His was an unprecedented rise to the top: from the thirteenth child of a poor Jewish emigrant agent to the “sovereign of shipping” and “friend” of the Kaiser. It is hardly surprising that Albert Ballin was one of the foremost figures of the Wilhelmine Empire. From the beginning, he attracted attention at Hamburg-Amerikanische Packetfahrt-Aktien-Gesellschaft, known as Hapag for short. Under its manager Ballin, Hapag became the largest shipping line in the world.

From 1907 until his tragic death on November 9th 1918, Ballin belonged to the board of trustees of the Hamburg Scientific Foundation, to which he also contributed in a special way. As a member of the expedition committee, he played a great part in the realisation of the large Pacific expedition to the Bismarck Archipelago and New Guinea (1908–10), which confirmed Hamburg’s reputation as a centre for science.

This biography sketches the unusual life of this man, who personified perhaps more than any of his contemporaries the prominence and power of the second German Empire but at the same time also experienced its limits and weaknesses.
Albert Ballin

by Johannes Gerhardt
PATRONS FOR SCIENCE

publ. by Ekkehard Nümann

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Dedicated to the families who with their generous donations 103 years ago made possible the establishment of Hamburg Scientific Foundation and were instrumental in ensuring that the foundation can continue to promote research, teaching and education.
Contents

Publisher's preface ............................................. p. 4
Foreword by the Chairman of the Executive Board
of Hapag-Lloyd AG ........................................ p. 5
1. Prologue .................................................. p. 7
2. Early years ................................................. p. 10
   Parents and childhood ................................ p. 10
   Starting into business on his own ....................... p. 11
   Marriage ................................................ p. 16
   Personality ............................................. p. 18
3. Albert Ballin and the rise of Hapag .............. p. 24
   Hapag before Albert Ballin ............................ p. 24
   The first German top manager ......................... p. 25
   Shipbuilding policy ................................... p. 31
   Hapag as supplier of tourism services ............... p. 43
   Emigrant halls ........................................ p. 47
   Expansion of Hapag's liner network ................... p. 56
   Shipping diplomacy ................................... p. 61
4. Albert Ballin and politics ............................ p. 72
   “Little Potsdam” and Hamfelde ........................ p. 72
   Albert Ballin and the Kaiser ......................... p. 74
   Albert Ballin and his political influence .......... p. 80
   Albert Ballin and the Admiral ....................... p. 82
   Albert Ballin and “big politics” ...................... p. 84
5. Albert Ballin and the “great seminal
   Catastrophe of the 20th Century” .................. p. 90
   Economic expansion and military confrontation ..... p. 90
   Albert Ballin in July 1914 ............................ p. 92
   Hapag in the first world war ......................... p. 94
   Political influence in wartime Berlin ............... p. 97
   Albert Ballin’s attitudes to the war aims of the German Empire p. 100
   Albert Ballin’s attitudes to submarine warfare .... p. 102
   Peace via Wilson ....................................... p. 104
   The end ................................................. p. 107
6. Epilogue .................................................. p. 117
7. Appendices ................................................ p. 121
   Family tree (excerpt) ................................ p. 121
   Albert Ballin and Hapag .............................. p. 122
8. Sources, literature and photo credits ............ p. 124
9. Name index .............................................. p. 130
Publisher’s preface

The Hamburg Scientific Foundation celebrated its centenary in 2007. This is the sixth volume in the series “Patrons for Science” initiated to mark this occasion. The history of the foundation is represented in it, and founders and members of the board of trustees are honoured in individual volumes.

The initiation of this series reflects the gratitude towards those who more than 100 years ago had the courage to create the foundation for promoting the sciences and academic research in Hamburg and ensured that this city obtained an university. This is linked with the hope and expectation that subsequent generations may take this as an example.

Ekkehard Nümann
Albert Ballin’s name stands for an unprecedented success story in business: under his management, Hapag grew into the largest shipping company in the world, and Hamburg became the gateway to this world. Ballin’s generous and far-sighted sponsoring activities, on the other hand, are less well-known. The “top manager” who represented his company so impressively in public was very discrete with his sponsoring of worthy causes. Success counted for more than publicity for Ballin, who was particularly fond of linking financial support with practical assistance. His commitment on behalf of the Hamburg Scientific Foundation was typical in this respect: Ballin was not only a generous financial promoter, but also helped to organise the large ethnological Pacific Expedition.

In this combination lay Ballin’s strength: he was a pragmatic visionary and could intuitively respond to trends of the time as well as turn them to profitable ends. While he developed new business areas with a visionary spirit, he also attended to every detail of his “overall work of art Hapag”. He thus made history. He invented the modern cruise in 1891 and then expanded Hapag also into the pioneering company in tourism and was even involved in civil aviation. Hapag achieved its global success thanks above all to the service it offered, in all classes: even poor emigrants were always taken seriously as customers and attracted with offers of passages. Millions of Europeans set off from Hapag’s internationally acclaimed emigrant town in the Port of Hamburg to start a new life overseas.

