskrit forms. Further, the controversy between the three opinions about this term will also be discussed. It is hoped that this study will shed some light on the above-mentioned issue as it was discussed in the Buddhist epistemological tradition.

2 *kaidao* = *avakāśadāna*

2.1 In CWSL, although three different interpretations of the function and the nature of this *kaidao*yi are introduced, the exact meaning of this term is not explicitly explained. Kuiji (窺基, 632–692), who is traditionally regarded as the most authoritative interpreter of Xuanzang, offers us quite a comprehensive explanation of the term *kaidao*yi in his commentary on CWSL, *Cheng weishi lun shuji* (成唯識論述記, hereafter CWSL-SJ), where he explains the sentence on the third basis, **samanantarapratyayāśraya*, in CWSL. Let us begin with his explanation, which reads as follows:

Now, the word *kai* means that [the preceding awareness] leaves its place, i.e., makes way for the [subsequent awareness]. Again, the word *dao* means that [the former] leads [the latter] to arise; [that is to say,] leads and causes [the latter] to be born in its place.

Thus, in Sanskrit [*kaidao*] is said *jielanduo* (羯爛多, **krānta*). Here [in China], this can be rendered as *cidiyuan* (次第緣, *krāntapratyaya*?²).

² Kuiji seems first to confuse *krānta* with *krama*, which is usually translated as *cidi* (次第), and then to confuse *cidi* with the same characters in the compound *cidiyuan* (次第緣), another standard translation of *samanantarapratyaya* used in Paramārtha's (真諦, 499-

For example, “in reverse order” is said **anukrānta*; *anu* means “reverse”, **krānta* means “in order”; “in due order” (順次第: 須次第) is said **pratīkrānta*; *prati* means “due”.³ When the condition is referred to as *samanantara*, it refers to *dengwujianyuan* (等無間緣), “similar-immediate condition”, because *sam-* means “similar”, *a-* means “un-”, *antara* means “mediate”.⁴

2.2 The first part of this passage is just a literal explanation of the two Chinese characters (*kai-dao*) in the first element of the term. In the second part of this passage, interestingly, a phonetic transcription of the Sanskrit form of the term is provided. In this regard, two points should be clarified.

First, based on Kuiji’s phonetic transcription of the Sanskrit form, *jielanduo*,⁵ given in this explanation, La Vallée Poussin suggests that the term *kaidaoyi* can be reconstructed in Sanskrit as **krānta* (cf. La Vallée Poussin, 1928: 228, n. 2). This is of course correct, and I also follow this reconstruction. However, this Sanskrit term, used in this sense, is not to my knowledge attested in any Indian sources, and Kuiji’s phonetic transcription is dubious.

Second, two terms appear here: **krāntapratyaya* (according to Kuiji!) and *samanantarapratyaya*; in this passage, Kuiji seems not to care about

569) translations of AKBh (AKBh P), corresponding to *dengwujianyuan* (等無間緣) in Xuanzang’s translation (AKBh X).

³ It is possible that this reversed placement of the characters *ni* (逆) and *shun* (順) is a result of miscopying during the process of textual transmission. My thanks to Dr. Hong Luo, who reminded me of this possibility.

⁴ CWSL-SJ 379a8-15: 今言開者。離其處所即開彼路。復言導者引彼令生。引導招彼令生此處。故梵言羯爛多。此可言次第緣。如逆次第云阿奴羯爛多。阿奴是逆義。羯爛多云次第。須次第者。云鉢刺底羯爛多。鉢刺底是順義。此緣既云三摩難咀囉故。言等無間緣也。三是等義。摩是無義。難咀囉是間義故。

⁵ It is almost needless to mention that the initial sound *j-* is to be pronounced in Middle Chinese as *k-*. The pronunciation of the character *jie* (羯) in Middle Chinese is reconstructed in Pulleyblank, 1991: 154 as **kiat*, etc. Cf. also the remark in *ibid.*: 19: “The graph 迦, now pronounced *jiā*, is found almost exclusively in Buddhist transcriptions, where it represents the Indian (Sanskrit or Prakrit) syllables *ka* or *kā*. In the *Guangyun*, it has the reading E. **kia*, which according to the expected regular development ought to give Mandarin *jiē*.”

the difference between *yi=āśraya* (依) and *yuan=pratyaya* (緣), but rather, tries to differentiate **krānta-* from *samanantara-*. He emphasizes that here *kaidaoyi* (**krāntāśraya*) can be understood as **krāntapratyaya*, while *samanantara-* refers to the “similar-immediate condition”. That is to say, according to him, it is not correct to use the term *kaidaoyi* (**krāntāśraya*) or **krāntapratyaya* (次第緣) to refer to *samanantarapratyaya*, “similar-immediate condition”. Although the form *cidiyuan* (次第緣) is also well attested as a Chinese translation of *samanantarapratyaya* in texts of both the Abhidharma and the Yogācāra, according to Kuiji this Chinese phrase can only be used as the translation of **krāntapratyaya*. The sub-commentary authored by Ruli (如理, whose dates are unknown), in explaining this sentence in Kuiji (羯爛多至是間義故者), also says that, here, Kuiji’s intention is to point out the mistake of the “old tradition” in calling the similar-immediate condition *cidiyuan*; thus, the Sanskrit term is introduced as a comparison, for the purpose of differentiating what is correct from what is wrong.⁶ This assertion that **krāntapratyaya* should be separated from *samanantarapratyaya* also seems implausible to me.

2.3 Indeed, the words *kaidao*, “making way and leading to arise”, in the term *kaidaoyi*, express a very common idea, which had already taken root in the old Abhidharma tradition, where the similar-immediate condition is often described as performing the function of “giving way” or “leading to arise” in respect to thought and thought concomitants in the subsequent moment. According to a principle widely accepted by Buddhist philosophical systems from the Sarvāstivāda down to the Yogācāra, the awareness that passed away in the antecedent moment is called “mind” (*manas*). This principle is based on the idea that the five types of sensory awareness have two kinds of “basis”, namely, the material sense faculties and the mental faculty. This is explained in AKBh as follows:

Of these [six awareness-elements] (*ṣaḍvijñānadhātu*), the visual sense is the co-nascent basis of the visual awareness, and so on, up to the tactile sense [which is the co-nascent basis] of the tactile awareness. In addition, for these [five types of sensory awareness], mind also

⁶ Cf. CWSL-SYY 591b19: 羯爛多至是間義故者，此文來意者謂舊喚等無間緣為次第緣謬也。今謂辨其邪正故引梵本對明。

[constitutes] a past basis. Thus, these five groups of [sensory] awareness have two faculties as their bases.⁷

This idea can be traced back to the scriptural tradition – the widely quoted scriptural statement: “Bhikṣus! Visible matter is grasped by means of two [things], i.e., by visual awareness and by mind (*manas*) which is brought into use (*ākṛṣṭa*) by that [visual awareness].”⁸ Here, “visual awareness” refers to the present awareness, and “mind” refers to the previous awareness.

2.4 The statements of this principle can be found in various Abhidharma treatises. PVVibh already speaks of the five sensory awarenesses as each having two kinds of “basis”, the one arising simultaneously, i.e., the five sense faculties such as visual sense, and the other ceasing in the immediate antecedent moment, i.e., the mental sense.⁹ In AMV there is a more detailed discussion. There, a question is asked: “Why is it only said that the thought series (*cittasamṭati*) of the living being in the sensual realm (*kāmadhātu*) and the form realm (*rūpadhātu*) takes a body as its basis (*āśraya*), although it also takes [conditioning forces dissociated from thought] such as the vital faculty (*jīvitendriya*) and group-commonality

⁷ AKBh 34.9-10 (ad AK 1.44d): *tatra caḥsurvijñānasya caḥsuḥ sahaja āśrayo yāvat kāyavijñānasya kāyaḥ. atītaḥ punar eṣām āśrayo mana ity apy ete pañca vijñānakāyā indriyadvayāśrayāḥ.* Cf. the similar idea stated in AMV 137b9: 若生欲界。眼識現在前。此識以眼及無間滅意為依及所依...

⁸ Quoted in DhPr 62.21 (=NBṬṬ 26.10=TBh 15.17-18 with slight deviation): *dvābhyām bhikṣavo rūpaṃ grhyate, caḥsurvijñānena tadākṛṣṭena ca manaseti.* In this sentence, the word *ā-√krṣ* means literally “to draw towards oneself”, but here it must mean “to bring into use”, “to make something active” or “to realize the function of a thing”. In NBṬṬ, the word *manas* is replaced with *manovijñāna*; the meaning then becomes completely different. In that case, the *caḥsurvijñāna* is the past awareness and the *manovijñāna* the present awareness, and the word *ā-√krṣ* means “to cause something to arise”, “bring something into being”. However, this change seems to me to be the result of the influence of Dharmakīrti’s theory that mental awareness is caused by visual awareness as the similar-immediate condition.

⁹ Cf. PVVibh 991b14-15: 或復五識各二所依。一俱時生。謂眼等五。二無間滅。謂即意根。

(*nikāyasabhāga*) as its basis (*niśritya*)?”¹⁰ In answering this question, one explanation is noted as follows: For living beings in these two realms, the present (*pratyupasthita*) sensory awarenesses, such as visual awareness, take both sense faculties, i.e., the visual sense and the mind that ceased in the immediately antecedent moment (*anantaranirodhamanas*), as the basis (with the exception that there is no olfactory awareness and gustatory awareness in the form realm); and in the formless realm (*ārūpyadhātu*), the present mental awareness takes the mind that has ceased in the immediately antecedent moment as its basis.¹¹

A clear and straightforward expression of this principle can be found in Vasubandhu’s AK 1.17ab: “In fact, [the element of] mind is any of the six [groups of] awareness that has passed away in the immediately antecedent moment.”¹² Vasubandhu further explains the relativity of the awareness that passed away in the immediately antecedent moment to the present awareness, saying that just like a person who is himself a son, but is also the father of another person, the awareness that itself is a fruit is also the seed of another fruit.¹³ And Saṅghabhadra also explains the same idea. In answering the question of why the awareness that has ceased to exist is called the basis of the present awareness, he says that this is because this ceased awareness is the immediate condition (*linjinyuan* 鄰近緣) for the present awareness to arise; just as visual awareness, even though it has visible matter [as its condition *qua* object-support (*ālambanapratyaya*)], needs the visual sense as its basis for arising, in the

¹⁰ AMV 137b2-3: 問欲色三界心相續轉亦依命根眾同分等。此中何故但說依身; cf. AKBh 112.11-13: *nikāyasabhāgaṃ jīvitendriyaṃ ca niśrityety ābhidhārmikāḥ rūpiṇām api tarhi sattvānām kim arthaṃ na tad eva dvayaṃ niśritya pravarttate cittasantatiḥ*. In AKBh 62.11-15 (ad AK 2.35-36a) fourteen conditioning forces dissociated from thought are mentioned; cf. Cox, 1995: 182, n. 1, Dhammajoti, 2009: 292-293.

¹¹ Cf. AMV 137b9-20: 若生欲界。眼識現在前。此識以眼及無間滅意為依及所依...如眼識耳鼻舌識應知亦爾。若身識現在前。此識以身及無間滅意為依及所依...若意識現在前。此識以無間滅意為依及所依...如生欲界。生色界亦爾。差別者。彼無鼻舌識。若生無色界。意識現在前。此識以無間滅意為依及所依...

¹² AKBh 11.22 (AK 1.17ab): *ṣaṅṅām anantarātitaṃ vijñānaṃ yad dhi tan manaḥ*.

