

A. Charles Muller

A Pivotal Text for the Definition of the
Two Hindrances in East Asia:
Huiyuan's "Erzhang yi" Chapter
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Chen-kuo Lin / Michael Radich (eds.)

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in memoriam

John R. McRae (1947-2011)

A Pivotal Text for the Definition of the Two Hindrances in East Asia: Huiyuan's "Erzhang yi" Chapter

A. Charles Muller

1 Introduction

Buddhism, especially in its meditative forms, is unique among religious traditions for the attention that it pays to the psychological aspect of human problems, and for the extent to which it distinguishes these problems into the categories of emotional and cognitive. While the general patterns of this distinction between these two aspects of mental function are discernible in early Buddhism, and become clearer in Abhidharmic scholasticism,¹ it is not until the maturation of the Mahāyāna that afflic-

¹ Although the explicit division of all mental disturbances along the general lines of afflictive vs. cognitive is seen mainly in the Mahāyāna systems of Yogācāra and Tathāgatagarbha, we begin to see the formation of precursory structures in Abhidharma texts, where, for example, the afflictive hindrances (*fannaozhang* 煩惱障) are established in contrast to the hindrances to liberation (*jiuetuo* 解脫障). In this case the afflictive hindrances refer to the manifestly active afflictions that serve to obstruct the production of undefiled wisdom, and thus obstruct attainment of liberation through wisdom (*huijietuo* 慧解脫). However, even if one overcomes these hindrances and is able to attain liberation through wisdom, he may still be obstructed by the subtler hindrances to liberation, which impede the attainment of the concentration of total cessation (*miejinding* 滅盡定). Thus, the latter type (also known as the "cessation hindrances", *dingzhang* 定障) are said to impede both types of liberation (*ju jietuo* 俱解脫). The former are seen as being constituted by defiled ignorance (*wuran wuzhi* 染污無知), and the latter by undefiled ignorance (*buwuran wuzhi* 不染污無知). In the **Abhidharma-mahāvibhāṣā-śāstra* (*Apidamo piposha lun* 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論), the first two of the four kinds of correct elimination (*si zheng duan* 四正斷) remove the first kind of hindrance and the second two remove the second kind of hindrance (T27:1545.724b29).

tive and cognitive obstacles to liberation are formally organized under the rubrics of the “two hindrances” – the afflictive hindrances (*kleśa-āvaraṇa*, *fannaozhang* 煩惱障) and the cognitive hindrances (*jñeya-āvaraṇa*; *zhizhang* 智障, *suozhizhang* 所知障²).

While the two hindrances are understood by many scholars as hallmark concepts of the Yogâcāra school, they are actually broad Mahāyāna categories, and as we will see here, the process of refinement and fleshing out of their contents was in some cases more extensive within the texts of the Tathāgatagarbha tradition.

1.1 Parameters for the two hindrances

Throughout the Mahāyāna texts where the hindrances are invoked, their most common function is to serve as a means of distinguishing the content of the Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna paths. The general characterization describes the practices of the adherents of the two vehicles (*śrāvakas* and *pratyekabuddhas*) to be limited in their focus and application of contemplation to the afflictive hindrances, while the practices of the bodhisattvas can be applied to both. In Yogâcāra, this accords with the basic doctrine that understands that the practitioners of the two vehicles are limited in their enlightenment to the realization of selflessness, i.e. recognition of *anātman*, and thus only attain the Hīnayāna *nirvāṇa*, whereas the bodhisattvas penetrate further, to the realization of *śūnyatā*, and can hence attain *bodhi* equal to the buddhas. While the Tathāgatagarbha texts do not define the causes of the hindrances so clearly in terms of this model of attachment to the selfhood of persons and *dharma*s, their descriptions of the hindrances basically agree with this general framework.

² The rendering *zhizhang* (智障) is found in both pre-Xuanzang Yogâcāra and Tathāgatagarbha texts. *Suozhizhang* (所知障) is used in Xuanzang’s translations and becomes standard in subsequent works in the East Asian Weishi (唯識) tradition. It should be noted, however, that Zhiyi (智顓) had already applied the connotation of “the known” (*suozhi*, 所知) in the sixth century in his rendering as *suozhiai* (所知礙). See, for example, T46:1911.85c18.

The development of a comprehensive systematic description of the hindrances in both Yogâcâra and Tathâgatagarbha occurs rather late in comparison with the finalization of other facets of their respective doctrines. The hindrances are mentioned only rarely and sketchily at first, but then with increasing frequency in a broad range of texts over a period of a couple of centuries. At the earliest stages, the hindrances are mentioned with almost no explanation, usually as simple markers to indicate the completion of a certain set of practices, or the attainment of a certain stage. I have outlined the general progression of the two hindrances framework in the Yogâcâra system in another work (Muller, 2013), so I will just summarize it briefly here.

In the Yogâcâra system proper (as accepted by Kuiji [窺基, 632–682] and his colleagues) the hindrances are mentioned only briefly, and with no serious intention of establishing a system, in the *Samdhinirmocana-sûtra*, *Yogâcârabhûmi-sâstra* (hereafter *YBh*), and *Mahâyânasamgraha*.³ The *Madhyânta-vibhâga*, while featuring an entire chapter entitled “The Two Hindrances” (the second chapter), articulates the hindrances in a way that barely relates to the rest of the Yogâcâra system at all. The full and complete definition of the two hindrances as they end up being taught in the Weishi (唯識) system appears in Xuanzang’s (玄奘, 602?–664) translation of the *Fodijing lun* (佛地經論, **Buddhabhûmi-sûtra-sâstra*, T1530, hereafter *FDJL*). This definition is copied almost verbatim into the *Cheng weishi lun* (成唯識論, T1585, hereafter *CWSL*), with a few minor, but very interesting tweaks.

As is now fairly well known, the most comprehensive articulation of two hindrances systems in the known history of Buddhism was carried out by the Korean scholiast Wonhyo (元曉, 617–686) in his *Ijang ui* (二障義, “System of the Two Hindrances”, hereafter *IJU*).⁴ This substantial

³ This does not mean, however, that the phenomena of affliction and nescience are not discussed in great detail in these texts – especially the *YBh*. For in fact, Wonhyo relies on the *YBh* more than any other text in his fleshing out of the two hindrances within the Yogâcâra system. Nonetheless, the hindrances are rarely labeled as *such* there.

⁴ I have published an English study and translation of this text in the volume entitled *Wonhyo's Philosophy of Mind* (Muller, 2012a), which is part of a series-in-progress that aims at providing scholarly translations of all of Wonhyo's extant works.

treatise (twenty-five pages in the *Hanguk bulgyo jeonseo* 韓國佛教全書 – translating out to over 200 pages in English), started out as a digression written in the process of the composition of a commentary to the *Awakening of Mahāyāna Faith* (大乘起信論 T1666, hereafter *AMF*), but grew to such a length that Wonhyo apparently decided to publish it separately. The *IJU* is of critical importance, not just for hindrances discourse, but for its thorough, non-sectarian analysis of East Asian Buddhist philosophy of mind at that point in history, in that Wonhyo was one of the first to clearly identify and discuss the two major forms of Mahāyāna philosophy of mind in a thoroughgoing, comparative, and impartial manner.⁵ These two are what we now call the Yogâcāra tradition (viz., Yogâcāra as understood by the East Asian Weishi/Faxiang lineage, established based on such works as the *Samdhinirmocana-sūtra*, *YBh*, *FDJL*, etc.), and the Tathāgatagarbha tradition (in East Asia largely developed out of the Dilun 地論 tradition, based on such texts as the *Śrīmālādevī-sūtra* [hereafter *ŚDS*], *Ratnagoṭravibhāga*, *AMF*, etc.).

Wonhyo's work is typically thorough. He first distinguishes hindrances discourse into these two main streams, calling the Yogâcāra system the “explicit” (*xianliao men* 顯了門; *nītârtha*) approach and the *AMF*'s system and approach, which “requires further explanation” (*yinmi men* 隱密門; *neyârtha*). He constructs a system for each of these, based on the prominent texts from within their respective traditions. Then – as is typical for Wonhyo – he tries his best to find the ways in which key elements of the two systems can be matched up with each other. To flesh out the Yogâcāra system, he relies primarily on Xuanzang's recently-completed translations of the *YBh*, *Samdhinirmocana-sūtra*, *Mahāyāna-saṃgraha* and so forth. And although he does not cite the *FDJL* by name, it seems that he must have had access to some draft of this text, or perhaps a draft of some of its counterpart passages that were to be included in the *CWSL*, as portions of these critical passages – the most important in

⁵ Basically, Wonhyo was the only major scriptural commentator of the period who did not belong to, and did not in an unbalanced way support, a particular school of Buddhism. I discuss this important aspect of Wonhyo's career in Muller and Nguyen (2012a): 24–42.

forming the final definitions for the hindrances in the Weishi system – appear in the *IJU* unidentified.⁶

For his articulation of the *AMF*'s system of the hindrances, Wonhyo relies on Tathatāgarbha-oriented works such as the *ŚDS*, the *Ratnagoṭravibhāga*, and works central to the Dilun school, such as the *Bodhisattvabhūmi-sāstra* (菩薩地持經 T1581, hereafter *BBh*), along with the *AMF*. Those familiar with the course of translation history in East Asian Buddhism will recognize that there is also a difference of almost a century in the texts being relied on to establish these two systems, with the texts for the Yogâcāra system being almost exclusively the translations of Xuanzang, and the texts for the Tathāgatagarbha system being works that were for the most part available a century or more earlier.

In terms of relative degree of systematicity between the two systems, it is fairly easy to map out an orderly structure for the Yogâcāra system once one has access to the detailed articulation of the hindrances that appeared in the *FDJL* and *CWSL*, as one can then work from this material to locate textual support and to flesh out the development in prior Yogâcāra texts such as the *Ybh*; hence Wonhyo's label of "explicit". Doing the same for the Tathāgatagarbha system is not as easy, since where Weishi Yogâcāra is eminently systematic, the Tathāgatagarbha texts do not in themselves readily form such a tight doctrinal system when it comes to describing the causes, factors, paths, and antidotes that are related to nescience and affliction. Despite this difficulty, Wonhyo, engaging in "further explanation" creates a reasonably systematic map for the Tathāgatagarbha hindrances. But he had some help.

The earliest effort in East Asia to thoroughly define and systematize the hindrances was made by Jingying Huiyuan (淨影慧遠; 523–592) in the form of a chapter in his *Dasheng yi zhang* (大乘義章, T1851, hereafter *DSYZ*) entitled *Erzhang yi* (二障義) – the same title chosen by Wonhyo for his *IJU* (Huiyuan's text is translated in full below, p. 236 ff.). The essay in the *DSYZ* is copied as-is (aside from the unfortunate new insertion of a few dozen scribal errors) into Huiyuan's commentary on the *AMF*, the *Da-*

⁶ While Wonhyo (like most of his scholarly colleagues of the period) did not consider it especially important to cite fellow exegetes, he was especially meticulous – and unusually accurate – in his citation of scriptural sources.

sheng qixin lun yishu (大乘起信論義疏 T1843, hereafter *DQLY*).⁷ This discussion, occupying three full pages in the Taishō canon, appears as a long digression within the commentary. In the *AMF* itself, the hindrances are invoked in a terse and cryptic manner, with almost no explanation. It is obviously the cryptic aspect of this presentation, along with its dissonance with the clearly articulated Yogâcāra framework, that motivated Wonhyo to conduct his own inquiry. In the case of Huiyuan's commentary, it would appear that when he (or his ghost writer) arrived at the cryptic section on the hindrances in the process of the commentary on the *AMF*, he copied in the essay that had been previously written in the *DSYZ*, adding a few sentences before and after for contextualization.

Around the same time (and probably a little after), Zhiyi (智顓, 538–597) composed a much shorter, but nonetheless valuable analysis of the hindrances in his *Mohe zhi guan* (摩訶止觀, T1911).⁸

1.2 Discrepancies

In a general sense, the systems of the two hindrances are quite similar in their structure and function in Yogâcāra and Tathāgatagarbha. In both cases they serve to distinguish between afflictive and cognitive problems. Both systems also generally agree that the afflictive hindrances can be remedied by the practices of Hīnayāna adherents, whereas cognitive hindrances can only be removed by the compassion and insight into empti-

⁷ In 1972 Yoshihide Yoshizu questioned the accuracy of the attribution of Huiyuan's authorship of the commentary to the *AMF* (Yoshizu, 1972) and was later supported by Akira Hirakawa in his *Dajjō kishin ron* (Hirakawa, 1973: 399). The argument presented there is sufficient to concede that this commentary was probably composed after Huiyuan's time. Nonetheless, no one disputes the probability that it was written by a person or persons intimate with Huiyuan's thought, quite possibly one or more of his students, and thus represents his essential teachings. For the sake of simplicity, we will refer to this text as "Huiyuan's Commentary".

