Wolf Schmid: Mental Events
Wolf Schmid

Mental Events

Changes of Mind in European Narratives from the Middle Ages to Postrealism

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Preface

The present book is a translation of my German monograph Mentale Ereignisse: Bewusstseinsveränderungen in europäischen Erzählwerken vom Mittelalter bis zur Moderne, which was written between 2013 and 2017, and published in 2017 (paperback edition 2019). My English translation has been edited by two native speakers, including Justin J. J. Ness, PhD, to whom I am most grateful. Any errors or stylistic infelicities that remain are my own.

Quotations have been taken from published translations where this was possible and appropriate; in some cases, I have modified them (marked tr. rev.). I have translated quotations from a number of works myself; page numbers in such cases are those in the original. Emphasis is in the original unless otherwise indicated.

Russian titles and names are given following the international transliteration system; quotations from published translations have been silently modified to use this system as well. The stress on Russian names and titles is marked by an acute accent in the index.
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I. Mind and Event
An essential component of narration, which in contemporary narratology is generally understood as the representation of changes in state, is the consciousness of the characters being narrated. Since the end of the eighteenth century, in European literature, the decisive changes in state have been of a mental nature, changes in consciousness.

This does not mean, however, that the representation of consciousness begins only at this time. In the European literatures of the Middle Ages we already find a developed representation of the characters’ emotions and thoughts, which is not only in the form of narratorial reproduction, but also in the form of characters’ discourse. Gottfried’s von Strassburg courtly romance *Tristan* (begin thirteenth century) even contains extended interior monologues that, in the form of a character’s inner dialogues with him or herself, express extremely contradictory evidence in the character’s soul.

Monika Fludernik’s (2011) investigations of Middle English literature are highly relevant for the chronology of consciousness representation. Fludernik comes to the conclusion that Middle English literature contains far more presentations of subjectivity and the heroes’ inner world than is generally expected, especially from those experts on the Renaissance who date the rise of subjectivity to the late sixteenth century. Fludernik explains the general underestimation of medieval consciousness representation by narratology with its exclusive interest in narrative works since the rise of the novel in the eighteenth century. The lack of narratological research in medieval literature may, however, also be due to the skepticism of the medievalists towards questions and research that do not seem appropriate to the way of thinking of the Middle Ages.

At the beginning of the nineteenth century, we observe a shift in action from the outside world to the inside world. In his lecture “The Art of the Novel” (1939), Thomas Mann called this development “internalization” (*Verinnerlichung*) and referred to Arthur Schopenhauer:
A novel becomes higher and nobler in its kind, the more inner and the less outer life it presents [...] Art consists in bringing the inner into the strongest movement with the least possible expenditure of outer life; for it is the inner life which is the true object of our interest. – The novelist’s task is not to tell great incidents, but to make small ones interesting. (Schopenhauer, Parerga and Paralipomena [1851]; quoted after Mann, X, 356)

In the internalization Mann sees the “secret of the narrative,” which consists of “making interesting that which is supposed to be boring”:

The principle of internalization must be involved in the secret that we breathlessly listen to what in itself is insignificant and forget the taste of the crude, robust adventure. (Mann, X, 357)

Since the beginning of the nineteenth century, external action has been associated with more or less detailed internal processes. Schopenhauer even used Walter Scott’s adventure novels as evidence:

Even Walter Scott’s novels still have a significant internal predominance over external life, and the latter always occurs with the intention of putting the former into practice, whereas in bad novels it is there for its own sake. (Mann, X, 356)

The nexus between action and consciousness becomes the basic principle of the newer narrative, and the mutual motivation of the two factors is the concern of the authors who strive for plausibility.

The keyword consciousness addresses the cognitivist or, more simply, “cognitive” narratology. Although its focus is above all on the relation between the text (or the story told in it) and the reader (cf. Herman 2009), it is also interested in the fictive consciousness depicted in the narrative work.

“Novel reading is mind reading.” With this slogan, the British cognitivist Alan Palmer (2007, 217) refers to Lisa Zunshine’s book Why We Read Fiction (2006). It is thus asserted that the most important role in the reading of fiction literature is played by the opening up of the consciousness of the fictive characters, that receptive action that is called “mind reading” or “theory of mind”
in cognitive approaches (Gopnik 1999; Zunshine 2006, 6). Even though the characters’ consciousness is important for fictional narrations, it cannot be accorded the rank of the most important in narrative. The thesis presented in Alan Palmer’s “target article” (2011a), that readers are less interested in the events of narratives than in the “workings of the fictional minds contained in them,” has been contradicted from the perspective of empirical psychology. Marisa Bortolussi, co-author of the volume Psychonarratology (Bortolussi & Dixon 2003), argues against Palmer’s (2011a, 202) conclusion, that the assumption about the reader’s preference for figure-consciousness is not empirically confirmed; it is even refuted by the results of empirical psychology, which indicates that it is events readers remember above all after reading stories (Bortolussi 2011, 286).

Referring to dramatic narrative, Aristotle emphasized the primacy of action over characters’ minds:

The representation (μίμησις) of the action (πράξις) is the story (μύθος). I call the story the joining together of happenings (σύνθεσις τῶν πραγμάτων) [...] The tragedy has six essential components [...]: story (μύθος), characters (ἠθη), linguistic expression, cognitive faculty, external equipment and music [...] The most important component is the joining together of happenings (τῶν πραγμάτων σύστασις). For tragedy is not the representation of people, but of actions (πράξεις) and of life [...], and the goal [of representation] is an action (πράξις), but not the property of a character. The persons do not act to represent characters, but the characters are contained in the actions. Therefore, the happenings (τὰ πράγματα) and the story are the goal of the tragedy. The goal, however, is the most important of all. (Poetics 1450a)

In modern terms, we can draw this conclusion: narrative literature is not written for the sake of the representation of consciousness, but to represent

---

1. The term theory of mind is somewhat irritating, since it is not a theory, but rather the everyday making of hypotheses about what may be going on in another person. The corresponding branch of cognitive science should actually be called theory of theory of mind (cf. Gopnik 1999, 838).

2. In Aristotle’s Poetics, mimesis does not mean “imitation” as in Platon’s Republic (chapter 10), but the representation of something that is unprecedented, which is first and foremost constituted in mimesis (cf. Schmid 2010, 32–23, and the literature given there).
changes in the circumstances of acting and suffering people. Aristotle’s concept of “character” (ἦθος) can also refer to “way of thinking,” “soul state” and “artistic representation of soul states,” and we can certainly understand it in the sense of our modern “consciousness” or the entire inner world of a figure – i.e., everything that the English term mind encompasses. The philosopher points out that although consciousness is “second” to tragedy, for action forms its “basis and soul” (Poetics 1450a), it is implied in action.

According to Aristotle, the “myth” of tragedy consists of three “components” (μέρη): the “peripety” (περιπέτεια), the “recognition” or “discovery” (ἀναγνώρισις) and the “suffering” (πάθος). Obviously, only the first two components are relevant for non-tragic narration. Aristotle describes both as forms of the “reversal” or “turnabout” (μεταβολή). The peripety is the change of a state into its opposite; the discovery is “the reversal from ignorance to knowledge” (ἐξ ἀγνοίας ἐις γνῶσιν μεταβολή; Poetics 1452a). With this second form of change Aristotle aims at the form of mental state change specific to the Attic tragedy: the recognition of figures. For Aristotle, the prime example of this change is the drama of Sophocles Rex Oedipus. The title hero of this drama must recognize that he unwittingly had killed his father and married his mother. For Aristotle, anagnórisis refers not only to characters, but also to non-living things and facts. This is illuminated by his laconic remark:

There are also other types of recognition. It can occur with inanimate objects (ἄψυχα) and random objects (τυχόντα), and you can also discover whether someone has done something or not. (Poetics 1452a)

In Aristotle we also find the idea that action and consciousness (ἦθος) need mutual motivation. In the language of his Poetics, which describes the process of motivation with the terms “necessity” and “probability,” this is formulated in the following way:

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3 A distinction must be made between the (artistic) motivation of the action of a work (in Russian motivirovka, in German Motivierung) and the (psychological) motivation of the figure to perform a single action (in Russian motivacija, in German Motivation) (for further distinction see Schmid 2020). The motivation of a figure to act in this way and not differently, the connection between psyche and action of the figure is a component in the overall artistic motivation of a work. See below, the chapter on Dostoevskij’s Crime and Punishment.
One must also strive for the necessary (τὸ ἀναγκαῖον) or the probable (τὸ εἰκός) in the representation of states of mind (τὰ ἔθα) as well as in the composition of the events, so that a certain person says or does this or that with necessity or probability and that one results from the other with necessity or probability. (Poetics 1454a)

Since modern poetics began to reflect on the novel in the eighteenth century, the problem of the mutual motivation of action and consciousness has played an essential role. In Germany, Friedrich Blanckenburg’s Versuch über den Roman (1774), the first poetics of the psychological novel, drew attention to the nexus between action and consciousness most emphatically. It focuses on the interaction of “human actions and feelings.” The novel is intended to shape the “becoming” of man, to make visible “the entire inner being of the acting persons with all the causes that set them in motion” and thereby to visualize the causal nexus between events and feelings in such a way that the “how” of development can be experienced and generalized.

In the narrative of the drama the nexus between consciousness and action has received the utmost attention since the Renaissance; one only has to think of Shakespeare. However, it is only since the second half of the eighteenth century that we have observed an increasingly careful motivation of action through consciousness in prosaic narration. Since then, every external action has been associated with internal processes. The nexus of action and consciousness is a basic principle of newer narrative, and the mutual motivation of the two factors is the concern of the authors striving for credibility.

At the center of this book is a particular type of action or occurrence, a change in the state of consciousness of a character, which can be described as a mental event. This work pursues both a systematic and a historical interest.

The systematic interest serves the classification of the forms of mind representation in literature and the clarification of under which conditions the change of a state of consciousness can be called an event. The historical dimension is brought to bear through the analysis of works of different cultures and epochs from the perspective of their mental events. The first task here is to clarify which changes of the mental activity are told by works. Then the questions have to be posed as to which of the six patterns, to be distinguished, a characters’ consciousness is created in and to what extent the nar-
erator and the character come into play. Finally, the mentality-historical status of the respective event poetics and philosophies of consciousness must be determined.

The selected works span a period of about 700 years, from the heyday of the medieval epic to the threshold of the twentieth century, and represent four national literatures. Their selection is based on their high quality examples of event, but the criteria for some texts also include the characteristic absence of mental events (Otto Ludwig), the systematic renunciation of the explication of inner decisions that nevertheless take place in the stories (Aleksandr Puškin), and the presentation of a micro-world unwilling to change (Jan Neruda).

The analytical course begins with the Middle High German courtly romances *Parzival* and *Tristan* as representatives of pre-modern narration, whose creation of mental events shows surprisingly ‘modern’ traits. Samuel Richardson’s epistolary novels as well as Jane Austen’s non-diegetic novels, in which modern consciousness art begins, will be discussed in detail. Particular attention will be paid to the novels of the Russian realists Dostoevskij and Tolstoj, in which evaluative positions can change to the maximum and which thus represent a climax of realistic event optimism. They are juxtaposed with the stories of Anton Čexov, which articulate the skepticism of post-realist modernism towards the world’s capacity for events and man’s capacity for change. The contrast between realism and post-realism shows that epochs can be characterized by their attitude to the possibility of profound mental events.

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4 One might ask why the course through European narratives starts with medieval romances. With *Parzival*, the newer European novel begins. Mixail Baxtin – who was an outstanding expert on the ancient novel, especially the Greek, but also the medieval courtly romances – localizes the classical knightly novel written in verses at the border between epic and novel and attests Wolfram’s *Parzival* that it has already crossed this border: “*Parzival is the first problem novel and development novel [scil. of European literature]***” ([1934/35] 2012, 132). Enlightening explanations on the “Chronotopos” of the European “knightly novel” – especially on *Parzival* and *Tristan*, which are regarded as outstanding examples of the genre – can be found in Baxtin ([1937/38] 2012, 404–411).
2 Representation of Consciousness

The mental events dealt with in this book include certain state changes in the consciousness of the characters of a narrated world, which will be qualified in more detail below. In some cases it is also about mental processes in the consciousness of the narrator – either a non-diegetic narrator (third-person narrator), who does not belong to the narrated world, or a diegetic narrator (first-person narrator), whose former, narrated self appears as a character of the narrated world.

The first question to be asked is how the character’s consciousness can be represented. The representation of the narrator’s consciousness will occupy us later.

The character’s consciousness can be presented in narration in two basic ways: either explicitly, as an object of representation, or only implicitly, as a motivational factor that is more or less clearly to be reconstructed, that justifies the character’s action, speaking and thinking and that can be derived from his or her behavior.

To ask the question about the representation of fictive consciousness is to disregard the reservations of cognitive narratology as recently formulated by Marco Caracciolo (2012; 2014). According to him, consciousness cannot be represented, but can only be “attributed” and “enacted” by the reader, who takes a character’s gestures and speeches as an expression of their consciousness.5 For Caracciolo (2012, 59), enactment means the reader’s merging with the character’s consciousness: “our consciousness merges with the consciousness attributed to the fictional character, and we experience a fictional world through the narrow gap between being ourselves and not being ourselves.”

---

5 Characteristic of the cognitivist skepticism towards the representation of consciousness is the difference in David Herman’s articles on “Cognitive Narratology” in the two editions of the Handbook of Narratology. While the first edition of the article (Herman 2009) still contains the section “Issues of Consciousness Representation,” in which the works of Cohn and Palmer in particular are reflected, the second edition (Herman 2014) no longer contains the term “consciousness representation” (or an equivalent).
This position is reminiscent of the “empathetic aesthetics” (Einfühlungsästhetik) of Karl Vossler and his Munich School of “Linguistic Soul Research” (Sprachseelenforschung), in whose spirit Etienne Lorck (1921) called the internationally known form of free indirect discourse erlebte Rede (“experienced speech”). This term was based on the concept of the “poet’s immersion into the soul of the creatures of his imagination” (Einfühlung des Dichters in die Geschöpfe seiner Phantasie; E. Lerch 1914; 1928; G. Lerch 1922), the idea of the direct “experience” of the processes of someone else’s consciousness.6

The consciousness-attribution is about the processes that Zunshine (2006) and Palmer (2007) describe as mind reading. Like these two authors, Caracciolo also regards the consciousness-attribution as equally adequate for fictive characters as for real people. Among the arguments put forward by empirical psychologists against the assumptions of cognitive narratologists, perhaps the most important is that the application of the theory of mind, which is indispensable in the context of life as an aid, does not do sufficient justice to the literary work as an aesthetic construction. In general, it can be said that cognitive narratologists who transfer the theory of mind to the fictive characters of literary works without further ado tend to neglect the artistic character of fictional narration and the artificial character of their fictive instances.7 They do not sufficiently appreciate that the content of a consciousness can be motivated not only by the character of the figure and the given situation, but also by the requirements of artistic construction. In well-made works, these factors usually coincide, so that no seams between characterological and constructive motivation become visible.

The character’s consciousness is explicitly and implicitly represented by the narrative discourse, which is composed of the narrator’s text and the characters’ text. This does not mean that the character’s inner world is linguistic or can be fully expressed by linguistic means. Much in the consciousness resists linguistic expression. For the preservation of this elusive aspect, however, narrative literature has developed special linguistic means that on the one hand convey an idea of the content of the figural consciousness and on the other hand depict in their structure the ambivalent, multi-layered and indeterminable life of the soul.

6 Already Mixail Baxtin, under the mask of Valentin Vološinov ([1929] 1993, 50–70, 153–174), described and criticized in detail the direction of the Vosslerians he called “individualistic subjectivism” in comparison with Charles Bally’s “abstract objectivism.”

7 See the 27 replicas on Palmer’s target essay “Social Minds in Fiction and Criticism” (2011a) and his responses (2011b; 2011c) in Style 45, Nos. 2 and 4.
2.1 The Patterns of Mind Representation

Classical narrative theory covered the forms of mind representation in the three patterns of speech reproduction: direct discourse (DD), indirect discourse (ID), free indirect discourse (FID).8 ID and FID were understood as more or less narratorial9 transformations of the character’s text. DD was regarded as “mimetic,”10 i.e., depicting the character’s text more directly than would ID, which was perceived as “diegetic” (i.e., more narratorial, closer to the narrator’s text and less authentic).11

These three patterns differ according to language specific grammatical features of ID and FID.12 In the basic type of English and German FID, for example, the tenses of the character’s text are shifted one step into the past:

Aber am Vormittag hatte sie den Baum zu putzen. Morgen war Weihnachten.13

*But in the morning she had to decorate the Christmas tree. Tomorrow was Christmas.*

In future expressions the mode is transposed from indicative to conditional

Was würde sie dazu sagen?

*What would she say to this?*

---

8 For English, see Toolan (2006). Fludernik (1993) is the most comprehensive and thoroughly empirical presentation of the linguistic representation of speech and consciousness to date, taking into account not only English but also French and German. Dirscherl and Pafel (2015) attempt a new typology of the processes of speech and thought representation from a linguistic point of view.


10 On the “direct discourse fallacy,” the false assumption that DD reproduces the character’s text more authentically than ID or FID, see Sternberg (1982a; 1982b) and Fludernik (1993, 312–315). For further problems that accompany the classical model of a transformation of ID and FID from DD, see Fludernik (1993, 275–279).

11 The terms “mimetic” and “diegetic” are used in the sense of the Platonic dichotomy mimesis (imitation of the heroes’ speech) and diegesis (“the poet’s pure, unmixed narration”) (Republic III, 392d). On Platon’s dichotomy diegesis vs. mimesis see Halliwell (2014).

12 For the tenses and modes of FID in German, English and French, see Steinberg (1971).

13 A famous, often quoted example from Alice Berend’s novel *Die Bräutigame der Babette Bomberling* (1915), quoted after Käte Hamburger (1957, 33).
The triad of patterns for the reproduction of the character’s text is also used for models of the representation of pre-lingual contents of consciousness (perceptions, thoughts, feelings, evaluative position). Leech and Short (1981) as well as Fludernik (1993, 285) point out, however, that the categories of speech representation cannot easily be transferred to thought representation: the proportions and frequency of the patterns figuring in various three- and multi-part linguistic models differ substantially in the representation of consciousness from those of speech representation.

In the following diagram, the correlation among (1) the contents of the represented CT, (2) the forms of the represented CT and (3) the preferred patterns for representation is illustrated (after Schmid 2010, 148).

Table 1: The three patterns of speech and consciousness representation

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<td>Forms</td>
<td>Outer speech</td>
<td>Inner speech</td>
<td>Fragment from the stream of consciousness</td>
<td>Evaluations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patterns</td>
<td>DD</td>
<td>ID</td>
<td>FID</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The three patterns of reproduction could be supplemented by the consciousness report – or, as it should be called, the “narratorial naming of the figural states of consciousness” – which does not serve the reproduction of external speech; rather, it serves the reproduction of thoughts, perceptions and emotions as well as the evaluative position of a character or a group of characters. The exclusion from the schema is justified, however, to the extent that in the various contents of the report on consciousness (“a shiver ran across his back,” “she felt uncom-
fortable in her skin,” “they could not follow his arguments”) there is no repre-
sentation of the character’s text, but only a narratorial representation of the in-
ternal state of a character. This representation is narrative text.

In Transparent Minds, the first monograph on consciousness representa-
tion in narrative literature, Dorrit Cohn (1978, 14) proposed a triad that no
longer corresponds to the three patterns of speech reproduction:

1. Quoted monologue: “a character’s mental discourse” (in my terminology:
direct interior discourse [or monologue]).
2. Narrated monologue: “a character’s mental discourse in the guise of the
narrator’s discourse” (free indirect discourse [or interior monologue in
FID]).
3. Psycho-narration: “the narrator’s discourse about a character’s conscious-
ess” (narratorial report on consciousness).

In the tradition of Käte Hamburger (1957; 1968), Cohn treated the represen-
tation of consciousness in the first-person and the third-person form sepa-
rately introducing 1) Stanzel’s dichotomy authorial vs. figural and 2) the eval-
Uative relation between narrator and character: dissonant is a representation
of consciousness that is presented by a distanced or even ironic narrator,
whereas consonant is the representation when the narrator “disappears” and
“merges with the narrated consciousness” (Cohn 1978, 26).

Psycho-narration, as Cohn pointed out, has traditionally been neglected
by narratology, and its existence is acknowledged only reluctantly by the
adherents of stream of consciousness (which can be shaped in the types 1 or
2 distinguished above). Cohn paid particular attention, however, to the appre-
ciation of this ill-respected form of consciousness representation, and this
is one of the many innovative aspects of her book.

A different triad, but broadly identical in substance, was proposed by
Alan Palmer (2004):

1. Direct thought (“She thought, ‘Where am I’”);
2. Free indirect thought (“She stopped. Where the hell was she?”);
3. Thought report (“She wondered where she was”).

Palmer, who already in 2002 vehemently polemicized against the speech cat-
egory approach, cannot hide the fact that his types 1 and 2 correspond to the
speech patterns of DD and FID, respectively. Significantly, he originally
wanted to completely circumvent the “swamp” of FID in his book (2004, 56). His special attention is paid to the third type, which corresponds to Cohn’s psycho-narration, and which he defends richly against its detractors. The consciousness report has certainly been neglected in the research of the reproduction patterns, which from the second half of the nineteenth century – the approaches of Heinrich Keiter (1876) and Adolf Tobler (1887) – until recently was dominated by the highly complex phenomenon of FID, as Brian McHale (1981, 186) stated in his review of Cohn (1978).

2.2 The Scale between Diegesis and Mimesis

In the 1970s, finer grained typologies were proposed. From them, the scale proposed by Brian McHale (1978, 258–259), who modified Norman Page’s (1973, 31–35) “degrees of indirectness,” gained special recognition. McHale’s scale distinguishes seven types, ranging from the “diegetic” (i.e., narratorial) to the “mimetic” (i.e., figural) pole. In the following table, McHale’s categories (most of them accompanied by his definitions and examples) are confronted with those of Cohn (1978) and Palmer (2004), so that the equivalences between the terms can be discerned (note that McHale typologizes the representation of *speech*, whereas Cohn and Palmer typologized the representation of the contents of *consciousness*).

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14 Matthias Grüne (2018, 88–89) refers to Heinrich Keiter as the first in the German theoretical tradition to describe the phenomenon of FID. Keiter (1876, 159–160) sees the advantage of this form of representation, which he calls “a kind of indirect monologue” in “inserting the content of characters’ consciousness into the epic flow and making the poet forget as the one through whom the communication takes place.”

15 The terms diegetic and mimetic are used here in Plato’s sense (see footnote 11 above). Although the terms are finely differentiated, McHale’s typology was criticized for not distinguishing between speech and thought representation, as Leech and Short did in 1981. W. Müller (1984, 207) complained that in McHale’s scheme “historically and typologically as far apart discourse types” as “direct speech” and the “inner monologue” came into close proximity. Against Müller one must object that one has to distinguish the patterns (like direct speech) from the contents of the representation (like interior monologue). Müller’s thesis (216) – that while the “free indirect rendering of speech” tends towards ironic representation, the “free indirect rendering of thought” tends towards an empathy of the narrator (and consequently also of the reader) with the mental and spiritual processes of the figure – is also problematic. Using passages from *Emma*, “Austen’s narrative masterpiece,” in which “over long stretches” irony appears in the “free indirect rendering of thought,” Müller himself provides counterevidence of his thesis.
Table 2: Comparison of MacHale’s, Cohn’s, and Palmer’s typologies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>McHale</th>
<th>Cohn</th>
<th>Palmer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1. Diegetic summary:</strong></td>
<td>“involving only the bare report that a speech event has occurred, without any specification of what was said or how it was said”</td>
<td>Psycho-narration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“When Charley got a little gin inside of him he started telling war yarns.”</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>2. Summary, less “purely” diegetic:</strong></td>
<td>“represents, not merely gives notice of, a speech event in that it names the topics of conversation”</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“He stayed till late in the evening telling them about miraculous conversions of unbelievers, extreme unction on the firing line [...]”</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>3. Indirect content paraphrase:</strong></td>
<td>“without regard to the style or form of the supposed ‘original’ utterance”</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“The waiter told him that Carranzas troops had lost Torreón [...]”</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>4. Indirect discourse, mimetic to some degree:</strong></td>
<td>“gives the illusion of ‘preserving’ or ‘reproducing’ aspects of the style of an utterance”</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“She shook her head but when he mentioned a thousand she began to brighten up und to admit that que voulez vous it was la vie.”</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>5. Free indirect discourse:</strong></td>
<td>“may be mimetic to almost any degree short of ‘pure’ mimesis”</td>
<td>Narrated monologue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“[H]e still had more’n fifty iron men, quite a roll of lettuce for a guy like him”</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>6. Direct discourse:</strong></td>
<td>“the most purely mimetic type of report”</td>
<td>Quoted monologue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>7. Free direct discourse:</strong></td>
<td>“direct discourse shorn of its conventional orthographic cues”</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As McHale (2014, 816) caution
s, this scale of forms, in which the representa-

As McHale (2014, 816) caution
s, this scale of forms, in which the representa-

tion of consciousness approaches the pure character’s text,\textsuperscript{16} should of course not be understood as a consequence of increasing authenticity to reality. Forms and functions are, as Meir Sternberg (1982a) notes, not to be found in “package deals,” but they can cross. This means that direct discourse, which is generally regarded as the most mimetic form, may well be less ‘authentic’ than, for example, the diegetic thought report.

2.3 The Text Interference Model

The text interference model is used as an alternative – or, more accurately, as a supplement – to the three-patterns model and the seven-form scale. It goes back to Baxtin’s description of the FID as a “hybrid construction” in which “two utterances are mixed, two ways of speaking, two styles, two ‘languages,’ two horizons of meaning and evaluation” ([1934/35] 1975, 118). Valentin Vološinov’s [alias Baxtin’s] concept of “speech interference” (rečevaja interferencija) is associated with the two-voices approach, which was already formulated in the Dosto-
evskij book (Vološinov [1929] 1993, 148). Baxtin’s and Vološinov’s models were taken up by the Czech structuralist Lubomír Doležel (1958; 1960; 1965; 1973) and integrated into a model of distinctive features of narrator’s text and character’s text. In Schmid (1973; 2010, 137–174), the model was further developed: the catalogue of characteristics, their status, the possible neutralization of oppositions redefined, and the category of text interference introduced.

Text interference results when, in a segment of the narrative discourse certain features refer to the narrator’s text (NT) while others refer to the character’s text (CT) as their origin (whereby the opposition of the texts can be neutralized

\textsuperscript{16} Monika Fludernik (1993, 305) has created a similar scale that extends from the narratorial pole to the figural. She distinguishes among the following ideal types, to which she applies numerous transitional forms: (A) pure narrative – action, background description plus evaluative commentary by the narrator; (B) narrated perception – description replaced by evocation of character’s perception; (C) speech report/psycho-narration – the narrative’s (frequently evaluative) rendering of utterances or feelings/thought processes; (D) free indirect discourse; (E) indirect discourse; and (F) direct discourse (quoted and unquoted). The question is, of course, whether form (A) belongs on this scale, as it is not a reproduction of the character’s text.
in certain features). The potential distinctions are (1) thematic features, (2) evaluative features, (3) grammatical features of person, (4) grammatical features of tense and mode, (5) orientation systems (deixis), (6) language functions, (7) stylistic features of lexis and (8) stylistic features of syntax (cf. Schmid 2010, 141–142). By the distribution of the features on the two texts, both texts are represented as a whole simultaneously. The bivocalist model of text interference implies that the narrator never leaves the stage – as univocalist conceptions, such as those of Ann Banfield (1982), for example, provide. The narrator is also present in the character’s speech, even if only as the one who selects certain things from the continuum of the character’s speeches and thoughts and thus uses the character’s text for his own narrative purposes. Even Platon rhetorically asked: “Aren’t the speeches that [Homer] quotes in each case and what stands between the speeches equally narrative [diegesis]?” (Republic, 393c).

The text interference can be represented by the following feature matrix for the basic type of FID in English (if all features are represented):

Oh! Why did she have to pitch up to this dumb Christmas party today? After all, it wasn’t Christmas ‘til tomorrow!

Table 3: Feature matrix for the basic type of FID in English

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NT</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CT</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

17 To clarify the terminology, the narrative discourse (the text of the narrative work as a product of the narrator) is divided into narrator’s discourse and character’s discourse, whereby the character’s discourse functions as a quotation within the arrangement of the narrator’s discourse. This distinction corresponds to that of diegesis and mimesis in the Platonic sense. Since the beginning of modern narrative in the eighteenth century, the narrator’s discourse often does not produce the narrator’s pure text, tending to be interspersed with features characteristic of the characters’ texts. Similarly, a character’s discourse may contain narratorial features. The narrator is responsible for both phenomena: the penetration of figural features into his own (the narrator’s) discourse and the narratorial revision of the character’s discourse. The unmixed, ‘genotypic’ texts – i.e., narrator’s text (NT) and character’s text (CT) – must be distinguished from narrator’s discourse and character’s discourse, which can contain features of the figural or narratorial poles, respectively (cf. Schmid 2010, 118–121). The opposition of NT and CT is neutralized if the two texts are identical with regard to one feature. The neutralization is marked in the tables below by an x for both NT and CT.
The manifold combinations of feature distributions result in countless finely differentiable forms of the representation of consciousness. In the following sections (2.4 and 2.5), their continuum is represented in its basic types with their feature profiles. The systematics of typology and the definition of types differ from McHale’s seven categories. When applicable, the equivalence with the McHale types is indicated.

All different basic types can occur in the axiological and stylistic features (2, 6, 7, 8) in either a narratorial or a figural variant. These variants do not form ideal types, but a sliding scale. Narratoriality and figurality are equally gradable, and thus we can distinguish between more and less figural or narratorial variants.

The distinction between narratorial and figural variants, however, only makes sense in works that fundamentally differentiate narrator’s text and character’s text in their axiologic and stylistic features. This is usually not the case in texts before the nineteenth century.

Let us look at an example from the story Poor Liza (Bednaja Liza, 1792) by the Russian sentimentalist Nikolaj Karamzin. The simple peasant girl Liza fell in love with the young nobleman Erast, who bought her lilies of the valley at the market. Now, with a heavy heart, she sits on the banks of a river without looking at the beauties of nature. A passing shepherd awakens in her wishful thinking that is based on idyllic literature:

Meanwhile a young shepherd drove his herd along the bank of the river and played his flute. Lisa turned her gaze to him and thought, “If the man who now occupies my thoughts was born a simple farmer, a shepherd, and if he now passed his flock by me, ah, I bowed with a smile and said to him, ‘Greetings, you lovable shepherd! Where are you driving your flock? Here, too, grass grows for your sheep; here, too, the flowers shine, from which one can weave a wreath for your hat.’” (Karamzin, 43)

The illiterate peasant girl is not only familiar with the props of the literary idyll, but also uses the language of sentimentalism. The peasant girl speaks like the narrator, and the narrator follows the language of the sentimental literature of his time. Characteristic of the character’s and narrator’s discourses are sentimental expressions such as the attribute “lovable [shepherd]” (ljubeznyj pastux). In such a context devoid of a linguistic point of view, it makes little sense to call the character’s discourse narratorially
tinged, for there is no alternative. No difference between NT and CT has yet
occurred in features 2, 7 and 8. This results not from oppositional texts being
neutralized, but from such texts not yet being fundamentally developed. The
character’s discourse is also not authorial, because the author cultivated a
different style as a real person and as the author of the *History of the Russian
State*. The character’s discourse, like the narrator’s discourse, corresponds
more to the epochal style of sentimentalism.

Only in the nineteenth century did the characters gradually acquire their
own linguistic profile in European literature, but still in Romantic narrative
CT and NT are linguistically little dissociated from one another and from the
author’s style. Full perspectivism did not establish itself in all parameters
until the middle of the nineteenth century in the narrative art of realism,
which applied the principle of mimetism and perspectivism to the relation-
ship between NT and CT in its quest for an authentic representation of reality
and a depiction of human beings as autonomous subjects.

But even in modernity it is possible to have no opposition between NT
and CT in the features lexis and syntax – e. g., if CT is formulated in written
language, for which Henry James’s novels provide numerous examples, or
if, on the other hand, the narrator is a man from the people and narrates
colloquially how this is the rule in the Russian Skaz of the 1920s. Then we
speak of the neutralization of the opposition, since at this time the differen-
tiation of NT and CT is basically known as a possibility or is even expected.

2.4 Marked Explicit Representation of Consciousness

In the following subchapters different modes and forms of consciousness
representation are considered. First, a distinction is made between *explicit*
and *implicit* representation of consciousness. In the former, either the narra-
tor describes the content of consciousness of the figure or the CT that formu-
lates the content of consciousness is presented through the narrative dis-
course; in the latter, the representation of consciousness takes place through
indexical signs and symbolic forms of expression.

The explicit representation must be subdivided into *marked* and *covert*
forms. The representation of consciousness is marked when the correspond-
ing segments of the narrative discourse explicitly refer to the figural origin
by graphical means (quotation marks, italics, blocking and the like) or so-called inquit-formulas (*he thought...; she felt...*). Of course, the representation is also marked in the narratorial report of consciousness (*Such thoughts went through her mind*). A covert representation exists when the CT is not readily recognizable as such but is formally issued as the narrator’s discourse. This concerns, to a greater extent, FID. It is not by chance that in the early days of its research in Germany, before it received its somewhat misleading German designation *erlebte Rede* (“experienced speech”), FID was called “veiled” or “disguised” discourse (*verschleierte* or *verkleidete Rede*) (Kalepky 1899; 1913; 1928).

The question whether the explicit representation of consciousness – first of all, FID – serves rather empathy or irony has been highly controversially discussed since the 1920s, and we do not want to raise it here (cf. Schmid 2010, 170–174). The following reference may suffice: The dispute between the bivocalists (cf. Roy Pascal’s [1977] dual voice position) and the univocalists (Banfield 1982; Voort 1986; Padučeva 1996), which is still ongoing today, can be settled by posing the question of the general axiological relationship between NT and CT in the respective work. Bitextuality, which always exists because of text interference, does not necessarily assume a two-voice, double-accented character, as postulated by Baxtin (1929; 1934/35) and Vološinov (1929), who were fixated on agonal relations. Between the one-accented text interference and the double-voiced performance that critically presents the hero’s content and expression, there is a broad spectrum of possible uses with different evaluations, ranging from empathy to humorous accentuation, critical irony to devastating mockery. Whether the narrator shows empathy or irony is a question of context and then, of course, interpretation. There is no a priori connection between the forms of the representation of consciousness and their semantic functions.

2.4.1 Direct Interior Discourse

In the figural type of *direct interior discourse* (*direkte innere Rede; prjamaja vnuntrennjaja reč*),18 all features (as in direct exterior discourse) refer to CT. The

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18 The English terms are accompanied by the German and Russian equivalents that are either in use or suggested by me (Schmid 2003a; 2014a).
pattern of DD is also characterized by the fact that the presence of CT is usually marked by graphic signs in the narrative text (usually quotation marks or italics). Relatively seldom is there a DD variant that is not explicitly marked as direct.\(^\text{19}\) Frequently, the pattern of the direct interior discourse is accompanied by an introductory matrix sentence (He asked himself…; she thought…) or an inserted or attached inquit-formula. This form of consciousness representation corresponds to McHale’s types 6 and 7.

The direct interior discourse is the pattern of the ‘mimetic’ ‘reproduction’ of the original inner character’s discourse.\(^\text{20}\) At least the convention of speech and thought representation provides that the reader perceives the character’s direct interior discourse as an authentic representation of his or her consciousness.

The character’s inner world presented in this pattern is a quotation in the narrator’s discourse, which is selective of the individual mental moments it presents. This inclusion implies that the moments of consciousness are not necessarily reproduced authentically. The character’s inner speeches can experience an axiological and stylistic change in the narrative style of a subjective narrator – i.e., a narrator who is ideologically and linguistically profiled, and who is strictly persevering in his or her own way of thinking and speaking.

Dostoevskij’s remarks on this are revealing. In the notebooks of his novel *A Raw Youth* (*Podrostok*, 1875), the author repeatedly states that the youthful narrator cannot authentically reproduce the concrete form of the speeches and ideas of adults in all their traits. And the diegetic narrator himself then confesses several times in the novel that he reproduces other people’s speeches and ideas only as far as he understood them then, as the narrated self, and how he remembers them now, as the narrating self. In the notebooks, Dostoevskij considers the advantages and disadvantages of choosing a diegetic (first-person) narrator. He sees a disadvantage in the fact that a narrator “in the first person,” in contrast to the third person (nondiegetic), cannot fully reproduce other people’s ideas fully authentically:

\(^{19}\) Doležel (1960) calls this variant in Czech “improper direct speech” (nevlastní přímá řeč) and in his Russian summary “unspecified direct speech” (neoboznačennaja prjamaja reč’). Doležel wrongly regards graphic marking as one of the distinctive features that separate the character’s “zone of expression” from that of the narrator. The “graphic features” he applies do not mark the character’s discourse itself, but its presentation in the narrative text.

\(^{20}\) It is not actually a reproduction because the original is missing. Literary fiction assumes, however, that the perceptions, thoughts, feelings, etc. presented in DD took place in the happenings of the story.
If [one] [tells] in the first person, then one can get less involved in the development of the ideas, which the young man of course cannot reproduce as they were pronounced; instead, he only reproduces the core of the matter (Dostoevskij, PSS, XVI, 98).

Even if a narrator capable of authentically reproducing other people’s inner worlds reliably reproduces a character’s inner speeches and strives for a strict imitation of both their axiological and stylistic features, the mere selection of individual sections from the continuum of the character’s perceptions, thoughts, and feelings – and the non-selection of others – will color the reproduction with a certain narratoriality.

In a narrative text, the quoted moments of figural consciousness inevitably experience a functional overdetermination. On the one hand they express the contents of a character’s consciousness; on the other they have the dual task of characterizing the figure while carrying the narration. In general, it can be said that the narrator – by quoting the character’s perceptions, thoughts or feelings – uses the character’s text for his own narrative purposes and transforms it narratorially, at least in the functional sense.

2.4.1.1 Direct Interior Monologue

We call a longer inner speech an interior monologue (the boundary between speech and monologue is not fixed and cannot be defined).

Interior monologues, in the mental development of the heroes, usually mark a special point of pausing, of inner accountability, of crisis, of new clarity, of a decision on important questions about life and existence. Michael Toolan points out that direct inner speech is already needed for “self-addressed, self-instructing conclusions, at moments of crisis, high emotion, and revelation” (2006, 704). This is all the more true of the interior monologue, which often appears at the interfaces of mental developments.

The interior monologue, which is often mistakenly identified with FID, can be represented in the patterns of both DD and FID. In the first case we speak of the direct interior monologue (direkter innerer Monolog; prjamoj vnutrennij monolog), in the second of free indirect monologue (erlebter innerer Monolog; nesobstvenno-prjamoj monolog; this second form is discussed below, in 2.5.1.3).
The priority in the use of the interior monologue is often attributed to Edouard Dujardin and his novella *The Laurels are Cut* (*Les Lauriers sont coupés*, 1888). While Dujardin’s affirmation “le premier emploi voulu, systématique et continu du monologue intérieur date des *Lauriers sont coupés*” must be relativized according to the indications of earlier occurrences given by various sides, it is indisputable that Dujardin gave at least one of the first definitions of the interior monologue:

Le monologue intérieur est, dans l’ordre de la poésie, le discours sans auditeur et non prononcé par lequel un personnage exprime sa pensée la plus intime, la plus proche de l’inconscient antérieurement à toute organisation logique, c’est à dire en son état naissant, de façon à donner l’impression « tout venant ».

Dujardin’s definition, however, does not concern the interior monologue in general, but a special type that can be referred to as *stream of consciousness* (*Bewusstseinsstrom; potok soznaniija*). In this type, CT is presented in *status nascendi* as a sequence of fleeting perceptual impressions, free associations, momentary memories and fragmentary reflections.

In the literature on the reproduction of speech and thought, there is still no consensus as to whether interior monologue and stream of consciousness are only different descriptions of the same phenomenon or whether they denote things altogether different (cf. Palmer 2005b). It seems reasonable to regard the stream of consciousness as an extremely figural, syntactically largely resolved, asyndetic variant of the direct interior monologue.

The direct interior monologue is by no means an achievement of modernism, as has been generally assumed since Dujardin’s definition, but is already encountered in realism, as in the case of the great authors of consciousness Dostoevskij and Tolstoj.

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21 “The first intended, systematic and continuous use of the interior monologue dates from the Laurels are cut.”

22 “The interior monologue is, in the order of poetry, the discourse without a listener and not pronounced by which a character expresses his most intimate thought, the closest to the unconscious prior to any logical organisation, that is to say in its nascent state, in such a way as to give the impression of ‘everything coming’.”

23 The term stream of consciousness was introduced by the American philosopher and psychologist William James (1890) to characterize erratic contents of consciousness. A classic example of this technique is the chapter “Penelope” in James Joyce’s *Ulysses*. 
An early example of a direct interior monologue in the work of the young Dostoevskij are Mr. Goljadkin’s inwardly dialogized confrontations with himself in the novel *The Double* (*Dvojnik*, 1846). In the following quotation, the hero argues with himself that he has invited his doppelgänger to join him and at the same time fears that the invited person will not come. The inner confrontation divides the ego into two instances and prepares the splitting of consciousness that will eventually befall the hero:

“Very well, we’ll see,” he thought to himself, “we’ll see, we’ll crack all this in due time: Ah, Lord God!” he moaned in conclusion, in a totally different voice, “why did I invite him, to what end did I do all that? I’m truly putting my own head into their thievish noose, I’m tying the noose myself. Oh, head, head! You can’t help yourself, you spill everything like a little brat, some office clerk, like some rankless trash, a rag, some rotten old shred, gossip that you are, old woman that you are!... Saints alive! And the rogue wrote a little ditty and declared his love for me! How can I, sort of... How can I show the rogue decently to the door, if he comes back? To be sure, there are many different turns and ways. Thus and so, I’ll say, given my limited resources... Or frighten him somehow, say, that taking this and that into consideration, I’m forced to inform you... say, we’ll have to go halves for room and board, and pay the money in advance. Hm! No, devil take it, no! That would besmirch me. It’s not entirely delicate! [...] Well, but what if he doesn’t come? Will that also be bad? I spilled out a lot to him yesterday!... Ah, bad, bad! Oh, things are in such a bad way with us! Oh, my head, my cursed head! Nothing gets sawed into you as it should, no sense gets nailed into you! And what if he comes and refuses? The Lord grant he does come! I’d be extremely glad if he came; I’d give a lot if he came...” (Dostoevskij, *D*, 75)

About a hundred years earlier, though, we find in Henry Fielding’s *Tom Jones* (1749) a dialogized direct interior monologue. It is announced in the title of book 7, chapter 2 as *Conversation which Mr Jones had with himself* (Fielding, 302) and presented both in the introductory words and in the postscript as an articulated monologue, but no matter how performed it is perceived, its communicative structure corresponds entirely to that of an interior monologue. An interior monologue in Fielding’s novel may come as a surprise, since the narrative perspective of this novel, which stands at the beginning...
of newer narrative literature, is narratorial irony (cf. Stanzel 1955, 50–54; Booth [1961] 1983, 215–218; Cohn 1978, 112). The inner world of the figures is presented here almost exclusively in a narratorial consciousness report. In addition, Fielding’s narrator, who is otherwise not very taciturn, likes to expressly forego the depiction of the inner life of his figures. One of his more or less ironic reasons for abstaining from the inner view is as follows:

A gentle sigh stole from Sophia at these words, which perhaps contributed to form a dream of no very pleasant kind; but as she never revealed this dream to anyone, so the reader cannot expect to see it related here. (Fielding, 542)

The above-mentioned direct interior monologue is about Tom’s response to the letter of the treacherous half-brother Blifil, in which he says Mr Allworthy, Tom’s benefactor, insists that Tom leave the area immediately:

He grew, however, soon ashamed of indulging this remedy; and starting up he cried, “Well then, I will give Mr Allworthy the only instance he requires of my obedience. I will go this moment – but wither? – why let Fortune direct; since there is no other who thinks it of any consequence what becomes of this wretched person, it shall be a matter of equal indifference to myself. Shall I alone regard what no other? – Ha! have I not reason to think there is another? – One whose value is above that of the whole world! – I may, I must imagine my Sophia is not indifferent to what becomes of me. Shall I then leave this only friend – and such a friend? Shall I not stay with her? – Where? How can I stay with her? Have I any hopes of even seeing her, tho’ she was as desirous as myself, without exposing her to the wrath of her father? And to what purpose? Can I think of soliciting such a creature to consent to her own ruin? Shall I indulge any passion of mine at such a price? – Shall I lurk about this country like a thief, with such intentions? – No, I disdain, I detest the thought. Farewell, Sophia; farewell most lovely, most beloved – ” Here passion stopped his mouth, and found a vent in his eyes. (Fielding, 303)
However, the use of the direct interior monologue is much older. As we will see below, already the Middle High German epicists Wolfram von Eschenbach and Gottfried von Strassburg use a form of representation of consciousness which cannot be called anything other than a direct interior monologue.

### 2.4.1.2 Figural and Narratorial Variants of Direct Interior Monologue

Both examples from *The Double* and *Tom Jones* are about a dialogized direct interior monologue that is located close to the figural pole but does not yet show the dissolution of thematic and syntactic coherence characteristic of the stream of consciousness – which is to say, does not yet show an associativity that, starting from phonic equivalences, arrives at peculiar thematic connections.

Such an extremely figural type is formed by Nikolaj Rostov’s splinters of thoughts and associations in Tolstoj’s *War and Peace* (*Vojna i mir*, 1868/69), which flash in Nikolaj Rostov’s consciousness during the nocturnal inspection of the soldier chain entrusted to the hero before the battle at Austerlitz. Rostov can hardly keep his eyes open from tiredness and has the greatest difficulty in distinguishing between the real and the phantasmagorical in the foggy darkness. Half-sleep, fever, strong excitement are mental situations for which Tolstoj, the psychologist of undramatic, prosaic everyday consciousness, uses an extremely ‘mimetic’ type of direct interior monologue. In the following example, the selection of thematic units is not made solely on the basis of thematic coherence and contiguity, but is based above all on phonic associations as is the case in the following monologue, a variation on the phonic motif *Na-taš-a*, the name of his sister:

“It must be snow – this spot; a spot – *une tache,*” thought Rostov. “*Tache* or no *tache* . . .”

“*Nataša,* my sister, dark eyes. Na...*taška*... (She’ll be so surprised when I tell her how I saw the sovereign!) *Nataša*... *taša*... *sabretache*...” [...] “But what was I thinking? I mustn’t forget. How I am going to speak with the sovereign? No, not that – that’s for to-morrow. Yes, yes! *Nataša*... at-tack a...attack who? Hussars. Whose hussars? with their moustaches... Along the Tversky boulevard rode that hussar with the moustaches, I was thinking of him too just opposite Gur’ev’s house... Old Gur’ev... Eh, nice fellow, Denisov! But that’s all trifles. The main thing now is that the sovereign’s here. How he looked at me, and he
wanted to say something, but he didn’t dare... No, it was I who didn’t dare. But that’s all trifles, the main thing is not to forget that I was thinking of something important, yes. Natasha, at-tack a..., yes, yes, yes. That’s good.” (Tolstoj, WaP, 266; italics mine – W. Sch.)

Such extremely figural chains of associations are not characteristic of Tolstoj, who generally gives little figural freedom to the monologues of his heroes. Thus, in War and Peace, the narratorial variant of the direct interior monologue dominates. One example is Pierre Bezuxov’s reflections on the lie spread in society:

“Elena Vasil’evna, who has never loved anything except her own body, and is one of the stupidest women in the world,” thought Pierre, “appears to people as the height of intelligence and finesse, and they bow down to her. Napoleon Bonaparte was scorned by everyone as long as he was great, but now that he’s become a pathetic comedian, the emperor Franz seeks to offer him his daughter as an illegitimate wife. [...] My brother Masons swear in blood that they are ready to sacrifice everything for their neighbor, but they won’t pay a single ruble into the collection for the poor [...]. We all profess the Christian law of forgiveness of offences and love of one’s neighbor, a law in consequence of which we have erected forty times forty churches in Moscow – but yesterday a deserter was flogged to death, and a priest, a servant of that same law of love and forgiveness, gave him the cross to kiss before the execution.”

So Pierre reflected, and accustomed as he was to it, this whole general, universally acknowledged lie amazed him each time like something new. (Tolstoj, WaP, 537)

Pierre Bezuxov obviously serves here as the mouthpiece of the author (from whom the narrator is little dissociated) and delivers an authorial message. The narrator has edited, smoothed and adapted his inner speech to the style of his narrator’s discourse. Traits of associative development of thought and characteristics of spontaneous production are missing in this example. The inner speech is rather rhetorical with its order and increase. In such cases, the characterizing function of the interior monologue is dominated by the authorial-ideological. Significantly, the style does not change during the transition from direct interior monologue to narrative discourse.
2.4.1.3 *Quoted Figural Designation*

The direct interior monologue is a long form of the direct interior discourse. There is also a reduction level. It consists of single words of the narrative discourse, which are identified by graphic signs as CT. This short form of the direct interior discourse, which is not intended by McHale, we call *quoted figural designation* (*direkte figurale Benennung, prjamaja nominacija*). In Dostoevskij’s novels we find numerous examples of such designations, which present the evaluative point of view and way of thinking of a character in strong abbreviation and with marking of the origin. The direct figural designation does not belong to the variants of FID, because the graphic marking cancels a basic feature of FID – i.e., the veiling of the origin.

Leo Spitzer (1928) demonstrated the “imitation of individual words in the narrative report,” as he calls the procedure, using an example from *The Brothers Karamazov*: “He [Dmitrij Karamazov] looked rigidly into the ‘milk beard’s’ eyes.” Spitzer comments: “One sees as it were a ray of subjectivity, the tone of Mitja’s voice, shooting up from the factual report” (Spitzer 1928, 330).

Quoted figural designation is usually a means of ironically distancing oneself from a person’s expression and way of thinking. Arkadij Dolgorukij, the young diegetic narrator in the novel *A Raw Youth*, uses the method with ironic intention frequently. He condenses the thinking of third persons of the narrated world in characteristic terms:

Wherever the Versilovs were [...] Makar Ivanovič never failed to send news of himself to the “family.” (Dostoevskij, *RY*, 11)

It was a perfect avalanche of “ideas” of the prince’s [Sokolsky] which he was preparing to present to the board of directors. (Dostoevskij, *RY*, 22)

In this way, the narrator also distances himself from the terms that indicate the evaluative position of his earlier, narrated self:

On that 19th of September I took one other “step.” (Dostoevskij, *RY*, 39)

And though my present “step” was only an *experiment* yet I had made up my mind not to take even that step till [...] I should break off with everything, hide myself in my snail shell, and become perfectly free. It is true that I was far from being in my “snail shell.” (Dostoevskij, *RY*, 39–40; tr. rev.)
The “snail shell” entering from the text of the narrated self into the text of
the narrating self is provided with evaluative accents, which correspond to
a changed evaluative position.

2.4.2 Indirect Representation of Perception, Thought, and
Emotion

The pattern of ID serves not only to reproduce external speeches, but also to
reproduce contents of consciousness that are not pronounced. In the latter
case we speak of indirect representation of perception, thought, and emotion (indirekte Darstellung von Wahrnehmungen Gedanken und Gefühlen; kosvennoe izobraženie vosprijatij, myslej i čuvstv).

In similar application to unspoken consciousness, ID consists of two
parts: the so-called “inquit-formula” (the matrix sentence or the introduction
by the reproducing instance with the verbum dicendi, sentiendi, cogitandi, etc.: she thought that...) and the contents of consciousness to be reproduced. The
inquit-formula can also be postscripted or inserted into the reproduction. A
difference between these position variants consists above all in the fact that
in some languages, such as English and German, the syntactic conversion
required for the introductory inquit-formula is omitted (and in some cases
also the subordinate conjunction). This means that CT is marked later and
that the corresponding statement can first be perceived as NT. We often ob-
serve the inserted inquit-formula (marked in italics in my quotations) in Vir-
ginia Woolf:

What would he think, she wondered, when he came back? (Woolf, Mrs
Dalloway, 41)

What an extraordinary habit that was, Clarissa thought; always playing
with a knife. (Mrs Dalloway, 49)

Since the inquit-formula, regardless of how it is constructed and positioned,
belongs to NT and explicitly marks the figural origin of what is reproduced,
it does not make sense to assign this template to FID, as Toolan (2006, 703)
suggests, even if the reproduction part in some languages is only slightly or
not at all different from FID. The marked reproduction of CT categorically
distinguishes ID from the covert representation of consciousness to which
FID belongs.
For many Indo-European languages, certain transformation rules apply to the reproduction of speech in the ID pattern: the replacement of the system of the three grammatical persons by the third person, the shift of the tense and/or mode, the replacement of expressive and appellative elements by additional qualifications of the inquit-formula (*He said strongly excited that...; she wondered why...*), and the smoothing of interjections and syntactic irregularities of direct speech such as ellipses, anacolutha, etc. When playing back non-oral content such as perception, thought, and emotion, some of these transformations, especially the transposition of tense and mode, are omitted.

With reference to Cohn (1978) and Leech and Short (1981), Fludernik (1993, 5) attests the pattern of ID a “near-non-occurrence” for the reproduction of consciousness. Later in her book (1993, 304) she accepts rare occurrences of *verba cogitandi* with *that*-sentences, but – like Cohn (1978) before her and then Palmer (2004) after her – assigns them to the thought report. Certainly, the sentences (constructed by me) *He remembered his happy childhood* (consciousness report) and *He remembered how happy his childhood was* (indirect representation of thought) differ not in the propositional content, but in the modality and accentuation of the activity of consciousness. Fludernik (1993, 305–306) finds a generalizing justification for the allegedly rare occurrence of indirect representation of thought: Thinking processes, attitudes and feelings could not be observed and not known, unless through their subject itself. She fails to recognize, though, that the skepticism formulated from the point of view of modernity about the experienceability of someone else’s inner life does not apply to the literature of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, nor does it lead in the avant-garde to a consistent renunciation of the indirect representation of the contents of consciousness.

Virginia Woolf’s *Mrs Dalloway* – a milestone in the modern novel that almost exclusively presents the inner worlds of the characters, especially the title heroine, in a single day of her life – contains countless indirect representations of the inner world. In addition to the two examples given above, we limit ourselves to three examples of different constructions that follow each other at short intervals (the reproduction parts are italicized by me):

And she felt that *she had been given a present, wrapped up, and told just to keep it, not to look at it.* (Woolf, *Mrs Dalloway*, 40)

She felt only *how Sally was being mauled already, maltreated.* (*Mrs Dalloway*, 41)
Strange, she thought, pausing on the landing, and assembling that diamond shape, that single person, strange how a mistress knows the very moment, the very temper of her house! (Mrs Dalloway, 43)

Mixail Baxtin (under the mask of Valentin Vološinov) underlines the analytical character of ID (“Analysis is the heart and soul of indirect discourse”) and distinguishes between two modifications: the referent-analyzing and the texture-analyzing form. In the first modification, the thematic contents and the evaluative position of the reproduced discourse are accentuated by the smoothing and neutralization of subjective-emotional forms of expression; in the second, the main component is the profiling of the “subjective and stylistic physiognomy of the message viewed as expression” (Vološinov 1929; tr. 1986, 131).

2.4.2.1 Narratorial and Figural Variants of Indirect Representation

According to the proximity and distance of the reproduction part to NT or CT, we distinguish between two types of indirect representation of perception, thought, and emotion.

In the narratorial indirect representation (which corresponds to McHale’s type 3, “indirect content paraphrase”), the expression of the figural content of consciousness undergoes a clear revision, which is expressed in the analytical accentuation of the thematic core, the smoothing of syntactic irregularities, the neutralization of figural idiosyncrasies, and generally in the stylistic assimilation to the NT.

The feature matrix characteristic of narratorial indirect representation in English looks like this:

Table 4: Feature matrix for the basic type of narratorial indirect representation in English

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The marking of both NT and CT refers to the neutralization of the opposition between the two texts in this feature.

The narratorial indirect representation of ideas is widespread in Goethe’s *Elective Affinities* (1809). We look at an example characteristic of this novel in which the narratorial indirect representation of thought (set in italics by me) contains a justification (underlined) that initially does not seem to be of figural origin, but then, after clear narratorial correction (underlined twice), proves to be part of CT:

Charlotte was convinced that *Ottile would begin to speak on that day again; for she had so far proved a secret bustle, a kind of cheerful complacency, a smile that floats on the face of the one who hides something good and joyful from his beloved. No one knew that Ottile spent many an hour in great weakness, from which she rose by spiritual power only for the times when she appeared.* (Goethe, 194)

In the *figural indirect representation* (which corresponds to McHale’s type 4, “indirect discourse, mimetic to some degree”) the narrator presents the contents of the character’s consciousness in his or her linguistic peculiarities.

In the following example of figural indirect representation of thought from Dostoevskij’s *Double*, the reproduction part is formulated entirely in the character’s discourse with all its idiosyncrasies, in its own authentic stylistic form, in its own hyperbolic language, with its tendency towards repetition and intensification. The narrator parodies this language and demonstrates in it the way of Mr Goljadkin’s thinking:

Realizing instantly that he was lost, annihilated in a certain sense, that he had besmirched himself and begrimed his reputation, that he had been laughed at and spat upon in the presence of strangers, that he had been treacherously insulted by the man whom he had regarded still yesterday as the first and most reliable of his friends, that he finally flunked it for all he was worth – Mr. Goljadkin rushed in pursuit of his enemy. (Dostoevskij, D, 84)

With reference to Table 5, the above passage contains the following features for CT: feature 5, orientation system (*yesterday*); feature 6, language function
(expression); feature 7 (lexis: hyperbolic vocabulary, oral expressions, hyperbolically high-register, overblown vocabulary); and feature 8, syntax (rhetorical sequence of synonyms).

Table 5: Feature matrix for the quoted figural indirect representation of thought

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2.4.2.2 **Autonomous Indirect Discourse**

Figuralization can go so far that the grammatical and syntactic norms of ID are violated. In that case, a hybrid type is formed, which I call *autonomous indirect discourse* (*freie indirekte Rede; svobodnaja kosvennaja reč*). It arises particularly when the expressivity and syntax of the CT in a figural ID burst the syntactic restrictions of the ID, or when the ID takes on the constitutive features of DD (graphic marking, use of the first and second person). For the first case, the transfer of interjections from CT, the following quote from *The Double* is an example:

[…] it seemed to him [Goljadkin] that just then, that minute, someone had been standing there next to him, also leaning his elbows on the rail of the embankment, and – wondrous thing! – had even said something to him […] (Dostoevskij, *D*, 45)

The second case can be documented with the following quotation from Dostoevskij’s *Mr Prozarčin*: the grammatical person switches from the “s/he”

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24 Some theorists use the term free indirect speech as a translation of *discours indirect libre* or *free indirect discourse* (cf. Holthusen 1968, 226): in Russian, for example, Bulakovskij 1954, 443-446, and more recently Padučeva (1996) (*svobodnyj kosvennyj diskurs*). However, the autonomous indirect discourse differs from FID by the explicit reference to the reproduction of the CT. Dirscherl and Pafel (2015, 19) refer to the mixture of direct and indirect patterns as “mixed speech representation.” See their reference (footnote 21) to both the more recent and the older literature on “mixed quotation.”
system of ID to the “I-you-s/he” system of DD, and this switch is marked with quotation marks:

[T]hen it could be discerned that Semen Ivanovič seemed to be predicting that Zinovij Prokof’evič would never succeed in entering high society, and that the tailor to whom he owed money for his clothes would give him a hiding, nay, would certainly give him a hiding since the jackanapes was taking such long time to pay up, and that, finally, “You want to be a cadet in the hussars, you jackanapes, but you won’t make the grade, it won’t work out the way you think it will, and when the administration gets to hear of it you’ll be demoted to the rank of common clerk; that’s what I’m telling you, do you hear, you insolent jackanapes?” (Dostoevskij, MP, 221)

Without marking by quotation marks, the following pattern change from ID to DD is carried out in *Mrs Dalloway*. The consciousness activity is that of Peter Walsh, who has just returned from India:

> Here she is mending her dress; mending her dress as usual, he thought: here she’s been sitting all the time I’ve been in India […]

(Woolf, *Mrs Dalloway*, 46)

We find a highly syncretic representation of consciousness in the following passage from *Mrs Dalloway*. In FID (italics), with the inquit-formula inserted (dotted underlined), a free indirect representation of thought is embedded, in which the polarity of the personnel system is not reversed (double underlined). In the indirect representation of thought, FID is again embedded (in brackets). The autonomous indirect discourse is followed by a basic form of indirect representation (simply underlined) with the inquit-formula inserted:

> This was a favorite dress, one of Sally Parker’s, the last almost she ever made, alas, for Sally had now retired, lived at Ealing, and if ever I have a moment, thought Clarissa (but never would she have a moment any more), I shall go and see her at Ealing. For she was a character, thought Clarissa, a real artist. (Woolf, *Mrs Dalloway*, 44)

Autonomous ID often arises from the narrator’s desire to reproduce the discourse of a character and all its idiosyncrasies as authentically as possible,
without renouncing his or her narratorial presence. Infractions against grammatical norms should then, as a rule, be ascribed to the character.

2.4.2.3 The Transfer Function of Indirect Representation

Very often the indirect representation of perception, thought and emotion leads over to FID. This does not completely eliminate the ambiguity inherent in the latter, for it still remains to decide the boundary between the forms and the respective proportions of NT and CT. The introductory or marking function of ID for a subsequent FID is also observed in the figural variant. We find an example once again in *Mrs Dalloway*:

> Her only gift was knowing people almost by instinct, she thought, walking on. If you put her in a room with someone, up went her back like a cat’s; or she purred. (Woolf, *Mrs Dalloway*, 11)

The inquit-formula is postpositive here, which is not uncommon in general and even the rule in *Mrs Dalloway*. The self-characterization of the figure in indirect thought representation (italics) is followed by a self-description in FID (underlined), in which the figural medium imagines herself as observed from outside, from third parties.

2.4.3 Consciousness Report

The most narratorial presentation of characters’ minds is the consciousness report (*Bewusstseinsbericht, narratorskoе soobščenie o vnutренней žизни персонажа*). In McHale’s typology, types 2 (“summary, less ‘purely’ diegetic”) and 3 (“indirect content paraphrase”) correspond to it. Dorrit Cohn calls the narratorial representation of the inner world “psycho-narration,” Alan Palmer “thought report.” Both strive for a recognition of this ‘stepchild’ among the narrative techniques, to which the theorists of the stream of consciousness have allegedly declared psycho-narration. Both Cohn and Palmer, however, have a very broad concept of this category and subsume indirect representation under it. This is problematic in so far as the indirect representation in the reproduction part is related to CT, while the psycho-narration or the thought report do not contain any figural moment and therefore do not cause any text interference. Text interference occurs in this most narratorial form
of the representation of consciousness only when CT is represented by axio-
logical or stylistic features in the reported contents of consciousness. But
then the consciousness report turns into figurally colored narration. A figural
indirect representation like *She wondered where the hell she was*, Palmer (2004,
56) regards as a colored thought report. His analysis is, unconvincingly, that
the narrator’s language is colored by the character’s mode of expression, but
the subjectivity remains that of the narrator.

To agree with Cohn and Palmer is that the consciousness report can pen-
etrate into areas that are not accessible to the character. Therefore, the corre-
sponding contents of consciousness cannot be presented in a form present-
ing CT because this presupposes a certain degree of awareness and reflexiv-
ity on the character’s part.

Lion Feuchtwanger’s novel *Jud Süß* (1925) provides numerous examples
for the consciousness report, which transcends the character’s horizon, de-
spite its strong tendency towards a figural point of view. In the novel (the
content of which was distorted to the worst in the anti-Semitic film of the
same name from 1940), the hero Josef Süß Oppenheimer fights an inner battle
with himself as to whether he should stand up for the Jew Jescheskel Selig-
mann Freudenthal, unjustly sentenced to death in Esslingen. He weighs the
pros and cons of his commitment:

> In his heart he knew he would do it. In his heart he knew it from the
> first moment he saw Rabbi Gabriel. And he had great difficulty in pre-
> venting certain inchoate fancies, which ever again thronged up his
> mind, from becoming pictures only too comprehensible […]. And
> while these vain and swelling pictures thronged up in his mind, he
> found it difficult to play before himself the grave drama of his sacrifi-
> cial resolve. While he lamented and sentimentally stroked himself
> about the sacrifices he had been postulated, there was a great sense of
> relief in his secret corner. (Feuchtwanger, *Jew Süß*, 227; tr. rev.25)

However, the reader is confronted here with the question: Who looks into
the “secret corner”: only the narrator, or the narrator with the hero?

The pure narratoriality of introspection is clear in the following passages:

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25 The last sentence is not to be found in the English translation. It is part of the German origi-
But as he had done several times recently, he did not admit the true reasons, but spread himself before himself: it now turns out that he had done the deed not for thanks, but only for pure and noble motives. (Jew Süss, 294)

The consciousness report is an archaic device that dominates in the older novel alongside DD. An example of frequent occurrence is Fielding’s *Tom Jones*. The title hero has the big decision to make how he, who has been repudiated by his guardian, should behave in the face of his love for Sophia:

And now the great doubt was, how to act with regard to Sophia. The thoughts of leaving her, almost rent his heart asunder; but the consideration of reducing her to ruin and beggary still racked him, if possible, more; and if the violent desire of possessing her person could have induced him to listen one moment to this alternative, still he was by no means certain of her resolution to indulge his wishes at so high an expense. The resentment of Mr Allworthy, and the injury he must do to his quiet, argued strongly against this latter, and lastly, the apparent impossibility of his success, even if he would sacrifice all these considerations to it, came to his assistance; and thus honour at last, backed with despair, with gratitude to his benefactor, and with real love to his mistress, got the better of burning desire, and he resolved rather to quit Sophia than to pursue her to her ruin. (Fielding, *Tom Jones*, 289)

The considerations of the hero in the key passage of the novel, which amount to a balance between existential values, would have been staged in younger novels in FID. Fielding uses the consciousness report, bringing Tom’s conflicting feelings to their concepts and giving a clear picture of the hierarchy of values in the moral household of the hero.

Although in Jane Austen’s novel *Pride and Prejudice* (1813) the relationships between the characters are presented largely from a figural point of view, through the perspective of Elizabeth Bennet, the narrator supplements the protagonist’s perceptions at important points in the plot:

Occupied in observing Mr. Bingley’s attentions to her sister, Elizabeth was far from suspecting that she was herself becoming an object of some interest in the eyes of his friend. (Austen, *Pride and Prejudice*, 15)
With this narratorial remark, the narrator makes an unmistakable anticipa-
tion that will warn the attentive reader. Fitzwilliam Darcy – the young, hand-
some and rich, but snobbish landowner whom all the mothers of the area
wish to be their son-in-law – had not only not danced with Elizabeth Bennet
at the ball, but had also disparagingly spoken to his friend Bingley about
Elizabeth’s appeal to him: “She is tolerable; but not handsome enough to
tempt me” (Pride and Prejudice, 7).

Darcy’s disinterest – actual or alleged – will soon be shaken. The reader
learns of this development neither through Elizabeth’s perception nor
through Darcy’s interior discourse, but through the authoritative report of
the reliable narrator, who knows more about this hero than Darcy himself:

Mr. Darcy had at first scarcely allowed her to be pretty; he had looked
at her without admiration at the ball; and when they next met, he
looked at her only to criticise. But no sooner had he made it clear to
himself and his friends that she had hardly a good feature in her face,
than he began to find it was rendered uncommonly intelligent by the
beautiful expression of her dark eyes. To this discovery succeeded
some others equally mortifying. Though he had detected with a criti-
cal eye more than one failure of perfect symmetry in her form, he was
forced to acknowledge her figure to be light and pleasing; and in spite
of his asserting that her manners were not those of the fashionable
world, he was caught by their easy playfulness. Of this she was per-
fectly unaware, – to her he was only the man who made himself agree-
able no where, and who had not thought her handsome enough to
dance with. (Pride and Prejudice, 15)

After this narratorial enlightenment at the beginning of the novel, it can no
longer come as a surprise to the reader that Elizabeth and Darcy are finally
a couple.

After considering the psycho-narration in “authorial novels” – as Stanzel
(1955 and later) calls them (Tom Jones, Thackeray’s Vanity Fair, Balzac’s Père
Goriot and Wieland’s Agathon) – Cohn (1978, 25) comes to the conclusion that
the more strongly the narrator is profiled, the less apt he is to reveal the
depth of his characters’ psyches: “It almost seems as though the authorial
narrator jealously guards his prerogative as the sole thinking agent within
his novel.” The retreat of narratorial perspective in favor of increasingly fig-
ural presentation of stories can hardly be explained by the narrator’s diminishing “jealousy” (and the author’s behind him). It should also be borne in mind that the idea of constant effort, which appears in this calculation of narratorial and figural “emotional and intellectual energy” is not consistently confirmed by literary development. There are strongly figural narratives with full development of the spiritual life of the characters in which the narrator is thoroughly profiled, even if only through narratorial irony in the double-voiced text interference. Dostoevskij’s Double and The Eternal Husband (Večnyj muž, 1870) are striking examples of this (cf. Schmid 1968), which even Stanzel (last 1979, 90) accepted.

Palmer attributes to the “thought report” the basic function of linking – the ability to link the character’s thought process with his or her environment and thereby to demonstrate the social nature of thinking. “It is in thought report that the narrator is able to show explicitly how characters’ minds operate in a social and physical context” (Palmer 2005a, 604). Palmer (2004, 81–85; 2005a, 604) expands this basic function into a series of facets. However, their list cannot hide the fact that the “thought report” – which for Palmer (2005a, 602) ranges from ID to summary (e.g., She thought of Paris) – by no means exclusively performs the functions mentioned, and that it is the driest and least complex of the three types that Palmer distinguishes for the “representation of mind.” The main disadvantage of the “thought report,” however, is probably its explicitness, which, as Baxtin ([1934/35] 1975, 133; tr. 1981, 319–320) already stated, corresponds little to the ambiguity and blurriness of the soul life to be represented. Consequently, it is not by chance that, since time immemorial, FID has been perceived as the appropriate mode for representing consciousness.

2.5 Covert Explicit Representation of Consciousness

We now turn to the forms in which the figural content of consciousness is given explicitly in the narrative text, but – since graphic signs, inquit-formulas and corresponding narratorial commentaries are missing – is presented as NT.
2.5.1 Free Indirect Discourse (FID)

Among the forms that explicitly depict CT with its contents of consciousness, but present it as narrative discourse, the most complex and the most commonly addressed in criticism is undoubtedly FID (*erlebte Rede, nesobstvenno prjamaja reč*) (McHale’s type 5).

We can define the device in the following way:

*FID is a segment of a narrative that in the form of the narrator’s text actually represents the inner speech, thoughts, feelings, perceptions and/or the evaluative position of one or more of the narrated characters or entire collectives whereby the reproduction of CT is not marked, neither graphically nor by any kind of explicit indicator.*

Table 6: Feature matrix for the basic type of FID in English and German.

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The column for tense is not filled, since, firstly, the languages here proceed differently, and secondly, there are variants in English, German, and Russian that differ in this characteristic from the basic type valid for the language.

Before the most important types of FID are dealt with, three widespread views are rejected:

(1) FID rarely serves to reproduce external speech. In specialist literature there are indeed occasional references to cases in which FID seems to form spoken speech (cf. Sokolova 1968, 29–31), but, at least in narrative prose from the eighteenth century onwards, this is almost always not about the reproduction of the spoken speech itself, but about reflected speech – the representation of the external speech in the perception or memory of one of the characters (cf. Kovtunova 1955, 138).

The following passage from *Mrs Dalloway* shows how Hugh Whitebread’s outer speech is first perceived (simply underlined) and ironically reflected (italic) by Clarissa Dalloway and then how Clarissa’s perception is directed towards her own outer speech (doubly underlined):
They [the Whitebreads] had just come up – unfortunately – to see doctors. Other people came to see pictures; go to the opera; take their daughters out; the Whitebreads came “to see doctors.” Times without number Clarissa had visited Evelyn Whitebread in a nursing home. Was Evelyn ill again? Evelyn was a good deal out of sorts, said Hugh, intimating by a kind of pout or swell of his very well-covered, manly, extremely handsome, perfectly upholstered body (he was almost too well dressed always, but presumably had to be, with his little job at Court) that his wife had some internal ailment, nothing serious, which, as an old friend, Clarissa Dalloway would quite understand without requiring him to specify. Ah yes, she did of course; what a nuisance; and felt very sisterly and oddly conscious at the same time of her hat. (Mrs Dalloway, 8)

(2) For some theorists (e.g., Banfield 1973), FID is a pattern specific to fictional literature. This is by no means the case. FID certainly occurs outside of fiction and especially in colloquial communication. For example, see the following ironic superimposition of someone else’s speech typical for everyday’s communication: A reports about B: Yes, yes, he couldn’t do that either. He really had more important things to do! Leo Spitzer (1922a; 1928) and Eugen Lerch (1928) already drew attention to the emergence of FID in everyday communication.26

(3) FID is by no means limited to non-diegetic (third-person) narrators, as Käte Hamburger (1957; 1968) and other theorists have postulated. Dorrit Cohn (1969; 1978, Part II “Consciousness in first-person texts”) has cited convincing examples from German and English literature for FID in diegetic narration. In these cases, FID does not reproduce the texts of third persons, but the thoughts and perceptions of the earlier, narrated self.

In diegetic narration, however, there are somewhat different conditions for profiling the texts of narrated self (CT) and narrating self (NT) than in non-diegetic narration and correspondingly different conditions for neutralizing the opposition (cf. Schmid 1973, 245–246). In general, the opposition of CT and NT is neutralized more often than in nondiegetic narrative. Feature 3 (person) is generally omitted for the differentiation of the texts, and the opposition of NT and CT is rarely strongly pronounced in feature 6 (lexis). Language function (feature

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26 On the role of FID in everyday communication, in parliamentary speech and in journalistic use (oral and written) see Pascal (1977, 18–19, 34, 57) and McHale (1978, 282).
7) and syntax (feature 8) will only form an opposition if the narrated self is in a particular mental state, is aroused or confused, or is particularly mentally reduced. More often than in non-diegetic narration, the identification of FID remains dependent on the features 1 (theme) and 2 (evaluation), but the opposition of NT and CT can be neutralized in them as well.

Let us look at an example from Dostoevskij’s novel *A Raw Youth* for FID in diegetic narration. Arkadij Dolgorukij realizes interior situations in which he had found himself half-a-year earlier. The FID portrays, in its most obvious form (feature 4 \( \Rightarrow \) CT), mainly the emotionally excited exclamations and questions of the internally agitated narrated self:

I was immensely astonished; this piece of news was the most disturbing of all: *something is wrong, something has turned up, something has happened of which I know nothing as yet!* (Dostoevskij, *RY*, 310)

Often in this novel the opposition of the texts is so weakly pronounced in the features that only explicit references of the diegetic narrator to his present attitude assign certain words to the time of action and thus reveal them as FID. And often the point-of-view status of statements of the narrative discourse is indiscernible.

### 2.5.1.1 Basic Type of FID in English, German, and Russian

The basic type of FID in English and German is characterized by a shift in tense compared to the tenses used in FT (feature 4 \( \Rightarrow \) NT):

1. The figural present tense is shifted to the narratorial preterite.
2. The figural preterite is shifted to narratorial pluperfect,
3. The explicit future is shifted to the conditional.

He [Peter Walsh] *would* be back from India one of these days, June or July, she forgot which, for his letters were awfully dull. (*Mrs Dalloway*, 5)

And Father Conmee smiled and saluted. How *did* she do? A fine carriage she *had*. (*Joyce, Ult*, 208)\(^{27}\)

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\(^{27}\) This is not a case of rendering outer speech but of the representation of its perception in the consciousness of the listeners.
But instantly she was annoyed with herself for saying that. Who had said it? not she; she had been trapped into saying something she did not mean. (Woolf, L, 101)

In its ideal form (the presence of all features and no neutralization of oppositions), the basic type of English and German FID has the following distribution of features:

Table 7: Feature matrix for the ideal form of FID in English and German.

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In English and German, FID is thus grammatically not dissociated from the narrative discourse: features 3 (person) and 4 (tense) \( \Rightarrow \) NT. This makes it difficult to identify.

In Russian, however, FID in the basic type contains the tense of CT (feature 4 \( \Rightarrow \) CT). In the context of a narrative in the preterite, the tense of CT, unless it expresses a figural past, has a relatively clear marking effect.

2.5.1.2 Tense Variant of FID in English, German, and Russian

There is a variant of the basic type in all three languages. In English and German, it is characterized by the present tense as the basic tense, more precisely, by the use of tense forms corresponding to the CT (feature 4 \( \Rightarrow \) CT).

An example of English from J. M. Coetzee’s novel The Master of Peters­burg, which is told throughout in the present tense system, is cited below. FID that expresses the presence of the figure lacks any temporal marking here. The whole novel reads like the narrative unfolding of the inner world of its hero, Fëdor Mixajlovič Dostoevskij:

He [Dostoevskij] emerges into a crowded ante-room. How long has he been closeted with Maximov? An hour? Longer? The bench is full, there are people lounging against the walls, people in the corridors too, where the smell of fresh paint is stifling. All talk ceases; eyes turn
on him without sympathy. So many seeking justice, each with a story to tell! (Coetzee, *The Master of Petersburg*, 48)

We find an example of the present tense variant in German in Lion Feuchtwanger’s novel *Der jüdische Krieg* (1932). Josef Ben Matthias (who will later be called Flavius Josephus) is in Rome for the first time, but can already orient himself roughly:

> Er hat viel über Rom gelesen, aber es nützt ihm wenig. Der Brand vor drei Monaten hat die Stadt sehr verändert. Er hat gerade die vier Bezirke im Zentrum zerstört, über dreihundert öffentliche Gebäude, an die sechshundert Paläste und Einfamilienhäuser, mehrere tausend Mietshäuser. Es ist ein Wunder, wie viel diese Römer in der kurzen Zeit schon neu gebaut haben. Er mag sie nicht, die Römer, er hasst sie geradezu, aber das muss er ihnen lassen: Organisationstalent haben sie, sie haben ihre Technik. Technik, er denkt das fremde Wort, denkt es mehrmals, in der fremden Sprache. Er ist nicht dumm, er wird diesen Römern von ihrer Technik etwas abluchsen. (Feuchtwanger, *Der jüdische Krieg*, 7–8)

Interestingly enough, the English translation of this passage uses the preterite instead of the present tense:

> He had read a great deal about Rome, but that did not help him much. The fire three months before had greatly changed the city. It had destroyed the four central districts, including over three hundred public buildings, some six hundred palaces and villas, and several thousand houses. It was astonishing how much these Romans had already rebuilt in the short time since. He could not endure them, these Romans; indeed he hated them, but he was forced to admit that they had a talent for organization; they had their technique. Technique, he mused over the strange word, repeating it several times to himself in the foreign Latin tongue. He was not a dunce; he would watch these Romans and learn something of their technique. (Feuchtwanger, *Josephus*, 4)

In Russian, a widespread variant of FID does not contain the tense of CT, but the narrative preterite (feature 4 ⇒ NT). This variant will be illustrated with an example taken from *The Double*:
Все было так натураль но! И было от чего сокрушиться, быть такую тревогу! (Dostoevskij, PSS, I, 156; italics are mine – W.Sch.)

It was all so natural! And what cause was there to lament, to raise such an alarm? (Dostoevskij, D, 68; italics are mine – W.Sch.)

The preterite in this case (italics) does not describe the past of the character, but is rather the narrative preterite, which describes the character’s present. The matrix of this variant is the following:

Table 8: Feature matrix for the NT tense variant of FID in Russian.

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In this variant, FID moves closer to the NT and thus becomes more difficult to identify. Decisively the easiest means of identifying FID is the difference between the general narrative tense and the tense expressing the character’s present.

Regardless of the use of grammatical tenses, the FID can be stylistically more similar to CT or NT. We then speak of a figural or narratorial FID, respectively. Figurality or narratoriality are not a question of the use of the tense.

2.5.1.3 Free Indirect Monologue

The interior monologue can also be reproduced in the pattern of FID. In that case, we are dealing with a free indirect (interior) monologue (erlebter innerer Monolog; nesobstvenno-prjamoj monolog), the large form of FID (which in McHale figures as little as the direct interior monologue as its own type). The free indirect monologue can be given in either the CT’s tense – that is, in the present tenses: present, perfect and future (feature 4 ⇒ CT) – or in the narrative preterite (feature 4 ⇒ NT). Independent of the tense a figural and a narratorial variant are to be distinguished.

The figural variant is to be found again in The Double. After the first encounter with the supposed doppelgänger, a trembling Goljadkin sits down
on a curbstone on the sidewalk. While certain statements of the following report undoubtedly stage the stream of consciousness of the hero, others may be attributed to the narrator, or at least they remain ambiguous. The ambiguity of the preterite, which can both denote the hero’s present and be the narrative preterite, contributes quite a bit to the undiscernibility of the attribution.

However, there actually was a cause for such bewilderment. The thing was that this stranger now seemed somehow familiar to him. That would still be nothing. But he recognized, he now almost fully recognized this man. He had seen him often, this man, even used to see him quite recently; but where was it? Was it not yesterday? However, once again this was not the main thing, that Mr Goljadkin had seen him often; and there was almost nothing special about this man – no one’s special attention would have been drawn to this man at first sight. He was just a man like everybody else, a decent one, to be sure, like all decent people, and maybe had some merits, even rather significant ones – in short, he was his own man. (Dostoevskij, D, 48)

A narratorial variant of a free indirect monologue is presented in the following quote, which is taken from an interior monologue of Andrej Bolkonskij in Tolstoj’s War and Peace. This extended interior monologue, which is central to the plot, is conducted first in DD, but then via consciousness report switches to FID and then back to DD. The central part of the monologue, given in the pattern of FID, is introduced by a narratorial representation of thought and gradually shifts to the figural perceptual perspective:

“Yes, tomorrow, tomorrow!” He thought. “Tomorrow maybe everything will be over for me […] Tomorrow maybe – even certainly, I have a presentiment of it – for the first time I’ll finally have to show all I can do.” And he imagined the battle, its loss, the concentration of the fighting at one point, and the bewilderment of all the superiors. And here that happy moment, that Toulon he has so long awaited, finally presents itself to him. He voices his opinion firmly and clearly to Kutuzov and Weyrother, and to the emperors. All are struck by the correctness of his thinking, but no one undertakes to carry it out, and here he takes a regiment, a division, negotiates the condition that no one interfere with his instructions, and leads his division to the decisive
point, and alone wins the victory. [...] “Well, and then?” the other voice says again. “And then, if you’re not wounded, killed, or deceived ten times over – well, then what?” “Well, then . . .” Prince Andrej answers himself, “I don’t know what will happen then, I don’t want to know and I can’t know; but if I want this, want glory, want to be known by people, want to be loved by them, it’s not my fault that I want it, that’s the only thing I want, the only thing I live for.” (Tolstoj, WaP, 264–265)

It is not unusual for free indirect monologues to oscillate between the tenses of the NT and CT, as is the case in the following excerpt from Nikolaj Gogol’s The Overcoat (underlined: NT’s tense; dotted underlining: CT’s tense):

Then Akakij Akakievič saw that it was impossible to get along without a new overcoat, and his spirit sank utterly. How, in fact, was it to be accomplished? Where was the money to come from? He might, to be sure, depend, in part, upon his present at Christmas; but that money had long been doled out and allotted beforehand. He must have some new trousers, and pay a debt of long standing to the shoemaker [...] in a word, all his money must be spent. (Gogol’, O, 88)

2.5.2 Free Indirect Perception

One step further to the narratorial pole is a form that Palmer (2004) in analogy to free indirect discourse calls “free indirect perception” (erlebte Wahrnehmung, nesobstvenno-prjamoe vosprijatie). Bernhard Fehr (1938) called this form “substitionary perception,” Laurel Brinton (1980) “represented perception.” In McHale’s list, this form does not figure as its own type.

In this form, the narrator reproduces the character’s perception without dressing it in the forms of the character’s language. Free indirect perception already exists when only the theme speaks for CT and all other features refer to NT or are neutralized. In this form, however, the valuation often also refers to CT.

Free indirect perception, even if stylistic signs for CT are missing, is often signaled as figural by its embedding in segments of FID. This is the case in the following quote from Mrs Dalloway, where the heroine’s perceptions (italic) are framed (underlined) by her inner speech:
The War was over [...] it was over; thank Heaven – over. It was June. The King and Queen were at the Palace. And everywhere, though it was still so early, there was a beating, a stirring of galloping ponies, tapping of cricket bats; Lords, Ascot, Ranelagh and all the rest of it; wrapped in the soft mesh of the grey-blue morning air, which, as the day wore on, would unwind them, and set down on their lawns and pitches the bouncing ponies, whose forefeet just struck the ground and up they sprung, the whirling young men, and laughing girls in their transparent muslins who, even now, after dancing all night, were taking their absurd woolly dogs for a run, and even now, at this hour, discreet old dowagers were shooting out in their motor cars on errands of mystery; and the shopkeepers were fidgeting in their windows with their paste and diamonds, their lovely old sea-green brooches in eighteenth-century settings to tempt Americans (but one must economize, not buy things rashly for Elizabeth), and she, too, loving it as she did with an absurd and faithful passion, being part of it, since her people were courtiers once in the time of the Georges, she, too, was going that very night to kindle and illuminate; to give her part. (Mrs Dalloway, 7)

One can certainly challenge the delimitation between FID and free indirect perception made here. In the passages marked as perception, valuations emerge that can be assigned to the character, such as absurd woolly dogs or lovely old sea-green brooches. In this way, islands of figural valuation would result in a largely neutral description. But all in all, in the passages of free indirect perception there is only a small expression of figural subjectivity.

Free indirect perception is the basic pattern in The Double, where it is responsible for the narrator’s pseudo-objectivity. It appears everywhere where the narrator reproduces the hallucinatory perception of the doppelgänger by Goljadkin, without coloring the narration with the hero’s means of expression in such a way that would make clear to the reader, just in itself, that the character is acting as a reflector:

Before him again, some twenty paces away, was the black shape of a little man quickly approaching him. This man was hurrying, flurrying, scurrying, the distance was quickly diminishing. [...] The stranger actually stopped some ten paces from Mr Goljadkin, and so that the light of a nearby streetlamp fell full on his whole figure – stopped, turned to Mr Goljadkin, and, with an impatiently preoccupied air, waited for what he would say. (Dostoevskij, D, 47)
Without any conspicuous evaluative or stylistic indicators of figural perception, the narrator represents the doppelgänger as he is perceived or constructed by the pathologically disturbed hero. The apparent objectivity of free indirect perception has the effect that the reader guesses the true nature of the double only gradually, things he initially perceives in terms of romantic fantasy.

Table 9: Feature matrix for the free indirect perception in English, German, and Russian.

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2.5.3 Figurally Colored Narration (FCN)

In prose, widespread since the beginning of the nineteenth century, but neglected in the typologies of speech and thought representation, is the *figurally colored narration* (uneigentliches Erzählen28, nesobstvenno-avtorskoe povest-vovanie29). In the English-speaking world, the “Uncle Charles Principle” has become established, jokingly used by Hugh Kenner (1978) and named after a sentence from Joyce’s *Portrait of the Artist*: “Uncle Charles repaired to the outhouse” (cf. McHale 2014, 819; in his typology of 1978 McHale does not consider the device).

How does FCN differ from FID? FID reproduces the text of a character in the form of NT, with greater or lesser narratorial transformation. FCN is, by contrast, the authentic narration of the narrator, which takes on unmarked evaluations and terms from the characters’ text in varying density. In FID, feature 1 (theme) refers to the CT, but in FCN, by contrast, to the NT.

