

Shinya Moriyama

A Comparison between the Indian and Chinese  
Interpretations of the Antinomic Reason  
(*Viruddhāvyabhicārin*)

pp. 121–150

in:

Chen-kuo Lin / Michael Radich (eds.)

**A Distant Mirror**

Articulating Indic Ideas in Sixth and Seventh  
Century Chinese Buddhism

Hamburg Buddhist Studies, 3  
Hamburg: Hamburg University Press 2014

## Imprint

Bibliographic information published by the *Deutsche Nationalbibliothek* (German National Library).

The *Deutsche Nationalbibliothek* lists this publication in the *Deutsche Nationalbibliografie*; detailed bibliographic data are available in the internet at <http://dnb.d-nb.de>.

The online version is available online for free on the website of Hamburg University Press (open access). The *Deutsche Nationalbibliothek* stores this online publication on its Archive Server. The Archive Server is part of the deposit system for long-term availability of digital publications.

Available open access in the Internet at:

Hamburg University Press – <http://hup.sub.uni-hamburg.de>

Persistent URL: [http://hup.sub.uni-hamburg.de/purl/HamburgUP\\_HBS03\\_LinRadich](http://hup.sub.uni-hamburg.de/purl/HamburgUP_HBS03_LinRadich)

URN: <http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:gbv:18-3-1467>

Archive Server of the *Deutsche Nationalbibliothek* – <http://dnb.d-nb.de>

ISBN 978-3-943423-19-8 (print)

ISSN 2190-6769 (print)

© 2014 Hamburg University Press, Publishing house of the Hamburg State and University Library Carl von Ossietzky, Germany

Printing house: Elbe-Werkstätten GmbH, Hamburg, Germany

<http://www.elbe-werkstaetten.de/>

Cover design: Julia Wrage, Hamburg

## Contents

Foreword	9
Michael Zimmermann	
Acknowledgements	13
Introduction	15
Michael Radich and Chen-kuo Lin	
Chinese Translations of <i>Pratyakṣa</i>	33
Funayama Toru	
Epistemology and Cultivation in Jingying Huiyuan's <i>Essay on the Three Means of Valid Cognition</i>	63
Chen-kuo Lin	
The Theory of <i>Apoha</i> in Kuiji's <i>Cheng weishi lun Shuji</i>	101
Shoryu Katsura	
<b>A Comparison between the Indian and Chinese Interpretations of the Antinomic Reason (<i>Viruddhāvvyabhicārin</i>)</b>	<b>121</b>
Shinya Moriyama	

The Problem of Self-Refuting Statements in Chinese Buddhist Logic	151
Jakub Zamorski	
A Re-examination of the Relationship between the <i>Awakening of Faith</i> and Dilun School Thought, Focusing on the Works of Huiyuan	183
Ching Keng	
A Pivotal Text for the Definition of the Two Hindrances in East Asia: Huiyuan's "Erzhang yi" Chapter	217
A. Charles Muller	
On the Notion of <i>Kaidaoyi</i> (* <i>Avakāśadānāśraya</i> ) as Discussed in Xuanzang's <i>Cheng weishi lun</i>	271
Junjie Chu	
Yogācāra Critiques of the Two Truths	313
Zhihua Yao	
Philosophical Aspects of Sixth-Century Chinese Buddhist Debates on "Mind and Consciousness"	337
Hans-Rudolf Kantor	
The Way of Nonacquisition: Jizang's Philosophy of Ontic Indeterminacy	397
Chien-hsing Ho	

Divided Opinion among Chinese Commentators on Indian Interpretations of the Parable of the Raft in the <i>Vajracchedikā</i> Yoke Meei Choong	419
Ideas about “Consciousness” in Fifth and Sixth Century Chinese Buddhist Debates on the Survival of Death by the Spirit, and the Chinese Background to * <i>Amalavijñāna</i> Michael Radich	471
The Process of Awakening in Early Texts on Buddha-Nature in India Michael Zimmermann	513
About the Authors	529
Index	535

in memoriam

John R. McRae (1947-2011)

# A Comparison between the Indian and Chinese Interpretations of the Antinomic Reason (*Viruddhāvyabhicārin*)<sup>1</sup>

Shinya Moriyama

## Introduction: *Viruddhāvyabhicārin* in Dignāga and Dharmakīrti

As is well known, the tradition of Chinese Buddhist logic, that is, the study of logical reasons (*hetuvidyā*, Chin. *yinming*, Jap. *immyō* 因明), started with the translations by Xuanzang (玄奘, 600/602–664) of Dignāga's *Nyāyamukha* (=NM, *Yinming zhengli men lun* 因明正理門論, T1628) and Śāṅkarasvāmin's *Nyāyapraveśa*[ka] (=NP, *Yinming ru zhengli lun* 因明入正理論, T1630).<sup>2</sup> While a number of Xuanzang's pupils then wrote commentaries on these two texts, it was the commentary by Kuiji (窺基, 632–682) on the NP that had the greatest impact on the later development of the Chinese and Japanese *hetuvidyā*.<sup>3</sup> This commentary con-

---

<sup>1</sup> I am grateful to Dr. Toshikazu Watanabe, Prof. Shōryū Katsura, Prof. Tōru Funayama, and Prof. Eli Franco for their valuable comments on earlier versions of this paper. I am also indebted to Dr. Michael Radich, who made insightful comments and suggestions on the final draft. I also thank Ms. Cynthia Peck-Kubaczek for correcting my English.

<sup>2</sup> Inami (2012: 22–23) has pointed out that the title of this work is still uncertain: according to the Tibetan and Chinese traditions it is called *Nyāyapraveśa*, whereas according to Jain tradition it is called *Nyāyapraveśaka*.

<sup>3</sup> With regard to Xuanzang's intentions in translating these two works, Takemura (1986: 31) assumes that it was for the purpose of educating his pupils who were engaged in translation work, especially those translating volumes 15 and 38 of the *Yogācārabhūmi*, in which several logical issues are discussed. To train them in questions of logic, Xuanzang selected NM and NP as two introductions to Indian logic. In the process of working on these translations, some of his pupils (Shentai 神泰, Jingmai 靖邁, Mingjue 明覺,

tains several interesting topics, on which Kuiji provided his own interpretations of logical terms and argumentations, including the topic of the so-called antinomic reason (*viruddhāvyaḥcārin*). The antinomic reason is one of the fallacious reasons (*hetvābhāsa*) that fail to establish the intended thesis. The aim of this paper is to demonstrate the originality of Kuiji's interpretation when compared to various interpretations by Indian commentators on the NP.

Before undertaking this comparison, however, we shall start with a brief overview of the historical development of the interpretations of this fallacious reason in Indian Buddhism (see Ui, 1966: 227-230; Kitagawa, 1965: 192-199; Tani 1987; Tillemans, 2000: 92-95; Ueda, 2008; and Ono, 2010). Dignāga, considered the founder of Buddhist logic, classifies the fallacious reason called “antinomic” (*viruddhāvyaḥcārin*) as an “inconclusive” reason (*anaikāntika*). It takes a unique position, however, within the group of “inconclusive” reasons: whereas the inconclusive nature of the others is based on their not fulfilling the three characteristics of a valid logical reason (*trairūpya*, 因三相), the antinomic reason does fulfill the three characteristics. Why, then, is it considered an “inconclusive” reason? In response to this question, Dignāga states the following:

PSV<sub>k</sub> (ad PS 3.23b, Kitagawa, 1965: 495): *gang gi phyir bshad pa'i mtshan nyid can gyi 'gal ba dag gcig la the tshom bskyed pa dag mthong ste | dper na byas pa dang mnyan par bya ba dag las sgra la rtag pa dang mi rtag pa dag nyid la the tshom za ba bzhin no.*<sup>4</sup>

= Ono, 2010: 127, fn. 4: *yasmād uktalakṣaṇābhyāṃ viruddhābhyāṃ ekasmin saṃśayo dṛṣṭaḥ, tad yathā kṛtakatvaśrāvaṇatvābhyāṃ śabde nityānityatvena saṃśayaḥ.*

Because doubt is observed in respect to the same subject on account of two contradictory [reasons], both fulfilling the above-stated [triple] characteristics of [a valid logical reason], for instance, one might

---

Wenbei 文備, Wengui 文軌, Bigong 璧公, etc.) developed a great deal of interest in this new field and began to write their own commentaries on these two works.

<sup>4</sup> See PSV<sub>v</sub> (ad PS 3.23b, Kitagawa, 1965: 495): *gal te gang phyir 'gal ba mtshan nyid gnyis su brjod pa dag las grangs gcig par ni mthong ba nyid de | dper na sgra la byas pa nyid dang mnyan bya dag las (em.: la ed.) rtag pa dang mi rtag pa nyid du the tshom za ba yin no zhe na |*

doubt whether sound is impermanent or permanent on account of [the two contradictory reasons:] “because it is a product” (*kṛtakatva*) and “because it is audible” (*śrāvaṇatva*) (see Kitagawa, 1965: 194; Tillemans, 2000: 93, fn. 332; Ono, 2010: 127).

From this description, one can reconstruct two proofs whose reasons result in the following antinomy:

	<u>Proof 1</u>	<u>Proof 2</u>
[Thesis:]	Sound is impermanent,	Sound is permanent,
[Reason:]	because it is a product,	because it is audible,
[Example:]	like a pot.	like sound-hood.