⁸ See T46:1911.85b22–c22. This piece was the object of a study by Paul Swanson (1983). Huiyuan and Zhiyi are roughly contemporaneous, and it is not possible to know with precision who wrote first, but since Zhiyi's piece seems to be at least in part a distillation of the far more thorough work by Huiyuan, I am working under the assumption that Zhiyi read Huiyuan, and not *vice versa*.

ness possessed by bodhisattvas. They are also subjected to and intertwined with the whole range of other concepts that these two systems hold in common, such as the role and extent of perfuming (*xunxi* 薰習); distinctions between manifest activity and latency; embeddedness at various depths of consciousness; their removal at certain stages of the path; and their treatment by the primary antidotes of *śamatha* and *vipāśyanā*.

There are also a few telling *problematic* areas in defining the hindrances that the two traditions have in common, and their respective approaches to the resolution of these can tell us much about their distinctive interpretations of the function of consciousness and the applications of practice. One of the most prominent of these problems is the very basic matter (in Yogâcāra) of identifying any given negative mental factor as being specifically afflictive or cognitive. In many cases the categorization of an affliction is obvious (such as lying, jealousy, etc.); but there are mental factors, such as views (*jian* 見),⁹ doubt (*yi* 疑), and pride (*man* 慢), which in Yogâcāra are usually labeled as afflictions, but which also have obvious cognitive dimensions.

Another question that arises is that regarding the limitations in potential attainment assumed regarding the practitioners of the two vehicles, who (as virtually every single reference work tells us) are only capable of removing the afflictions, and not the cognitive hindrances. Does this mean that *śrāvakas* and *pratyekabuddhas* are utterly incapable of dealing with cognitive issues, and that the cognitive problems dealt with by bodhisattvas are entirely bereft of afflictive implications? Finally, how firm is the line between these two broad categories of hindrances? Do they not in some way influence each other, or function like each other? If so, to what extent?

⁹ I have discussed the special case of views (*dṛṣṭi*) in considerable detail in Muller (2011).

2 The *Tathāgatagarbha* system of the hindrances as explained by Huiyuan

These were precisely the sorts of questions that seem to have impelled Huiyuan to conduct his investigation of the hindrances – an investigation the likes of which was unprecedented at his time. Mainly, he wanted to understand how the Mahāyāna viewed and defined the relationship between the afflictive and the cognitive. What he found out was that there was not a single set position or framework. The understanding of this relationship depended on a variety of factors, including: to what system the practitioner was an adherent (Hīnayāna, Mahāyāna); how far he or she was along the path; what kinds of antidotes were being applied, and even the context of any given discussion.

Huiyuan establishes the precedent (later followed by Wonhyo and scholars of Tiantai 天台 and Huayan 華嚴) of explaining the basic framework of the hindrances relying primarily on the doctrine of the four afflictive entrenchments (*si zhudi* 四住地) and the nescience entrenchment (*wuming zhudi* 無明住地) as first articulated in the *ŚDS*, and later invoked in the *Ratnagotravibhāga* (*Bao xing lun* 寶性論), *Foxing lun* (佛性論), and so forth. The four entrenchments¹⁰ as taught in these *Tathāgatagarbha* texts can be understood as four underlying bases from which manifestly active afflictions are generated – and which retain the afflictions when they are in a dormant state. In other words, they are the latent aspects of the hindrances – comparable in connotation to the concept of *bīja* (seeds) in Yogâcāra.¹¹ In the *ŚDS* they are contrasted with active, or “arisen” afflictions (*qifannao* 起煩惱 – analogous to the Yogâcā-

¹⁰ My translation of *zhudi* (住地) as “entrenchment” follows that established by Alex Wayman in his translation of the *ŚDS* (Wayman, 1974). However, Wayman only used the term *entrenchment* in conjunction with nescience, referring to the four afflictive types as “static defilements”. It seems to me that the meaning of *entrenchment* can be usefully applied in both cases, thus my present rendering. See Wayman, 1974: 84, n. 56. Diana Paul’s rendering as “stages” does not seem to reflect a useful understanding of the meaning of this concept; Paul, 2004: 32.

¹¹ This matching of the entrenchments with the notion of seeds is done in the *CWSL*, in a passage that will be cited below.

ra active afflictions, *chan* 纏 or *xianxing fanna* 現行煩惱). The four entrenchments are:

1. *jian yichu zhudi* (見一處住地) entrenchment of identity-view (lit. "seeing a single basis").¹²
2. *yuai zhudi* (欲愛住地) entrenchment of attachment to objects in the desire realm.
3. *seai zhudi* (色愛住地) entrenchment of attachment to things in the form realm.
4. *youai zhudi* (有愛住地) entrenchment of attachment to objects in the formless realm.

The fifth entrenchment is entrenched nescience (*wuming zhudi* 無明住地; *avidyāvāsa-bhūmi*), referring to nescience in its latent aspect as something innate and deeply embedded in the mind, which is extremely difficult to remove. It serves as the basis for the other four entrenchments, and thus forms the basis for the production of afflictions. When entrenched nescience is added to the previous four, they are spoken of as the five entrenchments (*wu zhudi* 五住地).¹³

Taking these five entrenchments as his basic framework, Huiyuan perceives in the source texts a sliding scale of three levels of interpretation, wherein the border between afflictive and cognitive steadily advances toward the cognitive end. These are:

1. The first level, which is the most straightforward and readily apprehensible, is the one that takes the four afflictive entrenchments (*si zhu fanna* 四住煩惱) to be directly equivalent to the afflictive hin-

¹² Based on various commentarial characterizations of this entrenchment, I take it as equivalent to the Yogācāra notion of *satkāya-dṛṣṭi* – or at least, self-view. For example: "How does one at the mundane level eliminate the afflictive hindrances? As the *DBh* explains: 'At the first ground one eliminates the self-hindrances of worldlings. The self of worldlings is equivalent to the entrenchment of identity-view;'" 云何世間斷煩惱障。如地論說。初地斷除凡夫我障。凡夫我是見一處住地 (*DSYZ* T44:1851.563c28–29; see Translation §3.3.2.1.1 below).

¹³ The locus classicus for this structure is the *ŚDS* T12:353.220a1–8.

drances, and the nescience entrenchments to be directly equivalent to the cognitive hindrances.

2. In the second approach, the intrinsic natures of all five entrenchments are collectively understood to constitute the afflictive hindrances, while the inability to properly cognize distinct phenomena (*shizhong wuzhi* 事中無知) constitutes the cognitive hindrances. In this approach, nescience is distinguished into two types: confusion in regard to principle, and confusion in regard to distinct phenomena. Huiyuan identifies this interpretation as equivalent to the presentation of the hindrances in the *AMF* (T44:1843.191a29).
3. In the third approach, the essences of the five entrenchments, as well as obscuration of cognition in regard to both principle and phenomena, are taken to be the afflictive hindrances, leaving only the function of object-discriminating cognition itself as the cognitive hindrances (T44:1843.188c3–9).

Rendered schematically:

afflictive hindrances (<i>fannaozhang</i> 煩惱障)	cognitive hindrances (<i>zhizhang</i> 智障)
four entrenchments of afflictions (<i>si zhufannao</i> 四住煩惱)	nescience entrenchments (<i>wuming zhudi</i> 無明住地)
natures of the five entrenchments, plus confusion in regard to principle (<i>wu zhuxingjie</i> 五住性結 + <i>mili wuming</i> 迷理無明)	nescience in regard to distinct phenomena (<i>shizong wuzhi</i> 事中無知)
natures of the five entrenchments, plus nescience in regard to principle and phenomena (<i>wu zhuxing</i> 五住性 + <i>shiwuzhi</i> 事無知 + <i>mili wuming</i> 迷理無明)	object-discriminating cognition (<i>fenbie yuazhi</i> 分別緣智)

At the first level, cognitive problems are clearly distinguished from afflictive problems. But as we move to the second and third levels, the

cognitive hindrances tend to be constituted by a narrower and subtler slice of the cognitive, with relatively coarse cognitive functions tending toward relegation in the afflictive category. At the second level, cognitive error is defined as *delusive* object-discriminating cognition, and at the third level, as object-discriminating cognition itself.

The straightforward afflictive/cognitive distinction provided at the first level, which separates the nescience entrenchments from the four entrenchments of desire and aversion toward the world, can be readily mapped in a general way to the basic Weishi-Yogâcâra explanation – which Wonhyo will later label as the “explicit” (*nītârtha*) approach.¹⁴ The second level is the one that Huiyuan maps to the description of the hindrances in the *AMF* (T44:1843.191a29). This is in general the category that Wonhyo will later label as the approach “requiring further explanation” (*yinmi men* 隱密門).

Interesting here is the third level, which is not directly discussed by Wonhyo. This is the definition where all five of the entrenchments, plus obscuration of both principle and phenomena, comprise the afflictive hindrances, with the cognitive hindrances consisting only of object-discriminating cognition. The bar is again raised, such that the cognitive hindrances are identified in their impedimentary effect to an even narrower range of mental function, one that in itself usually carries no inherent negative connotations at all. One could argue, however, that it is not incommensurate with the basic view in the *Tathâgatagarbha* texts that any movement of the mind whatsoever is impedimentary to the enlightenment of the Buddha. In terms of textual sources for these three types of interpretation, it is not the case that one interpretation refers to a reading given in any particular text, or family of texts. It is a matter of Huiyuan perceiving a certain way of explaining the relationship between various forms of defilement and cognitive distortion from different sections in what is sometimes even the same text. Nonetheless, it does indicate that although Wonhyo seems to have developed the core part of his

¹⁴ The explanation given to this category, found both in the *ŚDS* and in Huiyuan's commentary on the *AMF*, locates the practitioners of the two vehicles and the bodhisattvas in positions analogous to that found in the *Yogâcâra* explanation, in terms of their ability to deal with the hindrances. See T12:353.220a13–15.

“*neyârtha*” explanation following Huiyuan’s previous work, there are differences between the two in terms of their schemas of the hindrances, since, although the first level can be fairly easily mapped to that of the standard Yogâcâra model, and the second to the *AMF*, the third is problematic.¹⁵

Huiyuan’s analysis constitutes, until the time of Wonhyo’s *IJU* and Xuanzang’s translation of the *FDJL*, the most highly developed articulation of the two hindrances of any kind in East Asia, since, as noted, none of the sutras or *sâstras* available at that time, in Tathâgatagarbha or Yogâcâra, contain any systematic discussion comparable to this. From the East Asian perspective, the fully developed Yogâcâra/Weishi definition of the hindrances (in the *FDJL*, *CWSL*, etc.) actually appears *after* that of the crystallization of the Tathâgatagarbha version in the form of Huiyuan’s above-introduced work. In fact, we even have cause to wonder if Huiyuan’s work may have spurred some Yogâcâra scholars into action on this matter. As I discuss fully in Muller (2013), there is a radical leap in precision and detail in the systematic articulation of the hindrances in the texts of the Weishi-Yogâcâra tradition. That tradition starts with the vague and sketchy passages found in the *Samâdhinirmocana*, *YBh*, and *Mahâyânasamgraha*, and then makes a sudden leap to the comprehensive systematic exposition seen in the *FDJL* and *CWSL*. There is no pure Yogâcâra text at our disposal containing an intermediate level of development of a hindrances system that would readily serve as a bridge between these two stages. Yet during this interim period, the model of the

¹⁵ This difference between the two systems has been again pointed out by Seok, 2010. Seok shows the distinctive aspects of Huiyuan’s interpretation *vis-à-vis* that of the *AMF* and that of the Dilun school, of which he was considered a representative. Dr. Seok has made a valuable contribution to this discussion, but I do think that his attempt to set me up as a straw man, by insinuating that I have claimed that Wonhyo copied Huiyuan’s theory as-is, is disingenuous, as I have repeatedly pointed out the differences between Huiyuan’s and Wonhyo’s approaches on this matter (and did so again in Muller [2006], which he cites). And while he asserts that the matter of Huiyuan’s influence on Wonhyo should be “reconsidered”, he conveniently chooses not to discuss the portion of Huiyuan’s work that I (and others) have identified as having the most obvious influence on Wonhyo: Wonhyo’s usage of the structure of the four entrenchments (*si zhudi* 四住地) and the nescience entrenchment (*wuming zhudi* 無明住地) in defining the framework of the indirect interpretation.

hindrances in the Tathāgatagarbha texts undergoes significant development in such works as the *ŚDS*, *Ratnagotravibhāga*, *Benye jing* (本業經), *AMF*, and most importantly, in the analyses of Huiyuan and Zhiyi. Given this fact, it may be quite possible that even if the masters of the Yogâcāra/Weishi school did not really want to apply the Tathāgatagarbha structure to their own articulation of the hindrances, they may have felt pressure to flesh out their own argument to demonstrate their own level of sophistication on the matter. Argumentation attempting to support this will be given below.