It is possible to distinguish two modes for the adoption of evaluations and terms from the CT. In the first mode, the figurally colored elements of the narrative text reflect the current contents of the character’s consciousness,

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28 The German term was coined by Johannes Holthusen (1968).
29 In Russian literary studies, the device is well researched, mainly thanks to the works of Natalija Koževnikova (1971; 1977; 1994).
which, as it were, infect the narrator. Following Leo Spitzer (1922b), we will call this technique the “contagion” or “infection” of the narrator’s discourse by the CT. An example is the beginning of Čexov’s tale The Student:

At first the weather was fine and still. The thrushes were calling, and in the swamps close by something alive droned pitifully with a sound like blowing into an empty bottle. A snipe flew by, and the shot aimed at it rang out with a gay, resounding note in the spring air. But when it began to get dark in the forest a cold, penetrating wind blew inappropriately from the east, and everything sank into silence. Needles of ice stretched across the pools, and it felt cheerless, remote, and lonely in the forest. There was a whiff of winter. (Čexov, S, 106)

The first sentences, in which the narrator “sees” and speaks, are, nonetheless, interspersed with what are clearly figural evaluations (emphasized here with italics).

If the figurally colored elements of the narrative discourse do not reflect the current internal situation of the character in a given moment, but rather the evaluations and terms typical of the CT, we can refer to a reproduction of the CT. This technique is in evidence in the opening to Dostoevskij’s tale A Nasty Story:

Once in winter, on a cold and frosty evening – very late evening, rather, it being already the twelfth hour – three extremely distinguished gentlemen were sitting in a comfortable, even sumptuously appointed, room inside a handsome two-story house on Petersburg Island and were occupied in weighty and superlative talk on an extremely remarkable topic. All three gentlemen were officials of the rank of general. They were seated around a small table, each in a handsome upholstered chair, and during pauses in the conversation they comfortably sipped champagne. (Quotation according to Vološinov [Baxtin] 1929; tr. 1986, 135; his italics)

The italicized words denote evaluations that stem from the collected generals’ axiology and way of thinking, despite the fact that they could not be considered the current contents of the characters’ consciousnesses. The quotation illustrates the infection of the narrative discourse with the text of the characters. The epithets obviously correspond to the evaluative point of view
of the gentlemen depicted. It is not a single consciousness that is evoked by the epithets, but a collective state of mind and group mentality, which could be described by Alan Palmer’s (2010; 2011a) term “social mind.”

Both forms of FCN, infection as well as reproduction, must be distinguished from quoted figural designation, which is separated from the narrative discourse by means of graphic indicators.

2.6 Six Patterns of Explicit Representation of Consciousness

The six patterns of the explicit representation of consciousness are compiled in the following table:

A. Marked representation of consciousness

1. Direct interior discourse, direct interior monologue, quoted figural designation
2. Indirect and autonomous indirect representation of perception, thought, and emotion
3. Consciousness report

B. Covert representation of consciousness

4. Free indirect discourse (FID), free indirect monologue, stream of consciousness (third person)
5. Free indirect perception
6. Figurally colored narration (FCN):
   (1) contagion
   (2) reproduction

The six patterns are encountered with varying frequency in the national literatures and their epochs. Above all, the three patterns of covert representation of consciousness have been used systematically only since the literature at the end of the eighteenth century and reached their peak in the European literatures of realism (Flaubert, Tolstoj, Dostoevskij) and in the prose of modernity (Joyce, Woolf). The oldest of them is undoubtedly FID, which is systematically used for the first time in Jane Austen’s novels. All attempts (e. g.,
by Verschoor in 1959) to prove FID in medieval texts (in this case in old French literature) should be taken with caution. Either the concept of the pattern is too ambiguous (cf. Ullman’s [1960] criticism of Verschoor), or the corresponding passages can be interpreted in different ways (cf. Steinberg 1971, 55).

The Middle High German epic depicts the thinking and feeling of the heroes in partly extended direct interior monologues, as will be shown below in Parzival and Tristan, but FID cannot be proven in it. For the Old French epic, Gert Hübner (2003, 149–151; 2010, 139) diagnoses the presence of FID, the style indirect libre, in Chrétiens de Troyes’ Yvain ou Le Chevalier au lion (about 1177–1181; see Woledge 1988, 158). Hübner shows how Hartmann von Aue reproduces the representation of consciousness in his Iwein (between 1190 and 1205) in ID, which in Chrétien’s Yvain is designed in style indirect libre. This proves on the one hand that Hartmann understood the corresponding passages as representation of consciousness, and on the other that he himself did not have the means of FID at his disposal.

2.7 The Ambiguity of Text Interference

The ambiguity of text interference has been described since the beginning of the exploration of FID. The early German descriptions of the process as “veiled discourse” (verschleierte Rede, Kalepky 1899; 1913), “disguised discourse” (verkleidete Rede, Kalepky 1928), “deputy representation” (stellvertretende Darstellung, Låftman 1929) and its being likened to “hide-and-seek, which the narrator plays” (Versteckspiel, das der Erzähler treibt, Walzel [1924] 1926, 221) point to its ambiguity.

The forms of text interference are affected by this ambiguity to varying degrees. In the marked types there is of course no “concealment” of the presence of the CT. In the forms of indirect representation, however, the concrete portion of the CT may appear ambiguous. Here the reader must decide which axiological accents and stylistic tints NT and CT are to be assigned to. In the types of FID in which the tense points to CT, the identification of CT is facilitated by the difference to the narrative preterite. However, if the tense feature trait refers to NT, it may be difficult to identify the presence of the CT based on the tense feature in both the present and preterite contexts. An
aggravation of the assignment arises in both types of FID if the opposition of NT and CT is neutralized in further features besides the tense. Then FID can become indistinguishable from NT. The least clearly identifiable is the figurally colored narration. In many texts containing this device, it proves to be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to separate the shares of CT and NT in the interferences. Their fusion, however, facilitates the task of reproducing the heroes’ internal processes. The ambiguity of the constantly changing text structure corresponds to the ambiguity of the soul life to be presented. Where direct and indirect representation inappropriately fix the difficult to determine, not yet articulated soul movements, the ambiguity of the presence of the CT in the fluctuating narrative discourse forms an ideal medium for depicting the vague and unclear movements of consciousness.

Dostoevskij’s Double is a radical figural representation of consciousness without narratorial correction. For his readers accustomed to Romantic doppelgänger figures this meant a strong challenge. The entire story about the alleged “twin” and “usurper” is told from the point of view of a hero who falls into madness. Reality and chimera become blurred. Text interference occurs here in all its forms, and its ambiguity has been so consistently and carefully cultivated by the author that the contemporaries did not identify the underlying process, the systematic interference of NT and CT, and did not recognize the emergence of the doppelgänger from the hero’s consciousness. This led in criticism circles to a strong rejection of the work (for details cf. Schmid 1973, 92–100).

Conservative critics complained above all about the “annoying and boring repetition and paraphrasing of one and the same thought, one and the same words that the author particularly liked.”30 One did not recognize in the incriminated phrases the CT and the pathological urge of the hero to constant repetition.

Symptomatic of the progressive criticism of the time is the verdict of the then literary pope, Vissarion Belinskij:

The author tells the adventures of his hero in his own name, but entirely in the hero’s language and terms. On the one hand, this shows the abundance of humor in his talent, the tremendous ability to put himself, so to

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30 L. V. Brant in the conservative daily newspaper Severnaja pčela (28.2.1846, cited in Dostoevskij, PSS, I, 490).
speak, into the skin of another, completely alien being. But on the other hand, this has made many of the circumstances in the novel unclear. For example, every reader who does not understand or guess that Goljadkin senior in his confused imagination has written the alleged letters of Vaxrameev and Mr Goljadkin junior to himself is completely right [...] And not every reader will immediately guess Goljadkin’s insanity.31

Belinskij here describes nothing other than the covert representation of consciousness, which keeps the reader in uncertainty about what is actually happening. The indeterminacy of the action caused by the figural perspective and the resulting necessity of active reconstruction could not be appreciated by the critic as an aesthetic value.

In French literature, Gustave Flaubert played a role analogous to Dostoevskij’s. His Madame Bovary (1857) – through the figural presentation of the sinful thoughts of the adulteress, which was still unusual at that time – directed the moral indignation of contemporaries against the author, who allegedly spoke in his own name, and triggered a court case for violation of morality (cf. LaCapra 1982).

The ambiguity of the text interference can be removed if the covert representation of consciousness is introduced by a marked form or if it stands in the vicinity of segments that can be clearly identified as figurally perspectivized.

We observe the transition from an indirect representation to FID in the following excerpt from Goethe’s novel The Elective Affinities. The inquit-formula “Charlotte felt, how...” serves as a signal for the figural allocation of the following (here italicized) sentences:

So some time passed, and Charlotte felt how much house and park, lakes, rock and tree groups only renewed sad sensations daily in them both. The need to change the place was all too clear, how it should happen, not so easy to decide.

Should the two women stay together? (Goethe, 182)

The paragraph between the last two sentences, of course, admits the possibility of a change of instance. The question of the two women staying together could well be posed by the subjective narrator.

In Jane Austen’s *Pride and Prejudice*, FID (italic) is often embedded in indirect representation (underlined) or consciousness report (double underlined).

Elizabeth said no more – but her mind could not acquiesce. *The possibility of meeting Mr. Darcy, while viewing the place, instantly occurred. It would be dreadful!* She blushed at the very idea, and thought it would be better to speak openly to her aunt than to run such a risk. *But against this, there were objections; and she finally resolved that it could be the last resource, if her private enquiries as to the absence of the family were unfavourably answered.* (Austen, *Pride and Prejudice*, 163)

Such embedding not only makes it easier to recognize the presence of the CT, but also leads to the impression that we are reading and moving in a figural sphere that is only slightly modulated in the voice.

### 2.8 Indicative and Symbolic Representation of Consciousness

In addition to the devices of explicit representation of consciousness, the characters’ mental states can also be expressed implicitly, by indicative and symbolic means. These are the means which form the sole basis of the representation of consciousness in epochs, genres or poetics which do not know any explicit representation of consciousness.

The most important indicative sign is the characters’ speaking and behavior which, assuming plausible motivation, enables certain conclusions to be drawn about their state of consciousness. The category that Monika Fludernik (2011, 75) calls “descriptions of gestures and other behaviors indicative of emotional states” also belongs to the indicative signs. However, facial expressions, gestures and physical reactions such as a fit of raving madness or fainting express a state of consciousness only in general terms, referring only to the fact of an inner shock, mental pain, etc. The competences

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32 In this context, a letter from Lev Tolstoj is revealing: “For me, the main thing is the life of the soul that expresses itself in scenes” (letter to Čertkov of 5 May 1899).
of the “theory of mind” or “mind reading” brought into play by the cognitivists do not allow, if the context is not quite clear, any information about the specific content of emotional movement.

Some means of indicative and symbolic representation are specific to film and cannot be used in literature. Music is one of them. The protagonist’s mood in the film is often expressed symbolically by certain mood qualities of the music. A means of representing consciousness in the film is also the mood quality of certain views of the outside world. When an idyllic landscape is perceived through the eyes of a protagonist, its harmonious quality can be interpreted as an index of the viewer’s state of mind. On the other hand, images of chaotic outer worlds or hectic movement can indicate or symbolize corresponding inharmonious inner states of the characters (a director can of course also operate with the contrast between the mood qualities of the outer world and the inner world). One can speak of indicative representation if the character focuses on views of the outside world that correspond to his or her inner state, or of symbolic representation if the character does not actively perceive and focus. All means of implicit representation, whether symbolic or indicative, are of course dependent on interpretation by the viewer.

Indicative and symbolic representation of consciousness is, however, also possible in literature. Since Jane Austen’s novels of consciousness – especially her later novels, such as *Persuasion* (cf. Litz 1965, 150–153) – nature, perceived through a figural medium, has served as an indicator of the state of the character’s consciousness and also as a trigger for new mental states.

In Russian realism, the indicative and symbolic function of what is perceived by characters – and that is to say, what is selected, cut out and focused from continuous reality – is systematically used for the representation of states of consciousness. Let us look at two examples from Tolstoj’s *Anna Karenina*. When Konstantin Levin walks through the empty streets of Moscow early in the morning before his visit to Kitty’s parents, whom he wants to ask for their daughter’s hand, he sees things “he afterwards never saw again”:

He was especially moved by children going to school, the grey-blue pigeons that flew down from the roof to the pavement, and the white roll sprinkled with flour that some invisible hand had set out. These rolls, the pigeons and the two boys were unearthly beings. All this
happened at the same time: a boy ran up to a pigeon and, smiling, looked at Levin; the pigeon flapped its wings and fluttered off, sparkling in the sun amidst the air trembling with snowdust, while the smell of baked bread wafted from the window as the rolls appeared in it. (Tolstoj, AK, 403)

Schoolchildren, doves and bread form a paradigm associated with an affirmation of life and reflects Levin’s expectation of future happiness in marriage.

Anna’s perceptions on her way to the station – where, as she does not yet know, she will throw herself under the train – are quite different:

Glancing in the direction in which Pétr had just turned, she saw a half-dead-drunk factory worker, with a lolling head being taken somewhere by a policeman. [...] “This one wants to astonish everybody and is very pleased with himself,” she thought, looking at a red-cheeked sales clerk riding a rented horse. [...] I don’t know these streets at all. Some sort of hills, and houses, houses. . . And in the houses people, people. . . So many, no end of them, and they all hate each other. [...] Ah, a beggar woman with a child. She thinks she’s to be pitied. Aren’t we all thrown into the world only in order to hate each other and so to torment ourselves and others.” (Tolstoj, AK, 762–764)

Anna’s perceptions are faded into an extended direct interior monologue, so that a change of perception and conclusion of thought occurs. In the interior monologue, the heroine imagines what she desires to be happy (her divorce from Karenin, who leaves her son to her, and her marriage to Vronskij), and finally comes to the conclusion that she cannot imagine a state in which life would not be torture: “But if you see the truth, what can you do?” (Anna Karenina, 766). The negative views of the surrounding reality also accompany Anna’s perceptions at the station. The narratorial report follows the horizon of the heroine in the selection and rating of objects (features 1 [theme], 2 [evaluation] ⇒ CT):

The bell rang, several young men went by, ugly, insolent, and hurried, and at the same time conscious of the impression they produced; Pétr also crossed the room in his livery and gaiters, with a dull, animal face, and came up to her in order to escort her to the train. The noisy men
quieted down when she passed them on the platform, and one whispered something about her to another – something nasty, to be sure. She mounted the high step and sat by herself in a compartment, on a soiled, once white, spring seat. Her bag bounced on the springs and lay still. Pëtr, with a foolish smile, raised his gold-braided cap in a sign of farewell; an insolent conductor slammed the door and latched it. An ugly lady with a bustle (Anna mentally undressed the woman and was horrified at her hideousness), and a little girl laughing unnaturally, ran by under the window. (Tolstoj, AK, 765)

In these passages from Anna Karenina, the selection and evaluation of the perceived people and objects are clearly related to the heroine, functioning as indicative signs of her state of mind.

The narrative entrance from Anton Čeșov’s story The Student quoted above (2.5.3) as an example of figurally colored narration is somewhat different.

At first it is not clear who is the subject of the perceptions and the author of the evaluations (italicized in the quote). The next paragraph introduces Ivan Velikopol’skij, a twenty-two-year-old student of the Spiritual Academy, who on Good Friday (!) on a snipe hunt is disturbed by the evening coolness of spring in his body and consequently comes to negative conclusions about the course of human history. The quoted first paragraph contains indices for an egocentric subject who on the one hand aesthetically perceives the suffering of the creature, but on the other feels insulted in his body sensations by the natural evening coolness in spring (for details: Schmid 1997b; tr. 2014d). But we are not witnesses of the hero’s acts of consciousness, as would be the case in FID or free indirect perception. The whole first paragraph remains clearly in the domain of the narrator.
3 Mental State Changes and Events

3.1 Narrativity, Change of State, and Story

The topic of our investigation is the representation of consciousness in narration. As a defining characteristic of narration, the representation of changes of state is to be assumed. Narration can thus be found in genres and media that traditionally do not belong to the field of narrative literature: drama, poetry, film, dance, music and images. The only condition is that they represent changes in states.

Narrations of any genre and medium tell stories. “Story” – a term used differently in narratology, for which the Dictionary of Narratology by Gerald Prince (1987, 91) distinguishes five meanings – is intended here to denote the content of a narrative as opposed to the text depicting it.

How many changes of state does a story need? The minimum condition of a story is that at least one change of state is represented. Edward Morgan Forster’s famous example of a minimal story is still too extensive. Forster ([1927] 1974, 93) had coined the example The king died and then the queen died. Gérard Genette (1983, 15) undercut Forster by deleting the second part of the example sentence and recognizing the first part as minimal story: The king died.

Three conditions must be met for a change of state to constitute a story:

1. there must be a temporal structure with at least two states, one initial state and one final state (the king is alive – the king is dead);
2. there must be an equivalence of initial and final state – i.e., similarity and contrast of states – (being alive and being dead form a classical equivalence);
3. the two states and the change occurring between them must relate to one and the same subject of action or suffering (in our example this is the poor king).

The change of state and its conditions need not be explicitly described. For a story it is sufficient if the change is implied – for example, by the representation
of two contrasting states or, in pictorial narration, by the representation of a state that presupposes or necessarily entails a certain change.

3.2 Changes of External and Internal State

A state that is changed in a story is to be understood as a set of properties that relate to a character or the world in a particular time of the narrated story. Depending on whether the properties portrayed concern a character’s mind or the world in which the character lives, we are dealing with either an internal or an external state. (A state can be defined by both the inner qualities of the figure and the qualities of the world.)

If a change of state is brought about by a character (agent), we talk about an action. If it is inflicted on a character (patient), it is an incident (Chatman 1978, 32; Prince 1987, 39).

Actions and incidents can also relate to both the outer world and the inside of a figure. Accordingly, we distinguish between internal, or mental, and external state changes. With the rise of the novel of consciousness, which can be dated to the works of Samuel Richardson and Jane Austen, narration focuses more on mental state changes than on those of external action. While in the traditional adventure novel of the Tom Jones (1749) type consciousness at best serves to motivate external actions, in the more recent novel of consciousness it moves into the center of narrative interest. From the beginning of the nineteenth century onwards, the processes depicted in novels of European literature were essentially of a mental nature.

According to Aristotle, recognition is along with peripety the drama-specific form of that more general metabolé that we call the mental change of state. Also, in other genres of narration, the recognition of the figures can mean the turn of the action. In the Greek novel, especially in the type that Mixail Baxtin called the “adventurous examination novel” ([1937/38] 1975, 237), recognition – or non-recognition – plays a not insignificant role. The typical heroes of this genre are young lovers who are separated by external circumstances, who have to endure a series of adventures (among them other characters who put their faithfulness to the test), and who finally meet under circumstances that first make recognition difficult or prevent it, whereupon the action resolves in mutual recognition and unification.
Aleksandr Puškin created a modern contrafact to this arch-sujet in his novella *The Snowstorm* (a.k.a., *The Blizzard*, Russian: *Metelʹ*, 1831). In the thunderous snowstorm, the hussar Burmin meets a bride-to-be in a village chapel, whose groom has been delayed in spite of, or rather because of the meticulously planned measures for a secret wedding. After Burmin has become aware of the pretty girl, he gives the priest the signal for the wedding ceremony and is married to the unknown bride; however, immediately after the nuptials are performed, the bride faints, and Burmin sets off again into the snowstorm. Years later the spouses finally meet again but without recognizing each other, and they fall in love. How big is the surprise for both, then, when they, about to hint to the other at a secret reason why their love can never end in matrimony, realize that they are already husband and wife.

In verbal narration, however, recognition is less common than other mental state changes, namely gradual understanding, enlightenment and sudden clear vision. In Russian literary studies, this mental movement, which was given a paradigmatic character by the great realists Lev Tolstoj and Fëdor Dostoevskij, is called *prozrenie* (“sudden comprehension”). All these processes accord with Aristotle’s above-mentioned definition of recognition: they form a “reversal from ignorance to knowledge.”

However, this reversal is not limited to cognitive content. The change of knowledge can be accompanied by a reassessment of persons, actions and facts. For its part, the reassessment can be associated with a change of emotional states and with the acceptance of new moral or ethical norms.

Further dimensions of the inner world may be affected. In addition, mental states are often related to areas that border on the cognitive, axiological and emotional dimensions and are difficult to separate from them but must nevertheless be regarded as independent areas. These include intentions, motivations, hopes, and fears. The attribute *mental* is intended to denote all facets of an inner state – cognitive and emotional, intentional and involuntary, conscious and unconscious.34

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33 *Prozrenie* is according to the four-volume Russian language dictionary (*Slovarʹ russkogo jazyka v 4-x tomax, Moskva 1981*) 1. the becoming seeing, 2. the ability to penetrate into the essence of a thing (the latter meaning is illustrated by an example from Tolstoj’s *War and Peace*).

34 For the scope of the term *mind* see the chapter “The Whole Mind” in Palmer (2004, 87–129). In this chapter, Palmer refers to various theories on the components of consciousness and refers above all to Damasio 2000.
In recent narratological discussion, in which the suggestions of Jurij Lotman, the head of the Moscow Tartu School, are processed, special attention is paid to one type of change of state in particular: the event. An event (German: Ereignis, French: événement, Russian: sobytie) is in the usage of all four languages a special, unusual incident. Lotman (1970, 282; tr. 1977, 233) defines the event in categories of space and semantic fields. His basic definition is: “An event in the text is the shifting of a persona across the borders of a semantic field.” The crossed boundary can – so Lotman is to be understood – be a topographical one, but also a pragmatic, or an ethical, or a psychological or a cognitive one. For Lotman, the normative relevance of the boundary is decisive: “An event always involves the violation of some prohibition” (Lotman 1970, 286; tr. 1977, 236).

In narratology today, the concept of the event is somewhat broader than in Lotman. An event is not necessarily the violation of a norm. It is not necessary to deviate from what is lawful in a given narrative world, the execution of which maintains the order of that world. The border need not mean a prohibition. An event can also consist of a figure making a new discovery, revising a wrong understanding, confessing new values, undergoing a metanoia, or changing his or her way of life. In the current discussion, event is understood as a change in state worth telling.

In the understanding of current narratology, events are characterized by the property of tellability. This term does not denote the possibility of telling a story – as word formation might suggest – but its worthiness to be told. The somewhat misleading term was coined by William Labov (1972) for the analysis of everyday narratives and has been widely used in narratology (cf. Ryan 2005; Baroni 2009). Even in the smallest narrative a vast number of changes are reported, and among these some quite trivial ones. In order to avoid the dreaded reader reaction “So what?”, every narrator who is interested in the attention of his recipients will try to lend his story tellability.

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35 In Biblical Greek metanoia is a fundamental change of mind or a spiritual conversion. Applied to the secular realm, the term can be used to describe any profound intellectual or ideological conversion.

The concept of tellability is in most cases related to the diegesis, the narrated story.\(^3^7\) The tellability of a story is based neither on the abundance of changes of state nor on the quality of their presentation, such as a beautiful or interesting style or an unusual composition. Even the narrator’s assertions that he has something extraordinary to report cannot make his story worth telling alone (Prince 2008, 24). Decisive for the diegetic tellability of a story is the unusual nature of a change of state presented in it.

The concept of tellability can also be related to exegesis – for example, in a special way in which a narrator presents his story.\(^3^8\) Thus, in skaz narratives (Schmid 2014b), tellability can be based less on the story that is being told than on its presentation by an unprofessional narrator, a man from the people.

In stories with a high level of eventfulness, the latter will usually coincide with diegetic tellability. In low eventfulness stories, diegetic tellability may be based on the absence of an event that the reader may have expected. The non-fulfilment of an expectation, however, is not itself an event. Expected but not occurring events are the phenomenon in which eventfulness and tellability clearly diverge.

### 3.4 Conditions of the Event

Every event is a change of state, but not every change of state is perceived as an event. For a change of state to be perceived as an event, it must meet certain conditions. For these conditions we have to consider certain differences between external and internal events.

#### 3.4.1 Reality

The first basic condition for an event is the reality of change (reality, of course, within the framework of the fictive world). Desired, imagined or

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\(^{37}\) Under diegesis (from Greek διήγησις ‘narrative’) the narrated story is understood. The adjective diegetic means ‘belonging to the narrated story.’ In narratology diegesis has a different meaning than in ancient rhetoric. In Platon (Republic III, 392d) the term refers to the “pure narrative of the poet” as opposed to the “imitation” (mimesis) of the hero’s speech.

\(^{38}\) The term exegesis (from Greek ἔξηγησις ‘argument,’ ‘explanation’) refers to the level of narration and the commentaries, explanations, reflections and metanarrative remarks of the narrator accompanying the telling of a story.
dreamed-of changes do not form an event according to this premise. However, the emergence of desires, imaginations or dreams can indicate a change in a figure and be perceived as a mental event, even if the content of these desires, imaginations or dreams is completely illusory.

In the post-realistic narration of Anton Čexov, tellability often is based precisely on the unrealizability of illusionary changes. The longing for a different, better life permeates many of Čexovs’s heroes, but in most cases the boundary is only crossed in the daydream, in the illusion, and the change remains in the mode of the optative.

Hardly any other narrative demonstrates the lack of reality as clearly as Čexov’s story In the Cart (a.k.a., The Schoolmistress, Russian: Na podvode, 1897). The schoolmistress, who returns with her coachman in her one-horse carriage from the city to her village on the impassable road, visualizes her troublesome, joyless, lonely existence. Only something “vague, blurred, dream-like” (Čexov, Sel. stories, 343) has remained in her memory of life before she became a teacher. Both of her parents died early. Her brother has not answered her letters for a long time. Only a photograph of her mother has been preserved from her former things, but the picture has become cloudy from the moisture in the school building, and now nothing can be seen of the person except the hair and the brows. The way of the returnees is blocked by the barrier at the railway crossing shortly before their arrival to their village. The heroine stands by the crossing and waits until the train has passed. In a first-class window, she notices a lady in whom she recognizes her mother. And for the first time in the thirteen years of her existence as a teacher she brings to mind with astonishing clarity her mother, her father, her brother, the Moscow apartment, all the objects down to the last detail; she hears piano playing, her father’s voice, and she has the feeling that, as then, she is young and beautiful and sits in the bright, warm room in the circle of her loved ones. Meanwhile, the handsome, but somewhat run-down, single neighbor of the manor, who has long occupied the imagination of the lonely heroine has approached the railway barrier in his four-in-hand carriage. At his sight, the schoolmistress feels a happiness never experienced before. And it seems to her that her father and mother never died, and she never became a teacher herself, as if everything had been a long, difficult, strange dream, and as if she had woken up now. From this idea she is recalled into her joyless reality by the harsh call of the coachman, “Get in, miss” (350). In the story, two events emerge: the regaining of the past and thus of a new sense of self and
the entry into a new happy life at the neighbor’s side. Both changes, however, prove to be illusions, evoked by the phantasm of the mother passing by in the train. The new self-esteem is no more factual than the connection with the neighbor. Yes, even the reality content of the memory must be doubted. With the coachman’s call “suddenly it all vanished” (350). The heroine has crossed two lines that could be symbolically understood – she has crossed the river and passed the railway crossing – but the real action is reduced to that non-eventful change that is indicated by the difference between the first and the last sentence of the narrative: at half past eight in the morning “they left town” (343), and finally they arrived: “Well, here we are” (350).

Nevertheless, the making of illusionary plans can be an expression of an eventful mental change in the characters. This becomes clear in Čexov’s play The Three Sisters (Tri sestry, 1900). The heroines, who lead unsatisfactory lives in the Russian province, each wish for a radical change in their lives. This is attested by their repeated exclamation “To Moscow, to Moscow!” This is an expression of the longing for a different life, the life that the three sisters believed to have led in the past, until the late father and his family had to leave the city eleven years ago for professional reasons. The tellability of the play lies in the representation of the impossibility of crossing the existential and not least characterological boundaries. Although none of the three sisters is able to realize the desired external event, the leaving of the province and the life in Moscow, the emergence of the desire for change and the development of the longing for another life are quite real and factual changes of state.

3.4.2 Resultativity

The second basic condition for an event is resultativity, a correlative of reality. A change of state that is to be regarded as an external event must have come to a conclusion in the narrative world. This means that changes that form an external event are not inchoative (not only begun), are not conative (not merely attempted), and are not durative (not only in the state of execution) but are resultative (reach a certain conclusion in the respective narrative world of the text).

For an internal event, this conclusion need not manifest itself in concrete outer actions. For a mental event, it is sufficient that a revision of earlier views takes place or a deeper insight into certain circumstances is gained. Already the mere attempt or beginning of an external action can indicate an inner change of
the figure, a new conception or conviction, even if the corresponding action itself is not carried out at all. But in any case, the mental processes must have reached a certain result so that an event comes about. A fleeting wish, an ephemeral imagining or a planning that grows out of the moment, from which no decision follows, can hardly be regarded as a mental event.

Many mental events in Čexov’s stories lack resultativity. A prozrenie, a “sudden clear vision” prepares itself, but it remains uncertain whether it really comes to a result. This uncertainty is often due to the fact that the story ends earlier than the event. An example of a text lacking resultativity is The Teacher of Literature (Učitel’ slovesnosti, 1894), the narrative that critics accused of premature abandonment (while Lev Tolstoj saw in it an example of Čexov’s artistic capacity for prozrenie; see the summary of the first reception in Čexov, PSS, VIII, 510–512). Nikitin, the teacher of literature, has happily fulfilled the dream of a connection with his beloved Maša Šelestova, and he now leads the extremely comfortable life of a bourgeois (Philistines [Obyvateli] was the name of the story when its first part appeared in 1889). Nikitin must learn, however, that his successful courtship was not at all the surprising event he thought it was, but a natural consequence of his regular visits to the house of Šelestovs. This insight triggers in him the desire to leave the tiny world of his marital bliss, in which he leads such a peaceful and sweet life, and to set off into a wholly different world “where he himself could work in a factory somewhere or in a big workshop, speak out publicly, write something, publish, cause a commotion, wear himself out, suffer . . .” (Čexov, Sel. Stories, 313). But when Nikitin then entrusts his diary, at the end of the story, with the complaint about the narrow-mindedness and vulgarity that surrounds him, telling himself: “I’ve got to get out of here! I’ve got to get away this very day, or else I will lose my mind!” (315), it remains open whether his whole prozrenie does not exhaust itself in this diary entry.

3.5 Criteria for Eventfulness

The two basic conditions mentioned for an event – reality and resultativity – are fulfilled by countless changes of state in narrations. These two conditions can also be satisfied by changes that are perceived as quite trivial in a narrative world. When a figure raises a hand, the change in state is both real and
resultant. As a rule, this change will remain without major consequences. In certain contexts, however, the lifting of a hand can become very important. Think of a historical novel about ancient Rome. In the Circus Maximus, the smallest movement of the emperor’s hand can decide human life.

The same problem arises for mental state changes. How many fleeting feelings, momentary desires and emotional fluctuations may be represented for the character of a novel! They are all changes of mental state, but by no means will they all be accorded the status of events. Many of them essentially serve the constitution of the figure, thus fulfilling a descriptive function, without which even the most concise narration cannot do. Even with highly selective narrators – such as Aleksandr Puškin, Anton Čexov or Isaak Babel in Russian literature, who describe the interior of their characters very sparingly and in their stories refrain from explicating certain significant processes of consciousness – not every change of mental state mentioned in the narrative text will acquire great narrative significance.

The above leads us to conclude that a yes-no decision cannot be taken on the existence of an event. Rather, we must proceed from a gradation-capable quality, which we call “eventfulness.” Events can be more or less eventful, and this property can be different in its parameters.

In earlier publications (e.g., Schmid 2010, 8–12) I have distinguished five requirements that changes of state must more-or-less fulfill if they are to be considered events. In their interaction, these criteria determine the degree of eventfulness of a change of state. It must now be examined to what extent these criteria, which were formulated primarily for external events, can also characterize mental events.

### 3.5.1 Relevance

The first criterion for eventfulness is the relevance of the change of state. Trivial, everyday changes do not constitute an event. In the category of relevance, however, the question immediately arises, relevant for whom? A distinction must be made between the significance that a change has for the fictive instances – i.e., figures and narrators of a story – and the relevance for the story that the author and the real reader attribute to this change.

For the levels of the depicted fictive world, a distinction must be made between diegesis and exegesis – i.e., the levels on which either the characters (including a narrated self) or the narrator (or a narrating self) judge the
meaning of a change. At the level of real communications between author and reader, there will be further relevance judgments that may contradict those that are made by the fictive instances.

However, the relevance judgements are not only level-specific, but also instance-related. On each of the distinguishable levels, a divergence between the level-specific instances is conceivable: between the figures, between the narrator and the recipient he assumes, and between the (abstract) author and the real reader.

In the latter two instances, dissent in the assessment of change is not uncommon in the case of texts that are distant in time or culture. Jurij Lotman (1970, 285–286; tr. 1977, 236) uses examples from the Old Russian Nestor Chronicle to draw attention to the fact that in medieval Old Russian chivalry texts the death of the hero is by no means always an event, but only if it is linked with glory or ignominy. Later readers who set the norms of their own context may well misjudge the relevance of an event in the time the work was written.

Lotman’s recourse to medieval texts is an indication of the context-bound nature of relevance concepts. Which change of state is perceived as an event depends on the “general world picture” (Lotman 1970, 284; tr. 1977, 235).

The concept of relevance is therefore relative: level-specific, instance-related and context-sensitive. This applies in particular to the relevance of mental state changes. In statu nascendi, a subject will hardly give an account of a change of mood, a change of meaning or an insight. Momentary mental changes, which may initially seem highly relevant to the character, can become meaningless in the next moment. And these changes in state only become manifest to the outside world for the remaining figures of a narrative world when the character talks or writes about them or when they lead to unmistakable changes in his or her behavior. Both with explicit formulation and with implicit expression, the relevance of mental state changes cannot be assessed by the inhabitants of the respective narrative world in all cases, nor can they be assessed equally.

The situation is somewhat different with the narrator and with the author. The two creative instances already show a preference for certain thematic motifs in the selection of the characters’ acts of consciousness, thus assigning them relevance for the story. As long as an author makes his selection carefully (or – in terms of reception aesthetics – as soon as the selection
is experienced by the reader in this way), a certain relevance for the narrated story can be assumed in the selected mental state changes of the characters.

Narrators (and authors behind them) can signal the relevance of certain mental changes in a special way beyond mere selection, apart from the fact that narrators can of course also explicitly point to their meaning. One way of indicative signalling is to depict certain extracts of the activity of consciousness in particularly highlighted forms of representation.

In Tolstoj’s *War and Peace*, the character’s consciousness is essentially reproduced with narratorial design. The dominant reproduction patterns are the indirect representation of thoughts and perceptions and the consciousness report. In this context, the direct interior monologue is especially marked. In comparison to the dominant narratorial – indeed, sometimes even unmistakably authorial – character of the narrative in this novel, direct interior monologue is kept relatively figural.

The following situation from *War and Peace* is an example for the marking of relevance through the use of the figurally structured direct interior monologue. Here’s the situation: Prince Andrej Bolkonskij has been wounded in the Battle of Austerlitz. He is lying on the battlefield and is amicably addressed by Napoleon, who looks at the Russian dead. Bolkonskij does not answer him. The emperor turns away without waiting for an answer. The soldiers who carried Bolkonskij and took the golden icon that Princess Mar’ja Bolkonskaja had hung around her brother’s neck, hurry to return it to him when they see how friendly the emperor treats the prisoner:

“It would be good,” thought Prince Andrej, looking at [the] icon which his sister had hung on him with such feeling and reverence, “it would be good if everything was as clear and simple as it seems to Princes Mar’ja. How good it would be to know where to look for help in this life and what to expect after it, there, beyond the grave! How happy and calm I’d be, if I could say now: Lord, have mercy on me!... But to whom shall I say it? Either it is a indefinable, unfathomable power, which I not only cannot address, but which I cannot express in words – the great all or nothing,” he said to himself, “or it is that God whom Princess Mar’ja has sewn in here in this amulet? Nothing, nothing is certain, except the insignificance of everything I can comprehend and the grandeur of something incomprehensible but most important!” (Tolstoj, *WaP*, 293)
The pattern of the direct interior monologue, which is presented here in a relatively figural variant, can be regarded as a characteristic for the relevance of the mental motifs depicted in the widely narratorial context.

Thomas Mann’s *Magic Mountain* (*Der Zauberberg*, 1924) is another example of marking the relevance of a mental state change for the narrated story. During his ski trip in the high mountains, Hans Castorp is caught in a life-threatening snowstorm, from which he tries to protect himself behind a barn. Exhausted, he falls asleep after a sip of port wine and sees mythical images of the highest harmony and ghastly scenes of atavistic man-eating in his dream. Half awakened from the dream, Castorp indulges in reflections in which he not only relativizes the teachings of his mentors Settembrini and Naphta, but also overcomes his sympathy with illness and death. The conclusion of his metanoia is formulated in a sentence that is italicized in the text, the only one in the entire novel: “*For the sake of goodness and love, man should not grant death dominion over his thoughts*” (Mann, *Werke*, III, 686). The mental event, however, has no consequences for the hero. Although he, fully awakened, comes to the conclusion “My dream has given me that I know it forever” (III, 686), he understands on the same evening at the dinner in the “highly civilized atmosphere of the Berghof” “[... ] no longer” (III, 688). In his further Berghof existence he shows no traces of the knowledge gained. In the novel’s final scene we see Castorp as a soldier on the western front, where the dream, as the narrator apparently staggering exclaims, has led the novel. While Castorp has struggled to escape the snowstorm into which he voluntarily entered for the sake of the challenge, the final war picture of the novel, which shows some equivalences with the snow scene, depicts the one who has overcome the theoretical fascination of death in the storm of guns, which he will hardly survive. The call to life in italics is undoubtedly an expression of an essential mental change, but it has far fewer consequences for the hero than, in a metaleptic leap, for the author, who thereby announces his (temporary, until *Doctor Faustus*) renunciation of the glorifying association of art and illness, spirit and death.

### 3.5.2 Unpredictability

The second criterion for eventfulness of changes in the external state is unpredictability. Predictable changes have less eventfulness than surprising ones. In principle, this also applies to mental changes.
Jane Austen’s *Pride and Prejudice* is an example of high unpredictability of mental state changes. After Elizabeth Bennet inadvertently overhears Mr Darcy speaking about her derogatorily (“She is tolerable; but not handsome enough to tempt me” *Pride and Prejudice*, 7), she does not expect that her critic will twice ask for her hand, nor especially that she will gleefully accept his second proposal. Neither does Darcy expect himself to disregard the differences in status between his family and hers. For the protagonists of the plot, the ending of the story is therefore highly unpredictable. The narrator, of course, signals that Darcy soon begins to reconsider his indifference to Elizabeth (see above, the reports on Elizabeth’s and Darcy’s states of consciousness). Therefore, the reader is less surprised by the twist in the emotions of the protagonists than are the protagonists themselves. The reader trained in the literature of sensibility – who according to Richardson’s *Pamela, or Virtue Rewarded*, knows about the possible reversals of the heart’s inclination – will not only hold Darcy’s initial aversion and classism at arm’s length, but will also have before his eyes the course of literary ascension stories in which love overcomes great differences in status. The characters’ expectations of the course of their lives and the reader’s script formed by literature thus diverge unmistakably.

In this respect, the question of unpredictability, as well as that of relevance, must be posed in a level-specific and instance-related manner. As a rule, the protagonists orient themselves on the doxa, on what is generally regarded as true in their society and on what is generally expected. The reader, with a strong empathy for the protagonists, will orientate himself according to their doxa; however, to the extent that he understands the narrative work as an art form and recognizes the scripts called upon in it, he cannot fail to foresee the romantic bliss of the two protagonists of *Pride and Prejudice*.

For events of any kind an unpredictable change of state in the narrated world can be a quite predictable trait of the genre for the trained reader. This also applies to mental events. But the insight into the inner world of the character affected by the mental change is naturally limited for the other characters.

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39 Greek. δόξα means among other things ‘opinion’, ‘expectation.’ A paradox (παρά τὴν δόξαν) is something that contradicts most people’s expectations. In this sense, mental events can literally be “paradoxical.”
Mental reversals will have at least announced themselves to their subjects generally since a certain time, even if this time cannot be indicated by the subject itself. To the extent that the subject is capable of reflection at all, the change will be less surprising to him- or herself than to the environment for which it manifests later. For this reason, mental events are often less dramatic and at greater temporal scales than are external ones. This is the typical form of novels of personal development.

3.5.3 Consequentiality

The eventfulness of a change of state increases to the extent that the change has consequences. A despair that leads to suicide, as in the case of Anna Karenina or Emma Bovary, is highly eventful. Also the turn from idealistic dreaming to realistic plans for life, as it is characteristic for the German bildungsroman shows high eventfulness in its consequentiality.

The consequences of a rethinking usually do not remain in the mental realm. In The Brothers Karamazov such rethinking creates a conversion that has effects on several characters – effects recognizable externally, such as reformed behavior. Even the alleged atheist Ivan Karamazov shows an approach to new thinking, when he saves the drunken little farmer, whom he despicably pushed into the snow heap, from freezing to death. In his own way, Ivan participates in the chain reaction of conversions that permeates the novel, which is evident from his behavior.

3.5.4 Irreversibility

The eventfulness of a change of state increases to the extent that a reversal to the previous state is unlikely. In the case of rethinking, an insight must be gained that excludes any relapse into earlier ways of thinking. An example of irreversible mental events are the conversions which, in a kind of domino effect emanating from Zosima’s brother Markel, run through the The Brothers Karamazov. None of the figures who develop guilty consciences is likely to return to his godless former self.

The situation is somewhat different with Konstantin Levin in Tolstoj’s Anna Karenina. At the end of the novel Levin believes to have finally recognized the meaning of life and the existence of God. However, in view of the
fact that he went through all sorts of explanations of the world and ideologies and proved to be an extremely mobile figure, the ultimate conclusion of the notorious seeker of meaning is less certain than he himself is inclined to assume and than the author would have readers believe.

3.5.5 Non-Iterativity

The change must not only be irreversible, but also unique. Changes that repeat themselves, even if they do not return to previous states, have little eventfulness.

An example of iterative action is Čexov’s *Sweetheart* (*Dušečka*, literally: ‘little soul’, 1898). The novella consists of a series of love stories. Olja – called “Sweetheart”, an insatiable psyché – loves one after another: “Vanička” Kukin, the owner of the amusement park *Tivoli*; “Vasička” Pustovalov, the administrator of the wood store; “Volodčika” Smirnin, the veterinarian; and finally Smirnin’s son, the high school student Saša. Olja’s love is characterized by complete devotion to her current love object and abandonment of her own world and those of her previous interests. In the repetition, what appeared to be an event at the first marriage, namely the absolute conversion of the values of life to the world of the love object, shows up as a severe mental defect.

Uneventful iterations of mental state changes also characterize the narrated world in many other late works by Čexov. The repetition in Čexov’s last novella, *The Bride* (*Nevesta*, 1903), becomes paradigmatic. The groom Andrej Andreič – whose name indicates iteration, and who, not having to speak, plays the violin endlessly – succumbs to the compulsion to repeat. The bride’s mother, whose name *Antonina* recalls the Roman emperor Marcus Aurelius Antoninus, Čexov’s favorite philosopher (named *Antonin* in Russia), is constantly searching for a doctrine that can explain the world to her. Although she is initially attached to spiritualism and homeopathy, she finally becomes religious, deals with philosophy, and proclaims that much has now become “as clear as day” to her (for more details see below, section 13.5).
3.6 Diegetic and Exegetic Mental Events

Mental events can appear in the narrative on two levels: as diegetic events in the narrated story (diegesis) and as exegetic events on the level of narration and the accompanying commentaries, explanations, reflections and metanarrative remarks of the narrator (exegesis). While the diegetic mental events concern the characters of the narrated world, the exegetic mental events take place in the narrator’s mind.

3.6.1 The Characters as Subjects of Diegetic Mental Events

For a character to experience a mental event, it must meet two conditions. It must have a consciousness and be changeable.

To have a consciousness does not necessarily mean to be a human being. There are countless examples in literature of animal figures or even inanimate objects that have quite developed consciousnesses. The non-human perspective with which these figures illuminate the human world as primary or secondary narrators or as figural reflectors often serves to defamiliarize human concepts and institutions.

The old gelding who, in Lev Tolstoj’s story Strider (Xolstomer, 1866), tells the younger horses in his stable about his painful experiences with humans is a prism of the defamiliarization of the human world and its categories, above all the concept of property. The horse comes to the conclusion that people are not guided by deeds but by words, that the happiest of them is the one who can say the word mine to the greatest number of things, a word whose meaning the horse has understood only after various experiences with people.

An extreme example of a non-human figure with a consciousness capable of change is Mr Square in Edwin A. Abbott’s novella Flatland: A Romance of Many Dimensions (1884). Mr Square, inhabitant of the two-dimensional world, in a dream visits the one-dimensional Lineland, in which the length determines the social position of the inhabitants and whose king is the longest line. In another dream he travels to Pointland, a world without dimensions, whose inhabitant considers himself to be the only existing being and praises himself in the highest tones. Back in his Flatland, Mr Square is visited by a sphere that, after a long effort, can convince him of the existence of a
three-dimensional world. But when the adaptive Mr Square thinks of the possibility of a four-dimensional world, the sphere gets angry. Once returned to Flatland, Mr Square tries to convince his countrymen of the existence of higher dimensions – in vain. The circles, the priests in Flatland, declare him insane and imprison him.

In both cases the diegetic narrator as both narrating and narrated self not only has a consciousness, but is also capable of crossing the boundaries of his semantic field. In other words, the narrator proves to be “mobile” as Jurij Lotman (1970; tr. 1977) would have said.

However, the two conditions mentioned – consciousness and mobility – are not fulfilled by certain figures that are presented as human beings. This is the case in epochs and genres where narratives strongly typify figures, such as in folkloric narratives, in many narratives of medieval and spiritual literature, and in the Commedia dell’arte.

The situation is somewhat different with the figures in the Western European courtly romance. Although the High Medieval epic goes back to strongly typified models of the so-called Matière de Bretagne – i.e., to the legend of all legends, King Arthur and his court – it not only shapes transgressions of the socially and religiously valid norms, but even elevates the border crossers to heroes with strong individuality and developed consciousness. This is most evident in the two great romances of the German Middle Ages, Wolfram’s von Eschenbach Parzival and Gottfried’s von Strassburg Tristan (both between 1200 and 1210).

3.6.2 The Narrator as Subject of Exegetic Events

Exegetic events are usually of a mental nature. They manifest themselves above all in axiological peripeties – i.e., unexpected reevaluations of the action and its protagonists by the narrator or in a sudden understanding of contexts that have only become clear to the narrator through narration.

An example of high exegetic eventfulness is Dostoevskij’s novel A Raw Youth, whose twenty-year-old diegetic narrator Arkadij Dolgorukij develops unmistakably in the course of his narrative. This development crystallizes in the reconciliation with his biological father, for whose image in himself the boy fights desperately.

The development taking place is represented primarily indicatively, by two symptoms. First, Arkadij increasingly distances himself from his idea of
becoming a Rothschild. The boy, neglected by his parents and despised by his classmates because of his illegitimate origins, developed this idea in the Moscow aristocratic pension. In the narrated story, the idea that dominates at the beginning of memories plays an increasingly minor role. In the text of the narrating self, it usually appears in quotation marks, as a quoted figural designation, in which the narrating self proves its ironic distancing from the earlier, narrated ego (examples see above, p. 28–29).

The second symptom is the relationship to the addressee. At the beginning of his narrative, Arkadij has a tense relationship with his reader, whom he imagines to be a critical adult who laughs mockingly at his naivety and above all mocks his idea of becoming a Rothschild. Wherever Arkadij presents his earlier thoughts and actions, his desire to make an impression comes to the fore as a narrative function. The sometimes euphemistic self-evaluations as well as the weighty rhetorical gestures indicate that Arkadij wants to impress and convince the audience of himself and his dignity. Implicitly, Arkadij appeals to the reader to take him, the adolescent, seriously and to acknowledge him as a full-fledged adult. The desire for recognition is clear both in the passages in which Arkadij tries to gloss over his embarrassing behavior and in those in which he abandons all euphemisms and presents himself as a sinister, shy character.

Arkadij imagines a reader who does not adopt the suggested evaluation as his own, looks through Arkadij’s secret intentions and reacts with mocking objections. In addition to the impression function, the narrative is shaped by the narrator’s orientation towards the position of the assumed critical addressee. This orientation leads to the type of statement that Mixail Baxtin (1929) called “a word with a sidelong glance at someone else’s word.”

In the course of the narrative, both the intention to impress the reader and the orientation towards his destructive judgments noticeably diminish. The narrator increasingly renounces his attacks on the addressee, whose critical judgement he has less and less reason to fear. The gradual reconciliation with his father is indicated by his reconciliation with the reader (for details: Schmid 2010, 84–86).
II. Mental Changes in German Courtly Romances
4 Wolfram’s *Parzival*: Overcoming Haughtiness

The story Wolfram von Eschenbach tells in his *Parzival*, after Chrétien de Troyes’s *Li Contes del Graal ou Le roman de Perceval* (around 1190), has two turning points that correspond to the first two parts of the Parzival plot:

1. Parzival’s being cursed at Arthur’s Round Table by the Grail messenger Cundrie and Parzival’s subsequent declaration of war on God,
2. Parzival’s recognition of his *missevare*, his misconduct.

4.1 Being Cursed and Hating God

In the forest wasteland, Parzival is raised and educated by his mother Herzeloyde far from society, without any knowledge of God and the world. After he fortuitously meets knights in the forest, who seemed to him like divine beings in their splendid armor, he decides to sets off for the Arthurian court to become a knight himself. To protect her son from the dangers of knighthood, his anxious mother dresses him to look like a fool so no one will take him seriously. Herzeloyde sends him off with a series of admonitions, but Parzival’s naive, literal observance makes him the cause of other’s misfortune. Arriving at Arthur’s court, Parzival kills the Red Knight Ither to take possession of his armor. Only his uncle Gurnemanz instructs the stupid simpleton in the virtues and techniques of courtly knighthood and warns the inquisitive young man not to ask superfluous questions. After the liberation of the besieged city of Pelrapeire, the now exemplary knight wins the hand of the beautiful Queen Condwiramurs. Parzival then takes leave of his bride to visit his mother, unaware that Herzeloyde dropped dead from heartbreak when he left home. At the Castle of the Grail – on Munsalvæsche – Parzival is hosted by Anfortas, “the fisher king.” Anfortas is fatally ill, and part of the magical remedy is that his guest must inquire about his health, ask the ques-
tion of compassion everyone expects from him. However, Parzival, not un-
derstanding what is required of him, does not do so, heeding instead Gurne-
manz’s instruction not to ask questions. Parzival returns to the Arthurian
court, where he is received with all the honors. He has reached the pinnacle
of knighthood, but the festive gathering of the Round Table is disturbed by
the appearance of the ugly Grail messenger and sorceress, Cundrie. She
curses Parzival, laments his silence at the Castle of the Grail and calls his
presence at the Arthurian court a disgrace. Turning to Parzival she says,

*hêr Parzivâl, wan sagt ir mir
unt bescheidt mich einer mære,
dô der tûrge vischære
saz âne vrûde und âne trôst,
war umb irn niht siufzens hät
erlôst?
er truog iu für den jämers last.
ir vil ungetriuwer gast!
sîn nôt iuch solt erbarmet hân.
(Wolfram 315, 26–616, 330)\(^{40}\)

“Now explain to me, Lord Par-
zival, how it came about that
when the Sorrowful Angler was
sitting there, joyless and de-
spondent, you failed to free him
from his sighs! He made the load
of grief he bore apparent to your
eyes. O heartless guest! You
ought to have had compassion
on his sufferings.”
(Wolfram [Hatto],164–165)\(^{41}\)

Cundrie’s indictment, which is formulated much more sharply in Wolfram’s
text than in Chrétien’s (cf. Nellmann 2013, 618), culminates in the accusation that
Parzival missed his determination and gambled away his father’s legacy:

von Anschouwe iwer vater hiez, Your father took his name from
der iu ander erbe liez Anjou and left you qualities that
denn als ir habt geworben. ill accord with your deeds, for
an prîse ir sí verdorben. (317,13–15) you are dead to honour. (164–165)

The effect of the devastating speech on Parzival is presented in a conscious-
ness report with a narratorial description of the hero’s character:

\(^{40}\) Middle High German text: Wolfram von Eschenbach, *Parzival*. Nach der Ausgabe Karl Lach-
manns, revidiert und kommentiert von Eberhard Nellmann. Übertragen von Dieter Kühn. 2

Cundrie the Sorceress, sour yet proud, has mortified the Waleis. How could the promptings of a brave heart and truly manly breeding help him now? Nevertheless, he has a further resource, a sense of shame that reigns supreme over all his ways. His deeds were free from all that deserves the name of falseness, since a sense of shame is rewarded in the end by esteem and, when all is said and done, is the soul’s crowning glory and a virtue to be practised above all others. (166)

The narrator defends his hero: Parzival has moral feelings (scham). Valsch, the opposite of triuwe, is alien to him.

For Parzival, however, there is no consolation. He responds to the pagan woman Janfuse, who praises his beauty and bravery, with a message about his mental state:

> got lône iu, frouwe, daz ir hie, mir gebt sô güetlichen trôst. ine bin doch trûrens niht erlôst […] ine wil deheiner vröude jehn, ine müeze alrêrst den grâl gesehn, diu wîle sî kurz oder lanc. (329, 18, 25–27)  

> May God reward you, madam, for your consoling me so kindly. Yet I am not released from doleful feelings […] I shall never own myself happy, till I have seen the Grail, whether the time be short or long. (171)

Before the Arthurian Round Table, he draws a conclusion from his failure: if the criticism of the world meets him, then the teachings he followed must be imperfect. With regret over the suffering at Anfortas, whom he could have helped, Parzival leaves King Arthur’s Court. When he says goodbye to Gawan, he becomes emotional:
‘Alas, what is God?’ asked the Waleis. ‘Were He all-powerful — were God active in His almightiness — he would not have brought us to such shame! Ever since I knew of Grace I have been His humble servant. But now I will quit His service! If He knows anger I will shoulder it.’ (172)

In this declaration of war, Parzival denounces God as though renouncing his allegiance to an untrustworthy feudal lord, articulating his relationship to God in the categories of courtly chivalry. Parzival’s decisive rejection of God is one of Wolfram’s most significant revisions of Chrétien (Bumke 1991, 83; Nellmann 2013, 622).

From the very beginning Parzival’s thinking and aspirations were directed towards the goal of proving himself as a knight, and from this arise sorrow and suffering for others (Bumke [1964] 1966, 48–49). His departure for knighthood kills his mother, he kills the Red Knight for the sake of armor, he soon leaves his young wife Condwiramurs for new knightly deeds. At the Castle of the Grail he fails to help the ailing Anfortas in the expectation of knightly heroic deeds.

4.2 Recognition: From Haughtiness to Humility

After Parzival’s departure at the end of Book VI, the Romance describes Gawan’s adventures in Books VII and VIII, in which Parzival appears only in the background. Gawan is an exemplary Arthurian knight, but not destined for the Grail Kingdom. This destiny has fallen to Parzival due to his birthright, but he is not yet worthy of it. Book IX resumes the Parzival plot. After four years of joyless living far away from Condwiramurs, in defiance of God and on a futile search for the Castle of the Grail, Parzival in full armor on Good Friday meets a group of pilgrims of penance, who rebuke him for carrying weapons on that day and refer him to a holy man from whom he can obtain forgiveness for his sins. Although the pilgrims, among them two
beautiful daughters, invite him warmly and offer him food, he continues on his own way. In a direct interior monologue he expresses rationale for not accepting the pilgrims’ invitation:

Parzival thought “If I stop I would nevertheless not wish to go along with this company. These girls are so lovely that it would be wrong for me to ride beside them with all of them walking. It would be more fitting if I left them, seeing that I am at feud with Him Whom they love with all their hearts and look to help for but Who has shut me out from His succor and failed to shield me from sorrow” (230)

After the encounter with the pilgrims, sorrowful thoughts arise in Parzival:

Since young Herzeloyde had left him a loyal heart, remorse now began to stir in it. (231)

The Middle High German wording *sins herzen riuwe* is not to be understood in the sense of remorse, but as a feeling of suffering, which the narrator explains in his consciousness report with Herzeloyde’s inheritance (on ‘suffering’ as the most frequent meaning of *riuwe* in Wolfram, see Maurer 1950, 322). How little Parzival’s remorse is to be thought of can be seen in the following passage, in which a thought report introduces a direct interior monologue:

Only now did he ponder who had brought the world into being, only now think of his creator and how mighty he must be. “What if God has such power to succor as would overcome my sorrow?” he asked himself. “If he ever favoured a knight and if any knight ever
earned his reward or if shield and sword and true manly ardour can ever be so worthy of his help that this could save me from my cares and if this is his helpful day, then let him help, if help he can!” (231)

The tone of this argument is not free from haughtiness. Parzival continues to think his relationship with God in terms of feudalism and to set off the wages to which he is entitled against service rendered. In direct interior discourse he presumptuously puts God’s omnipotence to the test:

„If God’s power is so great that it can guide horses and other beasts and people, too, then I will praise his power. If the wisdom of God disposes of that help, let it guide my Castilian to the best success of my journey – then in his goodness he will show power to help! Now go where God chooses!” (231)

However, in his encounter with the hermit Trevrizent to whom the pilgrims referred him, Parzival, however, humbly appears as a sinner seeking advice:

„Sir,“ he said, „guide me now: I am a sinner.” (233)

The development that led Parzival to this new, humiliating attitude is not told in the story. Friedrich Maurer (1950, 317) believes that the hero benefits from the fact that he was “intensely” prepared for this confession of sinfulness through his encounters with Sigune and the pilgrim of penance, “through his years of wandering and the state of hatred of God and joylessness.” That may be so, but the transition from haughtiness to humility is not only “as it seems, quite abrupt” (Maurer), but forms a sensitive gap in the narrated story, which the recipient has to fill according to the logic extrapolated from the explicit narrative.
Cundrie had already spoken of sin to Parzival: *da erwarz inu swîgen sünden zîl* (“You have sinned when you were silent”; 316, 23), and the gray pilgrim of repentance had referred Parzival to Trevrizent:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{welt ir im riwe künden,} & \quad \text{If you show yourself contrite, he will take your sins away. (230)} \\
\text{er scheiinet iuch von sünden} & \\
(448, 25–26)
\end{align*}
\]

After his mother, who wanted to protect him from the dangers of knighthood, and Gurnemanz, who initiated him into the norms of the knightly world, the hermit Trevrizent is Parzival’s third teacher. But first this teacher must hear the accusation of God which Parzival raises again:

\[
\begin{align*}
ouch trage ich hazzes vil gein gote; & \quad \text{I am deeply resentful of God, since he stands godfather to my troubles:} \\
wand er ist mîner sorgen tote. & \quad \text{he has lifted them up too high, while my happiness is buried alive. If only} \\
die hât er alze hûhe erhaben: & \quad \text{God’s power would succour me,} \\
mîn vrûude ist lebendec begraben. & \quad \text{what an anchor my happiness would be, which now sinks into sorrow’s silt! (235–236)} \\
kunde gotes craft mit helfe sîn, & \\
waz ankers wær diu vrûude mîn? & \\
diu sinket durch der riwe grunt. & (461, 9–15)
\end{align*}
\]

Trevrizent explains to Parzival who demands God’s reward, that God’s immense help cannot be earned and blackmailed and that God, the epitome of the *triuwe*, does not act unfaithfully.

\[
\begin{align*}
swer iuch gein im in hazze siht, & \quad \text{Anyone who sees you hating him would think you weak of understanding. (236)} \\
der hât iuch an den witzen kranc. & \\
(463, 2–3)
\end{align*}
\]

In long conversations Trevrizent explains the basic features of the Christian faith and the mystery of the Grail. Asked about his origin, Parzival reveals himself and recalls his deathblow against Ither (*sluoc mîn sündbæriu hant* – “my iniquity killed him here”; 475, 10). Trevrizent tells him that his mother died during his departure and tells of the unknown man who, by omitting the obvious question of compassion, prolonged the suffering of the Grail King:
sît im sîn tumpheit daz gebôt
daz er aldâ niht vrâgte,
grôzer sælde in dô betrâgte.
(484, 28–30)

Since youthful inexperience saw to it that he asked no question, he let slip a golden opportunity. (246–247)

Parzival reveals himself as the unknown man:

ir sult mit râtes triuwe klagen mine tumpheit.
der ûf Munsalvæsche reit, unt der den rehten kumber sach; unt der deheine vrâge sprach, daz bin ich unsælec barn:
sus hân ich, hêre, missevarn.
(488, 14–20)

You should deplore my youthful folly whilst giving me loyal aid. The man who rode to Munsalvæsche and saw all the marks of suffering and who nevertheless asked no question was I, unhappy wretch! Such is my error, my lord. (248)

Trevrizent advises the repentant not to lament too much. But he should repent for two great sins: the killing of Ither and the death of his mother. The withholding of the question of compassion should be counted among the two sins. On parting Trevrizent gives his absolution to the repentant sinner. This basically concludes the mental event of Parzival. The hero has experienced a development from höchvart (‘haughtiness’) to diemuot (‘humility’). But haughtiness was an expression of tumpheit (‘simplemindedness’). Even more than an ethical fulfillment or religious conversion, Parzival’s way is a process of experiencing, learning and self-knowledge.

In the Middle Ages, self-knowledge included knowledge of genealogy and dynastic relationships. Parzival’s origin, which his mother withholds from him out of concern, means his destined entrance into the Grail kingdom, which of course does not simply fall to the chosen one, but is an honor that must be earned. To the extent that Parzival overcomes his haughtiness, he is also given knowledge of his descent. His cousin Sigune plays an important role, not only revealing his name and his family (140, 16), but also his rights, which he inherited from his parents. Trevrizent (494, 15 ff.) also tells him, above all, that he is the only legitimate successor of the sick Grail King.

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42 On genealogy as a “text-structuring principle” of Parzival see Armin Schulz (2012, 280).
The rest of the work serves to link the still unconnected threads of action. In the last books we don’t learn much more about Parzival’s inner state, as its development is little manifested. In the books X–XIII Gawan is in the center. In book XIV, Parzival, who has returned to the spotlight, meets Gawan and Gramoflanz, both of whom he defeats after a hard fight. The books XV and XVI are about Parzival’s encounter with the unknown pagan half-brother Feirefiz. The brothers’ fight ends with the breaking of Parzival’s sword. The brothers recognize each other and move together to the court of Arthur. There Cundrie appears a second time and proclaims Parzival’s appointment as King of the Grail.

The modern reader will have difficulty understanding the mental events in Wolfram’s epic. Parzival’s sins and guilt especially will raise questions in today’s view. The specialists in Middle High German literature have always struggled for answers to these questions. Especially in the first half of the twentieth century there was a fierce controversy about Parzival’s sins and guilt (cf. the overview and his own thesis in Maurer 1950).

Many modern readers would identify Parzival’s greatest sin to be his proclaimed hatred of God. However, the pious Trevrizent, the ethical compass of the work, behaves strangely lenient to this behavior, which for the Middle Ages was nothing short of sacrilegious. Instead, he emphasizes the two serious sins, the death of his mother and the manslaughter of Ither, to which he only adds the omission of the question of compassion as a third, lesser wrongdoing. The fact that the persons who were harmed by Parzival (Herzeloyde, Sigune, Ither, Anfortas) were his close relatives seems to make the guilt particularly heavy for Trevrizent.

A closer look at the three major sins and Parzival’s guilt reveals that Parzival can be held responsible for the death of his mother only because of his youthful impetuousness to leave home and enter the world of knights. But that is at best a slight “sin,” at least from a contemporary perspective.

A comparison with Chrétien is informative. In Chrétien (v. 6392), the hermit explains to Perceval that the mother had fainted and died of grief at his farewell. The death of the mother means a sin for the hermit, about which the sinner does not know (L’uns pechiez dont tu ne sez mot, v. 6393). According to the words of the hermit, the sin consists in the heartbreak that the setting out son has prepared for the mother. Perceval’s cousin, the model for Wolfram’s Sigune, has already pronounced a similar attribution of guilt: Perceval’s sin, for which he will be struck by many a blow, consists in the fact that
his mother died of grief over him (v. 3593–3595). But if we look at Perceval’s departure in Chrétien’s text, it becomes clear that the parting son, unlike in Wolfram’s text, witnesses the mother’s collapse:

Quant li vallés fu eslongiez  
Le get d’une pierre menue,  
si se regarde et voit cheüe  
Sa mère al pié del pont arriere,  
Et jut pasmee en tel maniere,  
Com s’ele fust cheüe morte.  
(Chrétien, 620–625)43

When the boy was a pebble throw away, he looks around and sees his mother lying there at the end of the bridge. She lay unconscious there, as if she had dropped dead.

This shocking sight notwithstanding, Perceval gives his horse the crop and rides away. Only the fact that Perceval does not care about his mother, who is close to death, explains why the hermit declares his behavior to be a fundamental sin, which led to the failure of the Castle of the Grail and all the following adversity:

Por le pechié que tu en as  
T’avient que rien n’en demandas  
De la lance ne del graal,  
Si t’en sont avenu maint mal  
(Chrétien, 6399–6402)

Because of this sin it was impossible for you to ask for the lance and the Grail; thus you were afflicted with many evils.

One cannot accuse Wolfram’s Parzival of such a lack of compassion. He did not even notice the mother’s collapse (dô si ir sun niht langer sach – “when she did not see the son any longer”; 128, 18) and later strives to visit the mother he believes to be alive. Chrétien’s causal nexus between the death of his mother and Perceval’s suffering, which is called upon several times in his work, is omitted by Wolfram.

Not much more serious is the misconduct towards Ither, whom Parzival kills for the sake of his red armor. Joachim Bumke ([1964] 1966, 58) rightly asks: “Is it a sin that he wants to fight for Ither’s armor, which King Arthur promised him?” Wolfram’s narrator emphasizes in the description of the

struggle and still afterwards again and again the *tumheit* (“simplemindedness”) of the inexperienced hero in the knightly world. So he comes to the conclusion:

sîn harnasch im verlôs den lip: 
dar umbe was sîn endes wer 
des tumben Parzivâles ger. 
sît dô er sich paz versan, 
ungerne het erz dô getân.  
(161, 4–8)

His armour had proved his ruin. 
Simple Parzival’s wish to have it had been the end of him. Later, on reaching years of discretion, Parzival wished he had not done it.  
(91)

The “*sin*” at the castle of the Grail must also be put into perspective. By omitting the question of compassion, Parzival reflects on the *zuht* (“good behavior”) and Gurnemanz’s advice. His motivation is expressed in a direct interior discourse:

durch zuht in vrâgens doch verdrôz. 
er dâhte „mir riet Gurnamanz mit grôzen triwen âne schranz, 
ich solte vil gevrâgen niht. 
was op mîn wesen hie geschiht 
die mâze als dort pî im? 
âne vrâge ich vernim 
wiez dirre massenê stêt.“  
(239, 11–13)

[...] true to the dictates of good breeding, he refrained from asking any question. 
“Gurnemanz advised me with perfect sincerity against asking many questions,” he thought. 
“What if I stay here for as long as I stayed with him? I shall then learn unasked how matters stand with this household.” (127)

So it is not the lack of misery that makes him remain silent, but the fear of the simpleminded to make a mistake again. It is not the lack of empathy with the concrete situation, but the schematic adherence to a teaching given to him by a well-meaning and knowledgeable person, the taking of advice literally, since he does not trust his own spontaneous judgment. Bumke (2001, 77) speaks of Parzival’s “habitual weakness of perception” and sees its cause in his mother’s questionable overprotective upbringing. Parzival does, however, *perceive*, but in the uncertainty of his judgement and in the schematism of his acquired behavior he is unable to react appropriately and flexibly to what he is perceiving.
Parzival repeatedly proves to have triuwe and erbærmde (cf. Maurer 1950, 315–316). He sincerely regrets the omission of the question after Sigune’s enlightenment, and he is immediately ready to make amends: “If I have done amiss in any way I shall make amends,” 255, 23). The remorse is confirmed by the narrator in his report of consciousness:

\[
\begin{align*}
& \text{daz er vrâgens was sô laz,} \\
& \text{do’r bí dem trûrgen wirte saz,} \\
& \text{daz rou dô græzlîche} \\
& \text{den helt ellens rîche. (256, 1–4)}
\end{align*}
\]

It was a cause of great remorse to the warrior that he had been so slow to ask the question as he had sat beside the sorrowing king. (135)

To explain Parzival’s three sins, many turn to contemporary theology. One of the most prominent attempts is that of Friedrich Maurer (1950, 328–330), who refers to Augustine’s distinction between consciously and deliberately committed sins and sins of lesser weight. The latter, consequences of original sin, arise from a failure of ignorance (ignorantia) and immaturity. With this failure from ignorantia Parzival’s three types of misconduct would be explained, but Maurer does not presuppose of Wolfram a knowledge of Augustine’s theology. Maurer (1950, 333) interprets Parzival’s innocent guilt as the “tragic situation of man in the world that even the most sincere and best willing man cannot avoid failing to cause others to suffer, to fall himself into dishonor and deepest pain.”

Dennis Green (1982, 290–291) establishes a connection between Wolfram’s conception of self-knowledge, which Parzival achieved, and medieval theology (Bernhard von Clairvaux, Augustine, Anselm of Canterbury, Archard and Richard of Saint-Victor). According to Green, self-knowledge in theology of the twelfth century has three aspects: the recognition of one’s own character, the recognition of the ego in relation to society and the recognition of the ego in relation to God. According to Green, the equation of self-knowledge and humility is decisive for the interpretation of Parzival. The hero arrives at the Grail, since the vacancy of royalty has arisen through Anfortas’s violation of diemuot (‘humility’; 478, 30), and Trevrizent’s last words to Parzival concern precisely this virtue (nu kêrt an diemuot ivern sin – “Now guide your thoughts towards humility”; 798, 30; 396). Nevertheless, Bumke ([1964] 1966, 58) is to be agreed with when he states that in Wolfram’s concept of guilt there is an “indissoluble residue” that cannot be explained even with the help of medieval theology.
Christian interpretations, which were pushed forward in the decades after the Second World War, find their limit in the fact that the action is detached from the self-evident ecclesiastical framework. What is striking is the “little importance of the church in the mediation of salvation” (Bumke [1964] 1966, 61). It is also significant that Wolfram omitted the admonition to regular church visits from Chrétien’s teachings of Mother and Gurnemanz in both cases (Bumke 1991, 67, 69). And in the encounter with the hermit Trevrizent, who gives Parzival absolution but is by no means a clergyman, “all church motifs are carefully erased” from Chrétien (Bumke 1991, 98). The apparitions and norms of the world of the Grail, of which Trevrizent reports, are in many facets for Christians markedly heterodox, even heretical.

It is widely shared consensus in research to interpret Parzival’s path as a path from dullness to cognition and self-knowledge, as a “quest for self-knowledge,” as Green (1982, 290) comprehensively interprets it. The typical theme of the courtly Romance around 1200 is the hero’s search for himself, which leads from dullness to knowledge and humility (Haas 1964, 12; Green 1982, 290).

The contact with reality, the experience that the schematic application of learned rules can harm others, leads Parzival from ignorant haughtiness to knowledge associated with humility. Before the Arthurian knights, Parzival expresses this insight:

sol ich durch mîner zuht gebot
hören nu der werlte spot,
sô mac sîn râten niht sîn ganz;
mîr riet der werde Gurnamanz
daz ich vrävellîche vrâge mite
und immer gein unfuoge strite
(330, 1–6)

If, having followed the precepts of my education, I am now to hear people twitting me, then Gurnemanz’s schooling may have had some flaws. For the noble man instructed me that I should refrain from asking questions overfreely and to be on my guard against unmannerliness. (171)

The question expected by everyone in the given situation on Munsalvæsche would certainly not have been at all vrävellîche (‘overfree’). It was not the teaching that had “some flaws,” one will have to correct the young knight, but his insensitive interpretation and schematic application of it.
4.3 Openness vs. Determination

From the point of view of eventfulness, *Parzival* offers an ambivalent picture. On the one hand, the ascent of the boy growing up in the forest wasteland without teaching about God and the world to the Grail King is a highly relevant, momentous, irreversible and unrepeatable change of state. On the other hand, the hero is literally pre-destined for this office by his origin, and the “power of the Grail” saves him from destruction. Significantly, before describing the struggle with the unrecognized pagan half-brother Feirefiz, the narrator confesses,

> owê, sît d’erde was sô breit,  
> daz si ein ander niht vermiten,  
> die då umb unschulde striten!  
> ich sorge des den ich hân brâht,  
> wan daz ich trostes hân gedâht,  
> in süle des grâles kraft ernern.  
> in sol ouch diu minne wern.  
> den was er beiden diensthaft  
> âne wanc mit dienstlicher kraft.  
> (737, 23–30)

> Alas, that broad though the earth is,  
> they did not pass each other by, this pair  
> that fought for no cause! I would be  
> anxious for the man whom I have  
> brought this far, had I not the consoling  
> thought that the power of the Grail  
> must save him. And Love, too, must de-  
> fend him. He has served both with un-  
> swerving devotion. (367)

It is characteristic of Wolfram’s thinking that, with the Grail and Love, two not quite-Christian protective powers and feudal lords are called to whom Parzival’s service is directed.

No matter how the powers to which the narrator refers may be interpreted, Parzival’s development lacks the feature of unpredictability that is constitutive of eventfulness. This dichotomy between openness and determination is characteristic of medieval narratives that are marked by the soteriology of the Christian faith. Salvation thinking of any ideology does not permit an open eventfulness.

The dichotomy between eventful openness to arbitrary developments and predetermined development also shapes the asymmetrical development of the rational and intuitive behavior of the contradictory hero. On the one hand, the hero unlearned in childhood makes serious mistakes with every step he takes into the world, recognizes these mistakes and tries to make them right. This gives the mental maturation a gradual course. However, there is no continuous development between the stages. Bumke (2001, 98)
rightly speaks of a “fragmentary” self-knowledge of Parzival. As it became clear from the quotations, the stages of cognition and maturation are usually marked by the representation of consciousness, which surprisingly often takes the form of interior discourse or monologue.

On the other hand, Parzival’s behavior is characterized from the beginning on, already in the forest wasteland with the bird-catching when he sheds tears over the killed birds, through triuwe and erbärnde, the virtues inherited from his mother. The constancy of intuitive behavior is also evident in the negative, in his unthinking manhood inherited from his father. In fighting situations, he shows unchanged blind bravado until the end, without paying attention to the person facing him. This also applies to his encounter with Gawan and Feirefiz in the last books of the epic. In this respect, the changeability of his rational behavior is countered by the immutability of his intuitive behavior (cf. Bumke 2001).

The modern reader will be irritated above all by one circumstance: his self-knowledge and ethical self-improvement do not predestine Parzival for the office of the Grail King as much as does the probation of the virtues triuwe and erbärnde that result from his inherited nature. This is a determinism to which the modern progressive, antigenetic mentality can hardly resign itself.
5 Gottfried’s *Tristan*: Border Crossings and Aporia

In Gottfried’s von Strassburg *Tristan*, two border crossings take place: (1) Tristan’s journey from Cornwall to the hostile Ireland – where the hero, at the risk of his life, wants to be healed by Queen Isolde, the sister of Morold, whom the hero has killed – and (2) the injury of the ère towards the society and of the *triuve* to the uncle and young Isolde’s husband in the absolute *Tristanminne*. At the end of the text, Tristan, wavering between the passionate love of the distant blonde Isolde and the comfort of the nearby unloved Isolde of the White Hands, is about to cross a border again – or, more precisely, is tempted to do so. The point at which the text breaks off represents the hero in an aporia.

Gottfried’s narrative, however, is less about the factual transgressions themselves than about their motivation and their accompaniment through mental processes. Gert Hübner (2003, 317), in his thorough investigation of the focalization of courtly romances, states that the narrative arrangement in *Tristan* evokes the impression that the inner-world processes are the actual core of the story.

According to Hübner’s observations, Gottfried’s narrator tends to “authoritatively support” the “standpoint” of the figures in his general remarks and in the representation of the inner world of the figures, as well as in their “soliloquies” (i.e., interior monologues) (394). In a contamination of key categories of Genette (1972) and Cohn (1978), Hübner calls this procedure “consonant focalization,” namely “focalization of the evaluative function of the voice” (which narratology supposedly does not foresee at all because of its fixation on modern narrative [117]). The device brings about a subjectivation “that is otherwise known only from the synthetic form of free indirect discourse” (397), which does not occur in the Middle High German poetry language in contrast to Chrétien, who already uses the *style indirect libre*. However, it must be asked critically whether Hübner does not overestimate the power of his analytical tool “focalization” (even if he defines it much more broadly than does Genette), whether the verse form permits at all the postulated “focalization” to the extent assumed
at all, and whether Hübner’s findings on evaluative perspective are always addressed by linguistic phenomena.

According to Hübner’s general thesis, the entire “narrative arrangement” models a “partiality for the lovers” and serves to enable an “identifying reception.” Against the action and the failure of the lovers in the outer world, the right of their love experience, according to Hübner, asserts itself “by becoming the inner right” (396).

5.1 Tristan’s Voyage to Ireland

After the duel with Morold, Tristan knows that his resultant wound can only be healed by Morold’s sister, Ireland’s wise Queen Isolde. The ban, which the King of Ireland imposed on all Cornish people after Morold’s death, forces Tristan to risk his life in order to be healed by Queen Isolde; Tristan thus disguises himself as a minstrel named Tantris. His deliberation about the dilemma is depicted through indirect representation of thought:

wie’z aber möhte gesîn, des enkunde er niht betrahten. nu begunde er aber daz ahten, sît ez sîn tôt doch wäre, sô wäre im alsô mære der lîp gewâget oder tôt als disiu tôtliche nôt. (7 300–305)44

Yet how this was to come about he could not fathom. Nevertheless he began to reflect, since it was a matter of life or death, that there was little to choose between risking his life or dying, and this death-like extremity.45

His cunning scheme to receive healing in hostile Ireland succeeds. Tristan returns, and his extraordinary story astonishes both king and people:

des nam s’ouch alle wunder und begunden hier under vil schimpfen und lachen

They were all amazed, and in the course of his narrative joked and lachen

---

michel lahter machen
von sîner verte in Ìrlant,
von sîner vindinne hant,
wie schöne in diu generte,
von allem dem geverte,
daz er under in begie.
si jâhen, sine gevrieschen nie
solhes wunders gemach.
(8 237–247)

laughed a good deal about his voyage to Ireland and how well he had been healed by her who was his enemy, and about all his doings among the Irish. They declared that they had never heard of any exploit like it. (150)

5.2 The Beginning of Love

The Tristanminne is a border crossing in that it blatantly violates religious and social norms and loyalty to Tristan’s uncle, King Mark of Cornwall. The assessment of the eventfulness of this border crossing, however, depends on how one views Tristan’s and young Isolde’s drinking of the love potion. The crucial question is whether the love between the heroes is initiated by the magic potion or whether it had germinated beforehand. If the Tristanminne is triggered only by the magic of the love potion, the protagonists are figures in the game of a magical power, and they lack the freedom of decision necessary for eventfulness.

The decisive question about the beginning of love cannot be answered with absolute certainty, since, as Hübner (2003, 394) states, Tantris in Ireland is a largely opaque figure. In the Irish episodes, the narrative does not depict how the hero experiences the world, but how the world experiences the hero (Hübner 2003, 393; critically: Armin Schulz 2004, 163). Only Tristan, who suffers from love, is depicted in his inner world. This corresponds to Gottfried’s orientation towards the noble hearts, which equally unite the “joy of heart” and the “torment of longing” (Gottfried, 45–78).

In Tristan literature, two camps have always been irreconcilably opposed to each other in the question of the beginning of love: the advocates of a more or less conscious love before the love potion (among them Ranke 1925; Weber 1953) and the supporters of the thesis that love is only triggered by the potion (overview of the controversy in Herzmann 1976; Weber and Hoffmann 1981, 92–94; Krohn [1980] 2002, 168–172; Tomasek 2007, 200–204).
The main representative of the second camp, Hans Furstner (1957, 34), concludes from his refutation of the arguments of the conscious-love party that Gottfried “failed to do anything that could give us the impression that Tristan and Isolde had already loved each other before the moment they drank the love potion” (similar arguments: Christoph Huber [2000] 2013, 82).

Independent of Furstner’s and the second camp’s arguments, we can name the following symptoms that speak against a before-potion love:

1. There is no explicit reference in Gottfried’s text to a love beginning before the magic potion.
2. Queen Isolde lets the minstrel Tantris retreat to England only after his reference to the wife waiting for him at home. No sign of regret about the departure is reported from the young Isolde.
3. In Tristan’s willingness to move to Ireland as King Mark’s bride canvasser, no expectation of a reunion with the young Isolde is expressed. This must be objected to Weber (1953, I, 219), who here sees the desire of the unconscious lover to see the young Isolde again.
4. After Tantris was identified as the murderer of her uncle Morold, hatred breaks out in the young Isolde.
5. On board the ship, Isolde sharply rejects Tristan, who wants to take her in his arms “gently and quietly and in no other way than a liege might hand his lady” (193; vil suoze unde lîse / und niuwan in der wîse, / als ein man sîne vrouwen sol, 11 561).

The argumentation of the skeptics of love before the potion, however, is not always consistent. Kurt Ruh, for example, criticizes on the one hand that it is not acceptable to “prove in psychological interpretation a germinally unconscious love of Tristan and Isolde since their first encounter” – as Ranke, Weber and others undertake – but on the other hand postulates “that Gottfried, in the more than 10,000 verses that precede the love potion, has done nothing other than to build up the protagonists’ love disposition, each related to the future partner” (Ruh 1978, 123).

Neither are the arguments of the before party by any means all convincing. Again, independent of the lawyers of this party, one can name a whole series of strong symptoms of a special emotional relationship between the two of them that burgeons before the magic potion:
1. Before the first meeting of the young Isolde and the minstrel Tantris, the narrator makes a prediction that there is no reason to refer only to the time after the magic potion (this against Herzmann 1976, 84):

*daz wâre insigel der minne,*

*mit dem sîn herze sider wart*

*versigelt unde vor verspart*

*aller der werlt gemeiner*

*niuwan ir al einer,*

*die schöene Îsôt si kam ocht dar*

*und nam vil vlîzeclîche war,*

*dâ Tristan harpfende saz.*

(7 812–819)

*Lovely Isolde, Love’s true signet,*

*with which in days to come his*

*heart was sealed and locked from*

*all the world save her alone, Isolde*

*also repaired there and attended*

*closely to Tristan as he sat and*

*played his harp.* (145)

2. Deviating from the early courtly versions of the Tristan fabric, also of Thomas d’Angleterre, Queen Isolde entrusts Tantris, the minstrel, with her daughter as a pupil. The young Isolde, who already has a very good education in book knowledge and string playing, is substantially encouraged by Tantris in her talents. He also teaches her *moraliteit*. In half a year the girl makes such progress in education, art and popriety that “the hole land talked of her felicity” (147). Shouldn’t the longing and the pain of love, which the magic of her singing awakened in everyone, have also touched the heart of her teacher? And conversely, shouldn’t the success that the art of the beautiful young lady had with people have also been reflected in her sympathy for the teacher? If one does not follow this interpretation, one has to explain what could have persuaded Gottfried to introduce the instruction of the young Isolde by Tantris against the tradition of the text and to make her extremely successful.

3. Back in Cornwall, Tristan is full of praise for the beauty and education of the young Isolde:

*der Îsôt under ougen siht,*

*dem liutert’z herze unde muot,*

*rehte als diu gluot dem golde tuot:*

*ez liebet leben und lip.*

*mit ir enist kein ander wîp*

*erleschet noch geswachet,*

*als maneger mære machet.*

*Whoever looks Isolde in the eyes*

*feels his heart and soul refined*

*like gold in the white-hot flame;*

*his life becomes a joy to live.*

*Other women are neither*

*eclipsed nor diminished by Isolde*

*in the way many claim for their*
ir schoene diu schoenet, ladies. Her beauty makes others
si zieret und crenet beautiful, she adorns and sets a
wiph und wiplichen namen a crown upon woman and woman-
kind. (150–151)

4. Is this hymn to the young Isolde not to be understood as a proof of love
(Ranke 1925, 204; Weber 1953, I, 219; Furstner 1957, 27–28, on the other
hand, sees here a traditional women’s prize)?

5. The young Isolde is the first to discover Tristan, badly injured, after he
had killed the dragon (9 368–376).

6. When Tantris, the dragon slayer, regains consciousness, he sees “three
lights” surrounding him, and the first “light” he identifies is Isolde (9
452).

7. Isolde is the only one to recognize Tantris in his knight’s armor and
weakened by carrying the dragon’s tongue (9 472).

8. Kurvenal, Tristan’s confidant, who considers his master dead, complains
to Isolde in an apostrophe:

was din schoene und edelkeit Was your noble beauty framed
ze solhem schaden üf geleit for such ruin of one of the finest
einer der sæligsten art, natures ever confirmed by lance
diu ie mit sper versigelt wart, and whom you pleased too
der du ze wol geviele? (9 653–657) well? (168)

9. Isolde scans Tantris’s body and his whole appearance “with uncommon
interest,” and not only as a revered teacher:

swaz maget an manne spehen sol, whatever a maid may survey in
daz geviel ir allez an im wol a man all pleased her very well,
und lobete ez in ir muote. and she praised it in her
thoughts. (173)

(10 001–003)

10. Isolde accuses God in her apostrophes that the minstrel, the “splendid
man” (10 014), has been “greatly wronged” (10 030), since God has given
him a “station in life out of keeping with his person” (10 031–032; tr. 173).

11. Tristan’s and Isolde’s love is preformed by the love between Riwalin and
Blanscheflur, Tristan’s parents, which was not based on a supernatural
spell, although Blanscheflur in her direct interior monologue (982-1 076)
for Riwalin’s effect on her considers a zouberlist (1 003; ‘witchcraft,’ 54). The equivalence also suggests that the Tristanminne was created by natural magic. In both cases Gottfried dissolves the magic psychologically.

The signs contained in the text thus suggest that the two protagonists have an affection for each other that begins long before the love potion. This doesn’t mean, however, that the protagonists are already aware of the love that is budding in them. According to Tomas Tomasek (2006, 470), it is Gottfried’s point that the lovers do not suspect anything of their being mutually determined immediately before the potion scene, while the recipients have long been informed about the ‘legitimacy’ of Tristan’s and Isolde’s connection under the point of view of minne.

Is the thesis of early love not excluded from Isolde’s hatred? On the other hand, isn’t it conceivable that Isolde would assume love and hate at the same time, love for Tantris, the sensitive teacher and handsome man – hate for Tristan, the murderer of her uncle? Such a conclusion is based on a psychological interpretation of the symptoms contained in the text, but to what extent is the psychological interpretation of the text permissible at all? Is it not anachronistic to project the modes of presentation and receptive habits of recent literature onto the Middle Ages? The older, psychology-friendly research on this question has been harshly criticized by the newer specialist literature, but not always with good reasons. Rejecting the fear of anachronistic psychologization, one must ask: shouldn’t the author of the greatest romance of the European Middle Ages benefit from a certain insight into the paradoxes of love? Isn’t it part of Gottfried’s art of consciousness to suggest contradictions in the souls of heroes? In no case will Isolde’s rude rejection of Tristan’s consolation (point 5 of the arguments against love before the potion) be an expression of a fundamental rejection of the man who fills her with joy every time she sees him (point 9 of the before-arguments).