¹³ AKBh 11.23-24): *yad yat samanantaraniruddhaṃ vijñānaṃ tan manodhātur ity ucyate* ([Ejima ed.: 18.2]: *ucyeta*). *tadyathā sa eva putro ’nyasya pitā bhavati, tad eva phalam anyasya bijam iti*.

same way, the awareness in the subsequent moment needs the mind that ceased to exist in the immediately antecedent moment as its basis for arising; therefore, the phrase “the mind that ceased to exist in the immediately antecedent moment” (read 前念無間滅意 for 前言無間滅意) serves the purpose of excluding the thought interrupted in the antecedent moment. Although [this mind] gives way [in order for the subsequent awareness to arise] (read 開避 for 聞避), it does not directly produce the subsequent awareness; for this reason, the six awarenesses that ceased to exist in the immediately antecedent moment provide the basis for the present awareness and are called the “element of mind” (*manodhātu*).¹⁴

2.5 This principle is also clearly stated in the *Yogācārabhūmi* as follows:

Then what is the similar-immediate condition? Those factors of thought and thought concomitants (*cittacaittā dharmāḥ*) from which [other] factors of thought and thought concomitants arise are called “the similar-immediate condition” of the latter. Thus, those six awarenesses which are the similar-immediate condition of the [other] six awarenesses are mind, designated as “mind” (*manas*) [i.e. the mental faculty (*manaindriya*)], “mental sphere” (*manaāyatana*) and “mental element” (*manodhātu*).¹⁵

A similar statement can also be found in a passage of MS, where Asaṅga explains two aspects of the meaning of “mind” (*manas*): (1) the term refers to the “mind” (*manas*) or thinking faculty in accordance with the theory shared generally also by the Sarvāstivāda and the Sautrāntika,

¹⁴ Cf. NA 342b21-25: 如何已滅名現識依。是現識生鄰近緣故。如雖有色而要依眼識得生。如是雖有所緣境界。而後識生。要依前念無間滅意。是故前言無間滅者。為遮前念有間滅心。雖先聞避而未生故。由此無間。已滅六識。為現識依。說為意界。

¹⁵ YBh (T) Zhi 16a2-3: *de la mtshungs pa de ma thag pa'i rkyen gang zhe na | sems dang sems las byung ba'i chos gang dag gi mjug thogs su sems dang sems las byung ba'i chos gang dag 'byung ba de dag ni | de dag gi mtshungs pa de ma thag pa'i rkyen zhes bya'o || de la rnam par shes pa drug po gang dag yin pa de dag ni rnam par shes pa drug po de dag mtshungs pa de ma thag pa'i rkyen yin te | de dag ni yid la yid ces bya ba dang | yid kyi skye mched ces bya ba dang | yid kyi khams zhes bya bar yang gdags so; =YBh (C) 584b28-c2: 復次云何等無間緣。謂此諸心心所無間。彼諸心心所生。說此為彼等無間緣。若此六識為彼六識等無間緣。即施設此名為意根。亦名意處亦名意界。*

which holds that thought (*citta*), mind (*manas*) and awareness (*vijñāna*) have the same meaning (*pariyāyā*); and (2) it also refers to the defiled mind (*kliṣṭamanas*), in accordance with the theory unique to the Yogācāra. Asaṅga says with regard to the first aspect: “Because it comprises the basis (*āśrayībhūta*) by virtue of performing the function of the immediate condition, the awareness that ceased to exist in the immediately antecedent moment (*anantarāniruddha*), named ‘mind’ (*manas*), is the basis for the arising of awareness.”¹⁶

¹⁶ MS 5.10-13: *de ma thag pa'i rkyen byed pas | gnas su gyur pa'i phyir | rnam par shes pa 'gags ma thag pa yid ces bya ba rnam par shes pa skye ba'i gnas dang...* Cf. also YBh (ed.) 11.6-7: *manaḥ katamat. yat saṅṅām api vijñānakāyānām anantarāniruddhaṃ...* Xuanzang's translation of this passage is worth discussing briefly. According to the Tibetan translation, it is only stated here that the awareness in the immediately antecedent moment is the similar-immediate condition for “awareness”, that is, any kind of awareness. However, in Xuanzang's translation, this “awareness” is specified as “mental awareness” (*yishi* 意識, *manovijñāna*, cf. MS (X) 133c6-7: 第一與作等無間緣所依止性。無間滅識能與意識作生依止); but Paramārtha's translation is similar to the Tibetan (MS (P) 158a21-22: 一能與彼生次第緣依故。先滅識為意。又以識生依止為意). Based on the Tibetan translation, the last part of this sentence can be reconstructed as something like **anantarāniruddhaṃ vijñānaṃ mano nāma vijñānasyotpādāśrayaḥ*; probably Xuanzang had a text something like ...**manovijñānasyotpādāśrayaḥ*, that is to say, *manas* is not construed with the first part of this sentence. This interpretation is also followed by Lamotte in his translation (cf. Lamotte, 1973: 16: “...est le support de naissance [*utpattyāśraya*] de la connaissance mental [*manovijñāna*]”). Nagao does not accept this interpretation, and maintains that *manas* provides the basis for the arising of all of the first six kinds of awareness (Nagao, 1982: 92, n. 2; 93-94, n. 4). Xuanzang's translation is probably influenced by Vasubandhu's interpretation. In MSBh Vasubandhu explains this sentence as follows: “Of these [different meanings of “mind”], because of the fact that it performs the function of the similar-immediate condition, the awareness that already ceased to exist in the immediately antecedent moment comprises the cause of the mental awareness [in the subsequent moment]; this is one [meaning] of ‘mind’;” MSBh 150b1-2: *de la mtshungs pa de ma thag pa'i rkyen byed pa nyid gyi phyir rnam par shes pa gang de ma thag par 'gags pa nyid ni yid kyi rnam par shes pa'i rgyu 'gyur bas de ni yid gcig go* (cf. also Xuanzang's own translation of this sentence in MSBh (X) 325b15: 謂無間滅識與意識為因是第一意). However, Paramārtha's translation of MSBh is different from that of Xuanzang; the second part of this sentence is translated by Paramārtha as: “Again, the mind is the basis for the awareness that is currently arising” (MSBh (P) 158a24: 復有意能作正生識依止). Ui Hakuju (宇井伯壽) interpreted this “awareness that is currently arising” as referring to *ālayavijñāna*, but as is pointed out in Nagao, 1982: 93, n. 2, this is not correct. Nagao interpreted it as referring to “the six awarenesses that are arising”. However, the reading 正生識依止 = **vijñānasyotpadyamāna-*

2.6 Already in the Sarvāstivāda tradition, the similar-immediate condition had been linked with the function of “giving way”. For example, in AMV it is said that the similar-immediate condition is like the [preceding] factor (*dharma*) that gives way [to the subsequent factor].¹⁷ Saṅghabhadra also mentions this idea. However, based on the Sarvāstivāda/Vaibhāṣika’s theory that a factor is present when it exercises its activity (*kāritra*) (cf. Dhammajoti, 2009: 126ff), he emphasizes that only a present factor can perform the function of giving way. Needless to say, this present factor is a past factor by the time the result it brings about is active. Saṅghabhadra says:

It is called “similar-immediate condition” on account of its power of giving way. It is not the case that [something] in the state of just arising (**utpadyamānāvasthā*) has the capacity of giving way; it has the power of giving way only when it has been already produced; and when it is already in the state of having ceased to exist, it is said to have already performed the function of giving way.¹⁸

The same idea is also stated in AK(Bh) 2.63, starting with the question: In respect to a factor in what temporal state (*kimavastha*) do these [four] conditions (*pratyayāḥ*)¹⁹ perform their activity (*kāritra*)?²⁰ Different tem-

syāśrayaḥ seems to me implausible; probably it is just a misreading of **vijñānasyotpādāśrayaḥ*. For the time being, since no Sanskrit text is available, a satisfactory explanation of the disagreement of these translations cannot be offered. I wonder if it is possible that Paramārtha omitted the word *manas* in his translation of the MSBh in order to make it concordant with the *mūla*-text of MS. If Vasubandhu’s text really read *mano-vijñāna*, then a question may be asked: Is it a special theory which holds that the awareness in the antecedent moment provides the similar-immediate condition for the arising of mental awareness only?

¹⁷ AMV 109a26: 等無間緣如開導法。Cf. also *ibid.* 284a19, 285b6: 等無間緣如開避法。

¹⁸ ANA 422c29-23a2: 等無間緣。據開避力。非正生位。有開避能。要已生時。有開避力。若至已滅。名已開避。

¹⁹ I.e., “condition *qua cause*” (*hetupratyaya*), “similar-immediate condition” (*samanantara-pratyaya*), “condition *qua object-support*” (*ālambanapratyaya*) and “dominant condition” (*adhipatipratyaya*). For a discussion of the doctrine of these four conditions, cf. Dhammajoti, 2009: 169-175.

²⁰ AKBh 100.19: *atha saite pratyayāḥ kāritraṃ kurvantaḥ kimavasthe dharme kurvanti.*

poral relationships between the conditions and the conditioned factors are discussed. It is said that of the five types of condition *qua* cause (*hetupratyaya*),²¹ the co-existent cause and the associated cause perform their activities in respect to factors that are “ceasing to exist”, i.e., the “present” factors, while the homogeneous cause, omnipresent cause and maturation cause perform their activities on the factors that are “arising”, i.e., the “future” factors.²² The text then turns to discuss the other three conditions. It is said that the similar-immediate condition performs its activity in respect to factors that are arising, i.e., future factors; the condition of object-support performs its activity in respect to factors that are ceasing to exist, i.e., present factors; further, the dominant condition performs its activity in respect to factors in all temporal states. Interestingly, in talking about the similar-immediate condition, it is explained why this condition performs its activity in respect to “arising” or “future” factors: “because it gives way [to the factors in respect to which it performs its activity]” (*avakāśadānāt*).²³ These factors refer to thought and thought concomitants caused by this condition.

2.7 In the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* section of YBh this idea is described as follows:

²¹ I.e., five of the six “causes” treated in AK(Bh) 2.49-55ab, with the exception of the “efficient cause” (*kāraṇahetu*), namely: “co-existent cause” (*sahabhūhetu*), “homogeneous cause” (*sabhāgahetu*), “associated cause” (*saṃprayuktakahetu*), “universal cause” (*sarvatragahetu*) and “retributive cause” (*vipākahetu*). For a discussion of the definition of these six causes, cf. Dhammajoti, 2009: 149-156.

²² Cf. AK(Bh) 100.19-25 (AK 2.63a-c): *hetupratyayas tāvāt pañcavidha uktaḥ. tatra nirudhyamāne kāritram, dvau hetū kurutaḥ || nirudhyamānaṃ nāma varttamānam. nirodhābhimukhatvāt. tatra sahabhūsaṃprayuktakahetū kāritram kurutaḥ. sahotpanne 'pi phale tayor vyāpāraḥ. trayah jāyamāne || jāyamānaṃ nāmānāgatam utpādābhimukham. tatra sabhāgasarvatragavi-pākahetavaḥ kāritram kurvanti. evaṃ tāvad dhetupratyayaḥ.*

²³ AKBh 101.3-5: *samanantarapratyayāmbanapratyayau veditavyau. samanantarapratyayo jāyamāne kāritram karoty avakāśadānāt. āmbanapratyayo nirudhyamāne, varttamānāis cītatacittair grahaṇāt. adhipatipratyayas tu sarvasyām avasthāyām anāvaraṇabhāvenāvasthita ity etad evāsyā kāritram. uktāḥ sakāritrāḥ pratyayāḥ.* In this passage, the phrase *avakāśadāna* is translated by Xuanzang *yu qi chu* (與其處, AKBh X 37c3), but it is explained in Yuanhui's (圓暉, 8th c., exact dates unknown) commentary as *kaipilu* (開避路): “It gives way, because it makes way immediately upon the arising of the resulting factor” (JSLs-Slb 859b4: 以等無間。果法生時。開避路故。與其處也)。

Only the factors of thought and thought concomitants have both a similar-immediate condition and a condition *qua* object-support.²⁴ To wit: the factors of thought and thought concomitants, being supported (*parigrhīta*)²⁵ by [thought and thought concomitants] born previ-

²⁴ This statement can be compared with AK 2.34bcd quoted below at the end of n. 42.