3 The completed Yogâcāra system of the hindrances

Since I have already elaborated the history of the development of the Weishi-Yogâcāra system of the hindrances (Muller, 2012a, 2013), I will not repeat that information again here. The reader should mainly be aware that there is no fully developed systematic explanation of the hindrances in East Asia until the appearance of Xuanzang's translation of the *FDJL* (repeated in the *CWSL*), and that version has been handed down to the present, through Wonhyo and others in Korea, and in such works as the *Kanjin kakumushō* (觀心覺夢鈔, T2312) in Japan. As articulated in Yogâcāra works, the term *afflictive hindrances* refers primarily to all the mental factors (*xinsuo* 心所) that are of unwholesome (*bushan* 不善) quality – which bring suffering and anxiety to sentient beings. Included here are the factors enumerated in such categories as the six fundamental afflictions (*liu fannao* 六煩惱) and twenty secondary afflictions (*sui fannao* 隨煩惱), along with their further derivatives. In the most standard Yogâcāra definition (as one will find in the *YBh*, *FDJL*, *CWSL*, etc.), the afflictive hindrances are said to originate in the view of the selfhood of persons (*wozhi* 我執, *wojian* 我見; *ātma-grāha*, *ātma-dṛṣṭi*, etc.). They are said to be eliminated by the practices of the *śrāvakas* and *pratyekabuddhas*. The cognitive hindrances are said to be derived from the fundamental error of understanding phenomena (*dharma*s) to have intrinsic reality (*fazhi* 法執, *fawozhi* 法我執; *dharma-grāha*). They are conceptual errors, the most subtle of which can only be permanently eliminated by bodhisattvas who have a thoroughgoing awakening to emptiness. The cognitive hindrances serve as the basis for the afflictive hin-

drances. The five levels of Weishi practice (*weishi xiudao wu wei* 唯識修道五位) are distinguished in terms of the bodhisattva's ability to quell and eliminate the active manifest forms, seed forms, and karmic impressions of these two kinds of hindrances.

The *FDJL* has a couple of fairly long sections that treat the hindrances in detail from the most important perspectives, including their content, function, and removal. It is quite clear that the summary of the hindrances in the *CWSL* is derived directly from the *FDJL*, or from a common source – one that was also apparently accessible to Wonhyo, as many of the descriptions of the hindrances found in the *FDJL* also appear in similar, but unreferenced, form in the *IJU*.

However, the *CWSL* contains one vitally important line that shows us that Huiyuan's work was read by Xuanzang and his circle, and was considered important enough for mention, even though they did not formally consider it as part of their own tradition. The critical passage on the hindrances in the *CWSL* starts as follows:

煩惱障者。謂執遍計所執實我薩迦耶見而爲上首、百二十八根本煩惱、及彼等流諸隨煩惱。此皆擾惱有情身心能障涅槃名煩惱障。

What are the afflictive hindrances? With the attachment to the pervasive imputations of an identity-view attaching to a true self at their head, [they include] the 128 fundamental afflictions,¹⁶ as well as all the derivative afflictions that flow out from them. Since they all bring discomfort to the bodies and minds of sentient beings, and are able to obstruct *nirvāṇa*, they are called the afflictive hindrances (T31:1585.48 c6-9).

所知障者。謂執遍計所執實法薩迦耶見而爲上首。見、疑、無明、愛、恚、慢、等覆所知境、無顛倒性、能障菩提、名所知障。

What are the cognitive hindrances? With the attachment to the pervasive imputations of an identity-view attaching to real *dharmas* at

¹⁶ This labeling of the 128 afflictions as “fundamental”, as seen in the *FDJL* and *CWSL*, is unusual, as the term *genben fannao* (根本煩惱) in these and other Yogācāra texts almost always refers to the six fundamental afflictions, which are followed by the twenty-odd derivative afflictions (*ershi suifannao* 二十隨煩惱).

their head, *views, doubt, nescience, attachment, anger, pride* and so forth obscure the undistorted nature of objects of cognition, and are able to obstruct *bodhi*. Therefore they are called the cognitive hindrances (T31:1585.48c10–12; emphasis mine).

It is of critical importance to note here that in listing “views, doubt, nescience, attachment, anger, pride, and so forth”, a set of mental factors from the same set of *fundamental afflictions* has been included in both the *afflictive* and *cognitive* categories of mental disturbances, which means that a careful reader who is intimate with the Yogâcâra system of the hindrances should be aware of a considerable unexplained overlap between afflictive and cognitive here. This does not go unnoticed by Kuiji, who explains this by saying that although these afflictions are listed in both places, we should understand that there are differences in their subtlety, intensity, and amount in each situation.¹⁷ Interestingly, this way of explaining away the ambiguity is not all that different from the way that Huiyuan deals with the same problem. And in fact, the author of this passage (Xuanzang?) is himself well aware of the ambiguity, and feels compelled to address it below. This brings us to the next passage, which constitutes the crux of the present paper.

若所知障有見、疑、等、如何此種契經說爲無明住地。無明增故總名無明。非無見等。如煩惱種立見一處、欲、色、有愛、四住地名、豈彼更無慢無明等。

If the cognitive hindrances include views, doubt, and so forth, how is it that this type¹⁸ [of mental factor] is explained in the scriptures as

¹⁷ See T43:1830.560c1–4.

¹⁸ An anonymous reviewer strongly advocated the rendering of *ci zhong* (此種) here as “these seeds”, following la Vallée Poussin’s rendering (Francis Cook also rendered it this way). However, I do not think that these venerable scholars, nor my reader, had the opportunity to be fully tuned into the two-hindrances issues that contribute to this discussion, where the issue is the *categorization* of certain types of hindrances as afflictive or cognitive; it is not an issue pertaining to their *latency*. Such a rendering also reflects a lack of familiarity with Yogâcâra two hindrances discourse. Where the hindrances are discussed as being in a latent state, the terminology usually employed is that of *suimian* (隨眠; Skt. *anusaya*). They are rarely discussed from the perspective of seeds.

[being included in] the nescience entrenchments?¹⁹ As the effects of nescience expand, [these too] are generally termed nescience. Views and so forth are not excluded. [On the other hand, in] the case of hindrances of the afflictive type constituting the four entrenchments of identity-view, and attachment to desire, form, and formlessness,²⁰ how could they lack pride or nescience [which are understood in the CWSL as cognitive hindrances]? (T31:1585.48c23–26; emphasis mine).

This is a very interesting passage – one somewhat rare in the CWSL. First, “the scriptures” (*qijing* 契經) being referred to are obviously the ŚDS (and perhaps the *Ratnagotravibhāga*). But in fact, those sutras, while introducing the entrenchments, do not actually go as far as mapping the entrenchments to either afflictive or cognitive hindrances. This is done by Huiyuan, which means that the editor of this section of the CWSL was well aware of Huiyuan’s scheme – which has here apparently even achieved the status of scriptural authority! Since the corresponding passages in the *FDJL*, which seem to be the source of this material in the CWSL, contain everything else *except* this statement, this has to be an insertion made at the time of the composition of the CWSL, in response to this specific concern. And while we would not be especially surprised to see notes to this effect in later commentaries by Kuiji *et al.* (and there are), to see mention here of the Tathāgatagarbhic entrenchments, in this, the definitive text of East Asian Weishi-Yogâcāra Buddhism, is notable. This is just one of many examples of the difficulties that Xuanzang and his colleagues were having in dealing with the scriptural authority of Tathāgatagarbha-oriented texts.

¹⁹ However, the “scriptures” being invoked here are not the orthodox Yogâcāra works, such as the *Samdhinirmocana* – it would be a reference to the ŚDS, or the *Ratnagotravibhāga*. The main point is that these mental functions do not fit into that framework, since there they are seen as afflictions existing outside of the nescience entrenchments.

²⁰ *Youai zhudi* (有愛住地) refers to attachment to existence itself, regardless of form. In some texts this is rendered as *wuseai zhudi* (無色愛住地). See, for example, the *Huayan wujiaozhang zhishi* (華嚴五教章指事) at T72:2337.261c2 and the *Tiantai sijiao yi* (天台四教儀) at T46:1931.779c1.

Thus, between Huiyuan's analysis of the hindrances, based on Tathāgatagarbha texts, and the CWSL's analysis, based on Yogâcāra texts, we have a basic disparity in understanding the meaning of, and relationship between, afflictive and cognitive obstructions.

As noted above, this point ends up, for obvious reasons, being intertwined with a couple of related issues, which are: (1) Is it true that the practitioners of the two vehicles do not remove the cognitive hindrances at all? And are the bodhisattvas handicapped when it comes to dealing with afflictions? (2) Are the hindrances really two strictly separate categories? Or do cognitive and afflictive problems influence each other? If so, to what extent?

The commentators of both traditions quite readily concede that they certainly do function in both ways, but they do not necessarily agree on the depth of the overlap. Regarding point #1, the CWSL says:

二乘但能斷煩惱障。菩薩俱斷。永斷二種唯聖道。

The practitioners of the two vehicles are only able to remove the afflictive hindrances. The bodhisattvas remove both. It is only the holy path that is able to permanently eliminate both kinds (T31:1585.48 c29).²¹

Huiyuan takes a more nuanced position, when he writes (cf. Translation below, §1.3.1.1):

The adherents of the two vehicles only remove the afflictive hindrances, and only bodhisattvas extinguish the cognitive hindrances. It is not the case that the adherents of the two vehicles do not partially remove the cognitive hindrances. But since the hindrances that are removed are negligible, the subtle is de-emphasized in favor of the coarse, and thus they are not discussed. It is not the case that the bodhisattvas do not remove afflictions. But since those that are removed

²¹ Note that this somewhat rigid categorization, which disallows any removal of cognitive hindrances by adherents of the two vehicles, does not hold true for all of Yogâcāra. As we will see below, Wonhyo cites passages from the *YBh* that acknowledge that the practitioners of the two vehicles eliminate some cognitive hindrances. Kuiji also takes a looser position in his comment on this passage, acknowledging that the line is not so hard and fast. See T43:1830.562c17–19.

are relatively insignificant, the coarse is de-emphasized in favor of the subtle, and therefore they are not mentioned. (T44:1843.188c29–a2).

On the other hand, regarding point #2, that of the mutual relationship between the hindrances, the CWSL allows for a virtual overlap in function between the two, saying:

所知障亦障涅槃。如何但說菩提障。說煩惱但障涅槃。豈彼不能障菩提。應知聖教依勝用說。理實俱能通障二果。

The cognitive hindrances also obstruct *nirvāṇa*. Why is it said that they only obstruct *bodhi*? And it is said that the afflictions only obstruct *nirvāṇa*. How could they not be capable of obstructing *bodhi*? You should know that the holy teaching relies on the most prominent function in explaining the matter. In principle, both are able to overlap in their obstruction of the two realizations (T31:1585.56a3–6).

This in itself would seem to problematize the rigid position taken above regarding the distinctions between adherents of the various vehicles. Nonetheless, on this present point, the CWSL has no disagreement with Huiyuan, who in fact explains it even more clearly, when he writes (cf. Translation below, §1.2):

Why is it that the four entrenchments are together labeled as the afflictive hindrances, and nescience alone is taken to constitute the cognitive hindrances?

Answer: In principle, they actually function to obstruct both. However, in this case, in order to distinguish between the two hindrances, certain aspects are emphasized or de-emphasized in their naming. In the proper application of emphasis and de-emphasis, each receives its own name according to its most prominent function. The binding of the four afflictive entrenchments in their active state instigates activity that gives rise to distress. Since this connotation is strong, the tendency is to call them afflictions. The mental disturbances in the minds of unenlightened beings are substantially different from liberation. But their distant obscuration of cognition is weak and hence they are not called cognitive hindrances. Nescient obscuration direct-

ly distorts clear understanding, and closely shrouds. Here the meaning of cognitive obstruction is strong, and hence they are called cognitive hindrances. Innate nescience is not active here, and is not able to instigate activity or invite painful retribution. The distress it brings about is slight, and thus it is not called afflictive hindrances (T44:1843.188c18–25).

Thus, both Huiyuan and the *CWSL* readily acknowledge the fact that the naming of the hindrances refers to their more prominent tendencies, and that at a deeper level of analysis, it is obvious that they cannot be separated out from each other.