As Kitagawa (1973: 194), Tillemans (2000: 93) and Ono (2010: 131) have explained, in this debate, a Vaiśeṣika advocate who accepts the impermanence of sound presents Proof 1. In response, another disputant, who does not accept the impermanence of sound, presents Proof 2 to show that the Vaiśeṣika’s logical reason is antinomic. This is because the two reasons, both acceptable to the Vaiśeṣika, lead to mutually contradictory theses, namely, in the first case, that sound is permanent, and in the second, that it is impermanent. Since the Vaiśeṣika accepts the existence of universals (*sāmānya*) like sound-hood (*śabdātva*) which are grasped by the sense organs, the example of Proof 2 is well-formed. Thus, the Vaiśeṣika is now unavoidably confronted with a contradiction between two conclusions that are both justified by valid logical reasons.

In the above procedure, it is noteworthy that taken as a whole, its logical structure constitutes a *prasaṅga* (*reductio ad absurdum*) style of reasoning: the proponent’s claim is rebutted by a counter-proof, which reveals the absurdity of the proponent’s metaphysical presuppositions. In other words, to establish *viruddhāvyabhicārin*, the proponent’s ontological system must contain some inconsistencies or absurdities. In the case of the Vaiśeṣika ontology, universals are categorized as eternal entities, which is directly perceived by the sense organs; yet the similarity between sound-hood and sound itself leads one to the conclusion that sound is eternal, which is contrary to their own position. This implies that the fallacy of *viruddhāvyabhicārin* only occurs when a proponent presents a proof that relies on an inconsistent metaphysical system. Dig-nāga says:

PSV<sub>k</sub> (ad PS 3.24cd, Kitagawa, 1965: 498:) *gal te 'di la yang mi rtag pa nyid kyi gtan tshigs byas pa nyid la sogs pa 'ga' zhig ston par mi byed na ni 'gyur na | gnyi ga dmigs pa na 'gal ba dag don gcig la mi srid pa'i phyir the tshom gyi rgyu yin no || 'di la yang mngon sum dang lung stobs dang ldan pa'i phyir de kho na las nges pa btsal bar bya 'o zhes bya ba'i...*<sup>5</sup>

= Ono, 2010: 133, fn. 16, 134, fn. 18: *yady atrānityatvāhetuṃ kṛtakatvādi kaścīn na nidarśayet. dvayor upalabdhyor viruddhaikārthāsambhavāt saṃśāyāhetuḥ. atra ca pratyakṣāgamasya baliyastvam. tata eva niścayo 'nveṣya iti.*

[One might argue: “The reason, ‘because of being audible’ (i.e., the fifth reason in Dignāga’s wheel of reason) would be a valid logical reason for the Vaiśeṣika school if one presents ‘sound’ as its subject and ‘permanence’ as the property to be proved.” To this, the following reply is given: “It would be so,] if on this [subject,] no one presents the reason ‘being a product,’ etc., as the reason for impermanence. [However,] if the two [reasons] are cognized [together], this is a cause for doubt, because it is impossible to [apply] two contradictory [reasons] to the same object. And in this case, a scripture based on perception (*pratyakṣāgama*)<sup>6</sup> is more powerful. Only from this [kind of scripture] is a determination [of truth] to be sought” (see Kitagawa, 1965: 203f.; Ono, 2010: 132).

Here, Dignāga is discussing the problem of the fifth reason in the wheel of reason, *asādhāraṇānaikāntika*, which is, as is well known, the most problematic part when considering the generation of the theory of inter-

<sup>5</sup> PSV<sub>v</sub> (ad PS 3.24cd, Kitagawa, 1965: 498): *gal te 'di la byas pa'i phyir zhes pa la sogs pa mi rtag pa nyid kyi gtan tshigs su nam yang mi ston na 'o || gnyis ka dmigs pa'i don ltan na ni 'gal ba'i don yin pa'i phyir the tshom gyi gtan tshigs so || 'di yang de nyid nges pa ni rjes su tshol ba po rnams kyi mngon sum dang ldan pa'i phyir ro; 若於爾時，無有顯示所作性等，是無常因，容有此義。然俱可得一義相違，不容有故，是猶豫因。又於此中現教力勝故，應依此思求決定 (NM, T32:1628.2b20-24).*

<sup>6</sup> As Kitagawa (1965: 203, fn. 381) has noted, the term *pratyakṣāgama* is translated into Tibetan as a *dvandva* compound: *mngon sum dang lung*, but according to Jinendrabuddhi’s commentary, it can be interpreted as a *tatpuruṣa* compound. The same term in Chinese (*xianjiao* 現教) is also interpreted as either a *dvandva* compound or a *tatpuruṣa* compound. See Kuiji’s discussion below.

nal pervasion (*antarvyāpti*). The proof “sound is permanent because it is audible, like sound-hood” seems to be a valid reason, at least for the Vaiśeṣika. But when its contradictory proof, “Sound is impermanent because it is a product, like a pot,” is taken into consideration, the reason in this proof forms a *viruddhāvyabhicārin*, an antinomic reason, which causes doubt in the minds of the audience. It is noteworthy that here, Dignāga does not mention the sequence of the two proofs; for him, it does not matter which proof is presented first. This point will be mentioned again when we examine Kuiji’s interpretation of this type of reason.

Moreover, the last sentence of the above argument is also remarkable: Dignāga concludes that scripture based on perception is necessary to determine whether or not sound is permanent. On this point, Kitagawa (1965: 204) has provided the following comment:

It should be noted here that the phenomenon of *viruddhāvyabhicārin*, in which two different reasons establish contradictory conclusions on one and the same subject, occurs only when one presents a reason that relies on incorrect teachings; it does not occur when one presents a reason that relies on teachings that are coherent with perceptions, etc. This implies that Dignāga implicitly accepts that all entities in this universe exist within a mutually logical harmony. This is because one can probably say that if the entities in this universe maintained this kind of logical harmony with one another, and if one only used reasoning based on correct teachings, namely, correct cosmology, a phenomenon such as *viruddhāvyabhicārin* would not occur.<sup>7</sup>

---

<sup>7</sup> Kitagawa, 1965: 204: ただここで注意すべきは、同一の宗（バクシャ）に互に相容れない帰結へ導く二つの因が成立するという相違決定の現象は、誤った教説にもとづいて因を立てる時に起るものであり、現量等と撞着しない正しい教説にもとづいて因が立てられる時には起り得べきものではないという考えがここに述べられているという点である。何となればこのことは、宇宙内に於ける凡ゆる存在物が相互に論理的な調和を保っているということを陳那が暗黙の中に認めていたことを意味するからである。宇宙内の存在物が相互に論理的な調和を保っているのはじめて、正しい教説、即ち正しい宇宙観に立つて推論が行われる限りは相違決定の如き現象は起るはずがないということが言えると考えられるからである。

Dignāga's philosophical endeavor is sometimes considered to be aiming at a certain kind of formal logic that would be acceptable to any religion or school, beyond the framework of Buddhism (see Katsura, 2012: 44). However, inasmuch as *viruddhāvyabhicārin* is concerned, we need an additional note about the exceptional case in which Dignāga dogmatically distinguishes between “correct” teachings and “wrong” teachings.

In the above sketch of Dignāga's treatment of *viruddhāvyabhicārin*, we might ask why, in the context of the wheel of reason, Dignāga needed to discuss the antinomic reason and classify it as an “inconclusive” reason. On this point, his follower Dharmakīrti found a clear answer by separating the discussion of *viruddhāvyabhicārin* from the context of the wheel of reason. According to Dharmakīrti, the antinomic reason should be considered part of “scripturally based inference” (*āgamāpekṣānumāna*), not “inference functioning by the force of real entities” (*vastubalapravṛttānumāna*). In his *Nyāyabindu*, Dharmakīrti says:

NB 3.110-114: *viruddhāvyabhicāry api saṃśayahetur uktaḥ | sa iha kasmān noktaḥ ||110|| anumānaviṣaye 'sambhavāt ||111|| na hi sambhavo 'sti kārya-svabhāvayor uktalakṣaṇayor anupalambhasya ca viruddhatāyāḥ ||112|| na cānyo 'vyabhicārī ||113|| tasmād avastudarsānabalapravṛttam āgamāśrayam anumānam āśritya tadarthavicāreṣu viruddhāvyabhicārī sādhanadoṣa uktaḥ ||114||*

[Question:] The antinomic reason is also stated [by Dignāga] as a cause producing doubt. Why is it not mentioned here (i.e., in the classification of the inconclusive reason)?

[Reply:] Because [the antinomic reason] cannot occur with regard to an object of inference [that relies on the triple characteristics of reason]. For there can be no [other reasons] contradictory to *kāryahetu*, *svabhāvahetu*, and *anupalabdhihetu*, [which fulfill] the above-mentioned [triple] characteristics, and there is no non-deviating reason other than [these three kinds of reasons]. Therefore, only when one investigates the meaning of [scripture] by relying on scripturally based inference that does not presuppose the observation of reality is *viruddhāvyabhicārin* stated as a fallacy of reason (NB III 110-114).