The extent to which Gottfried was able and willing to pursue the tricks of the soul is testified to by his portrayal of the self-deceiving Mark, who sees but does not want to recognize the signs of foreign love that are evident to all. Five times Mark, the zwîvelære (14 010; ‘the waverer’, 226), is haunted by suspicion, and five times he lets himself be talked out of his suspicion, until he is finally released from the zwîvelbürde (15 273; ‘the load of uncertainty’,
242) (Ries 1980, 325). The narrator concludes his observations and generalizations about the herzelöse blinheit (17 739; ‘insenate blindness’, 275) following Mark’s behavior with the following conclusion:

er was ir alse gerne bí,                      He desired so much to be with her
daz er ez allez übersach,               that he overlooked the wrong that he
swaz leides ime von ir geschach.           suffered at her hands. (276)
(17 814–816)

A brilliant piece of practical love psychology is the so called huote-excursus in the passage that follows (17 817–8114), which explains how the surveillance of a beloved woman kills her love and only stimulates her desire for the forbidden.

Gottfried has depicted the contradictions of the soul in Isolde’s inner struggle when she is about to take revenge on her uncle with her sword. In Isolde’s interior there is a battle between the two adversaries zorn (‘anger’) and wîpheit (‘womanhood’; 10 260; tr. 176). The narrator explicates the conflict in Isolde’s soul in a report on consciousness:

sus was ir herze in zwei gemuot,        Thus her heart was divided in purpose – a single heart was at one and
ein herze was übel und guot. [...]   the same time both good and evil. [...]            
si wolte unde enwolte;                She wanted and yet did not want, she
si wolte tuon unde lân.               wished both to do and refrain. Thus
sus lie der zwîvel umbe gân,           uncertainty raged within her, till at
biz doch diu süeze wîpheit             last sweet womanhood triumphed
an dem zorne sige gestreit            over anger (176-177)
(10 266–275)

Here the question arises what is meant by wîpheit. Does her soft woman’s heart give her the edge over her anger, or is it as Furstner argues, that “no courtly woman is capable of killing a man” (1957, 33)? If the latter were true, how would we explain Isolde’s cruel assassination attempt on the faithful Brangäne (12,732), whose indiscretion she fears, and then the threat of the death penalty to those who were commandeered to assassinate the servant (12,888)? Herzmann’s (1976, 86) suggestion of subordinating erotic interest to the victory of wîpheit is by no means far-fetched.
Gottfried’s novel does not belong to the so-called “minstrel epic,” which sought to entertain a less educated audience with garish plot effects. Gottfried wrote for the edelen herzen (47; ‘noble hearts’, 42):

\[
ein \text{ ander werlt die meine ich,} \quad \text{I have a [...] world in mind which}
\]
\[
die samet in eime herzen treit \quad \text{together in one heart bears its}
\]
\[
ir süeze sûr, ir liebez leit, \quad \text{bit-}
\]
\[
ir herzeliep, ir senede nôt, \quad \text{ter-sweet, its dear sorrow, its}
\]
\[
ir liebez leben, ir leiden tôt, \quad \text{heart’s joy, its love’s pain, its dear}
\]
\[
ir lieben tôt, ir leidez leben. (58–63) \quad \text{life, its sorrowful death, its dear}
\]

In other words, Gottfried wrote for an audience that was interested in the inner world of the figures and – long before the discovery of the unconscious – knew how to make sense of the contradictions in their hearts, their paradoxical, even oxymoronic, emotions.

The assumption of an early romantic interest between the protagonists for each other must have an impact on the interpretation of the role of the love potion. Whether the potion merely symbolizes the realization of love or the awakening of sensual love, or is rather superfluous – possibilities that have been discussed in specialist literature – the protagonists are in any case mentally involved and not merely defenseless objects of a magical force. It is also hardly conceivable that Gottfried, in his senemaere (168; ‘love tale,’ 43), whose prologue deals so extensively with the contradictory movements of the heart, relied solely on the magical power of the love potion, a relic from the oldest layers of the tradition of the material, and that he would not have recast the central power at work by replacing the magical element with true personal love. It is significant that the effect of the potion, which had been limited to only three (Béroul) or four years (Eilhart von Oberge) in early courtly versions, but became limitless in Gottfried’s text (cf. Weber and Hoffmann 1981, 31-57; Tomasek 2007, 265), seems to no longer play a role in the Isolde-of-the-White-Hand passages. In any case, the potion is not mentioned among the forces that prevent Tristan from connecting with the second Isolde.\footnote{It is also significant that Gottfried does not mention the effect of the magic potion any more. In the preserved text fragments of Thomas d’Angleterre, the deadly sick Tristan mentions the potion (beivre) before Kaherdin, the brother of Isolde of the White Hands (Thomas 2486–2494).}
5.3 Isolde’s Interior Monologue: Sorrowful Renunciation

The XXX. book, in which the text breaks off, contains an apotheosis of medieval representation of consciousness: four extended interior monologues reproduced in direct mode. The focus is on the minne under the conditions of separation, the triuwe testing lovers through distance. Both the monologue of Isolde, watching Tristan sail away, and the three monologues of Tristan contain structures of an inner dialogue: the respective figure, speaking to her- or himself, either addresses the absent partner in an apostrophe or splits into two voices arguing with each other. The inner world of the figures is thus dualized: the speaking ego is confronted with the addressed you and/or a contesting alter ego. The introduction of duality serves analysis. No German poet of the twelfth century has dissected the contradictions of emotional life as analytically as did Gottfried.

After the discovery of the adulterous love, Tristan has to leave Mark’s court. The forced separation is a highly eventful event, the greatest catastrophe imaginable, the victims of which are the two border crossers, who so far had been able to avert the manifold dangers of their discovery and punishment with cunning and deceit.

Tristan leaves sīn lip, sīn ander leben (18 358; ‘his life, his other self’, 282), following the request of his beloved (18 334), by saving his life to preserve her own (18 431).

Isolde calmly watches Tristan sail away, reassured that at least he is alive, but she addresses her fleeing lover in a disconsolate apostrophe (18 491-600). The direct monologue (ir herze gegen sich selben sprach, 18 490; ‘she said to herself in her heart’, 285) goes in different directions and carries out the inner struggle between emotion and reason. Isolde first laments the hasty removal of her beloved, then conjures up the indissoluble fusion of her two souls and bodies:
Ah me, ah me, my lord Tristan, now my heart cleaves fast to you, my eyes follow after you and you are fleeing fast away from me! Why do you hasten away from me like this? [...] Our lives and very souls are so interwoven, so utterly enmeshed, the one with the other, that you are taking my life away with you and leaving yours with me. No two lives were ever so intermingled: we hold death and life for each other, since neither can really find life or death unless the other give it. (285)

Addressing the absent with the passion-filled question of how to keep body and life, Isolde immediately calls herself back to reason, changing the speech situation from apostrophe to talking to herself and then to descriptive metonymic speech:


Now teach on! Why are you silent? We have dire need of wise counsel. But what am I saying, foolish Isolde? Tristan’s tongue and my spirit are sailing away there together!

Torn back and forth, the inwardly agitated woman asks for the place of her existence. Insofar as the verse form allows this to be determined at all, the interior discourse is figural.


Where shall I find myself now? Where shall I seek myself now, oh where? I am here and there, and yet I am neither there nor here.
wer wart ouch sus verirret ie?  
wer wart ie sus zerteilet mê?  
(18 532–18 537)

Whoever was so lost and bewildered? Whoever so divided? (285)

She sails there with Tristan and sits here with Mark. Death and life fight in her. She would die with joy if she could, if he, on whom her life depends, let her. The interior speech tends towards accusation again:

er lât mich hie und vert er hin  
und weiz wol, daz ich âne in bin  
reht innerthalp des herzen tôt.  
(18 551–553)

He is leaving me here and sailing away, and he knows full well that, without him, deep down in my heart I am dead. (285)

And again the complainant reflects, calls herself to reason: the pain is divided between both, yes, she even grants Tristan the greater pain:

Weiz got diz rede ich âne nôt.  
mîn leit ist doch gemeine,  
ine trage ez niht al eine.  
ez ist sîn alse vil sô mîn,  
und wæne es ist noch mère sîn.  
sîn jâmer und sîn pîne  
diust groezer dan diu mîne.  
(18 554–560)

But, God knows, I say so without need – my sorrow is shared, I do not suffer it alone. His sorrow is as great as mine and, I imagine, even greater. Yes, his grief and pain are more than mine. (285)

In a new turn, she asserts for herself a greater right to mourning and lamentation, for her life depends on him. On the other hand, she immediately realizes that his death lies with her.

At the end of her changeful dialogical monologue, Isolde reaches the position of perfect empathy and altruistic love: If Tristan stayed with her longer, there would be no salvation for him. She misses him agonizingly, but she prefers that he be far away from her in full health, rather than that she float around him in constant fear. Isolde formulates her attitude in a generalizing realization:

wan weizgot swer ze sînem vromen  
mit sînes vriundes schaden wil komen,  
der treit im cleine minne.  
swaz schaden ich sîn gewinne,  
ich wil Tristandes vriundin  
(18 554–560)

For truly, whoever seeks his own advantage at his friend’s expense bears him little affection. Whatever harm I reap from it, I desire to be Tristan’s
Carolyn Molke

5.4 Paradoxes in Tristan’s Feelings

Unlike Isolde, Tristan reacts to the separation. He suppresses his swære (18718; his ‘sorrows’, 287,) by throwing himself into battles. He thus helps Kædin of Arundel to a victory over the enemies of the country. Kædin’s sister, the beautiful Isolde of the White Hands (Îsôt as blanschemains, 18 709), reminds Tristan vividly of the blonde Isolde and renews his heartbreak. Whenever he looks at her, one notices his heartache. In a consciousness report, the narrator reveals the complicated paradox of Tristan’s now dominant feelings:

doch liebete er den smerzen und truog im inneclîchen muot. er dûhte in süeze unde guot. er minnete diz ungemach durch daz, wan er si gerne sach. so sach er si gerne umbe daz: im tete diu triure verre baz, die er nach der blunden hæte, dan im ander vrôude tæte. Îsôt was sîn liep und sîn leit, jà, Îsôt, sîn beworrenheit. diu tete im wol, diu tete im wê. sô ime Îsôt sîn herze ie mê in dem namen Îsôte brach, sô er Îsôte ie gerner sach. (18 978–992)

Yet he cherished this pain and held it in tender regard – it seemed sweet and good to him. He loved this suffering because he liked to see this Isolde; and he liked to see her because his pining for Fair Isolde assuaged him more than any pleasure. Isolde was his joy and his sorrow. Yes, Isolde, his distraction, both soothed and pained him! The more Isolde broke his heart in Isolde’s name, the more gladly he saw Isolde! (291)
The beloved torments, the good pain, the pleasant sorrow – these are oxymora that describe Tristan’s paradoxical sensations, feelings that the prologue has called the essence of noble hearts.

Tristan thus seeks the presence of Isolde of the White Hands because it makes the absent lover and the pain of his longing for her present to him. At least, that is the logic with which Tristan justifies his new desire.

5.5 Tristan’s First Interior Monologue: Name Realism

The identity of the names of the two women brings Tristan into deep confusion. His first interior monologue formulates the uncertainty about the identity of the Isoldes, caused by the identical name. In this monologue, Tristan addresses himself to a third person, as it were, to whom he explains his state of mind and his great confusion:

Vil dicke sprach er wider sich:  "Heavens," he would often say to himself, "how far I have gone astray over this name! It plays true and false with my eyes and sense, and utterly bewilders them.

â dê benîe, wie bin ich
von disem namen verirret!
er irret unde wirret
die wârheit und daz lougen
mîner sinne und mîner ougen. [...] 
mîn ouge, daz Îsôte siht,
daz selbe ensiht Îsôte niht.

mir ist Îsôt verre und ist mir bî.
ich vürhte, ich aber g’îsôtet sî
zem anderen mâle.
(18 993–19 007)

mîn ouge, daz Isolde, 
daz selbe ensiht Isolde niht.
mir ist Isolde verre und ist mir bî.
ich vürhte, ich aber g’îsôtet sî
zem anderen mâle.
(18 993–19 007)

The participle g’îsôtet (literally ‘isolded’) boldly formed by Gottfried allows for an ambivalent interpretation: Isolde of the White Hands enchants Tristan as much as Isolde of Ireland did, or Tristan wants to be enchanted by her as much as he was by the Irish Isolde. But that also means that the magic of love was based less on the love potion than on the person.

Although Tristan is still aware that the Isolde he sees every day is not the blonde Isolde who sweetly torments him, he appeases himself with a self-deception. In the heyday of high-scholasticism, which was marked by phil-
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osophical nominalism, he attaches himself to a realism of the name. He ascribes an essence to the name that has so often made him happy, even taking the name for the person.

swaz aber mîn ouge iemer gesiht, But I will always love and cherish
daz mit ir namen versigelt ist, whatever my eyes behold that bears
dem allem sol ich alle vrist the seal of her name, and bless the
liebe und holdez herze tragen, sweet sound which so often has de-
dem lieben namen genâde sagen, lighted me! (291)
der mir sô dicke hât gegeben wunne und wunnelichez leben.
wunne und wunneclîchez leben.
(19 034–040)

Over the bridge of sophistic name realism, Tristan can pass from the absent Isolde to the present one, justifying the replacement of the blonde Isolde by Isolde of the White Hands in his heart.

5.6 Tristan’s Striving for a Purpose-Love

The sight of the second Isolde, which reignites the glowing embers in Tristan’s heart, brings his thoughts away from fighting and knighthood and lets them revolve only around love and pleasure. However, the narrator for Tristan’s relationship with Isolde of the White Hands does not speak of existing or burgeoning love, but only of aspired love, of a purpose-love, which is to reduce the senebürde – i.e., the oppressive burden of true love for the distant Isolde:

er besazte sîne trachte, he bent his thoughts to entertain-
er wolte liebe und lieben wân ing fond hopes and affection for the
wider di maget Îsôte hân, maiden Isolde, and to forcing his
sîn gemüete gerne twingen feelings to love her, in the specula-
z’ir liebe úf den gedingen, tion that, through her, the load of
ob ime sîn senebürde his longing might dwindle. (291)
mit ir iht ringer würde.
(19 056–062)

In order to come closer to his goal, Tristan very consciously uses the means of eye play: *er üebete an ir dicke sîn inneclîche blicke* (19 063-064; ‘He regaled
her constantly with tender looks’, 291). In the relationship to the blonde Isolde, the gaze revealed the true feeling of the heart in manifold situations, while the languishing gaze now serves the deception and the seduction without love.

Isolde of the White Hands is extremely open to his glances, even the “accidental” ones (durch âventiure, 19 078), and so he begins to ponder how he could silence al sîn herzeswære (19 083; ‘all his despondency,’ 292). He strives to see her from morning until night. This intention is encouraged to the best of his ability by her brother Kædin, who for political reasons would like to see a connection between his sister and the savior of his country. Isolde of the White Hands is now doubly motivated and uses the woman’s entire arsenal of weapons, rede und geberde und aliez daz, daz die gedanken stricket (19 106-107; ‘looks and conversation and […] all those things which ensnare a man’s thoughts,’ 292). The versatile measures lead to success. Tristan is filled with a passionate longing as he hears and sees the new Isolde far more gladly than he wished. And so it comes to the common oath of liebe unde geselleschaft (19 121; ‘companionship and affection,’ 292).

5.7 Tristan’s Second Interior Monologue: Self-Accusation

The new, consciously induced love, however, cannot displace the old one. Tristan broods over his erbesmerzen (19 127, ‘old sufferings,’ 292), thinks of the many hardships that the other Isolde had endured for his sake and how she had nevertheless remained steadfast through all her trials. It pains him to the depths of his being that he allowed into his heart any woman other than Isolde or even considered a purpose love.

ich ungetriuwer, waz tuon ich? ich weiz doch wârez alse den tôt:
Mîn herze und mîn leben Îsôt,
an der ich hân g’unsinnet,
diu enmeinet noch enminnet
niht dinges ûf der erden
noch enklan ir niht gewerden
liep wan ich al eine

‘What am I doing, traitor that I am?’ he asked himself in anguish. ‘I know it as sure as death that my heart and my life, Isolde, towards whom I have acted like a man bereft of reason, neither loves nor has in her thoughts any thing on earth, nor can she treasure any thing but me; whereas I love a
Tristan thus deviates from his intentions to pursue a substitute love. He suppresses the desire for Isolde of the White Hands, but nevertheless shows her tender gestures, which she misinterprets and accepts as proof of love. But in reality, as the narrator assures us, “Isolde had robbed Isolde of her Tristan through desire; but now, with desire, Tristan had returned to the love he was born to” (19 176-179). Tristan feels the old pain again, from which he wanted to free himself with the help of the second Isolde.

### 5.8 Tristan’s Stress of Indecision

Committed to his courtly manner, Tristan tries to give pleasure to the girl whose torment of love he notices and to pass the time with *schoeni u maære* (19 188; ‘beautiful stories’, 293), with singing and sometimes also with making music. Tristan’s arts impress the second Isolde no less than the first, who was his pupil in Ireland. The seductive power of music, which was not explicitly mentioned for Tristan’s Irish romantic situation, becomes manifest in Arundel. The joy of the girl, of her brother and of the whole court, however, is based on a false understanding of the ambiguous refrain Tristan brings into his songs: *Îsôt ma drûe, Îsôt m’amic, en vûs ma mort, en vûs ma vie!* (19 213–214 and 19 409–410; ‘Isolde my mistress, Isolde my beloved, in you my life, in you my death!’ 293). Although Tristan sings of the Fair Isolde, he cannot avoid Isolde of the White Hands’s charms, and he again wavers in his love.

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„weder wil ich oder enwil ich? Ich wæne nein, ich wæne já.“
was constantly asking himself. 'I think I do not, and then I think I do.' (294)

Tristans *stæte* (‘constancy’) brings him back to Fair Isolde. His love for her causes him pain and sorrow, visible emotions that everybody attributes to Isolde of the White Hands. Therefore the two spend their time with different sorrows: *ir minne unde ir meine die wären ungemeine* (19 301–302; ‘Their love and affection related to different objects,’ 294; tr. rev.).

Again Tristan proves his courtely manners by trying to comfort the poor girl in her suffering with *bærdan* (‘conduct’) and *mæren* (‘stories’). But this only inflames her passion all the more, and so she, defeated by love, often turns her gestures, speeches and looks so intimately and sweetly to him that he falls for the third time into *zwîvelnôt* (19 352; ‘the stress of indecision,’ 295). The narrator, who likes to illustrate states of the soul with shipping metaphors (cf. 8105; cf. Krohn [1980] 2002, 145), compares Tristan’s state of mind with that of a ship’s wobbling and arouses understanding for the instability of his hero in a generalizing remark:

> Und was dâ cleine wunder an. 
> wan weizgot diu lust, diu den man alle stunde und alle zît lachende under ougen lît, 
> diu blendet ougen unde sin, 
> diu ziuhet ie daz herze hin. 
> (19 357–362)

> And little wonder, for, heaven knows, delight that lies laughing up at a man all the time blinds his eyes and thoughts and keeps tugging at his heart. (295)

The empathic narrator adds a teaching for lovers that also serves to justify Tristan: “one can bear a distant sorrow for an absent love with much greater ease than loving near at hand and missing love within one’s reach” (19 365–368). But Tristan suffers from double adversity:

> er gerte verrer minne und leit durch die grôz ungemach, 
> die er weder enhôrte noch ensach, und enhabete sich der nâhen, die sîn ougen dicke sâhen. 
> (19 376–380)

> He desired love that was far away and endured great anguish for one whom he neither heard nor saw, whilst refraining from one that was near and often before his eyes. (295)
Tristan yearns for blonde Isolde from Ireland and avoids Isolde of the White Hands. Gottfried lets his narrator further express Tristan’s inner situation through games with homonyms:

\[
er \text{ qual nach jener starke} \\
und zôch sich hie von dirre. \\
sus was er beide irre, \\
er wolde unde enwolde \\
Îsolde und Îsolde. (19 389–390)
\]

He suffered torment for the far and retreated from the near. In this way he was cheated of both: he desired yet did not desire Isolde and Isolde. (295)

But Isolde of the White Hands pursues the one who flees her. In a commentary, the narrator clarifies Tristan’s guilt for the behavior of the second Isolde: “It was his fault: she was betrayed,” (19 397). The second Isolde is deceived by Tristan’s ambiguous eyes and tongue. But of all the deceptions to which Tristan exposes the second Isolde, who sincerely adores him, the most fatal is his ambivalent French refrain on “Isôṭ,” who means death and life to him. For, referring to Tristan’s words, the girl follows the fleeing until she “catches up” (erzôch) with him at “love’s fourth stride” (trit) and draws him back to her.

5.9 Tristan’s Third Interior Monologue: Casuistic Justification

With Tristan’s third interior monologue, which extends over 124 verses (19 424–548), Gottfried’s text breaks off. Tristan seeks in it a justification for his inclination to follow the more pleasant life. The love of blonde Isolde robs him of life and reason. If it is ever to be alleviated, it must be done through a new love. He has often read that one love robs another of its power. The mighty Rhine also loses its power if one derives tributaries from it. The same applies to fire, whose power can be reduced by fragmentation (by these arguments Tristan follows Ovid’s Remedies against Love [Remedia Amoris, 444 ff.; cf. Krohn [1980] 2002, 267–268]).

\[
al \text{ ist dem, der dâ minnet.} \\
der hât dem ein geleiches spil. \\
er mag als ofte und alse vil \\
sîn gemüete zegiezen
\]

so it is with a lover – he can play a like gambit. He can draw off the flood of his passion through single channels and parcel out the fire in
mit einzelen vliezen, sînen muot sô manegen enden zeteilen und zesenden, biz daz sîn dâ lützel wirt, daz er mæzlîchen schaden birt. als mag ez ouch mir wol ergân, will ich zeteilen und zelân mîne minne und mîne meine an maneger danne eine. (19 448–460)

The comparisons with the river and fire are replaced by the thought that loyalty and love for the blonde Isolde cannot benefit him, that he wastes his life on her. Isolde and he lead lives too different. To relieve himself, Tristan constructs in an apostrophe to the distant Isolde a difference in which he assumes her infidelity:

nu bin ich trûric, ir sît vrô. sich senent mîne sinne nàch iuwerre minne und iuwer sinne senent sich, ich waene, mæzlîch umbe mich. die vröude, die ich durch iuch verbir, owî owî, die trîbet ir als ofte als iu gevellet. (19 484–492)

Tristan’s insinuation, which blatantly contradicts his own praise of Isolde’s steadfastness, lets him construe defamatory and absurd oppositions: she is married, at home and always together with Mark, while he is lonely in a foreign country. He can’t separate his heart from her, but she doesn’t long for him, can do well without him, doesn’t love him so much that she would have asked for him. But immediately the second voice comes in, and he rebukes himself:


she send a messenger? What am I saying? Where should she send to me, and how could she inquire about the life I am leading? (297)
Again, the pendulum of his inner dialogue strikes in the other direction, and the first voice appears: If someone started looking for him, he would find him. Isolde should have explored all of Cornwall and England, France and Normandy by now, if she really cared. But he means nothing to her. However, he avoids all women for her sake and yet must forgo her too. These are the last words of the text.

5.10 Non-Realized Events

In scholarly research, very different speculations are made about the probable continuation of the story (cf. Dietz 1974, 223–226; Tomasek 2007, 225–227). Even the intention of the last monologue, which must form the basis for a continuation, is not interpreted unanimously. For most interpreters Tristan tries here to legitimize his final turn to Isolde of the White Hands. This would correspond to the further course of the plot in the text by Thomas d’Angleterre, where Tristan marries the second Isolde. It must not be overlooked, however, that Tristan in his monologues is engaged in an inner battle, not between two beloved Isoldes, but between the still passionate but deprived love of the distant, unattainable Isolde and the enticement of the comfort offered by the nearby Isolde. There is no talk of love for Isolde of the White Hands. In Tristan’s monologues, there are two conflicting voices: one discredits the blonde Isolde as succumbing to a comfortable living arrangement not unlike that which tempts Tristan himself, while the other defends Isolde’s uncompromising consistency in love. How this fight ends has not been decided in Gottfried’s romance. The last monologue, which undoubtedly serves more than the earlier ones to justify pragmatic behavior, still contains too many counter-arguments for one to consider the decision in favor of Isolde of the White Hands to have already been made – contrary to the opinion of most experts. The most important argument against the connection with the second Isolde is Tristan’s confession up to the last word that he “loves and cherishes the distant Isolde more than his body and his soul” (19542–543). Here we see Tristan in a state of aporia, and the position of the author, too, is aporetic.

Many experts assume that Gottfried was prevented by illness, death or external circumstances from continuing the text. However, there is also a
completely different explanation to consider: Gottfried possibly recognized that the Thomas solution, namely marriage to Isolde of the White Hands, threatened the ethos and design of his senemære (cf. already Swietering 1932, 186; Krohn [1980] 2002, 270–271). Not only the marriage with the second Isolde, but also the practical suggestions from Ovid’s Remedia Amoris, which come to Tristan’s mind, disavow the high praise of the minne in the so-called “Minnebußpredigt” (12 183-357) and the announcement of the prologue:

ich wil […] wol bemærken von edelen senedæren, die reiner sene wol tâten schîn: ein senedære und ein senedærín, ein man ein wîp, ein wîp ein man, Tristan Isolt, Isolt Tristan. (125–130)

I will story […] well with noble lovers who gave proof of perfect love: A man, a woman; a woman a man, Tristan Isolt, Isolt Tristan. (43)

With pure sene (‘perfect love’), announced by the narrator, the pragmatic solution that Thomas d’Angleterre suggests and with which Tristan flirts is difficult to reconcile. This may be the reason why Gottfried did not complete his work. The thesis of some researchers that Gottfried had intended a fragment is anachronistic. The fragment does not figure as a genre in the Middle Ages (Weber and Hoffmann 1981, 98; Huber [2000] 2013, 148).

It will not be a coincidence that the text breaks off at the very moment when the author has to decide which decision his hero makes. The hero’s ethical aporia becomes the author’s artistic aporia. Tristan is forced to make a decision. He has two options to act. Each would be highly eventful. He could marry the white-handed Isolde according to the story of Thomas d’Angleterre. With this he would betray his love for the blond Isolde and step out of the field of nobles hearts who strive for “sweet bitterness,” “dear suffering,” “joy of heart and longing torment,” into the field of the comfortably situated. The fact that Gottfried lets his hero sink to the moral low point of the third monologue could be interpreted as a symptom that he originally intended to follow Thomas’s story and sought to create a motivation for it in Tristan’s constitution. In contrast to Thomas and the German continuators Ulrich von Türheim and Heinrich von Freiberg, Gottfried, who psychologically deepens the hero and embeds the plot in a philosophy of the minne,
such a regression would have had far-reaching and devastating consequences. Gottfried must have understood this. The other possibility for Tristan would be to renounce the marriage expected by everyone and to leave the court of Kædin and his sister. This consequence, however, which would have been plausible on the level of the figures, would have meant a deviation from the original that was unacceptable for the Middle Ages.

Against the argument that the marriage with the second Isolde would have threatened the ethical and aesthetic coherence of the work, one could argue that Thomas’s step was associated with a decisive reservation that would have reduced this threat for Gottfried’s romance as well: pretending to be ill, Thomas’s Tristan refrains from consummating the marriage. In Thomas’s text, the white-handed confesses to her brother Kædin during a ride that the water splashed up from a puddle “came higher along [her] thighs than did ever the hand of a man or than Tristan ever sought [her]” (Gottfried [Hatto], 320).

Nevertheless, Gottfried could have been hesitant to trace the line of action given by Thomas, since it violated the ethos of the Tristanminne. Julius Schwietering (1932, 186) already argued that even if Gottfried let his hero lead the marriage ascetically, the realization of this marriage meant a deep fall for the inner action, which could hardly be overcome. However, Christoph Huber ([2000] 2013, 148-149) considers the reference to the “inner consistency of Gottfried’s anything-but-conformist text” to be a weak argument: it is hardly conceivable that Gottfried, at the beginning of his work, had not yet known “how he would cope with the end of the subject matter.” But it cannot be ruled out at all that Gottfried – who deepened the psychology of the hero in comparison with Thomas and developed the philosophy of the minne, with which he sought to address the noble hearts – when he arrived at the Isolde of the White Hands episode, could no longer reconcile the course of action of the original with the ethos of his work. So much concern for inner conclusiveness can be attributed even to a medieval poet, despite all caution towards anachronistic projects.

In view of the aporia described above, Gottfried could not have seen any possibility of continuing his work. The romance thus breaks off in the expectation of an event highly relevant to the protagonists, an event which the artistic logic of the extant text forbade to tell. The breaking off of the text is not least caused by the psychology of love, whose contradictions are revealed by Gottfried’s representation of consciousness.
III. Mental Events in English Novels of the 18th and 19th Centuries
6 The Turns of Feeling in Samuel Richardson’s Epistolary Novels

6.1 Pamela, or Virtue Rewarded

In European literature, psychological narration begins with the sentimental English novel of letters and correspondence. Samuel Richardson has created the most powerful patterns for both genres.

The epistolary novel was represented in *Pamela; or, Virtue Rewarded* (1740). Through the letters of a fifteen-year-old girl, Pamela Andrews, Richardson tells the story of a young maid who resists the noble Master Squire B.’s attempts to seduce her with ingenuity and the timely use of fainting spells. She is abducted by the gentleman, who is harassing her with all means at his disposal, and given into the hands of a brutal warden. Since she cannot write any more letters there, she entrusts her emotional distress to her diary. She always asserts that she would rather lose her life than her innocence. When her notes fall into the hands of Mr B., the purity of the soul and the blatant expression of sympathy for her master that appear in them, despite all his pursuits, lead to a conversion of the unscrupulous seducer, who becomes a sincere lover and offers marriage to the steadfast girl. Pamela, who has become aware of her inner inclination towards her abductor, finally accepts his proposal of marriage in all honesty and thus rises to higher society.

This sentimental novel immediately became popular. Nonetheless, voices were soon heard accusing the virtuous heroine of calculation and hypocrisy. Parodies quickly followed, among them Henry Fielding’s *Apology for the Life of Mrs Shamela Andrews* (1741) and *Joseph Andrews* (1742).

The early parodies are a symptom of the fact that the character, intentions and actions of the heroine in the text are not completely consistent with

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47 The entire subtitle reads as follows: *In a Series of Familiar Letters from a Beautiful Young Damsel to Her Parents. Now First Published in Order to Cultivate the Principles of Virtue and Religion in the Minds of the Youth of Both Sexes.*
the author’s objective. Despite Richardson’s purposeful design and his sophisticated strategy of directing the reader’s reactions in a certain direction, reading the novel, as Hans-Peter Mai (1986, 136) states, “still leads to opposing interpretations today and again.” Mai refers, as an extreme example, to the interpretation by William B. Stein (1972), who regards the novel as a playful, highly ironic work and sees in Pamela a cunning intriguer who provides her victim, Mr B, with a fiction of literary phrases and clichés for which he and many readers have fallen (Mai 1986, 139).

Despite its moral message, which was not uncontroversial and perhaps not entirely unambiguous, the novel – which was soon translated into French, German and Italian – had a tremendous effect on the literature of sentimentalism developing in Europe. We can still register the echo in distant Russia, but not without ironic refraction. In Aleksandr Puškin’s novella The Noblewoman-Peasant (Baryšnja krest’janka, 1831), Pamela is the favorite reading of the English governess Miss Jackson, who works on a Russian estate and who reads the sentimental novel twice a year. It cannot be ruled out that the forty-year-old “affected-mademoiselle,” with the white make-up applied too thickly, secretly dreams the dream of ascent that was attributed to Richardson’s virtuous heroine. But the widowed lord of the estate does not make any effort to chase after Miss Jackson, despite his English spleen and his advice to his brown-skinned daughter to put on a little white make-up. Perhaps the Lord’s disinterest is the main reason for the English governess’s dissatisfaction with “barbaric Russia.”

6.1.1 Monoperspectivism and Introspection

Richardson’s novel consists, at least in his first volume, which depicts Pamela’s distress, almost exclusively of the letters of the poor girl, which are either delivered to her parents by secret messengers or, after the strict surveillance of the abductee, go into her secret diary to one day find their way to her parents. Individual letters of reply from the parents, which can be found in the opening parts of the novel, do not yet turn it into a novel of correspondence. Above all, the parents express their concern for the oppressed daughter and exhort her to moral steadfastness: “resolve to lose your Life sooner than your Virtue” (20).^{48}

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The morally resolute girl, however, does not need such reminders at all. In her third letter she assures her father:

[...] that which gives me most Trouble is, that you seem to mistrust the Honesty of your Child. No, my dear Father and Mother, be assured, that, by God’s Grace, I never will do any thing that shall bring your grey Hairs with Sorrow to the Grave. I will die a thousand Deaths, rather than be dishonest any way. (15)

Despite their admonition to virtue, the parents do not represent a position of their own and merely act as addressees of the letters. Pamela’s letters are basically diary entries in which the parents play a passive role (cf. Picard 1971, 39). In her letters Pamela sometimes quotes letters from Mr B. or third persons, which she literally copies. The novel takes on a metapoetic dimension in the ostinato thematization of writing and reading (and re-reading), as well as in the reflections of the writer and reader of the letters.

The quotation of foreign letters is so exact that the perspectival mediation by Pamela is lost. A special role is played by the discourses of other characters, whose detailed depictions in the direct and indirect pattern come into considerable conflict with the perspective of the letter writer copying them. The violation of perspective becomes manifest when the narrator, who acts as editor here, takes the opportunity to clarify certain facts by inserting a letter unknown to Pamela. This non-diegetic narrative instance justifies the interventions with the concern for the context of the events: “A few Words more will be necessary to make the Sequel better understood” (92).

Nevertheless, Pamela, the diegetic narrator of her story, is the only bearer of the narrative point of view (on the monoperspectivity of narration, see Mengel 1997, 73). Picard (1971, 40) explains the contradictory appearance of the heroine, on whom “a strange light of perfidious-naive vanity” falls, despite all modesty, with the monological form, which combines direct experience and reflected self-observation in one instance.

The short time lag between experiencing and narrating means that the difference between the figural perspective – i.e., the view of the narrated Pamela – and the narratorial perspective – i.e., the view of the heroine narrating in the letters – is not very strong. In dramatic developments, however, the figural perspective clearly dominates: the letter writer records the events every hour and immediately reproduces what she perceives, feels and thinks.
about in a synchronous narrative (*writing to the moment*[^49]) as it appears in her consciousness. A kind of direct inner monologue is thus formed in the diegetic narrative, which naturally means a further threat to the letter fiction:

*Five o’Clock is come,*

AND no young ladies! – So that, I fancies – But, hold, I hear their Coach, I believe. I’ll step to the Window. – I won’t go down to them, I am resolv’d –

Good Sirs! good Sirs! What will become of me! Here is my Master come in his fine Chariot! – Indeed he is! What shall I do? Where shall I hide myself! – Oh! what shall I do! Pray for me! But Oh! you’ll not see this! – Now, good Heaven preserve me! if it be thy blessed Will!

*Seven o’Clock.*

THO’ I dread to see him, yet do I wonder I have not. To be sure something is resolved against me, and he stays to hear all her Stories. I can hardly write; yet, as I can do nothing else, I know not how to forbear! – Yet I cannot hold my Pen – How crooked and trembling the Lines! – I must leave off, till I can get quieter Fingers! – Why should the Guiltless tremble so, when the Guilty can possess their Minds in Peace! (182)

The synchronic, basically fiction-breaking narrative enables an introspection that, in its immediacy, anticipates modern representation of consciousness. Richardson addresses the presentation of the life of the soul in the form of synchronic narration in the preface to *Clarissa*:

All the letters are written while the hearts of the writers must be supposed to be wholly engaged in their subjects (the events at the time generally dubious): so that they abound not only in critical situations, but with what may be called instantaneous descriptions and reflections (proper to be brought home to the breast of the youthful reader;) as also with affecting conversations; many of them written in the dialogue or dramatic way.

[^49]: In the preface to his novel *Sir Charles Grandison* (1753), Samuel Richardson writes about “familiar letters, written, as it were, to the moment, while the heart is agitated by hopes and fears, on events undecided” (https://ebooks.adelaide.edu.au/r/richardson/samuel/grandison/preface1.html. View date 7 July 2016. Italics mine – W. Sch.).
“Much more lively and affecting,” says one of the principal character, “must be the style of those who write in the height of a present distress; the mind tortured by the pangs of uncertainty (the events then hidden in the womb of fate;) than the dry, narrative, unanimated style of a person relating difficulties and danger surmounted, can be; the relater perfectly at ease; and if himself unmoved by his own story, not likely greatly to affect the reader.”

Pamela’s interior monologues, which she literally fixes in her notes, sometimes take on a dialogical character. The first volume of the novel thus closes with an extended dialogized interior monologue in which Pamela expresses her doubts about Squire B.’s sincerity:

What shall I do, what Steps take, if all this be designing! – O the Perplexities of these cruel Doubtings! – To be sure, if he be false, as I may call it, I have gone too far, much too far! – I am ready, on the Apprehension of this, to bite my forward Tongue, (or rather to beat my more forward Heart, that dictated to that poor Machine) for what I have said. But sure, at least, he must be sincere for the Time! – He could not be such a practised Dissembler! – If he could, O how desperately wicked is the Heart of Man! – And where could he learn all these barbarous Arts? – If so, it must be native surely to the Sex! – But, silent be my rash Censurings; be hushed, ye stormy Tumults of my disturbed Mind! for have I not a Father who is a Man? – A Man who knows no guile! who would do no Wrong! – who would not deceive or oppress, to gain a Kingdom! – How then can I think it is native to the Sex? And I must also hope my good Lady’s Son cannot be the worst of men! – If he is, hard the Lot of the excellent Woman that bore him! – But much harder the Hap of your poor Pamela, who has fallen into such Hands! – But yet I will trust in God, and hope the best: and so lay down my tired Pen for this Time. (219)

The dialogue with herself leads to a split in two instances in the letter writer. Even after Mr B. wrote to Pamela – “I find I cannot live a Day without you [...] I must be Yours, and only yours” (250–251) – and pleaded with her to

return to his house, Pamela is attacked by serious doubts about B.’s stability. In the following passage her mind turns to the heart in a great apostrophe:

O my exulting Heart! how it throbs in my Bosom, as if it would reproach me for so lately upbraiding it for giving way to the Love of so dear a Gentleman! – But take care thou art not too credulous neither, O fond Believer! Things that we wish, are apt to gain a too ready Credence with us. This sham Marriage is not yet clear’d up; Mrs. Jewkes, the vile Mrs. Jewkes! may yet instigate the Mind of this Master: His Pride of Heart, and Pride of Condition, may again take place; and a Man that could, in so little a Space, first love me, then hate me, then banish me his House, and send me away disgracefully; and now send for me again, in such affectionate Terms; may still waver, may still deceive thee. Therefore will I not acquit thee yet, O credulous, fluttering, throbbing Mischief! that art so ready to believe what thou wishest: And I charge thee to keep better Guard than thou hast lately done, and lead me not to follow too implicitly thy flattering and desirable Impulses. Thus foolishly dialogu’d I with my Heart; and yet, all the time, this Heart is Pamela. (251)

6.1.2 Squire B.’s Conversion

The unexpected twist in Pamela’s story raises two questions: what made the noble seducer offer the maid marriage, which was an unheard-of procedure in the society of the time, and how could the persecuted innocent accept his proposal with all her heart after the sinister and cruel hardships to which the aristocrat had subjected her? We ask here about the marriage not in keeping with Pamela’s status as an event in the social world of the novel (see Watt 1957, 135–172; Hühn 2010b), but about the mental changes that make the “happy ending” possible.

Squire B.’s motives can only be represented in two ways in the monoperspectival presentation: by Pamela’s observation of his behavior and by her rendering of his oral and written utterances. Her observations and renditions are, of course, influenced by the adequacy/inadequacy of her perception and the accuracy/inaccuracy of her memory.

Pamela observes Mr B. attentively and registers every sign that her words and letters are moving him. She observes such signs on B. especially
when she has addressed one of her numerous, and simultaneously accusing and submissive, speeches to him:

Indeed, Sir, said I, it is impossible I should be ungrateful to your Honour, or disobedient, or deserve the Names of Boldface or Insolent, which you call me, but when your Commands are contrary to that first Duty, which shall ever be the Principle of my Life!
He seem’d to be moved, and rose up, and walked into the great Chamber two or three Turns, leaving me on my Knees; and I threw my Apron over my Face, and laid my Head on a Chair, and cry’d as if my Heart would break, having no Power to stir. (31)

Pamela also notes how other people comment on Mr B.’s emotional responses to her words and humble behavior: “She [Mrs. Jervis] said, he [Mr B.] seem’d mov’d at what I said, and at my falling on my Knees to him, and my Prayer for him, at my going away” (38). Even after the insistent intercession of third persons for her, Pamela notes traces of Mr B.’s sensitivity in her notes: “My Master himself, harden’d Wretch as he was, seem’d a little moved, and took his Handkerchief out of his Pocket, and walk’d to the Window […]” (74). Pamela notes conscientiously when B. himself confesses that he is moved by her words: “And tho’ I am not pleased with all you said Yesterday, while I was in the Closet, yet you have mov’d me more to admire you than before” (84); “Why, my dear, said he, I was much moved, you may be sure, when I came to reflect” (484). Finally, Pamela observes sensitivity even in the brutal warden Mrs Jewkes: “Mrs Jewkes came up to me again, and found me bathed in Tears. She seemed, as I thought, to be moved to some Compassion” (165).

Pamela’s attention to the emotional responses of those who have wreaked and witnessed her suffering reveals that the sharpest critical interpretation of her, that she calculatingly forced her marriage and social advancement, is not so far-fetched.

Before Pamela hands over her notes to Mr B., she explains how she will interpret each of his possible responses:

Sir, said I, I have wonder’d you should be so desirous to see my bold Stuff; and for that very Reason, I have thought it a very good or a very bad Sign. What, said he, is your good Sign? – That it may not have an unkind Effect upon your temper, at last, in my Favour, when you see
me so sincere. Your bad Sign? Why, that if you can read my Reflections and Observations upon your Treatment of me, with Tranquillity, and not be mov’d, it is a Sign of a very cruel and determin’d Heart. (239)

When Pamela watches with pleasure how Mr B. reacts to her notes, she raises the suspicion that she might have had this effect in mind when writing them.

In a novel whose author aimed at religious edification, calculation must of course be ruled out as an explicit motive of the heroine. Nonetheless, as Pamela attributes her happiness to Providence in the following passage, she also states the matters have turned out as she had hoped, indicating some intentionality on her part and thus implying that Providence did not act alone:

What a happy Creature, my dear Mother, is your Pamela! [...] see the wonderful Ways of Providence! The very Things that I most dreaded his seeing or knowing, the Contents of my Papers, have, as I hope, satisfy’d all his scruples, and been a Means to promote my Happiness. (308–309)

The turning point of the story is reached when Mr B. has released his prisoner and read the letters she has written to her parents. The reversal occurs in stages fixed in Mr B.’s letters. In a first letter, he expresses that she was more dangerous to him than he was to her, for “I was just upon resolving to defy all the Censures of the World, and to make you my Wife” (247). In a second letter, delivered by a riding messenger to Pamela while she is en route to her parents, Mr B. regrets that he had let her travel to protect his peace. He has discovered in her diary so much generous concern for him, as well as her confession that she could not hate him, regardless of his maltreatment of her. He asks her not to continue the journey to her parents and to return to him, “for I find I cannot live a Day without you” (250). Pamela follows this request despite her remaining doubts about B.’s consistency.

6.1.3 Pamela’s Recognizing of Her Love

Already in her first letters, Pamela, subconsciously, leaves behind signs of her sympathy for Mr B. In her first letter, which is full of praise for his goodness, she mentions with conspicuous emphasis that Mr B. took her by the hand in front of all the servants of the house after his mother’s death and gave her ample wages by his own hand. The praise arouses the suspicion
and fears of her parents, who hurry to warn their daughter of such dubious kindness from her new master. In the following letters, Pamela emphasizes B.’s generosity and determination to keep her as a maid, even though his sister thinks she is too pretty for a bachelor’s house.

A clear symptom of B.’s attraction is Pamela’s lack of determination to leave B.’s house. After B. has attacked her in the summer cottage with hugs and kisses, she makes the distance between them clear to him, dries her tears so as not to expose him to others, and considers her options:

[…] after I had dry’d my Eyes, I went in, and began to ruminate with myself what I had best to do. Sometimes I thought I would leave the House, and go to the next Town, and wait an Opportunity to get to you; but then I was at a Loss to resolve whether to take away the Things he had given me or no, and how to take them away: Sometimes I thought to leave them behind me, and only go with the Cloaths on my Back, but then I had two Miles and a half, and a By-way, to go to the Town; and being pretty well dress’d, I might come to some Harm, almost as bad as what I would run away from; and then may-be, thought I, it will be reported, I have stolen something, and so was forc’d to run away; and to carry a bad Name back with me to my dear Parents, would be a sad Thing indeed! (24–25)

Sent home to her parents by Mr B., who was angered by her resistance of his advances, Pamela finds many reasons to postpone her departure. One of her motives is that she wants to finish the waistcoat she sews for B. She writes her parents that she is busy with her most beautiful work from morning until night, because she wants to be with them as soon as possible. Pamela will find all sorts of reasons not to start the journey to her parents in the time that follows.

The well-meaning Mrs Jervis explains the paradoxes of courtship to Pamela: “I begin to [believe what Mrs Jervis told me, that] think he likes me, and can’t help it; and yet strives to conquer it; and so finds no way but to be cross to me” (54). Nevertheless, Pamela shows herself in her simple dress as a peasant girl, with which she triggers extreme delight in Mr B. and aggravates her distress. So the sharp-sighted Mrs Jervis states: “you owe some of the Danger to the lovely

51 In brackets, the electronic version provided by Project Gutenberg (http://www.gutenberg.org/browse/authors/r#a1959); in the version of Oxford’s Worlds Classics quoted here, Pamela herself has insight into the psychology of love.
Appearance you made” (62). Pamela now wishes these clothes into the fire, but those skeptical of her innocence will again see an act of seduction in the rural costume. All the more so as the sentimental narration in the succession of Richardson attests a special seduction potential to the peasant girl’s traditional costume for the young nobleman with a weakness for the genre paysan. Just think of Puškin’s The Noblewoman-Peasant, the story in which the daughter of the landowner conquers the previously impregnable heart of her proud neighbor in rural disguise as an illiterate peasant girl.

In the following notes, Pamela increasingly expresses the fear that her heart could not cope with the impetuous onslaught of B.’s wooing. But she is determined “to set all [her] wits at work” (113).

Although she wishes to hate her persecutor for his wrongdoings, Pamela has to find out at a glance in her heart that she is incapable of doing so: “What is the Matter, with all his ill Usage of me, that I cannot hate him?” (179). Pamela increasingly reflects on the paradox of her affection, which she can no longer hide from herself.

Pamela is deeply moved by B.’s first letter, which she receives on her journey to her parents. For the first time she tells her parents about her feelings for Mr B.:

But, to be sure, I must own to you, that I shall never be able to think of any body in the World but him! – Presumption! you will say; and so it is: But Love is not a voluntier Thing: – Love, did I say! – But, come, I hope not! – At least it is not, I hope, gone so far as to make me very uneasy: For I know not how it came, nor when it began; but creep, creep it has, like a Thief upon me; and before I knew what was the Matter, it look’d like Love. (248)

In its middle, in the edition of Oxford’s Worlds Classics on page 250, the novel of the virtue rewarded may as well have ended; the author proceeds to solve further entanglements, but these are not significant for the study of the mental event. In its second part, the novel changes its genre: it becomes an exchange of letters novel. The married heroine now addresses her letters to various people in society and receives letters from them. For the two heroes, however, the decisive conversion has already been achieved. Squire B., in the face of the moving notes of his prisoner, has reached the point of contrition and offers marriage to the maid, disregarding the judgment of the world. And Pamela, despite all the repression of her feelings, has managed
to admit what the attentive reader has long discerned from her reactions, that she sincerely loves her persecutor and abductor.

The two conversions are linked: Mr B’s remorse and his proposal of marriage are inconceivable without Pamela’s expressions of sympathy for her master in spite of all the hardships to which he subjected her.

6.2 *Clarissa, or The History of a Young Lady*

In Richardson’s second novel – *Clarissa, or The History of a Young Lady* (1747-1748), a lengthy work at over 1500 pages – the author identifies himself in the subtitle as *Editor of Pamela*. Clarissa corrects some weaknesses of the first work. Instead of a monoperspectival letter novel, Richardson presents a correspondence novel in which, apart from secondary characters, four main characters are involved: Clarissa, the beautiful and intelligent young woman from a bourgeois home; Robert Lovelace, an attractive, witty, rhetorically brilliant, and aristocratically successful libertine; Anna Howe, Clarissa’s best friend; and John Belford, a close friend of Lovelace.

6.2.1 Multi-Perspectivism

The entire novel is divided into two double “lines of correspondence” (Picard 1971, 46), comprising the letters between the female and male writers. The female and male lines are developed differently in their respective parts of the novel. At first, the correspondence between Clarissa and Miss Howe dominates, then it is replaced by the male line, and later comes to the fore again. Of the total of 537 letters in the novel, only six have changed between the two main characters – i.e., across the lines of correspondence. By keeping the correspondences largely parallel and not allowing the writers any insight

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53 The entire subtitle reads as follows: *Comprehending the Most Important Concerns of Private Life. And Particularly Showing the Distresses that May Attend the Misconduct Both of Parents and Children, in Relation to Marriage. Published by the Editor of Pamela.*
into the letters of the opposite side, the author enables the reader the privi-
leged position of an overview and creates a “gap in knowledge” between
reader and characters (Picard 1971, 48).

The form of correspondence offers the technical possibility of letting the he-
roes be described both by themselves and by their correspondents, while Pamela
herself had to record the statements she had heard about herself. This lent her
monologue the conflict between modesty and vanity noted by some critics.

The four letter writers represent different perspectives, hold opposing
points of view and exhibit their own composition styles. Also, there are dif-
ferent valuation positions between the two protagonists, Clarissa and Love-
lace, and their respective confidants, Anna and Belford. Their divergence on
important ethical questions leads to an axiological multi-perspectivism.

The novel centers around the letters of Clarissa and Lovelace. While
Clarissa’s letters naturally revolve around questions of ethics, the re-education
of Lovelace and descriptions of her situation, which was in all respects oppres-
sive, the unscrupulous libertine shines with shameless confessions about his
character, the passions dominating him and his series of machinations. The lust
of intrigue and the triumph of overcoming a wise and vigilant woman give him
the elation of an inventive and strategic spirit. The following passage from a let-
ter to Belford is an example of his contemptible brilliance:

What, as I have often contemplated, is the enjoyment of the finest woman
in the world, to the contrivance, the bustle, the surprises, and at last the
happy conclusion of a well-laid plot? – The charming roundabouts, to
come the nearest way home – the doubts; the apprehensions; the heart-
achings, the meditated triumphs – These are the joys that make the bless-
ing dear – For all the rest, what is it? – What but to find an angel in imag-
ination dwindled down to a woman in fact? (Letter 271, 920)

With the reduction of the serious social gap between the main figures in Pam-
ela, the problem changes. Clarissa is no longer about social advancement, but
about the conflict between the duty to the family and the right to love, and
ultimately about the young woman’s struggle for self-determination. Clarissa
vehemently rejects the bridegroom chosen by her family and sees
no other salvation than to be abducted by Lovelace. Despite a certain mis-
trust, which she has towards the libertine, who is by no means idealized by
her, she is secretly devoted to him. Although Lovelace affirms to love her
and promises her marriage, she does not want to give herself to him until
after the wedding, when she has educated the immoral young man. To lead the man back to the paths of virtue and honor is, as she writes to Anna, her secret joy. Lovelace, however, is out to possess her at any price before the wedding. He is concerned with winning a supposed competition: “shall it be said, that I, a master of arts in love, shall be overmatched by so unpractised a novice?” (Letter 131, 472).

When the notorious woman seducer realizes that he can’t reach his goal with the tried and tested means of his love arts, he employs a heinous cunning, which not only reveals his brutality, but also shows how much he has erred in the object of his love. He has the beloved woman drugged, and then he rapes her, presuming she would forgive him afterward. But the abused woman rejects his supplication. The horror of her degradation throws her into a serious illness, and she slowly fades away. Only after her death can her unbending family recognize their own injustices and Clarissa’s virtue. Lovelace, who sets off on a journey, is killed in a duel by a cousin of Clarissa. The depiction of consciousness in this novel reaches an early climax in the history of European narrative. The reports and confessions of the letter writers reveal in a hitherto unknown immediacy their spiritual life and their evaluative positions. Factual messages are only minor. The letters unfold, on the basis of external occasions, considerations of one’s own situation and the situation of one’s counterpart, considerations between different possibilities of action, the playing through of options, and revelations of one’s mental state. Of particular interest are the letters in which Lovelace reveals the abysses of his soul. In the following passage he reveals to his friend the contradictions that plague him:

Do not despise me, Jack, for my inconsistency – in no two letters perhaps agreeing with myself – Who expects consistency in men of our character? – But I am mad with love – fired by revenge – puzzled with my own devices – My inventions are my curse – my pride my punishment – drawn five or six ways at once – Can she possibly be so unhappy as I? (Letter 216, 694)

6.2.2 Internal Dialogization

The inner dialogue that Richardson has already tested in Pamela’s soliloquies now also includes both the writing figure and the addressee, whose imagined replies the writer anticipates and answers. One example is Love-
lace’s letter to Belford, in which the seducer announces his “arts” to the imaginarily present Clarissa and engages in a dispute with a likewise imagined version of the recipient of the letter:

Oh my best-beloved fair one, repine not thou at the arts by which thou suspectest thy fruitless vigilence has been over-watched. Take care that thou provokest not new ones, that may be still more worthy of thee. If once thy emperor decrees thy fall, thou shalt greatly fall. Thou shalt have cause, if that come to pass, which may come to pass (for why wouldst thou put off marriage to so long a day as till thou hadst reason to be convinced of my reformation, dearest?) [...] Thou wilt not dare, methinks I hear thee say, to attempt to reduce such a goddess as this, to a standard unworthy of her excellencies. It is impossible, Lovelace, that thou shouldst intend to break through oaths and protestations so solemn. That I did not intend it, is certain. That I do intend it, I cannot (my heart, my reverence for her, will not let me) say. But knowest thou not my aversion to the state of shackles? – And is she not IN MY POWER? And wilt thou, Lovelace, abuse that power which – Which what, puppy? – which I obtained not by her own consent, but against it. But which thou never hadst obtained, had she not esteemed thee above all men.

(Letter 99, 401)

In the staged dialogue, which follows the apostrophe to the absent Clarissa, the letter writer assumes that the imaginary interlocutor has objections. Of course, they come from his own consciousness and remain in his horizon. This is the category of “someone else’s anticipated replica,” which for Mixail Baxtin (1929, 81–101) belongs to the forms of the “double voiced word.” The inner dialogue staged in the letter is one of those techniques of direct representation of consciousness with which Richardson introduces a new development in narrative literature.

The apostrophes to the imaginarily present Clarissa and the staged dialogue with the imaginarily responding Belford mark a key passage of the novel. In the two discourses, the author presents a ruthless picture of Lovelace’s malevolent brutality and his narcissistic joy at it.
What is relevant for the history of consciousness-representing techniques is that *Clarissa* already contains forms of text interference, even in the form of free indirect discourse. The latter appears in Letter 2 (to Anna), in which Clarissa reports on her older sister Arabella’s encounters with Lovelace. The situation is tense: the sister expects a proposal from Lovelace but is not sure of her attractiveness. Arabella’s speeches (or their activation in Clarissa’s memory) are all reproduced in FID, which is more or less manifest (here marked by italics). In the figural parts, a slight distancing of Clarissa from Arabella’s valuations can be discerned, but sometimes also an openly ironic accentuation.

My sister made me a visit there the day after Mr Lovelace had been introduced, and seemed highly pleased with the gentleman. *His birth, his fortune in possession, a clear 2000 [L a year], as Lord M. had assured my uncle; presumptive heir to that nobleman’s large estate; his great expectations from Lady Sarah Sadleir and Lady Betty Lawrence who, with his uncle, interested themselves very warmly (he being the last of his line) to see him married.*

“So handsome a man! – O her beloved Clary!” (for then she was ready to love me dearly, from the overflowings of her good humour on his account!) “He was but too handsome a man for her! – Were she but as amiable as somebody, there would be a probability of holding his affections! – For he was wild, she heard; very wild, very gay; loved intrigue. But he was young; a man of sense: would see his error, could she but have patience with his faults, if his faults were not cured by marriage!” (Letter 2, 42)

FID in the first paragraph is already quite clearly geared to the evaluation horizon of the character’s text (here, Arabella’s speech), mostly by mentioning the social advantages of the aspired candidate. Clarissa would have chosen, named and accentuated Lovelace’s merits differently. The emotional exclamations that introduce the second paragraph reinforce the figural coloration of the report, especially in the features of evaluation and lexicon. Here, at the latest, the less attentive reader will also diagnose FID.

This is another key passage in the novel. Clarissa describes her sister Arabella’s enthusiasm for Lovelace’s expected marriage proposal. With the
ironic accents in her rendering, she also distances herself from Arabella’s expectation that if the wild young man were not healed by marriage, he would see his mistakes, thanks to her patience. Just the illusion that Arabella might succeed in improving the libertine before marriage will then fall to Clarissa herself. Therefore, even when Lovelace first appears on the novel’s pages, Arabella’s illusionary hope and Clarissa’s sober distance from her contain a foreshadowing of Clarissa’s tragic end. Clarissa is brought into play as a possible object of Lovelace’s affections by no one other than Arabella herself, who is jealous of her more beautiful sister: “He was but too handsome a man for her! – Were she but as amiable as somebody, there would be a probability of holding his affections!”

FID becomes double-voiced, openly ironic, when Clarissa cites the sister’s explanation that Lovelace did not even make an application during his second visit:

[…] my sister found out a reason, much to Mr Lovelace’s advantage, for his not improving the opportunity that was given him. – It was bashfulness, truly, in him. (Bashfulness in Mr Lovelace, my dear!) – Indeed, gay and lively as he is, he has not the look of an impudent man. But I fancy it is many, many years ago, since he was bashful. (Letter 2, 42)

Lovelace then actually makes Arabella a proposal, but only half-heartedly and consciously in a situation that does not favor success. Arabella decides to reject the proposal – to the secret satisfaction of the applicant – in the hope that the procedure will soon be renewed with more fire.

When Clarissa tells her friend Anna about the refusal, the direct discourse of her sister – which, as in the citation quoted above, is in quotation marks – again develops into a classical FID. Its emergence in a DD passage can be seen as a model of this hybrid pattern. The FID here in quotation marks here shows the position of the figural speech between literal quotation and a narrative about it. Here again we have the complex situation that FID does not reproduce Arabella’s words themselves, but rather their reconstruction in the consciousness of Clarissa, who remembers them and communicates them in a letter.

My sister was not wanting to herself on this occasion, but made a virtue of necessity; and the man was quite another man with her. “A vain creature! Too well knowing his advantages; yet those not what she had conceived them to be! – Cool and warm by fits and starts; an ague-like lover.
A steady man, a man of virtue, a man of morals was worth a thousand of such gay flutterers. Her sister Clary might think it worth her while perhaps to try to engage such a man; she had patience; she was mistress of persuasion; and indeed, to do the girl justice, had something of a person. But as for her, she would not have a man of whose heart she could not be sure for one moment; no, not for the world; and most sincerely glad was she that she had rejected him.” (Letter 3, 45)

Again, the FID is completely focused on the sister’s values and language. But there is a new, negative position Arabella takes on Lovelace after his refusal, which did not lead to the anticipated renewal of the proposal. However, it should be noted that Clarissa – with her patience, persuasiveness and personality – seems here to be a suitable partner for the applicant, who has now been harmlessly reevaluated as a “gay flutterer.”

Willi Bühler (1937, 48) recognizes Richardson’s FID, of whose uses he cites numerous examples, only as a “coincidental” phenomenon that does not yet play the role of an elaborate device. The evaluation of the quoted passages, however, must lead to the conclusion that Richardson certainly uses the device as a means of representing consciousness in certain key situations of the mental events of his figures. And he does not use it without virtuosity. Consider the multiple-perspective refraction: the diegetic narrator describes to her friend the memories of the verbal reactions of her sister, in which she herself, the narrator, plays the role of the envied rival.

6.2.4 Mental Developments

From the point of view of mental events, Clarissa is a counterpart to Pamela. Richardson contrasts his earlier morality tale of the repentance and inner reversal of the libertine and the discovered love of the virtuous maid with a narrative in which no mental changes seem to occur at all (apart from Arabella’s disappointed turning away from Lovelace). A closer look, however, will reveal several subtle mental developments.

Lovelace’s atrocity, Clarissa’s rape, is not the result of a turnaround, but is the straightforward continuation of the unscrupulous speeches and actions of the cynical seducer – who does not love, but merely wants to possess at all costs. Although his love for Clarissa, as he perceives it, is boundless, he obsessively pursues the idea of destroying her virtue. After Clarissa’s death,
however, Lovelace falls into a deep crisis, which is accompanied by approaches of remorse and feelings of loss ("my loss in her is the greatest of any man’s"); letter 535, 1481). The profligate now blames his corrupt character on his mother’s upbringing, which did not require him to control him, and he accuses his educators, who have spared him contradiction and disappointment (letter 512). As the last words of the man fatally wounded in the duel, a witness reports Blessed and the three clearly pronounced words Let this expiate (letter 537, 1488). However, there is no evidence of a profound, lasting ethical change that Lovelace could have made, and the change would be too late to have an impact in the History of a Young Lady.

Clarissa’s death is not simply a psycho-physiological consequence of her dishonor but is also a conscious act of will (Mengel 1997, 89). With this intentional act, which is a mental event, she renounces the world. Richardson has elevated the virtuous to a saintly figure who readily anticipates death as her union with the heavenly Bridegroom. Consequently, Clarissa, who has her weaknesses and was divided in her relationship with the seducer between moral distancing and secret sympathy, becomes an unreal-ideal figure: she says farewell to her family members (in the letters 488–492) as a daughter and sister happy in death, and she even forgives her despoiler, whom she no longer loves. The radical transformation of the figure is accompanied by a generic shift: the story of love and seduction becomes the vita of a martyr. Not inappropriately, Ian McEwan lets the heroine of his novel Atonement speak of Clarissa’s “death-fixated virtue.”

Clarissa’s reaction to the disgrace and her transition from trauma to the will to die are no longer the subject of self-observation in the letters. In his didactic-moral intention, the puritanically attuned author replaces the soulful movements of the betrayed and desecrated with typical spiritual motifs of martyrdom.

With the mental events of the two heroes, which are hinted at but not depicted in detail, the form of the correspondence novel has reached its limits. Since the genre remained referred to that observation and linguistically feasible representation which the letter writers could afford out of themselves and which they wanted to open up to the respective addressee, entire dimensions of consciousness had to remain unthematized.

54 New York, NY, 2001, p. 103.
The 146th letter can serve as an example for the limits of consciousness analysis in the letter form. Clarissa pours her heart out to her friend Anna Howe that her father – as her sister told her in a letter – has cursed her for her rejection of Mr Solmes, the family’s chosen bridegroom, and for her escape with Lovelace:

O my best, my only friend! Now indeed is my heart broken! – It has received a blow it never will recover! Think not of corresponding with a wretch who now seems absolutely devoted! How can it be otherwise, if a parent’s curses have the weight I always attributed to them and have heard so many instances of their being followed by! [...] I am in the depth of vapourish despondency. I can only repeat: shun, fly, correspond not with a wretch so devoted as Your Clarissa Harlowe.

The cursed one makes no attempt to fathom the motives of her rigid father or to explore the state of her soul, torn between duty and inclination. Instead, she discharges her pain in an emotional-rhetorical exclamation, which does not lack theatricality. Clarissa’s orientation towards the addressee prevents her radical analytical turning back to her own self.

With the representation of the unconscious and semi-conscious, the diegetic narrative and the auto-introspection aimed at communicating to an external addressee were overstrained. Dependent on the pure character’s text and its linguistic fixation, the letter could not express the figure’s subconscious and thus inaccessible thoughts. A different narrative mode was needed to express the suspicious, wavering and indeterminate nature of the life of the soul. Such a mode offered itself in the non-diegetic narrator, who presented a more or less concrete image of the deeper, not clearly fixable movements of the consciousness of his figures in hybrid modes that mixed characters’ text and narrator’s text. The novels of Jane Austen, which present the mental events of the protagonists in the figural perspective of non-diegetic narrators, are the first to realize such a mode in European literatures.
7 Recognizing in Jane Austen’s Novels

One fact is highly revealing for the historical development of the new mode: the figural point of view through a non-diegetic – i.e., third-person – narrator. Jane Austen originally wrote her first works as epistolary novels and, after a few years, transformed them into non-diegetic novels. Her first novel published in the new mode, *Sense and Sensibility*, goes back to the epistolary novel *Elinor and Marianne*, written before 1797. Austen rewrote this work twice before giving it to the press at her own expense (like all later works) in 1811 in non-diegetic form under the pseudonym “a lady.” *Pride and Prejudice* (1813) was written from a non-preserved 1796 and 1797 work entitled *First Impressions*, which, as can be deduced (Southam 2001, 58–59), was also an epistolary novel.

The author, who was excellently read and had been writing since her earliest youth, had thus recognized that her intentions could be realized better in the new mode of non-diegetic narration than in the epistolary novel. These intentions did not consist primarily in depicting class contrasts and the difference in gender roles – thematic ideologies on which much critical research concentrates. Austen was primarily concerned with the representation of the inner human being under the conditions of its change.

Ian Watt (1957, 295–296), in his inclination towards large arches, observes in Austen’s work the reconciliation of the opposing traditions of Richardson and Fielding. If one follows this statement, one could say that in the author’s poetics Fielding’s distanced, slightly ironic, non-diegetic narrative and Richardson’s soul exploration of the characters in his epistolary novels were combined. However one tries to describe Austen’s development, the result was the figurally perspectivized non-diegetic novel of consciousness. This type of novel was to play a dominant role in the English narrative literature of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries up to Modernism (Henry James, James Joyce, Virginia Woolf).

It has become a topos of literary historiography to date the beginning of a systematic representation of consciousness in European narrative literature with Janes Austen’s novels. The author is regarded as the first master of FID,
the pattern characteristic of the figurally perspectivized non-diegetic novel. By no means, however, does Austen’s depiction of consciousness use only the concealed forms – i.e., FID and free indirect perception.

Throughout the author’s oeuvre, the classical patterns of marked representation such as direct discourse, indirect representation, and – above all – the consciousness report remain widespread. The dialogue parts of her novels play such a large part in the narrative text and are so meaningful for the representation of plot and motivation that the author has been described as a “master-dramatist with a perfect ear, a perfect sense of timing, a shrewd instinct for climax and anti-climax” (Wright 1953, 72).

The stories told in Jane Austen’s novels are based on mental events. From the first to the last of her six great novels, there are inner turns of the central female characters concerning the evaluation of fellow human beings and the emotional attitude towards them. The revaluation always involves overcoming illusions that were nourished by clichés of literary sentimentalism or – in the case of Northanger Abbey – of Gothic literature. After correcting the misjudgments of the men who are courting them, the female protagonists also become free to choose their ideal husbands. A character’s revision of her or his previous assumptions about others’ natures and motivations is a continuous train of mental events in Austen’s novels. The revision of errors and illusions combines Austen’s poetics with the mentality of the Enlightenment.

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55 Mansfield Park (1814) is an exception here. The heroine Fanny Price does not experience any mental change. She is secure in her feelings from the beginning and acts as a moral compass for the reader and some of the characters in a world marked by questionable norms. The two main characters experience mental events. First, the father of the Bertram family, Sir Thomas, who in the end has to admit that he was wrong about his children and that he did not recognize the true value of his niece Fanny. Even stronger is the turnaround in Edmund Bertram, who in the end has to realize that his supposed love for Mary Crawford was nothing but a product of his imagination and who, after long periods of emotional blindness, comes to true vision and connection with Fanny Price.

56 Austen’s last completed novel, Persuasion (1818, published posthumously), is about recognizing the remaining affection of Captain Wentworth, whose proposal Anne Elliot rejected eight years earlier, having yielded to the fatal “persuasion” of an older and presumably wiser confidante. The mental event in Persuasion is the revitalization of the heroine – who, at the age of 27, had already resigned herself to being an old maid, to love and life. Anne “had been forced into prudence in her youth, [and] she learned romance as she grew older – the natural sequel of an unnatural beginning” (Austen, Persuasion, 21). This transformation from prudence to romance seems to be a reversal of the usual development from romance to prudence. But in this case romance proves to be prudent.
7.1 Sense and Sensibility

7.1.1 Symmetries

Although sense and sensibility characterize the rational Elinor and the impulsive Marianne, these titular terms do not define the two heroines’ roles, as some critics postulate: “Elinor is always a person of sense, and Marianne always a person of sensibility” (Howells 1901, 71). After surviving a crisis favored by their character disposition, both Dashwood sisters succeed in overcoming their original one-sided attitude to life and achieving a new, more balanced and thus more mature attitude. The relevant and unexpected reversal in the sisters’ attitude to life, which does not give reason to fear a relapse, has the character of an event. According to the binary title and the opposition of the two sisters, the events unfold in the form of equivalences or – as Janet Todd (2006, 49) puts it – “in duplicating and shadowing.” Although Sense and Sensibility has not yet completely overcome the “crude antitheses” of the preliminary stages (Litz 1965, 73) and is based on clear symmetries (Wright 1953, 89), the reader should take the similarities and contrasts offered to him or her with caution. The structure in three volumes corresponds to the three phases of the development of the heroines, but this development is by no means as schematically symmetrical as the composition suggests and some critics want to see.

Those who only see the static opposition between the heroines simplify the relationship – as, for example, A. Walton Litz (1965, 74): “Marianne represents Sensibility while Elinor stands for Sense.” Even a contrasting development – such as Andrew Wright’s thesis states, “Elinor and Marianne virtually interchange their positions” (1953, 86) – does not take place in the novel. The sisters’ developments do not form a chiasmus in the sense that where sense was, sensibility now prevails and vice versa. Such radical changes would amount to a transformation of the characters, which cannot be postulated about even the early Jane Austen, an already sober, realistic observer of humans. The new attitudes that the heroines arrive at are mixed and do not simply stand in polar contrast to their original positions nor to each other’s.  

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57 For the antithesis as characteristic figure of the prose of the eighteenth century since Locke see Tanner ([1969] 2003, 356–357).
58 If, like Robert Liddell (1963, 31), one regards Marianne as the main heroine and her sentimental education as the main plot of the novel, one hides the binary root of the novel.
Marianne, the younger of the two sisters, falls victim to the betrayal of love by the charming but reckless Willoughby. As a result of her passion, she becomes seriously ill and barely escapes death. Now she is able to evaluate what happened not only with emotion but also with reason. Cured of her hyper-romantic worldview, which had been nurtured by sentimental literature, she realizes that her sensibilities were short-sighted and that she would not have been happy with the immoral Willoughby (a replica of Richardson’s Lovelace). She announces her intentions for the future to the family: “I have laid down my plan, and if I am capable of adhering to it – my feelings shall be governed and my temper improved. They shall no longer worry others, nor torture myself” (323).

The changed Marianne is now able to appreciate the courting of the silent colonel Brandon, and she learns over time to love the reserved suitor who, with his own selflessness, has taken care of her. However, Marianne’s newly won sense does not completely rule out the old sensibility. In her new happiness, though, she does not altogether forget about Willoughby. This results in a new, completely unexpected symmetry, an equivalence with Brandon, who secretly preserves warm feelings for his first romantic love, even after marrying (Todd 2006, 58–59).

Marianne is also associated with her serious sister by a surprising similarity, which goes beyond the schematic symmetry recognized by some critics. Towards the end of the story, Elinor has been despairing over the seeming impossibility of marrying Edward Ferrars – whom she has secretly loved for a long time, but who has been bound by an old promise to another – when she happily learns Edward has been freed from his betrothal.

Before the supposed obstacle is removed and nothing more stands in the way of the happiness of the two lovers, the self-controlled young woman is tried by the oppositional disposition of character. The temptation emanates precisely from the young man who had already turned Marianne’s head (Todd 2006, 55–56).

Willoughby arrives on a cold and stormy night with howling wind and rain beating against the windows (circumstances that seem to form his romantic sphere) in a four-in-hand carriage in front of the house, in which Marianne – of whose serious illness he has heard – lies unconscious in fever madness. Elinor receives him with an expression of horror. Willoughby persuades the initially reluctant to listen to the justification for his behavior towards Marianne, not his confession of guilt and remorse. The Romantic seducer who immediately sets off into the nightly storm after spoken self-defense leaves Elinor behind “too much oppressed by a crowd of ideas, widely differing in themselves, but of which sadness was the general result, to think even of her sister” (311). Deeply touched by Willoughby’s words Elinor resumes for herself the unexpected effect of the seducer on her, which the narrator reproduces in a slightly figurally colored report of consciousness:

Willoughby, he, whom only half an hour ago she had abhorred as the most worthless of men, Willoughby, in spite of all his faults, excited a degree of commiseration for the sufferings produced by them, which made her think of him as now separated for ever from her family, with a tenderness, a regret, rather in proportion, as she soon acknowledged within herself – to his wishes than to his merits. She felt that his influence over her mind was heightened by circumstances which ought not in reason to have weight; by that person of uncommon attraction, that open, affectionate, and lively manner which it was no merit to possess; and by that still ardent love for Marianne, which it was not even innocent to indulge. But she felt that it was so, long, long before she could feel his influence less. (311)

Replaced by her mother at her sister’s bedside, Elinor cannot find peace after a tense, sleepless night:

Willoughby, ‘poor Willoughby’, as she now allowed herself to call him, was constantly in her thoughts; she would not but have heard his vindication for the world, and now blamed, now acquitted herself for having judged him so harshly before. (312)
Even the self-controlled, rational Elinor has her sensibility, which the voice of sense must contradict.61

Therefore, neither of the two attitudes designated by the antithetical titular terms can be assigned to either of the two sisters as her fixed character role, nor does their chiastic reversal do justice to the work. Maintaining the original symmetry, the design of the novel has become much more complex – especially more complex than the conventional novels operating with fixed antitheses, which Austen found when she was working at the preliminary stage with the title Elinor and Marianne: e. g., Maria Edgeworth’s Letters of Julia and Caroline (1795; cf. Litz 1965, 74–78). In this respect the criticism must be relativized that Austen in Sense and Sensibility did not completely avoid the schematic antithetics of the eighteenth century or at least did not find a convincing way to overcome the stereotypical nature of conventional narrative in terms of subject matter, composition and language, which is why the work is rightly perceived by the audience as the least interesting of her great novels (Litz 1965, 72–83).62

7.1.2 Narratorial and Figural Presentation of Consciousness

The narrative point of view in this almost geometrically constructed novel (Tanner [1969] 2003, 357) is asymmetrical. Marianne, who is rarely described from her own internal perspective, is almost entirely filtered through Elinor’s perception and mental processes (W. Müller 1977, 90; Stanzel 1979, 174;

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61 The nocturnal scene between Willoughby and Elinor is taken into account in few of the novel’s interpretations (Janet Todd 2006 is an exception). For Robert Garis (1968, 66), on the other hand, who rates the novel very critically, Elinor’s temptation by Willoughby is the only credible scene in “this truly perverse novel.” According to Garis, the author succeeds in presenting the learning process of her protagonists and the desired “deep change of mind and heart” in a credible manner only if she directly observes the learning character and the learning process and presents the rest of the plot from this perspective, through the prism of this experience. What is characteristic of the underestimation of the irritating scene is that it is also ignored in film adaptations, or its punch line is lost. The former is the case in the otherwise good movie from 1995 by director Ang Lee based on the script by Emma Thompson with Emma Thompson and Kate Winslet in the leading roles: the scene is completely omitted here. The 2008 BBC mini-series – in three parts of 175 minutes, with Hattie Morahan and Charity Wakefield, directed by John Alexander – includes the encounter between Willoughby and Elinor, but the script deviates from the novel in two decisive ways: 1) Willoughby apologizes and asks for forgiveness; 2) Willoughby has no discernible effect on Elinor. There is no trace of attraction, and thus the scene has basically lost its function.

62 The criticism of the supposed schematism was put into perspective by Tony Tanner ([1969] 2003, 356–357).
Todd 2006, 53). As Willi Bühler has already pointed out, Elinor herself emerges “not so much through actions as through her reflections.” Shaped in FID, her reflections form “holding points in the action at which the event is observed” (W. Bühler 1937, 147).

However, FID in this early novel of the first master of this pattern has not yet the dissemination and elaborateness as in her more mature works (W. Müller 1977; 1984; Todd 2006, 53). The representation of consciousness is still largely narratorial, in that ironically distanced tone that is also characteristic of the narrators’ texts in Austen’s later novels. Franz Stanzel (1984, XVI) would find it difficult to accommodate the changing, sometimes narratorial, sometimes figural point of view in his famous “typological circle” of “narrative situations” and novel forms.

In what follows, there are two chains of motifs regarding Elinor’s mental reactions to important discoveries: the first pertains to those places where Elinor learns that her beloved Edward is engaged, and the second to moments she realizes Edward is free to marry whom he pleases.

7.1.3 Elinor’s Turn from Misfortune to Happiness

In chapter 22, the last of volume I, Elinor must learn from Lucy Steel that she, Lucy, is engaged to Edward:

What felt Elinor at that moment? Astonishment, that would have been as painful as it was strong, had not an immediate disbelief of the assertion attended it. She turned towards Lucy in silent amazement, unable to divine the reason or object of such a declaration; and though her complexion varied, she stood firm in incredulity, and felt in no danger of an hysterical fit, or a swoon. (124)

Elinor’s astonishment, her doubt and her firmness are shaped by the clearly profiled narrator, who anticipates a question from his or her reader, in a report of consciousness that is purely narratorial – i.e., contains no traces of contagion by the character’s text. The convincing evidence presented by Lucy Steel for the latter’s formal engagement to Edward, however, shakes Elinor’s composure:
[... ] for a few moments, she was almost overcome – her heart sunk within her, and she could hardly stand; but exertion was indispensably necessary; and she struggled so resolutely against the oppression of her feelings, that her success was speedy, and for the time complete. (128–129)

Again, the narrator presents the struggle of Elinor’s self-control with the overwhelming emotion in narratorial perspective, with pure consciousness report. Only the call “but exertion was indispensably necessary” sounds a little figural in the evaluation it expresses.

The conversation ends with the triumphant fiancée mentioning the ring in which she has had a lock of hair grabbed and which Edward wears constantly. Elinor may have seen the ring: “I did’ said Elinor, with a composure of voice, under which was concealed an emotion and distress beyond any thing she had ever felt before. She was mortified, shocked, confounded” (129). So Elinor can still hide her overwhelming emotion and the narrator can present her inner world narratorialy, in apt expressions that convey Elinor’s impression of finality.

This first chain of motifs is taken up again in chapter 48. The Dashwoods’ servant mentions to the mother and sisters that Mr Ferrars has wed. Marianne sees Elinor turning white and suffering a hysterical fit. The mother also looks at the older daughter and realizes how much she is suffering from the news. The servant had seen the “former Miss Steele” in a carriage, and Mr Ferrars, leaning back, also sat in the carriage, but he said nothing. Miss Steele was now called Mrs Ferrars. Mrs Dashwood now understands that it was a mistake to rely on Elinor’s own account of her experiences, that her daughter deliberately played down her pain to spare her. Mrs Dashwood fears that she has been unfair, inattentive, and even heartless to her older daughter in focusing on Marianne, that she has forgotten over Marianne’s visible, haunting grief, that Elinor almost suffers as much, albeit “certainly with less self-provocation, and greater fortitude” (331).

The second chain of motifs to be examined is the transition from silent suffering to the happiness of love that occurs to Elinor. It happens in chapter 48 (the antepenultimate chapter of the novel). The chapter begins with Elinor’s reflections. She admits that as long as Edward was unmarried, she unconsciously held the hope that something would prevent his marriage to
Lucy. The narratorial report of consciousness, in which this admission is presented, is followed by a presentation that alternates between different modes: consciousness report (simply underlined in the following quotation), indirect consciousness-representation (doubly underlined), FID (meandering underlined), free indirect perception (dotted underlined), direct interior discourse (dashed):

Elinor now found the difference between the expectation of an unpleasant event, however certain the mind may be told to consider it, and certainty itself. [...]  

But he was now married; and she condemned her heart for the lurking flattery, which so much heightened the pain of the intelligence.  

That he should be married soon, before (as she imagined) he could be in orders, and consequently before he could be in possession of the living, surprised her a little at first. But she soon saw how likely it was that Lucy, in her self-provident care, in her haste to secure him, should overlook every thing but the risk of delay. They were married, married in town, and now hastening down to her uncle’s. What had Edward felt on being within four miles from Barton, on seeing her mother’s servant, on hearing Lucy’s message! (332)

Elinor expects that one of her London acquaintances will inform her about Edward’s marriage. But day after day, no such news arrives. “Though uncertain that any one were to blame, she found fault with every absent friend. They were all thoughtless or indolent” (333).  

In response to Elinor’s impatient question about Colonel Brandon, from whom she expects accurate information about Edward Ferrars, Mrs Dashwood replies that she wrote Brandon and that he must come in any minute to the door.

This was gaining something, something to look forward to. Colonel Brandon must have some information to give.

Scarcely had she so determined it, when the figure of a man on horseback drew her eyes to the window. He stopped at their gate. It was a gentleman, it was Colonel Brandon himself. Now she could hear more; and she trembled in expectation of it. But – it was not Colonel Brandon – neither his air – nor his height. Were it possible, she must
say it must be Edward. She looked again. He had just dismounted; – she could not be mistaken, – it was Edward. She moved away and sat down. "He comes from Mr Pratt’s purposely to see us. I will be calm. I will be mistress of myself." (333)

The three women look at each other and silently wait for their visitor to enter. Edward’s face is not exactly happy, not even in Elinor’s eyes. Upon being greeted by Mrs Dashwood, he blushes, and his speech stumbles incomprehensibly. Elinor, who has found her voice again, begins to talk about the weather. The embarrassing pause that then occurs is ended by Mrs Dashwood, who considers herself obliged to ask whether Mrs Ferrars is all right. Edward’s hasty confirmation is followed by another pause.

The following dialogue shapes the metabolé in the Aristotelian sense, the “reversal of ignorance in recognition.” What in this dialogue looks like misunderstanding or dullness of comprehension of the participants is in reality the cautious, hesitant approach to a truth that is still secretly hoped for, despite the presumption of that which is feared:

Elinor resolving to exert herself, though fearing the sound of her own voice, now said,

"Is Mrs. Ferrars at Longstaple?"

"At Longstaple! – he replied, with an air of surprise – “No, my mother is in town.”

“I meant,” said Elinor, taking up some work from the table, “to inquire after Mrs Edward Ferrars.”

She dared not look up; – but her mother and Marianne both turned their eyes on him. He colored, seemed perplexed, looked doubtingly, and after some hesitation, said,

“Perhaps you mean – my brother – you mean Mrs – Mrs Robert Ferrars.”

“Mrs Robert Ferrars!” – was repeated by Marianne and her mother in an accent of the utmost amazement; – and though Elinor could not speak, even her eyes were fixed on him with the same impatient wonder. He rose from his seat, and walked to the window, apparently from not knowing what to do; took up a pair of scissors that lay there, and while spoiling both them and their sheath by cutting the latter to pieces as he spoke, said, in a hurried voice,
“Perhaps you do not know – you may not have heard that my brother is lately married to – to the youngest – to Miss Lucy Steele.”

His words were echoed with unspeakable astonishment by all but Elinor, who sat with her head leaning over her work, in a state of such agitation as made her hardly know where she was.

“Yes,” said he, “they were married last week, and are now at Dawlish.” (334–335)

In this dialogue, which forms the culmination of the novel’s plot, consciousness is represented not only explicitly, but also and especially implicitly. In Section 2.8, a distinction was made between indicative and symbolic representation for the implicit mode. Both are active here. Indicatively, the inner state of the protagonists is expressed by their mannerism of speech, for example, by the indirect question about the condition of “Mrs Ferrars.” Also indicative is Elinor’s avoidance of looking at Edward, and of course her fear of the direct, purposeful question. What is meaningful is that Elinor, when she asks precisely about “Mrs Edward Ferrars,” picks up her handiwork from the table and thus finds a reason not to look at her interlocutor. Edward’s behavior is revealing, depicted here through the perception of the unbelieving and impatient heroine. One eye-catching symptom of Edward’s inner condition, which Elinor must recognize, is that when he speaks he cuts a case into pieces with the scissors he accidentally finds. This action betrays Edward’s mental tension. But it also has symbolic meaning, which Elinor will understand: in cutting the case Edward metaphorically cuts the ties of his ill-considered vows to Lucy Steele, which have so far restricted him, and thus frees him from the shackles of the promise that has bound him.

In her moment of anagnórisis, the recognition of the true circumstances, Elinor reacts with an outburst of feelings of happiness, characteristically without Edward having even hinted at a marriage proposal: “Elinor could sit it no longer. She almost ran out of the room, and as soon as the door was closed, burst into tears of joy, which at first she thought would never cease” (335).

Edward, who then fell into deep brooding, leaves the house and approaches the village. The facetious narrator ponders:

His errand at Barton, in fact, was a simple one. It was only to ask Elinor to marry him; – and considering that he was not altogether inexperienced in such a question, it might be strange that he should feel so
uncomfortable in the present case as he really did, so much in need of encouragement and fresh air. (336)

After having described Edward’s feelings of happiness and his grateful cheerfulness in detail, the narrator turns again to Elinor:

But Elinor – how are her feelings to be described? [...] she was oppressed, she was overcome by her own felicity; and happily disposed as is the human mind to be easily familiarized with any change for the better, it required several hours to give sedateness to her spirits, or any degree of tranquillity to her heart. (338)

“To be mistress of [her]self,” Elinor has succeeded up to Edward’s explanation, but now the emotion that she has restrained and suppressed for so long breaks out of her. Her development, however, is by no means from sense to sensibility. She had emotions from the very beginning, but she controlled them. Now she freely expresses her feelings, which she had not allowed herself to show.

Elinor’s feelings of happiness are stated in rather sober narratorial terms: joy, felicity. But we get no insight into Elinor’s consciousness. We don’t find here the figural staging of the surging feeling one might have expected. Jane Austen is also sparing in her later works in depicting the final feelings of happiness of her successful heroines in winning partners.63

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63 Contrary to Wolfgang Müller (1977, 98), who excludes Austen’s last novel Persuasion, to which he attests the lack of irony, from this omission of the representation of happiness, it should be noted that even in this widely figurally perspectivized and – admittedly – altogether less ironically written work, happiness is not actually represented. When Anne, the heroine of the novel, concludes from obvious symptoms in the concert of the 20th chapter that Captain Wentworth, whom she turned down eight years ago, still loves her, she is “struck, gratified, confused, and beginning to breathe very quick, and feel an hundred things in a moment” (Jane Austen, Persuasion, 135). The feeling of happiness that overcomes her only manifests itself in her behavior towards the other visitors to the concert and is then merely described in the negative comparison presented narratorially: “She was divided from Captain Wentworth. Their interesting, almost too interesting conversation must be broken up for a time, but slight was the penance compared with the happiness which brought it on! She had learnt, in the last ten minutes, more [...] of all his feelings than she dared to think of; and she gave herself up to the demands of the party, to the needful civilities of the moment, with exquisite, though agitated sensations. She was in good humour with all. She had received ideas which disposed her to be courteous and kind to all, and to pity every one, as being less happy than herself” (136–137). Anne draws a conclusion from the obvious change in Wentworth’s behavior: “She could not contemplate the change as implying less. – He must love her” (137). Shortly thereafter, the narrator presents
In addition to the lack of a figural staging of the final happiness, another peculiarity of Austen’s representation of consciousness can be observed in *Sense and Sensibility*: the transformation of the figures is not represented as a gradual process. It has been stated that Marianne’s profound transformation takes place “abruptly” at the end of the novel (W. Müller 1977, 92). For both sisters and also for the heroines of the later novels, it is true that the mental reversal is not actually processual. But this is by no means unnatural or weakly motivated. *Metabolé* is a sudden reversal that occurs in the face of the overwhelming power of the factual. There is a *before* and an *after*, but the unshaped moment of the *metabolé* results from the irreconcilable gap between concept and reality. The microstructure of this moment, with its soul movements directed against each other, remains unshaped in Austen’s novels.