4 Observations

We have focused here on a very narrow set of categories, through which we attempted to shed some light on the interactive character of the development of the two hindrances in Yogâcâra and Tathâgatagarbha thought. Evidence of mutual influence and cross-fertilization is somewhat obvious, in the sense that the vast majority of what each of the two traditions have to say about the hindrances is not at odds with the other. Most telling in this regard is the shared understanding that both descriptions of the hindrances are a kind of *prajñapti* – a designatory label used to indicate distinctions among things that in reality cannot be clearly discriminated. The human mind, after all, cannot be cut into pieces, any more than reality can be cut into pieces with distinctions between the two truths, essence and function (*tiyong* 體用), or emptiness and existence, all of which just refer to distinctive aspects within a larger whole.

Appendix: Translation²² of *The Two Hindrances*

Preface

惑體有四。一、無明地。二、無明起。三、四位²³地。四、四住地起。四種中無明住地、定不相應。故勝鬘云。心不相應無始無明住地也。妄識之心體是無明故不相應。無明前起經說相應。故勝鬘云。於此起煩惱剎那相應。而隨義細論於中亦有不相應義。是云何知。如此論中業轉現識是不相應染。智識、相續識是相應染。然而此五、皆此無明所起故、有無相應義。

Mental disturbances have four kinds of substance: (1) entrenched nescience; (2) active nescience;²⁴ (3) the four entrenchments [of affliction]; (4) the four states of activity [of affliction]. Among the four, entrenched nescience is definitely not concomitant [with mind]. As is explained in the ŚDS: As for beginningless entrenched nescience not being concomitant

²² Note on the translation: The source for this translation is *DQLY* (*Dasheng qixin lun yishu* 大乘起信論義疏, T1843), the commentary on the *AMF* attributed to Huiyuan (T44: 1843.188b11-191a28). Ideally, it would have been more efficient to use the version of the text contained in *DSYZ* (T44:1851.568b18-564b28). Not only is *DSYZ* the probable origin of the analogous section in *DQLY*, but *DSYZ* is also free from most of the scribal errors contained in *DQLY*. It just happened that I became aware of the secondary version in *DQLY* first, and had edited it extensively before finding out about the version in *DSYZ*. Nonetheless, the version in *DQLY* has some important supplementary material attached (see §4 of the translation below), so working from it is not without its uses. In the process of the translation, I compared the text of *DQLY* to *DSYZ*, correcting and annotating the scribal errors.

²³ Obviously *wei* (位) here is used for *zhu* (住).

²⁴ Fully written as *wuming zhudi* (無明住地). This is nescience in its latent aspect as something innate and deeply embedded in consciousness, which is difficult to remove, and which serves as the basis for the production of afflictions (Skt. *avidyāvāsa-bhūmi*). This category is discussed at length in the ŚDS, the *Benye jing*, and this text. It is explained as being a broad category under which the four distinct entrenchments (*si zhudi* 四住地) are subsumed. When the nescience entrenchment is added as a separate item to the previous four, they are spoken of as the five entrenchments (*wu zhudi huo* 五住地惑). Sanskrit is known from citation of the ŚDS in the *Ratnagotravibhāga*; Johnston (1950): 33–34, Takasaki (1966): 217.

with mind: since the mental substance of the deluded consciousness is nescience, it is not concomitant. The sutra explains that which is arisen prior to nescience as being concomitant.²⁵ Therefore the ŚDS says that when it is active, affliction is momentarily concomitant. Yet if we investigate the meaning carefully, we can also discern an interpretation that allows for concomitance. How do we know this? In this treatise [the AMF], the activity consciousness,²⁶ transforming consciousness,²⁷ and manifest consciousness²⁸ are defiled without being concomitant with the mind. The discriminating consciousness²⁹ and the continuing consciousness³⁰ are defiled and concomitant. Yet since all five of these are produced by nescience, they are also interpreted as being non-concomitant.

²⁵ The discussion of the nescience entrenchment (*wuming zhudi* 無明住地) in the ŚDS is at T12:353.220a2–b28.

²⁶ The “activity consciousness” (*yeshi* 業識) in the AMF is the mental state where, through the agency of nescience, an unenlightened mind begins to be disturbed. Because of the nescience that does not perceive that the suchness of all *dharmas* is originally equal and of a single taste, there is the rising of this unenlightened, mistakenly conceptualizing consciousness. It is the first of the five kinds of consciousness explained in the AMF. The following four are also mentioned here in sequence. See T32:1666.577b7.

²⁷ In the AMF, the “transforming consciousness” (*zhuanshi* 轉識) is a mental state where with awareness having been stirred, the external world enters into consciousness. This is the second of the three subtle marks (*san xi* 三細) of mental evolution. See T32:1666.577b8.

²⁸ The manifesting consciousness (*xianshi* 現識) or “representation-consciousness” in the AMF refers to the perception of an external world; the aspect of consciousness as reflecting the myriad forms in the objective realm, the way a clear mirror reflects all the objects that appear in front of it. This is the third of the three subtle marks (*san xi* 三細) taught in the AMF. T32:1666.577b10.

²⁹ The discriminating consciousness (*zhishi* 智識) is a subtle form of cognition that is capable of differentiating pure and impure *dharmas* in the objective realm. It is the fourth of the five kinds of consciousness taught in the AMF. Wonhyo correlates it with the *manas* (seventh) consciousness taught in Yogācāra. T32:1666.32.577b12; HBJ 1.763 c8.

³⁰ In the system of the AMF, the continuing consciousness (*xiangxushi* 相續識 – which Wonhyo correlates to the Yogācāra mental consciousness – *mano-vijñāna* 意識) is thinking that continues unbroken without cessation. For example, once a deluded thought arises, it continues without limit, thus carrying karma along with it. This is the fifth of the five kinds of consciousness taught in the AMF. T32:1666.577b13.

問曰。若爾、勝鬘何故一向說爲相應。

Question: If this is the case, then why does the ŚDS consistently maintain that they are concomitant?

答曰。爲別無明故偏言耳。四住地者總相麤論唯心相應。隨義細分俱有二義。現起之惑共心相應。性成之惑與心同體、名不相應。以有此義故、雜心中一家使定心相應、一家說使定不相應。義既兩偏、不可偏執。四住所起一向相應。以彼麤起與心別故。故勝鬘云。四住起者剎那相應也。此論中就妄識明相應不相應義。

Answer: In order to specifically distinguish nescience, [the ŚDS] just focuses on one aspect. When one explains roughly the general aspects of the four entrenchments, they are said to be concomitant with the mind. If one investigates the meaning in detail, both interpretations are included. Active mental disturbances are all concomitant with the mind. Innate mental disturbances share the same essence with the mind, and are said to be non-concomitant. It is based on this interpretation that within the **Samyuktābhidharma-hṛdaya-sāstra*, one master says that [the mental disturbances] are definitely concomitant with the mind, and another says that [they] are not.³¹ Since this doctrine has both aspects, we should not attach to one of them. The active afflictions produced from the four entrenchments are uniformly concomitant. This is because they arise in a coarse manner distinguished from the mind. Therefore the ŚDS says that the active afflictions produced from the four entrenchments are momentarily concomitant.³² This treatise elucidates the interpretations of concomitance and non-concomitance from the perspective of the deluded consciousness.³³

³¹ See T28:1552.907b20-22. My thanks to Michael Radich for locating this reference.

³² See, for example, T12:353.220a5.

³³ “Deluded consciousness” (*wangshi* 妄識) is a general term commonly seen in discourse related to the AMF, referring to the mind that has moved from the original condition of thusness. This is correlated to the Yogācāra notion of the mind as influenced by the belief in the inherent reality of objects (*dharmagrāha*), or in the belief in the reality of the self (*ātmagrāha*), and thus is usually a reference to the sixth (*mano*) consciousness, or the seventh (*manas*) – or both taken together.

自下第四就二障辨。前明六重攝爲二障。根本無明以爲智障。業識以下爲煩惱障。然此二障且應廣論。夫、二障者、諸衆生等沒生死中重網羅也。衆惑之根源、遮涅槃路之剛關也。能障聖道名之爲障。障乃無量、取要言之凡有二。

There now follows the fourth section, where the two hindrances are explained. The previously-elucidated six levels include both hindrances.³⁴ [In the *AMF*] fundamental nescience is taken to be the cognitive hindrances, and everything after the activity consciousness is taken to be the afflictive hindrances. Yet these two hindrances merit a detailed elaboration. To wit, the two hindrances are the great net that keep sentient beings submerged in birth and death; they are the source of myriad mental disturbances, the hard barrier that blocks the road to *nirvāṇa*. Since they hinder the holy path, they are called "hindrances". While the hindrances are beyond counting, they generally can be summarized into two types.

一者煩惱障、二者智障。此二障義有三番釋。一者四住煩惱爲煩惱障、無明住地以爲智障。二者五住性結³⁵爲煩惱障、事中無知以爲智障。無明有二。一迷理無明、二事無知。迷理無明是性結也。三者五住性結及事無知同爲煩惱障。分別緣智以爲智障。就初番中四門分別。一、定障相。二、釋障名。三、明斷處。四、對障辨脫。

The first are the afflictive hindrances; the second are the cognitive hindrances. These two hindrances have three levels of interpretation. In the first, the afflictive entrenchments comprise the afflictive hindrances and the nescience entrenchments comprise the cognitive hindrances. In the second, the binding of the five entrenchments at the level of their nature constitutes the afflictive hindrances; ignorance³⁶ in regard to phenome-

³⁴ It is not immediately clear here what "six levels" might refer to, since in the above section, five levels of consciousness were mentioned, and five entrenchments. There is a possibility that Huiyuan could be referring to the six coarse aspects of mind (*liucu* 六麤) of the *AMF*.

³⁵ Following *DSYZ*, correcting *xu* (緒) to *jie* (結).

³⁶ Throughout this translation, for purposes of consistency, I have translated *wuming* (無明) as "nescience", and *wuzhi* (無知) as "ignorance". It is not clear from the text that any significant difference in connotation is expressed by the usage of these two terms, but it seems to be a good idea to separate them.

na constitutes the cognitive hindrances. There are two kinds of nescience: the first is the nescience of confusion in regard to principle; the second is ignorance regarding phenomena. At the third level, the binding of the five entrenchments at the level of their nature as well as ignorance in regard to phenomena comprises the afflictive hindrances; discriminating conditioned cognition constitutes the cognitive hindrances. Starting from the first level, I will analyze each in four ways: (1) determining the characteristics of the hindrances; (2) defining their terminology; (3) clarifying the levels of their removal; and (4) the application of their antidotes.

1 First level

1.1 *Defining the characteristics of the hindrances*

言定相者云何得知四住煩惱爲煩惱障、無明住地以爲智障。以勝鬘經對地持論驗之知矣。勝鬘經中就二乘人但斷四住、不斷無明住地。地持論中說、二乘人煩惱障淨非智障淨。煩惱淨者、猶勝鬘中所斷四住。非智障淨者、猶彼不斷無明住地。故知四住爲煩惱障、無明住地爲智障也。

In defining their characteristics, how do we know that the four entrenchments of affliction comprise the afflictive hindrances and the entrenchment of nescience comprises the cognitive hindrances? We can test this by juxtaposing the *ŚDS* with the *BBh*. The *ŚDS* teaches that the adherents of the two vehicles are only able to eliminate the four entrenchments, and are unable to eliminate the nescience entrenchment.³⁷ In the *BBh* it is explained that the adherents of the two vehicles cleanse themselves of the afflictive hindrances but not the cognitive hindrances.³⁸ This “cleansing of the afflictive hindrances” is equivalent to

³⁷ 阿羅漢辟支佛智所不能斷。恆沙等數上煩惱依。亦令四種煩惱久住; “It is something that the cognitive acuity of the *arhats* and *pratyekabuddhas* is unable to eliminate. It is the basis for virulent afflictions more numerous than the grains of sand in the Ganges. It also allows the four kinds of afflictions to abide permanently” (T12:353.220a13-14).

³⁸ 何以故。有二種淨。一者煩惱障淨、二者智障淨。二乘種性煩惱障淨、非智障淨。菩薩種性具足二淨; “How so? There are two kinds of cleansing. The first is the cleansing of the afflictive hindrances and the second is the cleansing of the cognitive hin-

the removal of the entrenchments of afflictions in the *ŚDS*. The “non-cleansing of the cognitive hindrances” is equivalent to the non-elimination of the entrenchment of nescience. Hence we know that the four entrenchments are equivalent to the afflictive hindrances and the nescience entrenchment is equivalent to the cognitive hindrances.

1.2 Explanation of terminology

次釋其名。五住之結通能勞亂、齊能障智。何故四住遍名煩惱障、無明獨爲智障。

Next is the explanation of terminology. The bindings of the five entrenchments are all able to bring about distress as well as hinder cognition. [Question:] Why is it that the four entrenchments are together labeled as the afflictive hindrances, and nescience alone is taken to constitute the cognitive hindrances?