As is well known, Dharmakīrti found the foundation of the inference in the necessary connection through the essential nature [of entities] (*svabhāvaṣpratibandha*), namely, causal relation (*tadutpatti*) or essential identity (*tādātmya*). From the viewpoint of this necessary connection, a valid reason can be restricted to only three types, namely, *kāryahetu*, *svabhāvahetu*, and *anupalabdhihetu*. As far as inferences on the basis of empirical reality are concerned, there is no room for the fallacy of *viruddhāvyabhicārin*. According to Dharmakīrti's thinking, this fallacy occurs only in relation to a metaphysical world accepted by other religions and philosophical schools that are supposed to exist outside empirical reality. Since such metaphysical worlds were invented speculatively by the respective founders of the various religions and philosophical schools, they contain numerous contradictions that can be revealed through the fallacy of *viruddhāvyabhicārin*. To exemplify such a contradiction, Dharmakīrti uses the theme of universals (*sāmānya*), accepted by the Vaiśeṣika school, and constructs an example of *viruddhāvyabhicārin* that establishes two contradictory conclusions, namely, the omnipresence (*sarvatra*) of universals and their non-omnipresence (see NB 3.117-120; Moriyama, 2013).

In this manner, in Dharmakīrti's system of logic, *viruddhāvyabhicārin* was removed from the wheel of reasons and occupied its own domain outside of empirical reality. At the same time, *viruddhāvyabhicārin* ended its role as a useful means for driving an opponent to self-contradiction, because in Dharmakīrti's logic there is little room for open discussion about religious issues beyond empirical reality.<sup>8</sup> However, until Dharmakīrti's interpretation, it seems that Dignāga's *viruddhāvyabhicārin* was quite useful as a tool of debate. Since Xuanzang and Kuiji's periods of activity fall exactly in the period between these two thinkers, by examining their ideas, another development of this same logical concept, in a place far to the east of India, comes into view.

---

<sup>8</sup> Jinendrabuddhi's commentary on Dignāga's PS 3.23-24 and several commentaries on Dharmakīrti's PV 4.65, NB 3.110-120, and HB \*31.6-\*33.1 are the best materials for studying *viruddhāvyabhicārin* in the post-Dharmakīrti period. However, such a comprehensive study is beyond the scope of this paper.

## 1 *Viruddhāvyabhicārin* in the *Nyāyapraveśaka* and its interpretations by Jain commentators

Following Dignāga's system of logic, the author of the NP, Śāṅkarasvāmin,<sup>9</sup> presents *viruddhāvyabhicārin* as one of six kinds of inconclusive reason as follows:

NP 6.13-15: *viruddhāvyabhicārī yathā – anityaḥ śabdaḥ kṛtakatvād ghaṭavad iti. nityaḥ śabdaḥ śrāvaṇatvāt śabdatvavad iti. ubhayoḥ saṁśaya-hetutvād dvāv apy etāv eko 'naikāntikaḥ bhavati samuditāv eva.*

The antinomic reason (*viruddhāvyabhicārin*) is, for example: “Sound is impermanent because it is a product, like a pot,” and “Sound is permanent because it is audible, like sound-hood.” [Together] these two [reasons] become a cause of doubt, since if the two [reasons] are combined they form a single inconclusive reason (*anaikāntika*).

This statement conveys almost the same meaning as Dignāga's argument in his PS. As we will see below, Kuiji's interpretation of this statement has some unique features. However, in order to understand the special character of his interpretation, we should first look at the Indian understanding of this concept. At present we have only two Sanskrit commentaries on the NP, namely, a commentary called *Śiṣyahitā* or *Nyāyapraveśakavṛtti* (NPV) ascribed to the Jain author Haribhadrasūri (eighth century), and the sub-commentary thereto called *Nyāyapraveśakavṛttipañjikā* (NPVP) by Pārśvadevaḡaṇi (thirteenth century). What follows is a sum-

---

<sup>9</sup> Modern scholars hold two opinions with regard to the authorship of NP, namely, Dignāga or Śāṅkarasvāmin. This discussion is summarized in Inami, 2011: 23-26. Inami has pointed out that in the ninefold classification of *paḡṣābhāsa*, four items that were added by the author of the NP are refuted by various followers of Dharmakīrti, namely, Śākyabuddhi, Jinendrabuddhi, Prajñākaragupta and Manorathanandin. This fact probably shows, as many scholars now believe, that Dignāga is not the author of the NP. It seems unreasonable to suppose that Dharmakīrti's followers would criticize their master's opinion. Thus, I am also of the opinion that Śāṅkarasvāmin was the author of the NP.

mary of their arguments, especially focusing on those points that are comparable to Kuiji's interpretation.<sup>10</sup>

Analysis of the compound *viruddhāvyabhicārin*: The compound is analyzed by Haribhadra as a *tatpuruṣa*, which means “[a reason] that does not deviate from a contradictory [reason, i.e., the other reason that proves what is contradictory to the intended conclusion]” (*viruddham na vyabhicarati*).<sup>11</sup> In addition, he criticizes the other option of interpreting the compound as a *karmadhāraya*, namely, “the reason that is contradictory and non-deviant” (*viruddhas cāsāv avyabhicārī ca*), because being contradictory and being non-deviant are opposed to each other, and because this interpretation would result in the theory of perspectivism (*anekāntavāda*) (see NPV 37.13-14). On the other hand, Pārśvadeva shows a way to accept both interpreta-

---

<sup>10</sup> In Pārśvadeva's explanation, there is also an interesting discussion on the necessity of preliminary investigation before presenting an antinomic reason. Since it is obvious that the discussion is constructed under the influence of Dharmakīrti, I would like to just summarize the discussion in the following. In Pārśvadeva's understanding, every reason contains the possibility of being interpreted as a *viruddhāvyabhicārin*; the primary role of the reason is to establish its own target property, not to refute its counter-proof. Thus, when presenting a certain reason, it is not possible to avoid being attacked by its counter-proof. Therefore one should begin by using another method (*upāyāntara*) to determine the target property. In other words, before starting a proof, one should rebut the property that is contradictory to the target property through logical reasoning (*yukti*). As a typical method for this kind of reasoning, Pārśvadeva proposes Dharmakīrti's *sādhya viparyayabādhakapramāṇa* (NPVP 92.18-23). However, when a disputant cannot demonstrate the necessary connection (*avinābhāva*) between a logical reason and its target property through the method of invalidating the reason's presence in the dissimilar example (i.e., *sādhya viparyayabādhakapramāṇa*) and when he cannot criticize the other proof as being non-established (*asiddha*), the fallacious reason called *viruddhāvyabhicārin* occurs (NPVP 93.21f). This exposition by Pārśvadeva is clearly based on his knowledge of Dharmakīrtian logic, which aims at establishing the necessary connection between the logical reason and its target property. If we rigorously follow Pārśvadeva's procedure, we must admit that *viruddhāvyabhicārin* occurs only if the necessary connection is not ascertained. However, in the period before Dharmakīrti, this was not how *viruddhāvyabhicārin* was understood, as we will see in the next section.

<sup>11</sup> NPV 37.10-12. On this passage, Pārśvadeva comments as follows (NPVP 92.12f.): *taṃ viruddham śrāvaṇatvākhyam na vyabhicarati kṛtakatvalakṣaṇo viruddhāvyabhicārī*.

tions. In order to defend the *karmadhāraya* interpretation, he explains the compound as follows: “[A reason] is a contradictory [reason] because it proves that which is contradictory to what is to be proved by another reason; [the same reason] is non-deviant from what is to be proved by [the reason] itself.”<sup>12</sup> These two interpretations are also held by certain followers of Dharmakīrti, as for example Jinendrabuddhi and Dharmottara.<sup>13</sup>

Explanation of the two proofs: According to Haribhadra, while the first proof is presented by a Vaiśeṣika, the second is presented by a Mīmāṃsaka. With regard to the example of “sound-hood”, Haribhadra notes that it is a lower universal (*sāmānyaviśeṣa*) by means of which one is able to express and cognize “sound” with regard to the various particular sounds that are produced by musical instruments (see NPV 37.14-19). Pārśvadeva does not provide any information concerning the two disputants of the debate.

Explanation of the phrase “cause of doubt”: With regard to the phrase “cause of doubt” (*saṃśayaḥetu*), Haribhadra explains that when the two reasons are combined, the complex reason becomes a cause of doubt about whether sound is permanent or not. If the two reasons were combined (*samasta*), the first reason would also be an over-exclusive, inconclusive reason (*asādhāraṇānaikāntika*) like the second; on the other hand, if the two reasons were separate (*vyasta*), each reason would be considered a valid logical reason because they both fulfill the necessary triple characteristics. It is only when the two reasons are mutually dependent (*parasparasāpekṣa*) that they become *viruddhāvyabhicārin* (see NPV 37.19-38.7).

---

<sup>12</sup> NPVP 93.16f.: *yadi tu sādhanāntarasiddhasya viruddhasādhanād viruddhaḥ svasādhyāvya-abhicārāc cāvyaabhicārī tato viruddhas cāsāv avyabhicārī ca viruddhāvyaabhicārīty ucyate, tadā syād eva.*

<sup>13</sup> For Jinendrabuddhi’s interpretations, see Ono, 2010: 129, fn. 9. Ono regards this sentence (*viruddhāyora vyabhicārah, so ’syāstīti viruddhāvyaabhicārī*) as evidence for a *bahuvrīhi* interpretation, but in my view, it reveals that it has been interpreted as a *tatpuruṣa*. See NPVP 92.15: *viruddhasyāvyaabhicārāḥ so ’syāstītiyam api vyutpattir jñeyā*. For Dharmottara’s interpretation, see Tillemans, 2000: 92.