²⁵ Here the word *parigrhīta* or *parigraha*, used also below in the compound *parigrahaheṭu*, has a special meaning, different from its normal use in the sense of “taking possession” as in the compound *ātmabhāvaparigraha* (the meaning and use of this compound is discussed at length in Schmithausen, 1987: 552-566). *Parigrahaheṭu*, as the fourth or fifth cause of the ten causes (*daśa hetavaḥ*), is explained elsewhere in YBh in the context of discussion of the ten causes along with four conditions (*catvāraḥ pratyayāḥ*) and five fruits (*pañca phalāni*). It seems to me that, in this context, this term is used to encompass all secondary causes, apart from the main cause that is usually referred to as the “generative cause” (*nirvṛtīheṭu*) or “seed” (*bīja*). In the BBh, seed (*bīja*), which should be understood as condition *qua* cause (*hetupratyaya*), is regarded as the projecting cause (*ākṣepaheṭu*) or the generative cause (*nirvṛtīheṭu*), while *parigrahaheṭu* refers to other conditions that are separate from “seeds” (cf. BBh 97.24-26: *tatra bījam āvasānikasya svaphalasyākṣepaheṭuḥ. bījanirmuktaḥ tadanyaḥ pratyayaḥ parigrahaheṭuḥ. tad eva bījam svaphalāsaya nirvṛtīheṭuḥ*). Furthermore, *parigrahaheṭu* is explained in another passage as “conditions in the manner that earth and rain [are conditions] for the appearance of a sprout” (BBh 99.22-23: *pṛthivīvṛṣṭyādikaḥ pratyayo 'ṅkuraprādurbhavāya parigrahaheṭuḥ*). In the *Maulī bhūmi* section it is said: “Of them, that which produces is the generative cause. The remainder are causes of means. Any (*ekatya*) *parigrahaheṭu* is a co-existent cause. Just as the visual sense is [the *parigrahaheṭu*] of the visual awareness, in the same way also the auditory sense, etc., [are the *parigrahaheṭu*] of the other awarenesses [respectively]” (YBh (ed) 111.9-11: *tatra janako abhinirvṛtīheṭuḥ. avaśiṣṭā upāyahetavaḥ. sahabhūtāḥ* [em: *sahabhūheṭuḥ*, Tib.: *lhan cig 'byung ba'i rgru*] *tad yathā ekatyaḥ parigrahaheṭuḥ. tad yathā cakṣuś cakṣurvijñānasya, evaṃ śrotādayas tadanyeṣāṃ vijñānānām*). In another passage of this section *parigrahaheṭu* is explained in more detail, and it is connected with “the basis of cause that passed away contiguously” (*śliṣṭānirodhaṃ hetvadhīṣṭhānam*), and “the basis of cause which is the object-field, sense faculty, action, human effort, and view of reality” (cf. YBh (ed) 108.12-20: *tatra śliṣṭānirodhaṃ hetvadhīṣṭhānam adhiṣṭhāya tathā viśayam indriyaṃ kriyāṃ puruṣakāraṃ tattvadarśanaṃ ca hetvadhīṣṭhānam adhiṣṭhāya parigrahaheṭuḥ prajñāpyate. tat kasya hetoḥ. tathā hi. kāmapratīsaṃyukteṣu dharmeṣu samanantarānīrodhaparigrhītā saṃskārāṇāṃ pravṛttir bhavati. viśayaparigrhītendriyaparigrhītā kriyāparigrhītā puruṣakāraparigrhītā ca. yathā kāmapratīsaṃyuktānām evaṃ rūpapratisaṃyuktānām ārūpyapratisaṃyuktānām. tattvadarśanaparigrhītā vā punas tadanyeṣāṃ apratisaṃyuktānām dharmāṇāṃ pravṛttir bhavati. tasmāc chliṣṭānīrodhaṃ viśayam indriyaṃ kriyāṃ puruṣakāraṃ tattvadarśanaṃ cādhiṣṭhāya parigrahaheṭuḥ prajñāpyate*); cf. also La Vallée Poussin, 1928: 457ff., where he translated the passage talking about the ten causes, among which *parigrahaheṭu* is translated “cause adjuvante”.

ously which give way to (*avakāśadāna*) [their successors] and [also being] supported by the object-support, become manifest and come forth. For this reason, the similar-immediate condition and the condition *qua* object-support are to be known as included in the supporting cause (*parigrahaḥetu*).²⁶

In this passage, the phrase *avakāśadāna* is translated in the Chinese version as *kaidao* (開導), the same characters that comprise the first part of the term *kidaoyi*; and as we have seen above (§2.1 and n. 5), the idea of “making room” or “giving way” is also employed by Kuiji when explaining the meaning of this term.

3 *kidaoyi* = **avakāśadānāśraya*²⁷

3.1 With regard to the causes of the arising of thought and thought concomitants, in the Yogācāra system, another set of terms, with “basis” (*āśraya*) at end of the compound, is introduced, although the old terms of the Abhidharma system with “condition” (*pratyaya*) at the end are also still in use. Under this circumstance, we need to explain why “basis” is preferred instead of “condition”. The reason is probably that, according to the Yogācāra, awareness needs a basis (*āśraya*) or substratum (*adhiṣṭhāna*) to perform the function of a condition, and the notion of “basis” is also somewhat related to the gradual development of the idea of the substratum awareness (*ālayavijñāna*) which is finally regarded as the basis of personal existence.²⁸ As we have mentioned above, in CWSL,

²⁶ BBh 99.3-8: *samanantarapratyayaś cālambanapratyayaś ca cittacaitasikānām eva dharmāṇām. tathā hi cittacaitasikā dharmāḥ prāgutpannāvakāśadānapariḡrhitā ālambanapariḡrhitāś ca prādurbhavanti pravartante ca. tasmāt samanantarapratyaya ālambanapratyayaś ca parigrahaḥetunā saṃgrhītau veditavyau.* = YBh (C) 501.15-17: 等無間緣及所緣緣。唯望一切心心法說。由彼一切心及心法前生開導所攝受故。所緣境界所攝受故。方生方轉。是故當知等無間緣及所緣緣。攝受因攝。

²⁷ The word **avakāśadānāśraya* could be two separate words: *avakāśadāna āśrayaḥ*, as in the case of *samanantara āśrayaḥ* (cf. n. 32 below). For convenience I use only the compound form throughout this paper. This also holds for **krāntāśraya*.

²⁸ Cf. Schmithausen, 1987: I:51: “Therefore, it would seem that in the *Pravṛtti Portion* (referring to the first half of the second part of *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī*, see *ibid.* 299, n. 226 - Chu) *ālayavijñāna* has, at least *de facto*, transcended its original feature of essen-

in the context of explaining the basis (*āśraya*) of the seventh awareness, i.e. the defiled mind, a general discussion of the basis of thought and thought concomitants (*cittacaitta*) is provided, and there the word “basis” (*āśraya*) is added to a term ending with “condition” (*pratyaya*). It is said there that all thought and thought concomitants have their basis, and three kinds of basis are mentioned: (1) **hetupratyayāśraya*, or “basis of condition *qua* cause”, which refers to each individual seed (*svabīja*) of conditioned factors (*saṃskṛta*), because the latter arise on this basis and do not arise without their condition *qua* causes; (2) **adhipatipratyayāśraya*, or “basis of dominant condition”, which refers to the six internal cognitive spheres (*ādhyātmikaṃ ṣaḍāyatanaṃ*, i.e., five material sense faculties and one mental sense faculty), because all thought and thought concomitants arise on this basis and do not arise without the co-existent (*sahabhū*) sense faculties; and (3) **samanantarapratyayāśraya*, or “basis of similar-immediate condition”, which refers to the mind that ceased to exist in the previous moment (*pūrvaniruddhamanas*),²⁹ because all thought and thought concomitants arise on this basis and do not arise

tially being bound, and somehow subordinate, to corporeal matter, and has rather in its turn become a fundamental constituent of personality, on a par with corporeal matter and eventually even superseding the latter in its function of basis[-of-personal-existence] (*āśraya*).”

²⁹ According to Kuiji, the element *samanantarapratyaya* in the compound *samanantarapratyaya-āśraya* is indispensable, because by using the term, one can specifically refer to the awareness (i.e., *citta*, the principal thought) that passed away in the immediately antecedent moment, and both the seed that ceased to exist in the previous moment and thought concomitants (*caitta*) can be excluded. Cf. CWSL-SJ 379.22-25: 若言無間依即前滅種子望後種子應是此依。簡異彼故言等無間緣依。若爾前念心所應是此依。是此緣故。不爾心所非是所依。言等無間復是所依故復雙簡也; “If it were called the ‘immediate basis (*anantara-āśraya*)’, the seed that ceased to exist in the previous moment could be this kind of basis in respect to the seed in the subsequent moment. In order to exclude this possibility, it is called the ‘basis of similar-immediate condition’. [Objection:] In this case, thought concomitants (*caitta*) should also be this kind of basis. [Reply:] That is not correct, because the thought concomitants cannot function as a basis [because only the principal thought (*citta*) can perform this function]. It is called ‘similar-immediate’, also, because [the awareness that passed away in the immediately antecedent moment, called ‘mind’] can be the basis [and the thought concomitants are excluded]. [Thus, by this term], a double exclusion is effected.”

without this past mental faculty which performs the function of *kaidao*, “making way and leading to arise” (*kaidao*gen 開導根).³⁰

3.2 From the perspective of the structure of the text, this discussion in CWSL seems to be an unnatural insertion – independent of the main context of discussing the basis of the defiled mind; and indeed, it is just an adapted version of the idea stated in YBh. Actually, in YBh, the relationship between “basis” (here, *adhiṣṭhāna*, “substratum” is used instead of *āśraya*) and “condition” is explained as follows.

Further, based on the seed as the substratum *qua* condition (*pratyayādhiṣṭhāna*), the “condition *qua* cause” is designated; based on [the factor that has] passed away immediately (*śliṣṭanirodha*) as the substratum *qua* condition, the “similar-immediate condition” is designated; based on the object as the substratum *qua* condition, the “condition of object-support” is designated; based on the substratum *qua* condition other than these [i.e., sense faculties], the “dominant condition” is designated.³¹

“Substratum *qua* condition” refers surely to the substratum (*adhiṣṭhāna*) based on which the conditions perform their function; probably it im-

³⁰ Cf. CWSL 19b22-27: 諸心心所皆有所依。然彼所依總有三種。一因緣依。謂自種子。諸有為法皆託此依。離自因緣必不生故。二增上緣依。謂內六處。諸心心所皆託此依。離俱有根必不轉故。三等無間緣依。謂前滅意。諸心心所皆託此依。離開導根必不起故; cf. La Vallée Poussin, 1928: 227ff. In his commentary, while explaining the “basis” of the eight awarenesses, Yuance (圓測, Wöñch’uk) mentions also three kinds of basis equivalent to those three in CWSL, but he uses the term **sahabhūr āśraya* for **adhipatipratyayāśraya*, and *kaidao*yi for **samanantarapratyayāśraya*. He explains the term *kaidao*yi as follows: “The second is the basis that gives way to [the subsequent awareness] (**avakāśadānāśraya*). This means that each of the eight groups of awareness that ceased to exist in the immediately antecedent moment is the basis that gives way to [the awareness] in the subsequent moment. For this reason it is said in [Xuanzang’s] *Vijñaptimātratā[siddhi]...*” Cf. JSMJS 241b5-10: 八識所依。各有三種。一因緣依...二開導依。謂前念滅自類八識。各望後念。為開導依。故唯識云。三等無間緣依。謂前滅意諸心心所。皆託此依。離開導根。必不轉故。三俱有依...

³¹ YBh (ed.) 110.18-21: *tatra bijam pratyayādhiṣṭhānam adhiṣṭhāya hetupratyayaḥ prajñāpyate. śliṣṭanirodham pratyayādhiṣṭhānam adhiṣṭhāya samanantarapratyayaḥ prajñāpyate. viṣayam pratyayādhiṣṭhānam adhiṣṭhāya ālambanapratyayaḥ prajñāpyate. tadanyāni pratyayādhiṣṭhānāny adhiṣṭhāya adhipatipratyayaḥ prajñāpyate.*

plies here the idea which is expressed later with the term *ālayavijñāna*, the substratum from which the various psycho-physical factors arise.