答。理實齊通。但今爲分二障差別隱顯爲名。等就隱顯各隨功強以別兩名。四住煩惱現起之結、發業生勞亂。義強偏名煩惱。異心之惑與解別體。疏遠翳障智微劣、故不名智障。無明闇惑正遠³⁹明解、親近翳障智義強、故名智障。任性無知非是現起 不能發業招集苦報。勞亂微劣故、不名煩惱障也。

Answer: In principle, they actually function to obstruct both. However, in this case, in order to distinguish between the two hindrances, certain aspects are de-emphasized or emphasized in their naming. In the proper application of emphasis and de-emphasis, each receives its own name according to its most prominent function. The binding of the four afflictive entrenchments in their active state instigates activity that gives rise to distress. Since this connotation is strong, the tendency is to call them afflictions. The mental disturbances in the minds of unenlightened beings are substantially different from liberation. But their distant obscuration of cognition is weak and hence they are not called cognitive hin-

drances. Those who have a nature inclined toward the practice of the two vehicles cleanse the afflictive hindrances. Those who have a nature inclined to the bodhisattva practices cleanse both kinds of hindrances” (T30:1581.888b9–11).

³⁹ Here *DSYZ* has *wei* (違, “differ”) instead of *yuan* (遠, “distance”), which makes more sense.

drances. Nescient obscuration directly distorts clear understanding, and shrouds closely. Here the meaning of cognitive obstruction is strong, and hence they are called cognitive hindrances. Innate nescience is not active here, and is not able to instigate activity or invite painful retribution. The distress it brings about is slight, and thus it is not called afflictive hindrances.

1.3 *Stages of their elimination*

次明斷處。略有二階。第一大小相對分別。二者直就大乘世出世間相對分別。

Next is the elucidation of the stages of elimination. There are two main levels. The first is that of the distinctions between the greater and lesser vehicles. The second is the direct access to the distinctions between the mundane and transmundane within the greater vehicle.

1.3.1 Distinction between Greater and Lesser Vehicles

大小對中義別三門。

The distinction according to greater and lesser [vehicle] is set out in three parts.

1.3.1.1 The contrast between what is de-emphasized and what is emphasized

一者隱顯互論。二乘之人但除煩惱、菩薩之人唯滅智障。二乘非不分除智障。所斷微劣隱細從麤、是故不論。菩薩非不除斷煩惱。所斷相微隱麤從細、是故不說。

First is the contrast between what is de-emphasized and what is emphasized. Adherents of the two vehicles only remove the afflictive hindrances, and only bodhisattvas extinguish the cognitive hindrances. It is not the case that the adherents of the two vehicles do not partially remove the cognitive hindrances. But since the hindrances that are removed are negligible, the subtle is de-emphasized in favor of the coarse, and thus they are not discussed. It is not the case that the bodhisattvas do not remove afflictions. But since those that are removed are relatively insignificant, the coarse is de-emphasized in favor of the subtle, and therefore they are not mentioned.

1.3.1.2 Mutual defining of superior and inferior

二者優劣相形。二乘解劣但斷煩惱。菩薩治廣二障雙除。故地持云。
聲聞緣覺煩惱障淨非智障淨。菩薩種姓具足二淨。

Second is the mutual defining of superior and inferior. Adherents of the two vehicles are inferior in their understanding, and only remove the afflictions. Bodhisattvas subdue [mental disturbances] broadly, removing both kinds of hindrances together. Therefore the *BBh* says: “*Śrāvakas* and *pratyekabuddhas* cleanse afflictive hindrances; they do not cleanse cognitive hindrances. Bodhisattvas thoroughly cleanse both kinds of hindrances” (T30:1581.888b10–11).

1.3.1.3 Comprehensive view from the perspective of reality

三者據實通論。二乘菩薩二障雙除。

Third is the comprehensive view from the perspective of reality. In actuality, the adherents of the two vehicles and the bodhisattvas both remove both kinds of hindrances.

1.3.2 Distinctions between mundane and supramundane in the Greater Vehicle

言就大乘世間出世間相對辨者、解行已前名爲世間。初地以上名爲出世。於中分別乃有四門。

As for the distinctions between the mundane and supramundane in the Greater Vehicle, all stages up to the stages of understanding and practice are called “mundane”. The stages from the first ground and upward are called “supramundane”. There are four further distinctions to be made here.

1.3.2.1 Ignoring the coarse and elaborating the subtle

一廢麤論細。地前菩薩於彼二障一向未斷。初地以上二障竝除。故涅槃中宣說。地前具煩惱性。

First, ignoring the coarse and elaborating the subtle. Bodhisattvas who have not yet entered the grounds do not in any way eliminate the two kinds of hindrances. But from the time they enter into the first ground and above, they remove both kinds of hindrances together. Therefore

the *Nirvāṇa Sutra* says that bodhisattvas prior to their entry into the grounds are fully afflicted in their nature (see T12:374.396c25 ff.),

1.3.2.2 The contrast between what is de-emphasized and what is emphasized

二者隱顯互論。地前世間但斷煩惱。初地以上唯除智障。
Second is the contrast between what is de-emphasized and what is emphasized. Those who are in the mundane levels prior to the grounds only remove the afflictive hindrances. Those in the first ground and above only remove the cognitive hindrances.

1.3.2.3 Mutual defining of superior and inferior

三者優劣相形。地前解劣唯除煩惱。地上解勝二障雙斷。
Third is the mutual defining of superior and inferior. Those who are in the stages prior to the grounds are weak in their understanding and only remove afflictive hindrances. Those who are in the first ground and above are of superior understanding and remove both kinds of hindrances together.

1.3.2.4 In actuality

四者據實。通世及出世二障雙除。相狀如何。
Fourth is the actuality of the situation. In fact, practitioners at both the mundane and supramundane levels remove both kinds of hindrances. How is this explained?

1.3.2.4.1 Afflictive hindrances

煩惱障中有其二種。一者子結。二者果結。子結煩惱地前所斷。果縛煩惱地上所除。
There are two kinds of afflictive hindrances: those that are bound at the level of seed, and those that are bound at the level of fruition. Seed-bound afflictions are removed prior to the grounds. Fruition-bound afflictions are removed from the first ground and above.

1.3.2.4.1.1 Seed-bound

子結之中復有二種。一者正使作意而生。二者餘習任性而起。正使煩惱聲聞緣覺乃至性種斷之周盡。習起之結⁴⁰種性以上乃至初⁴¹地斷之畢竟。故地持云。「初阿僧祇過解行住入歡喜地。」斷增上中惡趣煩惱。不善正使名爲增上、習名爲中。入歡喜時悉皆斷也。

Within the seed-bound afflictions there are two further types. The first are afflictions proper that arise with intentional activity. The second are habit energies that arise without effort. The afflictions proper are fully eliminated by *śrāvakas*, *pratyekabuddhas*, and those with the nature [for bodhisattvahood]. The habitually-bound afflictions are finished from the stage of seed-nature up to the first ground. Therefore the *Bodhisattva-bhūmi-śāstra* says: "During the first *asaṃkhyā kalpa* one passes through the stages of understanding and practice⁴² and enters into the ground of joy⁴³" (T30:1581.945a23). One eliminates the predominating tendencies within the afflictions of negative rebirths. Unwholesome afflictions proper are called "predominating"; habituation is called "within". These are all eliminated upon entry into the ground of joy.

1.3.2.4.1.2 Fruition-bound

果縛之中亦有二種。一者正使作意而生。二者習氣任運而起正使煩惱。所謂愛佛愛菩提等、始從初地次第斷除。至不動地斷之周盡。故地持云。「第二阿僧祇過第七住入第八地。」微細煩惱皆悉斷滅。八地以上除彼餘習。故地持云。「第三阿僧祇斷除習氣入最上住。」

Within the fruition-bound, there are also two types. The first are the afflictions proper that are produced consciously. The second are the afflictions proper that arise naturally by habituation. Attachment to the Buddha, attachment to *bodhi* and so forth are gradually removed starting

⁴⁰ Following DSYZ, removing the extraneous *xi* (習) here.

⁴¹ Following DSYZ, replacing *xiang* (相) with *chu* (初).

⁴² A reference to the ten understandings (*shi jie* 十解) and ten practices (*shi xing* 十行) in the 41-stage or 52-stage bodhisattva path. In Mahāyāna texts, these stages are usually characterized as being the final levels of mundane (*shijian* 世間) cognition and practice.

⁴³ The first of the ten grounds (Skt. *pramuditā bhūmiḥ*).

from the level of the first ground, up to the level of the ground of immovability (the eighth ground, *acalā-bhūmiḥ*), at which point they are completely extinguished. As the *BBh* says: “During the second *asaṃkhyā kalpa* one passes from the seventh abode and enters into the eighth ground” (similar to T30:1581.952b25). With the extremely subtle afflictions all extinguished without remainder, at the eighth ground and above one removes his habit energies. As the *BBh* says: “In the third *asaṃkhyā kalpa*, one removes the remaining habit energies and enters into the highest abode” (T30:1581.952b27).

1.3.2.4.2 Cognitive hindrances

智障之中亦有二種。一者迷相、二者迷實。情所趣法名之爲相。不能悟解、云其本無、說以爲迷。如來藏性說以爲實。不能窮達說以爲迷。迷相無明地前所除。迷實無明地上所遣。

There are also two kinds of cognitive hindrances. The first is confusion in regard to appearances; the second is confusion in regard to reality. The *dharmas* pursued by unenlightened sentient beings are called appearances. Not able to understand these and asserting them to be originally nonexistent is called confusion. The nature of the *tathāgatagarbha* is said to be real; not being able to fully fathom this is called confusion. The nescience of confusion in regard to appearances is removed before the grounds; nescience of confusion in regard to reality is removed after entry into the grounds.

1.3.2.4.2.1 Nescience of confusion in regard to appearances

迷相無明復有二種。一者迷相立性、二者迷性立相。言迷相者妄法虛集以之爲相。不知虛集建立定相名之迷也。言迷性者、情而起法無性爲性。迷此性故、立因緣相也。迷相無明聲聞緣覺乃至性種斷之窮盡。迷性無明習種性以上乃至初地皆悉斷除。

There are two kinds of nescience of confusion in regard to appearances. The first is when, in one’s confusion in regard to appearances, one posits natures. The second is when, in one’s confusion in regard to natures, one posits appearances. “Confusion in regard to appearances” means that one takes the vacuous conglomerations of delusive *dharmas* as appearances. Not knowing that these are vacuous conglomerations and constructing definite appearances is called confusion. “Confusion in regard

to natures" means that the *dharmas* that arise from unenlightened discrimination, while not having a nature, are understood to have a nature. Misconstruing these [natureless *dharmas*], one posits dependently-arisen appearances. The nescience of confusion in regard to appearances is fully extinguished by *śrāvakas*, *pratyekabuddhas*, and bodhisattvas in the stage of seed-nature. The nescience of confusion in regard to natures is thoroughly and completely eradicated from the stages of cultivation of the seed-nature up to the first ground.

1.3.2.4.2.2 Confusion in regard to reality

迷實無明亦有二種。一者迷實相、二者迷實性。空寂無爲是其實相、不能知是寂泊無爲故、名迷相。如來藏中恆沙佛法真實元有是其實性。不能窮證說爲迷性。此二無明說斷不定。若依地經、初地以上乃至六地除其迷相。是故得爲明別順忍。七地以上斷迷實性。是故證得無生忍體。若依涅槃、九地以還斷其迷相。是故說爲聞見佛性。十地以上斷迷實性。是故說爲眼見佛性。以驗求二障皆是始終通斷。治斷羸爾。

There are also two kinds of nescience of confusion in regard to reality. The first is confusion in regard to the appearance of reality; the second is confusion in regard to the nature of reality. The quiescent unconditioned state is the appearance of reality. Since one is not able to know this still unconditioned state, it is called confusion in regard to appearances. Buddha *dharmas* as numerous as the grains of sand in the Ganges in truth originally have this reality. Not being able to thoroughly realize this is called delusion in regard to the nature [of reality].

Explanations of the removal of these two kinds of nescience are not firmly set. If we rely on the *DBh*, then the confusion in regard to appearances is removed from the first ground up to the sixth ground. Therefore, its attainment is understood to clarify the tolerance of accordance.⁴⁴ In the seventh ground and above one removes the confusion in regard to the nature of reality. Therefore one realizes the essence of the tolerance based on the realization of the nonarising of all *dharmas*. If we follow the

⁴⁴ *Shunren* (順忍): *tolerance of accordance*. The third of the five tolerances (*wu ren* 五忍). Also one of three tolerances (*san ren* 三忍). These also represent the fourth, fifth and sixth of the ten *bhūmis*; DDB.