## 2 Kuiji's explanation of the *viruddhāvyabhicārin* section in NP

Kuiji, one of the great pupils of Xuanzang, wrote an extended commentary on NP. Although we know little about his knowledge of Sanskrit and Buddhist logic as transmitted from his master Xuanzang, his commentary is clearly good material for understanding the actual state of Chinese Buddhist logic in its early stages (see Ui, 1966: 294; Nakamura, 1960). In the following, we shall examine Kuiji's commentary on Śāṅkarasvāmin's argument about *viruddhāvyabhicārin*, which is divided by Kuiji into three parts: (1) the problem of the name (*biao ming* 標名), (2) the presentation of two proofs (*xian zong yin* 顯宗因), and (3) a conclusion.

### 2.1 Analysis of the compound

First of all, let us start with Kuiji's interpretation of the compound *viruddhāvyabhicārin*:

YRZLS: 具三相因，各自決定，成相違之宗，名相違決定。相違之決定，決定令相違，第三第六兩嚮，俱是依主釋也 (T44:1840.126a21-23).

[A pair of reasons] are called an “antinomic reason”, when each [reason] is determinative due to [its] fulfilling the triple characteristic [for a valid logical reason] and when [each reason] establishes [a mutually] contradictory thesis. [The compound can be analyzed as] a “determinative [reason] of the contradictory [thesis]” or a “[reason] that causes [its thesis] to contradict [the other thesis] through [its] determinative [reason]”, namely, [it is either] a genitive *tatpuruṣa* or an instrumental *tatpuruṣa*.

Here Kuiji provides two interpretations of the compound. Of the two, analyzing the compound as a genitive *tatpuruṣa* (*xiangwei zhi jue ding* 相違之決定) seems less problematic, even though there are other possible ways to connect the first component (i.e., *xiangwei* 相違, *viruddha*) to the second (i.e., *jue ding* 決定, *avyabhicārin*) through other case-endings. However, Kuiji's second analysis (*jue ding ling xiangwei* 決定令相違) is unreasonable, not because it is an instrumental *tatpuruṣa*, but because it

interprets the second component as possessing the instrumental case-ending “by means of *avyabhicārin*”. In this case, by means of a determinative (or non-deviant) reason such as *kṛtakatva*, in combination with another reason such as *śrāvaṇatva*, we arrive at a contradiction between the permanence and the impermanence of sound. What this exposition intends to claim is perfectly understandable. In Sanskrit grammar, however, a compound is interpreted as an instrumental *tatpuruṣa* when the first component, in the instrumental case, determines the second. Thus, Kuiji’s analysis, which reverses the order of the two components, is impossible.<sup>14</sup> Presumably, Kuiji understood that a compound can be classified as an instrumental *tatpuruṣa* if it is possible to analyze either of its two components as instrumental to the other, but this would show that his knowledge of Sanskrit was limited.<sup>15</sup>

## 2.2 Explanation of the two proofs

Next, we turn to the problem of identifying the opponent who presents the second proof. The Jain commentator Haribhadra identifies the opponent as a certain Mīmāṃsaka, but Kuiji takes a different stance:

<sup>14</sup> In order to understand Kuiji’s argument, it is helpful to consult the *Inmyōron so myōtō shō* (因明論疏明灯抄, T2270, hereafter *Myōtōshō*), written by a pioneer Japanese scholar of logic/*inmyō*, Zenju (善珠, 723-798 C.E.): 具三相因等者, 勝聲二師, 所作所聞, 具三相因, 各自決定, 成常無常相違之宗。名相違決定。相違屬宗, 決定屬因。相違之決定, 是第六轉。決定令相違, 是第三轉。俱依主釋也。六三兩轉其相如何? 且依《瑜伽》, 說男聲七, 如其次第: ①一說體聲。②二所作業聲。如說斫樹。樹是所作之業。③三能作具聲。如人及斧。能斫之具。④四所屬聲。如言斫樹為諸王等。⑤五所因聲。斫此樹木為造堂故。⑥六所屬聲。如樹屬官。⑦七所依聲。如樹依付百姓家等。⑧第八轉者。呼召諸法之聲。[1] 如樹屬官, 是官之樹也。相違屬宗, 是相違之決定。故依主釋也。[2] 令斫樹倒, 即依人斧。故云能作具聲。令宗相違, 即依因力故, 決定令相違。是依主釋也 (T68:2270.362b10-25). Following the grammatical explanations of the *Yogācārabhūmi*, in the underlined passage, Zenju explains Kuiji’s second analysis as follows: “Because it causes [its thesis] to contradict [the intended conclusion] [precisely] by means of the reason, [Kuiji says:] ‘[a reason] that causes [its thesis] to contradict [the intended conclusion] by [its] determinative nature’. This is based on interpretation [of the term] as a *tatpuruṣa* compound.”

<sup>15</sup> On Kuiji’s knowledge of Sanskrit grammar, see Teng, 2011, Chap. 3.

YRZLS: 此乃勝論對聲生論。義如前說，若對聲顯隨一不成 (T44: 1840.126b4-5).

That is to say, [the first proof] is [presented] by the Vaiśeṣika (Sheng-lun 勝論) against those who claim that sound is produced (\*śabdopattivādin, shengshenglun 聲生論). As has been argued previously, if [the proof] were [presented] against those who claim that sound is [merely] made manifest (śabdābhivyaktivādin, shengxianlun 聲顯論), it would be a [reason] that is not established for either the proponent or the opponent (*anyatarāsiddha, sui yi bu cheng* 隨一不成).

Certainly, Śaṅkarasvāmin had already claimed that the reason “because it is a product” constitutes an *anyatarāsiddha* fallacy when that reason is presented against a Śabdābhivyaktivādin.<sup>16</sup> Therefore, in order to avoid this fallacy, it seems necessary to assume a different figure/school who/which is claiming the permanence of sound. Kuiji introduces this figure/school with the name “those who claim that sound is produced” (\*śabdopattivādin, shengshenglun 聲生論); this figure is different from the Śabdābhivyaktivādin.<sup>17</sup> These two advocates of the permanence of sound are mentioned by Kuiji in several discussions in his *Yinming ru zhengli lun shu* (因明入正理論疏, hereafter YRLZS) and *Dacheng fayuan yi*

<sup>16</sup> NP 4.20: *kṛtakatvād iti śabdābhivyaktivādinam praty anyatarāsiddhaḥ*.

<sup>17</sup> We have no Indian source for a group called \*śabdopattivādin (shengshenglun 聲生論). Hōjō (1980) claimed that the Śabdopattivādin represents the Vaiśeṣika theory of language, but he did not present any evidence for this identification. On this point, however, Prof. Tōru Funayama has kindly informed me about the following passage from the commentary by Wengui (文軌) on the NP: 今鶴鷓子等對聲顯論，立量云，聲是無常，因云，所作性故。彼聲顯論雖計聲從緣顯，其若太虛無所作義。今鶴鷓等云，所作性者但是自許聲有此義。他聲顯論不許聲有。此則自成他不成也(...)又釋，其所作因有生有顯。生即鶴鷓等許\*，顯即聲顯論許\* (see Shen, 2008: 347, where the reading *ji* 計 is accepted instead of *xu* 許). In the above passage, Wengui attributes the theory of \*śabdopattivāda (shengshenglun 聲生論) to Ulūka (Xiuliuzi 鶴鷓子, i.e., Kaṇāda, the founder of the Vaiśeṣika school) and others, and thus we know that Kuiji's interpretation was not the only one concerning this group. However, because of space constraints, I cannot here compare the two interpretations of Xuanzang's two pupils further, but I do plan to do so on another occasion.

*lin zhang* (大乘法苑義林章).<sup>18</sup> It should be noted here that “sound” or *sheng* (聲) in Kuiji’s terminology is a complex concept that can be interpreted not only as a “physical sound” but also as a “signifer” and as “sound-hood”. I will use the term “sound” in the broad sense covering those aspects. By contrast, to indicate more precisely the first sense only, I will use “mere sound”:

1) YRZLS:聲生說聲總有三類：一者響音。雖耳所聞，不能詮表。如近坑語，別有響聲。二者聲性。一一能詮，各有性類。離能詮外，別有本常。不緣不覺。新生緣具，方始可聞。不同勝論。三者能詮。離前二有。響及此二皆新生。響不能詮。今此新生聲是常住。以本有聲性爲同品 (T44:1840.126b10-16).