Despite the symmetry of the work and the structural similarity in the development of its heroines, the asymmetries in the eventfulness cannot be overlooked. In a narratological sense, Marianne is the agent of her fate – i.e., after the failure of her concept of life and the insight into its falsehood, she actively changes her attitude. Elinor is rather passive in changing her life circumstances; she is – again, in a narratological sense – the patient of her fate. The change of state, the change from misfortune to happiness, is imposed upon her. The feeling controlled so far by the mind breaks out of her.

### 7.1.4 The Prosaic Ending

*Sense and Sensibility* contains an ending characteristic of Austen’s novels. The two heroines cross a border, but what awaits them beyond the border is not the fulfillment of wishful dreams or a reward, as the moralizing eighteenth century has understood. Man is “rewarded” and “punished” with himself, by his character with which he has to pass the prose of life.\(^{64}\)

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\(^{64}\) Lloyd W. Brown (1969, 1582) observes at Austen’s conclusions “marked self-consciousness, her deliberate emphasis on the artifices and the transparent inevitability of her ‘happy’ endings, together with the suspension of related moral judgments.” According to his observations, in the realistic author happiness and misfortune result from the characters and not from the application of an abstract poetic justice.
The realistic author’s skepticism about the traditional distribution of happiness and misfortune according to moral merit becomes clear from the ironic remarks the narrator makes about Lucy Steele’s successes in the final chapter:

The whole of Lucy’s behavior in the affair, and the prosperity which crowned it, therefore, may be held forth as a most encouraging instance of what an earnest, an unceasing attention to self-interest, however its progress may be apparently obstructed, will do in securing every advantage of fortune, with no other sacrifice than that of time and conscience. (349–350)

The happiness of her husband Robert Ferrars remains within narrow prosaic limits: “He was proud of his conquest, proud of tricking Edward, and very proud of marrying privately without his mother’s consent” (350).

The new life of Marianne, who of all characters has undergone the most drastic changes in her concepts and perspectives, is illuminated by the ironic narrator in the final chapter in an extremely prosaic light:

Marianne Dashwood was born to an extraordinary fate. She was born to discover the falsehood of her own opinions, and to counteract, by her conduct, her most favorite maxims. She was born to overcome an affection formed so late in life as at seventeen, and with no sentiment superior to strong esteem and lively friendship, voluntarily to give her hand to another! – and that other, a man who had suffered no less than herself under the event of a former attachment, whom, two years before, she had considered too old to be married, – and who still sought the constitutional safeguard of a flannel waistcoat!

But so it was. Instead of falling a sacrifice to an irresistible passion, as once she had fondly flattered herself with expecting, instead of remaining even for ever with her mother, and finding her only pleasures in retirement and study, as afterwards in her more calm and sober judgment she had determined on, – she found herself at nineteen, submitting to new attachments, entering on new duties, placed in a new home, a wife, the mistress of a family, and the patroness of a village. (352)

Marianne has no reason to complain about her fate. Under the given circumstances, the inevitable prose of life is the most favorable for her.
7.2 *Pride and Prejudice*

7.2.1 Symmetrical Changes

Jane Austen’s second published novel, *Pride and Prejudice*, became not only her most popular work, but also one of the most widely read novels in world literature. Austen, however, criticized *Pride and Prejudice* in a letter to her sister, Cassandra, dated February 1813: “the work is rather too light, and bright, and sparkling” (quoted from Austen-Leigh 1870, 134).

The binary title in turn leads to an equally distributive understanding of the title terms, as *Sense and Sensibility* suggested. Robert Fox (1962), who brought economic aspects into play, warned against an overinterpretation of the title. After the success of *Sense and Sensibility*, a similarly antithetic and alliterative title promised good sales. The decisive factor for the title of the new novel, however, was probably the fact that Austen, with her binary and antithetic titles, placed herself in the tradition of the moralistic novel of the late eighteenth century, in which opposing attitudes were staged by antithetical characters, usually sisters or close friends with radically different temperaments (cf. Litz 1965, 73–77).

*Pride and Prejudice* deals with the reconsideration of first impressions – *First Impressions* having actually been the working title, whilst it presumably was still an epistolary novel.65 This correction again means the eventful change of character attitudes, but the weaknesses to be overcome are again not simply divided between the two protagonists, as most interpretations suggest. To understand that Fitzwilliam Darcy only overcomes his pride and Elizabeth Bennet only her prejudice is to misjudge the narrated story. In the course of events, both protagonists are connected with both weaknesses.

Darcy is proud of his social position, Elizabeth of her perspicacity, and she confesses to her sisters: “I could easily forgive his pride, if he had not mortified mine” (12).66 Elizabeth is convinced that Darcy’s rejection of her family is driven by the “worst kind of pride”, and Darcy understands in his

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65 Austen had to give up the title in 1800 because of the publication of the four-volume novel *First Impressions, or the Portrait* (1801) by Margaret Wrench Holford. The new title, as has often been noted (cf. Litz 1965, 100–101,190), is probably inspired by Fanny Burney’s extremely successful novel of manners *Cecilia* (1782), in the end of which a character summarizes the morality of the whole three times with the formula *Pride and Prejudice*.

first proposal that by expressing his concerns about her inappropriate family, he hurt Elizabeth’s “pride.”

The accusation of Darcy’s pride comes with particular acerbity from Wickham: “Every body is disgusted with his pride” (53), “almost all his actions may be traced to pride; – and pride has often been his best friend” (55). Although Wickham’s testimony is substantially devalued by Darcy’s exposure of his character, pride is the general prejudice of gentry society against Darcy. Mrs Reynolds, the housekeeper of Darcy’s Pemberley manor, has a different opinion: “Some people call him proud; but I am sure I never saw any thing of it. To my fancy, it is only because he does not rattle away like other young men” (166).

Elizabeth holds “a strong prejudice against every thing he might say” (138) when reading Darcy’s letter, and she herself accuses herself of prejudice in the assessment of both Darcy and Wickham (141). Ultimately, Darcy also proves to be biased in the prejudice against Elizabeth, which mainly concerns her family’s class.

The central mental event of the novel, as one can sum up, is a double, symmetrical change in the mindset of both protagonists. Both heroes overcome the attitudes of pride and prejudice that determine their thinking and feeling. The change in the attitude of mind also leads to a change in social behavior; in the two protagonists it is linked to a corresponding development in mutual assessment and evaluation. The overcoming of their own weaknesses, which have strong social implications, happens through the emotional acceptance of the other. Therefore, the mental change of state has a social and an emotional side in both protagonists.

7.2.2 Narrative Point of View and Representation of Consciousness

The protracted process of rethinking and ‘refeeling’ is represented both narratorially and figurally. If the representation is perspectivized figurally, then it follows exclusively Elizabeth’s point of view, in all parameters that can be distinguished: the perceptive, ideological, spatial, temporal and linguistic point of view (Schmid 2010, 100–105). The heroine’s point of view, however, does not yet dominate as consistently as it does in the author’s later novels
or even in the modernist narratives of Henry James. In the narrative discourse of *Pride and Prejudice*, there remains a not inconsiderable proportion of narratorial selection and evaluation. The narratorial leadership is also evident in the fact that the heroine’s consciousness is often represented in direct interior and in free indirect discourse, but to a considerable extent also in indirect representation of consciousness and in consciousness report.

Elizabeth’s insights, which change her consciousness in the course of the story, are often reproduced narratorially. For example, her insight into Wickham’s earlier misjudgement leads to an understanding that is crucial to her relationship with Darcy and her emotional development:

She perfectly remembered every thing that had passed in conversation between Wickham and herself, in their first evening at Mr Philips’s. Many of his expressions were still fresh in her memory. She was now struck with the impropriety of such communications to a stranger, and wondered it had escaped her before. She saw the indelicacy of putting himself forward as he had done, and the inconsistency of his professions with his conduct. (140)

The conclusion that Elizabeth draws from the reassessment of remembered situations and attitudes, however, is expressed in FID: “How differently did every thing now appear in which he [Wickham] was concerned!” (140). Her shame is presented in a consciousness report, which at first has a narratorial character, but then ends in figurally colored self-accusations: “She grew absolutely ashamed of herself. – Of neither Darcy nor Wickham could she think, without feeling that she had been blind, partial, prejudiced, absurd” (141). This is followed by a direct interior monologue, which will be discussed below as a key passage in Elizabeth’s mental peripety.

The narrator has introspection into Darcy’s mind, but he or she does not consistently use the point of view of this character (introspection into the interior of a figure and the adoption of its perceptive point of view, however often they are mixed in perspective theories, are quite different things). Darcy’s inner world is never reproduced with FID and comparable forms. His mental state, apart from the indicative and symbolic signs that his actions and speech contain, is represented by a narratorial consciousness report. This often leads to so-called dramatic irony, which consists in the reader being informed more about characters than the characters are about them-
selves. In the present case, this means that the reader informed by consciousness report knows more than Elizabeth about what is going on in Darcy’s mind. One example is the passage quoted above: the narrator mentions that Elizabeth, who is entirely focused on Mr Bingley’s effort to win over her sister Jane, “did not remotely suspect” that she herself became the subject of some interest in the eyes of his friend Mr Darcy (15). A similar case of dramatic irony occurs when the narrator reports that Darcy admires Elizabeth’s radiant complexion from the movement in the fresh air and wonders whether the occasion – the visit of Jane, who, having fallen ill, stays on in Bingley’s house to recuperate – justifies Elizabeth walking all alone three miles to Netherfield in the pouring rain: “Mr Darcy [...] was divided between admiration of the brilliancy which exercise had given to her [Elizabeth’s] complexion, and doubt as to the occasion’s justifying her coming so far alone” (22).

Since Elizabeth has no access to Darcy’s inner processes, she cannot notice his growing interest in her or, when it becomes apparent through external signs, interpret it correctly:

[...] Elizabeth could not help observing as she turned over some music books that lay on the instrument, how frequently Mr. Darcy’s eyes were fixed on her. She hardly knew how to suppose that she could be an object of admiration to so great a man; and yet that he should look at her because he disliked her, was still more strange. She could only imagine however at last, that she drew his notice because there was a something about her more wrong and reprehensible, according to his ideas of right, than in any other person present. The supposition did not pain her. She liked him too little to care for his approbation. (34)

Therefore, the representation of what is going on in Darcy’s mind and what Elizabeth does not perceive can only be narratorial. With the last two sentences of the above passage, however, the narrator changes into the character’s element. Here we have an example of FID. That Elizabeth’s presumption does not hurt her, since she does not care at all about Darcy’s recognition, the reliable narrator would hardly claim from his own point of view. Elizabeth is too preoccupied with interpreting Darcy’s gaze and she is effectively telling herself that she doesn’t care about Darcy’s approbation.
The changes of both heroes begin in the scene of their first meeting, with Darcy’s fatal judgement about Elizabeth at the ball. To his friend, Bingley, who wants to persuade Darcy to dance with the pretty Elizabeth, Darcy judges her – unaware that Elizabeth is listening – as “tolerable but not handsome enough to tempt [him]” (7).

Darcy’s change, apart from some narratorial information, is presented through Elizabeth’s perception. And this perception is limited – limited to the contacts with him and the reports about his behavior. The reader, however, is informed early by narratorial consciousness report that Darcy begins to take an interest in the self-confident girl he has qualified as “tolerable,” without Elizabeth noticing the amorous nature of this interest. Already in chapter 10 the narrator mentions Darcy as having been bewitched by Elizabeth more than by any other woman so far. Darcy, according to the narrator, would have seen himself “a little endangered” if her family hadn’t been so far below him socially (35). In chapter 11, Darcy resists his growing attraction to her: “He began to feel the danger of paying Elizabeth too much attention” (39), and on Elizabeth’s visit to the sister who fell ill at Netherfield he decides to ensure that he lets escape no sign of his admiration for the clever and cheeky young woman who, as he observes, attracts him more than he likes. When Darcy takes Elizabeth’s hand by surprise at the next ball, he finds more pleasure than Elizabeth: “in Darcy’s breast there was a tolerable powerful feeling towards her” (65). Among the outward signs of Darcy’s interest in Elizabeth are his frequent visits to the vicarage of Hunsford at the time when he knows Elizabeth is visiting her friend Charlotte. But even Charlotte cannot reconcile the lack of liveliness in his conversation with the infatuation she suspects of him.

For Elizabeth, Darcy’s revaluation of her person only becomes manifest with his surprising confession of love amid his first marriage proposal: “In vain have I struggled. It will not do. My feelings will not be repressed. You must allow me to tell you how ardently I admire and love you” (128–129). Elizabeth is flattered, of course, but she gets angry when he indicates that he thinks he has earned a special merit for overcoming his rejection of her family. Her sharp criticism of his haughtiness and arrogance and her strong refusal (“I had not known you a month before I felt that you were the last man in the world whom I could ever be prevailed on to marry”; 132) make any further development of their relationship seem more unlikely than ever before.
Another unexpected turning point – right in the middle of the novel – is connected with Darcy’s letter, in which he, concerned about his reputation, tries to clear up some misunderstandings about his actions and his motivations, without making another proposal, but also without withdrawing his reservations about her family. (The strong impact of this letter on Elizabeth is discussed below.)

Elizabeth’s emotional peripety occurs when, while visiting Darcy’s Pemberley manor while she believed him to be absent, she, to her horror, encounters the owner. However, she is amazed at Darcy’s changed behavior:

She blushed again and again over the perverseness of the meeting. And his behaviour, so strikingly altered, – what could it mean? That he should even speak to her was amazing! – but to speak with such civility, to enquire after her family! Never in her life had she seen his manners so little dignified, never had he spoken with such gentleness as on this unexpected meeting. (168–169)

In the reconstruction of Darcy’s alteration, the reader is dependent on Elizabeth’s perception and reflection, except for the little that the narrator conveys directly. In the following way, the heroine puzzles over Darcy’s emotional state:

She longed to know what at that moment was passing in his mind; in what manner he thought of her, and whether, in defiance of every thing, she was still dear to him. Perhaps he had been civil, only because he felt himself at ease; yet there had been that in his voice, which was not like ease. Whether he had felt more of pain or of pleasure in seeing her, she could not tell, but he certainly had not seen her with composure. (169)

Elizabeth wonders what may have triggered Darcy’s change: “Why is he so altered? From what can it proceed? It cannot be for me, it cannot be for my sake that his manners are thus softened. My reproofs at Hunsford could not work such a change as this. It is impossible that he should still love me” (171).

With Darcy’s fundamentally changed behavior at Pemberley, his conversion is basically complete. He has shown his affection to Elizabeth, overcome his arrogance, and been extremely friendly with her relatives. The single phases of his reassessment remain hidden, inasmuch as they are not narratively depicted or perceived by Elizabeth. From the report of her aunt, Mrs
Gardiner, it becomes clear that Darcy has been engaged in the rapprochement between Elizabeth’s sister Jane and his friend Bingley, and he has made considerable financial efforts to ensure that Wickham marries Lydia – Elizabeth’s younger sister, with whom Wickham has scandalously absconded. Darcy even took part in the wedding himself, much to his own mortification to provide such a service to Wickham. Having learned of Darcy’s many efforts on her family’s behalf, Elizabeth, upon Darcy’s unexpected visit to Longbourn, “immediately, but not very fluently” tells him that her feelings have changed profoundly since her rejection of his proposal and that she now hears his affirmations with gratitude and joy (246).

Darcy’s reaction to Elizabeth’s statement, which is nothing less than her acceptance of his second marriage proposal, is communicated with narratorial and slightly ironic distance: “The happiness which this reply produced, was such as he had probably never felt before; and he expressed himself on the occasion as sensibly and as warmly as a man violently in love can be supposed to do” (246). The narratorial distanced presentation of the acceptance of the proposal and the reaction to it confirms the impression already conveyed by the conclusion of Sense and Sensibility that Jane Austen is reticent in depicting the final happiness of the characters she has married off. Elizabeth’s reevaluation of Darcy and her overcoming of pride and prejudice are portrayed in a more differentiated way, taking place in stages.

One of these stages is Elizabeth’s reflections on Darcy’s surprising initial marriage proposal and her rejection. As is often the case with Austen, the narratorial report of consciousness turns into FID:

Her astonishment, as she reflected on what had passed, was increased by every review of it. That she should receive an offer of marriage from Mr Darcy! that he should have been in love with her for so many months! so much in love as to wish to marry her in spite of all the objections which had made him prevent his friend’s marrying her sister, and which must appear at least with equal force in his own case, was almost incredible! it was gratifying to have inspired unconsciously so strong an affection. But his pride, his abominable pride, his shameless avowal of what he had done with respect to Jane [...] soon overcame the pity which the consideration of his attachment had for a moment excited. (132)
After Darcy’s letter, in which he explains his actions towards Jane and Wickham, Elizabeth is deeply ashamed of her pride in her judgment and of her prejudice against Darcy. Her reflections are shaped in a direct interior monologue that is unparalleled in its expressivity and emotional coloration in the novel, yet it retains clear narratorial traces in its conceptuality, thematic systematics, and syntactic order:

“How despicably have I acted!” she cried. – “I, who have prided myself on my discernment! – I, who have valued myself on my abilities! who have often disdained the generous candour of my sister, and gratified my vanity, in useless or blameable distrust. – How humiliating is this discovery! – Yet, how just a humiliation! – Had I been in love, I could not have been more wretchedly blind. But vanity, not love, has been my folly. – Pleased with the preference of one, and offended by the neglect of the other, on the very beginning of our acquaintance, I have courted prepossession and ignorance, and driven reason away, where either were concerned. Till this moment, I never knew myself.” (141)

Elizabeth rereads Darcy’s letter until she almost knows it by heart. When she thinks about how he proposed, she is still outraged, but when she thinks about how unjustly she condemned him, her anger turns against herself, and she feels sorry for his disappointment. His love evokes her gratitude, and his position in society attracts her high esteem, but she cannot accept him.

As has been stated already, the decisive stage of Elizabeth’s development is the unexpected encounter with Darcy in Pemberley. Even before the visit to Pemberley House and the unexpected encounter with the landlord, Elizabeth is in a harmonious mood, attuned to possible happiness. This is caused by her observation of the natural setting around Darcy’s manor, which is depicted in free indirect perception (cf. W. Bühler 1937, 155–158). She transfers the harmony perceived in the design of nature involuntarily to the owner67 and for the first time allows the thought of a connection with

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67 On the role of nature, which changes in Austen’s novels, see Litz (1965, 150–153). While in the early novels nature is perceived as a work of art (as an example Litz mentions Elizabeth Bennet in Pemberley), in the later novels, especially in Persuasion, it serves the representation of consciousness: “landscape is a structure of feeling which can express, and also modify, the minds of those who view it” (Litz 1965, 153).
Darcy: “Elizabeth was delighted. She had never seen a place for which na-
ture had done more, or where natural beauty had been so little counteracted
by an awkward taste. […] at that moment she felt, that to be mistress of Pem-
berley might be something!” (163). Walking through the house, Elizabeth ad-
mires the rich but tasteful furnishings, which are neither magnificent nor ex-
aggeratedly elegant.

“And of this place,” thought she, “I might have been mistress! With
these rooms I might now have been familiarly acquainted! Instead of
viewing them as a stranger, I might have rejoiced in them as my own,
and welcomed to them as visitors my uncle and aunt. – But no,” – rec-
ollecting herself, – “that could never be: my uncle and aunt would
have been lost to me: I should not have been allowed to invite them.”
This was a lucky recollection – it saved her from something like regret.
(164)

Elizabeth’s prejudice continues to be shaken when the housekeeper praises
her master’s philanthropy and kindness. Elizabeth appreciates the praise of
a clever servant, and when she stands before the picture from which Darcy
looks down on her, she thinks of his interest in her with more gratitude than
it has ever aroused in her: “she remembered its warmth, and softened its
impropriety of expression” (167).

In the remaining chapters some complications and clarifications delay
the full appearance of the changes revealed on both sides at Pemberley. But
the decisive change in the mental event of both protagonists has occurred.
At the end of the story, when the lovers have declared themselves, and the
family is inaugurated, Elizabeth gives a joking answer to Jane’s question
about the beginning of her love: “It has been coming on so gradually, that I
hardly know when it began. But I believe I must date it from my first seeing
his beautiful grounds at Pemberley” (252).

7.2.4 Two Levels of Consciousness

Elizabeth’s seemingly jocose answer is quite serious, as Darcy can only show
his newly developed attitude at Pemberley through kindness, overcoming
his pride, self-criticism, and respect for Elizabeth’s family. But long before
that, the attentive reader will have noticed that Elizabeth, more than she ad-
mits, is interested in the man whose judgment has so seriously offended her.
Indicative and symbolic signs suggest an inner struggle in Elizabeth early on. On the one hand, the self-confident young woman wants to make it clear that she rejects Darcy. This shows her closeness in her encounters with him and her spatial departure from him. Asked by Mr Wickham about her acquaintance with Darcy, she asserts that she knows him more than she feels comfortable with and finds him "very disagreeable" (53). At the ball at Netherfield, Elizabeth reacts with ostentatious rudeness against Darcy, whom she blames for Wickham’s absence. She can hardly answer Darcy’s polite questions with the tact required. After Darcy invites Elizabeth to dance, she receives the attempted consolation of Charlotte Lucas, who suggests Elizabeth would find Darcy very nice; Elizabeth’s reaction to this suggestion is perhaps a bit exaggerated: “Heaven forbid! – That would be the greatest misfortune of all! – To find a man agreeable whom one is determined to hate! – Do not wish me such an evil” (62). Even the narrator attests to her a “deeply-rooted dislike” (129) for Darcy.

Elizabeth is not vain – she does not mirror herself – but the clever, sensitive and attentive young woman cannot suppress the fact that Darcy likes her despite his first judgment of her. If one can conclude from the ostentatiously negative manner with which Elizabeth takes note of Darcy’s presence, speaking, and behavior – a tense attention and nearly a need to persuade herself to reject him – one will recognize further signs of her secret sympathy for the former despiser of her beauty.

With Lady Catherine De Bourgh, Elizabeth observes very carefully how warmly Darcy joins in with the praise of his cousin, Miss De Bourgh, who is associated with him, but for whom the observer is not compelled, either now or at any other time, to detect any sign of love in him. Must the search for signs of someone else’s love not be interpreted as a sign of her own interest?

Elizabeth often understands what Darcy means while others do not understand his intention. This speaks for clear empathy, which can also be interpreted as an expression of sympathy. In a discussion at Netherfield, Elizabeth is forced to point out to her mother her misunderstanding of what Darcy said: “‘Indeed, Mama, you are mistaken,’ said Elizabeth, blushing for her mother. ‘You quite mistook Mr Darcy.’” (29). This correction of the mother in favor of Darcy’s intention can also be regarded as symbolic and transferred from the concrete situation to the macrostructure of the action.

A sign of a special relationship with Darcy is also Elizabeth’s shyness to mention his name to others, as in the conversation with Wickham. Another
indication of her feelings must be seen in the fact that Elizabeth, who confidently expresses her opinions, likes to quarrel with Darcy. There is always something playful about this quarrel.

So before the happy ending one can see a certain contradictoriness in Elizabeth’s behavior towards Darcy. Or one can distinguish two levels in her consciousness, will and inclination, or voluntary and involuntary, or rational and emotional consciousness. With certain historical reservations, the Freudian dichotomy of conscious and unconscious can also be applied to Austen’s representation of mind.

*Pride and Prejudice* would then be an early case of the systematic differentiation of two levels of consciousness that is decisive for the further development of narrative literature. Already in *Sense and Sensibility* Austen hinted at the gap between these levels. Just think of the romantic fantasies that the sober, rational Elinor develops after the nightly visitation by the seducer Willoughby.

### 7.3 Emma

#### 7.3.1 Emma’s Errors

*Emma* (1815) unfolds a stepped series of mental events in a cascade of cognitive acts that cancel out more or less fatal errors. These events all take place in the consciousness of the title heroine Emma Woodhouse, a beautiful and intelligent woman of twenty-one years with a social status and fortune who is esteemed by her friends.

Austen wrote of her heroine, when she began work on the novel, “I am going to take a heroine whom no one but myself will much like” (cited after Austen-Leigh 1870, 204). The author’s suspicion is obviously based on the fact that she would endow her heroine with traits that seem unattractive: the tendencies to self-deceive, to overestimate herself, and to lust for power. The errors Emma succumbs to because of her immodesty and rashness concern the assessment of some of her fellow human beings and – not least – herself. Emma is mistaken in the most important of all themes in the world of Austen’s novels, namely whether two people are meant for each other. Emma, proud to have mediated the marriage of her former governess Miss Taylor (a merit that is relativized by George Knightley, her brother-in-law and older
trusted friend), is a tireless matchmaker. Her main victim is Harriet Smith, a seventeen-year-old orphan. Emma first talks her out of her genuine attraction to farmer Robert Martin, a capable and reliable man who proposed to Harriet, and then suggests to her that the priest Mr Elton is courting her. It turns out, however, that Elton is not interested in Harriet at all and rather has an eye on Emma herself, which she missed. Emma’s lack of instinct also prevents her from realizing the long-secret relationship between Frank Churchill and Jane Fairfax. Instead, she sees the two in other relationships, even considering herself at times the target of Churchill’s courting. However, Churchill’s flirting with Emma only serves to conceal his engagement to Jane. When Mr Knightley dances at the ball with Harriet out of sheer kindness, the deeply stricken heroine assumes him a courting for the pretty but somewhat harmless girl. Emma proves her greatest blindness for her own relationship with Knightley, who has known and worshipped her since childhood, even though he, a moral compass in the world of action and a sharp-sighted observer of people, keeps correcting her. Despite the hints of the empathic Mrs Weston, her former governess, it is a long time before Emma can see that her wise and considerate friend loves her sincerely and that he is the only man she can marry.

The corrections of the sometimes comical errors take place through the confrontation with reality, which is manifested either through the factuality of the real relationships or through the verbal communication of the figures. Herbert Rauter (1969, 29) puts it in Aristotelian terms: “The unbearable tensions between reality and error prepare the anagnorisis.”

The story ends with the all-around happy ending that Austen’s novels take for granted. Robert Martin makes Harriet a second proposal, and so the two, whose relationship Emma can happily accept after her change, become the first couple in the round of weddings. Frank Churchill marries Jane Fairfax. And to his great surprise, George Knightley’s spontaneous proposal is spontaneously accepted by Emma, the notorious matchmaker who has repeatedly declared that she herself would never marry.

As in her earlier novels, Austen renounces a figural staging of feelings of happiness. It is up to the narrator to soberly designate Knightley’s and Emma’s happy state:
Within half an hour, he had passed from a thoroughly distressed state of mind, to something so like perfect happiness, that it could bear no other name.

*Her* change was equal. – This one half-hour had given to each the same precious certainty of being beloved, had cleared from each the same degree of ignorance, jealousy, or distrust. (350–351)

The “perfect happiness” of which the narrator speaks, obviously infected by the characters, is, of course, as Emma realizes, not to have without “alloy” (352); that is for her the concern for the father, who does not want to lose the daughter, and the concern for Harriet, who has raised hopes for Knightley.

### 7.3.2 The Point of View

More consistently than in Austen’s earlier novels, the narration in Emma is in all distinguishable parameters from the heroine’s point of view. The novel is regarded as the first highlight of the use of FID in European literature. Compared to Austen’s earlier novels, however, the proportion of direct speech and dialogue has also increased. The dialogues account for more than 50% of the total text (W. Bühler 1937). The novel contains extensive dialogue replicas – e. g., the endless explanations of the nerve-rackingly long-winded Miss Bates and the flatterer Frank Churchill, which serve more to characterize the characters than to guide the plot.

In figural patterns, not only the title heroine’s consciousness is represented. In chapter 41, George Knightley’s perspective dominates with the representation of his perceptions and inner movements in free indirect discourse or perception. This is motivated by the fact that in this chapter Mr Knightley has the opportunity to articulate his still unclear suspicions against Frank Churchill and his assumptions about a secret connection with

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69 How the author succeeds in awakening and maintaining the reader’s sympathy for her heroine despite the undoubtedly unpleasant traits of her actions was a central question for Wayne C. Booth ([1961] 1983, 243–266). He sees the “solution of the problem” that Austen had to solve in the chosen point of view: “By showing most of the story through Emma’s eyes, the author insures that we shall travel with Emma rather than stand against her” (245). In fact, even a mere introspection into literary heroes seems to arouse sympathy with them.
Jane Fairfax. In the consciousness of the insensitive Emma, such hunches would not be justified at this point of the story.

Although Knightley, whom we have called the “moral compass” of the novel and who plays the role of the *raisonneur*, sees through the people around him and instructs and rebukes Emma accordingly, he is blind on one important point: he cannot recognize Emma’s secret affection for him and is jealous of Churchill, which is why he flees to London. This jealousy is not quite understandable, since it is the nearly clairvoyant Knightley who is the only one who suspects the secret of Churchill and Jane Fairfax.

Passages in which other figures seem to serve as reflectors and media of FID prove to be representations of Emma’s perception of other people’s speech. One example is the speech of the new pastor’s wife, the strenuously ambitious Mrs Elton, reflected by Emma:

No invitation came amiss to her. Her Bath habits made evening-parties perfectly natural to her, and Maple Grove had given her a taste for dinners. She was a little shocked at the want of two drawing rooms, at the poor attempt at rout-cakes, and there being no ice in the Highbury card parties. Mrs Bates, Mrs Perry, Mrs Goddard and others, were a good deal behind hand in knowledge of the world, but she would soon shew them how every thing ought to be arranged. (232)

But *Emma* cannot be called a figural (or – according to Stanzel – “personal”) novel, because the narratorial moment is still strongly present in it. The narrator does not shy away from commenting on the representation of consciousness: “And [Emma] leaned back in the corner, to indulge her murmur, or to reason them away; probably a little of both-such being the commonest process of a not ill-disposed mind” (150). The narrator can very well describe Emma’s behavior with his own judgements. Thus he calls the heroine, who is unable to listen to Mr Elton impartially or to see him with a clear eye, “too eager and busy in her own previous conceptions and views” (88). The narrator’s distance becomes clear, for example, when the educational program Emma intends to carry out with Harriet is described, a program that is ultimately exhausted in the collection of riddles.

Narratorial irony flashes up again and again when the narrator, without comment, expresses Emma’s opinions and views. When her brother-in-law draws Emma’s attention to the fact that Mr Elton obviously cares about her, she is highly amused:
amusing herself in the consideration of the blunders which often arise from a partial knowledge of circumstances, of the mistakes which people of high pretensions to judgment are for ever falling into; and not very well pleased with her brother for imagining her blind and ignorant, and in want of counsel. (90)

The reader who has grasped Knightley’s considerable reservations about Frank Churchill will hear narratorial irony in the seemingly neutral message about Emma’s concordance with the opportunistic flatterer: “He [Churchill] perfectly agreed with her [Emma]: and after walking together so long, and thinking so much alike, Emma felt herself so well acquainted with him, that she could hardly believe it to be only their second meeting” (163; italics mine – W. Sch.). In the adverbs in italics, the narrator’s voice resounds, ironically exaggerating the figures’ valuations.

7.3.3 Puzzle Motifs and Puzzle Structures

Since the reader is largely dependent on the perspective of the heroine who misinterprets reality, and the viewpoint and true motivations of other characters are not revealed to him, the narrative text poses a series of misleading puzzles. Therefore, the narrator, insofar as he does not explicitly correct the errors of the heroine, becomes an “unreliable” narrator. In the story he tells, however, the narrator leaves behind sufficient indications that allow the attentive reader to guess more or less clearly the true circumstances about which Emma is so thoroughly deceived.

Puzzles and riddles also play an indicative and symbolic role for the representation of consciousness. Emma loves to solve word puzzles, and she is particularly strong in them. She also helps Harriet to create a collection of riddles and to improve and embellish them with her “invention, memory and taste”. In chapter 41, Frank Churchill proposes to solve word puzzles in the presence of the main protagonists. Emma is taken with the suggestion. Churchill presents Jane Fairfax with a word puzzle, the solution of which blunder contains an allusion that makes Jane blush. Knightley, who, suspicious of Churchill, observes him and Jane attentively, does not understand the meaning of the word, but suspects, as the narrator conveys through FID, that Churchill codes his own deeper game of hiding with the word puzzle:
Mr Knightley connected [the word *blunder*] with the dream; but how it could all be, was beyond his comprehension. How the delicacy, the discretion of his favourite could have been so lain asleep! He feared there must be some decided involvement. Disingenuousness and double-dealing seemed to meet him at every turn. These letters were but the vehicle for gallantry and trick. It was a child’s play, chosen to conceal a deeper game on Frank Churchill’s part. (282)

While Emma remains clueless and fails to recognize the second level of Churchill’s game, the clairvoyant Knightley observes how Churchill ciphers reality with child’s play and enjoys the incomprehension of his fellow players.

The puzzle, which Churchill uses to conceal his true relationship to Jane Fairfax, can be understood as a metapoetic allusion on the authorial level: The riddle, motif of the narrated world, also forms the structure of the narrative. The author demands a reader who reads her text and its enigmatic plot as attentively as the (mostly) prescient Knightley perceives the behavior of his fellow players.

The mystery of the novel is countered by dramatic irony. Dramatic irony requires the reader’s insight into what is hidden from the protagonists. As Wayne Booth ([1961] 1983, 255) states, “The longer we are in doubt about Frank Churchill, the weaker our sense of ironic contrast between Emma’s views and the truth.” Conversely, “The sooner we see through Churchill’s secret plot, the greater our pleasure in observing Emma’s innumerable misreadings of his behavior and the less interest we have in the mere mystery of the situation.”

7.3.4 Patterns of Consciousness Representation

In a single paragraph, Emma’s emotions of consciousness are presented in a direct interior monologue. This is about her indignation at the stupidly presumptuous pastor’s wife, Mrs Elton. In this case her valuation corresponds to the implicit scale of values of the work (or of the abstract author), and there is no error. The rather long monologue is quoted here in its first part:

“Insufferable woman!” was her immediate exclamation. “Worse than I had supposed. Absolutely insufferable! Knightley! – I could not have believed it. Knightley! – never seen him in her life before, and call him
Knightley! – and discover that he is a gentleman! A little upstart, vulgar being, with her Mr E., and her caro sposo, and her resources, and all her airs of pert pretension and underbred finery. Actually to discover that Mr Knightley is a gentleman! [...] (223)

Essentially, however, the representation of consciousness in *Emma* takes place through concealed patterns, primarily through FID. The figural origin of the contents of FID is often indicated by preceding or following consciousness reports or indirect representations of perceptions, thoughts and feelings. If such contextual signs are absent and the FID is not in a clearly figural variant – with exclamations, syntactic forms of spoken language and a lexicon characteristic of the character, for which examples are given below – the attribution of the speech is difficult to decide. This ambivalence is, as explained above in chapter 2.7, a basic feature of the unmarked types of text interference. In contrast to modern narrative, where ambiguity is often cultivated and elaborated, Jane Austen is not so much concerned with the effect of ambivalence.

7.3.5 Emma’s Revisions

The essential mental event in *Emma* manifests itself in the multiple revisions to which Emma is forced to subject her concepts, ideas and goals, forced by the otherwise irreversible conflict with reality.

The first revision turns out to be necessary when Mr Elton, to Emma’s amazement, flatly denies ever having been interested in Harriet. The girl’s lack of means had already completely ruled out the idea of such an improper wedding (Knightley had already tried in vain to keep Emma from her matchmaking, having discerned with Elton’s motive).

It was a wretched business indeed! – Such an overthrow of every thing she had been wishing for! – Such a development of every thing most unwelcome! – Such a blow for Harriet! – That was the worst of all. Every part of it brought pain and humiliation, of some sort or other; but, compared with the evil to Harriet, all was light; and she would gladly have submitted to feel yet more mistaken – more in error – more disgraced by misjudgment, than she actually was, could the effects of her blunders have been confined to herself. (107)
The CT asserts itself here in the expressive language function and the sequence of exclamations, so that the FID is easy to identify. As can also be seen from further examples, emotional peaks are reproduced in FID. Since the indirect representation and the consciousness report would attenuate the emotionality, only the direct interior monologue would be possible as an alternative. However, Austen uses this pattern very little, presumably because the unmarked patterns allow a smooth transition from the narrative report to the representation of consciousness.

Emma’s deep disappointment does not let her overlook the fact that she has stiffened herself on the idea of a connection between Elton and Harriet only to find it did not match the shape of reality. And thus she blames Elton’s behavior, which she alleges was ambiguous:

How she could have been so deceived! – He protested that he had never thought seriously of Harriet – never! She looked back as well as she could; but it was all confusion. She had taken up the idea, she supposed, and made every thing bend to it. His manners, however, must have been unmarked, wavering, dubious, or she could not have been so misled. (107)

In Emma’s critical self-questioning, Elton’s assertion is taken up and reflected with his own intonation (never!). Here we have a two stage text interference. In her memory, which is designed in FID, Emma repeats and critically accentuates Elton’s words, which in themselves shape an FID.

In Emma’s memory, in which everything gets confused, she spreads the blame for the error between herself and Elton. The next step, however, is for Emma to take full responsibility and make a good resolution:

The first error and the worst lay at her door. It was foolish, it was wrong, to take so active a part in bringing any two people together. It was adventuring too far, assuming too much, making light of what ought to be serious, a trick of what ought to be simple. She was quite concerned and ashamed, and resolved to do such things no more. […] She went to bed at last with nothing settled but the conviction of her having blundered most dreadfully. (109–110)

The next morning, however, Emma has comforting thoughts that soften her contrition a little:
It was a great consolation that Mr Elton should not be really in love with her, or so particularly amiable as to make it shocking to disappoint him – that Harriet’s nature should not be of that superior sort in which the feelings are most acute and retentive – and that there could be no necessity for any body’s knowing what had passed except the three principals, and especially for her father’s being given a moment’s uneasiness about it. (110)

However, Emma’s conscience is still weighed down by the fact that she advised Harriet against Robert Martin. But she believes she can justify her decision with Martin’s low social position, and she expressly refuses to repent. As in the reflection just quoted, Emma’s development towards insight suffers a setback.

Emma could not but picture it all, and feel how justly they [the Martins] might resent, how naturally Harriet must suffer. It was a bad business. She would have given a great deal, or endured a great deal, to have had the Martins in a higher rank of life. They were so deserving, that a little higher should have been enough: but as it was, how could she have done otherwise? – Impossible! – She could not repent. They must be separated; but there was a great deal of pain in the process – so much to herself at this time, that she soon felt the necessity of a little consolation […] (149–150)

An idea for a new matchmaking comes to Emma after Frank Churchill has rescued Harriet from the gypsy raid, but she purports to resist the temptation:

It was a very extraordinary thing! Nothing of the sort had ever occurred before to any young ladies in the place, within her memory; no rencontre, no alarm of the kind; – and now it had happened to the very person, and at the very hour, when the other very person was chancing to pass by to rescue her! – It certainly was very extraordinary! – And knowing, as she did, the favourable state of mind of each at this period, it struck her the more. He was wishing to get the better of his attachment to herself, she just recovering from her mania for Mr. Elton. It seemed as if every thing united to promise the most interesting consequences. It was not possible that the occurrence should not be strongly recommending each to the other. […] Every thing was to take its natural course, however, neither
impelled nor assisted. She would not stir a step, nor drop a hint. No, she had had enough of interference. There could be no harm in a scheme, a mere passive scheme. It was no more than a wish. Beyond it she would on no account proceed. (271–272)

Emma discusses here in the pattern of FID, as it were, with her own critical voice, before which she defends herself and justifies her attitude. This voice is not personified, but it is obvious to regard her critical mentor Knightley as the imaginary addressee, whom her second voice represents.

When Knightley addresses her after the unfortunate trip to Box Hill about her hurtful behavior towards Miss Bates, Emma turns away and remains silent. As the narrator states, she is moved by “anger against herself, mortification, and deep concern” (305) and cannot produce a word. The initially narratorial presentation of her feelings and thoughts turns into self-reproach, shaped in FID.

Never had she felt so agitated, mortified, grieved, at any circumstance in her life. She was most forcibly struck. The truth of this representation there was no denying. She felt it at her heart. How could she have been so brutal, so cruel to Miss Bates! How could she have exposed herself to such ill opinion in any one she valued! And how suffer him to leave her without saying one word of gratitude, of concurrence, of common kindness! (305)

How far Emma has changed so far can be seen from the fact that she not only regrets her behavior bitterly but goes to the Bates the next morning to make up for her tactlessness.

After the second attempt to bring about a marriage for Harriet, this time with Frank Churchill, failed, Emma feels remorse and anger. Although Churchill has behaved shabbily, she is most annoyed by herself. Her inner movements are represented in consciousness report (simply underlined in the following quotation), indirect consciousness-representation (doubly underlined), and FID (meandering underlined):

Poor Harriet! to be a second time the dupe of her misconceptions and flattery. Mr. Knightley had spoken prophetically, when he once said, ‘Emma, you have been no friend to Harriet Smith.’ – She was afraid she had done her nothing but disservice. [...] she felt completely guilty
of having encouraged what she might have repressed. She might have prevented the indulgence and increase of such sentiments. Her influence would have been enough. And now she was very conscious that she ought to have prevented them. – She felt that she had been risking her friend’s happiness on most insufficient grounds. Common sense would have directed her to tell Harriet, that she must not allow herself to think of him, and that there were five hundred chances to one against his ever caring for her. – ‘But, with common sense,’ she added, ‘I am afraid I have had little to do.’ (326)

Emma only realizes her love for Knightley when Harriet confesses her own affection for him and asserts that Knightley replies to her feelings. A few minutes are enough, as the narrator assures us, to make Emma “acquainted with her own heart” (331). The progression of the process is still articulated by the narrator: “A mind like her’s, once opening to suspicion, made rapid progress. She touched – she admitted – she acknowledged the whole truth” (331). The circumstance that triggers the recognition is presented in FID: “Why was it so much worse that Harriet should be in love with Mr. Knightley, than with Frank Churchill? Why was the evil so dreadfully increased by Harriet’s having some hope of a return?” (331).

The result of the cognitive process, on the contrary, is again presented in a mode that corresponds more to the indirect representation than to FID: “It darted through her, with the speed of an arrow, that Mr. Knightley must marry no one but herself!” (331). What is characteristic of Emma’s egocentrism is that this insight is triggered by jealousy and that Knightley is named as an actant in the joint act of marriage and burdened with a bond (must). Note that the author motivates the decisive anagnórisis with a not exactly sympathetic motive. Even in this late phase of Emma’s transformation, the author thus accepts a turn in the reader’s sympathy against her heroine.

In this situation, however, Emma undergoes a final turnaround – or, in Aristotelian terms, the anagnórisis of her hamartia – in the recognition of her wrong doings. A consciousness report (simply underlined in the following quotation) leads to the staging of her self-accusation in FID (meandering underlined):

Her own conduct, as well as her own heart, was before her in the same few minutes. She saw it all with a clearness which had never blessed
her before. How improperly had she been acting by Harriet! How in-
considerate, how indelicate, how irrational, how unfeeling had been
her conduct! What blindness, what madness, had led her on! (331)

In the continued conversation with Harriet, Emma, threatened with losing
Knightley to another, is, as is narratorially stated, in a state of confusion that
such self-knowledge and bewildering feelings had to produce. At night she
does not rest, and she laments her blindness of heart and mind, with the
emotional peaks of her soliloquies reproduced in FID:

Every moment had brought a fresh surprise; and every surprise must
be matter of humiliation to her. – How to understand it all! How to
understand the deceptions she had been thus practising on herself,
and living under! – The blunders, the blindness of her own head and
heart! (334)

Understanding her own heart thoroughly is now her first effort. She wonders
since when Knightley has been as dear to her as he is now. Now she is sure
of her feelings. She now realizes that she cheated on herself, that she didn’t
know her heart, that she never cared for Frank Churchill. She reproaches
herself severely, ranging from the concrete case to her general behavior:

With insufferable vanity had she believed herself in the secret of eve-
rybody’s feelings; with unpardonable arrogance proposed to arrange
everybody’s destiny. She was proved to have been universally mis-
taken; and she had not quite done nothing – for she had done mischief.
She had brought evil on Harriet, on herself, and she too much feared,
on Mr. Knightley. (335)

But again, she is tempted to exonerate herself: she considers where Harriet
gets the “presumption” from to consider herself the Knightley elect before
he actually confirms it. And again she parries the temptation with a self-ac-
cusation:

Alas! was not that her own doing too? Who had been at pains to give
Harriet notions of self-consequence but herself? – Who but herself had
taught her, that she was to elevate herself if possible, and that her
claims were great to a high worldly establishment? – If Harriet, from
being humble, were grown vain, it was her doing too. (336)
The novel between Emma and Knightley comes to a good end when Knightley rides back from London in pouring rain after receiving the relieving news of Churchill’s association with Jane Fairfax and being cured of his jealousy of Churchill. Chapter 49 ends with a passage in plusquam perfect describing Knightley’s agonizingly uncertain last days before the mutual explanation. It remains open whether Knightley is directly the medium or whether the FID reflects Emma’s perception of his report:

He had ridden home through the rain; and had walked up directly after dinner, to see how this sweetest and best of all creatures, faultless in spite of all her faults, bore the discovery.

He had found her agitated and low. – Frank Churchill was a villain. – He heard her declare that she had never loved him. Frank Churchill’s character was not desperate. – She was his own Emma, by hand and word, when they returned into the house […] (351)

Booth ([1961] 1983, 260) is certainly justified to stress the rightness of the connection between Emma and Knightley “as a conclusion to all the comic wrongness that has gone before.” But the question is whether Emma’s marriage can really be seen as a “result” of her “necessary reform,” as Booth suggests. Emma’s marriage is not a reward for her transformation, but its last and most important manifestation. Emma’s transformation takes place within herself and is hardly recognizable from the outside. She has always loved Knightley, but her inner turns can hardly have been communicated to him. That Emma, for example, reacts to his reproaches about her tactlessness towards Miss Bates with bitter feelings of remorse and self-accusation, he cannot perceive, as is explicitly said from a narratorial point of view: “He had misinterpreted the feelings which had kept her face averted, and her tongue motionless” (305). Emma may have become aware of her love for Knightley after a few mental shifts, but this awareness is by no means only due to newly acquired virtues, but above all, as the realistic author shows, to her prosaic jealousy of Harriet, the girl on whom she had tested her matchmaking skills.
7.4 Austen’s Philosophy of Mind and Event

Which image of man is realized in the mental events of Jane Austen’s novels? What is Austen’s implicit philosophy of mind and event?

Austen’s narrators have absolute introspection into the interior of their characters but use them (almost) only in cases where it is motivated by the chosen point of view. In *Sense and Sensibility*, for example, Marianne is largely depicted only through the perception of her sister, Elinor, the novel’s reflector. The reflector is usually only one character, but the author is free to let the narrator tell the story from the point of view of another character, if necessary. This is the case in *Emma*, when in chapter 41, for the sake of profiling the dramatic irony, the world is suddenly seen with Knightley’s eyes and consciousness, without any effort at motivation of such a change.

Austen’s philosophy of consciousness knows no inhibition of alterity. Other people’s consciousness – or, more precisely, the consciousness of the fictive characters – is fundamentally accessible and is depicted in a differentiated way, above all in moments of crisis, shock, self-accusation and relentless self-knowledge. The author is much more interested in the moments of the heroines’ self-critical analysis than in the culmination of their happiness. This means that the author concentrates on the moments of ethical reversal, the Aristotelian *metabolé*.

The preferred pattern of FID, with its ambiguity of point of view, implies a certain securing reservation. But the ambivalence of the forms of text interference is not consciously exploited or even cultivated by Austen.

The consciousness depicted in Austen’s novels tends to split into two levels: voluntary and involuntary, or rational and emotional consciousness. In *Sense and Sensibility*, the gap between these levels is indicated in the romantic fantasies of the rational Elinor after Willoughby’s nocturnal visit. In *Pride and Prejudice*, the level that Freud will call the unconscious plays a certain role in Elizabeth’s behavior. In the case of *Emma*, the heroine’s mania of matchmaking could be seen as a suppressed and postponed longing of the young woman – to speak for Freud – for marriage, who strictly rejects marriage for herself.

Jane Austen represents a world regulated by the norms of society and the doxa of religion. Nevertheless, in her narrative world there are no abso-
lutely valid norms for human behavior. Marianne in *Sense and Sensibility* develops (or at least tries to develop) from romantic exuberance to sober wisdom. In *Persuasion*, Anne Elliot goes through the reverse development, from prudence to romance. Both developments are marked positively in the implicit value hierarchy of the novels.

Austen’s philosophy of event is optimistic and still influenced by the spirit of the rationalist eighteenth century. There are no narrow limits to the possibility of self-improvement or even character change. The question of how far and in what traits man can be changed is not asked, and skepticism about the perfection, consecutiveness and irreversibility of mental changes does not arise. Marianne Dashwood is freed forever from romantic exuberance, Elizabeth Bennet and Fitzwilliam Darcy have finally overcome pride and prejudice, and Emma Woodhouse has learned her lesson once and for all and will never want to play matchmaker again.
IV. Non-Narrated Events in Narratives of the 19th Century
8 Aleksandr Puškin’s Belkin Tales: Psychology in Absentia

8.1 Toward the Psychological Novel

Around the mid-1820s the Russian poet Aleksandr Sergeevič Puškin “descended” to prose – so he let his literary development be described by Ivan Sergeevič Belkin.70 Puškin’s transition from poetry to prose is evidenced in fragments in which the project of a psychological novel can be seen, a genre not yet present in Russia. Puškin, however, was well acquainted with Western European narrative prose. He received works of German, English and Italian literature, including poetry, through Russian translations or mostly mediocre French prose paraphrases. Puškin, whose knowledge of English was limited – as his unsuccessful attempts at translation of Byron and Wordsworth (into French!) indicate – even read Shakespeare, Sterne, Richardson, Scott and Byron, to whom he often referred, in French prose translations (cf. Nabokov 1975, II, 158–163). French was the cultural, letter and salon language of his time, which Puškin mastered so excellently early on that he was nicknamed “Frenchman” in Carskoe Selo’s Lyceum.

Which Western European novelists were particularly popular in Russia can be seen from a few verses in Eugene Onegin. Chapter II mentions Tat’jana’s reading:

She early had been fond of novels;
for her they replaced all;
she grew enamored with the fictions
of Richardson and of Rousseau.

(ch. II, st. 29, v. 1–4; Puškin, Onegin, I, 139)

70 The fictive author of the parodistic A History of the Village of Gorjuxino (Istorija sela Gorjuxina, fragment, written in 1830), Puškin’s ironic autoportrait (cf. in detail on this “descent” Schmid 2005a). In the verse novel Eugene Onegin (Evgenij Onegin, 1825–1831) Puškin confirms in chapter 6, which he writes in 1826: “The years to austere prose incline” (ch. VI, st. 43, v. 5; Puškin, One- gin, I, 247).
Tat’jana’s mother has similar preferences to her husband’s sorrow, even though she knows Lovelace and Grandison only from hearsay:

As to his wife, she was herself mad upon Richardson.
(ch. II, st. 29, v. 13–14; Puškin, Onegin, I, 139)

Puškin obviously did not know the novels of Jane Austen, although they were all available in French translations within a short time after the original editions at the time when Puškin was on his way to prose.

The pattern Puškin had in mind for his own experiments was neither Richardson’s letter novels nor Rousseau’s Julie ou la Nouvelle Héloïse, although he often mentioned the heroes of the former in his works and created a clear contrafact to the letter novel of the latter in The Snowstorm (Metel’, 1831). Puškin was inspired by the novel Adolphe. Anecdote trouvée dans les papiers d’un inconnu. This novel by the Swiss writer, politician and state theorist Henri-Benjamin Constant de Rebecque, written in 1806 but only published in 1816, was so popular in Russia that it was available in two translations. The first was published in 1818 and was written by Nikolaj Polevoj, the second was made by Puškin’s friend Pëtr Vjazemskij and appeared in 1831 with a foreword in which Puškin was involved. In the January 1830 issue of Puškin’s Literary journal (Literaturnaja gazeta), the following note was printed with a quotation from Eugene Onegin:

Vjazemskij has translated the magnificent novel by Benjamin Constant and will print it soon. Adolphe belongs to those two or three novels in which the epoch is reflected and modern man rather correctly represented with his immoral soul, selfish and dry, to dreaming measurelessly given, with his embittered mind boiling in empty action.

[Eugen Onegin, ch. VII, st. 22; Puškin, Onegin, I, 139]

Benjamin Constant was the first to stage the character that became famous thanks to the genius of Lord Byron. We impatiently await the
publication of this book. It will be interesting to see how the experienced and lively pen of Prince Vjazemskij masters the difficulties of the metaphysical, always harmonious, noble, often inspired language. (Puškin, PSS, XI, 87)


Puškin was interested in the title hero of Constant’s novel suffering from ennui, the *mal du siècle*, who became an ancestor of romantic dandies. Adolphe successfully persuaded Ellénore, the wife of a count and mother of two children, to give up all ties, renounce her social position and follow him, and then, cold in his love, he wavers in self-tormenting indecision between the social loyalty to the woman who sacrificed everything to him and the separation from a beloved, who became annoying.

Puškin was particularly interested in the representation of the life of the soul. According to Anna Axmatova ([1936] 1977, 98–99), the Russian poetess who was also an excellent Puškin researcher, Constantin’s *Adolphe* was the first to show the division of the human soul, the relationship between the conscious and the unconscious, the role of suppressed feelings, and the true motives of human actions. One can regard Puškin’s three prose fragments *The Blackamoor of Peter the Great* (*Arap Petra Velikogo*, 1827), *The Guests Were Arriving at the Dača* (*Gosti s’ezžalis’ na dače*, 1828–1829), *In the Corner of a Small Square* (*Na uglu malen’koj ploščadi*, 1830) as attempts at psychological prose à la Constant. Anna Axmatova (1936) has exhibited clear reminiscences of *Adolphe* in all three fragments.

The third of the three fragments, *In the Corner of a Small Square* unmistakably picks up Adolphe’s main motif, the agony of the soul of a successful but no longer loving seducer. But Puškin’s dandy is less sensitive and considerate than Constant’s hero. The three-page fragment contains two scenes. In the first we see Valerian Volodskij and his lover Zinaida, who for his sake has given up her husband. They are in a tense dialogue in Zinaida’s salon. Valerian is drawn into the society in which he cannot show himself with Zinaida, but she tries in vain to hold him back and lure him with a champagne meal she has ordered. She suffers from the fact that he comes to her “as if out of duty, not because [his] heart draws [him] here”: “You’re bored with me.” Valerian no longer listens, and he runs out of the room “like a restless schoolboy from a classroom.” Zinaida
steps up to the window, looks as he drives away, says loudly to herself “No, he doesn’t love me” and sits down at her desk (48–49).

The second scene flashes back and begins with a report on the thoughts of the husband abandoned by Zinaida:

X. soon found out that his wife was unfaithful. It threw him into great perplexity. He did not know what to do: it seemed to him that to pretend not to notice anything would be stupid; to laugh at this so very common misfortune would be despicable; to get angry in earnest would be too scandalous; and to complain with an air of deeply offended feeling would be too ridiculous. Fortunately, his wife came to his aid. (49)

Having fallen in love with Volodskij, Zinaida “conceived the kind of aversion to her spouse that is characteristic only of women and is understandable only to them” (49). She explains to her husband that she loves Volodskij and wants to divorce. The same day she moves from the noble English Embankment to Kolomna (a poorer neighborhood in which Puškin himself lived) and sends a brief note to Volodskij “who had expected nothing of the kind” (49).

The rest of the text introduces the reaction of the unpleasantly surprised seducer with a consciousness report (simply underlined), FID (meandering underlined) and figurally colored narration (doubly underlined):

He was thrown into despair. He had never meant to tie himself down with such bonds. He hated boredom, feared every obligation, and valued his egotistical independence above all else. But it was a fait accompli. Zinaida remained on his hands. He pretended to be grateful, but in fact he faced the pains of his liaison as if performing an official duty or getting down to the tedious task of checking his butler’s monthly accounts... (49)

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72 These considerations allude, as Anna Axmatova ([1936] 1977, 114) has shown, to Honoré de Balzac’s Physiologie du mariage (1829), which was intensively received and discussed in Russia. Puškin’s hero does not adopt the advice of the French marriage expert without correction. Balzac’s husband had come to the conclusion: “pretending to ignore everything betrays a man of wit” (Physiologie du mariage, ou Méditations de philosophie eclectique sur le bonheur et le malheur conjugal, publiées par un jeune célibataire. In: La Comédie humaine, ed. by P.-G. Castex. Paris 1980. Vol. 11. 1123).
8.2 The “Naked” Prose

The three prose fragments were attempts that Puškin soon gave up. Why did he remain dissatisfied with his experiments? For him, these fragments represented not a new literary genre but a failure. Paul Debreczeny (1983, 49) rightly names “the great speed of narration” among the shortcomings of the attempts at a psychological novel. The omniscient, intelligent narrator reveals too quickly the complex psyche of his heroes. A single sentence (“X. soon found out that his wife was unfaithful”) sums up an experience that should have grown in several chapters, as in Tolstoj’s Anna Karenina with Karenin’s gradual realization of his wife’s love for Vronskij.

But Debreczeny (1983, 45) wrongly characterizes the transition from the fragments to the Tales of the Late Ivan Petrovič Belkin (Povesti pokojnogo Ivana Petroviča Belkina, 1831) as a descent: “In fiction, Pushkin began with the complex, and then [...] he descended to the simple.” Rather, the development to the first completed prose work ought to be described as the path from the explication to the implication, as turning away from the explicit representation of the soul à la Constant to the creation of an implicative, indicative psychology – to what can be called a psychologia in absentia.

How is consciousness implied in the texts of the Belkin cycle that seem at first glance to be purely anecdotal and a-psychological? And to what extent does the psychopoetics realized in them approach the procedures of realistic representation of consciousness?

The narrated story is highly selective in relation to the happenings implied in it. Only a few of the moments of the action to be told are selected, and these have only few qualities. The reduction of the action to relatively few story-forming moments is a necessary act of any narrative, but the selectivity of the Belkin Tales is of a special kind, because moments of highest relevance are not depicted but implied. Thus, in the five tales, the motives of the heroes are not explicated. Why doesn’t Sil’vio shoot at the count, why doesn’t he shoot him? (The Shot; Vystrel)? Is it just coincidence or providence that those who, without knowing it, are already married fall in love with each other (The Snowstorm)? Why does the title hero in The Coffin Maker (Grobovščik) invite the “Orthodox dead” to his housewarming party, and why does he, awakening from the Cauchemar, apparently for the first time call the daughters to drink tea together, whom he otherwise scolds? Finally,
why does Aleksej propose a marriage to the teachable Akulina, even though he must be aware of the unbridgeable social divide that exists between him, the son of the landowner, and the poor peasant girl (*The Noblewoman- Peasant; Baryšnja-krest’janka*)?

Even the least puzzling of the five tales, *The Station Supervisor* (*Stancionnyj smotritel’*), provokes questions about the motivations of the characters and thus about the causality of their story. Why did Dunja weep during the whole journey from the post station to St. Petersburg, although, as the coachman testifies, she apparently went to Petersburg with Minskij “of her own free will” (99)? Why doesn’t Samson Vyrin follow his biblical example and doesn’t remain at home trusting in the return of the “lost daughter,” as the father of the Parable of the Prodigal Son does, a parable whose illustrations adorn the station supervisor’s room? Why does Vyrin, who hurried to Petersburg as a Good Shepherd, suddenly give up all attempts to return his “lost sheep” home? And finally – why does he drink himself to death?

Gaps thus occur most prominently in the inner states and motives for action. The young Tolstoj, who had just published his first novel *Childhood* (*Detstvo*, 1852), regretted this in a diary entry of 1853:

> I have read the Captain’s Daughter and must – oh alas! – confess that Puškin’s prose is already outdated, not in style, but in the way it is presented. Nowadays, in the new direction, interest in the details of emotion rightly replaces interest in the events themselves. Puškin’s stories are somehow naked.\(^{73}\)

Tolstoj thoroughly revised his early evaluation of Puškin’s prose as early as the 1870s, and at an advanced age declared the Belkin cycle (“How beautiful all this is, the Belkin Tales”) and The Queen of Spades (*Pičovna dama*, 1834; “This is a chef d’œuvre”) to be the best of Puškin’s works.\(^{74}\)

The variant drafts of the Belkin Tales show that, just before the printed versions, Puškin replaced his attempts at a direct representation of consciousness with scenes depicting the symptoms of consciousness. This can

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\(^{73}\) Entry of 1 November 1853 (Tolstoj, *PSS*, XLVI, 187–188).

\(^{74}\) See the memoirs of Nikolai Gusev (1973, 176), Tolstoj’s personal secretary, from 8 June 1908 and Aleksandr Gol’denveizer (1959, 221), the well-known pianist and composer, from 5 July 1908.
be shown by a motif from the *Station Supervisor*. This story is about the escape of Dunja, the daughter of the Station Supervisor Vyrin, with the traveling hussar, Minskij, from the post station to Petersburg. Vyrin, who perceives the event as an abduction, sets off for the town in order to rescue his daughter. He acts in accordance with Luke 15:3–7, and Matthew 18:12–14, where the owner follows the “lost sheep,” but Vyrin does not consider that the father remains at home in the neighboring Parable of the Prodigal Son (Lk 15:11–32). Vyrin finds the abductor in Petersburg and asks him to return his daughter. Minskij refuses, asks his forgiveness, shoves some bank notes into the cuff of his sleeve, and shuts the door on him. Vyrin suddenly finds himself on the street. At this point a sentence was originally planned which was conceived in two grammatical variants and in the third-person form which was finally chosen for Vyrin’s report read as follows: “For a long time he pondered, pondered and finally admitted in his heart that the young man was right” (Puškin, *PSS*, VIII, 652–653). The father thus agrees with the abductor. This is an important mental event in this story. Minskij, however, not only confessed to his guilt and asked Vyrin for forgiveness, but also assured him that he would never leave Dunja, that she would be happy. Vyrin finally asked him to what purpose he needed his daughter, and Minskij reproached him, that she loved him, Minskij, and was alienated from her former living conditions.

Puškin then deleted the sentence quoted above in its two variants and made an insertion character at the edge of the text. He only filled the gap after he had completed the *Station Supervisor* and also the second editing of the preface to the entire cycle. Under the text of the preface he wrote, with an explicit reference to the gap in the *Station Supervisor*, the following famous scene:

> He stood motionless for a long time; at last he took notice of a roll of some kind of paper in the cuff of his sleeve; he pulled it out, and unrolling it, discovered several crumpled five- and ten-ruble notes. Tears dwelled up in his eyes once more, tears of indignation. He pressed the notes into a lump, threw them on the ground, trampled on them with his heel, and walked away: Having gone a few steps, however, he stopped, thought for a while… returned… but by then the banknotes were gone. (100)
So Puškin has inserted here an ironic contrafact of the third parable of lost things in Luke 15, the Parable of the Lost Drachma.

The unambiguous consciousness report has been replaced by an ambiguous episode in which Vyrin’s thoughts must be inferred. The scene illustrates Vyrin’s inner battle as well as the victory of a thought over a feeling but does not allow any certain conclusions about the content of his thoughts and motives. Is Vyrin’s return the scenic equivalent of the admission in the original version? Does Vyrin want to pick up the money again because he acknowledges that Minskij is right? Or does the scene reveal that he has lost his pride and given himself up?

The emotion that brings tears to Vyrin’s eyes may not have been named quite reliably: the text conspicuously and emphatically identifies it as “indignation”. But one has to consider the perspective. The scene is part of Vyrin’s narrative, which, in its central passages, is reproduced in a form that can be described as free indirect report. Vyrin’s narrative is not only superimposed by the subject sphere of the sentimental travel writer, who functions as narrator, but is also accentuated by a superordinate omniscient and omnipresent narrative instance. The double neutralization of Vyrin’s subjectivity makes this middle section look like objective narration. In this section, rich in text interference, the perspective of the emphatic post-sentence “tears of indignation” can hardly be decided. It can be the authentic qualification that the objective narrative instance gives; or it can come from the interpretation of the sentimental narrator limited in his mental horizon, who observes the hero, as it were, from an external point of view; or it can represent the evaluation of the hero himself, namely the evaluation less of the narrated than of the hero narrating with a certain tendency.

The comparison of the two versions shows not only how consistently Puškin avoided presenting the inner motives of his hero explicitly, unambiguously and authentically, but also that, as a kind of compensation for the omission, he set signals of a fundamental psychological motivatedness that prompt the gaps to be filled. If one wants to answer the question of why Vyrin drinks himself to death in a reasonably plausible way, one must first have become aware that the scene discussed leaves a number of motives open that need to be concretized: Were they really “tears of indignation” that came into Vyrin’s eyes? If that was the case, what outraged him? What
thought changed his mind? But anyone who decides against the offered motive of indignation will have even more trouble reconstructing what may have happened in the father.

Most interpretations suffer from overestimating the thematic consistency of the Tales and filling the unidentified gaps with subjective conjectures. It is not surprising that the expectation of a sense is then confirmed by the sense found. Even those who are about to retell the stories are tempted to concretize the indefinite and in so doing merely fulfil their own expectations or desires for meaning.75

Nevertheless, Puškin relied on his reader. He contributed to the discovery of man as a complicated and contradictory psychic being, which took place in the literature of his time, above all by having the complex psychograms of his heroes extrapolated from the entire construction of the work, skeptical of the explicit representation and direct naming. Therefore, the Belkin Tales can rightly be described as the beginning of Russian psychological narrative – and, of course, of a narrative of psychologia in absentia.

8.3 Three Diegetic Devices

The Belkin Tales do suggest certain motives for the actions of the heroes. But the suggested motives all come from the repertoire of conventional sujets, which seemingly are repeated by the narrated stories. The motives borrowed from literature by the hero, narrator and author in the Station Supervisor – by the first to conceal his true motives from himself and the world, by the second to confirm his sentimental perception of the world, and by the author to playfully bring conventional interpretations of reality to absurdity – prove to be unsuitable for conclusively substantiating the causality of the narrated story. Should the station supervisor really have died of the grief of his daughter’s misfortune, which seemed inescapable to him?

75 In this context, it is significant that in the early 1860s, during his school experiments in Jasna Poljana, Tolstoj observed that his pupils could not retell the Coffin Maker. Tolstoj then completely refrained from Puškin, whose Tales – as he notes in his report – “had appeared to [him] earlier, in preliminary estimation, to the highest degree correctly built, simple.” Among other things, the pupils were irritated by the nedoskazannost to use Tolstoj’s term – i.e., the lack of explicit execution of all motives.
The Belkin Tales require an active reception that reconstructs the motives for action either not mentioned at all or not reliably mentioned in the text, rejects suggested conventional motivations, fills the gaps in the story and concretizes relevant “spots of indeterminacy” (Unbestimmtheitsstellen, Ingarden 1931; tr. 1979, 242). The filling in of the open and the concretization of the undetermined, which is already carried out more or less consciously in every retelling, can be based on certain suggestions contained in the structure of the text. Three diegetic devices (i.e., those concerning the formation of the story) serve as signals, which, despite the thematic diversity of the five tales, shape their construction in a similar way.

The first device is the paradigmatic structuring of the story: the formation of intratextual equivalence of thematic units; the parallelism of situations; and the repetition, reflection and variation of core motifs.\(^76\) The thematic or formal equivalence of the motifs does not predetermine a particular interpretation but is merely a signal for the reader to compare the equivalent characters, situations and actions and to consider both similarities and contrasts between them. In this way the reader can gain suggestions for the concretization of the indeterminate, particularly for the reconstruction of unexplained acts of consciousness.

A second device that lends towards concretization is the allusion to other texts. The Belkin Tales unfold a colorful display of intertextuality. Puškin alludes to texts from different cultures – ancient, Western European, American and Russian – and he makes no difference in literary rank. Besides Petrarca and Shakespeare there are Russian epigones like Wilhelm Karlhof and Antonij Pogorel’skij-Perovskij. In older research, Puškin’s intertextuality has been reduced to the parody of sentimentalist and romantic sujets and regarded as a means of enforcing realism. Since the 1970s and against the overestimation of parodistic destruction, the insight into the positive, sense-generating role of the actualized pretexts has gradually prevailed. Vadim Vacuro (1981) thus held the view that The Tales of Belkin tended less to destroy conventional sujets than to reawaken them and activate the possibilities of meaning contained in them. Starting from

\(^76\) Viktor Vinogradov (1934, 171–199; 1941, 438–479) was the first to systematically examine the devices of “reflection and variation” in the Belkin Tales. Jan van der Eng (1968) was a pioneer in functional analysis, recognizing in each of the five Tales the threefold recurrence of a core motif and the opposition of two strongly contrasting parts. Van der Eng assigns three functions to these devices: the deepening of the psychological profile of the heroes, the intensification of the moment of anecdotal surprise, and the intensification of the comic effect.
this new conception, Vladimir Marković (1989) formulated the idea that the cycle draws its sense complexity from the active interaction with the heterogeneous belles-lettres environment.

Two basic functions can be distinguished for the intertextuality of the Belkin Tales. The first is the contrafactum to known sujets, which the action follows only up to a certain point before taking a completely different course. The contrafactum uncovers the inconsistencies of the pretext and also expresses a meta-poetic critique of the world model of the previous work, but here – unlike in a mere parody – a new, more differentiated image of characters and actions is constructively sketched. Consequently, Karamzin’s sentimental sujet of the downfall of a lowly girl (Poor Liza), who had frozen into a template in the literature of the time, is contrasted with the socially atypical, but psychologically highly plausibly motivated story of the rise of the beautiful and cheeky daughter of the station supervisor.77

The second basic function of intertextual allusion is the concretization of the narrated story through the pretexts. For this function we have to distinguish two modes. In the first mode, the concretization comes about ex negatione – i.e., through the rejection of suggested analogies, or, more precisely, through the narrative refutation of false equivalences that narrators and heroes make. The heroes and also the diegetic narrators all appear as readers, and they tend to realize literary schemata in their own existence or to see them realized in the lives of others. In the second mode, the fragmentary story is completed by the expansion of an equivalence. This applies above all to the inconspicuous allusions, the pretexts of which do not play any narrative role whatsoever in the story. Neither does the narrator have these pretexts in mind as explanatory models, nor do the heroes use them to assert their interests. This includes, for example, the explicit comparison of individual plot details with corresponding features in well-known works, but also the many allusions that are signaled by the novellas’ mottos, the names of protagonists or covert quotations, without the pretexts appearing in the horizon of the depicted world. The expanded equivalence, which is tentatively extended to not particularly marked motifs of the two texts, again and

77 Puškin gave the recipe for this handling of pretexts, when in his unfinished Novel in Letters (Roman v pis’max, 1829) the literary enthusiast Liza describes “embroidering new designs on an old canvas” (55) as a task of the writer.
again results in surprising, comic findings and can even provide highly plausible suggestions for the inner motives of the heroes not presented in the story. Therefore, the pretext is not to be recognized here in its difference to the sujet of the text and rejected as an unsuitable, misleading explanatory scheme, but rather used as a donor of possible motivations.

A third device that stimulates the concretization of the story is the unfolding and realization of phraseological units, semantic figures (antitheses, paradoxes, oxymora), tropes (metaphors, metonyms), proverbs and sayings. These microtexts are present in the tales in different ways, either in explicit citation or anagrammatically hidden in individual word motifs or in scenes such as Sil’vio’s fly shooting. The realization, for instance, might consist in the quasi-primitive literalization of a figure of speech. The unfolding transforms the verbal motifs understood in the literal sense or the semantic figures appearing in the details of the story (the blind supervisor; the merciless avenger who hurts flies only) into whole sujets. In certain cases, however, it is not the actual meaning of word motifs that expands into action logic, but a figurative sense. Explicitly or implicitly given proverbs that contain a prediction prove to be true in a sense not intended at all by their users and quite surprising for themselves.

The three diegetic devices are connected with an activation of the indicative and symbolic representation of consciousness. They challenge the hermeneutic activity of the reader and explain the variety of interpretations applied to the Belkin Tales, especially the motives of their heroes.

8.4 The Snowstorm and the “Coup de foudre”

When asked whose prose was best in all of Russia, Puškin answered, “the prose of Karamzin, but that’s not much praise yet.” From Puškin’s perspective the prose of Nikolaj Karamzin – the sentimentalist author who was the first in Russia to consider the heart, the soul and the feeling worthy of representation – is characterized by a striking lack of “thoughts.” By this Puškin

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78 In the fragment named by the editors On Prose (O proze, 1822) (Puškin, PSS, XI, 18–19).
did not mean a lack of philosophy, but the inconsistency of the stories told.\textsuperscript{79} Karamzin’s sentimental tale \textit{Natal’ja, the Boyar’s Daughter} (\textit{Natal’ja, bojarskaja doč’}, 1792), a love and abducting story from ancient Russia, was countered by Puškin with an elaborate contrafact in \textit{The Snowstorm}. Although Karamzin refers to the dictum of a psychologist according to which the “description of a person’s daily activities is the most faithful representation of his heart” (59),\textsuperscript{80} he himself follows a completely different method. Instead of letting the inside appear on the outside, he brings the emotions of the innocent beauty to a sentimental term. Natal’ja thus feels “in her heart” or “in her soul” “a deep joy” at one time and “a certain sadness, a certain longing” at another time. The heroine does not understand – as the omniscient narrator explains – her own “emotions of the heart,” does not understand what she desires or what she longs for, and yet the narrator does know how to describe the “lack in her soul” quite precisely, with his sentimental vocabulary.

Puškin’s implicit critique can be shown in a single motif. Natal’ja, who is inspired by the pigeons’ springtime action, sees a stranger in the church, with whom she falls in love immediately. As if he felt a lack of psychological motivation, the narrator puts the critical question into his reader’s mouth: “In one minute? [...] After seeing him for the first time and not hearing a word from him?” (66). But the narrator tells nothing but the truth and warns against doubting the “power of mutual attraction felt by two hearts that are made for each other” (66–67).

This is where Puškin’s contrafactum comes in. His \textit{Snowstorm} is a psychological variation on love at first sight (\textit{coup de foudre}), an axiom of the sentimental love doctrine of the French eighteenth century. Not that Puškin destroyed the doctrine, no – he only gives it a psychological justification. The central proverb of the story – “You cannot escape the man destined for you even on horseback,” used by the parents of Mar’ja Gavrilovna about the poor sergeant Vladimir – proves true in the village church. Vladimir, the abductor misled by the snowstorm, arrives too late for the wedding ceremony because he, fastidious as he is, has made too many preparations. Meanwhile, Burmin (whose name is related to \textit{burja}, the ‘storm’) happens to pass by the village

\textsuperscript{79} In \textit{On Prose} Puškin had defined: “Accuracy and brevity are the first virtues of prose. It demands thoughts and thoughts again; without them brilliant expressions are useful for nothing. Verses are another thing” (Puškin, \textit{PSS}, XI, 19).

\textsuperscript{80} All quotations from Karamzin’s tales: Nikolaj Karamzin, \textit{Izbrannye proizvedeniya}. Moskva: Detskaja literatura, 1966.
church in the blizzard and is led to the church by the witnesses who, distracted by the beauty of the bride, believe him to be the groom. Using the favor of chance, Burmin steps before the altar with the bride, who appears to him as “quite pretty.” Later, in excessive self-accusation, which – as the French pretexts prove – is not free from refined calculation of conquest, he describes this step as “inexplicable, unexcusable recklessness” (86). When she becomes aware of the fatal error, the bride exclaims, “Oh, that’s not him! It’s not him!” (86) and collapses unconscious. The couple who have just been married do not seem to have been struck by instant love. Burmin continues his way through the nightly blizzard, and his newly wed wife, returning home, lies ill in bed and is on the edge of the grave for weeks. Yet the glimpse that Mar’ja Gavrilovna and Burmin threw at each other in the poorly lit church sparked a fateful love. This is hinted at by the author in many ways, in a grand display of intratextual correspondence, intertextual allusions and unfolded word motifs. This cannot be explained here in adequate detail (cf. Schmid 1991, 221–259). It may suffice to point out that the author also indirectly interferes in the polemics between Rousseau and Richardson about the possibility of love at first sight. In *La Nouvelle Héloïse*, which is expressly called upon elsewhere in the *Snowstorm*, Rousseau lets his heroes write of the predestination of their love and the *coup de foudre* that decides everything. In a footnote, Rousseau polemicizes with Samuel Richardson, who mocks affections that arise at first sight and are based on *conformités indéfinissables*. How, then, did Puškin justify love at first sight and the conviction of the lovers that they were “made for each other,” as Karamzin (67), following Rousseau, put it?

As so often in the *Belkin Tales*, the motivation not expounded in the text is suggested by an allusion. The central proverb of the novella alludes to a vaudeville by Nikolaj Xmel’nickij, which was frequently played in both capitals during the 1820s. In *You cannot escape the man destined for you even on horseback*, or *No Misfortune Without Happiness* (*Suženogo konëm ne ob’edeš’ ili Net xuda bez dobra*), the destined does not turn out to be the groom – the “most boring and slack young man,” who is, as always, late – but rather a hussar officer travelling by accident, wounded in the war, and who, in the absence of the gentlemen in the bride’s castle, has turned everything upside

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81 In the Russian original, *vetrenost’* ‘windiness,’ which designates a character trait and alludes to both the tale’s title and the hero’s name.
down. The bride, the “most lively and cheerful girl,” is anything but angry when she arrives at home with the handsome rascal and finds that she will marry none other than this impertinent replacement of her betrothed.

Here we observe a paradox of intertextuality typical of Puškin. By presenting motifs from the vaudeville, an apsychological genre, Puškin gives his figures a psychological profile. It seems to be the insolence, the windiness that makes Burmin attractive to Mar’ja Gavrilovna, and the story further proves that the conformité indéfinissable necessary for the fateful connection is based precisely on the windiness of both.

Natal’ja’s state of consciousness in Karamzin’s tale was one-sided, her explicitly biologically motivated willingness to love was exclusively and unconditionally directed at the fixed object. For Puškin’s Mar’ja Gavrilovna, we must assume very contradictory – and, among other things, also quite prosaic – emotions and a quite paradoxical affection. In addition to all outrage against Burmin, the false bridegroom who condemned her to the joyless life of a virgin widow, the young woman will also have other feelings: irrepressible curiosity about the mysterious impudent usurper and a secret longing for the daring conqueror who saved her from marrying Vladimir, who was not only unimaginative but also destitute. Only in this way is it possible to explain that Mar’ja Gavrilovna, after Vladimir’s death, gives the appearance of a Russian Artemisia mourning and remembering heartbrokenly. Does’t she conceal the secret longing for the ‘windy’ husband with the mourning for Vladimir whom she has never really loved?

The complex psychogram of the heroine, which also includes quite frivolous and cruel emotions, from the manifold allusions, such as those to Rousseau, Petrarca and Pietro Aretino, is not to be traced here. The point to be made is the gap between Karamzin’s quite simple Natal’ja and Puškin’s complex Mar’ja Gavrilovna. The comparison shows Puškin’s fundamental difference to the sentimentalist’s character constitution and his critique of the lack of psychology in the popular narratives of his time.

A similar difference can be seen between the father abandoned by Natal’ja and Samson Vyrin from The Station Supervisor, which forms another contrafact to the story of the boyar’s daughter. Karamzin’s concerned boyar

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82 Artemisia was the wife of the satrap Mausolos of Asia Minor, to whom she had the Mausoleum of Halicarnassus built, one of the seven wonders of the world. She was the pattern of a faithful wife and inconsolable widow.
Matvej considers for a moment that a villain could have seduced the innocent daughter and would leave her, plunging her into misery. But then he immediately rejects this fear, for he knows that his daughter cannot love a villain. But why did she not reveal herself to the father? Whoever the beloved would have been, he would have embraced him as a son. But perhaps, the father says to himself, he deserved God’s punishment. In any case, he will submit to it without grumbling. And he asks his God to be a merciful father to his daughter in every country. May he himself die in sorrow, if the daughter shall be happy. If only she returned at least one hour before his death. But as God pleases. Meanwhile he, the orphan in old age, will be a father to the unhappy and the afflicted. Karamzin’s ideal hero shows us which thoughts and motives spring from true, unselfish fatherly love. Puškin, however, did not believe in such a spiritual idyll. Not only is Samson Vyryin far less certain of the daughter’s virtue, but in his pain, he himself betrays quite unfatherly motives. For example, when he wishes the grave for his daughter, whom he cannot imagine other than living in sin in the town. And it speaks for itself that he does not rely on the Parable of the Prodigal Son, whose illustrations adorn his dwelling, but, referring inwardly to the image of the Good Shepherd (John 10), makes his own way to Petersburg. The confrontation with Minskij the Wolf and Dunja the Lost Sheep, however, proves the supposedly Good Shepherd to be the biblical “Thief” and “Robber.” And from Vyryin’s behavior we can conclude that it is not the daughter’s feared misfortune that kills him, but her happiness, witnessed by the “poor supervisor” in Petersburg.

Puškin’s contrafacts imply the following critique of Karamzin’s psychology, formulated in the terms of the fragment On Prose: Karamzin’s material is not “thoughts,” – which, for Puškin, was the “first virtue” of prose – but “brilliant expressions” that belong in the hemisphere of poetry. Indeed, Karamzin’s art of consciousness does not consist of staging or even exploration, but merely of naming discrete states of the soul, each of which is homogenized into a single emotional situation. Instead of depicting consciousness, Karamzin offers finger exercises in the vocabulary of the new sentimental inside-ness. And the depiction of the emotional, tearful heroes serves less as a precise reference than as an impression on like-minded hearts.
The allusive text of the Belkin stories requires a sensitive reader who, in poetic reading, resists the strong conclusion-oriented pull of this highly narrative prose and moves ‘on foot’ through the text, forwards and backwards, remaining with individual motifs, perceiving their allusion potential, descending into the depths of the pretexts, but also returning to the text again and transferring the potentials of meaning gained in the intertext to the triggering motifs of the text and their surroundings on a trial basis. The reader is called upon to keep his concretization of the heroes and their motives open to other possibilities and to resist seductive unification. More important than the production of a certain result of meaning is the playing through of different possibilities of concretization. Every new equivalence that appears in the text, every new verbal figure that can be discovered, every new pretext to which the text can be meaningfully related, will set the concretization in motion. The categorical indeterminacy of the stories can only be adequately answered by a concretization that accepts the unfinishability of the process of sense-making and the possibility of different interpretations.

Of course, Puškin’s text does not open the door to hermeneutic arbitrariness. The spectrum of meaningful ways of reading remains limited, and certain readings are unmistakably rejected. The acceptance of interpretations is measured by how fully they take note of the text and to what extent they are able to explain the entire story and not just individual motifs. To be concerned about the coherence of the story and the integration of all motifs, however, seems particularly appropriate with texts that – such as The Station Supervisor or The Shot – invite simplifying; voluntaristic access to meaning; and, in the course of their history of reception, have repeatedly been taken into the service of moral instruction and ideological indoctrination.

Puškin concluded from the failure of explicit psychology that the indefinite life of the soul withdraws from direct naming and analytical access. He now met the blurriness and polyphony of the psyche with a mode of representation that left a certain leeway for filling in the indefinite. Therefore, the indeterminate text, which in many respects requires concretization, becomes an image of the indeterminable, contradictory psyche. What’s more, the poetic devices that, through their concatenations, imprint certain potentials of
meaning on the explicit motifs are themselves models for what they help to concretize. The associative linking of motifs against all objective, temporal-causal coherence; the evocation of similar stories from the repertoire of archetypal sujets; and, finally, the magical unfolding of word, figure and saying are processes that poetry shares with consciousness and the unconscious. Interfering with the perspectivizing narration, the poetic fabric offers highly complex possibilities of indirect representation of man and his ungraspable inner world.

The absent psychology thus brought into presence by the reader has nothing in common with the characterology of the eighteenth century. It already has those traits that the art of consciousness of realism has uncovered: polyphony, contradictoriness and undecidability. The person is no longer the closed, fundamentally fixable character that literature has hitherto drawn. Liza from The Noblewoman-Peasant is not simply, like Marivaux’s heroine in Le Jeu de l’amour et du hazard, a disguised lady; she is both a lady and a peasant at the same time, as the title says. Of course, in this vaudeville novella, man is still more character and less psyche than in the other works in this cycle. But psychology comes into play when the text suggests in many ways that Aleksej doesn’t offer his hand to the peasant girl so much because he has a faible for the genre paysan or is fatefully in love with the village blacksmith’s daughter (he seems a little tired of the rustic beauty). The astonishing docility and spirit of the peasant girl make it easier for him to boldly cross the boundaries of his class, but his proposal is motivated above all by his defiance of his inexorable father, whom he, no less stubborn, defies. It is not by chance that it is only after the clash with his father that Aleksej can clearly see that he is passionately in love with the peasant girl.

Realistic psychology stages the tactics and strategy of consciousness. From Dostoevskij’s psyches we know the most refined maneuvers. In the psychology of the Belkin Tales there is deception and self-deception everywhere. With literary attitudes, the heroes hide from themselves and others their actual motives, which are sometimes quite prosaic. The supervisor Samson Vyrin thus conceals from others, but also from himself, the offendedness of the abandoned with the biblical concern of the Good Shepherd for his lost sheep. Sil’vio plays the role – to others as well as to himself – of the romantic avenger in order to deceive about the harmlessness of his being, which finds symbolic expression in fly shooting. Mar’ja Gavrilovna fakes mourning for Vladimir to conceal her longing for the ‘windy’ husband.
In addition to such a hierarchy of motivations, there is also an undecidable bipolarity of emotions and motives. One and the same motif, perceived against the background of several pretexts, can suggest very different motives. Mar’ja Gavrilovna withdraws to her ‘mausoleum’ for Vladimir and gives none of her countless clients the slightest hope. On the other hand, however, the context awakens certain doubts about the unapproachability of this Russian Artemisia. There is the ambiguous praise of the generous wages paid by Russian women to officers returning from the Napoleonic War, and in the countryside where Mar’ja lives, the enthusiasm is even greater than in the capitals. The intertextual meaning of the words Se amor non è, que dunque, with which the narrator characterizes Mar’ja’s sincere affection for the wounded officer, the unrecognized husband, is also ambiguous. The words can first be identified as a quotation from Petrarca’s Canzoniere. Thus understood, they associate the fateful love for the unattainably adored Madonna Laura. The line can also be seen as a quoted quotation and as an allusion to Pietro Aretino’s Ragionamenti. There the line in question is sung by the cavaliers who ride past the courtesan Nanna’s house with a “pocket Petrarca” in their hands. Those who realize the allusion to Aretino will perceive the equivalence of the contexts and will not be able to avoid comparing the inexorable Mar’ja with the refined Nanna, who only pretends to be unapproachable in order to arouse the interest of the cavaliers. The courtesan’s tactics were very successful, and Nanna was pleased to discover that, just as sparrows gather in ever-increasing numbers around a grain floor, lovers swarm around her house “who want to stick their beaks into her grain floor” (Aretino, 94).

Whatever profile for Mar’ja Gavrilovna the reader may form from the triangle of heterogeneous prototypes – the faithful widow Artemisia, the unreachable Madonna Laura and the calculating Nanna – the essence of Puškin’s heroine will remain in a certain ambiguity and contradictoriness. The three prototypes form a triad between whose figures the reader will waver, but they also denote the extremes that define the heroine’s soul.