Nirvāṇa Sutra, the confusion in regard to the appearances of reality is removed at the ninth ground and below. Therefore it is called “seeing the Buddha Nature with one’s ears”. From the tenth ground and above, one removes the confusion in regard to the nature of reality. Therefore it is called “seeing the Buddha Nature with one’s eyes” (T12:374.528a6). In order to seek out the two hindrances and thoroughly remove them from beginning to end, we must indeed remove the coarse!

1.4 Antidotes to the hindrances

次辨第四對障辨脫。斷煩惱得心解脫。斷除智障得慧解脫。是義云何分別有二。

Next is the fourth part, the explanation of the antidotes to the hindrances. When one removes the afflictive hindrances, one attains the mental liberation. When one removes the cognitive hindrances, one attains the wisdom liberation.⁴⁵ How is it that liberation comes to be bifurcated into two distinct types?

1.4.1 The contrast between what is de-emphasized and what is emphasized

一者隱顯互論。斷煩惱障、諸佛菩薩世諦心脫。斷除智障、真諦慧解脫。何故如是。煩惱染事故、斷煩惱、世諦心脫斷煩惱。理實雖隨有一切德脫就主為名、偏⁴⁶言心脫。無明障理故、斷無明、真諦慧脫斷無明。時即理所成一切德脫就主作名、偏名慧脫。

[This is explained] first [from the perspective] of that which is de-emphasized and that which is emphasized. With the elimination of the afflictive hindrances one attains the mental liberation of the buddhas

⁴⁵ *Hui jietuo* (慧解脫): *wisdom liberation* (Skt. *prajñā-vimukti*) and the prior *mental liberation* (*xin jietuo* 心解脫; Skt. *ceto-vimukti*) are early forms of the bifurcation of liberation into the two aspects of freedom from affliction and freedom from nescience found in the Abhidharma literature, which are developed into two-hindrance theory in Tathāgatagarbha and Yogācāra texts. In the case of the wisdom liberation, one relies on undefiled wisdom to eliminate the two mental disturbances of views and mental disturbances of perceptions (*jianhuo* 見惑, *sihuo* 思惑); DDB; see also Translation §2.4 below.

⁴⁶ Here, and in the next line, replacing *bian* (遍) with *pian* (偏), following DSYZ.

and bodhisattvas at the level of the conventional truth. With the elimination of the cognitive hindrances one attains the wisdom liberation at the level of the ultimate truth. How so? Since the afflictions defile at the level of phenomena, the elimination of affliction is the mental liberation at the level of conventional truth, [which] eliminates affliction. Even though in principle one is liberated while pursuing all kinds of merit, it is named based on its primary focus, and therefore is one-sidedly called mental liberation. Since nescience obstructs the principle, the elimination of nescience is the wisdom liberation at the level of the ultimate truth, [which] eliminates nescience. At this time, in principle one is liberated in the consummation of all kinds of merit, but it is one-sidedly called wisdom liberation.

1.4.2 Distinguishing the broadly and narrowly applied antidotes

二者對障寬狹分別。斷煩惱障 唯除事中染愛心故、世諦心脫。斷智障時、除無明地、及斷事中羸無明。故二諦慧脫。此初番竟。

Second is the distinction of broadly and narrowly applied antidotes. Since the elimination of the afflictive hindrances only entails the removal of attached defiled mental states with respect to phenomenal activity, it is the mental liberation in the conventional truth. When one eliminates the cognitive hindrances, one removes the entrenchment of nescience, as well as the coarse nescience that functions with respect to phenomenal activity. Therefore the wisdom liberation occurs at the level of both truths. This ends the first level of interpretation.

2 Second level

第二番中亦有四門。一、定障相。二、釋障名。三、明斷處。四、對障辨脫。

In the second level of interpretation there are also four parts: (1) defining the hindrances; (2) explanation of terminology; (3) stages of elimination; and (4) antidotes to the hindrances.

2.1 Defining the hindrances

言定相者、云何得知 五住性結爲煩惱障、事中無知以爲智障。如涅槃說。斷除一切貪瞋癡等得心解脫。一切所知無障礙故 得慧解脫。貪瞋癡者、卽是五住性結煩惱。一切所知得無礙者、當知卽是除事無知。又、如地經以佛無礙爲慧解脫。當知卽是除事無知。遠離癡染爲心解脫。當知卽是五住性結爲煩惱障。又雜心云。「如來除二種無知。一者斷染污、二者斷不染污。」 染污無知卽是五住性結煩惱。不染污無知卽是事中無明之心。准驗斯等當知。以彼五住性結爲煩惱障、事中無知以爲智障。

As for determining their characteristics, how do we know that the binding at the level of nature of the five entrenchments constitutes the afflictive hindrances and nescience in regard to phenomena constitutes the cognitive hindrances? As the *Nirvāṇa Sutra* says: “When one eliminates all craving, ill-will, and delusion, etc., one attains the mental liberation. When there is no obstruction to be found in all knowables, one attains the wisdom liberation” (T12:374.515b14–17). Craving, ill-will, and delusion are none other than the afflictions of the five entrenchments binding at the level of nature. When one attains nonobstruction of all knowables, you should know that it constitutes the removal of ignorance in regard to phenomena. Furthermore, the *DBh* takes the nonobstruction of the Buddha’s [wisdom] as the liberation wisdom. You should know that this is none other than the removal of nescience in regard to phenomena. Extricating oneself from delusional defilement is the mental liberation. You should know that this [delusional defilement] is none other than the binding of the five entrenchments at the level of nature, which is, in turn, the afflictive hindrances. As the **Saṃyuktābhīdharmahr̥daya-śāstra* says: “The Tathāgata removes two kinds of nescience: the first is defiled; the second is undefiled” (T28:1552.921b26–27). Defiled nescience is equivalent to the afflictions bound to the natures of the five entrenchments. Undefiled nescience is equivalent to the mental state of nescience in regard to phenomena. If you see it in this way, it will be clear that the binding at the level of nature in the five entrenchments constitutes the afflictive hindrances, and the nescience that occurs in regard to phenomena constitutes the cognitive hindrances.

2.2 *Explanation of terminology*

次釋其名。五住性結能起分段變易生死。勞亂人故、名煩惱障。事
中闇惑能障如來種知明解、是故說此爲智障也。

Next is the explanation of terminology. The binding at the level of the natures of the five entrenchments serves to bring about both delimited *saṃsāra* and the *saṃsāra* of subtle transformation.⁴⁷ Because they bring distress to people, they are called the afflictive hindrances. Obscuration with regard to phenomena serves to obstruct the clear understanding of the Tathāgata's lineage. Therefore they are called the cognitive hindrances.

2.3 *Stages of elimination*

次辨斷處。處別有三。一者、世出世間相對分別、二者、功用無功用相對分別、三者、因果相對分別。

Next is the articulation of the stages of elimination. There are three kinds of distinctions in these stages. The first is the distinction between mundane and transmundane. The second is the distinction between application of effort and effortlessness. The third is the distinction between causes and effects.

2.3.1 *Distinction between mundane and transmundane*

就初對中義別有二。

Within the first there are two further connotations.

2.3.1.1 *Contrast between what is de-emphasized and what is emphasized*

一者、隱顯互論。地前斷除五住性結。以彼捨相趣順如故。初地以上斷除智障。以彼地上契合法界了達諸法無障礙故。故地經云。「於初地中一切世間文誦⁴⁸咒術不可窮盡。」

⁴⁷ See *ŚDS*, T12:353.219c20-24.

⁴⁸ Based on *DSYZ*, replacing *song* (訟) with *song* (誦). The source text says: 在其中。一切世間書論技藝文誦咒術不可窮盡。佛子。譬如香山王。一切諸香集在其中。一切諸香取不可盡 (T26:1522.201a16-17). Also see *DSYZ* at T44:1851.563a10.

The first is the contrast between what is de-emphasized and what is emphasized. Prior to the grounds one removes the binding to the five entrenchments at the level of nature. This is because the practitioner abandons appearances and orients himself to thusness. From the first ground and above he removes the cognitive hindrances. This is because once one is in the grounds, he aligns himself with the *dharma* realm of cognitive experience, thoroughly penetrating all *dharma*s without impediment. Therefore the *DBh* says: “At the level of the first ground one cannot fully extinguish all kinds of worldly [essays, technology,] verses, and magical arts” (T26:1522.201a16–17).

2.3.1.2 Mutual defining of superior and inferior

二者優劣相形。地前菩薩唯除煩惱。初地以上智行寬廣、二障雙除。Second is the mutual defining of superior and inferior. Bodhisattvas at the level prior to the grounds only remove afflictive hindrances. From the first ground and above wisdom functions broadly, and they remove both hindrances.

2.3.2 Distinction between application of effort and effortlessness

第二對中義別有二。

Within the second, there are also two further distinctions in connotation.

2.3.2.1 The contrast between what is de-emphasized and what is emphasized

一者隱顯互論。七地以前唯除煩惱。八地以上滅除智障。如八地中淨佛國土、斷除一切色中無知。九地之中了初心行、滅除一切心行無知。第十地中於諸法中得勝自在、斷一切法中無知。此等皆是除事無知。

First is the contrast between what is de-emphasized and what is emphasized. At the level of the seventh ground and below, one only removes the afflictive hindrances. From the eighth ground and above, one extirpates the cognitive hindrances. It is like the purification of Buddha lands that takes place within the eighth ground, where one removes nescience with respect to all kinds of physical existence. In the ninth ground one

gets through the initial mental functions, extirpating all nescience associated with the mental functions. In the tenth ground one attains mastery in regard to all *dharmas*, eliminating all nescience associated with all *dharmas*. These are all part of the removal of nescience in regard to phenomena.

2.3.2.2 Mutual defining of superior and inferior

二者優劣相形。七地以還唯除煩惱。八地以上二障雙除。

Second is the mutual defining of superior and inferior. In the seventh ground and below one only removes the afflictive hindrances. In the eighth ground and above one removes both hindrances.

2.3.3 Distinction between causes and effects

第三對中義別有二。

Third is the distinction between causes and effects, which has two connotations.

2.3.3.1 The contrast between what is de-emphasized and what is emphasized

一者隱顯互論。金剛以還斷煩惱障。如來地中種智現起。了達一切差別諸法、斷除智障。以事無知難除斷故、至佛乃盡。

The first is the contrast between what is de-emphasized and what is emphasized. Up to the adamantine stage⁴⁹ one eliminates the afflictive hindrances. While within the ground of the Tathāgata, omniscience becomes active, and one thoroughly understands the distinctions among all phenomena, eliminating the cognitive hindrances. Since nescience in regard to phenomena is difficult to remove, it is not completely removed until one achieves Buddhahood.

⁴⁹ The adamantine or diamond stage (*jin'gangwei* 金剛位; **vajra-bhūmi*) is the final stage of the bodhisattva path, where bodhisattvas enter into the adamantine absorption (*jin'gangyuding* 金剛喻定). In Yogâcāra, this stage is equivalent to virtual enlightenment (*dengjue* 等覺).

2.3.3.2 Mutual defining of superior and inferior

二者優劣相形。金剛以還、唯斷煩惱。如來果德二障雙斷。
Second is the mutual defining of superior and inferior. From the adamant ground and below, one removes only the afflictive hindrances. From the point of the fruition of the merit of the Tathāgata, one removes both hindrances.

2.4 Antidotes to the hindrances

次辨對障明脫。除煩惱障、得心解脫。滅除智障、得慧解脫。言心脫者其有二種。一佛菩薩世間心。二佛菩薩第一義心。斷四住故、世諦心脫。除無明故、真諦心脫。言慧脫者、諸照世間一切種知得解脫也。

Next is the elucidation of the antidotes to the hindrances. When one removes the afflictive hindrances, he attains the mental liberation. When one removes the cognitive hindrances, he attains the wisdom liberation. There are two kinds of mental liberation. The first is the conventional mental state of buddhas and bodhisattvas; the second is the ultimate mental state of buddhas and bodhisattvas. Because one eliminates the four entrenchments, he attains liberation from the perspective of the conventional truth. Because one eliminates nescience, he attains the mental liberation from the perspective of the ultimate truth. As for the wisdom liberation, one attains liberation by the illumination of the all-inclusive understanding of mundane phenomena.

3 Third level

第三番中亦有四門。一、定其障相。二、釋障名。三、明斷處。四、對障辨脫。

The third level again has four parts: (1) defining the characteristics of the hindrances; (2) explanation of terminology; (3) stages of their elimination; and (4) antidotes applied to specific hindrances.