The Śabdotpattivādin claims that “sound” generally has three aspects: [1] Mere sound, which is audible, but cannot denote [an object-meaning], just as, when one speaks in the vicinity of a cave, there is an additional [set of] word[s] in the echo; [2] Sound-hood. There is both a class and a genus (*xing, lei* 性類) in each signifer (*nengquan* 能詮, \**abhidhāna*?). Outside of the signifer, [sound-hood] exists originally in permanence. It is not cognizable without a condition (*yuan* 緣). Once it comes into conjunction with the [appropriate] conditions [to make it] newly come into being, it becomes audible. [This] is different from the [idea of the] Vaiśeṣika; [3] Signifer (*nengquan* 能詮), which exists separately from the first two (i.e., mere sound and sound-hood). The mere sound and this signifer both come into being anew. This mere sound cannot denote [an object]. Now [i.e., when the Śabdotpattivādin presents the subject], this sound (i.e., signifer), which has newly come into being, is permanent [after it has arisen]. [The Śabdotpattivādin] can [therefore] present originally existing sound-hood (*ben you sheng xing* 本有聲性) as the similar example (*tongpin* 同品, \**sapakṣa*).

<sup>18</sup> In Kuiji’s *Dacheng fayuan yi lin zhang* (大乘法苑義林章, T1861), six heretical theories are enumerated: the Sāṅkhya, the Vaiśeṣika, the \*Vedavāda, the Śabdābhivyaktivāda, the \*Śabdotpattivāda, and the Lokāyata (*shulun* 數論, *shenglun* 勝論, *minglun* 明論, *shengxianlun* 聲顯論, *shengshenglun* 聲生論, *shunshilun* 順世論).

2) YRZLS: 聲論師中總有二種：一聲從緣生即常不滅。二聲本常住。從緣所顯今方可聞。緣響若息。還不可聞。聲生亦爾。緣息不聞。緣在故聞。此二師皆有一分一切內外異性，一體多體能詮別故。若佛弟子對聲生論立：聲無常，所作性因，便具三相。對聲顯論言：所作性，隨一不成。若對聲顯言：勤勇因，便具三相。對聲生論立：一切聲皆是無常，勤勇爲因。宗法非遍兩俱不成。今顯對聲生，所作爲因。若對聲顯，勤勇爲因 (T44:1840.108a27-b7).

Among the Śābdavādīns (*shenglunshi* 聲論師), there are generally two types: First, [the \*Śābdotpattivādin claims that] sound comes into being in accordance with conditions, and [that] it is eternal and non-perishing. Second, [the Śābdābhivyaktivādin claims that] sound is originally permanent; it becomes manifest in accordance with conditions, and only then is it audible; when the conditions, together with the mere sound, cease, it returns [to its original nature] and becomes inaudible. It is the same in the case of the \*Śābdotpattivādin: when the condition ceases, [the sound] is inaudible; because the condition exists, it is audible. These two masters both [accept] that there are differences [in the sound] concerning the parts, the whole, [what is] internal [to it], and [what is] external [to it], because of distinctions between single essence and multiple essences in the signifier.<sup>19</sup> If the Buddhist claims the impermanence of sound against the \*Śābdotpattivādin, the reason “being a product” (\**krtakavta*) fulfills the triple characteristics [of a valid reason]. However, if [the same thesis] is presented against the Śābdābhivyaktivādin, [the reason] “being a product” constitutes [the fallacious reason called] *anyatarāsiddha*. If [the thesis] is presented against the Śābdābhivyaktivādin, [the reason] “[coming into being] immediately after intentional effort” (\**prayatnānantariyakavta*) fulfills the triple characteristics [of a valid reason]. If [the thesis] “all sounds are impermanent” is presented against the \*Śābdotpattivādin with the reason “[coming into being] immediately after intentional effort”, [the reason] does not pervade the property of the subject [i.e., it does not fulfill the first characteristic of a valid reason, *pakṣadharmatva*] and thus, it constitutes [the

<sup>19</sup> This sentence is still unclear to me.

fallacious reason called] *ubhayāsiddha*. It is now clear that one [should] present the reason “being a product” against the \*Śabdopattivādin, and the reason “[coming into being] immediately after intentional effort” against the Śabdābhivyaktivādin.

3) *Dacheng fayuan yi lin zhang*: 聲顯論者，聲體本有，待緣顯之，體性常住。此計有二：一者隨一一物，各各有一能詮常聲，猶如非擇滅。以尋伺等所發音顯。音是無常。今用衆多常聲爲體。二者一切法上，但共有一能詮常聲，猶如眞如。以尋伺等所發音顯。此音無常。今者唯取一常聲爲體。其音響等但是顯緣，非能詮體 (T45:1861.251 b2-8).

The Śabdābhivyaktivāda [claims that] the nature of sound originally exists, and then becomes manifest in reliance upon its conditions. This nature is permanent. When one examines this nature, there are two types: [1] First, there is a permanent sound that signifies [each object] in accordance with the [corresponding] entity, like non-analytical cessation (*apratisaṅkhyānirodha*).<sup>20</sup> In terms of what is made manifest by sounds pronounced on the basis of reasoning (\**vitarka*) and reflection (\**vicāra*), etc., [mere] sound is impermanent; here, [however,] these plural [sounds] take the eternal sound (i.e., signifier) as their essence; [2] second, there is a single, permanent sound that signifies [an object] that exists commonly in all entities (*dharmas*), like suchness. In terms of what is made manifest by sounds pronounced on the basis of reasoning and reflection, etc., the [mere] sound is impermanent; here, [however,] we take only the singular, eternal sound as the essence. The mere sounds, etc., are only conditions for the manifestation [of the single, eternal sound], and [the single, eternal sound] is not the essence of the signifier.

<sup>20</sup> For non-analytical cessation (*apratisaṅkhyānirodha*), see AK 1.6cd and AKBh on the half stanza. Unlike analytical cessation, which obstructs the arising of defilements by the power of wisdom, this non-analytical cessation concerns every entity (*dharma*). According to Vasubandhu’s exposition, this cessation obstructs the arising of a future entity when it lacks the conditions for its arising. Since this cessation is permanent and applicable to each entity, Kuiji uses the concept as the example for sound as a signifier.

4) *Dacheng fayuan yi lin zhang*: 其聲生論計，聲本無，待緣生之，生已常住。由音響等所發生故，此計有二：一計體多，猶如非擇滅。二計體一，猶若真如。音響生緣體無常法。今取新生常聲為體，以能詮故。響非能詮 (T45:1861.251b12-16).

When we examine the \*Śabdopattivāda, [its doctrine is as follows:] Sound originally does not exist, but it comes into being in reliance upon conditions. Once it has come into being, it is everlasting. Because [sound] is brought into being by mere sounds, etc., there are two ways of enumerating [it]: [1] First, we can count it as multiple in nature, like non-analytical cessation; [2] second, we can count it as singular in nature, like suchness; here, [however,] we take the sound that is everlasting after newly coming into being (*xin sheng chang sheng* 新生常聲) as the essence [of sound] because it signifies [each object]. The mere sound is not the signifier.

From these descriptions – despite the fact that they contain a number of expressions that are difficult for me to understand – we can see how the two figures/schools differ:

The Śabdābhivyaktivādin does not accept the reason “being a product” (*kṛtakatva*); he only accepts “coming into being immediately after intentional effort” (*prayatnānantariyakatva*). According to this belief, the essences/essence of sound – either multiple in accordance with the objects being signified, or having a single nature – are/is eternal and become/-s manifest in reliance upon conditions such as mere sounds produced by reasoning and reflection. The Śabdābhivyaktivādin seems to equate the signifier with the eternal essence of sound.

The \*Śabdopattivādin accepts the reason “being a product”. Unlike the Śabdābhivyaktivādin, he claims that sound is produced by mere sound. Thus, for him, the permanence of sound means that a sound continues eternally after it is produced. According to the description in the NP-commentary, he distinguishes sound-hood from mere sound and signifier. However, in the *Dacheng fayuan yi lin zhang*, it is said that for him, sound does not originally exist (*sheng ben wu* 聲本無). It is significant that this \*Śabdopattivādin claims that sound-

hood is audible when it fulfills the conditions upon which it newly comes into being (*xin sheng yuan* 新生緣).

Supposing this \*Śabdōtpattivādin as the opponent, Kuiji provides a clear picture of a specific debate in which the two disputants share concepts relating to the proofs, including the reason “being a product” and the example “sound-hood”.

### 2.3 How do we determine the winner of the debate?

As seen in the previous section, when commenting on the antinomic reason, Kuiji aims at reconstructing a debate between a Vaiśeṣika and a \*Śabdōtpattivādin. However, if this is a real debate, one should be able to determine who the winner is. In the case of the debate under discussion, a Vaiśeṣika first presents a proof of the impermanence of sound, whereupon the opponent presents a counter-proof. Of the two antinomic reasons, then, neither *kṛtakatva* nor *śrāvaṇatva* results in a decisive conclusion.