The Belkin Tales mark the point at which, for the first time in Russian narrative prose, the unconscious appears as a sujet factor. Even the characters’ speech is motivated by the unconscious. This is most evident in Vyrin’s words about “His Honor,” who “is not a wolf, he won’t eat [Dunja]” (98). As in this involuntary prophecy of the later solution, soul reflex and action anticipation also mix in other proverbial microtexts as well as in dreams. Mar’ja
Gavrilovna dreams that she will be thrown into a dark dungeon by her father, when she leaves for the secret wedding ceremony with Vladimir. Another time she sees her groom lying mortally wounded in the grass. With oniric transposition, both motifs express unconscious fears and hopes: the fear of marriage to the unimaginative Vladimir, which must seem like a dark dungeon to the bright girl, and the hope of still escaping the unloved bridegroom. At the same time, however, both motifs in the symbolic language of the dream anticipate the course of the Burmin story: the cruel conduct of the father, who is extremely soft-hearted in the reality of the story, anticipates the cruel joke of the hussar, who will throw his wife into the dark dungeon of solitude. And Burmin will also prove to be a dying bridegroom, since he, disappearing immediately after the marriage ceremony, turns his wife into a virgin widow. Psychic reflexes and anticipation of action are very different functions, but in Puškin’s poetic world model, unconscious hopes and fears seem to have a magical effect on future events.

Adrijan Proxorov in the Coffin Maker proves an astonishing anticipation of what awaits him. This novella, the most prosaic in theme and the most poetic in construction, with the most pronounced figural perspective, contains the only explicit psychological motif: transporting the last belongings into his new house, Adrijan Proxorov notices “with surprise that his heart is not rejoicing” (87). This joylessness is evidenced by an allusion to Pogorel’skij’s Poppy-seed Saleswoman from Lafertovo (Lafertovskaja makovnica, 1825), a text beloved by Puškin, as a premonition of spooky events. Indeed, in the new house, which has the yellow color of the dead, the Coffin Maker will descend into the underworld, into the realm of skeletons. This oniric descent, initiated by the guard Jurko, a Moscow Hermes Psychopompos, is nothing else than the descent into the unconscious that has been suppressed during the day. Unpleasant experiences await Proxorov here: the confrontation with the guilt that he has brought upon himself as a dishonest craftsman, the encounter with the absurdity to which his thinking has turned the true paradox of his Coffin Maker existence, and the insight as to how he would feel if his absurd orthodoxy were to prove true – the belief that the dead live – in the houses that he, the Coffin Maker, makes for them.

A psychological masterpiece is The Queen of Spades. In it Puškin reaches the third stage of his psychopoetics: explicit and implicit psychology are linked here. Quite a lot of interpretations underlay the novella with deep
psychological motifs, even a proper Oedipus program. One must not over-
look, however, the fact that here the unconscious is limited as a motivating
factor. A purely psychological interpretation that ignores the fantastic im-
poverishes the work (for details cf. Schmid 1997a; 2013, 287–315). As we
know, Germann’s Faro game ends with a fiasco. But the countess’s card se-
cret does not fail. The Three, the Seven and the Ace actually fall. It is the
greedy, calculating Germann who fails. In a Freudian mishap, instead of the
ace, he draws the Queen who avenges his shameful treatment of the female
sex. Germann’s downfall is psychogenic, a self-punishment, but there is also
a fantastic power involved, which ensures that the expected three ‘safe’ cards
actually fall.
9 Otto Ludwig’s *Between Sky and Earth*: The Non-Occurring Event

9.1 Non-Events and Tellability

Otto Ludwig’s novel *Between Sky and Earth* (*Zwischen Himmel und Erde*, 1856) is relevant to the subject of this book in two ways.

The work is regarded as the first novel of consciousness in German literature. Patterns of the representation of consciousness that, like FID, conceal the presence of the character’s text, were occasionally found in the novels of Christoph Martin Wieland, and as we have seen, in Goethe’s *Elective Affinities* they quite often occur in their narratorial variant. Only Otto Ludwig’s novel, however, can be regarded as the first highpoint in a systematic use of concealed representation of consciousness in German literature.\(^{83}\)

The second point is that the hero of the novel, the ‘angelic’ Apollonius Nettenmair, renounces the course of action expected by everyone, namely marrying his beloved Christiane, who loves him too and has become a widow following the death of his brother Fritz. Their father sent Apollonius on a journey, prompted by the calculated persuasion of his frivolous and unscrupulous brother, who strove for a free hand with Christiane. In Apollonius’ absence, Fritz systematically slandered him in front of his bride and married Christiane himself. After Fritz, out of hatred, envy, and jealousy, has attempted to murder Apollonius while working with him on the roof of a church tower, Christiane, who had been a faithful wife to Fritz, throws herself into the arms of Apollonius, whom she still loves. In a second assassination attempt that he undertakes on the roof of the church tower, Fritz himself

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\(^{83}\) In the literature on the novel, there are a number of references to the techniques of representing consciousness, such as in Brinkmann ([1957] 1977, 166) and Lillyman (1967, 146–160; 1977). But the yield of these works is low, since in them the techniques of representing consciousness are limited to FID and the “interior monologue,” and the two patterns are either regarded as identical (as in Brinkmann’s case) or are insufficiently differentiated (as in Lillyman’s case). On the ambiguity of perspective, Stuart P. Atkins (1939, 352) states that “it is sometimes difficult to decide whether one is reading narrative or the thoughts of a character.”
falls to his death in the desperate struggle with his brother. The way would now be free for the two lovers. But the principled “hypochondriac” Apollonius – as the author repeatedly calls him in a paratext – who wrongly feels guilty for the death of his brother, renounces marriage to his beloved and takes flight in a resigned attitude of renunciation and self-sacrificing care for Christiane’s children.

The status of this decision where the logic of events is concerned may seem ambiguous. The renunciation could be regarded as a true event, since it seems to be a paradox and to oppose the expectations of the environment. People cannot understand Apollonius’ renunciation, even thirty years after his misfortune:

The neighbors are surprised that Mr Nettenmair did not marry his sister-in-law. It is now thirty years ago that her husband, Mr Nettenmair’s older brother, had an accident while repairing the church roof at St. George. At that time, it was generally believed that he would marry his brother’s widow. His father, who was still alive at the time, even wanted this, and the son himself did not seem averse to it. One does not know what stopped him. But it did not happen, although Mr Nettenmair took fatherly care of his brother’s children and did not get married otherwise, no matter how many good matches there were for him. Their strange life together had already started then.

It is natural that people wonder; they do not know what was going on in four souls at that time; and if they knew, they might wonder even more. (335)

Not only the people and the father consider a marriage to be “natural,” indeed “necessary.” Christiane herself, despite all her submission to Apollonius’ will, also cherishes corresponding secret “desires and hopes” (498). But for the hero the decision made is not an event, since it follows with great consistency from his strict principles and his previous ethical behavior, and only proves his steadfastness in moral matters.

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Ludwig’s novel is an example of the gap between tellability and eventfulness. Apollonius cannot cross the border to a realistic view of his diabolical brother, and after the death of his brother, who twice sought to take his life, he does not find the strength to subject his strict principles, his overblown sense of responsibility, to the judgment of reason. When, for self-accusing moral reasons, he renounces his love for his brother’s widow, who loves him dearly, and when he refuses marriage, which would be the most natural thing in the world for everyone, the expected border crossing does not take place. In this instance, it would be a mental event if Apollonius relativized his rigid moralism, abandoned his unfounded self-accusation, gained a realistic assessment of what had happened, and followed the inclination of his heart. The tellability of the story is essentially based on the withholding of an event, the not-crossing of a mental boundary, on the hero’s decision not to marry his beloved.

9.2 Differing Evaluations

The ethical value of the decision not to make the obvious marriage expected by everyone was assessed very differently in the reception of the novel. The contemporary public was not satisfied with Apollonius’ renunciation (cf. Lillyman 1977, 751).

There were also attempts, especially in the spirit of the German 1970s, to accuse Ludwig and his program of “poetic realism” of political abstinence and the idealization of social conditions. Critics of the author, his program, and his work can, of course, refer to the idyllic ending of the novel:

The roses on the high-stemmed trees smell, a warbler sits on the bush under the old pear tree and sings; a secret movement runs through the whole garden, and even the strong-stemmed box tree moves its dark leaves around the circling beds. The old gentleman [Apollonius] looks thinking at the roof of St. George’s tower; the beautiful matronly face [of Christiane] listens to him through the bean field. The bells call it, the warbler sings it, the roses smell it, the soft rain through the little garden whispers it, the beautiful old faces say it, you can read it on the tower roof of St. George: People speak of happiness and misfor-
tune that heaven brings them! What people call happiness and unhappiness is only the raw material; it is up to man what he forms it for. It is not heaven that brings happiness; man prepares his happiness and stretches out his heaven himself in his own breast. Man should not worry that he will go to heaven, but that heaven will come to him. He who does not carry it in himself seeks it in vain in all the universe. Let understanding guide you, but do not hurt the holy barrier of feeling. Do not turn away rebuking yourself from the world as it is; seek to do justice to it and you will do justice to yourself. And in this sense be your conduct: between heaven and earth! (531–532)

This ending suggests an unclouded happiness of old age for the two protagonists, which they have prepared for themselves, in the balance of mind and feeling, in the successful search for the ‘heaven within them.’

Not only the plot itself and the character of Apollonius stand in irreconcilable contradiction to the idyllic picture and doctrine with which the narrator closes the novel; the author’s critical statement on the demand for an ideal hero, as raised by contemporaries, is also incompatible with the final idyll. In the following note, the ironic author sketches a finale as his critics would have wished:

Finally, Apollonius had to fall out of character for the sake of dear sentimentality, the limited hypochondriac had to become an absolutely human moral ideal. The old man, of all things. They got married. Apollonius did not relapse into his hypochondria either, but the marriage was the happiest, the old man himself became a cozy soul and, melting in coziness, rocked the young hypochondriac brood. That would be the other side of the hypochondriac fate, namely what would result if the hypochondria no longer found any counterweight in external activity. Right; the women among ladies and gentlemen would have been satisfied, but – well, I myself would have been ashamed to the depths of my soul. (Quote from Lillyman 1977, 751)

Not only does the commenting author of the paratexts contradict his novel; his fictional text itself contains a contradiction. On the one hand, the renunciation of the beloved woman appears as an expression of the compulsive strictness of principles of a “hypochondrist”; on the other hand, the text (or
the abstract author to be reconstructed from it) tends to glorify the renunciation poetically.

Questions about the ethical value of the hero’s decision and about possible inconsistencies on the part of the author, as well as about the closeness to reality of the so-called “poetic realism” for which the novel figures as a key work, will not be raised again here. In the following, instead, we will look at the means by which the novel creates “what was going on in four souls at the time.”

9.3 The Psychogram of Things

Before Apollonius Nettenmair enters the scene of the novel as an old man, the basic features of his character are expressed in the strangely detailed constellation setting of small garden, house, and slate shed in an indicative and symbolic way. It is hermeticism and closure that are indicated and symbolized by the configuration of the buildings and their inner arrangement. The buildings are described anthropomorphically, both metonymically and metaphorically, and seem to be endowed with a soul:

Beyond the alleyway stands a high house, which in distinguished seclusion does not appreciate the narrow house of any gaze. It has open eyes only for the hustle and bustle of the main street; and if one takes a closer look at the closed eyes facing the alleyway, one soon finds the cause of their eternal sleep; they are only illusory works, painted only on the outer wall. (331)

The “little garden,” which is not by chance the first noun of the text and is mentioned as the first ‘agent’ of the story, is the indicative expression of Apollonius Nettenmair. The little garden presents a psychogram of the hero:

The utmost cleanliness smiles at the observer from the most hidden corner. In the garden it is almost too scared to smile. The garden does not seem to be cleaned with a hoe and broom but brushed. In addition, the small beds, which stand out so sharply from the yellow gravel of the paths, look as if they were not drawn on the ground with a string, but rather with a ruler and compass. The boxwood border looks as if it is served day after day by the most accurate barber of the town with
a comb and clippers. And yet the blue skirt, which you can see stepping into the garden twice a day when you are standing on the balcony, at the same minute one day after another, is even cleaner than the garden. (332)

Formulated in categories of psychology, the garden expresses compulsive accuracy and cleanliness. When the old Apollonius, metonymically represented by the blue coat and the white apron over it, “goes between the high-stemmed roses, which seem to have taken the attitude of the old gentleman as their model, one step is like the other, none reaches further or falls out of time” (332–333). Here, the narrator makes it clear that the garden is Apollonius’ “creation” and that Apollonius “outwardly imitates only that for which nature itself created the pattern in him” (333). When the narrator makes his speculations about this “pattern,” he adds to the traits of scrupulous precision a kind trait:

When nature formed him, his face must have carried the same expression of conscientiousness that the old man’s face shows, and which in its strength must have appeared as obstinacy, were it not for the element of loving mildness, almost of rapture, that had been added to it. (333)

The combination of severity and leniency manifests itself in Apollonius when he saves his father’s roofing business, which is facing collapse under the leadership of his unsound and undutiful brother, by intervening energetically and in doing so forcing his brother to take some austerity measures: “Apollonius was relentless, however mildly he presented his reasons to the brother” (417).

When the young Apollonius returned to his hometown after six years of absence and heard the bells of his hometown while he was still in the dense forest, his eyes shed tears of emotion and he abandoned himself to thoughts about the connection between being away from home and dreams on the one hand and home and wakefulness on the other. And at this decisive moment, the narrator observes a seemingly incidental action of the young Apollonius, which nevertheless fits in well with the psychogram of the old Apollonius drawn by buildings and garden:
It might be noticeable how, at this moment of excitement in all his inner self, he did not overlook the spider’s thread that the greeting air blew from home against his coat collar, and that he carefully dried the tears so that they could not fall on the neckerchief, and with the most stubborn perseverance removed the last, smallest remnants of the silver thread, before he abandoned himself with all his soul to his feelings of home. (337)

The inconspicuous actions, precisely registered by the narrator, express the preferences in Apollonius’ “soul.” The emotion, here the “feeling of home,” has to subordinate itself to the principles of order and cleanliness. The observation of the narrator at this point is also well motivated by composition. The micro-actions of the homecomer who really is moved to tears, aiming at achieving purity of the body and carried out with “stubborn perseverance” down to the last thread, anticipate his later macro-decision. Just as here he holds back the surging “feeling of home” in favor of a clean coat collar and neckerchief, so he will subordinate his undoubtedly strong feelings for his beloved Christiane to his scrupulous and stubborn principle of order and cleanliness.

With narratorial introspection into the depths of the soul of his hero, the narrator delivers a ‘psychological’ diagnosis of the cleansing action:

But even his attachment to his homeland was in part only an outgrowth of that stubborn need for cleanliness, which regarded everything foreign that wanted to approach him as pollution; and again that need arose from the warmth of mind with which he embraced everything that was more closely related to his personality. The clothes on his body were a piece of his homeland from which he had to keep everything foreign away. (337)

A contemporary psychologist would interpret the “stubborn need for cleanliness” as an obsessive-compulsive disorder and the defense against all things foreign in whatever form – even in the form of a spider’s thread – as an expression of an autistic-narcissistic personality disorder. And one might see in the latter a reason why Apollonius, caught in his “stubborn conscience” (419), is not capable of empathy, cannot accept the alterity of the foreign, and cannot cross the border of his ego to other people. Being encapsulated in his world might also explain why he is unable to recognize with
certainty that Christiane, whom he observes dancing with a beating heart, does not mean anyone other than him when, during a break, she places a flower, deeply blushing, on the bench near him. Apollonius does not see through his brother either, who pretends to be wooing for him but in reality disparages him before Christiane and persuades the young woman that Apollonius rejects her. The lack of empathy and the defense against alterity prevent Apollonius from guessing his brother’s thoughts and seeing through his evil intentions.

Apollonius suffers from a blatant inability to do what today’s cognitivism (Zunshine 2006; Palmer 2007) calls mind reading or theory of mind. What may seem like excessive shyness and good-natured guilelessness proves to be the inability of the hermetically encapsulated hero to cross the boundaries of his own self to the outside world.85

Fritz, on the other hand, is capable of mind-reading: “He read what she felt from her face” (399–400). Despite all his depravity, he is sensitive to what is in other people’s souls; with the sharp eye of jealousy, suspicion, and hatred, he discovers the most subtle emotions in them, above all the sympathy his wife and his children have for Apollonius, and he foresees the catastrophe from the outset, since his recognition is also directed at himself:

Nothing escaped him that could provide a pretext for his anger and hatred. He saw the hair of his boys wound in screws, as Apollonius did; he saw the resemblance to Apollonius in the features of the woman and the children emerge and grow; he had an eye for everything that revealed his wife’s reverence for his brother [...](421)

The positive counterpart to the fastidious Apollonius is the cousin in Cologne to whom the father sends the boy for an apprenticeship. The Cologne cousin instructs his assistants by asking them for their advice and thus indirectly giving them a “wealth of rules of life and principles.” While he holds “conscientiousness, stubbornness in the work and cleanliness of the body and the soul” high, the cousin does not, however, fail to give examples “of how these virtues could suffer from excess” (347). That would have been a good lesson for Apollonius if he had understood and accepted it.

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85 This finding is compatible with the diagnosis of William Lillyman (1967, 34–39), who explains two motifs responsible for the plot of the novel: “misunderstanding” and “isolation.”
Far away in Cologne, Apollonius receives his brother’s news that all his attempts to soften Christiane’s hardness against him, Apollonius, had been in vain and that he had married Christiane himself after they had discovered their mutual love. Apollonius “understands in pain” (348) his mistake, and now believes that it was Fritz for whom Christiane had laid down the flower. The man returning home after six years now wants to be nothing but a brother to the still-beloved woman for whose sake he ignored the girls in Cologne, and to show her that he does not deserve her – supposed – aversion. In relating Apollonius’ review of those six years, the narrator assures us that the distant Apollonius “turned from a stupid, dreamy boy into a man” (352).

9.4 Explicit Representation of Consciousness

Labeling Ludwig’s work as the first novel of consciousness in German literature suggests a narrative text in which the narrator’s voice is replaced or repressed by that of a reflector figure. But Ludwig’s novel is by no means dominated by a figural perspective that makes the narrator’s presence forgotten. In the novel Between Sky and Earth, the narrator is not repressed, despite his deep introspection into the characters’ souls and the dense figural perspectivization. In addition to figurality, narratoriality is strongly developed. Again and again, the narrator interrupts his report with emphatic exclamations or rhetorical questions that go beyond the horizon of the characters or cannot be assigned to them thematically. The narrator occasionally unfolds generalizations on the themes addressed in these proclamations and questions. The narrator also performs narratorial analyses of what is going on in the characters and they themselves do not understand. In the following example, he uncovers Fritz’s motives, which remain hidden from him:

Then Apollonius was the dreamer for him [Fritz], and he himself was the one who knew the world. Perhaps at the next moment he saw the malicious person in his brother again and found it pleasant to feel sorry for himself as the innocent one for whom the other laid snares, in order to be allowed to hate the brother who hated him. He lacked Apollonius’ need for clarity, which would have shown him the con-
tradiction and forced him, having acknowledged it, to remove it. Perhaps he had a feeling of the contradiction and deliberately suppressed it. So his sense of guilt presupposed as real the hatred that he had to reproach himself for having earned. (379)

The constant presence of the subjective NT makes it difficult to identify text interference. In works in which a narrator reveals himself only weakly and limits himself to objective reporting, every subjective evaluation, every emphatic coloring of the narrative, every expressive language function is a symptom of the secret presence of CT. In Ludwig’s novel, the language function cannot be an identifying feature of CT, because the narrator can also speak emphatically and expressively. Since the opposition of the two texts is also neutralized in lexicography and syntax, the reader remains essentially dependent on theme and evaluation to identify text interference. And in these two respects, the assignment of segments of the narrative report to CT and NT is particularly dependent on interpretation, i.e., not least on the reader’s image of the instances so far.

An example of expressive statements and emphatic exclamations that one might initially consider to be figural but then, interpreted in context, prove to be narratorial, is the description of the difficulties of Apollonius following his return after six years:

But what stood between him and his brother was different, quite different from what he thought. And the fact that he did not know it made it more dangerous. It was a suspicion, born of the consciousness of guilt. What he did to remove the supposed obstacles could only really make it grow.

Had he not come back! Had he not obeyed his father! Had he stayed far from home! (378)

In the course of the narrative, narratoriality decreases markedly. Examples of purely narratorial emphasis and expressivity are particularly to be found

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86 Lubomír Doležel (1958; 1960; 1973) has in mind this objective type of narrative text, which has an exclusively “representational linguistic function” (in the sense of Karl Bühler 1934), in his work with distinctive features. Doležel regards any subjectivity as a “stylistic device” that deprives the narrative text of its basic characteristic, namely objectivity. A similar idealization can be found in Elena Padučeva (1996, 336-337). Criticism of the two positions: Schmid 2014a, 166-167.
in the early parts of the text. In this way, the impression is created that with the increasingly dramatic plot, the reader is drawn ever deeper into the inner world of the characters.

However, there is another characteristic of the narrative that needs to be mentioned here. The representation of consciousness in this novel by no means makes exclusive use of concealed forms, i.e., FID, free interior monologue, and free indirect perception. The marked patterns of consciousness reports and indirect representations are well represented. Thus, the narrative remains in the “hands” of the narrator, even where it concentrates entirely on the characters’ inner world.

Even if narratorial emphases, rhetorical questions, and comments increasingly recede in the text, the narrator remains present – even if this is only because he allows concealed forms of representation of consciousness to alternate with marked ones. This switch takes place at such a high frequency and at such short intervals that there is a particular demand on the reader to work out what instance is expressing itself in every half sentence. Richard Brinkmann ([1957] 1977, 197) vividly describes the “wavering” of perspective and the “iridescence” of sentences between the objective judgment of the narrator and FID, which forces the reader to “switch” “at lightning speed” from one view to another: “The reader must [...] be quite careful that when imagining what the sentences say, he is on the right track” (199).

It is not easy to find the right ‘track’ where the following passage is concerned. It can be understood equally well as an analysis on the part of the penetrating narrator or as a self-analysis on the part of Fritz, who in moments of clarity can sharply and mercilessly dissect himself and his behavior:

If he had loved her earlier as he does now, perhaps her deepest soul would have opened itself to him, she would have loved him too. They lived together for years, walked next to each other, their souls knew nothing about each other. Although she was a physical wife and mother, her soul remained that of a girl. He did not awaken the deeper needs of her heart, he did not know them; he could not have satisfied them. He recognizes them only when they turn to someone else. He only feels what he possessed without having it now that it belongs to someone else. (397–398)
9.5 “What was going on in four souls”

The figural perspective, and also the text interferences, increase with the dramatic intensification of the plot after the death of little Anna, caused by Fritz. Apollonius recognizes the resurgence of his love for Christiane, which he believed to have gone cold; Christiane, who believed herself rejected by Apollonius following her husband’s manipulation, also has to admit her love for Apollonius. Fritz, who has a good sense for the feelings of others, feels the growth of their emotions and his hopeless position. He briefly thinks he could change, but he nevertheless realizes the murder plan presented to him by fate.

The narrator explains at the beginning that people did not know “what was going on in four souls at that time” (335). “Four souls” is to be modified. The old father, who for fear of losing authority does not take part in the communication of the young people, is only partly a carrier of consciousness. His thinking revolves exclusively around his authority and the honor of the family. This blind man who senses the murder even climbs up to Fritz on the tower roof in order to persuade him to throw himself off the roof and thereby avert the feared shame.

Christiane plays only a passive role in the psychological drama. Two moments are important in her development. She is surprised at the person who has returned, who behaves differently than was to be expected after Fritz’s warnings. She wavers in her own rejection of him. Here begins the gradual process of a reassessment that will retain the character of a mental event. After narratorial preparation, the inner change is introduced in FID:

Like a bolt of lightning and with joyful light it flashed in [...] She is told: you hate him; you have offended him and you want to offend him, and she believed he hated her, he wanted to offend her. And did he not offend her? She looks back to a long time ago when he insulted her. She has not been angry with him about it for a long time, she has only feared new insults. Can she still be angry with him now, when he is so different; when she herself knows he is not insulting her; when people say, and his sad look: she is insulting him? (391)

When Christiane listens involuntarily to a conversation between the two brothers, she comes to a realization of what has been hidden from her thanks
to her husband’s intrigues. In her mental development, this *anagnórisis* is the moment of the reversal, the Aristotelian *metabolé*:

The people had not lied to him [Fritz]; he himself was wrong. He had lied to her and lied to Apollonius, and she had mistakenly offended Apollonius. [...] Everything had been a lie from the beginning. Her husband persecuted Apollonius because he was wrong, and Apollonius behaved well. Her innermost heart turned away from the persecutor and towards the persecuted. Out of the turmoil of all her feelings rose a new holy victorious feeling, and she gave herself to it in the complete impartiality of innocence. She did not know it. Would that she never got to know it! As soon as she gets to know it, it will become sin.

The quotation shows how the narrator remains present in the presentation of the innermost emotions of the characters and ‘intervenes’ at every step, interpreting them. Thus, the references to turning away “her innermost heart,” the rise of a “new, holy victorious feeling,” and devotion “in the complete impartiality of innocence” cannot be traced back to Christiane’s text. It is undeniably the narrator that ‘sees’ and ‘speaks’ here. But to whom does the emphatic conclusion “Would that she never got to know it! As soon as she gets to know it, it becomes sin” go back? It is probably the narrator who is speaking here too, but the concept of sin comes from Apollonius’ text. The conversation between the brothers heard by Christiane ended with Apollonius’ conclusion that he would have considered it a sin if he had awakened feelings in Anne (a girl in whom Fritz wanted to stimulate his interest). This “sin” now makes its way from Apollonius’ speech, via Christiane’s perception, into the narrator’s report.

Apollonius is in great distress after his brother’s first assassination attempt. Christiane falls on his breast and, forgetting all her shyness, embraces him passionately out of joy that he had survived his brother’s assassination attempt. The innocent woman has no idea what her unconcerned devotion “must excite in the man” (479):

Does the woman belong to the one who stole her from him, who mistreats her, whom she hates? Or to him from whom she was shamefully stolen, who loves her, whom she loves? [...] He spent a long time grappling among the intoxicating sounds for something before he knew
that he was grappling and that that something was clarity, the basic
need of his nature. And now clarity came to him and said: “the word
you have given is to maintain the honor of the house, and what you
are going to do must destroy it.” He was the man and was responsible
for himself and for her. The clarity denounced the betrayal that he
would commit with a touch, with a look, of the unconditional trust
that spoke from the woman’s devotion. (480)

Two feelings are fighting in Apollonius’ soul, love for the woman and duty,
“concern for the honor of the house.” Apollonius struggles not to show the
woman what is going on in him, “but within him the struggle itself was not
fought to an end” (481).

On the roof of the church tower, Apollonius faces another decision:
whether to save himself or his brother. Fritz provokes the decision scorn-
fully. Thinking of his family, Apollonius remembers the word he gave. “He
is the only hold for his people; he must live” (493). So he lets his brother,
whose momentum threatens to take him down with him, run past him and
fall to his death. He is then tormented by the idea that he could have saved
his mad brother if his soul had not dreamed the “sinful dream” (505) – his
connection with Christiane. But when he thinks it over, he cannot find any
possibility that would have allowed him to stop or catch the doomed man
while preserving his own life. Nevertheless, he feels a heavy guilt. The em-
pathic narrator follows him in his self-accusation in FID.

He did not shift his guilt from himself to his brother; he lifted his
brother’s guilt across to himself with a loving hand. For it became ever
clearer to him that he could still have saved his brother from the fall
in the end. He would have been bound to find the means that existed
at the time, if his heart and head had not been full of the wild forbid-
den desires [...] (505-506)

Apollonius can now, after his brother’s death, rightly say to himself that his
desires are no longer “unlawful,” “but that they once had been cast its
shadow over the blameless now. His love, her possession, seemed to him to
be polluted” (506). He perceives a possible guilt as a real one and his own.
After the old father orders the marriage with his authority, the divide in Apollonius continues to open up: He is torn back and forth between the feeling of guilt, which he bases on absurd argumentation, and the prospect of love:

If he takes his brother’s wife, who was set free by the fall, he will have thrown him down. If the reward for the deed is his, the deed is also his. If he takes it, the feeling will not leave him: he will be unhappy and make her unhappy too. For her sake and for his, he must let her go. And when he wants that, then he realizes how unfounded these conclusions are before the clear eyes of reason, and if he wants to seize happiness again, then the dark sense of guilt floats anew over his flower like an icy frost, and reason cannot do anything against its destructive power. (508–509)

After his heroism during the fire on the roof of the church tower at night, he knows that he is no longer to blame, that he has done his duty. And this night also brings him “lust” again. But this is not lust in love, but an ethical state: “With joy he now remembered again the word that he had given himself. For people like Apollonius it is the highest blessing of a good deed that they feel strengthened to new good deeds” (520). Thus, Apollonius finds his happiness in renunciation, and he knows himself in intimate harmony with Christiane, who is invisible around him in the nights of his illness: “In these nights holy love conquered the earthly in her; out of the pain of the deceived sweet desires that wanted to possess him, his image rose again into the unapproachable glory in which she otherwise saw him” (529).

The picture Ludwig’s narrator draws of Apollonius is not without contradictions. While the hero is initially endowed with the traits of a personality disorder, with ongoing action he comes to be marked by mental health and equilibrium. After his brother’s first assassination attempt and Apollonius’ renunciation of Christiane, the narrator attests him as a “balanced, well-ordered soul” (485). Only life-friendly straightforwardness and “clarity” (480) remain of the compulsiveness of his thinking and acting that was emphasized at the beginning. There is, of course, no motivation for such a positive development.

One can ask other questions about motivation. Why is Apollonius, who overcomes his vertigo and the hypochondriac feelings of guilt behind it when he risks his life for the town in his heroic act of salvation on the burning
roof of the church tower, then unable to marry Christiane? The obstacle to marital happiness was his feeling of guilt. Or has Apollonius’ “need for cleanliness” now taken on a life of its own, has it become pure form without content? In that case, he would have returned to the compulsiveness of his strict principles or would never actually have overcome them. This corresponds mostly closely to the ideas of the author, if one follows his paratextual remarks. But where do the sacred motifs of the conclusion, “the highest blessing,” the “holy love,” the “unapproachable glory” come from? The chaste life together that Christiane, who remained a “bridal girl,” and the “virgin” hero lead realizes Christian, Pauline virtues. The plot has its dramatic climaxes on the roof of the church tower, but the church is viewed there more from the professional perspective of the slater. The action remains unaffected by the religious concerns of the Church.

It must also be asked whether the extremely harmonious, religiously colored conclusion with its idyllic final picture actually realizes the author’s intentions. Ludwig, who felt misunderstood by his readers and critics, expressed his intentions in a letter from 1857:

If he married Christiane, the hypochondria would return and make him incapable of keeping his word, and he would be doubly lost, because he would also bring those anchored on him down with him. The strength that the good deed gives him is not one that would make him an absolutely new man – such an effect is nothing but a poet’s legerdemain in poetic works and itself an immoral act – it merely gives him the strength to make the decision which, for him as he is, will be the saving one, namely – not to marry Christiane. (692)

Otto Ludwig’s novel shows obvious ambiguities in motivation. This may be due to the fact that Ludwig, who saw himself as a playwright and attached little importance to his prose production, quickly wrote his novel down while tinkering endlessly with his – as a whole unsuccessful – plays. Nevertheless, Between Sky and Earth is an excellent novel that leads us into the most diverse states of consciousness, into the depths of resentment and the narrowness of obsession. It stages fierce fights for decisions in the souls of the heroes and reflection directed towards self-knowledge, and shows the development and refusal of mental events.
10 Jan Neruda’s *Tales from the Little Quarter*: An Uneventful World

10.1 Processes of Insight

The problem of eventfulness presents itself in a distinctive manner in *Tales from the Little Quarter* (*Povídky malostranské*, 1877) by the Czech journalist and writer Jan Neruda (1834–1891). In this narrative cycle, which is usually treated as a kaleidoscope of sketches describing a milieu, description (the depiction of static or iterative motifs) seems to predominate over narration. The author himself underlined how important “telling without any action, without any intrigue” was to him. Of the typologically varied narratives of the cycle, he particularly valued, as he once explained, those in which the action was reduced to a minimum. Thus, he wrote about the micro-cycle *Figures* (*Figurky*, 1877) “that here only the persons or figures are and should be the main subjects.” Everything else should remain subordinate, secondary, and the detailed description of the people should form the main goal (cited from Vodička [1951] 1969, 184).

On closer inspection, however, the seeming mosaic of descriptive character sketches is also narratively structured. We owe a first hint to Felix Vodička’s essay on *Recognizing Reality in the Tales of the Little Quarter*. In this study from 1951, whose interests are very much a product of the time and its ideology, Vodička initially pursues the goal of demonstrating how Neruda represents the class structure of urban reality. In addition, the essay also refers to the latent narrative basis of the seemingly purely sketch-like narratives:

> It is true that the *Tales of the Little Quarter* have few intrigues, in them no action develops, and the author essentially just registers things, but

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87 The Little Quarter (also known as the Lesser Town, Czech: Malá strana) is the district of Prague below the castle on the left bank of the Vltava River. Until 1784, it was a legally independent town with a distinctly different character from Prague’s Old Town on the right bank of the Vltava. – For this chapter, I refer to my article Schmid 1994b, published in Czech.
As far as the recognition of reality is concerned, in all the stories there is a process of understanding in which the author leads us from the external view of reality, from the observation of individual events and occurrences, to the revelation and awareness of reality. (Vodička [1951] 1969, 184)

Vodička speaks here – possibly in an Aesopian gesture conditioned by the age – only of the reader as the subject of the process of understanding. From his examples, however, it becomes clear that recognition also takes place in the narrated world itself. Thus, Vodička brings an event structure into play. He gives the strongest profile to eventfulness in his retelling of the novella *The Water Sprite* (Hastrman, 1876):

Neruda first draws the Water Sprite, i.e., Mr Rybař [Engl. ‘fisherman’], as a figure whose entire physiognomy, whose confident appearance stems from the awareness that he is the owner of precious stones. But as soon as he learns that his gems are worthless, Mr Rybař loses his security, changes his appearance, and only the realization that he is appreciated by his family and friends not because of his possessions, but simply as a human being, gives him back his relationship to life. (Vodička [1951] 1969, 184)

More often than not, the protagonists are unable to achieve the recognition of reality, the uncovering of illusion. This applies both to the stories from the narrator’s childhood – *St. Wenceslas’ Mass* (Svatováclavská mše) and *How it came to Pass that on August 20th, 1849 at Half Past Noon, Austria was not destroyed* (Jak to přišlo, že dne 20. srpna roku 1849, o půl jedné s poledne, Rakousko nebylo rozbořeno) – and to some adult stories – *Doctor Spoiler* (Doktor Kazisvět) and *Written This Year on All Souls’ Day* (Psáno o letošních Dušičkách). If the protagonists do not grasp the difference between reality and illusion, the event appears in the mode of being withheld. Unfulfilled recognition, the withholding of the event, is certainly more representative of the world of Neruda’s Little Quarter than eventfulness and the capacity for insight.

The recognition of reality is ironically accentuated by the author in a final metapoetic gesture of the cycle. The recognition here concerns the diegetic narrator (the so-called first-person narrator). Krumlovský, whose *Idyllic Fragments from the Notes of an Apprentice Attorney* (Idylický úryvek ze zápisek advokátního koncipienta) forms the closing micro-cycle, must recognize that
the Little Quarter is not at all the “poetic,” “quiet” place he expected. His expectation, however, was formed in the reading of the previous stories, which he misunderstood as idylls. The disappointed diarist blames the author, as the alleged originator of the deception, for the difference between his expectations and reality: “Please, Mr Neruda, no more tales from the Little Quarter!” (310). With the reaction of this incompetent reader, who clearly expresses his lack of enthusiasm for poetry, Neruda anticipated the echo he feared among those of his contemporaries who were still guided entirely by the idyllic code of Czech literature of the Biedermeier period. And indeed, Krumlovský’s misunderstanding of the cycle’s intentions does seem to anticipate some later reception.

### 10.2 How Mr Vorel Broke in His Meerschaum Pipe

The completely unidyllic world of the Little Quarter is thus less marked by eventfulness than by the withholding of eventfulness, and its inhabitants tend less to transcend mental boundaries than to remain on familiar ground. If, despite this inertia, a boundary is crossed anywhere, this is mercilessly punished. The novella How Mr Vorel Broke in his Meerschaum Pipe (Jak si nakouřil pan Vorel pěnovku) is a good example of the unwillingness of the world of the Little Quarter to accept changes.

The title mentions an event, the breaking-in of a meerschaum pipe. According to the categories of conventional narrative, this is a non-event. It lacks relevance. The title must thus give the impression that it is preparing the way for an uneventful idyll. Smoking a pipe is indeed an action that is characteristic of the idyll and that indicates comfort and promotes community. But in the world of this tale, the trivial act of breaking in the pipe actually describes an event that leads to a catastrophe.

The action in brief: Mr Vorel, an incomer from the country, moves into Spur Street (Ostruhová ulice) in the Little Quarter and opens a grocery store

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89 On the idyllic tendencies of Czech post-Romantic culture and Neruda’s anti-idyllic poetics, see Sedmidubský 1988.

there. This is basically the main event of the tale, the initial and basic “in-
trigue.” In Lotman’s categories, one can speak here of a border crossing in
the most literal, local sense. But such an action can hardly be regarded as an
event worth telling any more than the breaking-in of a meerschaum pipe can.
Twice, the author seems to frustrate the expectation of an event. However,
he actually only takes an insider’s point of view. What is a non-eventful ac-
tion seen from the outside appears from an insider’s perspective as a scan-
dalous disturbance of the world order. The narrator even anticipates possi-
dible doubts about the relevance of what has happened, thematizes the differ-
ence between outside and inside views, and explains to the unsuspecting
outsider how eventful an everyday change – seen from the outside – is in the
context of the micro-world described:

Many of my readers may be frivolous enough to suppose that the
opening of a new shop selling grains and flour was no special event.
To you I would say, “You poor souls!” or perhaps I wouldn’t say any-
thing at all and simply shrug my shoulders. At that time a villager
from the country who hadn’t set foot in Prague for twenty years could
enter the city through the Strahov Gate, walk down Spur Street, and
find the same shop-keeper on the same corner, the baker beneath the
same sign, the grocer in the same shop. In those days, everything had
its assigned place. To suddenly open a flour shop where there had
previously been, let’s say, a grocery was simply so absurd it would
not have occurred to anyone. Shops were passed down from father to
son, and if one were to pass into the hands of a stranger from Prague
or the provinces, the natives would not be too upset if the newcomer
conformed to the reigning order of things and did not confuse them
with novelties. (169)

A foreign element has penetrated the immobile, static world of Spur Street.
But it is not really the strangeness that makes this border crossing so outra-
geous. Vorel is perceived as disturbing, even hostile, because of his activity
and mobility. The scandal is the disturbance of the accustomed order by new
developments.

The provocation that Vorel’s boundary crossing represents for the in-
habitants of the static microcosm of Spur Street is aggravated by an architec-
tural change:
But Mr Vorel was not only a total stranger, he has also set up his shop in the Green Angel, a building in which there had previously been no shop whatsoever. Moreover, he had had the wall facing the street of the first-floor apartment knocked down! There had always been an arched window there, and Mrs Staňková would sit in the window from morning till evening reading her prayer book and wearing a green shade over her eyes. She was visible to everyone who walked past. (169)

The narrator – going by language and mentality, a resident of the street, as it may seem at first, but in reality rather an ironic instance that reproduces the way of speaking and thinking of the narrated world with procedures of text interference – thus apparently shares the indignation and incomprehension of the Little Quarter inhabitants. The superfluousness of another shop on the street is also commented on as evaluated by the residents. In FID, the evaluation and the language function correspond entirely to the horizon of the Little Quarter people: “The old widow had been taken off to the cemetery of Košíře three months ago and now – what good was the shop now! There had always been only one flour shop on Spur Street, all the way down at the other end, but why should there be another?” (169; tr. rev.).

On the other hand, the narrator can also put himself in Vorel’s shoes and consider his possible motives:

Perhaps Mr Vorel had said to himself, “Why not give it a try!” Perhaps he also thought, somewhat smugly, that he was a young, good-looking fellow with plump cheeks and dreamy blue eyes, thin as a maiden and above all single. That would attract the servant girls. (169–170)

The curved window through which the old Staňková, sitting in front of her prayer book like a mannequin, could be seen, is replaced by a door. This door, which is addressed several times in the narrative, makes the boundary between inside and outside permeable and potentially removes the topological isolation of the known from the unknown in this hermetically sealed world. The scandalous thing about Vorel’s structural changes is that they break through the wall that borders the building and allow passage, exchange, between inside and outside. Thus, on a small scale, he literally strikes at the foundations of the Little Quarter, which is separated from the outside world by walls and connected to it only to the north and south by two strongly fortified gates. These gates play an important role in the cycle because, as places of passage, they are also places
of increased eventfulness. Where the fluidity of the outside world meets the sta-
tis of the inside world, there must be conflict.

This is most evident in Doctor Spoiler. It is no coincidence that the maca-
bre incident at the funeral of Mr Schepeler, the coffin lid falling off, occurs at
the Oujezd Gate, where the coffin has to be unloaded from the hearse be-
cause of the narrowness of the passage, and it is no coincidence that Dr.
Heribert, who recognizes the true condition of the apparently dead man and
saves him, is returning to the Little Quarter from a walk outside the city walls
through the gate. With his knowledge and his rescue action, the doctor dis-
rupts the general order, brings the police to the scene, and becomes “Doctor
Spoiler” for the Little Quarter inhabitants.

So, when Mr Vorel breaks the wall of the building and creates a passage
between the inside and the outside, he is violating a fundamental law of the
microcosm of the Little Quarter: seclusion and avoidance of the eventful.

However, no customers pass through the door of Vorel’s store on the
opening day. The neighbors who pass by look into the shop, shining with
cleanliness and novelty, and some take a step back to look again, but nobody
steps into the shop. There are, as it might seem, two exceptions: the beggar
Vojtíšek and Miss Poldýnka.

Vojtíšek does not come as a customer. Nor does he approach the store on
his own initiative, but rather seems to have been encouraged by Vorel’s gaze. In
any case, Vorel concludes this from the beggar’s approach: “It seems that all I
have to do is stare at a person to make him enter the shop. My shop will be a
success!” (173). Vorel gives a kreutzer to the beggar who, hardly has he been
looked at, is already on the threshold holding out his cap. Vorel asks him to stop
by every Wednesday. And so, every Wednesday, Vojtíšek picks up the kreutzer
that the new grocer promised him in his initial optimism. In so doing, he will
cross the threshold of the shop as little as he did the first time.

Poldýnka’s shopping trips bring her to the new shop only once. Strictly
speaking, she does not cross the threshold either. Consider the spatial move-
ments. The text says: “She walked up to the shop with a basket on her arm,
peered inside as if in wonder, then stumbled across the step and was already
standing in the doorway. She did not enter completely” (172).

So, Poldýnka remains on the threshold. Vorel greets her politely and
asks the young lady about her wishes. He takes two steps back, obviously to
encourage her to step in, and places his meerschaum pipe, on which he has
taken some good puffs, on the counter. However, Poldýnka does not accept
his invitation, but, calling out what she wants, turns halfway out of the shop.

Why doesn’t Poldýnka enter completely? And why is Vorel consistently
ignored by everyone after her visit? After a week, Vorel has not even earnt
two guilders. And so it goes on. Nobody came from the neighbors, and only
rarely did a stranger stray into the shop.

In the story, the boycott is explained in terms of the tobacco smoke in
Vorel’s shop. At six in the morning on 16 February, Vorel opened his shop,
and at eight he lit his new meerschaum pipe. Poldýnka tells Mrs Kdojeková
that Vorel has so much smoke in the shop that it’s as if everything is smoked.
And when in the evening the neighbors tell each other that it smells of to-
bacco smoke in the new store, that the flour there could be roasted and the
barley is smoked, and when Mr Vorel is no longer called anything more than
“smokey flour seller” (173), his fate is sealed.

Mr Vorel’s only consolation is his meerschaum pipe, and the unfortunate
man needs this consolation more and more. There is an exchange of life en-
ergy: “His cheeks grew pallid, his forehead furrowed, but day after day his
meerschaum grew redder and positively shone with prosperity” (173).

The boycott leads to bankruptcy, and Mr Vorel pre-empts being forced
to leave by hanging himself. The shop is to be converted back into an apart-
ment. This also means that the door is bricked up again.

The actual reason for the downfall, of course, is not tobacco smoke. Vorel
was boycotted even before he lit his new pipe in the shop at eight o’clock
after two hours of waiting in vain for customers. His smoking was not the
cause of the boycott, but its consequence. And the boycott is the result of the
hostility of the people of the Little Quarter towards events and their unwill-
ingness to tolerate only the slightest change. But the catastrophe was trig-
gerated by the talk of Miss Poldi, the only customer Vorel was ever able to
serve. But what prompted Miss Poldi’s malicious gossip? Vorel served her
very politely, measured the semolina generously, and showed her the ut-
most respect. To Poldi’s question about the price he replied affably: “Four
kreutzers. Thank you. I kiss your hand once again. My first sale and from a
pretty young lady. That’s a lucky sign!” (172). But how does Poldi react to
the shopkeeper’s friendliness? “Miss Poldýnka glared at him. ‘How dare he!
An outsider! He’d be lucky to get the soap-maker’s daughter, the red-headed
Anuše, and he presumes to…’ She made no response and left the shop” (173).
The strange, seemingly unmotivated reaction of the young lady leads back to a completely different motif, which has come to prominence twice before in the story, the theme of marriage and being single. Poldi, the “short, chubby little woman, but sturdy in the hips and shoulders” (172), a little over twenty years old, is already the object of talk in the neighborhood: “It was said that she had almost married four times, and her pale eyes reflected the indifference, or perhaps a weariness, that creeps into the eyes of women who go too long unmarried” (172). The unhappiness and supposed lack of self-confidence of those who have not been claimed seem to suggest themselves in her gait. It is “somewhat waddling” and has another special feature that the narrator describes quite precisely: “at a certain interval she would stumble and at the same time grasp her skirts, as if she had trodden on them” (172). In the unappealing gait of the young woman who is apparently indifferent but deeply humiliated by the gossip, one can recognize the traits of resignation and – out of fear of rejection – self-protection, but also perhaps unconscious, hidden signals of a desperate need to seduce in repeatedly reaching for her skirt.

10.3 Single and Almost-Married People

The motifs of marriage and being single have already appeared in the story in connection with another person. “Yesterday,” the day before the beginning of the story, Mr Jarmárka, the postal clerk, celebrated his silver wedding anniversary. However, he is an old bachelor. His bride died the day before the wedding. Bound in eternal fidelity to his deceased bride and never again having thought of marriage, he celebrates the twenty-fifth anniversary of the almost completed marriage. He obviously commemorates the almost-event every year, for in his name, Jarmárka (German ‘Jahrmärkt’), he bears the word for an annual festival. And in his memory, the joy of the happy event that almost took place suppresses the pain of the sad event that actually happened, namely the death of the bride. And so he gives the guests of the Yellow House tavern three bottles of good Mělník wine. The neighbors see nothing strange at all in the ritual remembrance of what had almost happened, in the deletion of the actual events and in the reversal of joy and sorrow.
The young Poldi, embittered by being single, is connected to the cheerfully celebrating silver-wedding bachelor by the equivalence in motifs. Indeed, celibacy is a general feature in the world of this narrative. At any event, the three persons introduced in more detail, Poldi, Jarmárka, and Vorel, are all single. And Mr Vojtíšek, who plays a certain role in the story, is also notoriously unmarried. From the tale dedicated to him, How She Brought a Beggar to Ruin (Přivedla žebráka na mizinu), we know how resolutely Vojtíšek resists the courting of the beggar woman called “Granny Millions,” who even lures with a scrap of duvet: “I’d sooner take arsenic!” (117). This harsh rejection is easy to understand in view of the woman’s lack of grace, but it nonetheless shows us Vojtíšek as the object of courtship and again brings out the motif of a marriage that does not take place.

This motif then also forms the theme of the tale Written This Year on All Souls’ Day. The narrator suggests that the double marriage proposals of Cibulka and Rechner to Miss Máry are nothing more than a wicked joke by the two “ne’er-do-wells.” But this never occurs to the victim and her widowed friend, with whom she exchanges thoughts on all aspects of the parallel courtship, and after the two wretches die very soon and in short succession, Máry decorates both graves every year for All Souls’ Day. In order not to favor either of the two almost-husbands in the slightest, Máry leaves the choice of the grave to which she goes first to a little girl. Certain similarities between her All Souls’ Day ritual and the absurd wedding days of Mr Jarmárka cannot be missed.

The absence of marital bliss, unsuccessful courtship, and, as its downside, the forced or misunderstood promise of marriage play an important role in the collection. The characters with whom these motifs are played out comprise abandoned brides, courted bachelors, and matchmaking mothers.

The series of weddings that do not take place is opened as early as the micro-cycle A Week in a Quiet House (Týden v tichém domě). Matylda Ebrová has embroidered the monogram of another groom and removed it again for the umpteenth time, and perhaps, as Marie Baurová notes maliciously, she will “cut open eternally” (chapter 3). In fact, jealous Marie, who has never had any acquaintances, manages to steal the not very attractive marriage candidate Kořínek from her girlfriend. “Doctor” Josef Lokouta, whom Mrs Ebrová would still prefer as Matylda’s bridegroom more than Kořínek, is already planning the details of his own wedding with Josefinka (chapter 4), without the chosen one, who is about to marry Mr Bavorák, knowing even
the slightest of Loukota’s secret intentions. An inverted variant of this motif is the misunderstood marriage intention expressed by the unfortunate Loukota. Mrs Lakmusová, his landlady, is determined to take advantage of the lack of resistance of Lokouta, who only gradually recognizes the misunderstanding. She is forced to do so by an unpleasant circumstance: the fiancé of her daughter Klára has turned away from that poor woman and married a widow. And so, Mrs Lakmusová actually becomes an unexpected mother-in-law for the lodger, who half faints at the news of Josefinka’s wedding and, robbed of his senses, enters Klára’s name in the marriage petition intended for Josefinka (chapters 5 and 9).

A completely different story of courtship and marriage can be found in the “semi-official idyll” by Václav Bavor, Concerning Several Kinds of Domestic Animals (O některých domácích zvířatcích), in chapter 11. The fact that Helena Veleb and Andreas Dílec finally get married seems at first glance to be due only to the subordination of feeling to practical considerations. The boys of the two play beautifully together, and the innkeeper woman and the owner of the building also complement each other perfectly in economic terms. But behind the double legal dispute about the annoying chickens and pigs, with which the later spouses cover each other up, we can already see hidden forms of courtship. It was precisely this novella about the power of love that Lokouta, first deeply disappointed by Josefinka and then steamrolled into marrying Klára – in accordance with the author’s recommendation – used as sleeping powder. One can understand the involuntary bridegroom’s soul wailing the next morning as he realizes his new situation.

The strange reaction of Miss Poldýnka is once again worthy of closer examination in this context rich in motifs of more or less successful marriages: “He’d be lucky to get the soap-maker’s daughter, the red-headed Anuše, and he presumes to...” – the resigned virgin, obviously entirely caught up in thoughts centered on marriage, interprets the simple business courtesy of the grocer as erotic courting. The virgin who regularly reaches for her skirt sees in Vorel not so much the grocer as the man. Does she react so maliciously to the supposed words of courtship because, still not married, she no longer dares to think of happiness in marriage at all and in a paradoxical or defiant reaction would rather deter than attract potential candidates? Or is all the malevolence of the unclaimed young woman meant to stem from the obvious lack of intent on the part of the new citizen of the Little Quarter? This lack of intent has something unpleasant about it, for
Vorel seems to be good-looking enough and not without means. At any event – as we recall – he has calculated in his complacency that, handsome and unmarried as he is, he will attract the servant girls.

Poldýnka’s mother does not seem to share the neighbors’ aversion to the stranger. After all, she sends her daughter to Vorel’s shop, obviously quite open-minded towards the new: “Du Poldi, hörst [Hey, Poldi, listen], buy the semolina from the new man, we can try” (169; tr. rev.). But what exactly is to be tried – the goods or their seller – is left to the reader’s discernment. And the reader also has to decide whether Poldi’s mother actually considers the stranger with such impartiality, even curiosity for the new, as it seems at first, or whether in her maternal desperation she simply does not want to miss a chance to get her daughter married. Perhaps it is only displeasure at her mother’s intention that makes Poldi react so maliciously to the grocer’s friendliness. In any case, the stranger has to suffer for something for which he does not bear the slightest responsibility.

10.4 Indeterminacy and Equivalence

The ambiguity of motivation is characteristic of the narration in the Tales from the Little Quarter. The crucial contexts for actions, in particular, are often left more or less obviously indeterminate. The moments in the happenings that produce the causal nexus and explain the characters’ choices of action have often not been chosen for inclusion in the story. As a rule, the narrator refuses to explicate the diegetic causality. In a number of cases, the narrator completely withdraws as a sense-giving instance and leaves it to the reader to link the explicit motifs to a line of meaning.

In the story of the pipe-smoker Vorel, there are some points of indeterminacy to be filled in. What caused Poldi’s anger and Vorel’s downfall? The tale’s title profiles the motif of smoking and thus justifies Poldi’s complaint about the smoky, i.e., inaccessible shop. Does the narrator recognize the secret connections between the motifs that his story forms, the equivalence between Jarmárka and Poldi (and the other single people), the causal relationship between the bitterness of the young woman looking in vain for a partner and her vicious reaction to the business-like friendliness of the new shopkeeper?
But what role does the meerschaum pipe and its smoke play in the tragic event of the novella? Vorel displays the new pipe for the first time at the silver wedding celebration of the bachelor Jarmárka. It is a means for him to persuade his neighbors to accept him, and in the narrative it functions as a symbol of the longed-for neighborliness: “And Mr Vorel had brought in today a brand new silver-plated meerschaum pipe, which he had bought only to fit in” (170; literal translation of the original: “to look like a neighbor”). Despite all the efforts of the new citizen, the festive community ignores the intruder and also excludes him from enjoying the Mělník wine.

In this novella with its dense network of references, it is not irrelevant that the meerschaum pipe is covered with the metal that gives its name to the bachelor’s wedding celebration. Vorel is unlikely to have known of Mr Jarmárka’s strange jubilee in advance, but there is an unmistakable equivalence of motifs between the silver-plated pipe and the silver wedding anniversary, an equivalence that is particularly noticeable in that the silver motifs in the text are only a few sentences apart.

Vorel’s wrathful puffing, which after Poldi’s wicked gossip causes him to perish, is thus to be understood as a substitute act, as an expression of the futile wish to be accepted into the community that is denied him. Against the background of this symbolism, the reaction of the policemen takes on special contours:

The policemen of Spur Street cast eager and venomous glances into the shop at the indefatigable smoker – if only once he would step across the threshold of his shop onto the street with his pipe in his mouth! Especially little Mr Novák would have given Lord knows what to have the chance to knock the pipe out of Mr Vorel’s mouth, and they instinctively shared the distaste for the outsider. (173–174; tr. rev.)

The threshold of the door that replaces the hermetically sealing arched window becomes a shelter for Vorel. The fact that he does not step over the threshold with his pipe at least protects him from the harassment of the authorities. Only after his gruesome death does the meerschaum pipe, the symbol of the desired neighborliness, find the appreciation of the Little Quarter, or more precisely of its authorities. The police commissioner of the Little Quarter, Mr Uhmühl, finds the pipe in the deceased’s pocket, holds it up to
the light, and exclaims: “Look at this! I’ve never seen a pipe broken in so well!” (174).

With the praise of the well-broken-in pipe, the story ends. Its event was the failed border crossing. An event that was unheard of for the Little Quarter took place: the crossing of the boundary between the outside and the inside. This event was cancelled out by a second event: the boycott of the citizens set in their place and Poldi’s incitement to hatred lead to the downfall of the mobile hero. The old state is restored. The opening in the wall is bricked up again. The immobility and the boundary triumph. The world of Spur Street is not event-capable and not event-willing. It is dominated by the uneventful, the unrealized connections between people, and the recurring cycles: Mr. Jarmárka’s strange almost-wedding days and Máry’s grotesque All Souls’ Day ritual at the graves of the two supposed almost-grooms.

The story of the tragic failure of the bold border-crosser can also be read as a metapoetic novella, a narrative about the conditions of possibility of events. The tellable in it is the non-occurrence of the event. After Vorel’s suicide and the elimination of all the innovations he introduced, the only positive result of his attempts at change is a well-broken-in meerschaum pipe.
V. Distinctive Mental Events in Russian Realism
11 Fëdor Dostoevskij

11.1 The Double

11.1.1 Figural World Perception and “Polyphony”

The work that both marked the breakthrough of figural narration in Russia and was the first example of the challenging extreme use of FID and free indirect monologue in European narrative art was Fëdor Dostoevskij’s short novel The Double (Dvojnik, 1846; cf. the examples quoted above in chapter 2). The most obvious consequence of the new textual configuration is that until the end of this story of the progressive madness of the Petersburg clerk Jakov Petrovič Goljadkin, the sense in which the quite improbable Adventures of Mr Goljadkin (Priklijučenija gospodina Goljadkina; thus the subtitle in the version of 1846) are to be understood remains open. The ambiguity of the plot results from the almost inextricable interference between NT and CT. The narrator presents what is perceived by his sick hero as an objective event, without making clear where he is presenting the narrated world according to the subjective logic and sick perception of the hero. The fact that the appearance of “Mr Goljadkin junior,” the brazen doppelgänger of “Goljadkin senior,” does not legitimize an autonomous fantastic world in its own right, as contemporaries caught up in the inertia of the Romantic tradition had to assume, but is merely the product of the subjective delusion of a sick brain, is not stated anywhere in the text and can only be concluded from individual signs (logic of the situation, language, the hero’s way of thinking and psycho-physical reactions).

The splitting of consciousness is not a disease that accidentally strikes the hero like an unearned misfortune; it arises from a defect of character. The ambitious and hierarchy-conscious official wants to be more than he really is and can be. The doppelgänger embodies those qualities that Goljadkin

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91 For a detailed analysis of the text interference in The Double and the difficulties this device presented to contemporary readers, see Schmid ([1973] 1986, 90–148).
would like to possess: assertiveness, a flattering personality, and success with his superiors. Another aspect of Goljadkin’s madness is that his superior’s beautiful daughter begs him in a letter to kidnap her, an idea far removed from reality in view of the unremarkable appearance of the hero and his unlikable character.

In psychological interpretations, the novel has been seen as a representation of schizophrenia *avant la lettre*. Social interpretations emphasized that the doppelgänger, as the embodiment of Goljadkin’s secret desires, represents the careerism and repressive mentality of the hypertrophic bureaucratic world of St. Petersburg and the system it governs. In Soviet studies on *The Double*, this interpretive figure has been varied *ad nauseam*. According to this position, the ambitious, careerist, malevolent character of Mr Goljadkin junior exposes the ‘inhuman social order.’

Mixail Baxtin uses the example of the Double to introduce his well-known thesis of “polyphony” in Dostoevskij’s novels. He demonstrates the phenomenon not in the great novels but in the short novels (*povesti*). In them, however, as he concedes, polyphony is only present to a certain extent, namely in the “impression that the narration is dialogically addressed to [the hero] himself” (Baxtin [1929] 2002, 242; tr. 1984, 218). Baxtin finds an example in the following quotation:

So there he is now, ladies and gentlemen, waiting for the chance to do things quietly, and he has been waiting for exactly two and a half hours. Why not wait? Villèle himself used to wait. “But what’s Villèle got to do with this?” thought Mr Goljadkin. “Who’s Villèle, anyhow? And what if I were to… just go through…? Oh you, bit player, you!” (Quoted after Baxtin 1984, 218)

Baxtin explains the structure of this passage as follows:

Goljadkin’s words seem to continue the narration uninterruptedly and answer it in an interior dialogue. […] These are in fact detached rejoinders in Goljadkin’s interior dialogue with himself: one side entered the narration, the other remained with Goljadkin. (Baxtin [1929] 2002, 244; tr. 1984, 219)

Baxtin initially expresses the impression of dialogue with a reservation (*seem*). The description that follows is perfectly reasonable and accurate. A
little later, however, Baxtin gives this observation a metaphorical formulation, obviously in an effort to adapt the structure he has found to the polyphony he seeks:

Relentlessly ringing in Goljadkin’s ears are the provocative and mocking voices of the narrator and the voice of the double. The narrator shouts into Goljadkin’s ear Goljadkin’s own words and thoughts, but in another, hopelessly alien, hopelessly censuring and mocking tone. (Baxtin [1929] 2002, 246; tr. 1984, 221)

The seeming “dialogical addressing of the narration to the hero” can and should, of course, be explained here in a different way, one that is clarified by Baxtin’s first, correct description. The impression of a dialogue between the narrative report and the hero arises only through the change in the patterns with which the inner speech of the hero is represented. It disintegrates into the contributions of two voices. While the first voice is represented in FID, Goljadkin’s second voice is represented in DD. FID is the narrator’s speech only formally; in reality it reflects the contents of the hero’s consciousness. The mocking voice that the hero hears and even reacts to is nothing other than the voice of his alter ego. Consequently, the hero hears only that mockery that emanates from himself. The narrator’s undoubted irony is not accessible to him. He does not protest against the narrator, but against his first voice. The narrator, however, who turns not to the hero but to his reader, does not give the hero the slightest chance, exposing him with merciless irony. Baxtin postulates that “the position of the hero is full of value and independent”; this view cannot be endorsed. Rather, the hero is a passive, defenseless object of the narrator’s unmasking monological word. It is only the word of the hero, directed at the alter ego, that is dialogical here. The seeming dialogical turn of the narration to the hero proves to be a transition from one pattern in the representation of CT to another.

11.1.2 Goljadkin’s Insight

*The Double* is relevant to the theme of this book insofar as it creates a mental event. That event is Goljadkin’s insight into his mental illness. Although the insight comes late, it is undoubtedly an event. After all, the hero has defended himself against this insight throughout the entire action with all sorts of absurd explanations. When Dostoevskij revised the novel in 1866, he
made a decisive change to the time of recognition or willingness to face the facts. This revision also affects the reader, whose process of insight is now synchronized with that of the hero.

In the final version, it is only at the very end of the novel that the reader reaches certainty about the state of the hero and the psychological nature of the seemingly fantastic.\textsuperscript{92} In the revised version, the author removed sentences from the first chapter of the first version in which the narrator emphasized Goljadkin’s penchant for fantasies:

We would like to note here casually a small characteristic of Mr Goljadkin. It is about the fact that he loved very much to sometimes make certain poetic considerations about himself, that he loved to sometimes appoint himself the hero of a highly intricate novel, to get entangled in various intrigues and difficulties in his thoughts, to finally – removing all obstacles, mastering the difficulties, and generously forgiving his enemies – get rid of all inconveniences with honor.

(1st version 1846; Dostoevskij, \textit{PSS}, I, 335)

If the reader, warned in this way, has adjusted to Goljadkin’s tendency to narcissistic illusions, it is easier for him to trace the fantastic qualities of the narrative back to the hero’s consciousness. Such a clarification was obviously not in Dostoevskij’s interest at all. For this reason, he deleted this narratorial commentary as well as all explicit indications of a figural point of view. On the other hand, in the second version the author specified signs of Goljadkin’s mental illness at the end of the story.

In the 1846 version, only the participation of the German doctor of medicine and surgery Krest’jan Ivanovič Rutenšpic in Goljadkin’s ‘abduction’ reveals that there could be a clinical connection with the state of the hero. When the doctor appears, it is said:

Something unexpected happened here... The doors to the hall opened noisily, and on the threshold a man appeared whose sight alone made

\textsuperscript{92} Dostoevskij, who transferred the Romantic fantasy from outside to inside, i.e., from external reality to the psychology of the hero, did not recognize the fantastic as such, but only as a product of delusional ideas. This is witnessed by his commentary on Puškin’s \textit{Queen of Spades}, a narrative he admired, whose ontology oscillates unsustainably between realistic psychology and supernatural reality: “The fantastic must touch the real so closely that you must \textit{almost} trust it” (Dostoevskij, \textit{PSS}, XXX, 192). Dostoevskij’s emphasis is on \textit{almost}. 
Mr Goljadkin froze to ice. He was rooted to the spot. A scream died in his cramped chest; by the way, Mr Goljadkin had known everything in advance and had long suspected something similar. (1st version 1846; Dostoevskij, PSS, I, 430)

A comparison of the text’s closing words in the two versions shows that Dostoevskij’s reworking aimed, on the one hand, to clarify the unspecified content of the presentiments in the passage just quoted, and, on the other hand, to place the articulation of a presentiment right at the end of the story. The first version concludes with Goljadkin’s confused associations:

“One must not be enemy to the bottle,” flashed through Mr Goljadkin’s head... By the way, he thought nothing more. Slowly, trembling, he closed his eyes. Stunned, he waited for something terrible, waited... already heard, felt, and finally...

But here, ladies and gentlemen, the story of the adventures of Mr Goljadkin ends. (1st version 1846; Dostoevskij, PSS, I, 431)

The second version ends instead with a representation of consciousness in which Goljadkin expresses the fact that his admission to a psychiatric institution is no surprise for him by now:

“You vill haf a gobernment apartment, mit firewood, mit licht, und mit serfices, vich you don’t deserf,” Krest’jan Ivanovič’s reply came sternly and terribly, like a verdict.

Our hero cried out and clutched his head. *Alas! he had long foreseen it!* (2nd version 1866; Dostoevskij, D, 170)

The novel ends in the second version with an FID (italicized by me) in which the hero expresses his recognition of his situation.

This recognition is undoubtedly an event, but according to the criteria introduced earlier it has a low level of eventfulness, since the mental development lacks consecutivity. But something else is remarkable: as already mentioned above, the author handles the hero’s and the reader’s processes of insight synchronously in the second version. The reader only gains certainty about the status of the doppelgänger when the hero himself recognizes the nature of Mr Goljadkin junior.
Fëdor Dostoevskij’s first great novel, *Crime and Punishment* (*Prestuplenie i nakazanie*, 1866), is dedicated to a great mental event. The student Rodion Romanovič Raskol’nikov, who dropped out of law school due to a lack of money, has been planning to kill the old pawnbroker Alëna Ivanovna for a month. He carries out the deed, but does not act as he had planned, but overhastily and headlessly. Lizaveta, the pawnbroker’s pregnant half-sister, who unexpectedly appears, also becomes a victim. The subtle intellectual Raskol’nikov kills the simple-minded Lizaveta, who does not even raise her hand to protect her face, with an axe like her half-sister in the most brutal manner: “The blow landed directly on the skull, with the sharp edge, and immediately split the whole upper part of the forehead, almost to the crown” (79).\(^93\) Raskol’nikov does not demonstrate the unrestricted control over intellect and will that he professes to himself before the deed, but the circumstances are such that no traces pointing to him are left, and to his good fortune there are no witnesses. Thus, by chance, he succeeds in committing a perfect crime. Raskol’nikov leaves the scene with disgust. He does not feel the hoped-for satisfaction and does not calm down. Tormented by remorse, he falls ill and is shaken by shivers and fever. The astute investigator Porfirij Petrovič intuitively suspects him of the crime but cannot prove it. Under the influence of Sonja Marmeladova, a young girl who prostitutes herself to feed her family, Raskol’nikov voluntarily surrenders to the police. The plot covers fifteen days, of which only nine are described in detail. The epilogue shows the hero in a Siberian labor camp, where Sonja has followed him. There, he experiences his inner conversion, which is described with resurrection metaphors.

### 11.2.1 The Motivation

“Why did Raskolnikov kill? The motivation is extremely muddled.” This is the view of Vladimir Nabokov (1981, 75), a harsh but unfair critic of Dostoevskij and especially of his first great novel. The question is the right one, but

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the answer is too simple for a Nabokov – perhaps because of envious resentment. The motivation is not “muddled,” as it appears to Nabokov, who refuses to properly acknowledge the underlying device, but multifaceted and complex, as complex as the consciousness represented by Dostoevskij, in which opposing impulses argue with each other.

At the beginning of the novel, before the depiction of the murder, the author unfolds a series of episodes that suggest possible motivations for the hero, but do not pin them down. The narrator does not permit himself to give any indication as to which of the possible motifs is the primary one, and even in Raskol’nikov’s inner speech it is not clear at first which impulse actually moves him to action.

On the first of the fifteen days, Raskol’nikov, after having once again visited the usurer in order “to make a trial of his undertaking” (5), goes to a tavern for the first time in his life. Since making his way to the old woman, he has felt an “boundless loathing” (9). On the run from his “anguish” (10), he walks over the sidewalk like a drunkard and descends the stairs to a tavern, lost in thought. In the tavern, he has an encounter with Semën Marmeladov, a titular councilor and alcoholic, who tells him about his family and the generosity of his daughter Sonja, who prostitutes herself for the needy family that the drunkard cannot feed. Raskol’nikov leaves some coins, his last money, with the family, to whom he accompanies Marmeladov. The encounter with Marmeladov and the misery of his family suggests social-humanitarian motives for the murder of the rich usurer.

A second story of a young woman sacrificing herself can be found in a letter from Raskol’nikov’s mother from the provinces. The mother reports that Raskol’nikov’s sister Avdot’ja, called Dunja, had to resign her position as a governess because she was persecuted by her employer Svidrigajlov, and is now about to marry the court councilor Pëtr Lužin. The union with this wealthy man, whom she cautiously describes as “somewhat abrupt” (36), the mother goes on, would improve the family’s financial circumstances so that Rodja could continue his studies. Raskol’nikov is outraged by Dunja’s sacrifice and firmly rejects it. In his extensive interior monologue (40–44), he addresses mother and sister in emphatic apostrophes: “No, mama, no, Dunja, you won’t deceive me!” (40). In his soliloquy, he explains to the two imaginary addressees that there is nothing else waiting for Dunja but Sonja Marmeladova’s lot.
Oh, dear and unjust hearts! Worse still, for this we might not even refuse Sonečka’s lot! Sonečka, Sonečka Marmeladova, eternal Sonečka, as long as the world stands! But the sacrifice, have the two of you taken full measure of the sacrifice? [...] Do you know, Dunečka, that Sonečka’s lot is in no way worse than yours with Mr Lužin? (44)

Raskol’nikov emphatically rejects the sacrifice of mother and sister in his interior monologue: “I don’t want your sacrifice, Dunečka, I don’t want it, mama! It won’t happen as long as I live, it won’t, it won’t! I don’t accept it!” (44)⁹⁴

The imaginary address to mother and sister changes into a dialogized interior monologue in which Raskol’nikov poses critical questions to himself in a sarcastic tone:

He suddenly came to his senses and stopped.

“It won’t happen? And how are you going to keep it from happening? Forbid it? What right do you have? What can you promise them in return for such a right? To devote your whole fate, your whole future to them, once you finish your studies and find a position? We’ve heard that before, but it’s still a blind deal, and what about now? It’s necessary to do something now, do you understand? And what are you doing now? You’re fleecing them. [...] How are you going to protect them from the Svidrigailovs, [...] you future millionaire, you Zeus disposing of their fates? In ten years? But in ten years your mother will go blind from those kerchiefs, and maybe from tears as well; she’ll waste away with fasting; and your sister? Go on, think what may happen to your sister after those ten years, or during those ten years. Have you guessed?” (44–45)

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⁹⁴ The rejection of the sacrifice points ahead to Ivan Karamazov, who returns the entrance ticket for final harmony to his creator, for whom the suffering of innocent children serves as “fertilizer.” Just like Ivan Karamazov, Raskol’nikov does not want to accept happiness based on the suffering of others. Ivan’s argumentation (Dostoevskij, PSS, XIV, 223–224) literally coincides with the motives that Dostoevskij attributed to Tat’jana’s final renunciation of Onegin in his famous speech on the occasion of the inauguration of the Puškin monument in Moscow (June 8, 1880) (Dostoevskij, PSS, XXVI, 142). On the comparison: Schmid 1998a, 185–186.
The mother’s letter and Raskol’nikov’s inner reaction suggest financial betterment of the impoverished family and saving Dunja from the unloved man as a possible motive for the murder.

Sonja’s manifest misery and Dunja’s future misfortune are presented to Raskol’nikov in an episode where he meets a drunken, carelessly dressed young girl being eyed up on the boulevard. Raskol’nikov is shaken. Dostoevskij thus pulls out all the stops to encourage the reader to impute humanitarian motives to the hero.

On the way home, exhausted and falling asleep in a bush, Raskol’nikov dreams of the little horse that is killed by its drunken owner for the joy of tormenting and killing. In the dream, Raskol’nikov is a little boy embracing the dead horse’s head and kissing the animal on its eyes and lips. The dream shows the hero what it means to kill a living, sentient being. Horrified, Raskol’nikov awakens:

“God!” he exclaimed, “but can it be, can it be that I will really take an axe and hit her on the head and smash her skull... [...] I knew very well I could never endure it, so why have I been tormenting myself all this while? Even yesterday, yesterday, when I went to make that... trial, even yesterday I fully realized I could not endure it... So what is this now? Why have I doubted all along? Just yesterday, going down the stairs, I myself said it was mean, nasty, vile, vile... the mere thought of it made me vomit in reality and threw me into horror... [...] Suppose, suppose there are even no doubts in all those calculations, suppose all that’s been decided in this past month is clear as day, true as arithmetic. Lord! Even so, I wouldn’t dare! I couldn’t endure it, I couldn’t...” (59)

In Raskol’nikov, two movements fight with each other, a rational decision based on calculation and “arithmetic,” and horror at actual execution. In his dream, Raskol’nikov must have recognized himself as the bloodthirsty and murderous perpetrator.

Besides the ‘arithmetic’ that promises the financial salvation of the families and the ethical salvation of the young women, Raskol’nikov seems to be guided by a completely different kind of motivation. It might be called mythical motivation. The hero is said to have “lately become superstitious” (63). He tends to attach special importance to coincidences, to see “a certain strangeness, a mysteriousness, as it were, in this whole affair, the presence
as of some peculiar influences and coincidences” (83). Fate seems to interfere when he listens to a student he does not know in a tavern telling him about a woman, his pawnbroker:

That in itself seemed somehow strange to Raskol’nikov: he had just left her, and here they were talking about her. By chance, of course, but just then, when he could not rid himself of a certain quite extraordinary impression, it was as if someone had come to his service: the student suddenly began telling his friend various details about this Alëna Ivanovna. (63)

When the student exclaims in jest that he could murder and rob this old woman without the slightest qualms, Raskol’nikov shrugs: “How strange it was!” (65). Raskol’nikov is obviously thinking of fate at work again. When the student presents his “arithmetic” of harm and benefit, he presents, without knowing it, Raskol’nikov with a social-utilitarian motive for the murder, which harmonizes very well with the latter’s concern for Sonja and Dunja:

“[…] On the one hand you have a stupid, meaningless, worthless, wicked, sick old crone, no good to anyone and, on the contrary, harmful to everyone […] On the other hand, you have fresh, young forces that are being wasted for lack of support, and that by the thousands, and that everywhere! […] Kill her and take her money, so that afterwards with its help you can devote yourself to the service of all mankind and the common cause: what do you think, wouldn’t thousands of good deeds make up for one tiny little crime? For one life, thousands of lives saved from decay and corruption. One death for hundreds of lives – it’s simple arithmetic! And what does the life of this stupid, consumptive, and wicked old crone mean in the general balance? No more than the life of a louse, a cockroach, and not even that much, because the old crone is harmful.” (65)

This abstract speech, in which the student, as he asserts, is ultimately only concerned with “justice” and from which he naturally draws no consequences for himself, makes a deep impression on Raskol’nikov. His thoughts on the direction of events by a mysterious power, on “predestination,” are articulated in FID:
Raskol’nikov was greatly agitated. Of course, it was all the most common and ordinary youthful talk and thinking, he had heard it many times before, only in different forms and on different subjects. But why precisely now did he have to hear precisely such talk and thinking, when… exactly the same thoughts had just been conceived in his own head? And why precisely now, as he was coming from the old woman’s bearing the germ of this thought, should he chance upon a conversation about the same old woman? (66)

For Raskol’nikov, the student’s social-utilitarian argument about the arithmetic of harm and benefit is fatally linked to the social and ethical plight of Sonja and Dunja that has become clear to him and to the impression that the murder was predetermined by fate.

In view of the remarkable coincidence that the unknown student expresses what is going on in Raskol’nikov’s thoughts at this time, the suspicion may arise that the student is not a real being at all, but a chimera, an external projection of what is brewing inside Raskol’nikov.

The inner conflict leads to a split between acting and thinking that is already anticipated in the name of the hero: The name Raskol’nikov goes back to Russian raskol ‘split.’ While the hand is already seeking the instrument of crime, the head is not yet ready for action, yes, it rejects it with disgust. This is made clear by a peculiar explanation when the narrator reports that Raskol’nikov is making intensive preparations for murder and has decided on the axe as a tool, but at the same time is still infinitely far away from the execution:

We may note, incidentally, one peculiarity with regard to all the final decisions he came to in this affair. They had one strange property: the more final they became, the more hideous and absurd they at once appeared in his own eyes. In spite of all his tormenting inner struggle, never for a single moment during the whole time could he believe in the feasibility of his designs.

If he had ever once managed to analyze and finally decide everything down to the last detail, and there were no longer any doubts left – at that point he would most likely have renounced it all as absurd, monstrous, and impossible. (69)
The status of the perspective in this last paragraph is unclear. Is it still a narratorial report, or has the perspective slipped to the figural end of the spectrum and been realized in FID?

The conflict between hand and head proves to be the struggle between two voices in Raskol’nikov’s consciousness. One voice, the conscience, resists the thought with disgust; the other voice, the mind, follows the ‘arithmetic’ and submits to the mechanical force of the supposed predetermination by fate. The affirmative voice drives action, while the voice of conscience postpones action and, paradoxically, believes less and less in its final decisions against the definitive actions of the hand.95

Raskol’nikov declares his visit to the old woman to be a “trial,” which he has only “tried out” “far from the real thing” (70). But he is unable to “endure it” and ran away, “furious with himself.” He concludes the whole analysis “in terms of a moral resolution of the question”: “His casuistry was sharp as a razor, and he no longer found any conscious objections” (70). The still-persistent search for objections to the deed is stopped by an internally effective appeal to the fateful power that forces him into the deed:

This last day, which had come so much by chance and resolved everything at once, affected him almost wholly mechanically: as if someone had taken him by the hand and pulled him along irresistibly, blindly, with unnatural force, without objections. As if a piece of his clothing had been caught in the cogs of a machine and he were being dragged into it. (70)

When it finally comes to action, Raskol’nikov sees himself as a tool of Providence. The characteristic phrase when the hour struck alludes to fate: “When the hour struck, everything came out not that way at all, but somehow accidentally, even almost unexpectedly” (72). It is fate, so to speak, that murders. And fate has already offered him the axe that, after the unexpected presence of the servant had thwarted the removal of the axe from the kitchen, “flashed

95 With a different characterological embedding and on a different intellectual level, Dostoevskij again shapes the splitting of consciousness, which he staged in The Double in seemingly external action, with seemingly Romantic ontology. The split in consciousness appears with a different thematic motivation again in Ivan Karamazov’s dialogue with Smerdjakov, which Baxtin ([1929] 2000, 163–166) has analyzed as the peak of Dostoevskij’s art of dialogue: with one of his two inner voices, Ivan refuses to consent to patricide; with the other voice, he signals that the murder may take place against his will.
into his eye” (72; tr. rev.) from the caretaker’s closet. The perpetrator, feeling encouraged, acknowledges the happy coincidence with the Russian proverb “If not reason, then the devil!” (72).

Hundreds of pages later, in the middle of the novel, a whole new motivation is presented in the form of an article written by Raskol’nikov half a year earlier and published without his knowledge. This article, entitled *On Crime*, has been read by the investigator Porfirij Petrovič, and he, with the help of the editor of the magazine, has followed the trail to Raskol’nikov from the initials with which the article was signed. In the article, Raskol’nikov, according to his memory, had investigated the psychological state of a criminal during the entire course of the crime. Porfirij Petrovič is, however, less interested in the “original” thesis that the execution of a crime is always accompanied by an illness—which in Raskol’nikov’s case is confirmed—than in the idea that there are “extraordinary” people in the world who have the full right to commit any crime as if the law did not apply to them.

Raskol’nikov immediately understands the trap set by Porfirij Petrovič, smiles at the deliberate distortion of his ideas, and lets himself be challenged to explain them in detail and answer questions. If his thesis had been as Porfirij Petrovič had formulated it, he points out, the censors would not have allowed the article to pass. He says that he merely ‘hinted’ at the fact that ‘extraordinary’ people have the right to transcend certain obstacles, but if and only if the realization of an idea that might save all mankind required it. If the discoveries of Kepler or Newton could not have been made known to man in any other way than by the sacrifice of one or ten or a hundred people who would have hindered those discoveries, then Newton would in his view have had the right, indeed would have been obliged, to eliminate those ten or a hundred people in order to make his discovery known to all mankind. (One recalls the ‘arithmetic’ of the student in the tavern, which justifies the

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96 The motif of writing treatises again points to Ivan Karamazov, who sets out his philosophical and socio-legal positions in a total of four texts, the most prominent of which is the Poem of the Grand Inquisitor.

97 On possible pretexts, Cesare Beccaria’s *Dei delitti e delle pene* (1764; Russian *O prestuplenijax i nakazanijax*, 1803), and Thomas de Quincey’s *On Murder Considered as One of the Fine Arts* (1827), cf. the commentaries in Dostoevskij, PSS, VII, 380.

98 Konstantin Baršt (2019, 77–86) has presented two theses on this subject: 1) the content of the essay is not the same as the topic of two kinds of people, discussed in the conversation with the investigator; 2) the topic of choosing the right path in life dealt with in the essay was influenced by an essay by the Petersburg feuilletonist and critic Viktor Burenin.
death of the usurer with the saved lives of thousands). Furthermore, Raskol’nikov continues, he developed the idea that, for example, all legislators and human leaders, starting with the oldest, the Lycurguses, Solons, Mohammedi, Napoleons, etc., were without exception criminals, simply because by enacting a new law they violated an ancient law held as sacrosanct by society, and of course did not shy away from the shedding of blood, if that blood, sometimes also completely innocent, could help them. From this, he argues, it can be concluded “that all, not only great men, but even those who are a tiny bit off the beaten track – that is, who are a tiny bit capable of saying something new – by their very nature cannot fail to be criminals” (260).\textsuperscript{99} The whole idea, Raskol’nikov continues, is by no means new and has already been printed a thousand times. But his main idea is important to him. This consists of the fact that there are two kinds of people, a lower one of ordinary people, the “material” that serves only reproduction, and the very few men in the true sense, i.e., those who have the gift or talent with which to speak a “new word” in their sphere.

This theory of the “Übermensch,” as set out by Nietzsche, is the basic motivation for Raskol’nikov’s actions. Thus, the motive lies not in social compassion, social-utilitarian thinking, and mythical compulsion by fate, but the idea of superhumanity. Raskol’nikov is an ideologist and lives on an idea. Its origins go back a few months, and Raskol’nikov refers to it several times internally without articulating it. It is only now, in the middle of the novel, that the reader learns what this idea, which has been hinted at several times, consists of and what actually moved Raskol’nikov to the murder. The other motifs suggested by the author do not disappear, but in their human nature allow the hero to gloss over the inhuman main motivation.\textsuperscript{100} Raskol’nikov must also assume that his enterprise has the backing of fate when he hears the student articulate his idea in the tavern when he has just returned from his “rehearsal” with the usurer.

\textsuperscript{99} In Russian, this thesis is supported by the fact that the word crime (prestuplenie), which also appears in the novel’s title, literally means ‘transgression.’ Jurij Lotman’s (1970) concept of the event as “transgression of a limit” also has a certain resemblance to the category of crime. In Crime and Punishment, the verbs perestupit’ and perešagnut’ (‘exceed’) appear several times in the meaning ‘transgression of a limit.’

\textsuperscript{100} The hero’s motivation underwent several changes in the course of the novel’s development. In a first exposé for the publisher Mixail Katkov, the murder was based on “simple arithmetic.” The poor student decided to kill and rob the “stupid, deaf, sick, and greedy old woman” in order to save himself, his sister, and his mother and then become an “honest man filled with a humane sense of duty towards the state,” “with which, of course, the crime is ‘made good,’ if one can even call the murder of the old woman, who herself does not know why she lives in the
The reasons for Raskol’nikov’s atrocity do not include protesting against the ruling power of money, which is shown in the usurious interest of the pawnbroker, or the desire for evil for its own sake. Neither explanation is valid. Raskol’nikov is not a critic of capitalism. That the perpetrator wants evil for its own sake is true of Smerdjakov, the devilishly refined murderer in *The Brothers Karamazov*, but not of Raskol’nikov. Smerdjakov pays careful attention to even the smallest detail in the execution of the deed, and acts in cold blood and deliberately. The idea-driven perpetrator Raskol’nikov, on the other hand, does not take care of the details, only procures the murder weapon at the last minute, and acts headlessly, which is why he only takes worthless objects with him. Raskol’nikov strives neither for social revenge nor for evil but makes an attempt to realize his idea. That is the germ of the murder. The motivations offered correspond more to the social doxa and the literary convention and were obvious to the audience of his time.

Already now, as he presents his theory, Raskol’nikov has of course understood that he does not belong to the “extraordinary” people. His illness shows him that he is not up to being the “ruler” that he found so attractive, that his conscience was stronger than his theory.

The primacy of conscience over theory is a central idea of Dostoevskij, which presents itself starkly in *Crime and Punishment*. Later, in *The Brothers Karamazov*, it will reappear in a more complex form, in the opposition of the Russian-feeling boozer and ruffian Dmitrii Karamazov, who has his heart in the right place, and Ivan Karamazov, the “Euclidean”-thinking essay writer, who has his problems with God and is a cold human being. Ivan subliminally tells the semi-idiotic Smerdjakov to commit patricide and then almost dies of his torments of conscience. Thankfully, the author is no longer so sure of his Christian position in this last novel and allows – as will be shown below – the work’s abstract author to oscillate unmistakably between “pro and contra.”

world and who might have died a month later, a crime” (Dostoevskij, PSS, VII, 310–311). In a second version, which Dostoevskij began after burning the early drafts (cf. letter of February 18, 1866, Dostoevskij, PSS, XXVII, 150) a philanthropic motive appeared: “I gather my energy, I gain strength [...] not for the sake of the bad, but to bring happiness.” Raskol’nikov prays: “Lord! If the attack on the blind, blunt old woman who is not necessary to anyone is a sin, [...] then accuse me. I have been strict with myself, not vanity...” (quoted after Belov 1979, 18). Only in the third phase was the idea of the “extraordinary man” and the separation of mankind into “rulers” and “trembling creatures” formulated.
11.2.2 Point of View and Representation of Mind

*Crime and Punishment* is the first Russian novel of consciousness (disregarding the shorter *Double*). In no other work of Russian literature is the plot so exclusively transferred into the consciousness of the hero as in Dostoevskij’s first great novel. Horst-Jürgen Gerigk (2013, 66–67) described the figural perception of the outside world as follows: “Dostoevskij always [lets] the outside world come into play only as Raskol’nikov’s outwardly projected inner world.” This description is correct, but it should not, of course, lead to the conclusion that this is a novel that Stanzel (1979) would describe as a “personal novel.” The narratorial element is too strong for this. Some researchers explain this by the fact that Dostoevskij originally envisaged a diegetic narrator, the murderer, who writes his confession in the form of a diary (Dostoevskij, *PSS*, VII, 312–316). Assuming traces of an earlier plan is hardly complimenting an author, especially one who, as the notebooks show, reflected in detail on questions of perspective and narrative situation and was very aware of the corresponding technical consequences and effects on the reader. In his first exposé for the publisher of the *Russian Messenger* (*Russkij vestnik*), in which the novel appeared as a serial, the author describes the profile and competence of his originally diegetic narrator in the following way: “In all these six chapters [which were finished] he [the narrator] must write, speak, and partly present himself to the reader as if he were not in his right mind” (Dostoevskij, *PSS*, VII, 315).