3.1 Defining the characteristics of the hindrances

言定相者云何得知。五住性結及事無知為煩惱障。分別之智以為智障。如勝鬘云。「五住及起同名煩惱。」明知五住及事無智是煩惱

障。言分別智爲智障者、如寶性論說。「有四種障不得如來淨我樂常。一者緣相謂無明地。以是障故不得如來究竟眞淨。二者因相謂無漏業。以是障故不得眞我。三者生相謂意生身。以是障故不得眞樂。四者壞相謂變易生死。以是障故不得眞常。」

How are the characteristics defined [in this level of interpretation]? The binding of the five entrenchments at the level of their nature as well as nescience in regard to phenomena comprise the afflictive hindrances, while discriminating cognition is regarded as the cognitive hindrances. As the *ŚDS* says: "The five entrenchments along with their arisen states are collectively called affliction."⁵⁰ From this we know that the five entrenchments and nescience in regard to phenomena constitute the afflictive hindrances. As for the association of discriminating cognition with the afflictive hindrances, this is like the passage in the *Ratnagotravibhāga*, which says:

There are four kinds of hindrances that impede the attainment of the Tathāgata's purity, self, bliss, and permanence.⁵¹ The first is the appearance of dependent origination, which is called the ground of nescience. It is due to this hindrance that one does not experience the authentic bliss of the Tathāgata. The second is the appearance of causation, which is called uncontaminated activity. It is due to this hindrance that one does not experience the authentic self. The third is the appearance of arising, which is called the mind-made body.⁵² It is due to this hindrance that one

⁵⁰ I have not found in the *ŚDS* any place where it explicitly mentions the five entrenchments as a unit as cited here. In the passage most similar to this in that text, it mentions only the four entrenchments (*si zhudi* 四住地); see T12:353.220a2.

⁵¹ Known as the "four attributes" (*si de* 四德). Purity, self, bliss, and permanence are four positive attributes of Buddhist religious experience that are taught as an antidote to the negativity of teachings such as that of emptiness (Skt. *catvāraḥ guṇa*). One of the best known sources for this notion is the *Nirvāṇa Sūtra*. These four notions are denied by early Buddhism, Abhidharma, and Yogācāra, but affirmed by Tathāgatagarbha/Buddha Nature-based traditions.

⁵² The mind-made body (*yisheng shen* 意生身, also written *yicheng shen* 意成身, Skt. *manomāya-kāya*) is a body as born out of a certain kind of intent or mindfulness: thus the bodhisattva body, *śrāvaka* body, buddha-bodies, etc. The body of a buddha is not arisen

does not experience authentic bliss. The fourth is the appearance of disintegration, which is called *saṃsāra* of subtle transformation. It is due to this hindrance that one does not experience authentic permanence (T31:1611.830 b1-9).

彼既宣說無漏業障不得真我。是故定知分別緣智是其智障。又如地經六地中說智障淨因事謂不分別空三昧。以不分別爲智障淨。明知卽用分別之智以爲智障。

Since it has been stated that the hindrance of uncontaminated activity obstructs the experience of the authentic self, we can know for certain that the object-discriminating cognition is the cognitive hindrance. This interpretation can also be seen in the teaching on the sixth ground in the *DBh*, where the causal condition for the purification of the cognitive hindrances is the nondiscriminating *samādhi* of emptiness. By not discriminating, the cognitive hindrances are purified (T26:1522.172b21-22). From this, we can clearly know that discriminating cognition constitutes the cognitive hindrances.

又楞伽經云。「妄想爾炎慧彼滅得我涅槃。」滅爾炎慧方名涅槃。明知所滅妄慧是障。又、龍樹說、「如彼覺觀、望下爲善、望第二禪卽是罪過。乃至非想望下爲善。望出世道卽是罪過。」緣智如是。望世爲善。望其實性亦是罪過。既言罪過何爲非障。

Additionally, the *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra* says: “I attain my *nirvāṇa*/ In the cessation of the deluded intelligence that cognizes the knowable.”⁵³ When one extirpates the intelligence that cognizes the knowable, then that is called *nirvāṇa* (T16:670.496b2). By this we clearly know that the deceptive intelligence that is extinguished is a hindrance. Furthermore, Nāgārjuna says: “This kind of initial mental application and subsequent discursive reasoning, when seen from below, is good, but when seen from the level of the second meditation, it is faulty. This is the case up to the nonconceptual state, which when seen from below is good, but when seen from the perspective of the supramundane path, is faulty” (source not loca-

from the five *skandhas* – it is created out of consciousness. This body can also be so created by a bodhisattva in the *bhūmi* levels, in order to aid sentient beings.

⁵³ The line in the sutra is slightly different: 妄想爾炎識 此滅我涅槃。

ted). The discriminating cognition is like this. When seen from the conventional perspective it is good, but when seen from the perspective of reality it is also faulty. Since it has been identified as being faulty, how could it not be a hindrance?

3.2 Explanation of terminology

次釋其名。五住性結及事無知體 是闇惑勞亂之法故、名煩惱。緣智礙真故名智障。

Next is the explanation of terminology. Since binding at the level of the natures of the five entrenchments as well as the essence of nescience in regard to phenomena are all *dharmas* of delusion and travail, they are called afflictions. Since discriminating cognition obstructs reality, it is called cognitive hindrance.

問曰。此智能顯真、故經中說爲了因也。何故今說爲智障乎。多義如真故復名障。如藥治病。若藥不去、藥復成患。此亦如是。云何妨真。如維摩說。「寂滅是菩提、滅諸相故。」此智是相、所以是障。「不觀是菩提、離諸緣故。」此智是緣、所以爲障。「不行是菩提、無憶念故。」此智憶念、所以爲障。「斷是菩提。斷⁵⁴諸見⁵⁵故」、此智是見、所以是障。「離是菩提、離妄想故。」此知⁵⁶妄想、所以是障。「障是菩提、障諸願故。」此智是願、所以是障。菩提真明。此智性闇、所以是障。如世樂受 性是行苦。如是等過、不可具陳。皆違真德故、說爲障。

Question: This cognition is able to disclose reality, which is why it is described in the scriptures as a “cause of understanding”. Why then do you here call it a cognitive hindrance?

It is because there are multiple interpretations of reality that it is called a hindrance. It is like medicine being used to cure a disease. If you do not get rid of the medicine (after the disease has been cured), then the medicine turns into an affliction. This is the same kind of case. How does it obstruct the truth? It is as the *Vimalakīrti-sūtra* says: “Extinction is *bodhi*, since it extinguishes all appearances.” In this case, cognition is

⁵⁴ The *Vimalakīrti-sūtra* has *she* (捨) instead of *duan* (斷).

⁵⁵ According to *DSYZ*, correcting *shi* (是) to *jian* (見).

⁵⁶ *DSYZ* has *zhi* (智) instead of *zhi* (知).

appearance, and hence it constitutes a hindrance. “Non-contemplation is *bodhi*, since it is free from all connections to objects.” In this case, cognition is connection to objects, and thus it constitutes a hindrance. “Non-activity is *bodhi*, since there is no memory.” In this case, cognition is memory, and hence it constitutes a hindrance. “Elimination [of views] is *bodhi*, since views are abandoned.” In this case, cognition consists of views, and hence it constitutes a hindrance. “Extrication is *bodhi*, since one is freed from deceptive thought.” In this case, cognition consists of deceptive thought, and hence it constitutes a hindrance. “Obstructions are *bodhi*, since they obstruct all wishes.” In this case, cognition is a wish, and therefore it constitutes a hindrance (T14:475.542b23–28). *Bodhi* is true illumination. The nature of this cognition is obscuration, and therefore it is a hindrance. It is like the way the experience of suffering at the conventional level is in nature suffering induced by the changes that occur in conditioned existence. Examples of this sort [are so numerous that they] cannot be explained in detail, but since all act contrary to authentic virtue, they are called hindrances.

3.3 *Levels of elimination*

次辨斷處。斷處有二。一者地前地上相對分別。二者直就地上世出世間相對分別。就初對中義別有二。

Next is the articulation of the levels of elimination, of which there are two: the first is discrimination between being prior to the grounds or in the grounds. The second is the discrimination of mundane and transmundane directly attained in the grounds.

3.3.1 Comparison of elimination prior to the grounds and in the grounds

3.3.1.1 The contrast between what is de-emphasized and what is emphasized

一隱顯互論。解行已前增相修故斷煩惱障。初地以上捨相修故斷除智障。云何增相能除煩惱。煩惱正以闇惑爲患。從初已來修習明解緣智轉增闇惑漸捨。至解行時明解增上惑障窮盡、說之爲斷。云何捨相能斷智障。智障正以分別爲過。初地以上窮證自實緣修漸捨。分別過減名斷智障。

First is the contrast between what is de-emphasized and what is emphasized. At the stages of understanding and practice and prior, the appearances of increase are cultivated. Hence one eliminates the cognitive hindrances. From the first ground and above the appearances of abandonment are cultivated, and hence one removes the cognitive hindrances. How is it that the appearances of increase are able to remove the afflictions? The afflictions bring distress precisely because of their obscuring activity. Up to the first ground one has cultivated clear understanding; the discriminating consciousness continues to expand as obscuration is gradually removed. When one reaches the stages of understanding and practice, one's clear understanding increases, and obscuring hindrances are totally extinguished; this is what is called "elimination". How is it that the appearances of abandonment are able to eliminate the cognitive hindrances? The cognitive hindrances are problematic precisely due to discrimination. From the first ground and above, one totally realizes the truth for oneself, and the cultivation of conditions is gradually removed. The extirpation of the error of discrimination is called the elimination of the cognitive hindrances.

3.3.1.2 Mutual defining of superior and inferior

二優劣相形。地前菩薩唯斷煩惱。初地以上對治深廣二障雙除。若論事識解滅者、地前亦得。但不論耳。

The second is the mutual defining of superior and inferior. Before the grounds, bodhisattvas only eliminate afflictions. From the first ground and above they counteract both kinds of hindrances extensively, such that both are removed.

3.3.2 Discrimination between mundane and transmundane in the grounds

次就地上世出世間相對分別。初二三[地名]爲世間。四地以上名爲出世。於中亦有二門分別。

Next is the discrimination between mundane and transmundane in the grounds. The first, second, and third grounds are called mundane. The fourth ground and above are called transmundane.

3.3.2.1 The contrast between what is de-emphasized and what is emphasized

3.3.2.1.1 Afflictive hindrances

一者隱顯互論。三地以還世間之行斷煩惱障。四地以上出世真慧斷除智障。云何世間除煩惱障。如地論說初地斷除凡夫我相障。凡夫我障即是見一處住地。第二地中斷除能犯戒⁵⁷煩惱。犯戒煩惱即是欲愛、色愛、有愛三種住地。第三地中斷除闇相聞思修等諸法妄障。闇相即是無明住地。是故明地世間但斷煩惱障也。

First is the contrast between what is de-emphasized and what is emphasized. The mundane practices from the third ground and below remove the afflictive hindrances. The supramundane authentic wisdom operating in the fourth ground and above removes the cognitive hindrances. Why is it that the mundane practices remove the afflictive hindrances? As the *DBh* explains, in the first ground, one eliminates the hindrances of the appearance of self that is experienced by the unenlightened worldlings (T26:1522.127a12). The hindrance of the unenlightened view of self is none other than the entrenchment of reifying views. In the second ground, one removes the afflictions that have the potential to lead to infractions of the Vinaya. Afflictions that lead to infractions of the Vinaya are included in the entrenchments of attachment to desire, attachment to form, and attachment to objects in the formless realm. In the third ground one removes the hindrances of delusion in regard to *dharma*s such as those that obscure the marks of hearing, consideration, and practice of the Buddha's teachings. Obscuration of marks is equivalent to the entrenchment of nescience. Hence it is clear that in the mundane level of the grounds one only eliminates the afflictive hindrances.

3.3.2.1.2 Cognitive hindrances

云何出世能斷智障。智障有三。

How is it that [supramundane wisdom] is able to remove the cognitive hindrances? There are three kinds of cognitive hindrances.

⁵⁷ Here and in the next phrase I replace *huo* (惑) with *jie* (戒), following *DSYZ*, which allows this line to make sense.

3.3.2.1.2.1 Hindrance of knowing

一是智障、所謂空有之心。

First is the hindrance of knowing, which means the mental states of [attachment to] emptiness and existence.