3.3 In the standard Yogācāra texts, these three bases are usually mentioned as *bijāśraya* (“basis in the sense of seed”), *sahabhūr āśrayaḥ* (“co-existent basis”) and *samanantara āśrayaḥ* (“similar-immediate basis”) respectively. In fact, these three bases are already mentioned in the *Maulī bhūmi* of the YBh, where it is said that for visual awareness, the visual sense is the co-existent basis, and mind is the similar-immediate basis, while the substratum awareness (*ālayavijñāna*), qualified as “containing all seeds”, “appropriating the basis of personal existence” and “comprised in the category of maturation”, is the basis in the sense of seed.³² The “mind” is further described as “the awareness [i.e. any one of the six kinds of awareness] that passes away immediately before the visual awareness [arises]”.³³ It seems to be quite possible that, in the discussion of CWSL mentioned above, in the context of discussing the “basis” of the arising of thought and thought concomitants, the theoretical model of “four conditions” that was available in the traditional Abhidharma system was replaced with the new model of “three bases”. Of the four Abhidharma conditions, the Yogācāra texts fail to take up only the “condition *qua* object-support” (*ālambanapratyaya*), for the reason that this condition, which the realistic systems maintained was eternally existent, does not serve the purposes of an idealistic analysis of the arising of thought and thought concomitants.³⁴ The traditional term *hetupratyaya* is now newly defined as the “basis in the sense of seed” (*bijāśraya*), referring the new element *ālayavijñāna*; while the other two elements, *adhipatipratyaya* and *samanantarapratyaya*, are described as *sahabhūr āśrayaḥ*, “co-existent basis”, and *samanantara āśrayaḥ*, “similar-immediate basis” respectively. In the case of these last two bases, notably,

³² Cf. YBh (ed.) 4.6-7: *caḥsurvijñānasya āśrayaḥ katamaḥ. caḥsuḥ sahabhūr āśrayaḥ, manaḥ samanantara āśrayaḥ, sarvabijakam āśrayopādātṛ vipākasamgrhitam ālayavijñānaṃ bijāśrayaḥ*. This passage is also quoted and analyzed in the context of discussion of the occurrence of *ālayavijñāna* in Schmithausen, 1987: 110ff.

³³ Cf. *ibid.* 4.11-12: *manaḥ katamat. yac caḥsurvijñānasyānantarātītam vijñānaṃ*.

³⁴ As is well-known, in Dignāga’s ĀP all possibilities for the existence of an external “condition *qua* object-support” are negated.

only the temporal aspect is taken into consideration, i.e., the fivefold material sense faculty is regarded as the present basis and the mental faculty (“mind”) as the past basis. Also worth mentioning is that the traditional *samanantarapratyaya* is now referred to as *āśraya*; however, the function it performs is still the same, viz. *avakāśadāna*, “giving way”.

3.4 Thus far, we can conclude that *kaidaoyi* refers to a preceding awareness that has ceased to exist, which is called “mind” (*manas*);³⁵ this mind “gives way” in order for the subsequent awareness to arise. It is also worthwhile to note that the idea that the awareness that had passed away in the previous moment is called “mind” with the function of giving way to the subsequent awareness, although it is well accepted in Yogācāra texts, is in fact an old traditional interpretation of the similar-immediate condition in the Abhidharma tradition. Indeed, this generally accepted idea is now expressed by the term **avakāśadānāśraya* in the commentarial materials on Vasubandhu’s TrK passed down to Xuanzang. For this reason, it seems to me that we should probably put aside Kuiji’s rendering of *kaidaoyi* with *jielanduo* or **krānta*, and take the Sanskrit word **avakāśadānāśraya*, “basis that gives way to [the subsequent awareness]”, or more concisely, “basis that gives way”, as the original form of the Chinese term *kaidaoyi*. It seems to me also possible that “basis that gives way” is a new expression used in Yogācāra texts to describe a factor that is understood as the “basis” (*āśraya*) and performs the function of *avakāśadāna*, “giving way [to subsequent awareness]”, which is parallel to *samanantarapratyaya*, “similar-immediate condition”, in traditional Abhidharma texts. That is to say, it is new only in the terminological sense, while the idea expressed by the term is adopted from the old system.

As for Kuiji’s phonetic rendering of the first part of the compound *kaidaoyi* as *jielanduo* = **krānta*, if we assume that he has some kind of information from commentarial materials which are not available to us, the form **krāntāśraya* could be at most a variant of *samanantara āśraya*. In that case, the word **krānta*, “preceding”, was probably used in these

³⁵ Thus, *manas* or “mind” has a double nature: it refers to the mental faculty, the sixth cognitive sphere; and it is also the designation of all awareness that has passed away in the immediately antecedent moment.

commentarial materials to explain the word *samanantara*, “immediately antecedent”, in the term *samanantara āśrayaḥ*. This probably led Kuiji to consider that **krāntāśraya* should be rendered as *cidiyuan*, and *samanantara āśraya* as *dengwujianyuan*.³⁶

3.5 With regard to the difference between **avakāśadānāśraya* or “basis that gives way” and the traditional form, *samanantarapratyaya*, “similar-immediate condition”, we find some interesting discussions. In fact, the former is easily confused with the latter.³⁷ However, if we read the materials carefully, we find that they differ.

According to the interpretation attributed to Dharmapāla, the basis that gives way must be a special kind of similar-immediate condition, but not that condition itself. He states clearly that being a similar-immediate condition is only one of three *sine quibus non* of being a basis that gives way. He says:

Being a basis that gives way means: (1) being a factor that possesses an object-support (**sālabana*)³⁸; (2) being the principal [thought, i.e. *citta*, opposed to *caitta*, “thought concomitant”]³⁹; and (3) having the function of similar-immediate condition.⁴⁰

³⁶ Cf. above n. 5 and §2.2.

³⁷ For example, the Chinese term *kaidaoyi* is translated directly in Yao, 2005: 139-140 as “immediate contiguous conditions (*samanantarapratyaya*)”.

³⁸ AK(Bh) 23.1-3 (AK 1.34ab): *sapta sālambanāś cittadhātavaḥ cakṣuḥśotraḥrāṅjihvākāyamanovijñānadhātavo manodhātus ca ete sapta cittadhātavaḥ sālambanā viṣayagrahaṇāt*. “Seven thought-elements (*cittadhātu*) have an objective support (1.34ab). The thought-elements, i.e., the elements of [the six internal cognitive spheres (*āyatana*), i.e.,] visual awareness, auditory awareness, olfactory awareness, gustatory awareness, tactile awareness, mental awareness, and mind-element, have an object-support, because they grasp an object.”

³⁹ Cf. CWSL-SJ 390a13-15: 為主者。即簡一切心所法等。彼非主故。要主有力方可為依；“Being the principal thought means all thought concomitants are excluded, because they are not the principal thought. Only those which are the principal thought have the power [to be *āśraya*], and thus can be taken as the basis.”

⁴⁰ Cf. CWSL 21b13: 開導依者謂有緣法為主能作等無間緣 (cf. La Vallée Poussin, 1928: 246). In AMV the *sine quibus non* of being the similar-immediate condition are also mentioned: being associated (*saṃprayukta*), having a basis (*sāśraya*), having an aspect (*sākāra*), being active (*ābhoga*) and having an object-support (*sālabana*) (cf. AK 2.34

Kuiji, in commenting on this passage, also says:

The basis that gives way (*krāntāśraya=cidiyuan*) is different from the similar-immediate condition (*samanantarapratyaya=dengwujianyuan*), which is one of four conditions (*catuḥpratyaya*). Any basis that gives way must be a [similar-]immediate condition, but some of the [similar-]immediate conditions are not a basis that gives way.⁴¹

3.6 The difference between the terms “basis that gives way” and “similar-immediate condition” is obvious: The former term indicates the function and the latter the temporal property; the former has “basis” (*āśraya*)

bcd: *cittacaitasāḥ* | *sāśrayālabanākārāḥ saṃprayuktās ca*; “Thought and thought concomitants have a basis, an object support and an aspect, and are associated”); thus, the dissociated conditioning factors (*[citta]viprayuktasamkāra*) cannot be the similar-immediate condition. Cf. AMV 52b3-7: 問何故不相應行。非等無間緣。答若法相應。有所依有行相。有警覺有所緣。彼法可立等無間緣。不相應行不爾。故非等無間緣 (partly translated in Dhammajoti, 2009: 174). In another place in AMV, in replying the objection that the factors of thought and thought concomitants (*cittacaitā dharmāḥ*) in the antecedent moment could not be the similar-immediate condition of those in the subsequent moment, since such factors arise spontaneously on the strength of the retributive cause (**vipākahetubalāt*), the same idea is repeated, but there it is added that these kinds of associated factors in the antecedent moment can serve the function of the similar-immediate condition, because they have the power of leading-arising and giving way to those in the subsequent moment, while the dissociated factors do not have such power, so they cannot be the similar-immediate condition. Cf. AMV 52c7-11: 問若爾異熟心心所法。由異熟因勢力引起。任運而轉。前應非後等無間緣。答心心所法。是相應有所依。有行相有警覺。有所緣故。前念於後有勝勢力。引發開避。故皆是後等無間緣。不相應行與此相違。不可為例。On the issue of whether or not, in order to serve as the similar-immediate condition, the factor in the antecedent moment must be of the same kind as that in the subsequent moment, a divergence of opinions is presented in AMV; there an opinion related to this topic is reported (相似相續沙門說曰), which seems to maintain that only the principal thought (and not thought concomitants such as *vedanā*) can serve the function of the similar-immediate condition, and it is also emphasized that the capacity of giving way is the characteristic of the similar-immediate condition. Cf. AMV 50c19-26: 問為心與心。作近等無間緣非受等。受等與受等。作近等無間緣非心等。為不爾耶。相似相續沙門說曰。心與心作近等無間緣非受等。受等與受等。作近等無間緣非心等。彼不應作是說。所以者何。前已說能開避義是等無間緣相。開避義中。無遠近故。應作是說。前生心聚與後生心聚。作等無間緣。無有差別。如豆等聚。

⁴¹ CWSL-SJ 390a8-10: 開導依者。與四緣中無間緣別。但是開導依必是無間緣。有是無間緣非開導依。

at the end and the latter has “condition”. Besides this, the difference lies also in the fact that the former has a narrower extension than the latter – the former is included in the latter, but not *vice versa*. Indeed the term *āśraya* in the sense referring to past mind is used in AKBh. In AKBh 34.9-16 (*ad* AK 1.44d) there is a discussion about the difference between the basis and the similar-immediate condition. It is said first that the five types of sensory awareness have the sense faculties as their co-nascent basis (*sahaja āśrayaḥ*), and also have “mind” as their past basis (*atīta āśrayaḥ*, cf. AKBh 34.9-10 quoted above in n. 6). Next, a dialectical apparatus of four alternatives (*catuṣkoṭi*) is used to explain the relationship between them. They are represented respectively by:

(A) the visual sense;

(B) the mental function (*caitasika*)⁴² as the element of factor (*dharmadhātu*)⁴³ that has passed away in the immediately antecedent moment;

(C) the mind that has passed away in the immediately antecedent moment; and

(D) factors other than those mentioned above.⁴⁴

According to Yaśomitra’s commentary, in the case of (A), the visual sense is the basis for visual awareness, but not the similar-immediate condition. In the case of (B), the mental function as the element of factor that has passed away in the immediately antecedent moment is the similar-immediate condition, but not the basis, because only the six faculties, i.e.,

⁴² Just as in the case of “(A)”, where only “the visual sense” is mentioned, but the mental faculty (*manas*) should also be implicated, here also “mental function” (= *caitta* “the thought concomitants”) must be representative in nature, not excluding thought (*citta*); because Vasubandhu also says in AK 2.62ab that all arisen thought and thought concomitants, except the final one [i.e., that of an Arhat] are similar-immediate [conditions] (*cittacaittā acaramā, utpannāḥ samanantaraḥ*).

⁴³ Of course, here *dharmadhātu* should be understood in the *ābhidharmika* sense of the term, i.e., as one of the eighteen elements (*aṣṭādaśa dhātavaḥ*), different in technical meaning from the more familiar Mahāyāna *dharmadhātu*.