The change to the non-diegetic narrator has become necessary not least because the murderer could not or did not want to present his consciousness as competently as an objective narrator. Moreover, the diegetic narrator’s vision, knowledge, and memory necessarily had to be limited, and Dostoevskij always paid strict attention to the observance of motivation. He did not write in a wild or holy fury as a legend would have it. The notebooks for *A Raw Youth* prove how carefully he considered narrative aspects and repeatedly revised his decisions if the results did not stand up to his critical examination. The report of the diegetic narrator contains numerous references to a lack of knowledge and recollection, but at times also reveals an unwillingness to tell everything: “I will not tell any further. The only sensation was – madness” (Dostoevskij, *PSS*, VII, 313).

In the published version, the task of describing the hero’s states of consciousness fell to a nondiegetic narrator whom the author described in his
notebooks as an “invisible but omniscient being.” This narrator, however, also speaks in his own name at every turn with explanations, evaluations, and comments. He loves generalizations. Some commentaries and generalizations that focus on the narrator and his sometimes good-natured and naïve way of thinking often provide a comic note in Dostoevskij’s novels and, especially in gloomy contexts, bring about a lightening of the mood. Narratorial traits are also contained in some descriptions that are made from the spatial point of view of a character, but not with their ideological, evaluative, or linguistic perspective. The following description of Lužin, the “bridegroom” regarded attentively by Raskol’nikov, points more to the narrator than to Raskol’nikov:

Indeed, there was some striking peculiarity, as it were, in Pëtr Petrovič’s general appearance – namely, something that seemed to justify the appellation “fiancé” just given him so unceremoniously. [...] All his clothes were fresh from the tailor and everything was fine, except perhaps that it was all too new and spoke overly much of a certain purpose. Even the smart, spanking-new top hat testified to this purpose: Pëtr Petrovič somehow treated it all too reverently and held it all too carefully in his hands. Even the exquisite pair of lilac-colored, real Jouvain gloves testified to the same thing, by this alone, that they were not worn but were merely carried around for display. In Pëtr Petrovič’s attire, light and youthful colors predominated. He was wearing a pretty summer jacket of a light brown shade, light-colored summer trousers, a matching waistcoat, a fine, newly purchased shirt, a little tie of the lightest cambric with pink stripes, and the best part was that it all even became Pëtr Petrovič. His face, very fresh and even handsome, looked younger than his forty-five years to begin with. Dark side-whiskers pleasantly overshadowed it from both sides, like a pair of mutton chops, setting off very handsomely his gleaming, clean-shaven chin. Even his hair, only slightly touched with gray, combed and curled by the hairdresser, did not thereby endow him with a ridiculous or somehow silly look, as curled hair most often does, inevitably making one resemble a German on his way to the altar. And if there was indeed something unpleasant and repulsive in this rather handsome and solid physiognomy, it proceeded from other causes. (145–146)
The selection of the details and their evaluation and naming do not fit the mood of the observing Raskol’nikov and his horizon of values, but they are also not unbrokenly narratorial. In some descriptive details and their implicit evaluations, Lužin’s self-satisfied autoperspective is realized (emphasized by my italics – W. Sch.). We are dealing here with the type of concealed representation of consciousness described above (2.5.3) as figurally colored narration (FCN): apparently authentic speech of the narrator that to a varying extent adopts evaluations and designations from CT without marking them. Of the two variants of FCN distinguished above, we are dealing here with the contagion of the narrator with CT, because the concentration on the details of the clothing and its evaluation reflect the current inner situation of the “bridegroom” and his self-perception.

Of course, the classic methods of representing consciousness play an important role in the novel: direct interior discourse, direct interior monologue, FID, and free indirect monologue. In the following, these patterns will be illustrated using a series of examples of thematic interest. But the significance of the narratorial report on consciousness should not be underestimated. It often introduces a passage whose quintessence or conclusion is then reproduced in direct interior discourse or FID. However, it is not uncommon for the crucial emotions of the hero’s soul and motives for his actions to be presented in a narratorial report of consciousness or in indirect representation.

Of considerable importance in this novel is the indicative and symbolic representation of emotions. Basically, all actions, speech, and thoughts of the hero are sign carriers. This also includes the meaningful dreams (see Shaw 1973). All these actions – quite contrary to the intention of their originator – indicate his states of consciousness indicatively and sometimes also symbolically.

Dostoevskij also uses a method for depicting the inner world of his hero that he will develop further in his later novels: having other characters expose secret motives and intentions in their direct dialogical speech. Such ‘unmaskers’ are not necessarily friendly to the hero they characterize, nor do they need to be positive characters. Allowing authorial truth to be expressed by figures discredited in character is one of Dostoevskij’s favorite methods, which he already used in the philosophical parts of the Notes from Underground. In Crime and Punishment, the role of the ‘unmaskers’ is played by the astute but highly unsympathetic investigator Porfirij Petrovič and the amoral cynic Svidrigajlov. This ‘transverse exposure’ is one of the reasons for the constitutive role of dialogue.
in Dostoevskij’s novels, a role, however, that leads theater directors to the false conclusion that the novels are particularly suitable for staging.

Raskol’nikov is not the only character into whom the narrator has introspection and who is depicted ‘from within,’ which is always a certain privilege in Dostoevskij’s work. This privilege is also granted to Raskol’nikov’s friend and Dunja’s later groom Razumixin, Raskol’nikov’s mother Pul’xerija Aleksandrovnna, and Sonja Marmeladova, but also to the negative figures Svidrigajlov and Lužin.

Even before the murder, to which the hand rushes ahead of the head, but above all afterwards, Raskol’nikov finds himself in a difficult state of mind and in changing states of illness extending up to several days of unconsciousness. These are – at least according to the author’s intentions – the psycho-physical manifestations of a bad conscience. In the entire second part, the author faced the difficult task of presenting the rapidly changing states of consciousness of his hero in a differentiated manner and with corresponding symptomatic details, without reducing the tension of action too much. He did not always succeed in this in this part. The rapid alternation of extreme psycho-physical states is a little tiring. In the later novels, Dostoevskij dealt more economically with the psychological dramas of his guilty heroes, which one could show, for example, with reference to Ivan Karamazov’s moods after the murder of his father.

In the second part of Crime and Punishment, the representation of inner life is essentially transferred to the narratorial report of consciousness. Here is an example of this technique, which also shows the narrator’s penchant for superlative expressions:

He went out all atremble with some wild, hysterical feeling, in which there was at the same time a portion of unbearable delight – yet he was gloomy and terribly tired. His face was distorted, as if after some fit. His fatigue was increasing rapidly. His energy would now be aroused and surge up suddenly, with the first push, the first irritating sensation, and then rapidly grow weaker as the sensation weakened. (166)

11.2.3 The Reversal

The reversal from crime to atonement takes place in many small steps and not without relapses. Basically, the metabolé already begins with the deed
that Raskol’nikov carries out so rashly that one is tempted to think that he would accept being discovered – or even that he wants to be discovered. Raskol’nikov’s attitude in the second part, which covers his state after the deed, is characterized by two tendencies that at first glance appear to be contradictory.

On the one hand, Raskol’nikov observes himself and wonders about his negligence in dealing with the traces of the crime. Returning from the crime to his coffin-like room, he forgot to lock the door and just let himself fall onto the sofa as he was, in his coat and hat on his head. “If anyone had come in, what would he have thought?” (98). The next morning, he hastily examines every garment for traces of blood and repeats the examination three times because he does not trust himself. “But there seemed to be nothing, no traces, except in one place, where the cuff of his trousers was frayed and hung down like a fringe; there were thick traces of caked blood on this fringe” (89–90).

He suddenly remembers that the stolen things are still in his pockets: “Until now he had not even thought of taking them out and hiding them! He had not even remembered about them while he was examining his clothes! What was wrong with him?” (90). He puts the things in a hole under the wallpaper:

“It all fits! Everything, out of sight, and the purse, too!” he thought joyfully, straightening up and staring dumbly at the hole in the corner, which bulged more than ever. Suddenly he shook all over with horror: “My God,” he whispered in despair, “what’s wrong with me? Do you call that hidden? Is that any way to hide things?” (90)

Suddenly he remembers the loop under the armhole of the coat in which he carried the axe: “That’s it. That’s it – the loop under the armhole – I haven’t removed it yet! I forgot! Such a thing, such evidence, and I forgot!” (90). The loss of memory and mind frightens and torments him: “What, can it be starting already, can the reckoning come so soon? See, see – There it is!” (90–91).

Raskol’nikov splits into two egos, into an ego that acts and a second ego that observes and argues. The second ego can even laugh at the first, albeit compulsively, derisively. Frightened by the summons to the police station, Raskol’nikov wants to kneel down to pray, but bursts out laughing instead “not at praying, but at himself” (93). He starts to dress, reminds himself that the sock must be covered in blood, tears it from his foot, and puts it on again, since he has no substitute “and again burst[s] out laughing” (93).
“It’s all conventional, all relative, all just a matter of form,” he thought fleetingly, with only a small part of his mind, while his whole body trembled. “There, I put it on! I did finally put it on!” But his laughter immediately gave way to despair. “No, I’m not strong enough…” the thought came to him. His legs were trembling. (93–94)

Insecure about the right hiding place for the stolen things, he takes them out of the hole behind the wallpaper and hides them under a big stone. He is overwhelmed with joy that the things will never be found and he will not be linked to the murder. However, the euphoric mood does not last long. A new, completely unexpected and extremely simple insight suddenly upsets him, and in a dialogized interior monologue he poses pressing questions to himself:

If indeed this whole thing was done consciously and not foolheadedly, if you indeed had a definite and firm objective, then how is it that so far you have not even looked into the purse and do not know what you’ve actually gained, or for what you accepted all these torments and started out on such a mean, nasty, vile business? Weren’t you going to throw it into the water just now, this purse, along with all the other things which you also haven’t seen yet? … How is that? (110)

Raskol’nikov is repeatedly haunted by the thought of giving himself up. Even at the police station, where he is summoned for a completely different, harmless matter, he is overcome by the need to confess, by the thought of telling everything down to the smallest detail and unloading everything from his shoulders.

Another time, he is overcome by the need to confess in a tavern. He makes allusions to Zametov and even reveals the hiding place in hypothetical form. His listener considers him insane. Both activities, careless handling of the traces and speaking the truth, have a common core, the desire to be free of the terrible act. And his disinterest in what he stole shows that Raskol’nikov was not concerned with enrichment, but also not with realizing philanthropic social plans or rescuing lost women.

After the deed, Raskol’nikov is filled with disgust, hatred for everything he encounters. He treats even his closest friends with harsh rejection. They attribute this to his precarious health situation, in which fever attacks and unconsciousness alternate. Raskol’nikov’s basic state of mind, however, is
anger. Anger at what? Raskol’nikov’s anger is directed against himself in two respects. On the one hand, he is angry with himself because he has humiliated himself to “such a mean, nasty, vile business,” the concrete physical consequences of which, split skulls and pools of blood, fill him with horror and disgust. On the other hand, he cannot forgive himself for having turned out not to have mastery over the act, not to be a cold-blooded “extraordinary man” indifferent to remorse. He understands that he did not cross the border that he hoped to with the murder: “…it wasn’t a human being I killed, it was a principle! So I killed the principle, but I didn’t step over [perestupit’-to ne perestupil]. I stayed on this side… […] eh, an aesthetic louse is what I am, and nothing more” (274). The subsequent variation of the louse motif in the direct interior monologue not only contains a self-accusation but also revels – with the virtuoso rhetoric of the Man from the Underground – in masochistic self-criticism:

“Yes, I really am a louse,” he went on, gloatingly seizing upon the thought, rummaging in it, playing and amusing himself with it, “if only because, first, I’m now reasoning about being a louse; second, because I’ve been troubling all-good Providence for a whole month, calling it to witness that I was undertaking it not to satisfy my own flesh and lust, but with a splendid and agreeable goal in mind – ha, ha! Third, because I resolved to observe all possible justice in carrying it out, weight, measure, arithmetic: I chose the most useless louse of all and, having killed her, decided to take from her exactly as much as I needed for the first step, no more and no less (and the rest would thus simply go to the monastery, according to her will – ha, ha!)… And ultimately, ultimately I am a louse,” he added, grinding his teeth, “because I myself am perhaps even more vile and nasty than the louse I killed, and I had anticipated beforehand that I would tell myself so after I killed her. Can anything compare with such horror! Oh, triteness! Oh, meanness! […]” (274–275)

101 This motive is understood very well by the amoral Svidrigailov, who in characteristically cynical manner explains to Avdot’ja Romanovna the motives of her brother: “He seems to have imagined that he, too, was a man of genius – that is, he was sure of it for a time. He suffered greatly, and suffers still, from the thought that though he knew how to devise the theory, he was unable to step over [in Russian: perešagnut’] without hesitation and therefore is not a man of genius. Now that, for a vain young man, is truly humiliating, especially in our age…” (491).
In this revelation, which – like many confessions and self-accusations of Dostoevskij’s heroes – also has a vain, self-complacent streak, the hero descends from the ‘extraordinary human’ to the most disgusting animal creature.

A highlight of the novel are the cat-and-mouse games between Raskol’nikov and Porfirij Petrovič. The investigator suspects the whole truth, but he has no evidence. He tries to catch Raskol’nikov with psychology. But Raskol’nikov knows: Porfirij Petrovič has no facts in his hands, only his psychology, which is “double-ended” (357) (o dvux koncax, PSS, VII, 275). “‘Everything’s double-ended, now everything’s double-ended,’ Raskol’nikov kept repeating, and he walked out of the room more cheerful than ever” (358). Raskol’nikov can more or less elegantly parry his opponent’s provocative advances. It should be noted that the duels with the investigator do not promote a rapprochement with the truth, do not lead to a turnaround in Raskol’nikov, although Porfirij Petrovič’s questions “stunned [him] on the head with an axe” (347), which picks up Raskol’nikov’s own expression.

The interrogations have a paradoxical effect: they anger Raskol’nikov to the point of rage and merely provoke him, after playing with the idea of giving himself up, to hold back the truth. This is where Dostoevskij’s conviction, expressed in The Brothers Karamazov, that secular jurisdiction (even – and this is the point – after the reforms carried out by Alexander II in 1864) cannot bring truth to light or do justice, comes into play.

11.2.4 Confession and “Resurrection”

When the murderer Raskol’nikov makes his confession to the prostitute Sonja Marmeladova, in a process painful for both sides, he explains the reasons for his actions in several false starts. In doing so, he repeats and explains the temptations the author creates for the reader. The first explanation is that he killed “to rob her, of course” (412). Sonja is angry about this explanation, which she finds implausible, and suspects that he was hungry and

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102 The binary formula of a thing that has two sides is a prominent motif in The Brothers Karamazov and appears there in various forms: the defender calls psychology a “stick with two ends” (palka o dvux koncax, Dostoevskij, PSS, XIV, 154); the prosecutor uses the saying of the “back of the medal” (oborotnaja storona medali, PSS, XV, 129); the narrator characterizes the institution of the Russian elders as a “double-edged sword” (obojudoostroe orudie, PSS, XIV, 27). The clever librarian of the monastery calls the main idea of Ivan’s ecclesiastical treatise, which receives the applause of both clerics and atheists, a “two-edged idea” (ideja o dvux koncax, PSS, XIV, 56).
wanted to help his mother. No, he denies: if he had killed because he was hungry, he ought to be happy now. In a second attempt, he presents the Napoleon idea: “I wanted to become a Napoleon, that’s why I killed” (415). After another denial (“It’s all nonsense, almost sheer babble!” 415), he brings into play the suffering mother and offended sister whose lives he wanted to make easier. But even this explanation cannot convince Sonja. Thus, he presents his cynical variant, which makes the murder disappear: “I only killed a louse, Sonja, a useless, nasty, pernicious louse” (416). He concedes to the protesting Sonja: “I’ve been lying for a long time... All that is not it; you’re right in saying so. There are quite different reasons here, quite different!” (416) In a new attempt, “as if an unexpected turn of thought [vnezapnyj povorot myslj] had struck him”, he flees into pejorative self-stylization: “That’s not it! Better... suppose (yes! it’s really better this way), suppose that I’m vain, jealous, spiteful, loathsome, vengeful, well... and perhaps also inclined to madness” (417). Faced with his listener’s skepticism, which cannot be overcome in this way, Raskol’nikov winds himself up into a rapture of dark enthusiasm, and as if in a fever, he expresses his true motives:

“It was not to help my mother that I killed – nonsense! I did not kill so that, having obtained means and power, I could become a benefactor of mankind. Nonsense! I simply killed – killed for myself, for myself alone [...] And it was not money above all that I wanted when I killed, Sonja; not money so much as something else... [...] I wanted to find out then, and find out quickly, whether I was a louse like all the rest, or a man? Would I be able to step over, or not! [smogu li ja perestupit’ ili ne smogu! PSS, VII, 322] Would I dare to reach down and take, or not? Am I a trembling creature, or do I have the right...” (419)

What prompts Raskol’nikov to open himself up to Sonja, to propose a life together? It is not her feminine charms that attract him. Eroticism played no discernible role in his perception of the young woman during their earlier encounter. Now, in the second encounter, her compassion evokes in him a “feeling long unfamiliar to him” that “flooded his soul and softened it at once” (412).

In the earlier encounter with Sonja, Raskol’nikov understood what reading aloud from the New Testament about the resurrection of Lazarus, which he had rudely and irritably told her to do, meant for her. He understood that
by doing so, she revealed her innermost self, and he recognized that this oppressed her and that she was terribly afraid to read to him from this book, but that at the same time she “also had a tormenting desire to read [...] and precisely for him [...] and precisely now [...]” (326). He sees in her the martyr rather than the woman. And he explains the fact that he kneels before her and kisses her feet by saying that he was not bowing to her but “to all human suffering” (322). He wants to go with her because they are both “cursed” (329). And he sees their common ground in the fact that they are both border crossers: “Haven’t you done the same thing? You, too, have stepped over [perestupila]. . . were able to step over [smogla perestupit’]” (329; PSS, VII, 252).

Raskol’nikov’s path from the confession he makes before Sonja to his “resurrection” and “rebirth” is still long and winding. The development towards repentance and atonement is retarded by several relapses. Thus, he furiously cries out to his sister, who comforts him by saying that by choosing to suffer, he has already washed away half his crime:

“Crime? What crime?” he suddenly cried out in some unexpected rage. “I killed a vile, pernicious louse, a little old money-lending crone who was of no use to anyone, to kill whom is worth forty sins forgiven, who sucked the life-sap from the poor – is that a crime? I’m not thinking of it, nor am I thinking of washing it away. […]” (518)

In conversation with his sister, he also falls back again into the pose of the “benefactor of mankind” and accuses himself only of “clumsiness” (518). He is further away than ever from repentance:

[…] I decidedly do not understand why hurling bombs at people, according to all the rules of siege warfare, is a more respectable form. Fear of aesthetics is the first sign of powerlessness!... Never, never have I been more clearly aware of it than now, and now more than ever I fail to understand my crime! Never, never have I been stronger or more certain than now!… (519)

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103 Among the interpreters who understand Raskol’nikov’s transformation as a conversion to the Christian faith, Daniel Schümann (2014) emphasizes the role of “listening as a pathway to faith.” Schümann sees the decisive moment of conversion in the scene in which Raskol’nikov listens to the story of the resurrection of Lazarus read out by Sonja from the Gospel of John.
He comes to his senses only when he accidentally looks at Dunja’s eyes, in which he reads “anguish for him” (519). It is also the experience of compassionate empathy that leads him back to Sonja. It is not so much her Christian faith or the little cross that she puts around him that motivates him to confess to the police, as pious interpreters like to postulate, but rather her suffering in her love for him. He has to admit this to himself – even if in cynical distortion, as the direct interior monologue shows:

Then why did I go to her now? What for? I told her it was for business; and what was this business? There wasn’t any business at all! To announce that I was going? But what of it? What was the need! Is it that I love her? I don’t, do I? Didn’t I just chase her away like a dog? Was it really crosses I wanted from her? Oh, how low I’ve fallen! No – I wanted her tears, I wanted to see her frightened, to look at her heart-ache and torment! (524)

Before he ‘goes there’ and turns himself in to the police, he makes his public gesture ‘before the people’ at the Haymarket that Sonja has demanded of him. Raskol’nikov’s impulse for this surprising action, which represents the real reversal in his development, is presented in a narratorial manner:

And so crushed was he by the hopeless anguish and anxiety of this whole time, and especially of the last few hours, that he simply threw himself into the possibility of this wholesome, new, full sensation. It came to him suddenly in a sort of fit, caught fire in his soul from a single spark, and suddenly, like a flame, engulfed him. Everything softened in him all at once, and the tears flowed. He simply fell to the earth where he stood… (525)

With “sparks” and “flames,” Dostoevskij pays tribute to the medieval mystical images of Christian conversion.

Although Raskol’nikov has now crossed the border from intellectual arrogance to humility in the spirit of his author and, like a martyr in a Christological pose, lets the mockery of the real people surrounding him pass over him calmly, without lashing out, he has not yet reached the end of his path.

After a condensed account of interrogation, trial, and lenient sentence, in the epilogue we see Raskol’nikov in a Siberian prison camp one and a half
years later. He seems to have fallen back into earlier attitudes, isolating himself from everyone, from his fellow prisoners, but also from Sonja, who has accompanied him and to whom he is nevertheless quite unkind. He falls ill, “and it was from wounded pride that he fell ill” (543), finds no fault in himself, only regrets a “simple blunder” (543) that could have happened to anyone. He is ashamed because, “by some sort of decree of blind fate,” he had to bow to a ‘meaningless’ court verdict (543). He does not regret his crime, and wonders to what extent his idea was stupider than all the other thoughts and theories with which the world is filled. Viewed without prejudice, his idea is not so strange. In his eyes, his crime consists only in the fact that he did not endure and voluntarily gave himself up.

Raskol’nikov wonders why, standing by the river, he did not kill himself. The narrator who has spoken for the hero in FID so far now authoritatively states the presentiment that arose but was not understood at the time:

[Raskol’nikov] could not understand that even then, when he was standing over the river, he may have sensed a profound lie in his convictions. He did not understand that this sense might herald a future break in his life, his future resurrection [voskresenie], his future new vision of life (545).

It is in this very indirect way of representation, in the narratorial statement of something to which the hero was oblivious, that the key concept of “resurrection” enters the novel text.

It is Sonja again who shows Raskol’nikov the way, but it is not her “radical Christianity” that saves Raskol’nikov, as Maximilian Braun (1976, 137) – and with him a whole phalanx of Christian interpreters – believes. Raskol’nikov’s heart is opened by Sonja’s undaunted spirit and her unwavering loyalty to him:

How it happened he himself did not know, but suddenly it was as if something lifted him und flung him down at her feet. He wept and embraced her knees. For the first moment she was terribly frightened, and her whole face went numb. She jumped up and looked at him, trembling. But all at once, in that same moment, she understood everything. Infinite happiness lit up in her eyes; she understood, and for her there was no longer any doubt that he loved her, loved her infinitely, and at last the moment had come... [...] In [their] pale, sick
faces there already shone the dawn of a renewed future, of a complete resurrection into a new life. (549)

It is worth noting that in this widely figurally perspectivized novel, the “dawn of a renewed future” does not appear in the consciousness of the protagonist but is announced by the authoritative word of the narrator.

The epilogue concludes with the announcement of a “new account, the account of a man’s gradual renewal [obnovlenie], the account of his gradual rebirth [pereroždenie]” (706; tr. rev.). With this promise, the literary history of eventfulness has reached its peak.

11.3 The Brothers Karamazov: The Chain Reaction of Conversions

11.3.1 The Improbable Event

Although the public prosecutor in Dmitrij Karamazov’s trial fully understands the character of the accused and shrewdly reconstructs the murder, he is fundamentally wrong. He calls Dmitrij’s true description of the actual course of events “absurd and improbable” (713; tr. rev. In the orig.: нелепо и неправдоподобно, Dostoevskij, PSS, XV, 142), and the motives given by the alleged perpetrator for not committing the murder seem “unnatural” to the prosecutor (714). The prosecutor’s error is that in his reconstruction, he follows doxa, the expected, what is generally thought to be true and probable, and that he does not reckon with the possibility of the paradox, i.e., the unexpected, the extraordinary, the violation of the norm. Seduced by the probability of the normative, he completely ignores the possibility of what narratology calls an event.

104 Interestingly enough, the translators Pevear and Volokhonsky shy away from translating pereroždenie with ‘rebirth,’ replacing it with the weaker ‘regeneration.’
106 Gerigk (1968) points out that the truth was made “unacceptable” by the objectively false statement of the otherwise credible witness Grigorij.
Dmitrij’s behavior, his renunciation of the planned patricide immediately before its execution, is an event. Dmitrij had, as he reports at the interrogation, felt hatred flare up in himself at the sight of his father, tore out of his pocket the pestle he had brought with him as murder weapon and… (in his dramatic report he pauses and thus repeats the pause in the action in his narrative). It is clear to Dmitrij that the prosecutor and the examining magistrate continue the story in their own, doxal sense, and he reproaches them for this doxal story: “Oh, then I killed him… smashed him on the head and split his skull… that’s the way it was in your opinion, isn’t it?” (472; tr. rev.).

Dmitrij’s own, true story, however, is a different one. It is paradoxical: he did not strike but ran away from the window into the garden. Dmitrij does not know what kept him from striking. He suspects the intervention of secret powers and sees his soul fighting with evil: “Whether it was someone’s tears, or God heard my mother’s prayers, or a bright spirit kissed me at that moment, I don’t know – but the devil was overcome” (472). Dmitrij also knows that, according to the court’s doxal yardstick, his true statement can be nothing more than “A poem! In verse” (473) to those listening to him. But the reader can conclude the following from the conceptual design of the novel: the event of the unexpected – unexpected also and above all for the hero himself – renunciation of patricide was caused by a factor that, in the language of the novel, must be called the ‘voice of conscience.’

One might be tempted to call Dmitrij’s non-killing a minus action (by analogy with Jurij Lotman’s [1970] term minus device). However, this term would not be entirely justified, for Dmitrij does indeed act, only on another level, by ‘overcoming the devil’ through his non-killing. Therefore, the focus of this section is not the completed murder, the murder of the father – which was, as only becomes clear late in the novel, committed by Smerdjakov – but the murder not committed by Dmitrij, which represents a true mental event as a successful fight against the devil.

The Brothers Karamazov represents a culmination of mental eventfulness in Russian literature. Here, the mental event finds its maximal realization in the chain reaction of religious conversions. The chain reaction starts with

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107 Maximilian Braun’s (1976, 233) view that Dmitrij was prevented from committing the murder “only by chance” completely misses the meaning of this conversion novel.

108 This chain is closely related to another sequence of mental events formed by the processes of self-knowledge undergone by the three brothers Aleksej, Dmitrij, and Ivan. Gengk (2013,
the conversion of the dying Markel, which is unexpected for everyone; via Zinovij/Zosima, who is influenced by his brother’s example, it reaches Aleša, Grušen’ka, Dmitrij, and even Ivan; and it is still noticeable in the transformation of the theorizing pupil Kolja Krasotkin from would-be socialist to amiable leader of the children. In Dostoevskij’s world, the conversion events are irreversible and consecutive. Dostoevskij models the mental event as a dynamic and synergetic phenomenon.

11.3.2 The Narrator and His Representation of Consciousness

In his last novel, Dostoevskij used an inconsistent narrator. He basically operates with the undeclared oscillation between two very different narrator instances. Most often, the narrator appears as an omnipresent, omniscient, impersonal instance that looks into the depths of the characters’ souls and makes his own existence be completely forgotten for long stretches. In certain important passages, however, such as the foreword “From the author,” the narrator appears as a chronicler limited in his knowledge who reconstructs with great effort, but also with the utmost care, events that took place thirteen years ago in his hometown of Skotoprigonevsk. As a chronicler, he employs a narratorial perspective and, of course, does not give introspection into the consciousness of the figures. This chronicler is characterized by the tendency to cumbersome description, to registering even the smallest details, to evaluative commentaries (especially ones that apply to the figures), to abstract generalizations, to reasoning, to aphorisms and sententiae (cf. Vetlovskaja 1967; 1977; Meijer 1971, 21). Although the chronicler is a thoroughly ‘reliable’ narrator, one cannot help but notice that his intellectual horizons and literary abilities do not entirely meet the demands that the serious subject matter of the novel places on him. The limited competence of the chronicler and the partial inadequacy of his text make themselves felt in various ways.

246–247) focuses on this aspect, reconstructing the insight of the three brothers into their respective participation in the murder of the father as follows: “Aleksj sees what he has failed to do; Ivan sees what he has promoted; Dmitrij sees what he has triggered.” The processes of insight and self-knowledge, however, are hidden, remain in the implied happenings, and do not form the foreground of the narrated story.
1. The chronicler occasionally makes linguistic mistakes – in morphology, for example, but also in syntax, where he tends to sentence breaks and anacolutha.

2. His text contains instances of stylistic clumsiness. Occasionally, he uses inappropriate expressions. His use of words fluctuates between heterogeneous lexical layers. Occasional coarse colloquial language of a city-dweller contrasts with high lexis with archaic coloring. The narrator’s sentences violate the norm of stylistic lightness, clarity, harmonious construction, and semantic unambiguity. They are often unnecessarily complicated and contain a surplus of adjectives, adverbs, and metalinguistic explanations (cf. Meijer 1960, 20), which does not facilitate the reader’s understanding.

3. Stylistic errors such as the use of inappropriate metaphors and comparisons lead to alogisms, to involuntary comedy. In addition, the narration easily becomes alogical because the narrator does not have full control over the flow of information and does not take sufficient account of what facts the reader is already familiar with.

The chronicler’s limited narrative competence, however, only affects the form of the narrative, not the content. He is not an unreliable narrator. However, his self-critical remarks about his report cannot always be taken at face value, for example when he introduces his description of the Russian elders with the reservation: “I feel myself not very competent or steady on this path” (27). However, the subsequent description is competent and reliable and contradicts the warning. We can observe a similar false forewarning in the beginning of the Book Twelve: A Judicial Error: “I will say beforehand, and say emphatically, that I am far from considering myself capable of recounting all that took place in court, not only with the proper fullness, but even in the proper order” (656). The subsequent complete and strictly ordered presentation contradicts this forewarning.

By allowing the content of metanarrative commentaries to be compromised, the author underlines the fundamental correctness of what is diegetically communicated. The inadequacy of the narrative contrasts with the accuracy of what is reported. The most noticeable weakness of the narrator lies in the involuntary comedy of some remarks. Thus, the chronicler begins the account of Ivan’s nightmare with the words: “I am not a doctor, but nevertheless I feel the moment has come when it is decidedly necessary for me to
explain to the reader at least something of the nature of Ivan Fëdorovič’s illness” (634). Now that the narrator, as an omniscient instance, has portrayed the finest emotions of Ivan’s soul and has awakened in the reader a tense expectation of something mysterious and terrible, the naive confession “I am not a doctor” cannot but appear comical. The comedy, however, does not cancel out the uncanny mood that prevails in this chapter. This quality of dissonance is characteristic of The Brothers Karamazov. Dissonance exists on various levels, between the narrative style and the narrated, but also between humor and seriousness, between the comical and the uncanny (cf. Schmid 1982).

The choice of a narrator who stands out because of his talkativeness in certain passages, and the fact that he does not concentrate on a single hero and a reflector figure, naturally marginalizes the concealed forms of representation of consciousness. The marked forms, the consciousness report and direct external or interior speech, dominate. A special role is played by external dialogue, in which the action is driven forward and the consciousness of the protagonists is depicted in an indicative way and the thinking of the figures is communicated.

There are three highlights of tense dialogue in the novel, in which Dostoevskij unfolds his brilliant art of psychology. The first of these highlights can be found in Book Five, which is titled Pro and Contra. It is about the conversation between the brothers Ivan and Alëša, who have not got to know each other well yet and are dining together at the inn. In the course of this meeting (in the chapter Rebellion), Ivan presents his criticism of God to the monastic novice Alëša, whose reaction he is most anxious to hear, and presents him (in the chapter The Grand Inquisitor) his “poem” of Jesus’ return to earth at the time of the Spanish Inquisition. Then, in Book Eleven, dedicated to Ivan, Ivan’s three visits to Smerdjakov, in which Ivan gives the semi-idiotic lackey subliminal, but well-understood consent to murder the father, on the one hand, and Ivan’s conversation with the devil in his nightmare, on the other hand, are of utmost importance. This conversation with the devil (to which Thomas Mann then referred in his Doctor Faustus) is, from a narrative point of view, a dialogically staged interior monologue.
11.3.3 Markel and the Conditions of Conversion

The chain reaction of the conversions starts, as mentioned, with the spiritual rebirth of the dying Markel. Zosima’s older brother is introduced as an irritable, silent young man who learns well at school but keeps his distance from his comrades. At seventeen, he meets a freethinker exiled to the city, and under his influence he begins to deny the existence of God, refuses to fast, and mocks the Church. Suffering from rapidly progressing tuberculosis, he is on the verge of death. And in this situation, to everyone’s surprise, he starts keeping the fast and going to church in order, as he says, to give his mother “joy and peace” (288). Then, a strange transformation takes place in him. He now allows the old nanny to light the lamp in front of the image in his room: “You pray to God as you light the icon lamp, and I pray, rejoicing at you. So we are praying to the same God” (288). (In parentheses, it should be noted that the theology of the novel is significant: Markel’s prayer consists in the joy of man. Here, we observe the immanentization of transcendence, which is characteristic of Dostoevskij’s positive figures and is particularly evident in Zosima.) These and similar words of Markel seem “strange” to everybody.

Markel then makes a series of statements that prove to be central to the spiritual structure of the novel. One of these statements expresses the emphatic assumption of this world: “Life is paradise, and we are all in paradise, but we do not want to know it, and if we did want to know it, tomorrow there would be paradise the world over” (288). Markel’s words then concern the acknowledgement of each person’s guilt before all and for everything, and the confession that he, Markel, bears greater guilt than all others before all and for everything. The third theme is the praise of God’s glorious world. Observing the birds, Markel begins to speak with them: “Birds of God, joyful birds, you, too, must forgive me, because I have also sinned before you” (289). No one could understand this anymore, as the reporting Zosima points out. And finally, Markel confesses his guilt before creation: “There was so much of God’s glory around me: birds, trees, meadows, sky, and I alone lived in shame, I alone dishonored everything, and did not notice the beauty and the glory of it all” (289).

Markel’s transformation is a fully valid event in the emphatic sense. There is a radical and profound mental and spiritual transformation of the hero that surprises everyone and that cannot prove its sustainability in the
short life of the dying young man but acquires considerable consecutiveness by the fact that it entails inner changes in other people.

Three questions must also be asked about Markel’s conversion.

1. What circumstances and factors determine the hero’s new way of thinking?
2. In what way does the mental event manifest itself, and what phenomena accompany it?
3. What are the consequences of the event in thought and action? How does the changed way of thinking manifest itself in the hero’s life?

1. The first question concerns the motivation of the event. Markel’s strange words, which amaze everyone, are explained by his mother, who can only shake her head over them, with his illness. And the German doctor Eisen-schmidt diagnoses “madness” (289). But this realistic motivation is not intended by Dostoevskij Pro in the context of the whole novel. (By Dostoevskij Pro is meant that part of the abstract author that can be connected with the intention of theodicy and the demand for intuitive faith. This Dostoevskij Pro is opposed by a Dostoevskij Contra, also tangible in the work, who, as the locus of doubt and accusation of God, is most likely to be identified with Ivan Karamazov’s position [in detail: Schmid 1996]).

The network of actions and motifs makes clear that Dostoevskij Pro demands of his reader that he should not accept the physiological reasons suspected by mother and doctor and should oppose them with religious motivation. In this context, it should be noted that Markel’s story is told in Zosima’s vita, which Alëša compiled according to the words of his teacher. Conversions are constitutive for hagiography.

The laws of the hagiographic genre also assert themselves in the motivation of Markel’s conversion. Through the hagiographic embedding, Dostoevskij points to a transcendent reason for the profound change in his hero, without, of course, sacrificing the possibility of a realistic, psychological motivation for this explanation.

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109 On theodicy, the justification of God in view of the suffering existing in the world, as the intention of Dostoevskij Pro, cf. Schmid 1996; 2012.
110 It is characteristic of Dostoevskij’s orientation towards hagiography that Zosima, in his comments on the stories of Scripture that are particularly worth reading, refers emphatically to the transformation of Saul into Paul in the Acts of the Apostles (“that is a must, a must,” 294), the prototype for conversion stories.
Ambivalence of motivation is characteristic of the narrative world of this novel. We should not forget that Markel’s change was not triggered by a transcendent impulse, an apparition, a dream vision, or a pre-epileptic aura, which not infrequently ground turning points in hagiography, but rather – as it initially seems – by a very earthly motive. Markel keeps the fast and goes to church in order, as he says, to give his mother “joy and peace.” Thus, empathy, remorse, and love for his mother present themselves as prerequisites for the mental event. These three factors also prove to be the triggering motives in other spiritual transformations. In Dostoevskij’s world model, they are of course not purely world-immanent factors, because they mediate between this world and the hereafter. In Dostoevskij’s world, the voice of conscience and love establish the connection between man and transcendence.

2. The second question relates to how and in conjunction with what, the mental event is realized. Markel’s change, which is triggered by the voice of conscience and love for his mother, manifests itself in his love for mankind and God’s creation. To the great astonishment of his family, Markel, whom all know only as unsociable, rejecting, and rugged, suddenly turns to humanity and reveals an inner joy inexplicable to all. He rejoices in the little birds and confesses his guilt before them. In this joy – again characteristic of hagiography – the conceptual contours of the whole novel can already be seen: love for people is inseparably linked to the acceptance of God’s world and to the confession of one’s own guilt.

3. The third question concerns the consecutive nature of Markel’s conversion. Markel turns out to be the grain of wheat mentioned in the epigraph of the novel, which bears rich fruit when it dies. The acceptance of the world and the praise of divine glory then become the message of Zosima, who, following the Book of Job and in similar images, praises the perfection of God’s creation.

Already in the Book of Job, which is more or less manifestly recalled as an important subtext, theodicy takes on the form of cosmodyicy. The lamentation of the beaten man is countered by the speech of God from the whirlwind. But this speech does not give an answer to Job’s lamentation. Rather, the world’s creator boasts of his demiurgical competence and praises the perfection of his creation, which he vividly demonstrates with the well-organized nature of the deer, wild ass, ostrich, hippopotamus, and crocodile.
This biblical praise of creation has an equivalent in the novel. Touched by the beauty of the world, the young Zosima breaks out in praise of the teleology created by God:

Each blade of grass, each little bug, ant, golden bee, knows its way amazingly; being without reason, they witness to the divine mystery, they ceaselessly enact it. [...] Truly, [...] all things are good and splendid, because all is truth. Look [...] at the horse [...], that great animal that stands so close to man, or the ox, that nourishes him and works for him, so downcast and pensive [...] everything is perfect, everything except man is sinless, and Christ is with them even before us. (294–295)

The Franciscan love for birds connects the dying boys Markel and Iljuša. The latter tells his father: “Papa, when they put the dirt on my grave, crumble a crust of bread on it so the sparrows will come, and I’ll hear that they’ve come and be glad that I’m not lying alone” (771).

The confession of personal guilt, the acceptance of one’s own responsibility for all and for everything, finding joy in nature, and not least the love of birds become the connecting elements in the chain of conversions that runs through the novel.

11.3.4 From Zosima to Dmitrij

The second link in the chain of conversions is Zinovij/Zosima. The transformation of the proud and vain officer Zinovij takes place immediately prior to a duel he has provoked. At dawn, Zinovij sees the rising sun, “warm and beautiful,” and hears the chirping birds. Pure nature makes him feel something “mean and shameful” in his soul (297). And he suddenly understands at once the reason for his depression. It is not the forthcoming duel, the fear of possible death, but the memory of how, the evening before, he had punched his faithful servant in the face with all his might:

What a crime! It was as if a sharp needle went through my soul. I stood as if dazed, and the sun was shining, the leaves were rejoicing, glittering, and the birds, the birds were praising God... I covered my face with my hands, fell on my bed, and burst into sobs. And then I remembered my brother Markel and his words to the servants before his death. (298)
When it is Zinovij’s turn to fire his shot in the duel, he abstains and praises the beauty of nature before those present:

Gentlemen […], look at the divine gifts around us: the clear sky, the fresh air, the tender grass, the birds, nature is beautiful and sinless, and we, we alone, are godless and foolish, and do not understand that life is paradise, for we need only wish to understand, and it will come at once in all its beauty, and we shall embrace each other and weep … (299)

In Zinovij’s conversion, too, we observe a coincidence between the perception of God’s glorious nature and the voice of conscience. In this case, too, the perception of nature leads to the vision of an earthly paradise. Like Markel’s death, this is a key passage in the novel, which pursues theodicy via cosmodicy, i.e., it seeks to prove the existence and justice of God with the beauty of his creation.

Markel’s teaching that life is paradise and that every human being bears responsibility for everyone and for everything is also adopted by the “mysterious visitor,” about whom Zosima’s vita reports. This murderer driven by jealousy decides to admit his crime under the influence of Zinovij’s behavior. After he confesses his guilt for the murder to Zinovij, he comes to him again, this time with the intention of killing him, out of hatred and out of a desire to take revenge on him for everything – as he later admits – but he does not carry out his plan. On his deathbed, the mysterious visitor confesses that he did not refrain from the deed out of fear of punishment, but for another reason: “My Lord defeated the devil in my heart” (312). As later in Dmitrij’s decision not to murder his father, the non-execution of the planned act is a mental event, and in the context of the novel this is an action on the metaphysical level, a victorious struggle with the devil, or in earthly terms a struggle of conscience against resentment.

Not the colorless Alëša, not the pantheistic elder Zosima, is the secret central figure of the novel, but Ivan Karamazov, the intellectual who revolts against God and his final harmony. In his dialog with Smerdjakov, he rejects patricide but gives his subliminal consent, which the refined lackey understands very well. The agony of conscience triggers a nervous fever in Ivan, which is associated with hallucinations. In his nightmare, one of the highlights of the novel, he discusses with the bourgeois devil, who basically wants to join in the hosanna of the angelic hosts but is destined to deny by an earlier decision unknown to him. Ivan understands that this diabolus is nothing more than an embodiment of
himself, “but of just one side of me... of my thoughts and feelings, but only the most loathsome and stupid of them” (637). Nevertheless, his hallucinated counterpart, who mockingly confronts him with his own earlier and then discarded arguments, and the anecdote of a quadrillion kilometers that he had come up with at school, and the poem of geological upheaval written the previous year, makes him so angry that he throws his tea glass at him. The devil recalls Martin Luther, who threw an inkwell at him, and moans: “He considers me a dream and he throws glasses at a dream!” (649). This is where Dostoevskij’s interior dialog, i.e., a dialog carried out in a single consciousness, comes to its most extreme peak. Ivan’s conversation with the devil is interesting and amusing. In the words of the devil, the author plays with innumerable literary allusions (even to Lev Tolstoj) and voices controversial positions from the ideological discussions of his time.

The voice of Dostoevskij Contra is articulated most clearly in Ivan’s “rebellion” and in his “poem” on the Grand Inquisitor, in those chapters whose “atheism,” as the author boasted to the critic Kavelin, “exceeds in strength anything expressed in Europe” (PSS, XXVII, 86).

The usual reception of Ivan’s revolt, manifested in countless treatises on the novel, must be corrected in two decisive points.

1. Ivan is not an atheist; he does not deny God’s existence, but rather he doubts it. Vacillating between pro and contra, he takes different positions in different parts of the story. But when he accepts the existence of God, he questions God’s justice and mercy and the perfection of his creation.111

2. By no means does Ivan postulate the infamous Everything is permitted. This dictum, to which everyone – including many interpreters – refers, is part of a conditional clause: If there is no immortality of the soul, then everything is permitted.112

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111 For the author, this was an intensification of opposition to God. The numerous interpreters who consider Ivan’s assumption of the existence of God (“It’s not God that I do not accept [...]”, it is this world of God’s, created by God, that I do not accept,” 235) to be the tactic of a disingenuous seducer should consider Dostoevskij’s letter to K. N. Pobedonoscev (from 1880, Chief Procurator of the Holy Synod of Russia) of May 19, 1879 (when the chapter had already been sent for printing). Dostoevskij writes that he has presented the current, stronger variant of blasphemy against God, which consists not in the negation of God’s existence but in the negation of his creation, the world of God and its meaning (PSS, XXXI, 66–67).

112 The conditionality of Everything is permitted is clear from Miusov’s rendition of Ivan’s ideas and is affirmed by Ivan himself. Cf. Ivan’s laconic formula: “There is no virtue if there is no immortality” (70). Even Smerdjakov confirms the conditionality of Ivan’s statement: after the
Ivan’s argument in the chapter *Rebellion* is that the suffering of the world, especially the suffering of innocent children, is too high a price to pay for the divine harmony that occurs at the end of the world. He does not accept this harmony, for which the suffering of the children serves as “manure” (244) and allows himself to return his ticket to the creator. Out of love for humanity, he rejects the final harmony bought with the suffering of innocent children.

Love for mankind is also the Grand Inquisitor’s argument. God has created man too weakly for him to be able to demand with good reason a decision for himself that is free, that is not facilitated by miracles, mystery, and authority. Out of love for the weak, the few that are strong organize the happiness of the masses by relieving them of the unduly heavy burden of free choice. Taking upon themselves the curse of knowledge of good and evil, the few sacrifice their eternal happiness for the earthly happiness of the many, for whom the afterlife, if there is one, is not intended anyway.

If we now take Ivan’s rebellion together with the accusation of the Grand Inquisitor and continue it beyond the explicit wording, the following criticism of God by the abstract author Dostoevskij Contra results: God has given man the freedom of decision, but demanded too much of him with this freedom, because he has endowed man too weakly with his Euclidean intellect; if God nevertheless demands to be recognized, this happens out of unchristian motives, out of mere self-love, out of vanity.

In these two sections, we have seen Dostoevskij’s plea for the unconditional freedom of faith as a choice. Just as he only accepts the free and autonomous decision of the perpetrator as pertinent to the crime and systematically excludes all relativizing circumstances, so he rejects any rational reasons for faith as a choice. The value of freedom necessitates that what is absurd for the Euclidean mind stands in the way of the decision for God. Of all the absurdities, in Ivan’s accusation of God Dostoevskij chooses the one that is most difficult for himself to bear, the suffering of the innocent children.

However, even Ivan, the critic of God, is capable of inner transformation. He too hears the voice of conscience and can enjoy nature. The power of conscience is already witnessed by Ivan’s rescue of the peasant whom he had

murder, he accuses Ivan of having taught him that “if there’s no infinite God, then there’s no virtue either, and no need of it at all” (632). The misleading elision of the conditional clause is common practice in the literature on *The Brothers Karamazov*.
pushed into the snow, reckoning that he would freeze to death. But there is an even stronger indication of conscience intervening. In Ivan’s split consciousness, the author stages the revolt of conscience against theory – as he does in Crime and Punishment. Alëša (the moral compass of the entire novel and mouthpiece of Dostoevskij Pro) is able to diagnose Ivan’s illness: “The torments of a proud decision, a deep conscience!” (655). In this respect, Ivan’s incipient insanity opens up the possibility of inner reversal.

The second motif, finding joy in nature, manifests itself, albeit only in its minimal form, in Ivan’s confession before Alëša that he loves the “sticky spring leaves,” the “blue sky” (230). The “sticky spring leaves” are, of course, a reminiscence of Puškin’s poem “Still the cold winds blow” (1828). Ivan’s love of nature is – in addition to the limited scope of its object, the leaves – also somewhat relativized by its literariness. But that is how Ivan is: he loves nature in its literary representation. Ivan then explains that this love is not about the mind, not logic, but about the whole inner being. And when Alëša affirms that one should love life more than the meaning of life, Ivan listens to him slightly amused (“You’re already saving me” [231]), but quite open-minded.

However, there can be no question of Ivan going through a “transformation from an atheist to a believing Christian” (Gerigk 2013, 262). Both states assumed thereby are incorrectly described. As already explained above, Ivan is by no means an atheist, but of all the characters in the novel he is most interested in transcendence and in life after death, and he has not yet been made a “believing Christian” by the voice of conscience appearing in him. Ivan’s transformation in the novel is only beginning; it seems to be possible, but its results remain uncertain. For Ivan’s spiritual fate, the clairvoyant Alëša, equipped with authorial command of truth, predicts two possible outcomes: “He will either rise into the light of truth, or… perish in hatred, taking revenge on himself and everyone for having served something he does not believe in” (655).

Kolja Krasotkin, the fourteen-year-old admirer of Ivan, shows some similarities with his role model. The precocious socialist commits terrible pranks out of a craving for prestige and self-love. So he plays badly with the seriously ill Il’juša. Plagued by his conscience, he tries to make up for the damage and subsequently becomes an ardent follower of Alëša.

In Alëša’s encounter with Grušen’ka, in the meeting of the two axiological antagonists of the novel’s world, a twofold, reciprocal transformation
takes place. Alëša, who after Zosima’s death is ready to rebel against his God, goes with Rakitin, the godless seminarian, to the well-known sinner in the expectation of finding “a wicked soul,” but, as he then states, he finds a “true sister,” a “loving soul” who raises up his own soul again (351). As soon as the seductress, who had long intended to “eat” the pure youth, learns of Alëša’s grief, she jumps up from his knees, where she was sitting.

Grušen’ka, who awaits her Polish seducer with thoughts of revenge, acknowledges that Alëša “wrung [her] heart” (357). By sparing Alëša, the pure young man, she gives him an “onion,” that is, she performs that act of mercy and love which, however small its meaning, according to the legend, opens the kingdom of heaven to even the worst sinner. And since Alëša does not despise her, but treats her with respect, he in turn gives her “an onion, one little onion” (357).

Rakitin, who observes the double conversion with wrath, mocks: “Look at them – both senseless! [...] It’s crazy, I feel like I’m in a madhouse. They’ve both gone soft, they’ll start crying in a minute!” (352). Alëša overcomes his grief and becomes ready for the “Cana of Galilee.” The vengeful Grušen’ka, however, is ready to forgive her corrupter and becomes capable of selfless love for Dmitrij and of living together with him, wherever the judgment of the court might banish him.

Rakitin, who – like other negative characters in the novel (old Karamazov, even Smerdjakov, and last but not least the devil in Ivan’s nightmare) – is allowed to make telling remarks, hits the truth with his derisive questions again here: “So you converted a sinful woman? [...] Turned a harlot onto the path of truth? Drove out the seven devils, eh?” (358).

Ivan’s argument of the suffering children is regarded as pretentious by his critics among literary scholars, especially Christian ones, as if Ivan did not care about the children at all, as if the theorist was not interested in man and his suffering.113 And it is pointed out that Ivan’s suffering children, mis-

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113 One of these critics is Igor’ Vinogradov (1996), who, in an attempt to refute a lecture I gave on Dostoevskij’s Nadryv, concludes that the Brothers Karamazov is “the most Christian novel in world literature.” This judgment is in the tradition of the Christian interpretation of Dostoevskij’s works, which was revived in the post-Communist period in Russia and was inspired by Vladimir Zaxarov, professor at the University of Petrozavodsk, editor of Dostoevskij’s works in pre-revolutionary orthography and currently president of the International Dostoevskij Society. Zaxarov coined the term Christian realism for Dostoevskij’s novels (cf. Terras [1981] 2002, x).
used by him as an argument, are opposed in the novel to other motifs involving children that demonstrate exemplary Christian attitudes in the face of suffering. Grigorij, the servant of old Karamazov, does not quarrel with the Lord God after the death of his only child, but devotes himself to reading religious texts and finds particular edification in the Book of Job. The suffering and death of little Il’juša are not the slightest cause for doubt of faith for the pious Alëša and the twelve boys who accompany him to the funeral.

In the ideological design of the novel, Ivan’s theoretical argument is above all opposed to Dmitrij’s practical action, or more precisely to the intention to act at which he arrives in a dream. After Dmitrij has been questioned in the court hearing, Grušen’ka makes a statement that is very uplifting for him. While the court is editing the transcript, Dmitrij, who is tired, falls asleep on a chest. He has a “strange sort of dream, somehow entirely out of place and out of time” (507): he is driving through the wintry steppe with a peasant in a cart with a pair of horses. In one village they pass, the huts are black, half of them burnt down. At the edge of the village, there are peasant women standing along the road. They are all thin and emaciated, and they have strangely brown faces. One of them is carrying a crying child in her arms, and her breasts, so Dmitrij supposes, must be completely dried up, they cannot provide another drop of milk. And the baby is crying, crying, reaching out its bare little arms, its little fists that are blue from the cold. “Why are they crying,” Dmitrij asks the driver. “The wee one [in Russian: дитё, […] it’s the wee one crying” (507). Dmitrij is struck that the driver has said in his peasant way “the wee one,” and not “the baby.” And he likes it that the peasant has said “wee one.” There is more pity in it. He asks more questions and reacts dismissively to the sober answers.

The death of children, a recurrent motif in the novel, is compensated for by their privilege in the hereafter. Zosima mitigates the pain of the inconsolable mother who has lost her three-year-old Aleksej, the last remaining of her four children, with the testimony of an old saint, according to whom the early deceased are the “boldest” in heaven. They argue that God has taken away the life he gave them so early that he has to make them angels. The Lord, Zosima says, grants this to the “bold” askers and beggars immediately, and so the mother should know that her child is now likely to be standing before the throne of the Lord and be glad and rejoicing. Dostoëvskij, who had lost his three-year-old son Aleksej in 1878, tried to comfort himself with this pious legend.
The answers to these questions come from within Dmitrij. We have arrived here at a key ideological point in the novel. Ivan’s theorizing, nourished by Western philosophies, is here – in the intention of Dostoevskij Pro – trumped by Dmitrij’s emotional call to action:

[...] he [...] feels a tenderness such as he has never known before surging up in his heart, he wants to weep, he wants to do something for them all, so that the wee one will no longer cry, so that the blackened, dried-up mother of the wee one will not cry either, so that there will be no more tears in anyone from that moment on, and it must be done at once, at once, without delay and despite everything, with all his Karamazov restraint. (508)

It is characteristic of the generally marked representation of consciousness in this novel that Dmitrij’s surging emotions are portrayed in syntactically disciplined, narratorial indirect representation.

It is also characteristic of the novel that the emotional climax of the dream, which will determine Dmitrij’s further life, moves from a projected foreign direct discourse (_) to a consciousness report with a clearly figural spatial orientation (_) to end in FID (\text{FID}):

“And I am with you, too, I won’t leave you now, I will go with you for the rest of my life,” the dear, deeply felt words of Grušen’ka came from somewhere near him. And his whole heart blazed up [загорелось все сердце его] and turned towards some sort of light, and he wanted to live and live, to go on and on along some path, towards the new, beckoning light, and to hurry, hurry, right now, at once! (508)

The metaphor of the burning heart and the image of the light that the burning heart strives towards point with their strongly religious impact\textsuperscript{115} to the change in Dmitrij’s way of life that is now beginning. The prerequisites for this ethical \textit{metabolé} are, on the one hand, compassion for the black mothers and the starving children and, on the other hand, Grušen’ka’s loving words of solidarity.

\textsuperscript{115} The burning heart recalls the Emmaus meeting in Lk, 24, 32: “не горело ли в нас сердце наше?” – “Did not our heart burn within us?” (King James Version).
Dmitrij’s conversion does not come out of nowhere. Throughout the story, he has repeatedly shown signs of his capacity for compassion and love. In the chapter *The Confession of an Ardent Heart. In Verse*, he confesses to his brother Alëša that he loves only him and a “low woman” (104). Before quoting Schiller’s *Ode to Joy* in the same chapter, he breaks out in praise of nature: “Let us praise nature: see how the sun is shining, how clear the sky is, the leaves are all green” (104). Two further symptoms of his readiness to convert are that he does not take advantage of his successful attempt to blackmail Katerina Ivanovna and simply lets her go with his money, and that when he learns of Grušen’ka’s supposed reunion with her old lover, he does not want to stand in the way of her happiness and even celebrates it with her and his apparently more successful rival.

11.3.5 Eventfulness and Philosophy

The chain of conversions is based on the conviction that everyone is guilty of everything and before everyone. This is contrasted in the novel by an additional chain whose principle is expressed in the formula *Everything is permitted*. This formula is, as has been explained above, part of a conditional proposition in Ivan’s statements: *If there is no immortality of the soul, then everything is permitted*. As it is passed on (not only between the characters of the novel, but also between its interpreters), the qualification of this sentence, which makes perfect sense and is theologically incontestable in the religious horizon of the novel, is lost, and the formula that perverts its meaning – *Everything is permitted* – appears instead. Ivan himself would never have thought of this reduction, since he is the only figure in the novel who is interested in transcendence. He does not deny God’s existence, but demands from him justice and consideration for the weakness of human nature.

We also observe a high level of eventfulness in the evil acts of the novel. In Dostoevskij’s world, the criminal commits a crime consciously and intentionally, in a complete freedom of choice that is not relativized by anything, neither by hereditary factors nor by the environment nor by psycho-physical insanity.

There is also a chain reaction in the negative actions: starting with Ivan’s rebellious ideas, which many consider blasphemous, this chain connects Rakitin, Smerdjakov, and the Grand Inquisitor. However, one must bear in
mind that in the course of the narrated story and its prehistory, Ivan formulates four different texts (the **Canonical Treatise**, the **Poem of the Grand Inquisitor**, **The Geological Cataclysm**, and the legend **One Quadrillion Kilometers**). In them, he expresses many different ideas. In contrast to his adepts, who commit themselves to a single position, believing that this is Ivan’s authentic and definitive conviction, Ivan himself is a mobile figure, oscillating between extreme ideological poles.

What can be concluded from the possibility of profound events for the philosophy of this last novel by Dostoevskij? According to the message that Dostoevskij Pro gives to the novel, the condition for a positive event is belief in the immortality of the soul. The novel is intended to illustrate that man can overcome his characterological and ethical limits, but only if he believes in the immortality of the soul. Faith brings forth a new man. According to the concept of the novel, conscience and love are the threads that connect man with transcendence. The voice of conscience and love are thus infallible, absolute signposts. All attempts to build ethics on earthly, non-religious principles are, according to the conviction of Dostoevskij Pro, doomed to failure, because without faith in eternity, man does not have the strength for brotherhood. Even Ivan expresses the conviction that love on earth exists not because of a law of nature but only because people believe in immortality (69). The possibility of virtue without believing in the immortality of the soul is defended in the novel only by the amoral seminarian Rakitin.

On the other hand, the maximal eventfulness of the novel gives it an unmistakably immanentist touch from a theological point of view. It is no coincidence that Zosima draws an utopian picture of this world in which, if the judgment of the Church came, “perhaps crimes themselves would indeed diminish at an incredible rate” (65). That sounds like utopian socialism and has not met with the enthusiasm of the Christian churches. And it is no coincidence that the conversion events in the novel are accompanied by the heterodox conviction of their bearers that “life is a paradise.”

In this context, one should not overlook the fact that the attitudes of mind and soul propagated by Dostoevskij Pro are ultimately not so much directed towards transcendence as towards this world. The love for God’s creation and the praise of its beauty, as expressed above all by Zosima, bear in this novel traits of a Franciscan immanentism, even a pantheism, that ultimately abolishes the opposition between this world and the next. In the
newly won faith of the dying Markel, God does not so much figure as a transcendent being, but rather exists in the good, in the love and beauty in which he shows himself.

We find ourselves here at the origin of the great ambiguity of Dostoevskij’s last novel: its mental events presuppose belief in transcendence. And for Dostoevskij, transcendence must already manifest itself in this world. If in his dream of the “wee one,” Dmitrij “wants to do something for them all, so that the wee one will no longer cry,” this decision for practical action is opposed in the novel’s conceptual framework to the blasphemous conclusions that the theorist Ivan draws from the suffering of the children. But Dmitrij’s decision, like the astonishing transformation of Markel, Zinovij, and the other characters, arises from nothing other than human compassion and love for people. If the event is possible solely on the basis of feeling, intuition, conscience, and love, then transcendence is either not necessary, or it merely figures as an abstract guarantee of the correctness of these movements of the soul.

Dostoevskij strove for a balance between religion and ethics, for a compatibility of transcendent and realistic motivation. In the search for this balance, he postulated the possibility of extreme eventfulness which, to use images from the novel, remains “a double-edged weapon” (29), “a stick with two ends” (725).

However hard Dostoevskij tried to reconcile hagiography with realism, to write a realistic vita and thus to realize realism ‘in a higher sense,’ in his novel the discrepancy between the transcendent and immanent foundations of the conversions remains unmistakable. This indecisiveness corresponds to the division of the abstract author into Dostoevskij Pro, who with all his might, in nadryvo,116 wants to believe and for whom Zosima and Aliëša speak

116 Nadryvo, explained by the dictionaries as “exaltation,” “overexertion,” is a basic psycho-ethical situation in Dostoevskij’s world, an intense moral attitude that contradicts an actual inclination, a form of pseudo-idealistic self-denial. The term is translated in several very different ways. In the Anglo-Saxon world, the terms rupture (such as Terras [1981] 2002, 82) or laceration (in the widely used translation by Constance Garnett, 1912, thoroughly revised by Ralph E. Matlaw in 1976) are used. The translation by Pevear and Volokhonsky used here translates nadryvo as “strain.” Swetlana Geier gives a brief outline of the meaning and history of the term, leaving it untranslated in her German translation of the novel, “since the German language offers no equivalent for the Russian expression” (Fjodor Dostojewskij, Die Brüder Karamasow, 1st ed. Zürich 2003, Frankfurt a. M. 2010, pp. 1215–1219). In most cases, Dostoevskij’s term nadryvo is best rendered with “overexertion,” “self-violation,” or – in German – with “Selbstvergewaltigung.” These translations fit well with Dostoevskij’s first use of the term in Devils (Besy; 1873), where
in the novel, and Dostoevskij Contra, tormented in the “crucible of doubts,” whose arguments and reservations are articulated by Ivan.\textsuperscript{117}

The often quoted passage from Dostoevskij’s letter to Mrs Fonvizina of 1854 is also suspicious of nadryv: “If someone proved to me that Christ is outside the truth, and if it were really so that the truth is outside Christ, I would rather stay with Christ than with the truth” (PSS, XXVIII/1, 176). In the same letter, Dostoevskij described himself as a “child of the century, child of unbelief and doubt,” and confessed that the “thirst for faith” caused him terrible torment, but that the more counter-arguments he had, the stronger it was in his soul.

A biographical speculation may be permitted at the end of this chapter: Are we to take the attitude of nadryv as alien to the author who with extreme psychological subtlety traces ‘overexertion’ in various characters of his novel and behind all kinds of idealisms, and exposes its mental mechanisms with great plausibility? Can we not instead understand nadryv as the formula to which the whole novel as theodicy is indebted? Can we not see in the consistently catechetical logic of the narrated story an overexertion on the part of its author, who, in truth close to Ivan, suppresses his own doubts and his own accusation of God, denies the power of reason, and propagates with all his might an intuitive faith that he himself was perhaps not capable of? Does Dostoevskij’s metaphysical faith itself not have that volitional, violent quality that the author imputes to Ivan’s rebellion, and is this faith not infinitely far from that utopian, cheerful certainty of faith that characterizes the Franciscan pantheism of Zosima? I would be inclined to say that Dostoevskij, who diagnoses nadryv in a number of characters in his novel, commits nadryv himself in his absolute will to faith.

\textsuperscript{117} Šatov charges his former idol Stavrogin with having married the feeble-minded Marija Lebjadkina out of emotional lechery, motivated by nadryv (X, 202). In The Brothers Karamazov, nadryv becomes paradigmatic. The fourth book, which bears this word as its title, shows a whole series of nadryvy, secular and spiritual, “in the drawing room,” “in the cottage,” “and in the fresh air,” as the last three chapters of the book are called.

\textsuperscript{117} In the drafts for the Diary of a Writer (Dnevnik pisatel’ja; February 1881), Dostoevskij asserts that he does not believe in Christ like a little boy, that his hosanna has gone “through a great crucible of doubt” (PSS, XXVII, 86), as the devil puts it in the novel (642).
Count Lev Tolstoj spent his life from 1828 to 1910, apart from two journeys to Western Europe, in Moscow and on the estate of his parents, Jasnaja Poljana. After early contact with the Petersburg literary salons, he kept himself away from the cultural life of the two capitals. His work has its intellectual sources in the Western European eighteenth century, in the ethicism of the Enlightenment, in the anti-conventionalism of Rousseau, and in descriptive sentimentalism of the Sterne type. The heir of these grandfathers was critical of the canon of his fathers, the Romantic poetics of the early nineteenth century: “Tolstoj began as a liquidator of Romantic poetics” (Ėjxenbaum [1920] 1924, 67).

Tolstoj’s oeuvre is characterized by the tension between ethics and aesthetics. The oscillation between the two functions explains the recurring “cri ses” in his life, which on the one hand initiate a turn away from literature and a turn to useful activity, pedagogical theology, and moral-religiously edifying literature, but on the other hand also repeatedly allow a return to the most focused artistic work. The contradiction in Tolstoj’s relationship to art was described by Thomas Mann, who did not hesitate to call the moralism of the “great poet of Russia” a “giant clumsiness” (eine Riesentölpel): “This wondrous saint took art all the more seriously, the less he believed in it” (Mann, IX, 632). The tension between aesthetics and ethics is also manifested in the structure of the literary works themselves, in the sequence of meticulously detailed descriptions and moral generalizations, in the antagonism of narrative and philosophical reflection, in the conflict between contemplation and didacticism.

From the first diary sketch Yesterday’s story (Istorija včerašnego dnja, 1851) to the last, unfinished story Xadži Murat (1896–1904), Tolstoj cultivates the

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118 On Tolstoj’s connection with the literature of European sentimentalism, see Ėjxenbaum (1922).
artistic concept of “defamiliarization” (ostranenie; term from Viktor Šklovskij 1917, cf. Schmid 2005b). The defamiliarized things can be insignia such as a banner (“a stick with a piece of cloth”); symbols such as the eucharistic bread; cultural institutions such as the opera, the court, the Church; or abstract concepts such as bravery or property. The device of defamiliarization, motivated by the gaze of the uninitiated, always calls for a re-vision of the convention, which appears to be unnatural and hostile to life.

Tolstoj’s anti-conventionalism is particularly evident in the central themes that run through his work. These include love and marriage, which are treated with – from the early Family happiness (Semejnoe sčast’e, 1859), through Anna Karenina (1878), to the gloomy Kreutzer Sonata (Krejcerova sonata, 1891) – an increasingly rigorous condemnation of sexual love.

After Childhood (Detsvo, 1852), the first part of his autobiographical trilogy, in which he tested defamiliarizing observation and self-observation and generalizing reflection, Tolstoj gave a depiction of the “truth” of war, freed from all literary conventions, in the Caucasus stories (1852–1853) and in the Sevastopol sketches (1855–1856). Defamiliarizing descriptions of battles, motivated by the civilian’s point of view, occupy a large space in the historical epopee War and Peace (Vojna i mir, 1868–1869), and in the late Xadži Murat, Tolstoj returned to the Caucasian War.

From the death of the mother in Childhood to the parable Three Deaths (Tri smerti, 1856), the haunting depictions of the deaths of Andrej Bolkonskij in War and Peace and Nikolaj Levin in Anna Karenina, to The Death of Ivan Il’ič (Smert’ Ivana Il’iča, 1886), Tolstoy occupied himself with the theme of death, which he feared as the annulment of all truths, all meaning, and from which he nonetheless sought to wrest a meaning.

The simultaneous life and work of the two great writers Dostoevskij and Tolstoj, who never met each other and never exchanged letters, has repeatedly provoked comparisons under the sign of great juxtapositions such as

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119 The war sketch Sevastopol in May (Sevastopol’ v mae, 1855) ends with an emphatic authorial commitment to truth: “The hero of my story, whom I love with all the strength of my soul, whom I tried to portray in all his beauty and who has always been beautiful, is beautiful and will always remain beautiful, is the truth” (Tolstoj, PSS, IV, 59).

120 In his memoirs, Maksim Gor’kij passes on the following statement by Tolstoj: “Once man has learned to think, he may think what he wants, he thinks only of death. What truths are there when death must be?” (Gorki 1926–1950, XIII, 47).
soul and body or spirit and flesh. Regardless of all the contrasts that exist between these two great figures of Russian realism, they are united by a trait that is crucial for the theme of this book. That is their belief in the ability of man to change. In their works, man appears as capable of transcending his character and moral boundaries. This is an image of the human being that post-realistic modernism, such as that embodied by Anton Čexov, is extremely skeptical of. A second important thing that the two antagonists have in common can be seen in the fact that, in their narrative art, they strive to provide universal answers to the great questions of existence and ultimately, for all their apparent authorial resolve, show themselves to be doubters and seekers.

These two great writers are generally regarded as philosophers and psychologists. Idea and consciousness, the two main themes of Russian realism, are shaped by them in different ways. Tolstoj is the psychologist of the everyday situation, Dostoevskij the psychologist of the border situation. Tolstoj crafts the psychology of character, Dostoevskij the psychology of the idea. In Tolstoj’s work, consciousness has a temporal structure, develops in a sequence of different states of mind, under the influence of the external situation in any given case and bearing the mark of changing ideas. In Dostoevskij’s work, consciousness has a spatial structure in which opposing movements and conflicting positions of meaning are simultaneously effective.121 While Tolstoj explores the ‘dialectics of the soul,’ Dostoevskij explores the ‘dialogicity of the idea.’ For Dostoevskij, the primary and identity-forming element is the idea, which, not conditioned by external influences, takes possession of the heroes and spreads from hero to hero, as can be observed in the chain reaction of conversions in the Brothers Karamazov. For Tolstoj, the primary and identity-forming factor is the personality that is formed through life experience and can accept and discard different ideas.

121 On the contrast between Dostoevskij’s spatial and Tolstoj’s temporal conception of consciousness, see Caryl Emerson’s ([1984] 1989) reconstruction of Mixail Baxtin’s modeling of the opposition between the two authors.
In *War and Peace*, there are two central male characters, who are in many respects opposites to each other: the coolly distanced and intellectually rational aristocratic Prince Andrej Bolkonskij, and the good-natured, warm-hearted, and somewhat unstable Pierre Bezuxov, who was born out of wedlock but has become the heir to a large fortune and bearer of the title of Count. Despite their contrasting personalities, the two have a special relationship to each other in three respects: (1) they are good friends and as such are introduced as early as in the first scene of the novel; (2) they successively become partners of Nataša Rostova, the novel’s central female figure; and (3) they are mobile heroes, representing Tolstoj’s seeker-of-meaning character type.

### 12.2.1 Andrej Bolkonskij

A personal letter from the author shows that the figure of Andrej Bolkonskij was only developed in the process of writing, as a reaction to the demands of sujet construction. On 3 May 1865, Tolstoj replied to L. I. Volkonskaja, a relative who had asked who Andrej Bolkonskij was:

> I hurry to do the impossible for you, namely to answer your question. Andrej Bolkonskij is no one, like any character of a novelist [...] But I will try to say who my Andrej is. In the Battle of Austerlitz, which is still to be described but with which I began the novel, I needed the motif of a brilliant young man’s death; in the further course of the novel, I only needed the old Bolkonskij and his daughter. But since it is clumsy to describe a character that is not at all connected with the novel, I decided to make the brilliant young man the son of the old Bolkonskij. Then he began to interest me, another role in the novel was found for him, and I pardoned him by wounding him badly instead of death. So that, dear Princess, is my completely truthful, if perhaps unclear, explanation of who Bolkonskij is. (Tolstoj, *PSS*, LXI, 80)

Before the Battle of Austerlitz, Bolkonskij confesses his ambition to himself. Tomorrow is supposed to be his “Toulon,” the battle in which he will prove his abilities in a first test, like Napoleon did in the battle near the French town. In the interior monologue, which alternates between the direct and
FID modes, a second voice is also heard. Andrej justifies his thirst for fame before this voice, representing an inner judge, and he arrives at an admission that represents a profound mental event:

“Yes, tomorrow, tomorrow!” He thought. “Tomorrow maybe everything will be over for me […] Tomorrow maybe – even certainly, I have a presentiment of it – for the first time I’ll finally have to show all I can do.” And he imagined the battle, its loss, the concentration of the fighting at one point, and the bewilderment of all the superiors. And here that happy moment, that Toulon he has so long awaited, finally presents itself to him. He voices his opinion firmly and clearly to Kutuzov and Weyrother, and to the emperors. All are struck by the correctness of his thinking, but no one undertakes to carry it out, and here he takes a regiment, a division, negotiates the condition that no one interfere with his instructions, and leads his division to the decisive point, and alone wins the victory. “And death and suffering?” says another voice. But Prince Andrej does not respond to that voice and goes on with his successes. The disposition for the next battle he does alone. He bears the title of an officer on duty in Kutuzov’s army, but he does everything alone. He alone wins the next battle. Kutuzov is replaced, he is appointed . . . “Well, and then?” the other voice says again. “And then, if you’re not wounded, killed, or deceived ten times over – well, then what?” “Well, then . . .” Prince Andrej answers himself, “I don’t know what will happen then, I don’t want to know and I can’t know; but if I want this, want glory, want to be known by people, want to be loved by them, it’s not my fault that I want it, that’s the only thing I want, the only thing I live for. Yes, the only thing! I’ll never tell it to anyone, but my God! What am I to do if I love nothing except glory, except people’s love? Death, wounds, loss of family, nothing frightens me. And however near and dear many people are to me – my father, my sister, my wife – the dearest people to me – but, however terrible and unnatural it seems, I’d give them all now for a moment of glory, of triumph over people, for love from people I don’t know and will never know, for the love of these people here,” he thought, listening to the talk in Kutuzov’s yard. (264–265)\(^\text{122}\)

Bolkonskij is injured at the Battle of Austerlitz, but he does not immediately admit it. Lying on his back, no longer able to follow the battle, he is given a new view and thus a new insight, which forms a further stage in his mental event:

There was nothing over him now except the sky – the lofty sky, not clear, but still immeasurably lofty, with grey clouds slowly creeping across it. “How quiet, calm, and solemn, not at all like when I was running,” thought Prince Andrej, “not like when we were running, shouting, and fighting; […] it’s quite different the way the clouds creep across this lofty, infinite sky. How is it I haven’t seen this lofty sky before? And how happy I am that I’ve finally come to know it. Yes! Everything is empty, everything is a deception, except this infinite sky. There is nothing. Nothing except that. But there is not even that, there is nothing except silence, tranquility. And thank God!…” (281)

The next stage in Bolkonskij’s mental development is his reaction to his encounter with Napoleon, his former idol, who is looking at his enemies lying on the battlefield. The scene contains an important experience for Bolkonskij, which he will remember several times during the course of the novel. Nevertheless, the author refrains from a strongly figural presentation and allows his narrator to present the hero’s perceptions, feelings, and desires in a narratorial report of consciousness (underlined) and in the indirect presentation of thoughts and perceptions (italics):

“Voilà une belle mort,” said Napoleon, looking at Bolkonskij. *Prince Andrej understood that it had been said about him, and that it was Napoleon speaking. He heard the man who had said these words being addressed as sire. But he heard these words as if he was hearing the buzzing of a fly. He not only was not interested, he did not even notice, and at once forgot them. He had a burning in his head; he felt that he was losing blood, and he saw above him that distant, lofty, and eternal sky. He knew that it was Napoleon – his hero – but at that moment, Napoleon seemed to him such a small, insignificant man compared with what was now happening between his soul and his lofty, infinite sky with clouds racing across it. To him it was all completely the same at that moment who was standing over him or what he said about him; he was only glad that people had stopped over him and only wished that those people would help*
him and bring him back to life, which seemed so beautiful to him, because he now understood it so differently. (291)

The unmistakable narratorial coloring of this passage and its unmistakable interpretative accents correspond to the fact that the relativization of the great man and his influence on world history is not so much the intention of the character Andrej Bolkonskij but above all the concern of the author, whose philosophy of history permeates the novel. In this respect, one can also trace the authorial intention behind the narratorial presentation.

When Bolkonskij is brought to the first-aid station, Napoleon sees him again and asks him about his condition. Bolkonskij does not answer:

To him at that moment all the interests that occupied Napoleon seemed so insignificant, his hero himself seemed so petty to him, with his petty vanity and joy in victory, compared with that lofty, just, and kindly sky, which he had seen and understood, that he was unable to answer him. (292–293)

Of particular importance for Bolkonskij’s development is one of his rare encounters with Bezuxov, the conversation on the ferry. Pierre talks to his older and in many ways superior friend about the meaning of life:

“If there is God and if there is a future life, then there is truth, there is virtue; and man’s highest happiness consists in striving to attain them. We must live, we must love, we must believe [...] that we do not live only today on this scrap of earth, but have lived and will live eternally there, in the all” (he pointed to the sky). (389)

Andrej reacts skeptically (“Yes, if only it were so”), according to his nature, but looks up to the sky to which Pierre has drawn his attention, and sees again, for the first time after Austerlitz, the “high eternal sky” he saw when he was lying on the battlefield. His mental reaction is presented in narratorial mode:

[...] something long asleep, something that was best in him, suddenly awakened joyful and young in his soul. This feeling disappeared as

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123 Bezuxov here argues similarly to Ivan Karamazov, who makes a secular ethics dependent on belief in the immortality of the soul (cf. section 11.3.4 above).
soon as Prince Andrej re-entered the habitual conditions of life, but he knew that this feeling, which he did not know how to develop, lived in him. The meeting with Pierre marked an epoch for Prince Andrej, from which began what, while outwardly the same, was in his inner world a new life. (389)

Together with two incidents, the conversation on the ferry is a key moment in Andrej’s mental development. The first of these incidents is the double encounter with the old oak (II, 3, 1 and II, 3, 3). First, the “angry, scornful, and ugly” tree with its “huge, gnarled, ungainly, unsymmetrically spread arms and fingers” awakens “hopeless but sadly pleasant” thoughts in Andrej (419). At the second encounter, the old oak tree has produced new shoots, and Andrej is overcome by a “springtime feeling of joy and renewal” (423). The second incident is Nataša’s chat with Sonja at night, to which Andrej becomes an involuntary and unnoticed listener (II, 3, 2). The girl, fascinated by the moonlit night, enchants Andrej with her desire to fly into the sky. Recalling the high sky of Austerlitz, the conversation with Pierre on the ferry, and the girl who wanted to fly into the sky, Andrej makes a decision:

“No, life isn’t over at the age of thirty-one,” Prince Andrej decided definitely, immutably. “It’s not enough that I know all that’s in me, everyone else must know it, too: Pierre, and that girl who wanted to fly into the sky, everyone must know me, so that my life is not only for myself; so that they don’t live like that girl, independent of my life, but so that it is reflected in everyone, and they all live together with me!” (423)

For all his apparent selflessness, Andrej’s decision for life is unmistakably borne by the egocentricity to which he confessed in his admission of his craving for fame quoted above.

Summing up his Petersburg life of the last four months, during which he worked on a military statute for the Tsar’s personal state secretary, Mixail Speranskij, and participated in many meetings, and on the other hand drafted reforms for the peasants in the village, Bolkonskij comes to a sobering conclusion: “he felt astonished that he could have been occupied with such idle work for so long” (466).

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124 The numbers indicate volume, part, and chapter.
A short time later, Andrej asks for Nataša’s hand. His father demands the postponement of the marriage for one year. During this time, Nataša, who has fallen for Anatole Kuragin, agrees to his elopement plan, and after it fails, she cancels her engagement with Bolkonskij.

Before the Battle of Borodino, in which he takes part as commander of a regiment, Bolkonskij for the first time imagines the possibility of death not in its effect on others, but in relation to himself:

He knew, that tomorrow’s battle was to be the most dreadful of all he had taken part in, and the possibility of death presented itself to him, for the first time in his life, with no relation to the everyday, with no considerations of how it would affect others, but only in relation to himself, to his soul, vividly, almost with certainty, simply, and terribly. And from the height of that picture, all that used to torment and occupy him was suddenly lit up by a cold, white light, without shadows, without perspective, without clear-cut outlines. The whole of life presented itself to him as a magic lantern, into which he had long been looking through a glass and in artificial light. Now he suddenly saw these badly daubed pictures without a glass, in bright daylight [...] – the clear notion of death. “There they are, those crudely daubed figures, which had presented themselves as something beautiful and mysterious. Glory, the general good, the love of a woman, the fatherland itself – how grand those pictures seemed to me, how filled with meaning! And it’s all so simple, pale, and crude in the cold, white light of the morning that I feel is dawning for me.” (769)

It is revealing for Tolstoj’s poetics that the mental process of disillusionment is presented in a very narratorial way, in narratorial indirect representation (___) and in a consciousness report (italics), and that even the direct discourse ( ) refers in the lexis, syntax, and language functions more to the narrator than to the character. Tolstoj’s personal testimonies allow the conclusion that Bolkonskij is here expressing the thoughts of the author.

Without any illusions, Andrej also recalls his feelings for Nataša: “Oh, you dear boy!” (770). At the thought of Napoleon brushing aside the life and work of his father, of which he knew nothing, it occurs to him that his sister sees all this as a trial sent from on high:
Why a trial, when he’s no more and never will be? Never will be again? He’s no more! So for whom is it a trial? The fatherland, the destruction of Moscow! And tomorrow I’ll be killed [...] and the French will come, take me by the feet and head, and fling me into a pit, so as not to have me stink under their noses, and new conditions of life will take shape, which will become habitual for other people, and I won’t know about them, and I won’t be there. (770)

What is interesting here is the transition from free indirect mode ( ) to direct mode ( ), which corresponds to Bolkonskij’s insight that the victim here is not man as such, but he himself.

In the battle, Bolkonskij is indeed seriously wounded. Although warned by the adjutant, out of pride he did not throw himself to the ground. He realizes that this is his death, and at that moment he thinks of his love of life. And at the dressing station, he thinks: “Why was I so sorry to part with life? There was something in this life that I didn’t and still don’t understand…” (812).

On the neighboring table, he recognizes an officer whose leg is being amputated as Anatole Kuragin, and he is filled with compassion for his one-time rival. After the suffering he has endured, Andrej is deeply moved and breaks out in tender, loving tears “over the people, over himself, and over their and his own errors”:

Compassion, love for our brothers, for those who love us, love for those who hate us, love for our enemies – yes, that love which God preached on earth, which Princess Mar’ja taught me, and which I didn’t understand; that’s why I was sorry about life, that’s what was still left for me, if I was to live. But now it’s too late. I know it! (814)

 Seriously wounded, Andrej leaves Moscow in the retinue of the Rostovs without knowing it. He experiences a spiritual change. It occurs to him that he now has a new happiness and that this happiness has something to do with the gospel:

“Yes, a new happiness was revealed to me, inalienable from man,” he thought, lying in the quiet semi-dark cottage and looking straight ahead with a feverishly wide, fixed gaze. “A happiness that is beyond
material forces, beyond external material influences on man, a happiness of the soul alone, the happiness of love! [...] Yes, love” (he thought again with perfect clarity), “but not the love that loves for something, for some purpose, or for some reason, but the love I experienced for the first time when, as I lay dying, I saw my enemy and loved him all the same. [...] Now [...] I am experiencing that blissful feeling. To love my neighbors, to love my enemies. To love everything – to love God in all his manifestations. You can love a person dear to you with a human love, but an enemy can only be loved with divine love. That’s why I experienced such joy when I felt that I loved that man. What’s become of him? Is he alive… Loving with a human love, one can pass from love to hatred; but divine love cannot change. Nothing, not even death, nothing can destroy it. It is the essence of the soul. But I’ve hated so many people in my life. And of all people, I have loved and hated no one so much as her.” And he vividly pictured Nataša to himself, not as he had pictured her before, with her loveliness alone, which brought him joy; but for the first time he pictured her soul. And he understood her feeling, her suffering, shame, repentance. For the first time now he understood all the cruelty of his refusal, saw the cruelty of his break with her. “If it were possible to see her just one more time. One time, looking into those eyes, to say…” (921)

Through his hallucinations of fever, Andrej actually sees the pale face and shining eyes of the real Nataša, who has secretly come to his bed. Andrej realizes that this is the living, real Nataša, and declares his love for her. From that day until his death, Nataša never leaves him.

Dying, however, Andrej internally withdraws more and more from life. His gaze at the people closest to him, Nataša and Mar’ja, is described by the narrator as “cold, almost hostile” (979). He is alienated from everything in this world:

He clearly had difficulty now in understanding anything living; but at the same time it could be felt that he did not understand the living, not because he lacked the power of understanding, but because he understood something else, such as the living could not understand, and which absorbed him entirely. (979)
From the position of an observer, the narrator enters the interior of the dying man, who is trying with great effort to return to life and put himself in the position of those close to him. He is tempted to comfort his relatives with the biblical simile of the birds that neither sow nor reap, but he gives this up because he realizes that they cannot understand him, they cannot understand that all the feelings they value are “unnecessary” (981). It would be wrong to see in the biblical quotation a conversion of the dying skeptic to faith. The two women would have understood a Christian message “in their own way.” But the boundary experience in which concern loses its meaning, an experience that annuls all meaning, cannot be communicated to the living: “He experienced an awareness of estrangement from everything earthly and a joyful lightness of being” (982).

For Andrej, withdrawal from life is connected with overcoming the fear of death and with the unfolding of an eternal, free love that is independent of this life. It is this abstract all-love, not directed towards a person, which he already had in the tent hospital of Borodino when he saw the seriously wounded Anatole Kuragin on the neighboring stretcher, that overcomes him again in his feverish shivers in the Rostovs’ retinue.

Andrej’s development is controversial among interpreters. There is a tendency to see Andrej’s rational nature as being overcome by Nataša, who awakens feelings in him. Käte Hamburger ([1950] 1963, 65), on the other hand, has quite convincingly asserted that “precisely the attempt to break through to the human” reveals the “nature of this man, whose destiny must be fulfilled according to the law inherent in him.” And that law is a lack of empathy and a lack of understanding for the feelings of others, which made him lose the love of Nataša. Hamburger (118) also convincingly demonstrates how Tolstoj’s very abstract idea of love does not refer to concrete people, but ultimately only has the meaning of overcoming the fear of death. It is this all-love postulated by the author that fills Andrej Bolkonskij in the expectation of death and with which the author himself seeks to overcome his own fear of death.

12.2.2 Dying

Tolstoj is a great depicter of dying. Even at the age of twenty-four, Tolstoj writes thoughts about death as a natural “change” in his diary. In *Childhood*, he describes the fear of death that oppresses the hero when he is confronted
with the dead body of his grandmother. In the small trilogy *Three Deaths*, he compares the death of a tree, a peasant, and a noble landlady. The tree dies in the most dignified and beautiful way, “beautiful, because it does not lie, does not make a fuss, does not fear or regret anything,” as the author writes in a letter from the time (quoted from Wedel 1973a, 9564). The death of the noblewoman is unworthy and ugly in its hypocrisy. Tolstoj’s ideology of naturalness, according to which nature is the appropriate religion, suggests the paradoxical conclusion that the tree is the ideal of man. There is no trace here of the Christian message that death is the threshold to a new, eternal life.

Tolstoj moves away from his vitalist view of death as a mere change of state in the cycle of nature after experiencing the agonizing death of his brother Nikolaj (which he then translates into art as the description of the death of Konstantin Levin’s brother Nikolaj in *Anna Karenina*). A letter to Afanasij Fet dated 17 October 1860 bears witness to the shock to his naturalistic thinking. A new conception of death takes shape in the letter, where death is understood as the crossing of a border into a dreadful nothingness:

> Nothing in life has made such an impression on me. He [that is, Tolstoj’s brother Nikolaj] was right when he said that there is nothing worse than death. [...] What’s the point of worrying and trying if there is nothing left for him of what Nikolaj Nikolaevič Tolstoj was? [...] A few minutes before death, he fell asleep and suddenly woke up and whispered in horror “What is this?” That is, he has seen death, this devouring of himself into nothingness. (*PSS*, 60, 357)

From now on, Tolstoj’s depictions of death are distinguished by the fact that the passage to death is told from the perspective of the dying person.