In this situation, Śāṅkarasvāmin simply says, “both [reasons] are a cause of doubt; these two combined constitute a single inconclusive [reason]” (*ubhayoḥ saṁśayahetutvād dvāv apy etāv eko 'naikāntikaḥ bhavati samuditāv eva*). Commenting on this passage, Kuiji explains that the author’s intention consists in avoiding the misconception that in the case of *viruddhāvyabhicārin*, the one who presents the counter-proof gains the advantage and becomes the winner. Indeed, this was the idea expressed by Wengui (文軌, d.u.), a predecessor of Kuiji.<sup>21</sup>

Kuiji points out the error in this idea by quoting Dignāga’s statement: “And here, since *pratyakṣāgama* predominates, exactly by this [means] one should seek a determination [as to whether sound is permanent or

---

<sup>21</sup> See Takemura, 1986: 227-232. As Takemura has emphasized, the above is Kuiji’s understanding of Wengui’s discussion (Takemura, 1986: 230). Unlike the above summary, Wengui claims that the winner of the debate is determined by perception and Buddhist scripture; if both proponent and opponent are opposed by perception and scripture, the one who first presents a proof is defeated, whereupon the other becomes the winner.

not]” (又於此中現教力勝故依此思求決定).<sup>22</sup> The compound *pratyakṣāgama* (*xianjiao* 現教) is analyzed by Kuiji in three different ways: (1) what is experienced in common by the world (*xian* 現 = *shijian* 世間) and the Buddha’s teaching (*jiao* 教 = *fojiao* 佛教), (2) teaching based on Śākyamuni Buddha’s direct experience (*Shijia fo xianzheng* 釋迦佛現證), and (3) teaching based on what is accepted by the world (*shijian xian* 世間現) (see T44:1840.126c9-17). In each case, Kuiji judges the Vaiśeṣika to be the winner of the debate. However, as Kuiji explains, to eliminate the misconception that victory always goes to the one who presents the counter-proof, Śāṅkarasvāmin concludes the section with the words, “both are inconclusive [reasons]”.

In the above exposition, Kuiji seems to ignore the importance of the “antinomy” of *viruddhāvhyabhicārin*. Certainly, in a real debate, one must decide who the winner is. As we have seen in the introduction, from a logical viewpoint, this type of fallacious reason has the destructive function of driving the opponent’s position into self-contradiction. As in other *prasaṅga*-style arguments, it is important to reveal the failure of the opponent’s implicit presupposition logically, and yet, Kuiji’s interpretation does not seem to do this. Nonetheless, we must refrain from concluding that Kuiji has completely ignored the “antinomy” in *viruddhāvhyabhicārin* until we have examined his three types of inference.

#### 2.4 *Kuiji’s typology of viruddhāvhyabhicārin*

Soon after the exposition of the concluding passage of this section, Kuiji adds some additional arguments concerning his own ideas on *viruddhāvhyabhicārin*. These contain, in my view, three remarkable points:

- A) The typology of *viruddhāvhyabhicārin*: According to Kuiji, *viruddhāvhyabhicārin* can be classified into three types according to the situation

<sup>22</sup> Katsura, 1979: 77. In YRZLS (T44:1840.126b29-c4), Kuiji quotes a passage of NM in order to criticize the interpretation of a former master (i.e., Wengui) that in a debate, the disputant who presents his proof second, after the first disputant, is the winner when the two proofs are equally valid, as in the case of stopping a slow (i.e., inconclusive) game of go, where one judges the player who took the second move of the game as the winner (古有斷言：如殺遲碁，後下爲勝).

of the debate, namely: (1) a situation in which one is refuting the other's proof from one's own position; (2) a situation in which one is defending one's position from the other's refutation; and (3) a situation in which two disputants argue while commonly accepting the concepts used in their proofs.

- B) The relation between *viruddhāvyabhicārin* and *anumānaviruddha*: The fallacy of *viruddhāvyabhicārin* is encompassed in the fallacious thesis called “thesis contradicted by another inference” (*anumānaviruddha*).
- C) Four kinds of *viruddha* and *viruddhāvyabhicārin*: In the NP, the contradictory reason (*viruddha*) is classified into four types, namely, *dharmaśvarūpaviparītasādhana*, *dharmaviśeṣaviparītasādhana*, *dharmisvarūpaviparītasādhana*, and *dharmiviśeṣaviparītasādhana*. Kuiji claims that these four categories are also applicable in classifying *viruddhāvyabhicārin* into four types. These types depend upon which element of the thesis is contradictory to the decisive reason.

Of the above three points, we will focus only on point A, in order to look for the basis of Kuiji's understanding of *viruddhāvyabhicārin*. According to this typology, one can construct a counter-proof in three different situations, namely, when refuting the other's position, when defending one's own position, and during a discussion based on common acceptance.

Of these three situations, the two proofs exemplified in the NP concerning the permanence/impermanence of sound are understood as representing the third situation, namely, based upon common ground accepted by both disputants. In this case, all of the elements constituting the proof(s), such as the reason and the example, are expressed by concepts that are held in common by both the proponent and the opponent. In this case, the inference is called “inference based on commonly accepted grounds” (共比量), and the fallacy of *anyatarāsiddha* should not occur.

There remain the other two cases, in which the fallacy of *anyatarāsiddha* is not ruled out. Kuiji explains these two cases using the terms *svārthānumāna* (“inference based on grounds one accepts oneself”, *zibiliang* 自比量) and *parārthānumāna* (“inference based on grounds accepted by the other”, *tabiliang* 他比量), in a different way than they are

commonly understood based on the writings of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti. According to Kuiji, a *zibiliang*-inference is constructed with a logical reason containing the qualifier “we accept” (*zi xu* 自許); in a *tabiliang*-inference, the reason contains the qualifier “you believe” (*ru zhi* 汝執).<sup>23</sup> Based on this classification, Kuiji distinguishes three patterns of *viruddhāvhyabhicārin*.<sup>24</sup>

	<u>Proponent</u>	<u>Opponent</u>
Pattern 1: <i>gongbiliang</i> vs. <i>gongbiliang</i>	[the Vaiśeṣika claims:] Sound is non-eternal because it is a product, like a pot.	[the Śābdotpattivādin claims:] Sound is eternal because it is audible, like sound-hood.
Pattern 2: <i>tabiliang</i> vs. <i>zibiliang</i>	[the Mahāyāna claims:] Non-manifested matter ( <i>avijñaptirūpa</i> ), which <u>you believe in</u> , is not in fact matter ( <i>rūpa</i> ), because <u>you believe</u> that it is non-resistant ( <i>apratigha</i> ), like consciousness	[the Hīnayāna claims:] Non-manifested matter, which <u>we accept</u> , is in fact matter, because <u>we accept</u> that it has the nature of matter, like color and sound, which <u>we [also]</u>

<sup>23</sup> Although *svārthānumāna* and *parārthānumāna* are technical terms in Indian Buddhist logic, which are usually translated “inference for one’s own sake” and “inference for others’ sake”, respectively, they are different from Kuiji’s understanding of the two concepts. As Teng (2011: 148-149) has noted, “These two types of inference should not be confused with the inference for one’s own sake *svārthānumāna* and inference for others’ sake *parārthānumāna* found in the Indian logic transmissions; both ‘self-*anumāna*’ and ‘other-*anumāna*’ are *parārthānumāna*.” See also Frankenhauser, 1996: 71. On the other hand, for the two qualifications which are particular to Chinese *hetuvidyā*, see Harbsmeier, 1998: 376-379, Frankenhauser, 1996: 55-59, Yao, 2009: 393-394, Teng, 2011: 148-149. As for Kuiji’s definition of *zibiliang* 自比量, Harada (1993: 147f.) has pointed out its similarity to Candrakīrti’s idea of *svārthānumāna*, which does not require any ground that is commonly accepted by both disputants. See Pras 35.9: *svārthānumāne tu sarvatra svaprasiddhir eva garīyasī, nobhayaprasiddhiḥ*. See also Yamazaki, 1960.

<sup>24</sup> Frankenhauser (1996: 72) presents a typology of inference which contains an additional fourth pattern, refutation of a *gongbiliang*-inference by a *zibiliang*-inference. However, I am doubtful whether such an example exists.

	and mental acts. <sup>25</sup>	<u>accept</u> . <sup>26</sup>
Pattern3: <i>zibiliang</i> vs. <i>tabiliang</i> <sup>27</sup>	[the Hīnayāna claims:] Non-manifested matter, which <u>we accept</u> , is in fact matter, because <u>we accept</u> that it has the nature of matter, like color and sound, which <u>we accept</u> .	[the Mahāyāna claims:] Non-manifested matter, which <u>you believe in</u> , is not in fact matter, because <u>you believe</u> that it is non-resistant, like consciousness and mental acts.

On first reading, the two disputants in Patterns 2 and 3 (i.e., a Mahāyāna Buddhist, and a Hīnayāna Buddhist as represented by a Sarvāstivādin) seem to be talking at cross purposes, but when one looks closer at the text, one soon notices that these two patterns illustrate typical examples of *viruddhāvyabhicārin*: If one ignores the qualifiers “we accept” and “you believe in”, the two proofs are concerned with the same subject, “non-manifested matter”, and aim to establish mutually contradictory conclusions, “being matter” or “not being matter”, based on different reasons, namely “being non-resistant” or “having the nature of matter”.

<sup>25</sup> YRZLS: 汝無表色定非實色，許無對故，如心心所 (T44:1840.126c20-21). Vasubandhu defines *avijñaptirūpa* as follows (AK 1.11): *vikṣiptācittakasyāpi yo ’nubandhaḥ śubhāśubhaḥ | mahābhūtāny upādāya sa hy avijñaptir ucyate*. This *avijñaptirūpa* arises by depending on four elements, and in accordance with the change of *vijñaptirūpa*, its corresponding *avijñaptirūpa* is also changed. According to Sako (1985), even though *avijñaptirūpa* is classified as one kind of “material” (*rūpa*), its function is closer to *prāpti/aprāpti* (karmic acquisition/non-acquisition). At any rate, also from the description in AK(Bh), we are aware of the problematic position of *avijñaptirūpa* in the Sarvāstivāda’s categorical system, and therefore, it is a good example with which to construct a *viruddhāvyabhicārin*. For Kuiji’s own interpretation of *avijñaptirūpa/avijñapti* and its practical background, see Ōtani (2004).