⁴⁴ AKBh 34.12-13: *catuṣkoṭikaḥ. prathamā koṭiś cakṣuḥ. dvitīyā samanantarātītaś caitasiko dharmadhātuḥ. tṛtīyā samanantarātītaṃ manaḥ. caturthī koṭir uktanirmuktā dharmāḥ.*

the five sense faculties and the mind, are accepted as the basis of awareness. In the case of (C), the mind that has passed away in the immediately antecedent moment can be both basis and similar-immediate condition. And in the case of (D), factors other than those mentioned above refer to the dissociated factors, such as unconditioned factors.⁴⁵ This discussion in the *catuṣkoṭi*-form can also be found in AMV⁴⁶ and ADV.⁴⁷

3.7 Here, through the formulation of four alternatives, the difference between the basis and the similar-immediate condition is clearly demonstrated: all parts of C (the mind that has passed away in the immediately antecedent moment) must be A (a kind of sense faculty), but only part of A can be C, this part being the mind (*manas*); and on the other hand, all parts of C (the mind that has passed away in the immediately antecedent

⁴⁵ Cf. AKV 99.30-100.13: *prathamā kotis cakṣur iti. cakṣurvijñānasya cakṣur āśrayabhāvena, na samanantarapratyayabhāvena. na hi cakṣuś cittacaittasvabhāvam. cittacaitta acaramā utpannāḥ samanantarāḥ* [AK 2.62ab] *iti ca samanantarapratyayalakṣaṇaṃ. dvitīyā kotih samanantarātītāś caitasiko dharmadhātuh. tasya samanantarabhāvena. śaḍ eva hy āśrayā vijñānasyeṣyante cakṣurādayo manaḥ paryantā nānye. tritīyā samanantarātītam manaḥ. ubhayalakṣaṇayuktatvāt. caturthī uktanirmuktā dharmāḥ. koṭitrayamuktā viprayuktā asaṃskṛtādayaḥ.*

⁴⁶ Cf. AMV 369c22-27: 以是因緣應作四句。有法是眼識所依非等無間緣。謂俱生眼。有法是眼識等無間緣非所依。謂無間已滅諸心所法。有法是眼識所依亦是等無間緣。謂無間已滅境界。有法非眼識所依亦非等無間緣。謂除前相。乃至身識四句亦爾。

⁴⁷ Cf. ADV 40.6-15: *kim punar eṣāṃ cakṣurvijñānādīnāṃ sahaja evāśrayaḥ, āhosvid atīto 'pi? tad ucyate - paścimasyāśrayo 'tītaḥ. manovijñānasya kriyāvato nityam āśrayo 'tītaḥ. pañcānāṃ taiḥ sahāpi ca || pañcānāṃ vijñānakāyānāṃ taiḥ sahāpi cātītaś ceti caśabdāt. evaṃ catuṣkoṭika ārabhyate. ye dharmā vijñānaniśrayāḥ samanantarā api te. praśnaś catuṣkoṭikāḥ. niśraya eva cakṣurādayaḥ. samanantarā eva vedanādayaḥ. ubhayaṃ samanantarāniruddhaṃ vijñānam. nobhayam etān ākārān sthāpayitvā.* “Further, do these visual awareness, etc., have only a co-nascent basis, or also a past one? The answer is as follows: The last [of the six awareness-elements] has the past [factor] as its basis. [This means,] the active (*kriyāvāt*) mental awareness always has a past basis. The five [groups of sensory awareness] are also simultaneous with their [bases]. The five groups of [sensory] awareness are simultaneous with their [bases], and yet they also have a past basis, because [the word] *ca* is used. [A discussion] in the form of four alternatives is formulated as follows: Are all factors that serve as the bases of awareness also immediate antecedents? This question [comprises] four alternatives: (A) [Sense faculties] such as the visual sense are only the bases; (B) [Mental factors] such as sensation are only immediate antecedents; (C) Awareness [any of the six awarenesses] that has ceased to exist in the immediately antecedent moment is both [basis and immediate antecedent]; (D) [Any factor] other than these forms is neither.”

moment) must be B (all mental factors including both thought and thought concomitants), but only part of B can be C, this part referring to “principal thoughts”, namely the first six awarenesses; thus, C has a narrower extension than B. This coincides nicely with Kuiji’s statement quoted immediately above.

In summary, the relationship among the **avakāśadānāśraya* or basis that gives way, the similar-immediate condition and their product, that is, awareness including visual awareness and mental awareness, can be illustrated as follows:

moment 1	→ moment 2
<i>samanantarapratyaya</i> =	→ <i>citta/caitta</i>
(<i>citta</i> [<i>manas</i> : * <i>avakāśadānāśraya</i>]	(<i>indriyavijñāna/manovijñāna</i>)
+ <i>caitta</i>)	

4 Three interpretations of **avakāśadānāśraya*

4.1 As mentioned above, in Xuanzang’s CWSL it is reported that there are three divergent opinions about the nature and function of the **avakāśadānāśraya*, “basis that gives way”, which reflect in fact the different understandings of the relationship between two awarenesses in a thought series.

It is well known that in CWSL, when a topic is under discussion, if there are a number of different interpretations they are normally reduced to several opinions attributed to groups headed by important interpreters, such as Nanda, Sthiramati and Dharmapāla. Also, Dharmapāla’s opinion is normally given after that of Sthiramati or others, and is regarded as the final and decisive voice; for Dharmapāla is seen as the orthodox interpreter of Vasubandhu’s TrK, among the ten interpreters whose views are canvassed.⁴⁸ Furthermore, throughout the whole work, on numerous topics, the opinion of Sthiramati is reported as a criticism of Nanda’s interpretation, and Dharmapāla’s interpretation is in turn

⁴⁸ CWSL-SJ 232a8-12: 製此釋者雖十論師。於中護法聲德獨振。故此論題特以標首。此師所說最有研尋。於諸義中多為南指。邪徒失趣正理得方。迴拔眾師穎超群聖者。其惟一入乎。

presented as a criticism of Sthiramati. Indeed, there are controversies between Sthiramati and Dharmapāla regarding many crucial issues; however, as we will see below, in the case of the interpretation of the function of the basis that gives way, they do not differ sharply.

4.2 The first opinion is attributed in Kuiji's commentary to Nanda *et al.*⁴⁹ The main position of this opinion is explained in CWSL as follows:

Some say: The five [sensory] awarenesses cannot continue from a previous moment to a subsequent moment as the same type [such as visual awareness in the previous moment and subsequent moment] or as different types [such as visual awareness in the previous moment and auditory awareness in the subsequent moment], since they come into being necessarily through the projecting force (*yinsheng* 引生, **ākṣepābhinirvṛtta*) of the sixth awareness [in the previous moment]; therefore, they take exclusively the sixth awareness as their basis that gives way. [On the other hand,] because the sixth awareness can continue as the same kind [of awareness in previous and subsequent moments], and because it also comes into being through the projecting force of the five [types of] awareness [in the previous moment], it takes the first six types of awareness [in the previous moment] as its basis that gives way. [Furthermore,] because the seventh and eighth awarenesses can maintain continuity as the same [type of awareness in previous and subsequent moments], and because they do not come into being through the projecting force of other awarenesses, they take only themselves as the basis that gives way.⁵⁰

4.3 Nanda's opinion can be summarized as follows: The five types of sensory awareness cannot continue for two moments; consequently they come into being in dependence on the "projecting force" (*ākṣepa*) of mental awareness and take only this awareness as their basis that gives way; while mental awareness takes the five types of sensory awareness

⁴⁹ CWSL-SJ 387c19-20: 云後開導依至不相續故。述曰。即是難陀等長徒之義。

⁵⁰ CWSL 21a4-8: 有義五識自他前後不相續故。必第六識所引生故。唯第六識為開導依。第六意識自相續故。亦由五識所引生故。以前六識為開導依。第七八識自相續故。不假他識所引生故。但以自類為開導依 (cf. La Vallée Poussin, 1928: 242).

as well as another mental awareness, i.e., the same kind of awareness in the antecedent moment, as its basis that gives way. This opinion is indeed, as I see it, close to the *Maulī bhūmi* of YBh, which reflects the realistic aspect of the earlier Yogācāra, where it is said:

And it is not the case that the five groups of awareness arise simultaneously (*saha*) in two moments, nor is it the case that they arise one from the other immediately one after the other; [rather] immediately subsequent to the five groups of awareness that arise in a single moment, mental awareness necessarily arises. Sometimes, immediately subsequent to these [five groups of awareness, attention (*manaskāra*)] is distracted [elsewhere], and an auditory awareness or any other one of the five groups of awareness may arise thereafter. When this [attention] is not distracted, only mental awareness, called “discerning [thought]” (*niścita*), [would arise] thereafter. Two kinds of mental awareness, i.e., searching [thought] (*paryeṣakaṃ* [*cittam*]) and discerning [thought] (*niścitaṃ* [*cittam*]), conceptualize the object.⁵¹

To a certain extent, this opinion is also similar to Dharmakīrti’s explanation of the similar-immediate condition, i.e., mental awareness (or “mental perception”) is produced by sensory awareness (or “sensory perception”) in the immediately antecedent moment, functioning as the similar-immediate condition.⁵²

⁵¹ YBh (ed.) 58.13-19: *na ca asti pañcānāṃ vijñānakāyānāṃ saha dvayoḥ kṣaṇayor utpattiḥ, na apy anyonyasamanantaram anyonyotpattiḥ. ekakṣaṇotpannānāṃ pañcānāṃ kāyavijñānānāṃ* (read *vijñānakāyānāṃ*, cf. YBh (T) 30a4: *rnam par shes pa’i tshogs lnga po dag gi*, YBh (C) 291b3: 五識身) *anantaram manovijñānam avaśyam utpadyate. tadanantaram kadācid vikṣipyate, tataḥ śrotravijñānam vā anyatamānyatamad vā pañcānāṃ vijñānakāyānāṃ. sa cen na vikṣipyate. tato manovijñānam eva niścitaṃ nāma. tābhyāṃ ca niścitaparyeṣakābhyāṃ manovijñānābhyāṃ sa viśayo vikalpyate.* For a detailed discussion of the earlier Yogācāra position with regard to the relationship between two awarenesses in two moments in connection with the theory of the five types of thought (*citta*) including the “discerning thought” and “searching thought” mentioned here, cf. Chu, forthcoming.

⁵² Cf. PVin 19a-c (19.3-4): *mānasam cākṣavijñānāntarapratyayodbhavam | tadarthānantaragrāhi.* “And mental [perception] arises from sensory awareness as its immediate condition, and grasps the object-referent of the latter in the immediately subsequent moment.” Cf. also PVin 19.5-6: *mānasam apīndriyajñānena samanantarapratyayena svaviśayānantarakṣaṇasahakāriṇā janitaṃ pratyakṣam.* “Also mental [awareness], produced by sensory cognition as its similar-immediate condition with its own object-field in the

As a matter of fact, in the earlier period of development of the Yogācāra system, to which the *Maulī bhūmi* of the YBh belongs, the Yogācāras share the same doctrines in many aspects with the realistic systems, the Sautrāntika, or the Sarvāstivāda. In AMV we read an interesting passage which mentions the different opinions between the Yogācāra and the Abhidharma teachers with regard to the same topic:

Question: Does [each type among] the five awarenesses, such as visual awareness, come forth (**pratyupasthita*) immediately one after the other (*anyonyasamanantaram*) [and thus maintain its continuity]? Answer: The Yogācāra teacher says that [each type among] the five awarenesses, such as visual awareness, does not come forth immediately one from the other, because they all arise immediately from mental awareness. However, the Abhidharma teachers say that [each of] the five [types of] awarenesses, such as visual awareness, can arise immediately [one from the other].⁵³

Here, it is also clearly said that Yogācāra maintains that the five groups of awareness do not arise from the same kind of awareness; rather, they are necessarily produced by mental awareness, a position similar to Nanda, *et al.* This can be regarded as the position of the Yogācāra at its early stage.⁵⁴

Disregarding the point that mental awareness can additionally have an awareness of the same kind in the immediately antecedent moment as its basis that gives way, the salient point of Nanda *et al.*'s position is that the five types of sensory awareness (symbolized as “S”) and mental awareness (symbolized as “M”) come forth one after another in succession, which can be represented thus:

Nanda: S(/M)→M→S(/M)→M→ ...

immediately subsequent phase as the auxiliary factor [for its arising], is a kind of perception.” Cf. also the similar statement in NB 1.9: *svaviṣayānantaraviṣayasahakāri-ṇendriyajñānena samanantarapratyayena janitaṃ tan manovijñānam.*

⁵³ AMV 682b2-4: 問眼等五識展轉無間現在前不。答諸瑜伽師說。眼等五識展轉無間不現在前。皆從意識無間生故。阿毘達磨諸論師言。眼等五識展轉皆得無間而起。

⁵⁴ I will discuss this topic in more detail in Chu, forthcoming.