The passage to death is most vividly described in the late tale *The Death of Ivan Il’ič*. Here, the narrator has a direct insight into the dying person’s inner life. Dying begins with a scream that lasts for three days and is so terrible that it cannot be heard without horror, even separated by two doors. The dying person feels he is being pushed into a black bag by an invisible, insurmountable force. He lashes out like a man condemned to death defending himself at the hands of the executioner, and yet he knows that he cannot be saved. He feels at every moment that despite all his efforts, he is getting closer and closer to what fills him with horror. And he feels that the torment lies both in the fact that he is being pushed into this black hole and in the fact
that he cannot get into the hole. The thought that his life has been good still prevents him from entering it.

Finally, the dying person enters the hole and sees light at the end of the hole. This process is accompanied by two events. First, his son, the high school student, steps up to the bed and presses the hand of the screaming man, who is becoming unbearable for everyone, to his lips. Second, the dying man realizes for the first time that his life was not as it should have been.

The author thus links the description of the passage into death with a passage into an essential ethical insight. Käte Hamburger ([1950] 1963, 70-71) speaks with reference to this passage of a “leap” “by which the phenomenology of death, which is the actual subject of the narrative, is transformed into an interpretation of the meaning of death.” This leap from experience to idea becomes manifest on the one hand in the empathy for the suffering family that appears for the first time in Ivan Il’ič, and on the other hand in the joyful vision that is imputed to the dying person in a strongly ideological postulate:

And suddenly it was clear to him that what tormented him and did not want to come out of him was suddenly coming out from two sides, from ten sides, from all sides. He felt sorry for them, he had to do something so that they no longer needed to suffer; he had to save them and save himself from suffering. “How good and how easy!” he thought. “And the pain?” he asked himself. “Where should it go? Yes, where is the pain?” And he listened up. “Yes, there it is. Well, whatever.”

“And death? Where is death?” And he sought his former fear of death and did not find it. “Where is the fear? Where is death?” The fear was no longer there, because death was no longer there either. Instead of death, there was a light.

“So this is it!” he said aloud. “What a joy!” (PSS, 26, 112)

Tolstoy thus tries to integrate the Christian image of metaphysical experience into the description of the physical reality of dying. Thomas Wächter (1992) accuses this ideology-driven representation of death as an entrance into the light of being logically inconsistent:

If the light that Ivan Il’ič sees instead of death is to be understood ontically, a further description of dying is not possible. But if only the
process of dying, its physical and psychological aspects, is to be regarded as reality, then the light seen by Ivan Il’ič is nothing more than an illusion. (Wächter 1992, 203-204)

Andrej Bolkonskij has a dream shortly before his death. In it, he anticipates the passage into death, which he perceives as a struggle with an opening door. He wants to keep the door closed, latch it and lock it. But his feet cannot be moved, even though he is exerting all his strength. Terrible fear seizes him. Behind the door is death. Death pushes through the door. The dying man reaches for the door, gathering his last strength. But he is too weak. Both halves of the door open noiselessly. “It comes in, and it is death” (985). At the moment when he dies, Andrej wakes up from the dream. As later for Ivan Il’ič, for Andrej Bolkonskij the passage into death is connected with liberation, relief, and the experience of brightness.

“Yes, that was death. I died – I woke up. Yes, death is an awakening.” Clarity suddenly came to his soul, and the curtain that until then had concealed the unknown was raised before his inner gaze. He felt the release of a force that previously had been as if bound in him and that strange lightness which from then on did not leave him. (985)

Unlike Ivan Il’ič, Andrej Bolkonskij sees the light only in a dream. But this is a prophetic dream that anticipates the real transition:

Since that day, there began for Prince Andrej, along with his awakening from sleep, an awakening from life. And it seemed no slower to him, in relation to the length of life, than an awakening from sleep in relation to the length of a dream. There was nothing frightening and abrupt in this relatively slow awakening. (985)

In tireless effort, Tolstoy tried to wrest a meaning from death, but he did not get beyond the joyful enlightenment of Ivan Il’ič, which he deeply mistrusted as an author.

12.2.3 Pierre Bezuxov

Pierre Bezuxov, who, as the heir of his natural father, has acquired wealth and the title of Count, is considered an attractive potential bridegroom. Prince Vasilij, the head of the morally dubious Kuragin family, is particularly
keen to marry Pierre, who is inexperienced with women and socially clumsy, to his daughter Hélène. Pierre is torn by the prospect. He has always found Hélène beautiful. But at the same time, he saw her as stupid. Now that he understands that this woman could belong to him, he feels a great temptation and at the same time something repulsive, forbidden in what she has awakened in him: “This isn’t love” (207). The temptation that emanates from Hélène’s beautiful body struggles in him with the awareness that there would be something “vile, unnatural,” “dishonest” (207) in this marriage. Although he decides to avoid Hélène and leave, he remains indecisive, stays with her father, and feels with horror that in the eyes of the people he is becoming more and more attached to the Kuragins. He discounts his assessment of Hélène’s stupidity to himself. Is what she says not always simple and clear? Does she not end every dispute with a brief but appropriate remark that shows she is not interested in the subject? And does she not address him with a “joyful, trusting smile, meant for him alone” (209)? In the analytical thought report of Pierre’s turmoil, however, it becomes clear that the driving force is no longer erotic allure but the pressure of the surroundings, and here attention turns to the border and its transgression:

Pierre knew that everyone was only waiting for him finally to say one word, to cross a certain line [perestupil ěrez izvestnuju čertu], and he knew that sooner or later he would cross it; but some incomprehensible terror seized him at the mere thought of that frightful step. (209)

Pierre does not cross the border, he is lifted above it. After he feels that everything has already been determined, but cannot decide on the last step, on the decisive word, Prince Vasilij creates a fait accompli by simply declaring Bezuxov and his daughter engaged. Pierre accepts his fate: “It’s too late now, it’s all over; and anyway I love her” (214).

After the duel with Doloxov, Hélène’s rumored lover, in which Pierre, so he believes, kills his opponent, he takes stock of his actions and his marriage. This extended interior monologue belongs to the type that Adolf Stender-Petersen ([1957] 1974, 394–397) characterizes as a “stop monologue”: the heroes stop on their life’s journey, look around, discuss their mental state with themselves, and experience “a kind of catharsis” or “crisis-like metamorphosis” without – in Stender-Petersen’s view – any real development taking place. The following quotation contains only excerpts from Pierre’s “stop monologue”:
“What has happened?” he asked himself. “I killed a lover, yes, I killed my wife’s lover. Yes, it happened. Why? How did I come to that?” “Because you married her,” an inner voice answered. – “But what am I to blame for?” he asked. “For having married her without loving her, for deceiving both myself and her,” and he vividly pictured that moment after supper at Prince Vasiliy’s, when he had spoken those words: “Je vous aime,” which had refused to come out of him. “It’s all because of that! I felt then, too,” he thought, “I felt then that it was wrong, that I had no right to it. And so it turned out.” He recalled their honeymoon and blushed at the recollection. […] “And how many times I felt proud of her,” he thought, “proud of her majestic beauty, her worldly tact; proud of my house, in which she received all Petersburg, proud of her inaccessibility and beauty. So this is what I was proud of?! I thought then that I didn’t understand her. How often, pondering her character, I said to myself that I was to blame, that I didn’t understand her, didn’t understand that eternal calm, contentment, and lack of any predilections and desires, and the whole answer was in this terrible word, that she is a depraved woman: I said this terrible word to myself, and everything became clear! (317–318)

Stender-Petersen’s thesis that there is no development must, however, be relativized. A development certainly takes place in the quoted monologue, and it is also expressed in the fact that Pierre separates from his wife the next morning after a dramatic scene.

Pierre is, as he perceives it, saved by a Freemason from the disorientation and melancholy that now occurs. The old man tells him that true knowledge of the world and the self are the decisive goals in life. Pierre enthusiastically joins the movement and becomes head of the Petersburg Lodge. After his impassioned speech, which is badly received by the brothers, Pierre breaks with the Freemasons. On his estates, he declares that he wants to liberate the peasants. Here too, he is forced to realize that he was mistaken about the difficulty of putting his philanthropic plans into practice.

It is revealing for Tolstoj’s poetics of consciousness that in individual passages of Volume II, he has his hero give an account of his thoughts and actions in a diary, the preferred genre of the eighteenth century. In this diary, Pierre mainly records dreams and writes down good intentions in the style of the Franklin journal that Tolstoj himself kept (Ėjxenbaum 1922, 26–29):
I go to bed in a happy and calm mood. Great Lord, help me to walk in Thy ways (1) to overcome the part of wrath by gentleness and slowness; (2) of lust by restraint and repulsion; (3) to withdraw from vanity, yet not lose the habit of (a) work in government service, (b) family cares, (c) friendly relations, and (d) economic concerns. (441)

The rules and intentions reveal an analyticism that was characteristic of the thinking of the eighteenth century. The flowing, complex life of the soul, formed from contradictory impulses, is thus broken down into individual facts and appears as a manageable mechanism. (It is not by chance that in Éjxenbaum, a representative of Russian formalism drew attention to Tolstoj’s analytic method. This movement, as well as simultaneous directions in the fine arts and psychology, sought access to truth, essence, and meaning through analysis).

After the engagement of Andrej and Nataša, Pierre changes his life suddenly and without any apparent reason. He ceases writing in his diary, avoids the company of the Masonic brothers, begins going to clubs again, and begins to lead a dissolute life, so much so that even Hélène, with whom he is living again, feels it necessary to reprimand him sternly.

Pierre leaves for Moscow. “For him Moscow was comfortable, warm, habitual, and dirty, like an old dressing gown” (535). At the moment of his life crisis, Pierre takes stock of what he has achieved in life. This account is designed in free indirect monologue, which in its rhetorical composition bears clear traces of narratorial syntax and language function:

Pierre was one of those retired gentlemen-in-waiting of whom there were hundreds good-naturedly living out their lives in Moscow.

How horrified he would have been if, seven years ago, when he had just come from abroad, someone had told him that there was no need to seek or invent anything, that his rut had long been carved out for him and determined from all eternity, and that, however he twisted and turned, he would be that which everybody was in his position. He could not have believed it. Had he not wished with all his soul to establish a republic in Russia, then to become a Napoleon himself, a philosopher, a tactician, the defeater of Napoleon? Had he not seen the possibility and passionately wished to transform depraved mankind and bring his own self to the highest degree of perfection?
Had he not established schools and hospitals and liberated his peasants?

But instead of all that, here he was – the rich husband of an unfaithful wife, a retired gentleman-in-waiting, who liked to eat, drink, and, unbuttoning himself, to denounce the government a little, a member of the Moscow English Club, and a universally beloved member of Moscow society. For a long time he could not reconcile himself to the thought that he was that very same retired Moscow gentleman-in-waiting the type of which he had so deeply despised seven years ago. (536)

Dissatisfied with himself, Pierre suffers from the “general, universally acknowledged lie,” as is expressed in the direct interior monologue quoted in section 2.4.1.2. The unanswerable questions of life make him seek oblivion in all possible distractions, whereupon the questions only rear up with greater urgency.

In the course of his rapprochement with Nataša, who is inwardly trying to break away from her fiancé Andrej Bolkonskij after her affair with Anatole Kuragin and is in a serious health crisis, the agonizing questions about the meaning of the earthly cease to occupy Pierre. The questions are now replaced by the idea of her (i.e., Nataša). Pierre therefore decides to avoid the Rostov family.

With the capture of Moscow, left to the French, Pierre re-enters the scene of the novel. In the city, largely abandoned by its inhabitants, Pierre rescues a little girl from a burning house and a beautiful young Armenian woman from the marauding French soldiers. After knocking one of them down, he is arrested by a French patrol. Since he witnessed an execution, his belief in a well-ordered world, in the human soul, his own soul, and in God is destroyed. In contrast to before, when he had to recognize himself as the cause of his doubts, he now feels that it is no longer in his power to return to faith in life.

In the barracks of the prisoners of war, he meets the peasant Platon Karataev, the “embodiment of everything Russian, kindly and round” (972), who for Pierre is the “unfathomable, round and eternal embodiment of the spirit of simplicity and truth” (974). Karataev is an ideology-generated construct typical of Tolstoj, the embodiment of simple, spontaneous, unreflected, vegetative life. The peasant lives life directly, without a guiding idea, without
memory, and without intentions. His dubious Christianity does not consist in belief in transcendence, but in trust in the power of life. He does not steer Pierre towards the Christian values of humility, selflessness, or sacrifice (Zelinsky 2007, 215), and in his startling indifference to the suffering of others, he is far from the Christian ideal of charity.

In captivity, Pierre attains that peace and contentment with himself that he had previously searched for in vain. And he understands that through the horror of death, through privations, and through Karataev, he has now found the harmony with himself that he had hoped to find in philanthropy, in Freemasonry, in social distractions, in alcohol, in self-sacrifice, in romantic love for Natasha. And he also begins to understand the "mysterious, indifferent force that made people kill their own kind against their will" (1015).

In the peace of the night, Pierre laughs out loud, to the amazement of his fellow prisoners. The French are holding him captive, him, his immortal soul. And looking at the starry sky, he says to himself: "And all this is mine, all this is within me, all this is me! [...] And all this they’ve caught and put in a shed and boarded it up!" (1020).

The harder Pierre’s situation, the more “independent of the situation he found himself in were the joyful and calming thoughts, memories and images that came to him” (1060–1061). Pierre distances himself from the sick Karataev, the weaker he becomes. This blatant lack of caritas corresponds completely to Karataev’s view of life, which consists of vegetative existence at any given moment of life without reflection on past and future. In prison and on the march, where prisoners who cannot keep up are shot, Pierre “realized not with his mind, but with his whole being, his life, that man is created for happiness, that happiness is within him, in the satisfying of natural human needs” (1060). When Karataev, who is seriously ill and no longer able to march, is shot by a Frenchman, Pierre, who hears the shot, does not even look back. And he is annoyed at the howling of the dog that was left behind when Karataev died.

In his dream, Pierre hears words about life that immediately bring Karataev to his mind and reaffirm the vitalist-pantheistic creed he represented:

“Life is everything. Life is God. Everything shifts and moves, and this movement is God. And while there is life, there is delight in the self-awareness of the divinity. To love life is to love God. The hardest and
most blissful thing is to love this life in one’s suffering, in the guiltlessness of suffering (1064).

After his liberation from French captivity, Pierre enjoys the feeling of freedom, and thus searching for the purpose of life is no longer necessary for him:

That which he had been tormented by before, which he had constantly sought, the purpose of life – now did not exist for him. It was not that this sought-for purpose of life happened not to exist for him only at the present moment, but he felt that it did not and could not exist. And this very absence of purpose gave him that full, joyful awareness of freedom which at that time constituted his happiness. (1103)

For Pierre, the search for the purpose of life is replaced by “faith in a living, ever-sensed God” (1103). He recognized this God in his captivity, in the life of Platon Karataev, in which God was greater and more unfathomable than in the “Arxitekton of the universe recognized by the Masons” (1104). In the past, he had been unable to see the great in anything. Now, he has learned to see the “great, the eternal, and the infinite in everything” (1104).

The terrible question “Why?” which formerly had destroyed all his mental constructions, did not exist for him now. Now, to this question “Why?” a simple answer was always ready in his soul: because there is God, that God without whose will not a single hair falls from a man’s head. (1104)

Even Pierre’s path to faith under the influence of Platon Karataev’s philosophy of life place a high demand on the reader’s tolerance. The consequences of his finding God exceed all limits of credibility. Tolstoj claims for Pierre’s inner event the highest consecutiveness, beyond all commonly assumed limits of the ability of people to change. Pierre has become a different person: patient, where he used to be annoyed; content with himself, whereas he used to be eternally at odds with himself; a smile of joy of life constantly playing around his mouth, compassionate and attentive to other people, tolerant of their convictions that differ from his own. In money matters, in which he always used to be uncertain, he is now sure of himself. And during his trip to Moscow, he feels a joy like a schoolboy on holiday. The people he meets along the way have a new meaning for him. The change in him is noticed by the people around him, servants and equals. The change in Pierre Bezuxov is a culmination of mental eventfulness in the narrative world of War and Peace.
12.3 *Anna Karenina*: The Levin Story

Tolstoj’s double-plot novel *Anna Karenina* (1877–1878), in a certain sense a continuation of *War and Peace* (Zelinsky 2007, 223), represents in its two plot lines highly eventful mental developments in the two main characters, which lead in opposite directions. While Konstantin Levin finds the purpose of life, the heroine’s mental development leads her to suicide.

Konstantin Levin is a soulmate of Pierre Bezuxov. Both are seekers of meaning, and Tolstoy, as has often been remarked, endowed them with his own character traits, even hiding his own first name in Konstantin’s surname. Levin, the young landowner, is contrasted with the figures of the urban world he rejects, but nevertheless maintains friendly relations with its protagonist Stepan Oblonskij, and has a surprisingly harmonious and empathetic encounter with Oblonskij’s sister Anna Karenina (VII, 10). Like other fictional self-portraits by the author, Levin is “designed as a complicated figure: ponderous in his thinking, not very attractive on the outside,” but of “honest ethical disposition” and with a “wide-awake conscience” (Wedel 1973b, 1049).

In Levin’s brooding search for the meaning of life, the encounter with his peasants shows him the way to knowledge. If he has already experienced deep satisfaction in his active participation in haymaking (III, 4–5), observing a young peasant couple, freshly in love, making hay leads him to new thoughts. The cheerful peasant women pass the haystack on which Levin is lying with many-voiced singing, a “thundercloud of merriment.” Levin becomes envious of this “healthy merriment” and would have liked to take part in it. But he must lie on his haystack and look and listen. And when the women have passed by, severe melancholy comes over him because of “his loneliness, his bodily idleness, his hostility to this world” (275). That day, for the first time, “the thought came clearly to Levin that it was up to him to change that so burdensome, idle, artificial and individual life he lived into this laborious, pure and common, lovely life” (275). It is characteristic of the narratoriality of the novel that the crucial inner *metabolé* is presented in a consciousness report and indirect representation.

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125 The numbers indicate part and chapter.
Levin spends the whole night on his haystack, listening to the people singing, and when the voices fall silent, he listens to the croaking frogs and snorting horses. When the night is over, he gets up and looks at the stars. He asks himself questions in direct interior discourse: “Well, what am I to do then? How am I to do it?” (276). The narrator summarizes what Levin thinks and undergoes in three trains of thought. The first is the renunciation of his old life, of his “useless knowledge, his utterly needless education.” Second, the principles of the new life should be “simplicity, purity and legitimacy.” The third line turns on the question of how to make this transition. But he does not have a clear idea about that:

“To have a wife? To have work and the necessity to work? To leave Pokrovskoe? To buy land? To join a community? To marry a peasant woman? How am I to do it? He asked himself again, and found no answer. “However I didn’t sleep all night and can’t give myself a clear accounting,” he told himself. “I’ll clear it up later. One thing is sure, that this night has decided my fate. All my former dreams about family life are nonsense, not the right thing,” he said to himself. “All this is much simpler and better...” (276)

On the country road along which he walks back to the village in the morning chill, a carriage comes towards him. Confused, he looks inside. A young girl is sitting at the window and looking over him into the dawn. At the moment the carriage disappears, her truthful eyes look at him. The girl recognizes him, and joy lights up her face. This is the moment that will change his life: He could not have been mistaken. There were no other eyes in the world like those. There was no other being in the world capable of concentrating for him all the light and meaning of life. It was she. It was Kitty. He realized that she was driving to Ergušovo from the railway station. And all that had troubled Levin during that sleepless night, all the decisions he had taken, all of it suddenly vanished. He recalled with disgust his dreams of marrying a peasant woman. There, in that carriage quickly moving away and bearing to the other side of the road, was the only possibility of resolving the riddle of his life that had been weighing on him so painfully of late. [...] “No,” he said to himself, “however good that life of simplicity and labor may be, I cannot go back to it. I love her.” (277–278)
After the night on the haystack, Levin has lost all interest in farming. And soon he will be married to Kitty. But he need not give up farming. Kitty does not agree with her brother-in-law Oblonskij’s suggestion of a honeymoon abroad, and decides very firmly that she and Levin will go straight to where both of them live, to the countryside where he works, which she does not understand, but which she considers important.

Levin, in all his happiness over his marriage to Kitty, is burdened by a problem: his unbelief. Already in the confession to which he reluctantly went in preparation for the wedding, he had to admit that he doubted everything, sometimes even the existence of God. Afterwards, he felt that something was unclear and unclean in his soul and that he would have to clarify this at some point later. The pious Kitty, who never doubts the truths of religion, is not at all affected by the confession of his unbelief in the diary he gives her before the wedding ceremony. She knows his soul, and in it she sees what she desires. Bitter tears, however, are caused by the erotic past life reported in the diary (one of the many autobiographical traits of the Levin plot).

Even later, Kitty is not troubled by Levin’s unbelief, even though she knows that there can be no salvation for an unbeliever and she loves her husband’s soul more than anything in the world: “What kind of unbeliever is he? With his heart, by that fear of upsetting anyone, even a child!” (785).

Levin, however, tortures himself unspeakably in his search and his doubts. The concepts of the new sciences, which have replaced his youthful beliefs since the death of his brother, are good for intellectual purposes but give nothing for life (VIII, 8). In the initial period after the marriage, his new joys and duties silenced these thoughts. But since living idly in Moscow after Kitty’s confinement, Levin has been asking himself more and more urgently the decisive question: “If I do not accept the answers that Christianity gives to the questions of my life, then which answers do I accept?” (786). He understands that religion is not outlived, he knows that around him everyone believes, that the entire Russian people are believers. He reads the philosophers who do not explain life materialistically, from Plato to Schopenhauer, but as soon as he returns from life to what he thought he understood from the theories, the whole structure collapses. Several times close to suicide in his desperation, Levin hides the rope so as not to hang himself, and does not go out with his gun so as not to shoot himself (VIII, 9).

Returned to the country, he is freed from his fruitless brooding by the necessary work. As long as he does what is necessary, Levin’s life is fulfilled;
but it has no meaning as soon as he thinks about it. When he does not think, he feels in his soul the presence of an infallible judge who decides which of two possible actions is the better one.

The torturous search for meaning comes to an unexpected conclusion when Levin, at the height of the grain harvest, in which he himself is heavily involved, enters into conversation with the worker Fëdor. When Levin asks, why Platon Fokanyč, a wealthy peasant from the village, is less successful in farming than his neighbor, Fëdor replies: “Uncle Fokanyč, [...] does he perhaps pull the wool over the eyes of a man? To one he borrows, to the other he gives a little slack. And does not get his money’s worth. Just remains human” (794). And when asked why Fokanyč gives a little slack, Fëdor gives an answer that makes Levin extremely excited: “He lives for the soul. He remembers God” (794).

A new, joyful feeling came over [Levin]. At the mužik’s words about Fokanyč living for the soul, by the truth, by God’s way, it was as if a host of vague but important thoughts burst from some locked-up place and, all rushing towards the same goal, whirled through his head, blinding him with their light. (794)

Levin is now on the turning point in his conversion: “The words spoken by the mužik had the effect of an electric spark in his soul, suddenly transforming and uniting into one the whole swarm of disjointed, impotent, separate thoughts which had never ceased to occupy him” (794–795). The processing of the new things that Levin finds delightedly in his soul is set out by the author, who has so far presented Levin’s conversion in a narratorial consciousness report, in a direct interior monologue extending over several pages, which shows Levin in dialogue with himself:

To live not for one’s own needs but for God. For what God? For God. And could anything more meaningless be said than what he said? He said one should not live for one’s needs – that is, one should not live for what we understand, for what we’re drawn to, for what we want – but for something incomprehensible, for God, whom no one can either comprehend or define. And what then? Didn’t I understand those meaningless words of Fëdor’s? And having understood, did I doubt their rightness? Did I find them stupid, vague, imprecise?
No, I understand him, and in absolutely the same way that he understands, I understand fully and more clearly than I understand anything else in life, and never in my life have I doubted or could I doubt it. And not I alone, but everybody, the whole world, fully understands this one thing they do no doubt and always agree upon. [...]

If the good has a cause, it is no longer the good; if it has a consequence – a reward – it is also not the good. Therefore the good is outside the chain of cause and effect.

And I know it, and we all know it.

But I looked for miracles, I was sorry that I’d never seen a miracle that would convince me. And here it is, the only possible miracle, ever existing, surrounding me on all sides, and I never noticed it! (795)

The novel ends with another direct interior monologue. Levin asks himself about the consequences of his faith, or new feeling:

This new feeling hasn’t changed me, hasn’t made me happy or suddenly enlightened, as I dreamed [...] And faith or not faith – I don’t know what it is – but this feeling has entered into me just as imperceptibly through suffering and has firmly lodged itself in my soul.

I’ll get angry in the same way with the coachman Ivan, argue in the same way, speak my mind inappropriately [...] I’ll fail in the same way to understand with my reason what I pray, and yet I will pray – but my life now, my whole life, regardless of all that may happen to me, every minute of it, is not only meaningless, as it was before, but has the unquestionable meaning of the good which it is in my power to put into it. (817)

12.4 Tolstoj’s Philosophy of Events

Bezuxov’s and Levin’s ‘enlightenments’ are great mental developments that prove to be true events according to our criteria. The changes are relevant, unexpected, not iterative, and highly consecutive.

Bezuxov’s search for meaning gives him a completely new view of life and leads him to a considerably changed way of life. Only as such a changed person can he become a partner of the lively, spontaneous, energetic, and
people-oriented Nataša. Levin, on the other hand, fundamentally changes his view of life but does not need to change his way of life. He merely forms a new theoretical superstructure for his ethos and practical actions, which themselves remain unchanged: at the end of the novel, he understands “that his life was good, but his thinking was bad” (797). It is not by chance that the novel ends with his interior monologue, in which he admits to himself that his “new feeling,” as he calls the faith he has gained, will not change his habitual behavior and practical actions, but will fill his whole life with a meaning he has long searched for in vain.

In his two novels, Tolstoy is generally a skeptic of great deeds. There are no outstanding, particularly significant changes in practical actions. In *War and Peace*, Tolstoj shows us, with all didactic emphasis, that the small actions of Captain Tušin at his cannon are at least as decisive for the battle as the instructions of the commander. Life and history consist of teeming innumerable small, insignificant actions, and in Tolstoj’s view, it is arbitrary to single out any of them as particularly decisive. Tolstoj models life and history as an infinite continuum in which only the abstracting and constructing gaze recognizes events or causalities.

Tolstoj also shapes the inner life of his heroes as an infinite continuum. No less than historical developments, changes in consciousness happen in countless small steps. This has been demonstrated with reference to Andrej Bolkonskij’s mental event. The sudden enlightenments of Bezuxov and Levin, revising all previous assumptions, seem to contradict the idea that development takes place in small steps. Yet, as has been shown, they are both prepared by a series of errors and wrong choices, so that only a small spark is needed to trigger the enlightenment.

For Tolstoj, the search for God and the meaning of life is a privilege or a burden for men. The searches of Pierre Bezuxov and Konstantin Levin lead to the conclusion that God cannot be grasped with a metaphysical idea and the meaning of life cannot be gained in reflection. In Tolstoj’s anti-metaphysical faith, God coincides with the good, and the good consists in the right action appropriate to the situation. The ideal women Nataša and Kitty do not need searching and reflection. They know instinctively what is necessary in a particular moment. This can be seen in the death of Nikolaj Levin. While

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127 Cf. Gary Saul Morson’s (2014, XIV) application of his concept of “prosaics” (Morson 1988; 2013) to the representation of consciousness in Tolstoj’s two great novels.
Konstantin stands helpless and bewildered at his brother’s deathbed, Kitty does what must be done to make the dying person’s life easier, even if only by shaking his pillow. Kitty instinctively knows what is necessary and helpful, what is ‘good’ in Tolstoj’s sense. That is why she does not need an idea of God, and why she is not disturbed by Konstantin’s unbelief. She knows his soul, his honest disposition. That is enough for her. She does not ask for a metaphysical justification for doing the right thing.

Another ideal woman, the “moral compass” of Anna Karenina (Morson 1988, 5), is Dar’ja, known as Dolly, the wife of the cynical life-lover Stepan (Stiva) Oblonskij; as a mother of seven children, she is constantly worried about her family and prudently takes care of what is necessary in any given case. Vronskij condescendingly describes her as “very kind, mais excessive-ment terre-à-terre” (641). It is precisely this prosaic existence, concerned with the small, concrete needs of life, that the author of the novel sees as the ideal form of life in which the meaning of life is fulfilled.

The counterplay of male reflection and female practical concern for the life of the family, which determines the relationship between the sexes in Anna Karenina, is manifested once again in the final lines of the novel. Levin prepares to share his new thoughts on God and the meaning of life with Kitty, but is interrupted when she looks after a guest who has arrived. Levin is satisfied with this and refrains from sharing his ideas with Kitty.

The result for Tolstoj’s narrative world is that the men, in their long and torturous search for God and the meaning of life, arrive where the women already are. In Tolstoj’s world, women are not subjects of a cognitive, ethical, or religious metabolé, as long as they correspond to the author’s ideal. They do not lack the ability to experience events. Rather, they are not in need of events. The situation is different with the women who do not correspond to the author’s ideal, i.e., Hélène Kuragina and Anna Karenina. The former is infinitely far removed from rethinking and re-evaluating and is taken out of the game by illness and death. Anna’s thinking leads her into the abyss of suicide.

The mediators of the knowledge that the seekers of meaning acquire are not the women Nataša and Kitty, but figures from the simple peasant folk, the vegetatively living Platon Karataev and the unselfish Platon Fokanyč, both of whom not coincidentally bear the name of the philosopher Platon. Nataša and Kitty, but also Dolly and the two Platons, have in common the
fact that they are closer to nature, natural life, and natural ethics than the reflective men.

If men only get as far as their female partners have always been, is development in Tolstoj’s world possible at all? The author of War and Peace and Anna Karenina shows himself to be a skeptic of change, of eventfulness. Levin’s monologue, which concludes the entire novel, is highly symptomatic of this, with its anaphorical sequence as it was before. Nothing has changed in his practical actions as a result of finding the meaning of life and an idea of God. Even before he gained his insights, he was a man of high ethos. In Levin, the author exemplifies his own anti-metaphysical idea of God: God is the good, and the good consists in appropriate practical action.

In view of Levin’s and Tolstoj’s skepticism about far-reaching changes, a question must be asked about the end of both novels: is the final tranquility that the two mobile heroes Bezuxov and Levin find in family life credible in view of the constitution of their restless personalities that are constantly searching for an ideal? Is it plausible that the heroes, who change from one concept of life to another, will find peace after their ‘enlightenments’? Is it not the case that the author is actually realizing his own desire for meaning in the peace that his seekers of meaning find in faith and in the family?

12.5 Pragmatic Eventfulness in Resurrection

Tolstoj demonstrates that reflection, insight, and rethinking can also have far-reaching practical consequences and that mental events can lead to a high degree of pragmatic consecutiveness in his third novel, Resurrection (Voskresenie, 1899), which he worked on for more than ten years and which was published more than twenty years after Anna Karenina and which the audience eagerly awaited during the author’s long pause.

Prince Dmitrij Nexljudov, who is serving as a juror in court, recognizes in the prostitute Ekaterina Maslova, accused of murder by poisoning, a girl that he once seduced and left when she was, without his knowledge, pregnant by him. Conscious of his guilt, he makes every effort with all the means at his disposal to have the verdict, which he has recognized as unjust, overturned. After his efforts to have the sentence reviewed have failed, he hands over a large part of his property to his peasants free of charge and follows
the condemned woman to Siberia. Before the beginning of her forced labor, Ekaterina is pardoned and can settle in Siberia. Nexljudov wants to live with Ekaterina in Siberia and makes a marriage proposal, but she refuses and marries a political prisoner. Why does Ekaterina not accept the offer of Nexljudov, who gave up his entire existence to make amends for his reprehensible actions? That remains a mystery. Nexljudov understands her rejection as meaning that she loves him, but wants to spare him because, as she says, he too must live.

There is another explanation for the rejection, which does not appear explicitly in the text. Ekaterina accuses Nexljudov of merely wanting to “save” himself through her, just as he had merely satisfied his lust through her. She clearly senses that he is still guided by motives of atonement, sacrifice, and her salvation, without loving her. There is no talk of love on his part, after all. She does not want to be the object of a sacrifice, the object of general, abstract human love supported by thoughts of atonement. That is why she apologizes, obviously for not being willing to play the intended role in Nexljudov’s atonement drama. Ekaterina may have guessed the thoughts that ran through his head shortly before their last encounter: “I want to live, want to have a family, want to have children, want a human life” (PSS, XXXII, 431).

Whatever way Ekaterina’s refusal is to be interpreted, there is no doubt that Tolstoj’s late novel, already strongly influenced by his didacticism, represents a spiritual-moral metabolé that has far-reaching consequences in practical life.

12.6 Anna Karenina: How Anna Subconsciously Constructs Her Story

12.6.1 Equivalences: The Dreams and the Bear

There are widely diverging views among interpreters regarding the reason for Anna’s suicide, ranging from society’s rejection of adultery, to Anna’s punishment of her beloved for his supposedly diminishing passion, to the fatal effects

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128 Käte Hamburger ([1950] 1963, 106) captures this in the formula: “Nexljudov represents Tolstoj’s impersonal pity ethic.”
of the *will to live* ("Lebenswille") as described by Schopenhauer (cf. L. Müller 1952; Busch 1966, 1–14). A somewhat different explanation opens up when one considers a diegetic, story-forming procedure that was used a lot by Tolstoy: the equivalence that appears in relations of similarity and contrast (cf. Schmid 2014a, 9–11; 2014d). Equivalences are an essential part of that "endless labyrinth of concatenations" which, according to Tolstoj’s famous letter to Nikolai Straxov of 1875, constitutes the meaning of *Anna Karenina*:

> If I were to say in words all that I intended to express with the novel, then I would have to write the same novel that I wrote again, and if the critics can already understand what I want to say and even express it in a feuilleton, then I can only congratulate them and frankly assure them *qu’ils en savent plus long que moi*. And if short-sighted critics think that I only wanted to describe what I like, how Oblonskij eats lunch, and what shoulders Karenina has, they are wrong.

> In everything, almost in everything I have written, I have been guided by the need to collect thoughts which, in order to find expression, were chained together, but every thought that is expressed separately in words loses its meaning, becomes terribly trivial when it is taken out of the concatenation in which it finds itself. The concatenation itself is (I believe) not formed by a thought, but by something else, and to express the basis of this concatenation directly in words is simply impossible. This is only indirectly possible by describing figures, actions, and situations with words [...] But now that nine-tenths of everything printed is art criticism, people are needed who will show how absurd it is to seek out individual thoughts in a work of art, and who will guide the reader through the endless labyrinth of concatenations on which the essence of art is based, and who will finally lead him to those laws that form the basis of these concatenations. *(PSS, LXII, 268–269)*

Equivalences include not only the well-known leitmotifs in Tolstoj’s novel, such as Anna’s willful hair and Vronskij’s strong teeth, but also entire plot sequences. An example are Vronskij’s and Anna’s similar dreams. Returning home from a bear hunt with a foreign prince, Vronskij finds a message in which Anna asks him to come to her in the evening. After lunch, Vronskij lies down on the sofa. Before he falls asleep, the repulsive scenes he has wit-
nessed in recent days with the foreign prince on his hunt for “Russian” pleasures become entangled in his mind with the image of Anna and a man from the bear hunt. He has a dream from which he wakes up trembling. Cold horror runs down his back. He recognizes the horror in the dream as the figure of a small dirty mužik, it seems to him, the man from the bear hunt, with a dishevelled beard, muttering strange words in French. What is so horrible about the dream? It is clearly the hunter’s equivalence with Anna. In his dream, Vronskij sees himself as a victim, as the bear who is trapped by the man. Waking up, Vronsky dismisses the dream as “nonsense” and looks at his watch. It is late. He hurries to Anna. Anna greets his late arrival with one of her ever-recurring fits of jealousy. She knows for certain that she will die when the child she expects from Vronskij is born. This certainty is given to her by a dream that she has dreamed several times for a long time. When Anna mentions this dream, the content of which he does not yet know, Vronskij immediately remembers his dream and the figure murmuring French words in it. Anna’s dream depicts “a mužik with a dishevelled beard, small and frightening.” Anna says: “I wanted to run away, but he bent over a sack and rummaged in it with his hands…” (361). There is horror on her face. And Vronskij feels just as much horror remembering his dream.

He rummages and mutters in French, very quickly, and rolling the rs in his throat, you know: “Il faut le battre le fer, le broyer, le pétrir… [You must beat the iron, pound it, knead it].” And I was so frightened that I wanted to wake up… but I woke up in a dream. And I wondered what it meant. And Kornej says to me: “You’ll die in childbirth, dear, in childbirth…” And I woke up… (361–362)

As well as the strong similarity of the dreams, there is a significant difference. Vronskij’s dream is a reflection of his fear that Anna might deprive him of his freedom, a fear expressed in images of bear hunting. Anna’s dream reflects the expectation of her imminent death. The motif of iron refers to the railway (the Russian name železnaja doroga, ‘iron way,’ is a borrowing of the German word Eisenbahn). It was at the railway that Anna first met Vronskij, and it is the railway that will bring her death.

Hundreds of pages later, Anna has the same dream. She has argued with Vronskij. She thinks she senses that his feelings for her have gone cold, and death seems to her the only means to restore his love for her in his heart, to punish him and win the fight for control in love. After a restless night, during
which she revises the intentions of the day and is only able to get to sleep with her usual dose of morphine, she has the gruesome nightmare again, which, as the narrator points out, “had come to her repeatedly even before her liaison with Vronskij”:

A little old mužik with a dishevelled beard was doing something, bent over some iron, muttering meaningless French words, and, as always in this nightmare (here lay its terror), she felt that this little mužik paid no attention to her, but was doing this dreadful thing with iron over her, was doing something dreadful over her. And she awoke in a cold sweat. (752)

The motifs of the dream are of course an anticipation of her end under the iron wheels of the train. It is no coincidence that the figure of the little mužik appears at her suicide just before she dies.

When the narrator mentions that the nightmare “had come to her repeatedly even before her liaison with Vronskij,” he is obviously reporting figurally. Given the construction of the dream equivalences, it is not very likely that the figure of the little mužik murmuring French words, a messenger of death, occurred independently of Anna’s liaison with Vronskij or even before it. The narrator has obviously adopted Anna’s perspective and treats her wishful thinking as an objectively given fact. We have good reason for this assumption, since the passage is embedded in a context that contains much FID and FCN. And Anna has good reason to wish that her nightmare is not connected to her lover. In reality, the figure of the uncanny little man only enters her consciousness after her first encounter with Vronskij. On her return from Moscow to Petersburg, during a stopover at a small station during a raging snowstorm, just before she sees Vronskij, she notices the bent shadow of a man scurrying through at her feet, and she hears hammer-blows against iron. This perception, close to the devoted

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129 During this return journey, Anna is torn between feeling and reason. On the one hand, as she boards the train, she is happy: “Well, it’s all over, and thank God!” (99) – she means, of course, the temptation of the devoted and enamored Vronskij. Looking back on the Moscow encounters, she makes sure that there was nothing in them of which she should be ashamed. “But just there, at that very place in her memories, the feeling of shame became more intense, as if precisely then, when she remembered Vronskij, some inner voice were telling her: ‘Warm, very warm, hot’” (100). This feeling is contradicted by the voice of reason: “Can it be that there exist or ever could exist any other relations between me and this boy-officer than those that exist with any acquaintance?” (100). The voice of reason, in turn, is denied by the surge of emotion: she “nearly laughed aloud from the joy that suddenly came over her for no reason” (101).
gaze of Vronskij, who stimulates her erotic imagination, and in the ominous context of the railway, can be assumed to be the origin of the nightmare. This example shows how artfully Tolstoy uses compositional techniques to represent consciousness.

12.6.2 Cut-up Bodies

The network of concatenations, however, goes even further and connects the beginning and end of the Anna plot through a strong, three-part equivalence. The motif that connects the three parts is the cutting up of a human body. The middle part of this triad is the scene of the lovers’ first physical union. At stake here is the situation after the fulfillment of what Vronskij ardently desired and what seemed to Anna an impossible, horrible, but all the more enchanting dream of happiness:

She felt herself so criminal and guilty that the only thing left for her was to humble herself and beg forgiveness; but as she had no one else in her life now except him, it was also to him that she addressed her plea for forgiveness. Looking at him, she physically felt her humiliation and could say nothing more. He, however, felt what a murderer must feel when he looks at the body he has deprived of life. This body deprived of life was their love, the first period of their love. There was something horrible and loathsome in the recollections of what had been paid for with this terrible price of shame. Shame at her spiritual nakedness weighed on her and communicated itself to him. But, despite all the murderer’s horror before the murdered body, he had to cut this body into pieces and hide it, he had to make use of what the murderer had gained by his murder.

And as the murderer falls upon this body with animosity, as if with passion, drags it off and cuts it up, so he covered her face and shoulders with kisses.

(149–150; tr. revised; italics mine – W. Sch.)

Who compares the lover Vronskij with a murderer? At first, it might seem that Vronskij feels that way. “He, however, felt what a murderer must feel.” But would the cavalry captain really feel the fulfillment of “that which for

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130 On the motif of the railway in Anna Karenina and Tolstoy’s negative attitude towards the means of transport, which he regarded as a symbol of carnal desire and cruelty, see Elisabeth Stenbock-Fermor (1975, 65-74).
almost a year had constituted the one exclusive desire of [his] life” (149) as murder? It is also unlikely that there is a narratorial rendering of Vronskij’s feelings here. Vronskij must feel something else. It is conceivable, of course, that we are dealing with a comparison that the narrator makes in his own name, behind the characters’ backs, so to speak, i.e., a purely narratorial remark or even an authorial one that goes back to the author. Such narratorial – and ultimately authorial – comments are by no means uncommon in Tolstoj. Nonetheless, the perspective of this passage suggests a different reading. Considering that the segments in italics represent Anna’s feelings and inner speech, one can conclude that the comparison of the passionate lover with the murderer is drawn by none other than Anna herself.\footnote{The in many ways inspired film adaptation of 2012 based on the screenplay by Tom Stoppard, directed by Joe Wright, and starring Keira Knightley in the title role, confirms this view: during the act of love-making, Anna calls out to Vronskij: “Murderer, murderer.”} Such an idea is highly motivated for Anna’s mind, for the image of the dismembered body can be interpreted as a reflex of the horrible death that the railway guard suffered during her first encounter with Vronskij. The words she heard at the time from two passers-by must have been deeply engraved on her consciousness: “What a terrible death! […] Cut in two pieces, they say” – “On the contrary, I think it’s the easiest, it’s instantaneous” (65). Anna is shocked and can hardly keep back her tears. She interprets the tragedy as a “bad omen” (65). The question is: an omen for what development, what story? Anna obviously means her relationship with Vronskij, whose admiring and devoted looks cannot have escaped her. In view of these glances, Anna has already conceived a story with him.

From this moment on, the heroine becomes the bearer of the fatal image of the cut-up body, which connects her to Vronskij and which appears associatively in her dreams in the motif of the little mužik who works with iron. She underlays her first physical union with Vronskij with this image, and carries it within her until her destiny is fulfilled under the cutting wheels of the railway. Shortly before her suicide, the helpless and disoriented woman remembers the railway worker who was run over on the day of her first meeting with Vronskij, and she knows what she has to do. In such a concatenation of motifs, her death under the wheels of the train appears as the fulfillment of the design of her fatal expectations, which had already taken
shape at her first meeting with Vronskij. Insofar as the key scene under consideration after the act of love-making is presented in Anna’s perspective, the author directs us to the heroine as the designer of her fate.

Anna’s suicide is not the result of a conscious decision and not the result of long deliberation. How the decision to commit suicide comes about requires closer examination.

After visiting Kitty, who she believes condemns and hates her, Anna lets herself be driven home in the carriage. In her extensive, multi-chapter direct interior monologue, which forms a stream of consciousness in its associative-fragmentary structure, she articulates her memories of the unpleasant encounter with Kitty, reacts pejoratively to random impressions from the street, and formulates negative generalizations for herself.\footnote{132} She has just observed two boys getting unclean ice cream from a vendor:

We all want something sweet, tasty. If not candy, then dirty ice cream. And Kitty’s the same. If not Vronskij, then Levin. And she envies me. And hates me. We all hate each other. […] Why these churches, this ringing and this lie? Only to hide the fact that we all hate each other, like these cabbies who quarrel so spitefully. (760–761)

There is a close connection here between Anna’s experience of what she believes to be Kitty’s rejection of her, her suspicion that Vronskij is moving away from her, the figures of the outside world on the street perceived with a negative focus, and her generalizations.

Arriving home, Anna finds a telegram from Vronskij that she misinterprets, since she does not take into account the fact that Vronskij, when he sent it, could not have received her letter yet. Anger and the need for revenge arise in her:

“I’ll go to him myself. Before going away for ever, I’ll tell him everything. I’ve never hated anyone as I do this man.” […] “Yes, I must go quickly,” she said to herself, still not knowing where to go. […] “Yes, I must go to the railway station and, if I don’t find him, I’ll go there and expose him” (761).

\footnote{132} Cf. the examples of indicative and symbolic representation of consciousness cited in 2.8.
The decision to go to the railway station to meet Vronskij there bears witness to Anna’s lost connection with reality. Vronskij will hardly be at the railway station and will not be met by chance. He sent the telegram from his mother’s, and there is no indication that he gave a false address. When assessing the reality of Anna’s ideas, it should be borne in mind that she regularly takes a medicine before bedtime in which morphine is an important ingredient.133

That Anna goes to the train station is obviously dictated by subliminal association of her beloved with the railway, which was formed when she arrived at the train station in Moscow. Unconsciously, Anna wants to free herself from her conflict by returning to its origin. On the conscious level, Anna has only vague ideas about how to proceed. Having arrived at the train station, she does not know where she wanted to go.

While Anna is on her way to the train station, she sinks into the associative stream of her negative observations and generalizations again. For the first time, she takes stock of her relationship with Vronskij and concludes that she must have flattered Vronskij’s vanity above all else, that he was proud of his success. In Anna’s FID, Tolstoj again uses the metaphor of light that accompanies clear insight: “This was not a supposition. She saw it clearly in that piercing light which now revealed to her the meaning of life and of people’s relations” (763). Anna not only mercilessly assesses Vronskij’s motives but also questions her love for her own son, which she exchanged for “that” love. “And with disgust she remembered what it was that she called “that love.” And she was glad of the clarity with which she now saw her own and everyone else’s life” (764). At the station, she is overwhelmed by contradictory thoughts and feelings: accusation of Vronskij, her love, and her hatred. So far, however, she has not consciously thought of suicide.

From her compartment, Anna sees “a dirty, ugly mužik in a peaked cap, his matted hair sticking out from under it” (765). The mužik passes by the window, bending down to the wheels of the carriage. The figure reminds Anna of her dream, and she leaves her place in the compartment. Anna hears only mutual hatred in the conversations of her fellow passengers, and it is

133 The 2012 film leaves no doubt about Anna’s drug consumption: it is shown several times how she uses a bottle with the label Morphine before going to bed. In one scene, in which she is shown dreaming, the image of the bottle appears superimposed on the picture and accompanied by the sound of the rotating wheels of the train.
impossible for her not to hate such “pathetically ugly people” (766). During the journey, she picks up a sentence spoken by a fellow traveler: “Man has been given reason to rid himself of that which troubles him” (766), and she applies this sentence to herself:

Yes, troubles me very much, and reason was given us in order to rid ourselves of it. So I must rid myself of it. Why not put out the candle, if there’s nothing more to look at, if it’s vile to look at it all? But how? Why was that conductor running along the footboard? Why are those young men in the other carriage shouting? Why do they talk? Why do they laugh? It’s all untrue, all a lie, all deceit, all evil!… (766-767)

On arrival at the station, Anna gets off the train and does not really know why she has come there and what she had intended to do. She does not want to be tormented, and this wish is addressed not to Vronskij, not to herself, “but to the one who made her suffer” (767).

Anna is on the platform. She is helpless in the abundance of the visual and acoustic impressions tormenting her, not knowing where to go. A freight train is approaching. “And suddenly, remembering the man who was run over the day she first met Vronskij, she realized what she must do” (768). She turns her gaze to the middle between the front and rear wheels: “There, right in the middle, and I’ll punish him and be rid of everybody and of myself” (768):

[She] fell on her hands under the carriage, and with a light movement, as if preparing to get up again at once, sank to her knees. And in that same instant she was horrified at what she was doing. “Where am I? What am I doing? Why?” She wanted to rise, to throw herself back, but something huge and implacable pushed at her head and dragged over her. “Lord, forgive me for everything!” she said, feeling the impossibility of any struggle. A little mužik, muttering to himself, was working over some iron. And the candle by the light of which she had been reading that book filled with anxieties, deceptions, grief and evil, flared up brighter than ever, lit up for her all that had once been in darkness, sputtered, grew dim, and went out for ever. (768)

The reconstruction of the end makes it clear that there can be no question of a conscious, purposeful action. The thought of suicide comes associatively,
but is likely to be well prepared on the level of the unconscious. It is no coincidence that the iron-working man of the nightmare, who symbolizes the relationship with Vronskij that began at the railway and who embodies death, is the last agent mentioned in the Anna plot.

The moment Anna falls onto the track, she asks horrified questions. She awakens from her intoxication with denial of reality and recognizes her reality. In awakening, she realizes that the clarity she believes she has gained in her understanding of the situation has been deceptive. And the revenge that she wanted to exact with her fall before the wheels turns out to be a game that was not meant to be existentially serious, a feint in her struggle for Vronskij’s boundless devotion, in her fight for power. Even after their first sexual encounter, she threateningly announced: “Everything is finished. [...] I have nothing but you. Remember that” (150). And on the way to the station, she gave blatant expression to her excessive desire for domination: “For me, everything is in him alone, and I demand that he give himself more and more to me” (763).

The event lies in the fact that Anna, seduced by Vronskij’s devotion, sees her love from the very beginning as possession and, in the struggle for dominance, seeks to punish Vronskij for his supposed withdrawal. In doing so, she overlooks the fact that what she intends in her delusional reality as punishment, as a feint, has terrible consequences in the real world.\(^\text{135}\)

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\(^{134}\) Dolly, Tolstoj’s ideal figure, notices a habit of squinting in Anna, especially when it comes to matters of the heart (e. g. in VI, 18; VI, 19; VI, 23; and VI, 28). Dolly interprets this as Anna’s refusal to see reality: “As if she narrows her eyes at her life in order not to see it all” (628).

\(^{135}\) The play-like character of Anna’s actions is clearly symbolized by the transfer of the plot to a theatrical stage in the above-mentioned film adaptation of 2012.
VI. Event Skepticism in Russian Post-Realism
The Russian physician Anton Čexov was a true ‘positive hero’ in his life, but a skeptic of eventfulness in literature. While the propagators of a progressive literature issued their directives for the depiction of great social events from their positions of comfort, in April 1890 the tuberculosis-afflicted writer set off on the exhausting two-month journey from Moscow to the convict island of Saxalin, more than seven thousand kilometers away. This was, in his words, a “place of the most unbearable suffering,” in whose prisons Russia “let millions of people rot” and “passed everything on to the red-nosed guards.” With the intention of documenting the unbearable living conditions of the prisoners, Čexov went to every settlement, entered every hut, and talked to every convict and penal colonist. When he returned home in December 1890, he was satisfied with the treatise Saxalin Island (Ostrov Saxalin, 1893–1895) as the fruit of his journey and refrained from using his experiences on the convict island in his literary works. The sober, but therefore no less shocking report Saxalin Island was well received in Russia and prompted the government to make a number of concessions to the convicts. Nevertheless, the philanthropist Čexov, whose successful writing financed his medical treatment of the poor, did not join the then-dominant trend towards socially committed literature, but continued to write dispassionately

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136 Letter to Aleksej Suvorin of March 6, 1890 (Čexov, Pis‘ma, IV, 31–34). Suvorin was the publisher of the conservative newspaper The New Time (Novoe vremja), in which Čexov published his stories from 1886 onwards and by whose publishing house the first editions of his works were published. Čexov was associated with Suvorin until their rift in 1899, when Čexov moved to the German publisher Adolf Marx (Marks). He had a close relationship of trust with Suvorin, from which numerous letters with personal confessions emerged, a main source for the reconstruction of his world view.

137 Only in the story Ward № 6 (Palata № 6, 1892) is there a certain resonance of what Čexov experienced on Saxalin.
objective stories in which he took the liberty of a critical look at the progressive doxa of mainstream culture. His hundred-line narratives earned him accusations of a lack of ideals and social commitment. He countered the accusation of ethical indifference in a letter to Suvorin shortly before his departure for Saxalin:

You abuse me for objectivity, calling it indifference to good and evil, lack of ideals and ideas, and so on. You would have me, when I describe horse-stealers, say: “Stealing horses is an evil.” But that has been known for ages without my saying so. Let the jury judge them, it’s my job simply to show what sort of people they are. I write: you are dealing with horse-stealers, so let me tell you that they are not beggars but well-fed people, that they are people of a special cult, and that horse-stealing is not simply theft but a passion. Of course it would be pleasant to combine art with a sermon, but for me personally it is extremely difficult and almost impossible, owing to the conditions of technique. (Pisma, IV, 54; tr. Constance Garnett)

The accusations of a lack of a political position and social commitment were combined with complaints about the “lack of action” (bessjužetnost’) in his stories. This was attributed either to the “randomness” (slučajnost’) of the events or the “uneventfulness” (bessobytnost’) of the stories. In the literature of progressive political thought, the characters’ mental developments were usually accompanied by social messages. Thus, Čexov’s skepticism regarding the possibility of profound changes in human nature seemed akin to apostasy.

The author’s fundamental and consistent renunciation of clear ethical or political messages led to sharp rejection of his works in the circles of the left intelligentsia. In the widely circulating journal The Russian Idea (Russkaja mysль, 138 Cf. the detailed overview of the history of these criticisms in Cilevič (1976, 9–51). 139 Čexov was very critical of the intelligentsia of his time, as can be seen from the letter to I. I. Orlov of February 22, 1899: “I don’t believe in our intelligentsia, which is hypocritical, false, hysterical, badly educated and indolent. I don’t believe in it even when it’s suffering and complaining, for its oppressors come from its own entrails. I believe in individual people, I see salvation in individual personalities scattered here and there all over Russia – educated people or peasants – they have strength though they are few. [...] science is advancing and advancing, social self-consciousness is growing, moral questions begin to take an uneasy character, and so on, and so on – and all this is being done in spite of the prosecutors, the engineers, and the
1890, № 3; *Pis’ma*, IV, 406–407), Čexov was even denigrated as a “priest of unprincipled writing” (žrec besprincipnogo pisanija) in an anonymous article, which led him, in a letter to the editor Vukol Lavrov, to set out his personal and professional ethics with his characteristic modesty and, moreover, to break off contact with the journal (letter of April 10, 1890; *Pis’ma*, IV, 54–57).

Having returned from Saxalin, Čexov continued his practical social activities: he led the relief organization during the famine in the Nižnij Novgorod governorate; fought as a zemstvo doctor against the spread of the cholera epidemic; and built primary schools at his own expense in and around the Melixovo estate, to which he and his relatives, for whom he was responsible, had moved in 1892. Despite his personal social commitment, which he often pursued far beyond his strength reduced by the illness, Čexov remained skeptical about political progress. However, he believed in scientific and technical progress, and saw in electricity and steam power “more philanthropy than in chastity and rejection of the consumption of meat,”140 thus setting himself apart from Tolstoj’s moral teachings.

### 13.2 Problematic Recognition

Čexov’s post-realist storytelling is not prose without a sujet, not simply uneventful, as has been repeatedly perceived, but rather problematizes the eventfulness of realism. The event, the core of any sujet, found its highest embodiment in Russian realism in that spiritual and moral reversal that has been called prozrenie (‘sudden comprehension’), prosvetlenie (‘clarification of thoughts’) or ozarenie (‘enlightenment’).141

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140 Letter to Suvorin of March 27, 1894 (*Pis’ma*, V, 283–284). In the letter, he states: “Tolstoj’s philosophy touched me profoundly and took possession of me for six or seven years, and what affected me was not its general propositions, with which I was familiar beforehand, but Tolstoj’s manner of expressing it, his reasonableness, and probably a sort of hypnotism” (tr. Constance Garnett).

141 On the concept of prozrenie, see section 3.2, note 1. On its narratological use: Cilevič 1976, 56; Levitan 1976, 33; Šatalov 1980, 67. On the application of the concept of enlightenment to Turgenev and Čexov, see Šatalov 1974; the term sdvig is used synonymously with these terms, the ‘shift’ in the soul (Šatalov 1974) or in consciousness (Levitan 1976).
The event of insight has also been claimed to occur in Čexov’s narrative world – albeit often, and in Soviet research almost without exception, confined to processes of socio-political insight. Cilevič, for example, defines the sujet of prozrenie as the story of a hero “who has already felt the unnaturalness of social conditions, but has not yet begun to act” (1976, 56).

In fact, Čexov’s narrative in many of his stories is entirely focused on the depiction of a mental event, an existential or social insight, an emotional retuning, or an ethical-practical reorientation. However, the event appears differently motivated, in a different form and with a different function in his work than in the realists. In Tolstoj and Dostoevskij, the moral, religious, or social insight, the conversion, the ethical-moral purification and perfection, was initiated by – at least apparent – enlightenment from the transcendent, and thereby fully completed, unquestionable in its results, true and generally valid in its exemplary character. The repentance and penance of criminals and sinners promised the possibility of a moral rebirth for all, and the successful search for the meaning of life guaranteed the existence of a universally valid truth. The acts of insight in Čexov’s narrative world differ at least in seven essential points from the events of the great realists, which were made possible by the belief in transcendence, confirmed in the unquestionable results, and elevated to models in the intentions of authors:142

1. For the realists, the recognition of the Bezuxovs, Levins, Raskol’nikovs, and Karamazovs was the result of a long and painful search for meaning. In Čexov, on the other hand, people arrive at a new view of things unexpectedly, involuntarily, at least unwillingly, under the pressure of circumstances. Čexov’s characters do not strive on their own for knowledge, or for moral perfection, or even for a revision of their life plans. In contrast to the dynamic meaning-seekers of the realists, Čexov’s post-realist figures tend more towards ethical inertia.

2. With the realists, insight, which was expressed with metaphors of light such as illumination or enlightenment, owed itself to the movement of the soul or even the influence of a transcendent power, and was mediated by a man of the people, who in his simplicity proclaimed a transcendent truth. In Čexov, the acts of insight are motivated from within this world. Any even

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142 In my remarks on Čexov and the sections on individual works, I take up results of the following earlier publications: Schmid 1984; 1987; 1994a; 1995; 1997b; 1998b; 2014e; 2014f; 2018.
partial involvement of a transcendent power is excluded from Čexov’s anti-
metaphysical world design. The prozrenie owes its existence to a new way of
seeing, which is only caused by the external situation, and not to an enlight-
enment from above or from within.¹⁴³

3. Insight in the realists’ narratives involved essentials. The novels of Dosto-
evskij and Tolstoj were about nothing less than the existence and justice of
God, the meaning of life, the limits of man. In Čexov, the acts of insight often
involve something that can be regarded as trivial. The objective relevance
required by the classical event is abolished as a criterion in Čexov’s world.
Relevant is what the protagonist feels as such. The relativity of relevance is
demonstrated by Čexov in the story with the narratologically promising title
An Event (Sobytie, 1886). The event consists here of a cat having kittens and
the huge dog Nero eating all the kittens at once. Čexov shows how depend-
ent the assignment of relevance is on the subject. For the little children Vanja
and Nina, the birth of the kittens is already an occurrence of great im-
portance. While the adults then calmly accept Nero eating all the newborn
kittens and only marvel at his immense appetite, the world breaks down for
the children.¹⁴⁴

4. For Dostoevskij and Tolstoj, insight meant ethical progress, which was
clearly marked axiologically by the setting of narratorial accents. In contrast,
Čexov’s acts of insight are radically figuralized and are not evaluated from
a narratorial perspective. In this way, insights that appear doubtful from the
point of view of the ethics prevailing at the time can also become the central
event. The agitated questions, for example, that Ergunov poses to the world
order in the story Thieves (Vory, 1890), reveal a prozrenie. But the new insight,
which includes admiration for the strength, freedom, and moral unscrupu-
lousness of the horse thieves, not only collides with the prevailing ethics but
also leads the hero into a highly unromantic, unimpressive existence. The

¹⁴³ Cf. the correction of Šatalov’s view (1980, 67) of the difference between Tolstoj’s and Čexov’s
¹⁴⁴ Cathy Popkin 1990 distinguishes four strategies with which Čexov undermines the tradi-
tional significance of the event and makes the dichotomy significant/insignificant problematic: 1.
an apparently insignificant event proves to have great consequences (example: The Death of a
Civil Servant [Smerť činovnika]); 2. an event appears from one perspective to be extremely trivial,
from another perspective to be highly significant (An Event); 3. a significant event is expected
but does not occur (The Spouse [Supruga]); 4. an expected event occurs but then proves to be
insignificant (The Literature Teacher [Učitel’ slovesnosti]).
axiological unmarkedness of this recognition caused moral concern for Suvorin, who accused the author – as we know from Čexov’s response quoted above – of “indifference to good and evil.”

5. Moral insight or ethical perfection were universally valid in their exemplary character in the works of the realists. Čexov’s representation of mental events, on the other hand, does not follow any didactic plan and does not aim at creating models. A gained insight has no general validity and no exemplary character, even if it seems to be in accordance with general ethics. Truth exists only as an individual, subjective one. Čexov’s individualistic thinking is deeply skeptical of generalization, and his writing strives for the utmost impartiality, without getting carried away with explicit or implicit judgments.145

6. In Tolstoj’s and Dostoevskij’s works, insight was complete, irreversible in its results, and had radical consequences for the further thoughts and actions of people. The acts of insight of Čexov’s heroes show clear deficits in at least one of the characteristics that were decisive for the classical event, namely reality, resultativity, irreversibility, and consistency. The reduction of realistic eventfulness is one of the crucial traits of Čexov’s skeptical narration.146

7. Čexov’s eventfulness is subject to reservations, is open to doubt, appears to be parenthesized or relativized in certain respects. This is the reason why in some narratives, it remains undecided and perhaps undecidable whether an event has occurred at all.

Čexov therefore does not simply depict mental events but problematizes them. He is not interested in the result, but in the process, not in the fact, but in the unfolding. He is interested in the motives that prompt a reversal, the physiological and psychological triggers of an attempt to cross the border, and the external and internal circumstances that hinder or ultimately even prevent an actual change.

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145 On Čexov’s principle of individualization and his rejection of any generalization, principles that he had already acquired as a medical student (“Explain each case separately”), see Vladimir Kataev (1979, 87–140).

146 On the problems in Čexov’s late narratives regarding the conditions of reality and resultativity mentioned above in section 3.4 and the five criteria for eventfulness, see Schmid (1992, 109–117; 2014a, 16–19).
Čexov treats mental events as impassibly, dispassionately, scientifically as he does the ideas presented. When he deals with ideological topics, he is – as Karla Hielscher (1987, 59–60) points out – “less concerned with the content, the substance of what is said, but rather with the psychological conditions of emergence and effect.” Čexov had a practically scientific interest in ideas. He was less interested in the realization of the idea in thoughts and actions than in the circumstances of its origin and the conditions of its existence (cf. Čudakov 1986, 329). The author clearly expressed this in a letter to Suvorin of October 17, 1889:

For me as an author, all these opinions actually have no value at all. It is not about what they say; that is changeable and not new. The essence lies in the nature of these opinions, in their dependence on external influences, etc. You have to look at them like things, like symptoms, absolutely objectively, without trying to share or deny them. (Pis’ma, III, 266)

Čexov’s analytical approach to the conditions of events and the reasons why they do not occur must not, of course, be equated with the mere negation of eventfulness. It is therefore an unacceptable oversimplification to say that Čexov’s works are without sujet and nothing happens in their world. Even if the validity and finality of the changes are subject to doubt or appear to be relativized, the later narratives are entirely focused on the phenomenon of the event itself.

13.3 Fat and Thin: A World without Change

Čexov is not only skeptical about social progress, he also doubts the possibility for people to change significantly. In no other work is this critical attitude expressed more clearly than in the early humoresque Fat and Thin (Tolstyj i tonkij, 1883, modified version 1886), a programmatic narrative of changelessness.

Two old friends meet by chance at a railway station, one “fat” and one “thin.” While the fat one has dined alone in the station restaurant and smells of sherry and fleur d’orange, the thin one, loaded with suitcases, bundles, and boxes, has just got out of the carriage and smells of ham and coffee grounds.
“From behind his back peeked a skinny woman with a long chin – his wife – and a tall boy with a squint –, his son.”

The thin man’s luggage and family share with him his main characteristic, physical and social thinness.

The narrative is a perfect example of thematic and phonetic equivalences and elaborate sound structures in prose (cf. Schmid 1992, 42–50). Thus, the thinness of the family is also made phonically apparent in the narrative discourse: the word tonkij (‘thin’) is contained in the kartonki (‘boxes’) that the thin person drags. And the thin one’s “giggling,” which sounds like the “giggle” of a Chinese, “Hee-hee,” becomes an acoustic icon of being thin.

Regardless of the social inequality of the friends, their similarity is dominant in the first phase of the encounter. The heroes greet each other heartily with their names, first the fat one: “Porfirij! […] Is that really you? My dear fellow!” then the thin one: “Miša! My childhood friend!” The friends kiss each other three times in the Russian way and look at each other with tearful eyes. “Both were pleasantly stunned.”

The thin one starts exchanging information: he talks a lot, praises his friend’s appearance (“As handsome as ever! Same old heartthrob and dandy”), proudly presents his wife “Luisa, formerly Wanzenbach… a Lutheran” and his son Nafanail (“in his third year of high school”) and introduces the “childhood friend” with whom he went to school to his son. He has been a collegiate assessor for nearly two years and has the Stanislav (the lowest Russian order), but his salary is so modest that his wife gives music lessons and he has to sell wooden cigarette cases. It thereby becomes clear that the man who bears a ruler’s name – Porfirij (from the Greek πορφύριος ‘the purple bearer’) – and has christened his offspring Nathanael (in Hebrew ‘the one given by God’), leads an existence that corresponds more to the German maiden name of his wife.

The similarity of the friends is abruptly suspended for the thin man as soon as he is confronted with the rank his schoolmate now holds. The thin one has thought it possible that the fat one has become a state councilor. That

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148 The maiden name of the wife, in whose Protestant denomination and German background the thin man takes pride, means something like ‘bedbugs’ brook.’

149 For the role of Greek names in Češov’s stories, see Schmid 2013b.
would have been the 5th rank in the fourteen-part ranking table and thus three ranks above the thin one, but the friend could still have been considered similar. But now the fat one explains that he is already a privy councilor (which corresponds to the 3rd rank) and has two stars. With this, he has definitely left the social sphere of the thin one behind him.

The reactions to the social anagnorisis are split. The thin man, together with his family and his luggage, undergoes a profound transformation:

All at once the thin man froze and went pale; soon enough, though, his entire face was distended by an enormous smile, and sparks seemed to emanate from his face and eyes. The rest of him crumpled, cringed, contracted... His suitcases, bundles, and boxes crumpled and shriveled up... His wife’s long chin became longer still; Nafanail snapped to attention and did up all the buttons of his school uniform. “Your Excellency, I... What a great pleasure, sir! A childhood friend, as they say, and suddenly such an exalted personage! Hee-hee!”

While the behavior of the three thin ones is determined by the differentiating characteristic of rank, the fat one, unpleasantly touched by the subservience of the friend from his youth, continues to insist on the unifying characteristic of their common childhood: “that’s enough, now!” frowned the fat man. ‘Why that tone? You and I are childhood friends – there’s no need for such bowing and scraping between us!”

Since their friendship has been nullified for the thin man, the presentation of the family has also lost its validity for him, and so he considers it necessary to present son and wife again. The latter, however, is now presented only with a submissive downplaying of her dignity: “a Lutheran, as it were” (tr. rev.). He does not repeat himself but presents the family for the first time, in a completely changed world, not to his childhood friend but to his superior (Šklovskij [1955] 1966, 348). The fat man is about to protest. “But there [...] is such veneration, such cloying deference and obsequiousness written on the thin man’s face that the privy councilor [feels] sick to his stomach.” The fat man turns away and gives him his hand in parting. “The thin one squeezed three of his fingers, bowed all the way to the ground, and giggled like a Chinaman ‘Hee-hee-hee!’ His wife smiled. Nafanail clicked his heels and dropped his cap. All three were pleasantly stunned.”

Behind the similarity of the sentences Both were pleasantly stunned and All three were pleasantly stunned there lies a significant shift. The fat man and the
thin man were pleasantly stunned when faced with a childhood friend. *All three* refers only to the thin ones, and their shock is not at the childhood friend himself but at the high rank he embodies.

Thus, two very different mental events take place in the two protagonists. In the thin man, a sudden shift occurs from his initial misunderstanding of the social status of his childhood friend, who he initially thinks is similar, to his recognition, which consists in recognition of the deep social gap between them. In Aristotelian terms, we are dealing with a *metabolé* from *hamartía* in *anagnórisis* (i.e., from an error in recognition) to the real *anagnórisis*, to recognition of the fat man’s actual social status. While the thin one makes the transition from the originally assumed similarity to the finally recognized difference in an almost dramatic, physical way, with his whole family and his luggage, the fat one keeps insisting on similarity. When he finally turns away in disgust, he is reacting not to the recognition of the social difference itself (which he must have been aware of from the beginning of the encounter) but to the effect that the anagnorisis has produced in the thin one, namely his complete transformation into a submissive groveler, which the fat one has to experience as a betrayal of their common past at school. So we have two events: the event of the thin man, his true insight and subsequent transformation, and – as a consequence – the event of the fat man, his turn away in disgust from the transformed schoolmate who has nullified their common past.

However, another aspect, the constancy of life roles, is more relevant here. In recollection of his school days, the thin man mentions that the fat man once burned a hole in a schoolbook with a cigarette and that he himself liked to tell on others. The memory shows that the fat man had always broken the rules and the thin man tried to ingratiate himself with the authorities by betraying others. The ontogenetic perspective reveals that in the figural sense of the story, the two did not become ‘fat’ and ‘thin’ but always were so. This excludes any possibility of a conventional motivation that explains the development of the characters in terms of social conditions. The fat man and the thin man are not developable, social characters, but types, archetypes – the fat man and the thin man. They also have a phylogenetic background in the story. The thin one recalls the nicknames they were given in class, the names of archetypal characters from Greek history. The fat one was called Herostratus because he set the book alight, and the thin one was called Ephialtes because of his tendency to snitch on others. Herostratus set fire to
the Temple of Artemis in Ephesus, one of the Seven Wonders of the Ancient World, around 356 B.C. to make his name immortal. Although it was stipulated in the judgment on him that no one should ever mention his name (ut nomen eius ne quis ullo tempore nominaret), it certainly reached the class of Čexov’s heroes. Ephialtes was the name of the Greek who in 480 B.C. in the Battle of Thermopylae “betrayed the fatherland to the Persians” (as Čexov writes elsewhere [PSS, I, 155]). While Herostratus became the epitome of the ambitious man who seeks fame at all costs, Ephialtes became synonymous with a traitor among the Greeks.

The reference to the negative genotypes neutralizes the axiological difference between the phenotypes of the generous man of success and the submissive subordinate that appear in Čexov’s story. In his career, the fat man has probably not only shown that accomplished joviality with which he evokes his childhood friendship with the thin man and has probably not always expressed that contempt for obsequiousness that makes him turn away from the transformed thin man. The negative quality shared by both the ancient genotypes and the school pupils creates a similarity that cancels out the ethical antagonism that, as it may seem at first, exists between the Russian officials. It is most revealing that Čexov made only minor changes when revising the narrative in 1886, yet thereby categorically changed its meaning. In the first version, the sharp transition from the similarity of the friends to the contrast of the officials came from the fat man: “‘So you are to be my secretary?’ said the fat man with his bass, which suddenly blew up like a turkey” (PSS, II, 439). And this transition was not motivated by the recognition of the social distance between them, but by the fact that the thin man called his new superior, whom he has not recognized yet, whom he considers to be a chance namesake of his childhood friend, a “bastard” that the devil may take. Thus the anecdotal ‘splinter’ for the humorous magazine of that name (Oskolki) turns into a serious story about people’s inability to change.

The revision did not simply mean a reversal of the signs. In the second version, the fat man does not become a sympathetic figure. Čexov’s weariness with the social-philanthropic topos of the oppressed minor official, which he expresses in his advice to his older brother Aleksandr from the year
of rewriting,\(^\text{150}\) does not turn into the opposite, into praise of jovial authority. The fat man’s abhorrence of the writhing thin man is not an expression of a fundamental rejection of the rank system. The fat man too much enjoys trumping the thin man’s assumption about his achieved rank with the revelation of his true rank: “No, my dear boy, you’ll have to go a little higher than that [...]. I have already worked my way up to privy councilor... I have two stars.” His archetypal nickname, Herostratus, prevents social motives from being imputed to him. He is obviously just uncomfortable to see the childhood friend that he considers part of his world in such submissiveness. When he assuages the thin man and apostrophizes his junior as equal (“You and I are childhood friends”), he is merely defending the value of his world, which is not to be diminished by his former companionship with the groveler of the present. But he will not forget that even the situational equivalence of the pupils did not abolish the hierarchy of the social roles of Herostratus and Ephialtes.

13.4 The Student: Body, Mood, and World View

The physician Anton Čexov knows about the connection between body and mind and shows in many cases the dependence of ideological positions on mental states and physiological conditions. In model form, this nexus is fixed in a small sketch in the author’s notebook: “He went to his aunt, who entertained him with tea and pastries, and anarchism passed away” (\textit{PSS}, XVII, 73).

Aleksandr Čudakov, who draws attention to this note, states (1986, 328-329) that in Dostoevskij’s works, circumstances never had a decisive influence on the development of ideas. For Dostoevskij, circumstances are a different, lower sphere. Only other ideas, phenomena of the same sphere, can influence ideas (with which Čudakov follows a basic idea of Baxtin 1929).

\(^{150}\) Among the advice given in the letter of January 4, 1886 is: “For Allah’s sake! Please leave your oppressed collegiate registrars alone! Have you no sense that this subject has outlived its usefulness and only causes yawns? [...] No, Saša, it’s high time to put the persecuted correspondents into the archives along with the suppressed official souls... It’s more real now to portray college registrars who won’t give their Excellencies any rest, and correspondents who poison the existences of others...” (\textit{Pis’ma}, I, 176, 178). The subject of the subordinate who becomes annoying with his subservience was realized by Čexov in the story \textit{The Death of a Civil Servant} (\textit{Smert’ činovnika}, 1883).
The philosophy of the Underground Man, for example, is not a result of his liver pain, and Raskol’nikov’s murder plan did not originate from his feverish shivers. Just as Dostoevskij is not inclined to relativize the criminals’ capacity for guilt with states of psycho-physical crisis or circumstances in their milieus, he does not explain the emergence or development of ideas from physical or psychological states of mind.

The nexus of the physical, the mental, and the spiritual that Čexov creates in his depiction of mental events is shown in the late narrative The Student (Student, 1894). Declared by the author to be his favorite narrative151 and considered by him to be his best thought-out work,152 The Student became for many readers and interpreters a master example of a successful spiritual and moral conversion.153 This highly complex story, which has been received and interpreted in very different ways over time, and which has caused controversy even in recent times,154 allows us to consider the question of how ideological positions are motivated.155

Ivan Velikopolskij, a seminary student, returns home from a snipe hunt on the evening of Good Friday. The initially beautiful spring weather has changed, and a cold wind has come up. At the beginning of the text quoted above (2.5.3) it becomes clear that the student feels disturbed in his physical comfort by the evening cool of spring, which is not unusual. Because it is Good Friday, Ivan has not yet eaten. Frozen through and hungry, the student thinks:

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151 This is testified by Ivan Bunin in his memoirs; cf. A. P. Čexov v vospominanijax sovremennikov, Moskva: GIXL, 1986. 482–486, here: 484.
152 Cf. his brother Ivan’s answer to the question “Which of his works was most appreciated by Čexov?”: “The Student. He considered it to be his most thought-out work” (PSS, VIII, 507).
153 The Soviet tradition of interpretation tended to overestimate the factuality, validity, and scope of Čexov’s prozrenie events. According to Leonid Cilevič (1976, 60–61), the “sujet of enlightenment” leads the student “to the realization of the highest truths of existence.” We find similarly exuberant findings in other interpretations from Soviet times. But there is also in the West, especially among the representatives of religious interpretations, the tendency to quite uncritically accept the stories of supposed conversion. In his book, written in 1952 and published posthumously in 1959, Abram Derman already cooled down the euphoria about the student’s insights by referring to youth as the subject of the story: “This is a story about how dear, fresh, and poetic youth is, and how naive and gullible” (Derman 1959, 35).
154 Cf. for example the works of Ščerbenok (2005; 2010), which polemize against the interpretations of Cilevič (1976; 1994) and Schmid 1994a.
155 Apart from this aspect, the question of the ethical reaction of the title character is not raised again here, and an assessment of his mental development is not given. Cf. Schmid 1992, 117–134; abridged English version: Schmid 2014d.
 [...] the same wind had blown in the days of Rurik and Ivan the Terrible and Peter the Great and there had been the same crippling poverty and hunger, the same leaky thatched roofs and benighted, miserable people, the same emptiness everywhere and darkness and oppressive grief, and all these horrors had been and were and would be and even the passing of a thousand years would make life no better. 

The student approaches the fire that he has seen from afar and that promises warmth and food. By the fire, he finds two women from the village, both widows, Vasilisa (whose name comes from the Greek Basiléus ‘king’), wearing a man’s coat, and her intimidated daughter Luker’ja. The fire on the cold night reminds the student of the story of Peter the Apostle’s triple denial of Jesus, which he heard the night before at the reading of the twelve Gospels, and he retells the New Testament story to the women, who also heard the reading. The story he tells is, however, his own selection from the Twelve Gospels read on Holy Thursday (cf. Martin 1978). This story, compiled by the student, is not so much about the suffering of Christ and Peter’s betrayal, but rather about the suffering of Peter, who cannot resist sleep in the Garden of Gethsemane and then, in the courtyard of the high priest, as he warms his hands by the fire, has to watch from a distance how Christ is beaten. After the student has finished his story of Peter’s sufferings, Vasilisa, who was initially smiling, begins to sob and shields her face from the firelight with her sleeve, as if she were ashamed of her tears. Her daughter, on the other hand, whose unwavering gaze had been fixed on the storyteller since his very first mention of Peter’s fierce love of Christ, continues to stare at the student unblinkingly, her face flushed, her expression tormented and strained like someone trying to suppress terrible pain.

The student thinks he can make sense of the reactions of the women in a three-step thought process, in a three-part syllogism.

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First step:

The student’s thoughts turned to Vasilisa: if she wept, it meant the things that happened to Peter on that terrible night were in some way related to her… (tr. rev.)

Second step:

Again he thought that if Vasilisa wept and her daughter was flustered then clearly what he’d just told them about events taking place nineteen centuries earlier was relevant to the present – to both women and probably to this backwater village, to himself, and to everyone on earth.

Third step:

If the old woman wept, it was not because he was a moving storyteller but because Peter was close to her and her whole being was concerned with what was going on in Peter’s soul.

The premises on which these abstract conclusions are based are demonstrably in need of correction themselves: Vasilisa did not merely weep but also exhibited signs of shame, and what Luker’ja exhibited was not fluster but barely suppressed pain. The product of this three-part mental exercise is not very convincing. Are we really to suppose that Vasilisa is interested in the agitation in Peter’s soul? Structured as it is by equivalences, the text suggests entirely different motives for the women. Luker’ja, who “was silenced by her husband’s beatings (zabitaja mužem),”157 becomes the equivalent of Christ, who (as Peter observes from a distance) was “beaten” by his torturers. Vasilisa, for her part, “bursts into tears” like Peter, who after his act of betrayal “began to shed bitter, bitter tears.” Does Vasilisa really hide her face because (as the student assumes) she is ashamed of her tears? Is she not much more ashamed that she has betrayed and abandoned her daughter, as Peter did his Savior? Was she not the one who handed her daughter over to that barbarous husband, and did she not watch her suffering from afar and not do a thing? The student is not entirely wrong in his conclusions. Everything that happened to Peter on that terrible night is in some

157 Heim’s translation (“product of the village and her husband’s beatings”) here does not quite match the original text.
way related to Vasilisa. But Vasilisa is not interested in Peter’s story; she is interested in her own. In the story of Peter’s betrayal recounted by the student, Vasilisa has obviously recognized her betrayal of her daughter.\footnote{On the equivalences between Vasilisa and Peter as well as Luker’ja and Christ, see already Rayfield (1975, 154); on Vasilisa’s betrayal of her daughter, Amsenga/Bedaux (1984, 310) and Schiefelbein (1986, 5).}

Pleased with his apparent insight, the student draws a further conclusion. This one addresses a loftier topic – the shape of world history:

The past, he thought, is tied to the present in an unbroken chain of events flowing one out of the other. And he felt that he had just seen both ends of that chain: he had touched one end and the other had moved.

At the beginning of the story, when Velikopol’skij was racked with hunger and frozen stiff by the cold wind, he had conceived of history as an eternal return of horrors, as an unremitting repetition, as a cycle. Now that he is joyful and elated, he envisions history instead as a causal chain. In its own deployment of equivalences, however, the text suggests that Vasilisa’s story is linked to Peter’s not by contiguity but by equivalence, by a repetition of betrayal that confirms the pessimistic image of the cycle far more than the optimistic image of the chain.

Euphoric from his abstract conclusion about the progress of history, the student has a third realization, still more abstract:

[…] he kept thinking of how the truth and beauty guiding human life back there in the garden and the high priest’s courtyard carried on unceasingly to this day and had in all likelihood and at all times been the essence of human life and everything on earth […]

Here, too, the greatest skepticism is warranted. To what extent, after all, does the story of Peter illustrate the triumph of “truth and beauty”? Is the student not rather mouthing a philosophical commonplace of his era, the nineteenth-century longing for a connection between the ethical and the aesthetic?

Čexov’s story does indeed point to a genuine realization, namely the equivalence-based insight of the mother into her betrayal of her daughter. Yet this recognition, so readily discernible in the gestures and expressions of
the women, is misconstrued by the student. In this respect, the story depicts the misrecognition of an act of recognition.

However, Čexov shows us the student not merely as someone who gets it wrong and is inclined to rash, theoretical conclusions. The system of equivalences and re-enactment includes the student himself. It is not only Vasilisa who repeats the behavior of Peter in her own act of betrayal; the student, too, acts as an equivalent of the Apostle. In the last light of the setting sun, still visible from the mountain, the student betrays the beaten Luker’ja with his three-part argument and three-stage conclusion, just as Peter, in the first glimmer of sunrise before the cock has crowed, has thrice betrayed the beaten Christ. The story exposes a terrifying disinterest in the suffering of the world in this aspiring cleric who goes hunting on Good Friday and observes the fast only under duress. At the beginning of the story, Velikopol’skij integrates an animal’s plaintive cry of pain into his cozy image of order and harmony. He takes the women’s signs of remorse and silent suffering as the point of departure for his abstract and exhilarating conclusions. The young theologian, Čexov shows us, avails himself freely of the suffering of others for his own hedonistic purposes.

This discussion of The Student was intended to show how Čexov shapes the nexus of mental states and physiological conditions with ideological positions. In the beginning, when Velikopol’skij felt agonizing hunger and was frozen by the cold wind, he thought world history as a return of horrors, as an uneventful iteration, as a painful cycle. Now, joyfully excited by his narrative success, he thinks of history as a causal chain of events. The young man – “he was only twenty-two,” the narrator adds here in relativizing terms – is overcome by a feeling of youth, health, strength. He gives himself – with the illusionary joy of many of Čexov’s heroes and with the corresponding emphatic upsurge of their inner speech – to an “ineffably sweet anticipation of happiness, unknown and mysterious,” and life, which he had previously thought of as a repetition of horrors, now appears to him “wondrous, marvelous, and filled with lofty meaning.”
The lack of factuality hangs over many insights and moral changes in Čexov’s world like a shadow. The shift in knowledge and feeling is perceived by the figures, but it is often questionable whether the subjectively perceived change has actually taken place. The narratorial confirmation of the figural perception is missing.

An example of a subjectively perceived ethical-emotional change is *The Lady with the Little Dog* (Dama s sobačkoj, 1899). This story is the model work for all *prozrenie* enthusiasts, who see in it an undeniable mental event, namely the transition from a fleeting liaison at a health resort to existential love, Gurov’s transformation from a cynical womanizer to a sincerely loving man.

Even analysts who read critically acknowledge that the story represents a fundamental mental change. Vladimir Nabokov’s sensitive lecture on the story, which he gave at American universities in the 1940s (1981), is shaped by this view. After careful and prudent analysis of the story, Jan van der Eng (1978, 89) notes that in all the equivalences, the opposition between Gurov’s new love and his earlier affairs eventually prevails and that Gurov’s “psychological development” can be described as “a gradual process of emotional and moral awakening (at first hardly acknowledged, then for a long time subject to uncertainties).” The uncertainties that van der Eng considers to have been overcome remain, however, until the end.

The consecutive nature of Gurov’s transformation seems more than questionable. The two lovers discuss in endless conversations the question of how to free themselves from the unbearable shackles of the marriages in which they find themselves, but do not make the slightest effort to do so. And, setting all that aside, even the factuality of the event is shrouded in uncertainty.

Even shortly before the conclusion, Gurov’s conviction that their love will not end soon is formulated exclusively in terms of Anna’s emotion:

For him it was obvious that this love of theirs would not end soon, that there was no knowing when. Anna Sergeevna’s attachment to
him grew ever stronger, she adored him, and it would have been unthinkable to tell her that it all really had to end at some point; and she would not have believed it. (426)

Is this the way a man feels when he thinks he has found his great, only love in life, when he has changed from a womanizer to a deeply feeling partner? Consider the situation in which Gurov recognizes himself as loving, or thinks he recognizes himself as loving. He takes Anna by the shoulders to caress her, to joke with her. He sees himself in the mirror:

His head was beginning to turn gray. And it seemed strange to him that he had aged so much in those last years, had lost so much of his good looks. The shoulders on which his hands lay were warm and trembled. He felt compassion for this life, still so warm and beautiful, but probably already near the point where it would begin to fade and wither, like his own life. Why did she love him so? Women had always taken him to be other than he was, and they had loved in him, not himself, but a man their imagination had created, whom they had greedily sought all their lives; and then, when they had noticed their mistake, they had still loved him. And not one of them had been happy with him. Time passed, he met women, became intimate, parted, but not once did he love; there was anything else, but not love. (427)

Only now, after looking at his reflection in the mirror, registering his own age and feeling the warmth of the body in front of him, does he direct his thoughts to himself and his emotion. This is followed in the text by the key sentences cited by supporters of the thesis that Gurov undergoes a moral and emotional transformation:

And only now, when his head was gray, had he really fallen in love as one ought to – for the first time in his life.

He and Anna Sergeevna loved each other like very close, dear people, like husband and wife, like tender friends; it seemed to them that

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fate itself had destined them for each other, and they could not understand why he had a wife and she a husband; and it was as if they were two birds of passage, a male and a female, who had been caught and forced to live in separate cages. They had forgiven each other the things they were ashamed of in the past, they forgave everything in the present, and they felt that this love of theirs had changed them both. (427)

These words do state a categorically new emotional state. But in the form of apparently narratorial narrative, they represent figural content of consciousness. It is here that Gurov thinks and feels, and there is no doubt at all that he is “now” actually convinced of “this love of theirs” and its transforming power. But what validity and longevity does this conviction have? Might it not perhaps stem from a moment of self-pity, from the awareness of approaching old age, which has come about when looking in the mirror, when looking over Anna, who, standing in front of him and taking up most of the mirror image, is conspicuously not even looked at closely? Does the contrast between his impression of age and the ugliness of his body and the perceived warmth and beauty of the youthful body standing before him not contribute to his conviction that this is his first true love? Could Gurov, whom we met as a cynic, have changed so profoundly? Can we believe that he, who spoke of women as a “lower race,” has gained the capacity for sincere, friendly love? Is it not strange that “this love of theirs” only arose after a long separation and that Gurov’s secret life is quite compatible with his other life in society? Čexov’s consistently figural presentation does not show us any objective reality behind the subjective conviction. But the exposition of the hero and the blossoming of his first real love under the conditions of his double life cast a shadow on the factuality of the transformation, which – as Gurov (and with him many an interpreter) is convinced – was caused by “this love of theirs.”