<sup>26</sup> YRZLS: 我無表色(*em. cf. Dōgakushō* 227b16: 無對色 *ed.*)定是實色，許色性故，如許色聲等 (T44:1840.126c21-22).

<sup>27</sup> The following two proofs are not mentioned in Kuiji’s commentary on the NP. See *Dōgakushō*: 若薩婆多對大乘立量云：我無表色定是實色，許色性故，如許色聲等。大乘作違決云：汝無表色定非實色，許無對故，如心心所者。是自比量相違決定也 (T66:2263.227b18-22).

What draws our attention is the proof presented by a Mahāyana Buddhist to refute the Hīnayāna's concept of *avijñaptirūpa*. In this proof, which Kuiji calls *tabiliang* 他比量, the Mahāyana Buddhist constructs a counter-argument against the opponent's position accepting the reality of *avijñaptirūpa* by using exactly the notions acceptable to the opponent. We can see here one of the most representative usages of *viruddhāvyabhicārin*: to reveal a self-contradiction in an opponent's ontological/meta-physical system. Thus, Kuiji was probably aware of the importance of "antinomy" in the cases of Patterns 2 and 3. Only in Pattern 1, however, does he ignore its importance, changing *viruddhāvyabhicārin* into a mere indicator of two opposite opinions in a common debate.

Why, then, did Kuiji regard Pattern 1 as a case of *viruddhāvyabhicārin*? To reply to this question, we shall in closing investigate the relation between Kuiji's interpretation of *viruddhāvyabhicārin* and Xuanzang's proof of consciousness-only (*weishi biliang* 唯識比量).

### 3 Xuanzang's proof of consciousness-only and its relation to *viruddhāvyabhicārin*

The famous proof of consciousness-only ascribed to Xuanzang is documented in the *Yinming ru zhengli lun shu* as follows:

YRZLS: 大師立唯識比量云：真故極成色不離於眼識宗，自許初三攝眼所不攝故因，猶如眼識喻 (T44:1840.115b25-26).

Master (Xuanzang) presented an inference for consciousness-only as follows: "From the ultimate viewpoint (*zhen gu* 真故, \**paramārthatas*), commonly accepted colors and forms are not separate from the visual consciousness (*yanshi* 眼識, \**cakṣurvijñāna*), because while being included in the first three [of the eighteen elements] that we accept, they are not included in the visual sense-faculty (*yan* 眼, *cakṣus*), like the visual consciousness" (see Ui, 1966: 321-325; Ejima, 1980: 205; Franco, 2004: 205; Teng, 2011: 149-154).

Commenting on the qualifier of the thesis "from the ultimate viewpoint", Kuiji explains that due to this qualifier, this inference can avoid the fallacious theses called "what is contradictory to what is accepted in

common by the world” (*shijian xiangwei* 世間相違) and “what is contradictory to one’s own teaching” (*zijiao xiangwei* 自教相違). In addition, he explains the qualifier for indicating the inference as a type of *gongbiliang*. In doing so, he defends the inference from the criticism of the brilliant Korean monk Wǒnhyo (元曉, 618-686) (see Franco, 2004: 211f.; Moro, 2007). In a letter written to Xuanzang, Wǒnhyo challenged Xuanzang’s proof by formulating the following counter-proof, which leads to a pair of reasons constituting a *viruddhāvyabhicārin*:

YRZLS: 眞故極成色定離於眼識，自許初三攝眼識不攝故，猶如眼根 (T44:1840.116a20-21).

From the ultimate viewpoint, commonly accepted colors and forms *are* separate from the visual consciousness, because while included in the first three [of the eighteen elements] that we accept, they are not included in the visual consciousness, like the visual sense-faculty (see Franco, 2004: 211f.).

Using the basic framework of Xuanzang’s proof, Wǒnhyo has clearly constructed a counter-proof based on the Sarvāstivādin’s viewpoint. As Franco (2004: 212) has remarked, “At least as far as the three characteristics are concerned, it seems that Wǒnhyo succeeded, after all, to annul Xuanzang’s brilliant inference.” However, Kuiji did not think this was the case. He claims that this counter-proof cannot be considered a *viruddhāvyabhicārin*. Why not? The following is Kuiji’s reply:

YRZLS: 凡因明法若自比量，宗因喻中皆須依自。他共亦爾。立依自他共，敵對亦須然。名善因明無疎謬矣。前云唯識依共比量。今依自立。即一切量皆有此違。如佛弟子對聲生論立：聲無常，所作性故，譬如瓶等。聲生論言：聲是其常，所聞性故，如自許聲性。應是前量決定相違。彼既不成。故依自比，不可對共而爲比量 (T44:1840.116a22-29).

Generally speaking, in Buddhist logic, “inference based on grounds one accepts oneself” (*zibiliang* 自比量) is [an inference where] thesis, reason, and example, are all dependent on the grounds of one’s own [position]. The same is [true] for [the other two types of inference, namely,] *tabiliang* and *gongbiliang*. When [the proponent] presents a *zibiliang*, *tabiliang*, or *gongbiliang* [type of inference], the opponent

should also reply with the corresponding [type of inference]. This is what is called “good logic”, which is free of fallacies. The above-mentioned [inference for] *vijñaptimātratā* is [presented] as a *gongbiliang* [type of inference]. Nevertheless, [Wōnhyo] presents [as a counter-proof] a *zibiliang* [type of inference]. If this were allowed, the same fallacy would occur for all means of valid cognition. For instance, when the Buddhist claims against a Śābdotpattivādin [a *gongbiliang* type of inference such as] “Sound is impermanent, because it is a product, like a pot,” [to this,] the Śābdotpattivādin could claim [a *zibiliang* type of inference:] “Sound is permanent, because it is audible, like sound-hood, which we accept.” Exactly [this reason presented by the Śābdotpattivādin] would be an antinomic reason to the previous means of valid cognition [i.e., the previous inference by the Buddhist], but this [antinomic reason] is not established. Therefore, it is impossible to reply to a *gongbiliang*-inference by making a *zibiliang*-inference.

In this manner, supposing Xuanzang’s proof to be a *gongbiliang*-inference, Kuiji criticizes Wōnhyo by pointing out the impossibility of constructing a counter-proof in the form of a *zibiliang*-inference. However, it is undeniable that this critique of Kuiji’s is unfair. In fact, he classifies Wōnhyo’s proof as a *zibiliang*-type just because of the expression “we accept” (*zi xu* 自許), which qualifies the reason. But in that case, why does he not classify Xuanzang’s proof as a *zibiliang*-type for the same reason, since it also uses the term “we accept” as a qualifier of the reason? Kuiji replies that the qualifier “we accept” plays a different role in Xuanzang’s proof, namely, the role of avoiding the fallacy of *dharmiviśeṣaviparitasādhana*; thus, it does not indicate that it is a *zibiliang*-inference. This is certainly a lame excuse, and yet, for Kuiji, there was probably no other way to defend the glory of his master’s proof from Wōnhyo’s criticism, within the innovative schema of three patterns of *viruddhāvyaḥicārin*.<sup>28</sup>

<sup>28</sup> In order to examine this issue in more detail, we would need to understand Xuanzang’s concept of the three kinds of inferences and their qualifiers, namely, “we accept”, “you believe in”, and “both accept in common”. In this regard, our attention is drawn by Xuanzang’s criticism of the proof of Jayasena (Shengjun 勝軍). Cf. T44:1840. 121b21-23.

## 4 Conclusion

We have examined here a significant logical concept, *viruddhāvyabhicārin*, from various trans-cultural viewpoints, from India to China, as developed over a timespan of five to seven centuries. The findings of this study can be summarized as follows:

1. With regard to the analysis of the compound *viruddhāvyabhicārin*, Kuiji's first interpretation of it as a genitive *tatpuruṣa* is basically the same as the Jain commentators' interpretations, even though they did not specify the sub-class of *tatpuruṣa* in question. Kuiji's second interpretation, which understands the second component of the compound (*jueding* 決定, *avyabhicārin*) as having an instrumental case-ending, seems grammatically impossible.
2. Kuiji's identification of the opponent who claims the permanence of sound with the \*Śabdotpattivādin reveals Kuiji's systematic understanding of the NP as a manual for practical debate. By introducing the \*Śabdotpattivādin, whose actual historical nature is still uncertain, as the opponent, Kuiji clearly presents a debate in which the two disputants present their proofs without committing the fallacy of *anyatarāśiddha*.
3. To win a debate, it does not matter which proof is presented first, especially in the case of inference based on other-accepted grounds (*gongbiliang* 共比量). According to Kuiji, the winner of a debate is determined on the basis of "perception and scripture/scripture based on perception" (*xianjiao* 現教). In the case of the two example proofs, the Vaiśeṣika's position wins due to its reliance upon what is accepted in common by the world and the Buddha's teaching. On this point, Kuiji seems to misunderstand the destructive function of the "antinomy", namely, its ability to drive the opponent into the corner of self-contradiction.
4. Kuiji's typology of *viruddhāvyabhicārin* presupposes his classification of inference, namely, inference based on grounds one accepts oneself, inference based on grounds accepted by the other, and inference based on commonly accepted grounds. By using this clas-

sification system, Kuiji has constructed a new set of rules for debate, that is, in accordance with the type of the first proof, the type of the counter-proof should be restricted to one of three patterns. Of these, Patterns 2 and 3 can be understood as typical examples of *viruddhāvyabhicārin* being used as a method for a *pra-saṅga* style of argument.