[“(/M)” indicates the disregarded requirement that mental awareness can have another mental awareness in the antecedent moment as its basis that gives way.]

4.4 This opinion is criticized and refuted by the second opinion, attributed in Kuiji’s commentary to a group of interpreters headed by Sthiramati *et al.*⁵⁵ The refutation starts straightforwardly as follows:

Some [others] maintain: The above-mentioned opinion is not characterized by thorough reasoning (**pariniṣṭhayukti*). Granted that, when the first five groups of awareness are in the state (*avasthā*) of not possessing supernatural power (**a-vaśitā*), obtaining (**lābha*, etc.) [an object spontaneously] or [obtaining] a non-distinctive object (**a-viśiṣṭārtha*), [they can be non-continuous], as [the opponent] says.⁵⁶ But, when they are in the state of possessing supernatural power, as in the case of Buddhas and so on who possess the supernatural power in respect to the object, [i.e., cross-modality,] employing any sense faculty [in respect to any object] interchangeably, determining [objects] effortlessly (*anābhogena*) without the medium of seeking [thought]

⁵⁵ Cf. CWSL-SJ 388a16: 論。有義彼說未為究理。述曰。安惠等解 (in Yao, 2005: 139–140, this opinion is incorrectly attributed to Dharmapāla; in fact, Dharmapāla’s opinion is reported in the next passage, beginning with the phrase “someone else maintains”, 有義; cf. CWSL 21b12). In CWSL, the discussion of Sthiramati *et al.*’s opinion is extended with quotations from YBh, and some special theories are also involved, such the theory of five types of thought (*citta*) and the theory of mental awareness accompanying the five groups of sensory awareness; furthermore, this opinion is associated in Kuiji’s commentary with Dignāga’s *Pramāṇasamuccya*, etc. (cf. CWSL-SJ 420c21–22: 集量論等五俱意識定現量者。必同緣故). All of these points require a separate study, which is provided in Chu, forthcoming.

⁵⁶ Cf. Kuiji 388a25–388b1 (*ad loc.*: 且前五識未自在位。遇非勝境可如所說): 一未自在位。二率爾遇境位。三遇非勝境位。上一位言通下二處。次一遇言貫下第三。後境之言復通第二; “[Here, three mental states are mentioned]: First, the state of not having supernatural power; second, the state of obtaining the object spontaneously; third, the state of obtaining a non-distinctive object. [In this sentence] the word *wei* (位, **avasthā*) in the first item also applies in other two; and the word *yu* (遇, *lābha*, etc.) in the second item also applies in the third; further, the word *jing* (境, *viṣaya*) in the last item applies in the second.” According to this explanation the sentence should be read as: 五識未自在位、遇、非勝境。

(**paryeṣakam* [*cittam*]), why [then] would these five groups of awareness not be continuous?⁵⁷

As we mentioned above, the key point of the opinion of Nanda *et al.* is that the five types of sensory awareness and mental awareness take each other as their basis, and arise one after the other; that means, of course, that the five types of sensory awareness are not continuous, but rather, are interrupted by mental awareness while proceeding from the first moment to the second moment in the series. By contrast, according to Sthiramati *et al.*, sensory awareness, accompanied by mental awareness, can be continuous; only in the special cases where sensory awareness grasps the object spontaneously or the object is not a distinctive one, so that cognition involves no mental activity such as attention (which is mental awareness by nature), can sensory awareness be non-continuous; but, even so, this holds good only for those who have not arrived at the stage of possessing the supernatural power of controlling their sense faculties, and not for the Buddha, and so on.

Further, according to the principle of mental awareness accompanying sensory awareness, the opinion of Nanda *et al.* is challenged by Sthiramati *et al.* as follows:

When the five [types of] awareness arise, there must be a mental awareness to give rise to the mental awareness of the subsequent moment. Why does [this later mental awareness] need the five [types of] awareness as its basis that gives way?⁵⁸

4.5 In the opinion of Sthiramati *et al.*, the five types of sensory awareness take the same kind of awareness in the antecedent moment as their basis that gives way, so that they maintain their continuity; and immediately

⁵⁷ CWSL 21a9-12: 有義前說未有究理。且前五識未自在位。遇非勝境可如所說。若自在位。如諸佛等於境自在。諸根互用任運決定不假尋求。彼五識身寧不相續 (cf. La Vallée Poussin, 1928: 242f.).

⁵⁸ CWSL 21a27: 五識起時必有意識能引後念意識令起。何假五識為開導依。

after their arising they are accompanied by mental awareness.⁵⁹ The conclusion of Sthiramati *et al.* is summarized in CWSL as follows:

It should be said that the five [types of] awareness take all six awarenesses in the antecedent moment as their basis that gives way; [because the five types of sensory awareness are themselves continuous, and also come into being through the projecting force of another awareness, i.e., the mental awareness, they can arise without interruption⁶⁰]. The sixth awareness takes the antecedent [awareness] of its own kind as its basis that gives way, or takes the seventh and the eighth awarenesses [when it arises in the five thought-free (*acittakam*) states, i.e. the ideationless realm, absorption in ideationlessness, absorption into the cessation of ideation, sleep, and fainting].⁶¹

That is to say, the relationship between sensory awareness and mental awareness is that they are not temporally separated in two different moments; rather, they exist in tandem in both moments: in the antecedent moment, both of them serve the function of the basis that gives way for their successors in the subsequent moment; in the subsequent moment, sensory awareness, being the extension of the same kind of awareness in the antecedent moment and continuously produced by mental awareness in the antecedent moment as its basis that gives way, is further accompanied upon its arising by a mental awareness which takes the awareness of its own kind in the antecedent moment as its basis that gives way. This opinion can be presented as follows:

Sthiramati: S/M→S/M→S/M→ ...

⁵⁹ These two points in Sthiramati *et al.*'s opinion, i.e., (1) the five types of sensory awareness are continuous and (2) they are accompanied by mental awareness, along with other relevant theories, are discussed in more detail in Chu, forthcoming.

⁶⁰ Cf. Kuiji's comment in CWSL-SJ 389c18-19: 五識以前六識皆得為依。自相續故。他引生故。得次無間生。

⁶¹ CWSL 21b8-9: 應說五識前六識內隨用何識為開導依。第六意識用前自類或第七八為開導依; cf. CWSL-SJ 389c22-23: 五位無心時。或第七。八為依; cf. also the five thought-free states listed in TrK, 16 where it is stated that mental awareness arises in every case with the exception of these five thought-free states (*acittaka*): *manovijñāna-saṃbhūtiḥ sarvadā āsamjñikād ṛte | samāpattidvayān middhān mūrchanād apy acittakāt.*

[“/” means the simultaneity of the two events.]

4.6 Finally, this second opinion, in its turn, is criticized and refuted by the third opinion attributed to the group of interpreters led by Dharmapāla.⁶² This third opinion reads as follows:

Some say: This theory is not reasonable, either...One [awareness] can be explained as having the power of giving way to the other [awareness], when it does not occur simultaneously with the latter. Since the eight awarenesses in one personal existence (**ekakāye*) are accepted as arising simultaneously, how can these heterogeneous [awarenesses] (**visabhāga*) be the basis that gives way [of one other]? If they are regarded as the basis [that gives way for one other], they should not occur simultaneously; but then, [the resulting doctrine] would fall into line with the other [Hīnayāna] schools (**parapakṣa*),⁶³ which maintain that thoughts do not occur simultaneously.⁶⁴

Here, Dharmapāla’s point is that awarenesses of different kinds, such as sensory awareness and mental awareness, since they exist simultaneously, cannot serve as the basis that gives way for one other.

Dharmapāla continues by saying that in one personal existence different kinds of awareness occur simultaneously, and their number is indeterminate, i.e., the substratum awareness (*ālayavijñāna*) exists together with anything from one to seven kinds of awareness; if they are all

⁶² CWSL-SJ 390a2-4: 論。有義此說亦不應理。述曰...此護法釋。

⁶³ The *Dārṣṭāntika* takes the clear position that thought and thought concomitants do not arise simultaneously; cf. AMV 79c7-11: 謂或有執心心所法。前後而生非一時起。如譬喻者。彼作是說。心心所法依諸因緣前後而生。譬如商侶涉嶮隘路。一一而度無二並行。心心所法亦復如是; “That is to say, there are some who hold that thought and thought concomitants arise one after the other, and do not arise simultaneously. For example, the *Dārṣṭāntika* say that thought and thought concomitants arise in the antecedent or subsequent moments according to causes and conditions. It is just as, when the members of a caravan go through a narrow mountain pass, they pass through one by one, but not two side by side; thought and thought concomitants are the same.”

⁶⁴ CWSL 21b13-17: 有義此說亦不應理...若此與彼無俱起義。說此於彼有開導力。一身八識既容俱起。如何異類為開導依。若許為依應不俱起。便同異部心不並生 (cf. La Vallée Poussin, 1928: 246).

regarded as similar-immediate conditions of one another, then the number of the antecedent awarenesses serving as similar-immediate condition and of the subsequent awareness would be unequal, and also matter, etc. (*rūpādi*) could be a similar-immediate condition, as is maintained in the Hīnayāna system; this would be contradictory to the noble treatise (聖說, *śāstra*) that accepts only thought and thought concomitants as the similar-immediate condition.⁶⁵ Here, the argument apparently has as its background a discussion presented in the *Mahāyānasamgraha*. In that text, the Hīnayāna⁶⁶ idea is refuted that material and thought (*rūpacitta*) is the “seed” (*bīja*) or the condition *qua* cause (*hetupratyaya*), and thus the substratum awareness (*ālayavijñāna*) postulated by the Yogācāra does not need to exist; in this context it is said that material and thought can be at most the similar-immediate condition, but never the condition *qua* cause.⁶⁷ Thus, it is said in CWSL that in that text the mentioning of mat-

⁶⁵ CWSL 21b18-20: 又一身中諸識俱起。多少不定若容互作等無間緣。色等應爾。便違聖說等無間緣唯心心所。Here, “noble treatise” refers to the passage in YBh; cf. above n. 14.

⁶⁶ According to the sub-commentary, this refers to the Sautrāntika, who maintain that matter in the antecedent moment immediately produces matter in the subsequent moment; also thought and its associated (*samprayukta*) *dharma* in the antecedent moment immediately produces thought in the subsequent moment... cf. Lamotte, 1973: 77.