3.3.2.1.2.2 Hindrance of essence

二是體障、所謂建立神智之體。相狀如何。謂彼緣智正觀諸法非有非無、捨前分別有無礙。雖捨分別有無之礙而猶見已以爲能觀、如爲所觀。見已能觀、心與如異。如爲所觀。如與心別。由見已心與如別故、未能泯捨神知之礙、說爲體障。

The second is the hindrance of essence, which means the essence of constructed spiritual cognition. What sort of thing is this? It means that this object-discriminating cognition accurately observes that all phenomena are neither existent nor nonexistent, which means that one lets go of the prior obstruction of discrimination between existence and non-existence. Even though one lets go of the obstruction brought about by the discrimination between existence and nonexistence, it is still the case that seeing is already taken to be subjective observation, with thusness being the object of that observation. When seeing is already subjective observation, the mind differs from thusness. When thusness is taken as the object of observation, thusness is distinguished from the mind. Since, in seeing, the mind is already distinguished from thusness, one is not able to dissolve the obstruction of the constructed spiritual cognition and this is called the hindrance of essence.

3.3.2.1.2.3 Hindrance due to notions of correction

三是治想。通而論之向前二種俱是治想。但此一門治中究竟偏與治名。然此治想⁵⁸亦是緣智。對治破前神智之礙、實心合如。雖復合如論其體、猶是七識生滅之法。障於真證無生滅慧故、名爲障。

The third is the [hindrance due to] notions of correction. If we discuss [all three types] together, we can say that the prior two kinds of cognitive hindrances also include this notion of correction. It is just that in this particular case, this aspect is disclosed thoroughly, and thus it is

⁵⁸ Replacing *xiang* (相) with *xiang* (想), following *DSYZ*.

one-sidedly labeled “[hindrances due to the notion of] correction”. Yet this notion of correction is also [a kind of] discriminating cognition. In getting rid of the prior obstruction of the spiritual cognition, the true mind merges with thusness. Even though it returns to its unity with thusness, if we discuss its essence, it is none other than a *dharma* of the arising and ceasing of the seventh consciousness. Since it obstructs the authentic realization of the wisdom of neither arising nor cessation, it is called a hindrance.

障別如此。治斷云何。始從四地乃至七地斷除智障。入第八地斷除體障。八地以上至如來地斷除治想。

So much for the distinctions between the cognitive hindrances. What about their removal? Starting from the first ground, continuing up to the seventh ground, the hindrance of knowing is eliminated. Entering into the eighth ground, one removes the hindrance of essence. From the eighth ground up to the ground of the Tathāgata, one removes the hindrance of the notion of correction.

3.3.2.1.3 Removal of the three kinds of cognitive hindrances

3.3.2.1.3.1 Removal of the hindrance of knowing

云何斷智障。四五六地觀空破有。捨離分別取有之智。故地經中廣明。四地觀察諸法不生不滅、捨離分別解法慢障。第五地中觀察三世佛法平等、捨離分別身淨慢心。第六地中觀法平等、捨離分別染淨慢心。此等皆是觀空破取有之心。第七地中觀諸法如、捨前分別取空之心。離如此等名斷智障。

How does one remove the hindrance of knowing? At the fourth, fifth, and sixth ground one contemplates emptiness and refutes existence, discarding the cognition that discriminates and grasps at existence. Therefore this is elaborated in detail in the *DBh*. At the fourth ground one penetratingly observes that all *dharma*s neither arise nor cease, discarding the hindrance of pride in one’s understanding of the Dharma. In the fifth ground one penetratingly observes the equality of the Buddhadharmas of the three divisions of time, and thus discards the pride resulting from discriminating the purity of one’s body. In the sixth ground one penetratingly observes the equality of all *dharma*s, and thus discards the pride resulting from the discrimination of defilement and purity. These

are all states of mind where the observation of emptiness destroys attachment to existence. In the seventh ground one observes the thusness of *dharmas*, discarding the prior mental state of discriminating and grasping at emptiness. Freedom from these obstructions is called the elimination of the hindrances of knowing.

3.3.2.1.3.2 Removal of the hindrance of essence

云何八地斷除體障。前七地中、雖觀法如、猶見已心、以爲能觀、如爲所觀。以是見故、心與如異、不能廣大任運不動入第八地。破此等礙、觀察如外由來無心、心外無如。如外無心、無心異如。心外無如、無如異心。無心異如、不見能知。無如異心、不見所知。能所既亡、泯同一相。便捨分別功用之意。捨功用故行與如等、廣大不動名入八地。此德成時名斷體障。

What is the removal of the hindrance of essence in the eighth ground? While in the prior seventh ground, even though one observes the thusness of *dharmas*, this is still a mental state of "having seen", and is to be regarded as a subjective observation, with thusness being that which is observed. It is based on this seeing that the mind differs from thusness, and one is unable to exercise the vast, effortless immovability that places one into the eighth ground. In breaking this kind of obstruction, one penetratingly observes that outside of thusness, there is originally no mind, and that outside of the mind, there is no thusness. [Given that] outside of thusness, there is no mind, there is no mind that differs from thusness; [given that] outside of the mind, there is no thusness, there is no thusness that is different from the mind. With there being no mind that differs from thusness, one does not see subjective knowing. With there being no thusness that differs from mind, one does not see that which is known. With subjective and objective already gone, they vanish into the same single mark. This is the meaning of directly abandoning the exertion of discrimination. Since one abandons this exertion, activity is the same as thusness, and the resultant vast immovability is called entry into the eighth ground. The moment this merit is complete it is called the elimination of the hindrances of essence.

3.3.2.1.3.3 Removal of the hindrance due to the notion of correction

云何八地至如來地斷除治想。向前八地雖除體障、治想猶存。故八地云。此第八地雖無障想⁵⁹非無治想。然此治想八地以上漸次除至佛乃盡。彼云何斷者。分別息故真相現前。覺法唯真本末無妄。以此見真、無妄力故能令妄治。前不生後。後不起前。於是滅盡也。

How does one eliminate the notion of correction from the eighth ground up to the ground of the Tathāgata? Even though one has been removing hindrances of essence up to the level of the eighth ground, the notion of correction still lingers. Therefore the exegesis of the eighth ground says: “At this level of the eighth ground, even though there are no notions of hindrance, it is not the case that there are not notions of correction” (source not found). Yet this notion of correction is, from the eighth ground, gradually removed, until it is fully exhausted at the ground of the Tathāgata. How is it eliminated? Because discrimination subsides, the real appears directly before one. The *dharma* of enlightenment is only real; from beginning to end it lacks falsity. With this vision of the real there is no power in the false, and therefore one is able to cause the false to be corrected. The former does not produce the latter, and the latter does not give rise to the former. In this, they are completely extinguished.

3.3.2.2 Mutual defining of superior and inferior

二者優劣相形。初二三地對治微劣、唯斷煩惱。四地以上對治深廣二障雙除。若通言之、始從初地乃至佛地當知念念二障並斷。緣智漸明斷煩惱障。真法漸顯滅智障。治斷如是。

The second is the mutual defining of superior and inferior. In the first, second, and third grounds one overcomes the weaker hindrances, only eliminating the afflictions. From the fourth ground and above one deeply and widely treats the two hindrances, removing both of them. Comprehensively speaking, you should know that from the first ground up to the Buddha ground both hindrances are removed together in every thought-moment. Discriminating cognition gradually clarifies, eliminating the afflictive hindrances. Real *dharma*s gradually manifest, extin-

⁵⁹ Following DSYZ, changing *xiang* (相) to *xiang* (想).

guishing the cognitive hindrances. Correction and elimination occur like this.

3.3.3 Application of antidotes

次對障辨脫。就此門中除斷煩惱二脫俱生。息除智障二脫俱顯。相狀如何。前修對治斷煩惱時能治之道必依真起。所依之真恆隨妄轉。故以妄修動發真心。令彼真中二脫德生。真德雖生、與第七識緣智和合、為彼隱覆真德不顯。息除彼智真德方顯。其猶臘⁶⁰印印與泥合、令彼泥上文像隨生。泥文雖生臘印覆⁶¹之不得顯現、動去臘印其文方顯。彼亦如是。二障之義難以測窮。且隨大綱略標⁶²旨況。

Next is the articulation of the application of antidotes. From this perspective, when one eliminates the afflictive hindrances, both kinds of liberation arise together. When one removes the cognitive hindrances, both kinds of liberation appear together. How does this happen? When the previously applied corrective practices eliminate the afflictive hindrances, the path that is the agent of the elimination must arise in dependence on the real. The real that is depended upon always adjusts according to falsity. Therefore, based on deluded practice, one motivates the real mind. This allows it to be that within this reality, the qualities of the two kinds of liberation are produced. Even though the qualities of the real are produced, they become blended in with the discriminating cognition of the seventh consciousness, and due to this, they cover the real so that its true qualities are not apparent. When one removes this cognition, the qualities of the real become apparent. It is like when one presses a seal of completion of the summer retreat onto clay, giving rise to text and image on the clay. Even though there is now text on the clay, while the seal is still on the clay it is not yet visible – and it only becomes visible after one removes the seal. The result of removing the discriminating cognition is like this.

The system of the two hindrances is difficult to fathom, so for the time being let us just be satisfied with a brief summary of the main

⁶⁰ Following *DSYZ*, changing *la* (臍) to *la* (臘) here and next instance.

⁶¹ Following *DSYZ*, changing *fu* (覆) to *fu* (覆).

⁶² Following *DSYZ*, changing *shu* (樹) to *biao* (標).

points. [This is where the discussion of the hindrances in the *DSYZ* ends. The initial part of the discussion that continues from this in the commentary on the *AMF* still has some relevance, so we follow this a bit further, stopping at the point where the commentary on the *AMF* returns to the explication of the main text (*ci sui wen shi* 次隨文釋).]

今此論中辨二障者是第二番也。五住相望四住及起同為煩惱障、無明及起齊為智障。故地持無明以妄同為智障。就無明中隨義更論、所起恆沙復為煩惱。無明住地獨為智障。故此論中。但無明地以為智障、染心恆沙以為煩惱障也。

The two hindrances as introduced in the *AMF* are the same as those of the second level of interpretation provided here. i.e., the manifest aspects of the five entrenchments (the four entrenchments, including their active manifestations) are equivalent to the afflictive hindrances, and nescience, including its active manifestations, is equivalent to the cognitive hindrances. Therefore the in *BBh*, nescience, regarded as delusion, is equivalent to the cognitive hindrances. If we discuss this again following the interpretation from the perspective of nescience, then the myriad troubles that arise from nescience can also be called afflictions, with the entrenchment of nescience alone being regarded as the cognitive hindrances. Therefore in this treatise, the nescience entrenchments alone are regarded as the cognitive hindrances, while the myriad troubles that defile the mind are the afflictive hindrances.

問曰。於彼事識之中取性無明是何地收。妄識之中所有愛見是何地收。斷言。不定、略有二義。一隱顯互論。彼事識中取性無明。以本後末攝為四住。彼妄識中所有愛見。以末從本收為無明。二隨義通論。妄識之中所有見皆四住收。事識中所有無明亦無明攝。

Question: In this case, into which of the entrenchments does the nescience of grasping at natures within the phenomenal consciousnesses fall? And into which of the entrenchments does the view of attachment to desire within the false consciousness fall?

Answer: There is no fixed answer to this, but there are two general interpretations. The first is that from the perspective of what is de-emphasized and what is emphasized. The nescience of grasping at natures within the phenomenal consciousnesses prioritizes what is fundamental, and subordinates what is derivative in assimilating the four en-

trenchments. The view of attachment to desire within the false consciousness prioritizes the derivate and subordinates the fundamental in assimilating all into nescience. If these two interpretations are considered together, all of the views in the false consciousness are included in the four entrenchments, and the nescience within the phenomenal consciousness is also included within nescience.

Abbreviations

AMF	<i>The Awakening of Mahāyāna Faith, Dasheng qixin lun</i> (大乘起信論) T1666
BBh	<i>Bodhisattvabhūmi-śāstra</i> (菩薩地持經) T1581
CWSL	<i>Cheng weishi lun</i> (成唯識論) T1585
DBh	* <i>Daśabhūmika-sūtra-śāstra</i> (十地經論) T1522
DDB	<i>Digital Dictionary of Buddhism</i> . http://www.buddhism-dict.net/ddb . A. Charles Muller, ed. (2012).
DQLY	<i>Dasheng qixin lun yishu</i> (大乘起信論義疏) T1843
DSYZ	<i>Dasheng yi zhang</i> (大乘義章) T1851
FDJL	<i>Fodi jing lun</i> (佛地經論) T1530
HBJ	<i>Hanguk bulgyo jeonseo</i> [<i>The Collected Texts of Korean Buddhism</i>] (1984). Seoul: Dongguk University Press.
IJU	<i>Ijang ui</i> (二障義)
T	<i>Taishō shinshū daizōkyō</i> (大正新脩大藏經) [<i>Japanese Edition of the Buddhist Canon</i>] (1924–35). Tokyo: Taishō issaikyō kankō-kai.
ŚDS	<i>Śrīmālādevī-(siṃhanāda)-sūtra</i>
YBh	<i>Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra</i>

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