13.6 The Bride: Iterative Changes of State

The realists’ acts of insight were presented in the perfective narrative aspect and in a resultative modality, i.e., the insight was completed before the end of the narrated story and did lead to a result. In Čexov,
however, the *imperfective* narrative aspect dominates in various modalities: insight is either only in its initial state (inchoative modality) or is merely attempted (conative modality), or it remains in an ongoing state until the end of the story without reaching a conclusion (durative modality), or it is repeated (iterative modality). A new view of life is aspired to, and takes shape before our eyes too, but it remains uncertain whether it will really reach a conclusion. This uncertainty is often based on the fact that the story ends earlier than the mental event. The resultativeness that characterizes an authentic event can also become questionable when a border crossing is carried out repeatedly, with an intermediate return to the starting point.

Imperfectivity with inchoative, conative, durative, and iterative modality characterizes the insights of Nadja in *The Bride* (*Nevesta*, 1903). In hardly any other work by Čexov can the finality of an inner conversion be determined as little as in his last story. Saša, who eternally calls on women “to turn their lives upside down” (*perevernut’ žizn’*; *PSS*, X, 214) is no less compelled by repetition than Andrej Andreič, the scorned fiancé who, in order not to have to speak, is forever playing the violin, or Nadja’s mother Nina, who changes from one explanation of the world to another (cf. above, 3.5.5). This casts a shadow on the finality of Nadja’s departure from the world dominated by her bigoted and enterprising grandmother. Nadja renounces her bridegroom and also develops beyond her mentor Saša. But can she really leave the spell of her old existence, or does she too succumb to the repetition that dominates the world she is leaving? This is a question that appears so persistently with the famous final sentence, the referential meaning of which Čexov made so unclear in the final version of the text by an insertion, the mere marking of subjective opinion:160 “She went upstairs to pack, and the next morning she said her farewells and alive, happy left the town behind – as she thought, forever” (497).

Even in the first version, the final sentence left room for considerable doubts about the resultative, irreversible, and consecutive nature of Nadja’s decision: “She went upstairs to get ready for her journey, and the next morning she left, and a busy, wide and pure life loomed before her” (*PSS*, X, 299). The famous addition *as she thought* is not to be understood as a narratorial

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clarification that this was not the case: it only underlines the figurality of the judgment and thus the durative modality of the action.

Let us consider a passage shortly before this final sentence, in which the occurrence of the event is stated in the text of the character concerned. The Russian text says:

Она ясно сознавала, что жизнь ее перевернута, как хотел того Саша […] (PSS, X, 219)

Carol Apollonio translates:

It was now clear to her that her life had been turned completely around, just as Saša had wanted […]¹⁶¹ (497)

The translator does not pay attention to the imperfective verbal aspect. It should rather be:

She was realizing clearly that her life was turned upside down […]

How is this sentence to be understood? Is She was realizing clearly the introductory narratorial sentence for an indirect representation of thought, or are these words already part of a FID that encompasses the process of consciousness as well as its result? Someone who chooses the first possibility can reproach the author for not signaling clearly enough the precariousness of the supposedly clear insight, for having identified too strongly with the character’s insight. Realizing clearly is, however, a predication that the narrator would hardly have used in his own name, because in it a not inconsiderable semantic-grammatical contradiction becomes apparent. The result, the clear insight denoted by the lexemes, is counterbalanced by the durative type of action in the imperfective verb. Clearly, with its implication of the perfective, the resultative, is an adverb that is essentially incompatible with the action of realizing still being in progress. Realizing clearly sounds suspiciously like the character’s text, and indeed similar turns of phrase have already appeared twice before in the narrative, once in the discourse of the mother, who affirms that many things have now become “clear as day” to her (495), and even earlier in Nadja’s speech itself. Before Nadja’s first departure, we read:

“It was now clear that she really was leaving for good” (493). The lexemes clear and clearly thus create equivalences. But the correspondence of the Nadja apparently departing once and for all with the earlier Nadja, who returned, and with the mother, who has never been able to escape the thralls of her mother-in-law and who describes her ever-new philosophies with images of clear and sharp perception, casts doubt on both clear and realizing. The acts of insight in realistic narrative were unique, non-iterative, and irreversible. Relapses into earlier ways of thinking were impossible in the realists’ acts of insight. In Čexov’s world, we often observe iterative cognition, and the rescindment of processes of insight can never be ruled out.\footnote{An extreme, almost pathological case of iterative prozrenie is Sweetheart (Dušečka, 1899). Olja Plemjannikova, a vampire, always adapts completely to the life world of her husbands and with every change of partner she comes to a completely new view of life. For the story, see Schmid 1992, 67–70; Freise 1997, 205–208.}

13.7 The Archpriest: A Vision in Death

Dying and death was a challenging topic for the physician Anton Čexov. The end of life causes a particular lack of eventfulness in processes of insight, the lack of consecutiveness. A realization is made, but it comes too late to have consequences for life. In these cases, death is a condition of insight and at the same time thwarts its consecutiveness.

A late mental metabolé is the topic of The Archpriest (Archierej, 1902). There is no prose work on which the author worked for longer, with more interruptions, and under less favorable conditions for writing, struggling constantly with his progressing illness (cf. the commentary in PSS, X, 457). The theme of the story is the death of Bishop Pëtr. On the eve of Palm Sunday, the bishop celebrates the night Mass. He has not been feeling well for three days, and the night Mass seems to go on forever. The people in the darkened church seem to him like a rolling sea, and it seems to him that all the faces resemble each other, old and young, male and female, and all those who take pussy willow branches have the same expression in their eyes. It seems to him that his mother, Marija Timofeevna, whom he has not seen for nine
years, also approaches him and picks up a branch, looking at him with a joyful smile, before she disappears into the crowd again.\textsuperscript{163}

The narrative is dichotomous. But it is not the opposition of life and death, time and eternity, everyday life and church life, the secular and the clerical, that organizes the narrated world, as it may seem at first and as many interpretations assume.\textsuperscript{164} The evaluative reactions of the bishop fall into two groups. The faithful gathered in the church evoke negative responses in the clergyman (“the crowd kept on moving, and it looked as if there was, and would be, no end to it” [466]), the cry of a holy fool “disturbs him unpleasantly,” the petitioners with their petty concerns are annoying to him. These motifs, to which Petr reacts negatively, are contrasted with another series of motifs that connote life and pleasantness. This group is formed by the aesthetically received objects and vivid phenomena of nature that the narrator presents in a harmonious picture through the perception of the bishop:\textsuperscript{165}

Soon the service ended too. As the Bishop was getting into his carriage to go home, there came spilling through the whole garden, illuminated by the moon, the cheerful, beautiful ringing of expensive, heavy bells. The white walls, the white crosses on the graves, the white birches and the black shadows, and the distant moon in the sky, hanging right above the convent, now seemed to be living their own particular life, incomprehensible to man, but close to him. It was the beginning of April, and after a warm spring day it had become cool, there was a touch of frost, and in the soft, cold air could be sensed the breath of spring. [...] everything around was welcoming, young, so close, everything – the trees, and the sky, and even the moon – and one wanted to think that it would always be so.\textsuperscript{166}

\textsuperscript{163} A detailed analysis of the narrative is not intended here. For a thorough, subtle, and very differentiated interpretation, cf. Thomas Wächter (1992, 173–223), where the allusions to Jesus Christ as “Archpriest” and “Son of Man” play a prominent role. Wächter also critically refers to the relevant secondary literature in Russian, English, and German.
\textsuperscript{164} For a metacriticism of the oppositions assumed in many interpretations of the narrative, see Stepanov 2005, 335–359.
\textsuperscript{166} On the factors that evoke the impression of harmony in this section, see Nilsson 1968, 102–104.
How unlike the young cleric in *The Student* does the old cleric in *The Archpriest* perceive the cool of evening during Holy Week.

Pëtr’s sense of perception continues to alternate between the reverential people, who are an annoyance to him, and the phenomena of nature and the natural, which for him mean life and fulness of life. The ranks of natural phenomena are joined by Father Sisoj and Pëtr’s niece Katja. Sisoj is “the only person who behaved with freedom in his presence and said all he wanted” (474). Katja uninhibitedly observes her uncle, tells him about back home, and, addressing him confidentially as “dear,” asks him for a little money for the family.

What Pëtr saw earlier was no illusion: his mother has arrived with her granddaughter Katja. The arrival of his mother triggers tender feelings and memories in Pëtr. While the text has so far been largely narratorial, with a tendency towards slightly figurally colored narration and individual fragments of classical FID, the reproduction of the memories becomes increasingly figural but basically remains in the hands of the narrator:

The Bishop got changed and started saying his prayers before bed. He said the old, long-familiar prayers attentively, and at the same time thought about his mother. She had nine children and about forty grandchildren. She had once lived with her husband, a deacon, in a poor village, and had lived there for a very long time, from the age of seventeen until sixty. The Bishop remembered her from his early childhood, almost from the age of three, and how he had loved her! Sweet, dear, unforgettable childhood! Why does it, that irrevocable time, gone forever, why does it seem brighter, more festive and richer than it actually was? When in his childhood or youth he had been unwell, how gentle and sensitive his mother had been! And now his prayers mingled with his memories, which flared up ever more vividly, like a flame, and the prayers did not prevent him from thinking about his mother. (468)

The memories carry the bishop deep into the past. He remembers his native village, his parents, individual people, strange situations, even the dog named *Syntax*. During his memories Pëtr laughs out loud, and he laughs again when he remembers that his mother has come.

The mother, however, despite the tenderness with which she speaks, is embarrassed and addresses her son formally. Petr confesses to his mother
that he had a great longing for her when he was abroad. The mother smiles, but maintains her reverent behavior, “as if she felt more like a deacon’s wife than his mother” (471). Pëtr becomes sad and angry. For him, his reverent mother, who does not treat him as a son, joins the annoying visitors and petitioners who astonish him with the “shallowness of everything that was asked for, that was cried for” (473). After his return from abroad, the Russian people seemed to him coarse, the petitioners boring and stupid, the seminarians and their teachers uneducated, sometimes even raw. Pëtr suffers from the distance that people, including his mother, keep from him. In a mixture of consciousness report, figurally colored narration, and FID, the narrator presents Pëtr’s appraisal of his feelings since the return from abroad:

He was also quite unable to get used to the fear which he aroused in people, without wishing it himself and despite his quiet, modest disposition. When he looked at them, all the people in this province seemed to him small, frightened, guilty. Everyone was timid in his presence, even old archpriests, everyone “plopped down” at his feet, and one suppliant, the old wife of a rural priest, had recently been unable to get a single word out through fear and had thus gone away with nothing. And he, who could never bring himself to speak ill of people in sermons and never reproached them, because he felt sorry for them, he would lose his temper with suppliants, get angry, throw petitions onto the floor. In all the time he had been here, not a single person had talked to him in a sincere, straightforward way, like a human being; even his old mother no longer seemed the same, not the same at all! And why, the question was, did she talk incessantly and laugh a lot with Sisoj, while with him, her son, she was serious, usually silent, and shy, which was not like her at all? (474)

After the reading of the twelve Gospels on Holy Thursday evening, Pëtr goes to bed exhausted. He is suffering physically and emotionally. It is not the church services that burden him: “[...] in church, especially when he was himself playing a part in the celebration, he felt active, vigorous, happy” (478). It is the isolation from the human, the reverence and shyness that keeps people away from him. “Oh for just one person to whom he could talk and unburden his soul!” (478).

Shrunken in stature, with wrinkled face and big eyes, the man who was a bishop lies there like a child, and he rejoices (“How good! How good!”; 479)
that he is “more insignificant than anyone, that all that had been had receded somewhere far, far away and would not be repeated again, would not be continued” (479). The old mother comes and no longer remembers that he is a bishop. She kisses him like a beloved child and calls him Pavluša, using the diminutive form of his real name.167

In the very last moment of his life, when he can no longer speak a word or understand anything, the archpriest Pëtr has a vision:

[...] he imagined that, already a simple, ordinary man, he was walking quickly through the fields, cheerfully, tapping with a stick, and above him was the wide sky, flooded with sunlight, and now he was as free as a bird, he could go wherever he wanted! (479)

_The Archpriest_ tells no Easter story, no secularized saint’s legend, as some Christian-minded interpreters in Russia as well as in the West would have it (cf. the criticism in Wächter 1992). The bishop neither overcomes death, nor does he gain eternal life by entering into the cycle of nature. The narrative presents nothing more than a vision of the dying man. In this vision, there is no promising light (as in Tolstoj) and no expectation of a resurrection (as in Dostoevskij).

In dying, the archpriest crosses a boundary, the boundary to a way of existence that he envisions as ideal. He does not simply terminate his spiritual existence but frees himself from the burdensome expectations that people have of him as a bishop. He becomes the “simple, ordinary” person he was in his childhood and who was prevented from remaining so not by his ministry but by the gap opened up by the reverence of the faithful. This is how the joyful walk across the open field under the wide sky flooded with sunlight is to be understood. This winning of life is, of course, granted to him only for a moment and only in the mode of imagination. And something stands out in this vision: there are no people in it, apart from the joyful wanderer, not even “simple, ordinary” ones, and it is far from any livable reality. A mental event has taken place, but it takes place in an illusory vision and cannot have any consequences. It lacks factuality and consecutiveness.

167 The threefold retransformation – Pëtr into Pavel, the clergyman into the boy, and the “old” man into the “new” – is what Valerij Tjupa (2001, 26) regards as the paradoxical plot event of _The Archpriest_. 
How far Čexov’s narrative is from propagating the idea of life after death – even if only in a metaphorical sense – is shown by the epilogue. Some months after the archpriest’s death, no one remembers him, and when his mother timidly tells the other women at the meadow that she had a son who was a bishop, “not everyone did believe her” (480).

13.8  *Grief*: Reversal in an Imaginary Dialogue

*Grief* (*Gore*, 1885) is the story of the woodturner Grigorij Petrov, who takes his dying wife Matrënà to hospital and, after his wife dies on the sleigh, gets such frostbite that the doctor at the hospital gives up on him. The tale *Grief* is a kind of precursor to *Rothschild’s violin*. Grigorij Petrov is characterized by the same paradoxical combination of rough character and aesthetic refinement as the unfeeling coffin maker Jakov Ivanov, who plays the violin exceedingly well. Petrov is a master turner known for his creations. In the imagined conversation he has with the doctor during the trip, he offers to make his masterpieces for him free of charge, if only Matrënà gets well again: “A cigarette-case, if you like, of the best birchwood,… balls for croquet, skittles of the most foreign pattern I can turn… I will make anything for you!” (*PSS*, IV, 231). 168 In the real dialogue with the doctor, he then offers similar samples of his mastery in return for the extension of his own life.

Both artists, Grigorij Petrov and Jakov Ivanov, have remained poor despite their talent. The turner is prevented from earning money by his addiction to drink. And the coffin maker is rarely asked to play in the Jewish orchestra because of his hatred of Jews. In addition to the rough virtuosos and their mutely suffering women, the two narratives are connected by the unfeeling sources of medical help. The real doctor in *Grief* is of the same coarse nature as the feldsher in *Rothschild’s Violin*. The heroes try to ingratiate themselves with both. The feldsher, to whom the coffin maker has brought his sick wife, states succinctly: “The old woman’s had her innings. It is time to bow out” (*PSS*, VIII, 300). And the doctor, who is no more sensitive, calms the turner, who is doomed to death by frostbite: “What are you crying for?

You’ve lived your life, and thank God for it! I suppose you have had sixty years of it – that’s enough for you!…” (PSS, IV, 234).

The most important common feature of the stories is the theme of inner conversion. In both narratives, the death of the wife leads the hero to a re-evaluation of his life, to an insight into his inhuman treatment of his wife, and to a recognition of his guilt.

The tale Grief is characterized by four narrative features:

1. The narrative contains an embedded story, the narrative of the future of a character who thus acts as a secondary narrator. In that narrative, the turner Grigorij Petrov anticipates his encounter with the doctor in the hospital.

2. Embedded in the narrative of the future is the imaginary dialogue that Petrov expects to have with the doctor. The secondary narrator anticipates the doctor’s replies against his own horizon.

3. Formally, the narrative of the future is addressed to the dying wife. In reality, however, the turner is speaking only to himself. Thus, the future story and the imaginary dialogue with the doctor embedded in it are part of the turner’s interior monologue.

4. An inner reversal in the turner takes place in this highly complex interior monologue.

A snowstorm is raging on the road along which Grigorij Petrov drives his wife to the hospital. Without turning to the woman lying on the sleigh, Petrov mumbles to himself how he will try to persuade the unwilling doctor Pavel Ivanovič to treat her. Fighting with the elements on the impassable road, pushing the weak little horse with his whip again and again, Petrov develops an imaginary dialogue with the doctor. After some time, he asks the woman whether her side is still sore but receives no answer. It now strikes him as strange that the snow on his wife’s face is not thawing. Without looking round, he feels her cold hand. “She has died! Damn!” (PSS, IV, 232–233). Petrov turns the sleigh around and beats the horse with all his might. Lost in memories, Petrov snaps out again: “Where am I going?” and turns around again. Dreaming of a new life, he falls asleep and awakes only in the hospital. Hands and feet no longer obey him. The doctor tells him they

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169 In place of “Damn!” Garnett has here: “What a business!”
are frozen. To Petrov’s complaint “I am grieving... Graciously forgive me! If I could have another five or six years!...” the doctor goes out with a wave of his hand: “Amen for the turner!” (IV, 234).170

The turner’s inner reversal has been triggered by his wife’s look, an unfamiliar and hitherto completely unknown look. The previous evening, when Petrov came home drunk as usual and began, as usual, to scold and shake his fists, his old woman looked at her “rowdy spouse” as she had never looked at him before. Usually, her eyes had a suffering, gentle expression, like that of a dog frequently beaten and badly fed. But now she looked “sternly and immovably, as saints in the holy pictures or dying people look. From that strange, evil look in her eyes the grief had begun” (IV, 232; tr. rev.). The turner borrowed a horse from a neighbor to take the old woman to the hospital, hoping that the doctor, by means of powders and ointments, would bring her back her normal look.

During the whole trip, Petrov mumbles to himself. Formally, his words are addressed to his wife; they are intended to calm her down until the doctor prescribes drops, bleeds her, or rubs alcohol on her. In reality, the turner is calming himself; he cannot assume that the woman lying on the sledge will understand his murmuring.

The unexpected change in the turner’s life is noted in the narratively authoritative words of the objective narrator:

Grief had come upon the turner unawares, unlooked-for, and unexpected, and now he could not get over it, could not recover himself. He had lived hitherto in unruffled calm, as though in drunken half-consciousness, knowing neither grief nor joy, and now he was suddenly aware of a dreadful pain in his heart. The careless idler and drunkard found himself quite suddenly in the position of a busy man, weighed down by anxieties and haste, and even struggling with nature.

In his imagined account of his future arrival at the hospital, Petrov sees the doctor as unfriendly, grumpy, but in principle ready to help: “Pavel Ivanyč will do his best. He will shout and stamp about, but he will do his best...” (IV, 230). However, the image of the doctor imagined by Petrov by no means

170 This last sentence is missing in Garnett’s translation.
coincides with the real doctor. While the doctor in Petrov’s imagination, for all his grumpiness and grumbling, is a decent person who is willing to treat the sick, the real doctor proves to be an unfeeling monster.

In the accusations from the doctor that Petrov imagines, he expresses a criticism of himself. The self-criticism in the words of his imagined interlocutor takes place gradually. At first it concerns the late hour of their arrival. Petrov apologizes by citing the snowstorm and the weak horse. Then the doctor reminds Petrov of his drinking: “We know you! You always find some excuse! Especially you, Grishka; I know you of old! I’ll be bound you have stopped at half a dozen taverns!” Petrov will defend himself emphatically: “And I shall say: ‘Your honor! am I a criminal or a heathen? My old woman is giving up her soul to God, she is dying, and am I going to run from tavern to tavern! What an idea, upon my word! The devil take them, the taverns!’” (PSS, IV, 231; tr. rev.). After these words the doctor is satisfied and – still in the turner’s anticipatory account – has the sick person taken into the hospital. The doctor acknowledges the excessively submissive expressions of gratitude with contempt and raises a new accusation: “‘You’d much better not be swilling vodka, you fool, but taking pity on your old woman instead of falling at my feet. You want a thrashing!’” (PSS, IV, 231). Petrov even agrees and promises the doctor to give him his products if he can cure Matrëna. In the imaginary dialogue, the doctor laughs at this, and, addressing now the woman lying on the sleigh, the turner boasts of his ability to talk to gentlemen. Petrov is still aware of a sore point in his life and says that if the doctor asks Matrëna if he beats her, she should say: “Never!” The memory of his true behavior leads the turner to the promise: “I never will beat you again. I swear it!” But at the same time, he tries to reduce his sin and emphasizes that he cares: “And did I ever beat you out of spite? I just beat you without thinking. I am sorry for you. Some men wouldn’t trouble, but here I am taking you... I am doing my best” (PSS, IV, 232). When he receives no answer from the dead woman, Petrov is annoyed: “You are a fool! I tell you on my conscience, before God,... and you go and... Well, you are a fool! I have a good mind not to take you to Pavel Ivanyč!” (PSS, IV, 232).

When he discovers that Matrëna is dead, Petrov begins to cry. His thoughts, which the narrator introduces with an indirect representation, followed by narratorial FID, express pity and remorse in a lament about the fleetingness of life:
He thought how quickly everything passes in this world! His trouble had hardly begun when the final catastrophe had happened. He had not had time to live with his old woman, to show her he was sorry for her before she died. He had lived with her for forty years, but those forty years had passed by as it were in a fog. What with drunkenness, quarreling, and poverty, there had been no feeling of life. (*PSS*, IV, 233)

This rethinking is connected with memory. When Petrov recalls how he sent his wife to people to ask for bread, he feels uneasy: “Damn! She ought to have lived another ten years, the silly thing; as it is I’ll be bound she thinks I really was that sort of man…” (*PSS*, IV, 233; tr. rev.).

Forty years ago, Matrëna had been young, handsome, happy. She had come from a well-to-do family. They had married her to him because they had been attracted by his handicraft. All the essentials for a happy life had been there, but the trouble was that, just as he had got drunk after the wedding and lain sprawling on the stove, so he had gone on without waking up till now. “Forty years had been wasted like that” (*PSS*, IV, 233).

A wish is growing on Petrov: “To live over again! [...] I should get a new lathe, take orders,... give the money to my old woman... Yes!” (*PSS*, IV, 234; tr. rev.). It is at this climax of his rethinking that his life ends.

What degree of eventfulness can be attributed to this change in thinking? Recognition comes too late for the turner. It is not possible for his new thinking to have any consequences. His rethinking also passes without a trace. There is not even a witness in the narrative world to what has happened inside him.

The eventfulness of this is also questionable because the hero’s *prozrenie* does not have any results. Petrov’s reassuring narrative of the future is directed less at Matrëna than at himself. After Petrov discovers that his wife is dead, he begins to cry. It is not only pity but also anger that makes him cry. He is angry that his rethinking has been overtaken by his wife’s death. The absurd reproach of the woman for dying too soon intrudes into his thoughts on how quickly life passes: “And, as though to spite him, his old woman died at the very time when he felt he was sorry for her, that he could not live without her, and that he had behaved dreadfully badly to her” (*PSS*, IV, 233). Despite the unquestionable remorse Petrov feels, these words also evoke
pity for himself, anger at his wife who could not wait for his prozrenie. Petrov’s inner reversal thus proves to be distinctly relative.

13.9 Rothschild’s Violin: Terrible Losses and Caring for an Orphan

The story of Rothschild’s violin (Skripka Rotšil’də, 1894), hardly noticed by critics at the time of its creation (see the commentary in PSS, VIII, 504), later gained extraordinary recognition as a perfectly built masterpiece. The Russian poet and critic Kornej Čukovskij (1967, 129) called it the “quintessence of Čexov’s style”: “In it are concentrated all the basic features of Čexov’s world view and the peculiarities of his artistic work, in their strongest embodiment.”

Rothschild’s violin tells the story of Jakov Ivanov, a crude, unfeeling Russian coffin maker who, on the threshold of death, bequeaths his violin to the poor Jewish flutist Rothschild, whom he has insulted and threatened all his life. The handing over of the violin is no insignificant act for the coffin maker. The instrument lies next to him on his bed, and when he thinks about his enormous business losses, which are due to the fact that people are not dying often enough, he touches the strings and the violin makes a sound that makes him feel better. The dying coffin maker’s heart is moved, not because he is going to die but because he cannot take the violin into the grave and it will remain an “orphan.”

Playing the violin brings out an otherwise hidden side in the coarse coffin maker. He plays the violin “exceedingly well, particularly Russian songs” (282). And because of his good playing, he is sometimes invited to play in the Jewish orchestra at weddings, although he hates and insults the Jews and, in particular, cannot stand the sight of the gaunt, red-haired Rothschild. Rothschild, however, is the only figure in the story to explicitly acknowledge Jakov’s talent. He would have thrown his offender, as he exclaims in helpless indignation, out of the window long ago if he had not respected him for his talent.

On the violin, Jakov can express thoughts for which he lacks the language. And when he sits on the threshold of his hut and lets the violin sing in thoughts of “life’s wastage and losses,” “without knowing what,” it sounds “mournful (žalobno) and touching” (289). The notes that the violin now sings have precisely the same plaintive character that made Jakov so angry about Rothschild’s flute-playing in the Jewish orchestra: “This damned Jew managed to play even the most joyful mournfully (žalobno)” (282; tr. rev.). Rothschild, who approaches Jakov, who is playing the violin on the threshold, in order to invite him to play in the orchestra again, anxious, expecting new insults, listens attentively; the “frightened, baffled look on his face” gives way to “an expression of mourning and pain,” he shows painful delight, and he bursts into tears, following the example of the crying violinist.

In Rothschild’s violin, the handing over of the musical instrument is linked to a second sujet, which is sketched in the notebook of 1893 under the title Coffin for Olga (Grop [sic] dlja Ol’gi). A coffin maker’s wife dies. He takes the measurements for the coffin from her when she is still alive and enters the costs for the coffin in his expense book. (The intended title with the orthographical error reflects the entry of the coffin maker, so it is character’s text.) The dying woman reminds her husband that thirty years ago, they had a child with blond hair and that they were sitting with him at the river under the willow tree. After the death of the woman, the coffin maker goes to the river and realizes: in those thirty years, the willow has grown considerably (PSS, XVII, 109).

13.9.1 Five Stages of Rethinking

In Rothschild’s violin, the death of his wife Marfa leads the coffin maker to a new view of his life and behavior. The process of recognition and rethinking takes place in five stages.172

1. Marfa falls seriously ill and carries out her daily domestic work with her last remaining strength. Meanwhile, Jakov plays the violin. Towards evening, Marfa goes to bed sick. Jakov, bored, draws up the annual balance sheet

172 Cf. Lija Levitan’s analysis of 1976, which sets out only three stages. Wächter (1992, 63–122) judiciously and convincingly reconstructs the process of recognition and rethinking, differentiating and correcting Levitan’s findings. On Čexov’s poetics of memory, see also Kirjanov 2000.
in his account book and calculates a loss of more than a thousand rubles. The coffin maker, who is immersed in his absurd calculations and desperate about the losses incurred everywhere, has no eye for his seriously ill wife and only pays attention to her when she unexpectedly addresses him: “Jakov! I’m dying!”. Only now does he look at his wife: “Her face was rosy from heat, and remarkably clear and joyous” (283). Jakov understands that she is dying and that she is glad to finally be able to get out of this hut, get away from the coffins and Jakov. The dying woman has a happy expression on her face, as if she were seeing death, her deliverer, and whispering with him. Looking at his wife, Jakov remembers for some reason that he never treated her kindly or felt sorry for her once in his life. Not once had it occurred to him to buy her a headscarf or bring her back some sweets from a wedding. He just shouted at her, lashed out over the losses, and shook his fists at her. And to cut down on her expenses, she had to drink hot water instead of tea. “And now he realized why her face was so strange and joyous, and he was horrified” (283). The next morning, Jakov takes his wife to hospital. The coarse feldsher, whom Jakov submissively tries to persuade to carry out some kind of treatment (cupping, leeches), holds out no hope and makes him understand that the sixty-nine-year-old has lived long enough.

2. Returning to the hut, Jakov takes his wife’s measurements with the iron ruler, as four days on which he cannot work are approaching, and begins to make the coffin. In his expense book, he enters: “Coffin for Marfa Ivanova – 2 roubles 40 kopecks” (285, tr. rev.). Towards evening, Marfa speaks to him a second time: she asks whether he remembers that fifty years ago, they had a little child with fair hair and that they used to spend their time sitting by the river and singing songs under the willow tree. But their girl had died. No matter how much as Jakov racks his memory, he cannot recall any child or willow. “You’re imagining it,” he replies. At the funeral, to avoid expenses, Jakov reads the Psalms himself and enlists the free help of his acquaintances. And he is terribly pleased that everything works out so appropriately, and nice and cheaply. Saying his final farewell to Marfa, he touches the coffin: “Nice work!”. But when he returns from the cemetery, he feels unwell, his legs weaken and he is thirsty, the first signs of the typhoid fever that has taken hold of him too. He remembers once again that in all his life, he never showed Marfa any compassion, never gave her a caress. She managed the household and looked after him for fifty-two years. And in all that
time, he never thought about her, not once paid her any attention, as if she were a cat or a dog.

The coffin maker is approached by Rothschild, who has been sent to invite him to play in the Jewish orchestra. The Jew’s wheezing, his blinking and freckles, repel Jakov, and he is disgusted to see the green frock coat with the dark patches and the whole frail, weedy figure. He rebukes the Jew: “Why are you pestering me, garlic-breath? Just get lost” (286), and Rothschild again emits one of his unrealizable threats: “Vill you please be more quiet, or I’ll zend you flying over the fence!” (287). The Jew runs away from Jakov’s fists, is taunted by the ragamuffins with “Yid! Yid!”, and is pursued by the barking of dogs. A dog must have bitten Rothschild, for there was a desperate cry of pain.

In the encounter with Rothschild, Jakov, who shortly before had become aware of his shameful behavior towards Marfa, still shows no trace of prozrenie. However, one cannot speak here of a “relapse” (as does Levitan 1976, 33). Jakov’s rethinking here only concerns his behavior towards his wife and has not yet extended to a wider circle.

3. Obviously guided by Marfa’s question about his memories, Jakov goes to the river. On the way, this time the ragamuffin boys shout “Bronze is coming! Bronze is coming!” (Bronze is the nickname of Jakov Ivanov). The poor coffin maker is therefore just as little respected in the society of the little town as the poor Jew. By the river, Jakov sees a vast old willow with a huge hollow, the sight of which makes him remember the deeply forgotten past. And in his memory, the baby with the blond fair hair and the willow of which Marfa had spoken, emerge. Yes, it was indeed that same willow, green, quiet, sad. “How it had aged, the poor thing” (287). Jakov wonders why he has not been to the river once in the past forty or fifty years, and he imagines the profits that could have been made from fishing, boating, and goose-breeding. And he has missed all this, he has done none of it. “What losses! What dreadful losses!” (288). And if all this had been done together with playing the violin, what capital would have resulted? Life has passed without any use, without any kind of pleasure, it was wasted, for nothing at all. If one looked ahead,

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173 On the complex thematic equivalences, in which the opposition of hollow wooden things (violin, coffins, boats, hollow willow) and metal (iron ruler, tinsmith [profession of the leader of the Jewish orchestra], bronze, Rothschild = Red-shield) plays a prominent role, see Schmid 2018.
nothing remained, if one looked back, there was nothing but losses, so terri-
ble that it made one shudder. In a curious expansion, Jakov, in his process of
prozrenie, extends his idiosyncratic concept of loss, which he has already
used in a very broad sense, including lost business, from the commercial do-
main to nature and interpersonal relationships:

Why was it that man could not live free of all this wastage and loss? Why
had they chopped down the silverbirch forest and the pine wood? Why was the pasture meadow not put to use? Why did people always have to do the very thing that they ought not to do? Why had Jakov quarreled all his life, growled, flown at people with his fists, upset his wife – and why, oh why, had he just now frightened and insulted the Jew? Why can people not live and let live? What losses it caused! What terrible losses! If there were no hatred or ill will, people could bring each other such phenomenal benefit. (288)

4. The next day, Jakov goes to hospital and understands that he too cannot
be helped. On the way home, the spiral of his thoughts takes one more turn:

As he went off home, the thought occurred that death would be sheer
profit: there would be no need to eat, to drink, pay taxes, upset people,
and as a man lies in his grave not just for a year, but for hundreds, for
thousands of years, if you did the sums, the profit was phenomenal.
Life brings man losses, whereas death brings him profit. (288)

5. Thinking of his lost, loss-filled life, Jakov, on the threshold of his house
and his life, lets the violin sing its mournful melody, and this time he kindly
calls Rothschild, who is approaching with every sign of fear, to come close.
When the clergyman asks him in confession if there is any particularly grave
sin, Jakov remembers again the unhappy face of Marfa and the desperate cry
of the Jew whom the dog had bitten, and he barely audibly tells the confes-
sor: “Give the violin to Rothschild” (289).

13.9.2 Ornamental Narration

Čexov’s ornamentalizing narration occasionally gives the impression that
the cohesion of the thematic units is not only determined by the events but
also controlled by phonic patterns in the discourse. The specifically word-artistic procedure of overdetermining thematic correlations by phonic equivalences is clearly evident at the story’s culmination point.

The dying Jakov is sitting on the threshold of his hut. Thinking of “lost, loss-filled” life, he elicits a completely new, “mournful and moving” tune from his violin, which brings tears to the eyes of the rough coffin maker: “I čem krepče on dumal, tem pečal’nee pela skripka. Skripnula ščekolda raz-drugoj, i v kalitke pokazalsja Rotšil’d” (“And the more deeply he thought, the sadder the violin sang. The latch creaked once, twice, and standing in the gate was Rothschild,” 289).

The first sentence makes the sad singing of the violin not only thematically but also phonically dependent on Jakov’s deep reflection: krepče (‘stronger’) is broken down into its phonetic components in skripka (‘violin’) and pečal’nee (‘sadder’). Sensitized by this isotopy of thematic and phonic relationships, the reader will also pay close attention to the second sentence and its connection to the first. The words at the junction of the sentences, skripka (‘violin’) and skripnula (‘creaked’), which – in principle combinable – here nevertheless denote the agens and actio of two quite different actions, form a paronomasia. It in turn suggests a more than just coincidental connection between the actions. The phonic order of the discourse thus creates a connection that is not drawn in the story itself. A prerequisite for this is, of course, that the reader projects the principle of equivalence from the level of sound to the level of the action. This, however, presupposes the iconicity of ornamental narration.

If in the discourse skripnula (‘creaked’) sounds like a verbal echo of skripka (‘violin’), then the repeated creaking of the door latch announcing the fearfully hesitant Rothschild appears in the story as a consequence, as an action-echo of the singing violin. We can go further: Rothschild’s appearance is motivated by both story and discourse. And in the story, it is grounded in two ways: Rothschild has been sent on an errand by the orchestra leader, namely to invite Jakov to play at a wedding, but he also seems to be following the sound of the violin. And the phonic ornamentation of the discourse

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174 On the tendency to ornamental phonic structure in Čexov’s prose, see Schmid 1984; on the sound figures in Rothschild’s violin, Winner (1966, 162–167).

suggests that Rothschild, metonymically represented by the creaking (*skripnula*) door latch, is also summoned by the sound of the word (*skripka*) that metonymically designates Jakov Ivanov, who is thinking new thoughts on the threshold of death.

Jakov’s performance on the threshold is the key scene of the narrative. The similarity of Jakov’s lamenting violin-playing with Rothschild’s lamenting flute-playing, which is emphasized in the text, is not to be interpreted such that Jakov imitates Rothschild’s way of playing, but rather such that he, as a dying, remembering, and recognizing person, has those same experiences that triggered the Jew’s laments. Rothschild’s empathetic reaction shows that he understands the Russian’s lament in the singing of the violin.

13.9.3 Ironic Finale

Čexov’s tale unmistakably responds to a prominent text, Puškin’s novella *The Coffin Maker*. Adrijan Proxorov, Puškin’s hero, is a similarly gloomy character to Jakov Ivanov. He is usually immersed in sad reflections on inevitable expenses. Like Jakov Ivanov, he considers lost funerals a loss. Čexov’s hero complains that the old people in his town do not die often enough, and his balance sheets, which show a loss even where no business has taken place, are nothing other than absurd. He even adds to his losses the interest on the unearned income from failed funerals. On the third level of his prozrenie, Jakov adds to his trading losses his losses in nature and in interpersonal relationships, and on the fourth level, he finally draws the radical conclusion that man benefits only from death. The conclusion is both absurd and paradoxical: absurd insofar as it is commercial, paradoxical, i.e., apparently absurd, but in reality deeply truthful, insofar as Jakov, as a dying man, actually puts an end to the moral losses that have accompanied his life and for the first time achieves a (material and moral) gain: he hands over his “orphan,” the violin, to the hated Jew.

The opposition of metals connoted by the names Bronze and Rothschild enters into a very complex relationship with the opposition of loss and profit that has dominated history. Loss, the basic category in Jakov’s thinking, is played out on different objects and with different meanings. First of all, it refers to the coffin maker’s unrealized profits, then to the capital that Jakov could have drawn from fishing, playing the violin, operating boats, and raising geese. In the scene by the river, under the willow, a loss of a completely
different kind then appears for the first time: the loss of nature and fullness of life. Finally, loss becomes a moral category that denotes the inhumanity of human coexistence.

Before his remembering and the prozrenie accompanying it, Ivanov, despite his beautiful violin-playing, did not make a profit because he was archaic, primitive, just bronze; as a dying man, he made a profit by giving his most precious thing to Rothschild. The Jew, who has literally had to feel the deplorable losses that people inflict on each other, but is capable of forgiveness, lends meaningful, musical expression to the victory of soulful wood over hard metal that took place in the dying coffin maker’s inner conversion, as his legacy. For this reason, the story rightly bears the title Rothschild’s Violin.

The handing over of the violin, which is a material manifestation of the mental event to the outside world, makes the story’s point possible: when the flutist Rothschild tries to repeat on the violin what the dying coffin maker played on the threshold when thinking of a life full of losses, something so sad and mournful emerges that the audience is moved to tears. And this new tune has so impressed the town that the merchants and officials invite Rothschild to their homes and make him play it ten times in a row. The poor flutist thus realizes the huge profit that the violin-playing coffinmaker was not able to make in his life, and which fulfills the promise lying in the name Rothschild.

The finale of the tale has also been interpreted quite differently. Most Soviet interpreters, following a common socio-philological figure of interpretation, perceive the “progressive world view of the author” at the end of the story and attribute Jakov’s complaint about the losses made in life to Čekov’s criticism of social conditions. In the West, too, the story has usually been read as having an unreservedly positive finale. Gary Rosenshield (1997, 488) calls the story one of the few depictions of “reconciliation” between Russians and Jews in nineteenth-century Russian literature. Donald Rayfield (1975, 137) even speaks of a “harmonious end of almost schmalzy sentimentality.” Only a few recipients recognize the irony in the finale. One of the most radical interpreters is N. L. Mamaeva (1972, 147), who sees in the last paragraph a bitter negation of the pathos that the story of Jakov’s last days has created. The irony of the last sentences shows that people are not capable of understanding Jakov’s discovery. However one might understand the ironic tones of the finale, they in no way drown out the tones of recognition.
and empathy struck in Jakov’s prozrenie. The simultaneity of impressions of contradictory mood is characteristic of Čexov’s poetics.

13.9.4 The Jewish Theme

According to the assessment of Efim Ėtkind (1985, 31), the Jewish question is central to Rothschild’s violin. The contrast between the coffin maker with the very common Russian name Ivanov and the flutist with that most famous Jewish name Rothschild, he argues, is dissolved in the common feeling of music and in their common tears. Jakov’s relationship with Rothschild develops from hatred to love. This is too uncritical, or too simply put. Čexov always describes only a moment in the development of his characters; he depicts the inner state of his characters at a moment in their story that is determined by external and internal factors, and excludes extrapolations to the next moment or even to what is generally valid. In one moment of their shared story, Ivanov and Rothschild have certainly “merged” with each other in music and tears, as Ėtkind states, but this does not mean that the opposition between them is set aside.

Jakov Ivanov’s anti-Semitism is of a special, selective nature. It is mainly directed against the weak, fearful, sensitive Rothschild, but strangely enough not against Moisej Il’ič Šaxkes, the leader of the Jewish orchestra. His profession as a tinsmith adds him to the series of metallic motifs. His name comes from the Hebrew šakar ‘recruit, buy, bribe.’ The Russian occupation name ludil’ščik (‘tinner’) is derived from the verb ludit’, which not only means ‘to tin’ but also ‘to cheat, to do roguery.’ With this second meaning of ludit’, ludil’ščik activates a thematic feature which, converging with the meaning of the name Šaxkes, characterizes the money-hungry orchestra leader who keeps more than half the profits for himself. This behavior, which corresponds to the anti-Semitic cliché of the money-hungry Jew, is curiously accepted with indifference by the Jew-hater Jakov Ivanov.

Rothschild, who in the story remains without a first name or patronymic (while his orchestra leader is equipped with both) is obviously the embodiment of Judaism for Jakov. Jakov is surely attracted by the weakness and helplessness of the flutist, who seems to him a suitable victim of his aggression, while he has respect for the tinsmith and orchestra leader, not least because he makes a tidy profit. Lija Levitan (1976, 36) also accuses the scolding Rothschild of rudeness, enmity, and humiliation, but it must be countered
that the flutist’s absurd threats merely express the helpless indignation of someone injured without reason, and not real aggression.

When revising the story for the second edition, at a time of pogroms and official anti-Semitism in Russia, Čexov reinforced Ivanov’s anti-Semitic accents by replacing evrej, the neutral Russian name for a Jew, with the pejorative žid wherever the narrative text linguistically reproduces Jakov’s position, while leaving evrej in narratorial passages. In addition, Rothschild is linguistically characterized by shtetl forms of Russian in the second edition.

Anti-Semitic clichés are also echoed in the mistrustful questions of the inhabitants of the small town about the origin of Rothschild’s violin: “Did he buy it? Or steal it? Or someone pawned it to him?” (289).

Robert Louis Jackson ([1978] 1987) sees the singing under the willow by the river that Marfa recalls for the memoryless Jakov as an allusion to Psalm 137, which begins with the verses: “By the rivers of Babylon, there we sat down, also we wept at our remembrance of Zion. On the willows, in the midst thereof, we hung up our lyres.” Čexov may well have thought of the Psalm, especially since the Latin name of the weeping willow, Salix babylonica, recalls the Babylonian Captivity, but no convincing intertextual equivalence can be established between the characters and situations (cf. already Wächter 1992, 84–85). Neither the coffin maker couple singing by the river fifty years ago nor Jakov, who is now by the river remembering the past, can be compared with the Jews sitting on the rivers of Babylon who, beset by their oppressors, refuse to sing. At most, two motifs establish a point of contact between the texts: the harassment of the Jews in a foreign country and the theme of forgetting and remembering.

13.9.5 Representing the Rethinking Mind

The first paragraph of Rothschild’s violin leads directly into the coffin maker’s horizon of values:

The town was small, more wretched still than a village, and it was filled almost entirely with old folk, who died so seldom that it was a crying shame. And in the hospital and the prison the demand for coffins was low. In a word, business was bad. Had Jakov Ivanov been a coffinmaker in the provincial capital, he would no doubt have had his
own house, and people would have addressed him respectfully as Jakov Matveič. Here in this little backwater, though, he was simply Jakov, and for some reason he had also been nicknamed “Bronze.” He lived humbly enough, like an ordinary peasant, in a small old hut that had only one room, which housed Jakov, Marfa, the stove, a double bed, the coffins, a workbench, and all their belongings. (281–282)

The quote presents the story’s initial situation. The selection of elements (small town, old folk, hospital, prison, coffins, business), their evaluation (the town is small, more wretched still than a village; old folk so seldom die that it is a crying shame; the demand for coffins is low), and the connection of these heterogeneous elements to make a situation that expresses a certain atmosphere are all oriented around the spatial and ideological perspective of the protagonist, the coffin maker Jakov Ivanov, who ekes an existence out of other people’s deaths. The temporal standpoint from which the situation is described in this way is that of the protagonist. It can be localized on the cusp between the prehistory (presented later in memories) and the actual story, directly before the occurrence of the events (the death of his wife Marfa, Ivanov’s own illness) that trigger the story’s main mental event, the crude coffin maker’s remembering and internal change. Thus, the spatial, temporal, and ideological perspective of the representation is figural. However, it is not the case that a situation shaped by the elements themselves is merely figurally presented. The happenings, which are, after all, entirely continuous and have no breaks, do not contain any situations. A situation is only ever constituted in the consciousness of a latently story-forming subject, who experiences reality and reduces its complexity to a few elements. Who is that subject here? It initially appears to be Jakov who has drawn the town, the old people, and the bad state of business together into a situation. But this situation does not exist in his consciousness, since the selected elements are not the objects of current perception or memory on the part of Jakov, who has not yet even appeared in the story. This is not a case of FID, the more or less narratorially reshaped reproduction of the current content of a character’s consciousness, but rather of FCN, figurally colored narration by a narrator who reproduces the character’s text in the selection and evaluation of the
thematized elements, without the character perceiving or thinking about them at this moment in the story.\footnote{This is a not uncommon device in Češov; see for example the beginning of The Student (see above, 2.5.3). That with Češov “the voice of the hero is often heard before he appears as the acting person,” was already noticed by Vera Ximić (1969, 143).}

Although the selected elements determine the coffin maker’s general mental state and their qualification adheres entirely to Ivanov’s internal sensitivities – i.e., although they fundamentally could appear in his consciousness – the selection of them from the myriad possible thoughts passing through his consciousness, and their combination into a situation, has been undertaken by the narrator. By choosing these, and not other, elements, he picks out a thread through the countless goings on in Ivanov’s consciousness in the happenings. In this way, his ideological standpoint is also represented in the extract, in the meaning which the selected elements are given in his story. This meaning is realized primarily in the highlighting of the commercial categories that determine the coffin maker’s thoughts and feelings.

The presentation of the action that begins with Marfa’s illness and the presentation of the prehistory both involve figurally colored narration. The prehistory also includes the description of the Jewish orchestra and the perception of its music as a cacophony. Here, it becomes clear that the narrative text follows the horizon of the hero in its values (i.e., in the ideological perspective):

As Bronze sat in the band, his face would quickly start to sweat and turn crimson; it was hot, and there was a choking stench of garlic. His violin would be squealing away, he had a double bass croaking at his right ear, a flute weeping at his left ear, played by a scrawny ginger-haired Jew with a face crisscrossed with red and blue veins, a namesake of the famous millionaire Rothschild. (282)

A large part of the narrative text serves to depict Jakov’s inner world, his inner speeches, thoughts, and perceptions. The character’s text, which includes the mental actions of the hero, is reproduced in DD, ID, and FID. DD often appears without graphic marking and, when pronouns of the first and second person are missing, coincides with FID: “Yes, it was indeed that same willow, green, quiet, sad.”
The reader thus perceives Jakov, his prehistory, and his transformation entirely from Jakov’s axiological or ideological perspective. The objective narrator denies himself his own evaluations and evaluative accents such as ironic intonation. He also adapts his lexis and syntax to the linguistic horizon of the hero. The spatial perspective is also figural. The outside world is only captured to the extent that it falls within the hero’s field of perception. The temporal perspective, however, is narratorial. The narration takes place after Marfa’s and Jakov’s death, both of which are assigned to the “past year.” The temporal standpoint of the narrator is marked in the last paragraph: “And now the whole town is asking where Rothschild could have found such a fine violin? [...] Long ago he put his flute away, and now he plays only the violin” (289).

13.9.6 How Far Does the Prozrenie Reach?

How far does Jakov Ivanov’s prozrenie reach? What degree of eventfulness does it have? Soviet interpretations tend to interpret Jakov’s lament about the “losses” as a call for changed social conditions on the part of Čexov, or at least to see in Jakov’s “new thoughts about life” a “victory over death” (thus Cilevič 1981, 96). The Jewish theme is conspicuously excluded here. And in the West, Gary Rosenshield (1997, 496) speaks in highly religious formulas of Jakov’s “epiphany and awakening,” “resurrection from the dead,” and “spiritual rebirth.”

The tale, however, forces us to make a number of qualifications that relativize its eventfulness.

First of all, it must be remembered that Jakov’s prozrenie comes too late for his life. This places the story in the group of narratives by Čexov about an event that comes too late. Even if Jakov’s new way of thinking is resultative, it is in any case lacking in consecutiveness, which is a criterion for full eventfulness. Jakov’s inner conversion can no longer have consequences for his life. And his new tune, which Rothschild tries to reproduce on Jakov’s violin, may move the merchants and officials in the city, but it will not change the world. How little the inhabitants of the small town are touched by Jakov’s insight and the new tune is proven by their suspicious questions about the origin of Rothschild’s fine violin. It is to be feared that the effect of the new tune will be exhausted in the emotion of the listeners and in Rothschild’s commercial gain.
The *metabolé* is also put into perspective by the fact that Jakov cannot overcome the commercial thinking in the categories of loss and profit on which he is fixated, even as a dying man. He puts the ethical losses that he is now lamenting alongside the commercial ones. This equivalence markedly calls the scope of his rethinking into question.

When Jakov notes the losses on an environmental level, he seems to be less interested in the conservation of nature as such than in its economic use. He wants to reintroduce fishing on the river and breed geese to slaughter and sell them to Moscow. The sale of down alone would yield ten rubles a year. This commercial plan renders his vision of white geese by the river, which seemed to signal aesthetic pleasure in nature, rather more prosaic: “Jakov shut his eyes and in his mind he saw huge flocks of white geese rushing toward each other” (287).

The real breakthrough to a new way of thinking is less evident in Jakov’s inner speeches and visions than in the fact that he instructs the clergyman to give his violin to Rothschild. But this way of acting also qualifies the eventfulness to a certain extent. Could Jakov not have given the violin to Rothschild himself?

What made Jakov decide to give the violin to Rothschild? Rothschild is a flutist and not a violinist. And there is no indication that he has any special musical talent. He only makes a profit with the touched merchants and officials because he tries to reproduce what Jakov played on the threshold. Not without good reason, Viktor Šklovskij (1966, 369) describes Rothschild as a “good-natured, understanding, devoted and powerless Salieri.” Immediately before asking the clergyman to give Rothschild the violin, Jakov recalled the happy face of his dying wife and the desperate cry of the dog-bitten Jew. In this, empathy appears and the motive of remorse, perhaps also an attempt at reparation. But the question is whether the legacy does not also stem from the fatherly concern for the “orphan,” the violin, that is left behind and that Jakov knows will be well looked after by Rothschild. If that is the case, his instructions to the clergyman would be less of a “grand gesture of magnanimity” (Rosenshield 1997, 496) than they might at first appear. It also remains undecided whether the concern for the violin shows a new way of thinking in the person who had to be reminded by his dying wife that they once had a child, or whether it just shows an old fixation on an object that was meant to replace his child and, lying next to him in bed, his wife. When Jakov presents his sick wife to the feldsher as his *prédmet* (‘object’), he uses
an expression that in the nineteenth century referred to someone to whom one was attached with affection. Anna Gunin translates *moj prédmet* correctly with “my one and only” (284). Nonetheless, the unintentional, unconscious, but literal meaning ‘object’ is very present in the use of this expression by Jakov, who is not stylistically confident.

*Rothschild’s violin* is thus the story of a deficient event, and as such is characteristic of the Čexov’s late work, which shows a lack of eventfulness in the various mental changes that the heroes undergo, or believe they undergo.

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177 Cf. *Slovar’ russkogo jazyka v 4-x tomakh*, Moskva 1983, s. v. “predmet 5".
VII. Summary and Conclusions
How are mental events, i.e., important and consequential shifts in the consciousness of figures, represented in narrative works from different epochs and cultures? That was the central question of the preceding studies.

Medieval romances are underestimated in mainstream literary studies in at least two respects. They are more narratively complex than is generally assumed and require narratological analysis to a greater extent than some representatives of Medieval German Studies are prepared to concede. The use of narratological categories such as the narrator, perspective, events, patterns in rendering speech and thought, etc. in no way contradicts the specific structure and socio-pragmatic position of the medieval romances, or their status in the history of mentalities, as methodologically defensive Medieval Germanists like to argue. Recent studies of Middle High German romance using these categories demonstrate that they are not operating with anachronistic tools but rather arrive at findings that are entirely appropriate for the Middle Ages and enrich our knowledge of medieval works to a considerable extent.

Wolfram’s Parzival will, however, cause the analyst approaching with the tools of narratology some discontent. There is no doubt that a great event can be traced in the case of the hero. And his path – from the simple fool who grows up in the desolate forest without contact with the outside world, to Grail King – is also accompanied by an inner development that can be described as a process of gradual insight and maturation. A continuous line between these stages, however, is often lacking, so that we are forced to speak in terms of developmental leaps. In these leaps, Parzival develops from arrogant hostility towards God to penitential humility. Meanwhile, his spiritual and character development remains one-sided, asymmetrical. While Parzival gains maturity in his rational behavior, he shows unchangeable traits in his intuitive behavior that recall his parental heritage. These are, on the one hand, the virtues inherited from his mother, triuwe and erbärmde, and on the negative side, a rash manheit inherited from his father, which manifests itself in unreflected recklessness.

Something else is also puzzling for the modern reader: self-knowledge and ethical self-improvement would not open the Grail Kingship to the hero
if he were not predestined for it by his origins and if he did not distinguish himself by virtues which he owes to his inherited \textit{art}.

In the account of Parzival’s ascent, a dichotomy between openness and determination, characteristic of teleological cultural systems shaped by thinking in terms of salvation history, emerges. Predetermination, however, reduces eventfulness, which is no longer open to all developments. If Parzival’s path in life is protected by the power of the Grail, as the narrator underlines in 737, 25–27, his development lacks the characteristic of unpredictability that is constitutive of eventfulness.

The point of view in Parzival is narratorial. The clearly profiled, omniscient narrator, equipped with unrestricted introspection, repeatedly interpolates his evaluations, comments, and confessions in the course of the narrative. He also simulates concern for his hero, as if he did not know about the story’s happy ending. For the representation of consciousness, the narrator uses the two archaic explicit patterns, consciousness \textit{report} and direct interior discourse. Some direct external discourse (e. g., 329, 25–27; 332, 1–8), however, is less communication with another figure than self-talk, a direct interior monologue. The important negative decisions in the mental development of the hero are shaped following this pattern, such as the rejection of the joys of life until he sees the Grail again (329, 25–27); the denunciation of feudal service to and declaration of war on God (332, 1–8); the accusation of God for refusing to help him and not protecting him from suffering (450, 21–22); the arrogant request to God to reward his service and to help him, at least on Good Friday (451, 15–22), and to guide his horse (452, 5–9); the renewal of his hatred of God and his accusation of God before Trevrizent (461, 9–14).

There are no stylistic differences between direct external and internal speeches. Both are linguistically narratorial. Even the numerous interior monologues do not contain any lexical or syntactic features, that suggest we are dealing with character text. It should be borne in mind that the strict verse structure, with its four-foot iambic meter (and potential to emphasize semantically important words through metrical devices) and obligatory couplet rhyme, imposes so many limitations on language that it would have suppressed any strong figuralization.

The broad application of direct interior monologue is an occasion to reflect anew on the use of this device in the history of narrative. Certainly, Wolfram’s method is still far away from the Dujardin variety of this device.
What is missing here is immediacy, the expression of thoughts in *statu nascendi* with the impression that *tout venant*. Parzival’s interior monologues are logically well ordered, linguistically fully articulated, narratorial in lexis and syntax. Wolfram systematically uses the interior monologue when he creates turning points in the inner plot.

*Tristan* the term’s: Contradictions of the Heart in Dialogized Interior Monologues

Gottfried’s *Tristan* is more ‘modern’ than Wolfram’s *Parzival* where some narratological parameters are concerned. This applies especially to the representation of consciousness. Even more than in *Parzival*, the action has moved from the outside world to the inner world. Accordingly, the narrative point of view shifts slightly from the narratorial pole to the figural pole. A large part of the diegesis consists of interior monologues, which of course still only appear in the direct form. Both hero and heroine express themselves in extended monologues. Tristan’s departure triggers Isolde’s sorrowful renunciation monologue, which comprises more than 100 verses. After Tristan has left Marke’s court, the focus remains on him and we learn nothing more about Isolde. In three extended interior monologues, Tristan expresses the distress of his heart. In contrast to Parzival’s interior monologues, the soliloquies of Gottfried’s hero and heroine are characterized by a strong interior dialogue. The person addressed in the imaginary dialogue is either the absent partner or an *alter ego*. This supports the analytical function of the monologues.

Although Isolde fights a battle between emotion and reason in her monologue and is tempted to reproach the departing lover, the inwardly agitated woman remains calm; she can moderate her impatience and call herself to reason again and again. Finally she reaches the attitude of true, unselfish love.

Tristan’s extensive soliloquies, which carry the entire plot after the separation of the lovers, are more dramatic. In his three interior monologues, in which he is torn between two positions, he expresses his *zwîvelnît*, the agony of indecision between the two Isoldes, or more precisely, between his passionate love for the distant blonde Isolde and the comfort of the near but unloved Isolde of the White Hands.
The internally dialogized monologues created by Gottfried are a milestone in the history of the representation of consciousness. The haunting presentation of the heart’s dilemmas points far ahead into modern times.

Samuel Richardson: The Beginning of the Art of Consciousness

With the sentimental novel of letters and correspondence, storytelling enters the realm of the art of consciousness.

In Pamela, a the monoperspectival epistolary novel, the writer registers the finest movements of her own soul and the mental states of Squire B., who desires her. Immediate experience and self-description coincide in a single person, and there is often a short time gap between experience and narration (writing to the moment). In the case of dramatic developments, the letters become a kind of interior monologue. Pamela’s interior monologues sometimes take on a dialogical character and reflect the heroine’s indecisiveness about the steps to be taken and her deep doubts about the sincerity of the man who desires her. The interior dialogue leads to a split of the letter-writer into two voices. This division becomes dramatic in the great apostrophe of the mind to the heart (O credulous, fluttering, throbbing mischief), which so frivolously believes what it wants.

The monoperspectivism presented a certain problem. Mr B.’s motives and his conversion from a desperate seducer to a sincerely loving man could only be depicted via Pamela’s perception. Thus, the persecuted woman registered attentively and with pleasure every sign that her words and letters triggered emotion and a change of thinking in B. This naturally gave many recipients the impression of vanity and calculation, and made the heroine’s motives appear in a questionable light, which soon triggered parodies and ambiguous allusions in England and abroad.

Richardson sought to solve the problems of monoperspectivism in his second novel, Clarissa, which was conceived from the beginning as a correspondence novel. The four letter-writers have different evaluative positions. The letters include reflections on their own situations and those of their counterparts, the weighing up of different courses of action, the playing through of options, but also revelations of their emotional states of mind. Of
particular interest are the letters of the seducer Lovelace to his friend Belford, in which the libertine reveals the abysses of his soul with cynical openness.

The interior dialogue, at which Richardson had already tried his hand in Pamela’s soliloquies, now also includes the figure concerned and the addressee, whose imaginary replies the writer anticipates and answers. The interior dialogue staged in letters is one of the techniques of the direct representation of consciousness with which Richardson introduced new developments to narrative literature.

Classical FID already appears in Clarissa’s letters about her sister Arabella; in these letters, which are concerned with Lovelace’s half-hearted courtship of Arabella, it serves to ironically distance Clarissa from her sister’s words and evaluations.

Up to its middle (after which it becomes a correspondence novel), Pamela depicts two clear mental events, relevant and unpredictable reversals: Squire B.’s contrite remorse and his proposal of marriage to the maid he loves, and the assurance of the virtuous woman that she sincerely loves her persecutor and abductor, who has so persistently harassed her. Clarissa creates less obvious events. Lovelace’s crime is the unsurprising consequence of this notorious seducer’s cynical speeches and actions, and can hardly be considered an event. And his final remorse after Clarissa’s death lacks any consecutiveness. On the other hand, the fact that Clarissa renounces the world after losing her honor should be considered an event. However, this development comes at a price: the living woman, who certainly has some weaknesses, becomes an ideal figure and the novel changes from a love and seduction story to the vita of a martyr.

In Clarissa, the form of the correspondence novel has reached its limits. The genre was dependent on the observations and linguistic representation that the letter-writers were able to provide from within themselves. This excluded whole dimensions of consciousness. A different mode of narration was needed for the expression of the foreboding, vacillating, and indeterminate nature of the life of the soul. Such a narrative mode presented itself in the non-diegetic (third-person) narrator, who presented a more or less complete picture of the deeper, not clearly fixable movements of his characters’ consciousness in hybrid modes that mixed CT and NT.
Various types and forms of changes in mental state are depicted in the three novels of Jane Austen that we have taken a closer look at. Processes of insight are a common theme of Austen’s early novels (and also of the posthumous *Persuasion*). In some cases, the change of state consists of overcoming self-deception through self-knowledge.

The heroines develop an increasingly active role in the events of the three early novels. In *Sense and Sensibility* the sisters Marianne and Elinor overcome their original one-sided attitude to life and arrive at a new, hybrid, and therefore more mature attitude. Marianne proves to be more actively involved in this process, in that she consciously strives for a new approach to life after the setback to her romantic attitude. Elinor, by contrast, remains largely passive. She is more of a patient (in the narratological sense), more the object of a change of state than an agent who brings about a change of state.

In *Pride and Prejudice*, both Elizabeth and Darcy overcome their pride and prejudice and must take action to address their own weaknesses. Their mutual transformation brings them closer together and makes this couple, who have shown a secret interest in each other from the beginning, ready for a happy love relationship.

In *Emma*, the mental event, the painful recognition of Emma’s own error and misconduct, becomes paradigmatic. A partner in the transformation is absent here. The development of the *raisonneur* Knightley, an ideal figure, as the name suggests, is already complete at the beginning of the story. Only a tiny weakness clouds his radiant image. This is his jealousy of Frank Churchill, which does not entirely make sense given his own assuredness and the fact that he essentially saw through Churchill from the beginning.

In *Pride and Prejudice* and *Emma*, the heroines have to go through a state of being humiliated, and in both works, the proud heroines have to admit that they did not know themselves until now or that they were blind in head and heart. This cathartic low point is the necessary passage to final happiness.

Austen concentrates on the moments of crisis, whose emotional peaks are usually presented in figural FID. Where emotional excitement is not de-
picted, FID is usually narratorially filtered. In general, it can be said that narratorial FID reflects the essential insights, admissions of guilt, and intentions of the central figures.

Uncertainty about the speaking and thinking instance active in FID does not play a role in Austen’s works. The originating character is often indicated by preceding or succeeding reports of consciousness or the indirect representation of perceptions, thoughts, and feelings. If such contextual indications are missing and FID is not shaped in a clearly figural variant, with exclamations, syntactic forms of spoken language, and a lexis characteristic of the character, it approaches FCN.

The slightly distanced, non-diegetic narrator in Austen’s novels (who is not marked in terms of gender), who tends to leave an ironic mark, often reveals a thoroughly benevolent but not uncritical intonation in the concealed presentation of CT. In this context, the reproduction of CT in FID is generally a privilege of positive characters. Where negative figures speak in FID, it usually involves speech perceived by another figure, i.e., a phenomenon of the representation of consciousness (in Emma, this is often the case in the presentation of Mrs Elton’s speeches).

The indicative and symbolic modes of consciousness representation also play a role in Jane Austen’s work. An example is the plot point from Sense and Sensibility analyzed above: Edward Ferrars, whom the Dashwood sisters believe to be married, indicates that he is unmarried. His inner state is suggested by the fact that he, while talking, uses the scissors he finds by chance to cut their sheath into pieces.

The actual moment of upheaval in the mental metabolé, the microstructure of contradictory mental movements, is not presented in Austen. Nor is Austen interested in the staging of love scenes and feelings of happiness. The narrator, who is always slightly aloof and tends to irony, instead notes, quite soberly or following the impression of the figures, “joy” (S＆S, 335), “felicity” (S＆S, 338), “happiness never felt before” (P＆P, 246), or “something like perfect happiness” (Emma, 350).
In the fourth part of this book, three different cases of “minus devices” (Lotman) of mental eventfulness were considered.

On the way to the psychological novel, the Russian national poet Aleksandr Puškin orientates his prose fragments around the representation of consciousness as he knew it from contemporary francophone literature, especially from Benjamin Constant’s Adolphe. Dissatisfied with the explicitness of the devices found there, Puškin applied a fundamentally different mode of consciousness representation in his first completed prose work, the cycle of Belkin Tales: a psychologia in absentia. Puškin refrains from naming psychological states and leaves the indeterminate motivations of his characters to be filled in by the reader. In so doing, the reader has three diegetic techniques to turn to: 1) the creation of intratextual equivalence between thematic units, the parallelism of situations, the repetition, mirroring, and variation of core motifs; 2) allusions to other texts; 3) the unfolding and realization of phraseological idioms, semantic figures (antitheses, paradoxes, oxymora), tropes (metaphors, metonyms), and proverbs and sayings. The author’s changes allow us to trace how Puškin systematically replaced remnants of explicit representations of consciousness with scenes that require interpretation. In particular, the devices of indicative and symbolic representation of consciousness are used, which challenge the hermeneutic competence of the reader. The absent psychology that the reader makes present in this way no longer has anything in common with the characterology of the eighteenth century. The person is no longer the closed, fundamentally fixable character that literature has portrayed so far. The psychologia in absentia introduced by Puškin already bears those traits that realism’s art of consciousness ‘discovers’: polyphony, contradiction, and the ambiguity of mental movements.

Otto Ludwig: The Non-Occurring Expected Event

Otto Ludwig’s novel Between Sky and Earth serves as an example of the depiction of a mental event that is expected, even considered desirable, by all participants but that does not happen. Apollonius Nettenmair is unable to make the decision to marry his brother’s widow, although they love each
other. The event in that decision would be the crossing of the borders that “clarity” and the “need for cleanliness” have drawn in his consciousness. The absence of an expected event is not itself an event. It lacks the dimension of eventfulness. This is one of the cases in which eventfulness and tellability become distinct from each other.

Ludwig shows himself in the novel to be an event skeptic as far as mental events are concerned. The world he depicts is characterized by intellectual narrowness and unstinting ethical rigidity. To draw a different, more mobile picture would, as the author remarked to critics, be a betrayal of reality.

*Between Sky and Earth* is considered the first novel of consciousness in German literature. Apollonius has to make two decisions: can he, may he, marry his beloved Christiane? How should he meet his brother’s attack on the roof of the church tower: should he let his brother fall to his death, or should he risk his own life to save his brother? The protagonist’s inner struggles over the right decision give the author the opportunity to depict the consciousness of his protagonist with a wide range of devices. In addition to the concealed forms, above all FID, which is used systematically here for the first time in German literature, the two basic forms of marked representation of consciousness, indirect representation and the consciousness report, are also found here. At the beginning of the novel, the description of house and garden is dominated by the indicative and symbolic representation of consciousness, with the help of which the author draws a vivid psychogram of the hero.

The narrator has introspection into all the characters, presenting the narrated world from the point of view of various protagonists, but is nevertheless constantly present himself. The presence of the narratorial element makes it difficult to identify the concealed patterns of the representation of consciousness, which occurs in manifold forms. The extensive neutralization of the opposition of NT and CT in the stylistic features (language function, syntax, lexis) obscures who ‘sees’ and who ‘speaks’ in whole passages to the extent that it cannot be resolved.

Ludwig’s narrative texture is characterized by rapid and frequent changes between narratoriality and figurality as well as between marked and concealed modes of representing consciousness. This requires a reader who has sufficient linguistic sensitivity and ability to immerse himself in the characters to untangle the interference of the voices and to recognize the configuration of the evaluative positions. This will not always be possible with cer-
tainty, even with the greatest sensitivity for the texts involved in the interference. The ambiguity of the identification of the feeling and thinking instance in any given case becomes the model for ambiguous mental life. In this respect, Ludwig’s *Between Sky and Earth* is the first German novel of consciousness.

**Jan Neruda: The Cycle of Unsuccessful Events**

In his tales from Prague’s Little Quarter, Jan Neruda depicts a closed micro-world, characterized by an unwillingness to change and an inability to host events. The mentality of this topos is most impressively reflected in the tale *How Mr Vorel Broke in his Meerschaum Pipe*. The title refers to an event that involves a crossing of borders in the literal, topological sense, the breaking down of a wall behind whose arched window Mrs Staňková has been sitting in front of her prayer book from morning to evening since time immemorial. In place of the window, the grocer Vorel puts the door to a new shop. The citizens of the Little Quarter punish the transgression of the border, which for them is a superfluous innovation, by boycotting the new shopkeeper, which leads him to bankruptcy and finally to suicide. The catastrophe is triggered by the talk of Miss Poldi, the only customer Mr Vorel has ever been able to serve. The unmarried lady has misunderstood the friendliness of the businessman as erotic courtship and, humiliated by the neighborhood gossip about her unmarried status, has ‘avenged her sex’ on the supposed wooer.

The rejection of events by the micro-world of the Little Quarter, whose evaluations are reproduced in collective text interference, above all in FID and FCN, is also expressed in the fact that the other stories tell of futile attempts at marriage and ritual commemoration of almost-marriages. Mr Jarmárka, for example, celebrates the twenty-fifth anniversary of his almost-wedding. In this world, events are replaced by ritual repetition. The rites of the Little Quarter are characterized by the fact that the events they commemorate did not take place at all, such as Jarmárka’s marriage or the marriage proposals of (seemingly) would-be bridegrooms who are dead and commemorated by Miss Máry in her annual All Souls’ Day ritual. And where something happens, for example, the rescue of the seemingly dead man by
the physician Dr. Heribert, when at the narrow Oujezd Gate (the symbolic passage to the world of events) the coffin has to be unloaded and the lid falls down, the police are called and the life-saver is denigrated as “Doctor Spoiler.” It is no coincidence that in Vorel’s story Mr Uhmühl, the representative of law and order in the Little Quarter, is the only one to benefit from the meerschaum pipe, and the fact that the pipe is nicely broken is the only positive outcome left behind by Vorel’s attempts at change.

Fëdor Dostoevskij: Dialogicity of Pros and Cons

Dostoevskij presents the consciousness of his characters as bipolar. Many of his protagonists are affected by an inner split. This is already the case with the despondent but ambitious law clerk Jakov Goljadkin, the hero of The Double, who projects the ego that he is not able to be onto the outside world and imagines a rival successful at work and with women. Raskol’nikov, who bears the split (raskol) in his name, is divided before the murder between the will of the head and the action of the hand, and after it between the desire to cover the traces and the urge to reveal himself that emanates from the voice of conscience. Ivan Karamazov is torn between the secret desire to see his despised father dead and the will to hold back from the crime. When, in dialogue with the semi-idiotic but extremely shrewd Smerdjakov, he rejects the murder, he subliminally gives his consent, which is understood by his counterpart. In his nightmare, Ivan stages his alter ego in the form of the bourgeois, but not quite evil-minded devil, who sneeringly reproaches him with his own earlier arguments and texts, which makes Ivan furious.

The profound figuralization of the narrative report, in which above all the patterns of the concealed representation of consciousness, such as FID, free indirect perception, and FCN dominate, gives The Double a prominent position in Western literature. If Jane Austen was the first to systematically apply FID, it is The Double that exploits the disorienting effect of text interference, which consists in the concealment of the speaking and thinking instance, to a hitherto unknown extent.

The new technique led to the fact that readers, who were accustomed to narratorially presented Romantic and fantastic double depictions of Hoffmann’s type, did not recognize the figuraiity of the presentation and thus the
purely imaginary existence of the double. For this reason, *The Double*, innovative in the form of its presentation, was a failure in its time.

Dostoevskij’s first great novel, *Crime and Punishment*, continues the technique begun in *The Double*. Although the narratorial element is strongly pronounced in the novel, its narrated world is presented, mostly without any special marking, largely from the hero’s perspective. The devices of text interference are therefore widespread, but the hero’s mental struggles over the right decision are also fought out in direct interior monologues.

The internally dialogized monologue, in which the thinking character turns to and against his *alter ego*, was already a basic device for the representation of consciousness in *The Double*. The device is also encountered in *Crime and Punishment* when Raskol’nikov calls himself to account or mocks himself for his own arguments and motives.

In *The Brothers Karamazov*, which is not focused on a single hero and reflector, text interference naturally recedes and external dialogue dominates. In the tense dialogues, the plot is driven forward, the consciousness of the protagonists is portrayed in an indicative way, and the philosophy of the figures is made known. Highlights of Dostoevskij’s art of dialogue and psychology are to be found in the Fifth Book, which is titled *Pro and Contra*; the conversation between Ivan and Aléša in the inn, during which Ivan articulates his “rebellion” and recites the “poem” *The Grand Inquisitor*; further, the three conversations between Ivan and Smerdjakov, in which Ivan gives the subliminal consent to patricide; and finally Ivan’s brilliant encounter with the devil, which is basically a dialogically staged interior monologue.

The texts written by the protagonists are form of representation of consciousness in Dostoevskij’s novels that should not be underestimated. Some time prior, Raskol’nikov had written a treatise *On Crime*, by means of which the clever investigator identifies the murderer and his true motivation, without, however, having any evidence in his hand to prove that Raskol’nikov was the perpetrator. Ivan expresses his views in four texts in *The Brothers Karamazov*. However, he takes a different position in each of them and does not like to be reminded of earlier positions. While he himself changes positions, his adepts are fixed on only one of his positions. (Something similar can be observed in *The Demons* in Stavrogin’s relationship with his adepts, who accuse him of being unfaithful to his earlier ideas).

The events portrayed in Dostoevskij’s work essentially take place between two poles that sound as voices in the protagonists’ consciousness. In
The Double, the mental event consists of the final recognition on the part of Goljadkin, who throughout the story has fought with all his strength against both his supposed enemies and his feared mental illness. In Crime and Punishment, the perpetrator does not murder for social-philanthropic reasons or to save the young women, motivations which the author initially offers his readers, who he knows will be drawn to progressive discourses of the time. The mythical motivation to which Raskol’nikov increasingly takes a liking will only convince the reader before the investigator brings into play the above-mentioned treatise, in which Raskol’nikov sets out the distinction between the “extraordinary” people, who have the right to commit any crime, and the “ordinary” ones, who serve only the purpose of reproduction.

The actual mental event in Crime and Punishment, the change from crime to confession and acceptance of punishment, takes place in many small steps and not without relapses. In this torturous process before his own conscience, Raskol’nikov’s interior monologues of the direct type and his dialogues with Sonja Marmeladova play an important role. The decisive prognostic keywords of the finale, however, such as “resurrection into a new life” and “dawn of a renewed future” appear in the authoritative words of the narrator.

The mental events in The Brothers Karamazov concern the conversion from an existence far from God to the acceptance of a good and just God and a corresponding lifestyle. The conversions take place in the form of a chain reaction, which starts from the atheist Markel and, through his brother Zinovij-Zosima, Alëša, the well-known sinner Grušen’ka, and her lover Dmitrij, finally reaches the God-critic Ivan and the socialist student Kolja Krasotkin. Accompanying and conditioning moments of the conversions are joy in God’s glorious nature, Franciscan love for the little birds, and of course love for people and the acceptance of personal guilt, responsibility for everyone and for everything.

Dostoevskij is an optimist of eventfulness. Faith in the ability of man to change and be changed reaches its peak in the two novels discussed.
Tolstoj is an authorial author. The narrators are not constituted as separate personalities in his two great novels. Although the fundamental separation of narrator and author, which is clearly apparent in other works such as the Kreutzer Sonata or in the diegetic narrators of his early works, also applies to Tolstoj, there is no sign of a dissociation of the narrator from the author in War and Peace and Anna Karenina. The author’s shadow also lies over the depiction of the characters’ consciousness. Their states of consciousness are more often presented in a consciousness report or indirect representation than in direct or free indirect discourse. With the exception of the staging of special states of mind – such as the reproduction of the thought fragments and phonic associations of the drowsy Nikolai Rostov, or the selectively negative perceptions of Anna Karenina on her ominous way to the train station – Tolstoj’s direct and free indirect interior monologues tend towards the narratorial type. Levin’s extensive interior monologues in the final chapters, in which he presents his new insights in dialogue with himself, also have a narratorial character. Their spontaneous character does not change this. Question and answer, the sequence of premise and conclusion, and the increasing accumulation of facts are less an expression of figural consciousness than of the didactic intention of the narratorial rhetoric.

A counterbalance becomes apparent here to the argument of Viktor Vinogradov (1939, 179–189), who distinguishes two types of interior monologue in Tolstoj’s work: (1) the “irrational” type (which directly reproduces CT) and (2) the more conventional “logical” type, which according to Vinogradov is an exception in Tolstoj’s work. As already explained by Lidija Ginzburg ([1971] 1977, 339), Tolstoj’s narratives are clearly dominated by the ‘logical,’ i.e., the narratorial type of interior discourse. This type predominates both in direct discourse and in FID. This becomes clear again and again in the material that has been quoted.

As in Dostoevskij, albeit in a less radical form, Tolstoj’s work contains many dialogized interior monologues. In the dialogues staged in the interior monologues of Dostoevskij, whose dialogicity is where the struggle between positions of meaning is played out, as is particularly evident in Raskol’nikov’s soliloquies or Ivan Karamazov’s nightmare. Tolstoj’s heroes in their
interior monologues are more concerned with self-critical stock-taking, sober self-knowledge, and resolutions for ethical action.

Here once again, the two great realists can be compared. Tolstoj uses the consciousness and inner speech of his characters for his authorial purposes. He uses them to exemplify what is exemplary and wrong. The axiology is always clear. There are no mixed values. Dostoevskij is more interested in the character, in its idiosyncrasy, in its individuality and contradictions. As indicated above, his model of figural consciousness is spatial. The soul of his heroes is polytopic, has several places. His heroes are thus in constant dialogue and in constant conflict with themselves. There are also figures in Dostoevskij who are very close to him. But the author’s sympathies are not as clearly distributed and uncontestable as in Tolstoj. In The Brothers Karamazov, the author’s position is represented much less by Zosima with his Franciscan-like piety, or his adept Alëša, than by Ivan, the accuser of God. But Ivan is torn between ideas. As described above, he takes very different positions in his four texts and, in contrast to the adepts who are fixed on a single one of his positions, switches between extreme ideological poles. The difference that becomes apparent between the two great realists is probably what Mikhail Bakhtin wanted to express with his dichotomy of polyphony (Dostoevskij) and monologism (Tolstoj).

Tolstoj makes his male protagonists go through mental events that shake them to their core. Nothing less than the meaning of life and the existence of God is at stake. Their female partners behave with equanimity in the face of the men’s inner struggles, because they do not need a metaphysical justification for the right course of action: they know it instinctively. Pierre Bezuxov and Konstantin Levin, however, arrive at an ametaphysical faith in which God is equated with the good and the good with action appropriate to the situation.

Andrej Bolkonskij, the third male seeker of meaning, is given an early death. His dying is represented as a mental event in its various phases. They are the inner withdrawal from life, painful and incomprehensible for those who remain; the alienation from this world; a cold, almost hostile view of those closest to him; the understanding of something not communicable, the feeling of a “joyful and strange lightness of being”; and the unfolding of an all-love not directed at a person. The composition of Andrej Bolkonskij’s passage into death, like the death of Ivan Il’ič, which is accompanied by experiences of light, is for the author a means of finding a meaning in death, a
meaning he himself had been fighting for from his first work. The knowledge of death as an awakening, which is attributed to Andrej, is the result of self-persuasion on the part of the author, given what we know about Tolstoj’s fear of death, which, as he put it, erases all truth. This attitude is not dissimilar to Dostoevskij’s nadryv – overexertion, self-persuasion to faith – different as the two authors may be.

Anna Karenina is depicted as an unconscious constructor of her destiny by means of a wide-ranging triad of equivalences. Even in her first encounter with Vronskij, in the fatal sphere of the railway, she recognizes in the accompanying accident in which a worker is cut in two by the wheels of a train an “evil omen” – obviously for the story with the young man she has just met, a story that she has already outlined. Since the first encounter, Anna has carried within her the fatal image of the mangled body, which she associates with her love for Vronskij and which in her dreams appears associatively in the motif of the iron worked by a bearded man. She underlays her first physical union with Vronskij, whom she identifies in that context with a murderer, with this image, and she carries it with her until her fate is fulfilled under the wheels of the train. It is no coincidence that before she steps onto the tracks, she remembers the accident at the station when she first met Vronskij, and she knows, as the narrator reports in FID, what to do now. Thus her own death under the wheels of the train is the fulfillment of the schema of her fatal expectations, which are formed at the moment of her acquaintance with Vronskij.

Why does Anna Karenina’s love fail? What makes her fatal expectations come true? She fails not because of the disapproving society, not because of the disadvantaged position of women, not because of Vronskij’s – only in her imagination – dwindling love, but because of her ever more exorbitant claim to power, which demands ever more unconditional devotion.

One of the highlights in Tolstoj’s presentation of consciousness is Anna’s journey to the station, when she does not yet know consciously that she will throw herself under the train. In her extended direct interior monologues, Anna articulates her gloomy mood, and highly selective perceptions are embedded in the monologues, which focus on repulsive views of the outside world. The indicative and symbolic mode of the representation of consciousness is brought to perfection here.
Anton Čexov has been described here as a post-realist. By post-realism, I mean a poetics that remains committed to realism in its basic parameters, such as the requirement for psychological verisimilitude or a consistent narrative perspective, but detaches itself from it in other respects. Čexov’s post-realism can be characterized in five points.

1. The great mental events portrayed by the realists contrast in Čexov with changes that do not meet at least one of the criteria for complete eventfulness. Either they lack factuality and the change turns out to be an illusion (In the Cart), or there is a suspicion that the reversal is merely a self-deception bound up with the moment (The Lady with the Little Dog). Relevance, an important characteristic of eventfulness, can be highly relative, for example present only in the reduced perspective of an outsider (An Event). The changes often lack resultativity, and only a wish or intention remains (The Teacher of Literature). If all participants except the protagonist have foreseen and expected the change of state, there is a lack of unpredictability (The Literature Teacher). A mental event may actually occur, but may come too late to have an effect on the life of the dying person or his or her fellow human beings: a lack of consecutiveness (The Archpriest, Grief, Rothschild’s violin). Full events are irreversible, as is the case with the conversions in the Brothers Karamazov. Such irreversibility is highly doubtful in the departures of Nadja, whose full name is Nadežda ‘hope’ (The Bride). A repetition weakens eventfulness, and iteration completely erases it. The requirement for non-iterativity is not fulfilled in many stories by Čexov. The prime example is Sweetheart, the story of a woman who adapts herself unreservedly to her husbands, robbing them, herself “rosily blossoming,” of their substance, so that the men, increasingly pale and thin, leave her behind as a widow.

2. The hero of realist narration was an autonomous subject who freely decided on his actions. Dostoevskij introduces physical crisis states, e. g., the Underground Man’s liver pain or Raskol’nikov’s shivering fits of fever, and also the influence of the milieu as possible motivations, only to refute their effects and reject any relativization of free action. Raskol’nikov acts of his own free will, not conditioned by anything. This autonomy of the free subject is questioned in Čexov’s post-realist world. The budding clergyman in The Student, while he is hungry because of the Good Friday fast and freezing in...
the coolness of a spring evening, which seems inappropriate to him, thinks pessimistically of world history as a cycle of the same hardships without any progress. But after he has warmed his hands, tested his storytelling skills on the women at the fire, and reached his conclusions about the reason for their reaction, he thinks of world history in the comforting image of a chain of events. The post-realist man thus acts in a manner dependent on physical conditions and mental moods. The response of Čexov – physician that he was – to the rational-autonomous human being of realism is naturally more clear-cut than in the case of other authors. But this is still not yet naturalism with its rigid physiological causality.

3. Čexov’s post-realist prose, which remains fundamentally “narrative art,” is characterized by an affinity to “word art” (on this distinction: Hansen-Löve 1984, 16–19; Schmid 2008b). Despite the unquestionable priority of the story told, Čexov’s novellas evoke the impression of lyricism and musicality, of “word art.” The word-art character of Čexov’s prose is based in particular on phonic equivalences that draw a web of connections across the diegetic substrate, a web that does not refer to the narrator, but rather directly – as in poetry – to the author. The formal correspondences resulting from the sound repetitions suggest thematic connections that may not exist in the diegesis itself, and they can thus play a decisive role in the construction of meaning.

It was by nature not possible to illustrate the word-artistic element in Čexov’s prose extensively in the translations quoted. Nevertheless, a small example of the diegetic relevance of phonic equivalences was given for Rothschild’s violin, one that is also significant for the question of eventfulness: the phonics of the denoting words suggest a connection between the plaintive singing of the violin and Rothschild’s approach.

4. Čexov’s post-realism also shows itself in its anti-authorialism. In his early work Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity, which was not completely published until 1979, Mixail Baxtin (1922–1924) developed a decidedly authorial and value-oriented aesthetic. According to this, the “internal locatability” (vnutrinaxodimost’) of the author in the hero is only a transitory state. The actual aesthetic activity only begins when the author returns to himself, when he gives form to the material of empathy and “finalizes” (zaveršaat) it, as Baxtin formulated it (cf. Freise 1993, esp. chap. III). Baxtin even compares modernity’s mistrust of the author’s “finalizing” word that definitively char-
acterizes the hero, with the “immanentization of God, with the psychologization of God and religion” (Baxtin [1922–1924] 1979, 176). Čexov gave shape to nothing other than such an ‘immanentization and psychologization of God’ in his antidogmatic, ametaphysical agnostic world view. Significantly, Baxtin does not mention Čexov by name, but refers to him with the paraphrase “the prose between Dostoevskij and Belyj.”

In Čexov, the expression of deauthorialization is the striving for extreme objectivity and impartiality, the renunciation of any kind of evaluation, the elaboration of an impassive, indifferent technique of representation. Čexov does not leave the internal position in favor of an axiologically ‘finalizing’ outer position. Instead, he leaves judgment completely to the reader. Such a technique was naturally a provocation for a Russian audience that sought evaluation and a critical view of society. And so the above-mentioned accusations of ethical indifference came about.

5. FCN is characteristic of the late Čexov. It gives the impression that the entire world portrayed is submerged in the character’s horizon. The advance of this form makes reception considerably more challenging. The figural part of the narrative report is less easy to identify than in classical FID, in which linguistic means (exclamations, self-questioning) and adjacent direct or indirect representation suggest the presence of CT. The figural aspects of FCN, which is not distinguished from a purely narratorial context by syntactic means, consist mainly in the use of certain figural expressions and evaluations. Their identification presupposes a recourse to the entire linguistic, intellectual, and ethical profile of the character.

Significantly, many readers tend to perceive the mental changes presented in FCN as narratorially and authorially authenticated. However, the addition inserted in The Bride by the author at the last minute of typesetting, “as she thought,” is not to be understood in the sense that the narrator qualifies the heroine’s departure as truly final, nor is it to be understood as a narrative signal of doubt about the finality of her departure. The narrator, and with him the author, are here saying nothing more than that Nadja is convinced of the finality of her departure at this given moment. The reference to the moment is important in an author who knows about the fleetingness and changeability of mental movements, and depicts them again and again. The insertion does not allow any conclusions beyond this moment fixed in the sentence. The author is prevented from making assumptions
about the story after the text by his scientific training, medical conscience, life experience, and literary discretion. Čexov refuses to “finalize” his heroes in the sense of Baxtin, and relies entirely on the reader in this respect as well.
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