⁶⁷ Cf. MS §1.55 (TP 221.2.4-6): *gang yang gzugs dang sems kyi mjug thogs su 'byung ba chos rnam kyi sa bon nyid du rtog pa de yang gong ma bzhin du mi 'thad kyi steng du gzugs med pa dang | 'du shes med pa nas shi 'phos pa dang | 'gog pa'i snyoms par 'jug pa las lang pa'i de yang mi rung ngo | de ma thag pa'i rkyen du rung ba ma gtogs par dgra bcom pa'i tha ma'i sems kyang mi rung bar 'gyur ro; = MS (X) 137a15-17: 若復有執色心無間生。是諸法種子。此不得成如前已說。又從無色無想天沒。滅定等出不應道理。又阿羅漢後心不成。唯可容有等無間緣; “Again, also the idea (*vikalpa*) [of the Sautrāntika] that the uninterrupted production (*anantaropāda*) of matter and thought is the seed of the *dharmas* is not correct, as stated above (in MS 1.23). Furthermore (*upari*), it is also impossible [for this matter and thought to be the condition *qua* cause] in cases [where no matter and thought exist, such as in] those who have transmigrated (*cyuta*) into the formless (*ārūpya*) and ideationless [realms], and those who have arisen (*vyutthita*) from the meditative attainment of cessation [of ideation] (*nirodhasamāpatti*), etc. It is also impossible that the final thought of an Arhat (*antycitta*) [should be a condition that gives rise to another thought,] except that it is possible for it to be the similar-immediate condition” (cf. Lamotte, 1973: 77, Nagao, 1982: 244).*

ter as similar-immediate condition is a concessionary statement for the sake of argument; that is to say, it grants the Hīnayāna idea that matter and thought in the antecedent and subsequent moments are in the relation of similar-immediate condition, for the purpose of refuting the claim that they are the condition *qua* cause (*hetupratyaya*); but, in fact, matter cannot be regarded as the similar-immediate condition, for in that case the number of the antecedent awarenesses serving as similar-immediate condition would be unequal to the number of the subsequent awareness (since besides thought, matter would also be taken as a similar-immediate condition), and thus the element “similar” (*sam-*) in the term “similar-immediate condition” would serve no purpose; if Sthiramati *et al.* were to say that *sam-* does not limit the number of similar-immediate conditions, but simply indicates the homogeneity (*sabhāga*) of similar-immediate conditions, this would be contradictory to their own assertion that a heterogeneous awareness can be the similar-immediate condition.⁶⁸

4.7 Dharmapāla *et al.*’s position concludes as follows:

Therefore, each of the eight kinds of awareness has only the [awareness] of its own kind (**svajāti*) as its basis that gives way. This conforms very well to the scriptural tradition as well as to reasoning, because [awareness], insofar as it is of the same kind, cannot occur simultaneously.⁶⁹

Thus, Dharmapāla *et al.*’s position is that mental awareness cannot be caused by sensory awareness as its similar-immediate condition, or *vice versa*. That is to say, Dharmapāla *et al.* hold to the strict principle that each kind of awareness can only have its own kind of awareness in the antecedent moment as its similar-immediate condition. This opinion can be represented thus:

⁶⁸ 然攝大乘說色亦容有等無間緣者。是縱奪言。謂假縱小乘色心前後有等無間緣，奪因緣故。不爾等言應成無用。若謂等言非遮多少但表同類。便違汝執異類識作等無間緣。For the interpretation of this passage, cf. CWSL-SJ 390b8-18; cf. also La Vallée Poussin, 1928: 247.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 21b25: 是故八識各唯自類為開導依深契教理。自類必無俱起義故。

Dharmapāla: S→S→S→ ... / M→M→M→ ...

[“/” means the parallelism of the two series of events]

4.8 For Sthiramati, when the five awarenesses take awareness of their own kind in the antecedent moment as their basis that gives way, being always accompanied by mental awareness, they by definition also take mental awareness in that moment as their basis that gives way, since mental awareness and sensory awareness are never separated. However, Dharmapāla perceives a contradiction between the fact that one awareness is the basis that gives way of another awareness, and the fact that these two still occur simultaneously.

In fact, however, the difference between these two interpreters is trifling. Both of them accept the simultaneous arising of multiple kinds of awareness. The point on which Dharmapāla disagrees with Sthiramati is that Sthiramati accepts that five types of awareness also take mental awareness, in addition to sensory awareness, as their similar-immediate condition; that is to say, Sthiramati does not strictly enforce the principle that the function of the similar-immediate condition can be performed only by an awareness of its own kind. Indeed, Sthiramati himself does not reject the idea of “similarity” (*sam-*) between the antecedent awareness functioning as the similar-immediate condition and the subsequent awareness conditioned by the antecedent one, for he also stipulates, in his own work, that a thought, being the similar-immediate condition of the subsequent thought, cannot be separated from that subsequent thought by any other kind of thought;⁷⁰ however, in contrast to

⁷⁰ Cf. ASBh 37.23-28.1 (ad AS 29.9-10): *nairantaryasamanantarato 'pīti nāvaśyaṃ kṣaṇanairantaryam kiṃ tarhi cittāntaranairantaryam apy atra nairantaryam draṣṭavyam itarathā hy acittikasamāpattau vyutthānacittasya samāpatticittaṃ na samanantarapratyayaḥ syāt. bhavati ca. tasmād ekasmin saṃtāne paścimsasya cittasya pūrvakaṃ cittaṃ cittāntareṇānantaritam samanantarapratyayaḥ. yathā cittaṃ evaṃ caitasikā api veditavyāḥ.* “Due to its being similar-immediate, viz. without interval, as well as... This does not necessarily mean [that there is] no interval between moments; rather, here, [a state in which there is] no interval between thoughts [even if other moments do intervene] is also to be regarded as the immediate. For otherwise, the thought at [the inception of the thought-free] meditative attainment (*samāpatticitta*) would not be the similar-immediate condition of the thought [after] arising (*vyutthānacitta*) from that thought-free meditative attainment (*acittikasamāpatti*) [since there is an interval of thought-free moments between these two thoughts], but [in fact] it is. [This is because there is no other kind of

Dharmapāla, he places the emphasis on the continuity of thought. In the case of the five awarenesses, as discussed above, even though they take mental awareness in the antecedent moment as their similar-immediate condition, they can maintain continuity under the condition that they are accompanied by mental awareness, and are not separate from the latter.

4.9 The fact that Dharmapāla does not disagree with Sthiramati on the fundamental point that sensory awareness and mental awareness can arise simultaneously, and thus can have a common object, can be confirmed in his commentary on Dignāga's *ĀP*. Commenting on the meaning of the word "etc." (等 = *la sogs pa*) in the first sentence "those who maintain that the external object is the object-support of the visual cognition, etc.",⁷¹ he introduces an interesting discussion. Although the meaning of this passage is not completely clear to me in every detail, the gist is surely as follows. According to Dharmapāla, realistic systems hold that the object of the five types of sensory awareness is real, while that of mental awareness is unreal – they make a clear-cut distinction between the nature of the object of sensory awareness and that of mental awareness.⁷² Based on this assumption, it is held that the target of Dignāga's refutation is merely the existence of the object of the five types of sensory awareness, and not the object of mental awareness, because the latter does not need refutation.⁷³

thought between them.] Therefore, within one [thought-]series, the antecedent thought, not being separated by any other kind of thought, is the similar-immediate condition of the subsequent thought. Thought concomitants are also to be understood in just the same way as thought." A similar idea can also be found in Yaśomitra's commentary on AK 1.17a, AKV 41.28-32. For a more detailed study of Sthiramati's position in this regard, see Chu, forthcoming.

⁷¹ *ĀPV* TD 86a6-7: *gang dag mig la sogs pa'i rnam par shes pa'i dmigs pa phyi rol gyi don yin par 'dod pa de dag...*

⁷² Cf. GSYL-SJ 821a8: 此推他宗執根識不同意識所緣; and *ibid.* 821a12: 此句。乃護法師。斥他宗一向執眼等五識。緣極微和合為真實之事。意識不然非一向故者。

⁷³ Cf. *ĀPT* 889a23-c4: 此中等言。謂攝他許。依其色根五種之識。由他於彼一向執為緣實事故。意識不然。非一向故。許世俗有緣車等故。縱許意識緣實事境。有其片分。亦能將識相似之相。離無其境。於眼等識。境不相離。得成就已。方為成立。是故於此不致慙慙。又復於串修果。智所了色。誠非但迦所行境故。及如所見。而安立

However, according to Dharmapāla, such a clear-cut distinction is problematic in respect to the relationship between sensory awareness and mental awareness. He continues by pointing out that in that case the following problem would arise:

If this were the case [i.e. if mental awareness never grasped the real object that is cognized by sensory awareness], how could it be possible that mental awareness in every case comes into being through the projecting force (*ākṣepābhinirvṛtta) of sensory awareness? [Mental awareness cannot come into being through the projecting force of sensory awareness, for in that case] this [mental awarenesses] could neither [arise] simultaneously with sensory awareness, nor in the im-

故。今此但觀聞思生得智之境也。如斯意識所緣之境。全成非有。此於自聚。不能緣故。復緣過未。非實事故。猶若無為。為此等言。攝五識身；“Here, the word ‘etc.’ includes all five types of awareness based on the material sense faculties (*rūpiṇām indriyāṇām) as accepted by other realist systems [such as the Sarvāstivāda]. This is because according to these systems, this kind of awareness always takes really existent things as its object-support; mental awareness is different, because it does not always do so, [that is to say,] because it can also take conventionally existent things, such as a chariot, as its object-support. Even if it were accepted that mental awareness can take a real thing as its object-support in one moment, [after that moment (cf. GSYL-SJ 821a18: 此謂意識緣境。一剎那頃。即離境而緣)] it would still grasp a mental image similar to [that object], separate from that object; [whereas] in the case of visual awareness etc., [the awareness] is never separated from the object. Since [the doctrine of the realistic systems] can be established only by taking this [distinction between the object of sensory awarenesses and that of mental awareness] for granted, no effort needs to be made [to examine the object of mental awareness]. And this is also because the visible matter [consisting in atoms (cf. GSYL-SJ 821b6: 即假想觀中極微色也)] apprehended through cognition resulting from contemplation is definitely not the field (*gocara) of [mental awareness such as] reasoning (*tarka*) or the [verbal] determination of the [imagined] view [of atoms (cf. ibid. 821b9: 是意識緣本質色安立名言。即彼妄執假想觀中分析極微)]. Only by observing the object of hearing and thinking can [mental] cognition arise (ibid. 821b14: 意謂但觀聞思境。生得意識智). Thus, the object taken by mental awareness [in the distracted state (*vikṣiptam*)] as object-support is completely non-existent, because in this [awareness] both [the atom] itself and the aggregate [of atoms] cannot be apprehended (cf. ibid. 821b17-18: 此於自聚不能緣故者。自乃極微。聚名和合。此又謂意識不能緣極微和合為境), and because the object-support in the past or the future is not really existent, just like the unconditioned [factor] (*asaṃskṛta*). For these reasons, through the use of the word ‘etc.’ all five groups of sensory awareness are included [but mental awareness is excluded].”

mediately subsequent moment, because in both cases it takes the visible matter, etc., that have ceased to exist (**niruddha*), as its object-support. Or [you may say:] it takes the present thing as its object-support; then, because this [object-support] has not been experienced (**anubhūta*) by sensory awareness, the mental awareness itself would take the external object *per se* directly as its object-support [independent of the sensory awareness]. This would lead to the unwanted consequence (**iti prasajyate*) that there was no blindness, deafness, etc.⁷⁴

4.10 According to the sub-commentary, this passage serves the purpose of refuting the doctrine of other systems (他宗, **parapakṣa*), which do not accept that the mental awareness takes the five [sensory] object-referents (**pañcārthāḥ*) as its object-field simultaneously with the five [sensory] awarenesses.⁷⁵ “Other systems” here refers, of course, to the realistic systems that assume the separation of sensory awareness from mental awareness. Indeed, for these systems, it is a problem to explain causality between these two kinds of awareness, but not for Sthiramati and Dharmapāla, who both follow the Yogācāra. The Yogācāra, which

⁷⁴ ĀPT 889b4-8: 若爾根識引生所有意識。斯乃如何。非此共其根識同時。或復無間。皆減色等為所緣故。或緣現在。此非根識。曾所領故。斯乃意識自能親緣外境體性。此則遂成無瞶盲等。A similar problem is also discussed by Jinendrabuddhi in his PST: cf. PST 51.13-52, 1: *tatra manovijñānam indriyagrhitam evārthaṃ grhṇāti tato vānyam iti dvayī kalpanā. yadi pūrvā, tatas tasya prāmānyam eva na syāt, grhitagrahaṇāt smrtyādivat. atha dvitīyā, tadāndhāder apy arthagrahaṇam syāt. indriyajñānanirapekṣam hi manovijñānam yadi bāhye 'rthe pravartate, tadā cakṣurādivikalasyāpi darśanam prāpnoti.* “In this regard there are two alternatives – namely, mental awareness grasps precisely the object that is grasped by the sensory [awareness]; or [an object] other than that. If the first were the case, this [mental awareness] would certainly not be a valid means of cognition, because it is an apprehension of what has already been apprehended, like recollection. Alternatively, if the second [alternative] were the case, then a blind person etc. could also grasp the object. For, if mental awareness, independent of sensory awareness, came forth in respect to the external object, then a person without the visual sense would have sight.” This is based on PV 3.239: *pūrvānubhūtagrahaṇe mānasasyāpramāṇatā | adṛṣṭagrahaṇe 'ndhāder api syād arthadarśanam;* “If mental [awareness] apprehended what had already been previously apprehended, it would not be a valid means of cognition; [on other hand,] if it apprehended what is not seen, a blind man would also see things.” The argument is valid only under the assumption that mental awareness apprehends an external object.