5. Kuiji's special interpretation of *viruddhāvyabhicārin* is related to Xuanzang's proof of consciousness-only. According to Kuiji's commentary and other sources, Xuanzang's proof was criticized by Wǒnhyo, who presented a counter-proof that leads to *viruddhāvyabhicārin*. In order to avoid this fallacy, Kuiji interprets Xuanzang's proof as an inference based on commonly accepted grounds (*gong-biliang* 共比量). Thus, any counter-proof must also be presented as a *gongbiliang*-inference. However, since Wǒnhyo's inference is interpreted as a *zibiliang*-inference, his challenge is judged to be illegitimate in its form.

## Abbreviations

AK/AKBh	<i>Abhidharmakośa/-bhāṣya</i> (Pradhan, 1967)
DhPr	<i>Dharmottarapradīpa</i> (Malvania, 1971)
Dōgakushō	<i>Yuishikiron dōgaku shō</i> (唯識論同學鈔) of Ryōsan (良算), T2263
HB	<i>Hetubindu</i> (Steinkellner, 1967)
Myōtōshō:	<i>Inmyōron so myōtō shō</i> (因明論疏明灯抄) of Zenju (善珠), T2270
NB	<i>Nyāyabindu of Dharmakīrti</i> : see DhPr
NB†	<i>Nyāyabinduṭīkā of Dharmottara</i> : see DhPr
NM	<i>Nyāyamukha</i> ( <i>Yinming zhengli men lun</i> 因明正理門論) of Dignāga, T1628
NP	<i>Nyāyapraveśa[ka]</i> (Jambuvijaya, 2001)
NPV	<i>Nyāyapraveśakavṛtti</i> of Haribhadrasūri: see NP
NPVP	<i>Nyāyapraveśakavṛttipañjikā</i> of Pārśvadevagaṇi: see NP
PS/PSV 3	<i>Pramāṇasamuccaya/-vṛtti</i> (3rd chapter) of Dignāga (Kitagawa, 1965)

- T *Taishō shinshū daizōkyō* 大正新修大藏經  
 YRZLS *Yinming ru zhengli lun shu* (因明入正理論疏) of Kuiji (窺基),  
 T1840

## References

- Ejima Yasunori (江島恵教) (1980). *Chūgan shisō no tenkai* (中觀思想の展開). Tokyo: Shunjūsha.
- Franco, Eli (2004). “Xuanzang’s Proof of Idealism (*Vijñaptimātratā*).” *Hōrin* 11, pp. 199-212.
- Frankenhauser, Uwe (1996). *Die Einführung der buddhistischen Logik in China*. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag.
- Harada Takaaki (原田高明) (1993). “Yuishiki hiryō to Indo Bukkyō” (唯識比量とインド仏教), *Indotetsugaku Bukkyōgaku* (印度哲学仏教学) 8, pp. 145-151.
- Harbsmeier, Christoph (1998). *Science and Civilisation in China. Volume 7 Part 1: Language and Logic*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Hōjō Kenzō (北条賢三) (1980). “Koe shō ron kanken” (「声生論」管見), *Tetsugaku nenshi* 哲学年誌 (*Taisho University* 大正大学) 4, pp. 107-124.
- Inami Masahiro (稲見正浩) (2011). “Indo Bukkyō ronrigaku no juyō to tenkai – Chibetto, Chūgoku, Nihon” (インド仏教論理学の受容と展開—チベット・中国・日本—), *Ibunka rikai kyōiku to shūkyō* 異文化理解教育と宗教 *Report of Tokyo Gakugei University Priority Research* 2010, pp. 1-32.
- Jambuvijaya, Muni, ed. (2001). *Nyāyapraveśakaśāstra of Bauddh Ācārya Dignāga*. Bhavnagar: Jain Atmanand Sabha.
- Kitagawa Hidenori (北川秀則) (1965). *Indo koten ronrigaku no kenkyū: Jinna (Dignāga) no taikei* (インド古典論理学の研究—陳那[Dignāga]の体系). Tokyo: Suzuki Gakujutsu Zaidan.
- Katsura Shōryū (桂紹隆) (1977). “Inmyō shōri mon ron kenkyū [ichi]” (因明正理門論研究〔一〕). *Hiroshima daigaku bungakubu kenkyū kiyō* (広島大学文学部研究紀要) 37, pp. 106-127.
- Malvania, D. ed. (1971). *Paṇḍita Durveka Miśra’s Dharmottarapradīpa*. Patna: K. P. Jayaswal Research Institute [1st edition 1955].

- Moriyama, Shinya (2013). "On the Role of *Abhyupagama* in Dharmakīrti's Scripturally Based Inference." In *Scriptural Authority, Reason and Action*, edited by V. Eltschinger & H. Krasser. Wien: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, pp. 183-207.
- Moro, Shigeki (2007). "Xuanzang's Inference of Yogācāra and Its Interpretation by Shilla Buddhists." In *Korean Buddhism in East Asian Perspective*. Korean Studies Series No. 35 compiled by the Geumgang Center for Buddhist Studies, Geumgang University. Seoul: Jimoondang, pp. 321-331.
- Nakamura Hajime (中村元) (1960). "Inmyō nisshōri ron kaidai" (因明入正理論解題). *Kokuyaku issaikyō ronsobu nijūsan* (国訳一切経論疏部二十三). Tokyo: Daitō shuppansha.
- Nemu Kazuchika (根無一力) (1983). "Yuishiki hiryō o meguru shomon-dai" (唯識比量をめぐる諸問題). *Indogaku Bukkyōgaku kenkyū* (印度学佛教学研究) 32:1, pp. 124-125.
- Ono Motoi (小野基) (2010). "Sōiketsujō (*viruddhāvyabhicārin*) o megutte" (相違決定[*viruddhāvyabhicārin*]をめぐって). *Indo ronrigaku kenkyū* インド論理学研究 1, pp. 125-143.
- Ōtani Yuka (大谷由香) (2004). "Jion daishi Ki no muhyōshiki kaishaku" (慈恩大師基の無表色解釈). *Ryūkoku daigaku daigakuin bungaku kenkyūka kiyō* 龍谷大学大学院文学研究科紀要 26, pp. 56-68.
- Pradhan, P. ed. (1967). *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya of Vasubandhu*. Patna: K. P. Jayaswal Research Institute.
- Sako Toshiho (佐古年穂) (1985). "Muhyōshiki ni kansuru ichikōsatsu" (無表色に関する一考察). *Indogaku Bukkyōgaku kenkyū* (印度学佛教学研究) 33:2, pp. 136-137.
- Shen Jianying (沈劍英) (2008). *Dunhuang yinming wenxian yanjiu* (敦煌因明文獻研究). Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe.
- Steinkellner, E. ed. *Dharmakīrti's Hetubinduḥ Teil I: Tibetischer Text und rekonstruierter Sanskrit Text*. Vienna: Kommissionsverlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1967.
- Tachikawa, Musashi (1971). "A Sixth-Century Manual of Indian Logic (A Translation of the *Nyāyapraveśa*)." *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 1, pp. 111-145.
- Takemura Shōhō (武邑尚邦) (1986). *Inmyōgaku - kigen to henshen* (因明学起源と変遷). Kyoto: Hōzōkan.

- Tani, Tadashi (谷貞志) (1987). “Dharmakīrti’s Interpretation of Antinomic Indicators (*Viruddhāvyabhicārin*).” *Indogaku Bukkyōgaku kenkyū* (印度学佛教学研究) 36:1, pp. 1-10.
- Teng, Wei Jen (2011). “Recontextualization, Exegesis, and Logic: Kuiji’s (632-682) Methodological Restructuring of Chinese Buddhism.” PhD Dissertation, Harvard University.
- Tillemans, Tom J. F. (2000). *Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇavārttika: An Annotated Translation of the Fourth Chapter (Parārthānumāna) Volume 1 (k. 1-148)*. Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften.
- Ueda Noboru (2008). “A Minimal Model of *Viruddhāvyabhicārin*.” *Indogaku Bukkyōgaku kenkyū* (印度学佛教学研究) 56:3, pp. 100-108.
- Ui Hakuju (宇井伯寿) (1966). *Bukkyō ronrigaku* (仏教論理学). Tokyo: Daitō shuppansha.
- Yamazaki Tsugihiko (山崎次彦) (1960). “‘Ricchaku gūko’ to sono genkai” (「立敵共許」とその限界). *Indogaku Bukkyōgaku kenkyū* (印度学佛教学研究) 8:2, pp. 593-597.
- Yao, Zhihua (2009). “Empty Subject Terms in Buddhist Logic: Dignāga and His Chinese Commentators.” *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 37, pp. 383-398.