⁷⁵ GSYL-SJ 821c4: 此破他宗。不許意識。與五識同時緣五塵為境。

regards the object of sensory awareness as equally unreal with that of mental awareness, can solve this problem easily by maintaining that mental awareness, as a phase of the continuum, is caused by the awareness of the same kind that arose simultaneously with sensory awareness in the antecedent moment, and accompanies the present sensory awarenesses. Thus, mental awareness and sensory awareness share the same object. Dharmakīrti's solution is different: he says that mental awareness arises from sensory awareness as its immediate condition, and it grasps a different object than that which has been grasped by sensory awareness. Thus, since mental awareness also depends on sensory awareness, the unwanted consequence that a blind man would also perceive the object is avoided.⁷⁶ This approach is evidently based on the Sautrāntika position.

5 Conclusion

On the basis of the above study, we can arrive at the following conclusions:

1. The Chinese term *kaidaoyi* reflects a different version of *samanantarapratyaya*, referring to the awareness that has passed away in the immediately antecedent moment, called “mind”, which has the function of giving way in order for the subsequent awareness to arise. The first part of the compound, *kaidao*, expresses exactly this function; thus, it must be a translation of the Sanskrit word *avakāśadāna*. This word is widely used in the texts of both the Abhidharma and the Yogācāra to describe the function of the so-called “mind” that passed away in the immediately antecedent moment.

2. In the Yogācāra system, a set of terms is used to describe the cause of the arising of thought and thought concomitants (*cittacaitta*), which

⁷⁶ Cf. PV 3.243: *tasmād indriyavijñānānantarapratyayodbhavaṃ | mano 'nyam eva grhṇāti viṣayaṃ nāndhadṛk tataḥ*; However, “grasps a different object” is omitted in his later work, cf. NB 1.9: *svaviṣayānantaraviṣayasahakāriṇā indriyavijñānena | samanantarapratyayena janitaṃ tan manovijñānam*; “The mental awareness is engendered by the sensory awareness as its similar-immediate condition with the object-field of the latter in the immediately antecedent moment as the auxiliary [condition].”

end with “basis” (*āśraya*), such as “basis in the sense of seed” (*bijāśraya*), “co-existent basis” (*sahabhūr āśrayaḥ*) and “similar-immediate basis” (*samanantara āśrayaḥ*). This is parallel to the fourfold “condition” (*pratyaya*), i.e., condition *qua* cause (*hetupratyaya*), dominant condition (*adhipatipratyaya*), similar-immediate condition (*samanantarapratyaya*) and objective condition (*ālambanapratyaya*), which was already used in the old Abhidharma texts. It is exactly the “similar-immediate condition” that is now named in CWSL the “basis that gives way”; both of them refer to the same thing: that awareness that has passed away in the immediately antecedent moment, which is called “mind”. Thus, the special term *kaidaoyi*, which is introduced into the discussion of the relationship between mental awareness and the five types of sensory awareness in Xuanzang’s CWSL, is not a translation of the Sanskrit word **krāntāśraya*, as Kuiji’s phonetic transcription *jielanduo* suggests, but rather, of **avakāśadānāśraya*, “basis that gives way”.

3. Concerning the function and the nature of this **avakāśadānāśraya*, controversies among three different interpretations are reported in CWSL. The first opinion, represented by Nanda *et al.*, holds that the five types of sensory awareness cannot continue for more than one moment, and come into being in each moment in dependence on the “projecting force” (*ākṣepa*) of mental awareness, taking only mental awareness as their basis that gives way; while mental awareness takes the five types of sensory awareness as well as another mental awareness (of its own kind) in the antecedent moment as its basis that gives way; thus, the five types of sensory awareness and mental awareness come forth one after another in succession. The second opinion, attributed to Sthiramati, *et al.*, maintains that the five types of sensory awareness take the same kind of awareness as well as mental awareness that accompanies the sensory awareness in the antecedent moment as their basis that gives way, so that they maintain their continuity; and upon their arising they are accompanied by a further mental awareness; thus, sensory awareness and mental awareness are not temporally separated in two different moments, but rather, always arise in tandem. Finally, the third opinion, promoted by Dharmapāla, *et al.*, holds that each of the eight kinds of awareness has only the awareness of its own kind as its basis that gives way; thus mental awareness cannot be caused by sensory awareness as

its similar-immediate condition, or *vice versa*; this opinion adheres to the principle that each kind of awareness can only have its own kind of awareness in the antecedent moment as its similar-immediate condition. The difference between the last two opinions is not significant; both of them accept the simultaneous arising of multiple kinds of awareness. The point on which they differ is that the second opinion accepts that the five types of awareness also take mental awareness, in addition to sensory awareness, as their similar-immediate condition, while the third opinion strictly adheres to the principle that the awareness serving as similar-immediate condition must be of the same kind as the subsequent awareness. However, Dharmapāla does not differ on the fundamental point that mental awareness and sensory awareness arise simultaneously, for he also considers that the mental awareness, arising simultaneously with sensory awareness, can share the same object with the latter.

Abbreviations and primary literature

- ADV *Abhidharmadīpa* with *Vibhāṣāprabhāvṛtti*. Edited by Padmanabh S. Jaini. Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series 4. Patna: Kashi Prasad Jayaswal Research Institute, 1977.
- AKBh *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*: in *Abhidharmakośabhāṣyam of Vasubandhu*. Edited by P. Pradhan. Patna: Kashi Prasad Jayaswal Research Institute, 1975.
- AKBh/Ejima *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya of Vasubandhu*, Chapter I: *Dhātunirdeśa*. Edited by Yasunori Ejima. Tokyo: The Sankibo Press, 1989.
- AKBh P *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya = Apidamo jushe shilun* (阿毘達磨俱舍釋論), Chinese translation made by Paramārtha (真諦), T1559.
- AKBh X *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya = Apidamo jushe lun* (阿毘達磨俱舍論), Chinese translation made by Xuanzang (玄奘), T1558.
- AKV *Abhidharmakośavyākhyā*: in *The Abhidharmakośa & Bhāṣya of Ācārya Vasubandhu with Sphuṭārthā Commentary of Ācārya Yaśomitra*. Edited by S. D. Śāstrī. 2 vols. Varanasi: Bauddha Bharati, 1998.

- AMV **Abhidharmamahāvibhāṣā* = *Apidamo dapiposha lun* (阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論), Chinese translation, T1545.
- ANA *Abhidharmayāyānusāra* = *Apidamo shun zhengli lun* (阿毘達磨順正理論), Chinese translation, T1562.
- ĀP *Ālambanaparikṣātikā*, *Ālambanaparikṣā* in Frauwallner, 1930: 176–179.
- ĀPT *Ālambanaparikṣātikā* = *Guan suoyuan lun shi* (觀所緣論釋), Chinese translation, T1625.
- ĀPV *Ālambanaparikṣāvṛtti* = *dMigs pa brtag pa'i 'grel pa*, Tibetan translation, in D Ce, 86a5-87b2 (= TP Vol. 130, 177b5-179a3).
- AS *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, in *Abhidharma Samuccaya of Asanga. Critically edited and studied by P. Pradhan*. Santiniketan: Visva-Bharati, 1950.
- ASBh *Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya*, in *Abhidharmasamuccaya-Bhāṣya*. Deciphered and edited by N. Tatia. Patna: K. P. Jayaswal Research Institute, 1976.
- BBh *Bodhisattvabhūmi*, in *Bodhisattvabhūmi, a Statement of Whole Course of the Bodhisattva (Being Fifteenth Section of Yogācārabhūmi)*. Edited by U. Wogihara. Tokyo: [press unknown], 1930-1936. Reprint: Tokyo: Sankibo Buddhist Book Store, 1971.
- CWSL *Cheng weishi lun* (成唯識論) = *Vijñānamātrasiddhiśāstra*, by Xuanzang, T1585.
- CWSL-SJ *Cheng weishi lun shuji* (成唯識論述記), by Kuiji (窺基). T1830.
- CWSL-SYY *Cheng weishi lun shu yuyan* (成唯識論疏義演), by Ruli (如理). X815.
- D Tibetan Tripiṭaka, Derge Edition, in *Sde dge Tibetan Tripiṭaka Bstan 'gyur - preserved at the Faculty of Letters, University of Tokyo*. Edited by J. Takasaki, Z. Yamaguchi, Y. Ejima. Tokyo: Sekai Seiten Kanko Kyokai Co., Ltd. for the Faculty of Letter, University of Tokyo, 1981 ff.
- GSYYL-SJ *Guan suoyuanyuan lun shiji* (觀所緣緣論釋記), by Mingyu (明昱). X832.
- JSLs-Slb *Jushe lun song shu lun ben* (俱舍論頌疏論本), by Yuanhui (圓暉). T1823.

- JSMJS *Jie shenmi jing shu* (解深密經疏), by Yuance (圓測, Wōnch'ük). X369.
- MS *Mahāyānasamgraha* = *Theg ma chen po bsduṣ pa*, Tibetan translation, in Lamotte, 1938 (= TP 5549, vol. Li, 215.1.1-226.5.6)
- MS (P) *Mahāyānasamgraha* = *She dacheng lun* (攝大乘論), Chinese translation made by Paramārtha, T1593.
- MS (X) *Mahāyānasamgraha* = *She dacheng lun ben* (攝大乘論本), Chinese translation made by Xuanzang, T1594.
- MSBh *Mahāyānasamgrahabhāṣya*, in *La Somme du Grand Véhicule d'Asaṅga* (Mahāyānasamgraha), Tome I: Versions Tibétaine et Chinoise (Hiuan-Tsang), Louvain-la-Neuve: Université de Louvain, Institut Orientaliste, 1973.
- MSBh (P) *Mahāyānasamgrahabhāṣya* = *She dacheng lun shi* (攝大乘論釋), Chinese translation by Paramārtha, T1595.
- MSBh (X) *Mahāyānasamgrahabhāṣya* = *She dacheng lun shilun* (攝大乘論釋), Chinese translation by Xuanzang, T1597.
- NBṬṬ *Nyāyabinduṭīkātippanī: Tolkovanie na sočinenie Darmottary Nyāyabinduṭīkā. Sanskritskij tekst s priměčanijami.* Ed. F. I. Ščerbatsoj. St. Pétersbourg: Académie Impériale des Sciences, 1909.
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- PV *Pramāṇavārttika:* in PVV.
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- PVVibh **Pañcavastukavibhāṣā-śāstra* = *Wushi biposhalun* (五事毘婆沙論), Chinese translation by Xuanzang, T1555.
- T *Taishō Tripiṭaka*, in *Taishō shinshū daizōkyō* (大正新脩大藏經). Edited by Takakusu Junjirō (高楠順次郎) and Watanabe

- Kaikyoku (渡邊海旭). Tokyo: Taishō Issaikyō Kankōkai, 1924–1932.
- TBh *Tarkabhāṣā*, in *Tarkabhāṣā and Vādasthāna of Mokṣākaragupta and Jitāripāda*. Edited by H. R. Rangaswami Iyengar. Mysore: The Hindusthan, 1952.
- TrK *Triṃśikākārikā*, in TrBh.
- TrBh *Triṃśikāvijñaptibhāṣya*: in *Sthiramati's Triṃśikāvijñaptibhāṣya: Critical Editions of the Sanskrit Text and its Tibetan Translation*. Edited by H. Buecher. Wien: Verlag Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2007.
- X *Shinsan zokuzōkyō* = 卍 *Xuzangjing* (卍續藏經).
- YBh (ed.) *Yogācārabhūmi*, Sanskrit edition, in *The Yogācārabhūmi of Ācārya Asaṅga*. Edited by V. Bhattacharya. Calcutta: Univ. of Calcutta: 1957.
- YBh (C) *Yogācārabhūmi* = *Yuqieshi dilun* (瑜伽師地論), Chinese translation. T1579.
- YBh (T) *Yogācārabhūmi* = *rNal 'byor spyod pa'i sa*, Tibetan translation, in D Vol. 39-40, nr. 4035-4042 (Tshi 1a-, Dzi, Wi, Zhi, Zi, 'I 68b7).

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