The director general, one of the first German managers, devoted himself so wholeheartedly to his life’s work that it was stated: “He was Hapag, and Hapag was him.” For Ballin, that meant above all a sense of responsibility: the visionary was never a gambler. The Hapag balance sheets of his era impressively confirm the sound financial foundation of even the most ambitious projects of the company at any time.
Ballin had a wide-ranging sense of responsibility. He regarded Hapag as an integral component of its home country as well as integrated in a world economy with interconnections that he understood far better than most politicians of his time. He was a successful shipping diplomat who for decades at the head of large international conferences and joint ventures managed to solve even the most controversial problems constructively. Ballin also tried finally to transfer this successful model to politics: he made great efforts to advocate German-British rapprochement from 1908, but failed tragically because of the military-political establishment.

Vision just as much as pragmatism were also typical of the social involvement of the head of Hapag. For example, in 1911 with his discrete commitment he played a decisive part in ensuring the financing of Lüneburg Heath Nature Park. In 1909 he had already joined the Jordsand Association and supported the exemplary environmental protection project by helping finance the purchase of Hallig Norderoog. Ballin was also a particularly generous and forward-looking patron of science: he was, for example, one of the financial backers making possible the beginnings of the present-day Max Planck Society.

Albert Ballin embodied what is regarded as typically “Hanseatic”: cosmopolitanism, open-mindedness and dynamism, coupled with down-to-earth realism and business acumen. He left an enduring mark on our company as well as his home city Hamburg, and indeed his name has been regarded internationally as the embodiment and hallmark of excellence of German shipping. But Ballin’s far-sightedness, dedication and influence went well beyond the realm of business. The commitment of the great man from Hamburg also lives on in the Hamburg Scientific Foundation, in which he was a member of the board of trustees.

Michael Behrendt
A few days after Albert Ballin’s death, Kurt Singer, editor-in-chief of the “Wirtschaftsdienst” and later lecturer in economics at Hamburg University, wrote on November 15th 1918: “Germany is losing its greatest shipowner, one of its most brilliant mediators and one of its most loyal advisors, but also the man who represented like none other the power and limits of the post-Bismarck empire as representative and as symbol. With him and in him an era goes to an end.”

Ballin was one of those who achieved a swift rise in Wilhelmine society and made the most of the scope for advancement in
the German Empire, founded in 1871. Under his management, Hamburg-Amerikani-
sche Packetfahrt-Actien-Gesellschaft, which was established in 1847 and called Hapag, became the world’s largest shipping company. Ballin’s career is all the more impres-
sive because as son of a Jew who had emi-
 grated from Denmark to Hamburg he had anything but a favourable start in life.

Ballin was an “honest admirer” of Wil-
helm II.² He shared this attitude with many members of the upper middle class, with bank directors, captains of industry and shipowners. They all sought proximity to the monarch, who did not basically restrict personal contact (unlike the Hohenzollern rulers before him) to members of the arist-
ocracy. Ballin was able with his ships to generate a special aura of splendour around the monarch, which undoubtedly impressed around the monarch, which undoubtedly impressed him – the German Empire founded a few years before had, after all, scarcely a past with traditions capable of being magnificently presented on specific occasions. The Hapag luxury liners “Imperator”, “Vater-
land” and “Bismarck”, launched between 1912 and 1914, have thus been regarded as typical examples of Wilhelminism, as “float-
ing symbols” of an entire country and, by a certain analogy, Albert Ballin has been seen as a Wilhelminist.³
The prism through which the historic personality Albert Ballin is observed below has – as already indicated by the brief introductory comments – two focal points: one economic and one political.
Parents and childhood

Albert Ballin’s father Samuel Joel Ballin, who later called himself Joseph Ballin, was a massively built man. He emigrated from Denmark to Hamburg around 1830. He initially worked as a textile entrepreneur but went bankrupt in this line of business and later also failed with a coal firm. In 1852, he founded an independent emigrant agency with his partner Samuel Moritz Hirsch. This traded under the name Morris & Co. (probably named after an English agent) and had a concession as an agency for emigrants from Schleswig-Holstein, Mecklenburg and outside Germany. The agency attracted these persons and organised their passages, particularly to the USA. However, business did not prosper, and Samuel Ballin had difficulties supporting his large family.

There was a rapid surge in the number of emigrants from 1850. Previously Bremen had played the key role in Germany in the “emigrant business”, a term that is contemporary and very vividly shows what was involved, but then Hamburg gradually picked up. Independent agencies like that of Samuel Ballin, however, continued to have a difficult time. Their activities were a thorn in the eye of Hamburg shipping lines, as the independent operators were unwelcome competitors. Around 1850, the shipping lines therefore began to stop allocating ship capacities to them. This marked the beginning of the “indirect traffic”: the independent agencies brought the emigrants to Hamburg, where they embarked on small British ships and were taken to ports on the east coast of England. Then the passengers went by train to Liverpool, where they were put on vessels of British shipping lines bound for America.

Albert Ballin was born on August 15th 1857. His mother Amalia Ballin, a daughter of the well-to-do merchant Joseph Meyer, was the second wife of Samuel Ballin, with whom she had nine children. Then there were four more children from Ballin’s first marriage. Albert was the youngest child in this long line. The house where he was born no longer exists. It was Stubbenhuk 17, scarcely more than 25 yards from a lively corner of the Port of Hamburg. Some years later, the family moved to Baumwall 6, where it again lived right by the port. Albert’s childhood experiences – “the eternally defining in a person” (Berthold Auerbach) – thus came from a milieu defined by seamen and ships carrying goods of every type. He was closely connected with the Port of Hamburg his entire life.

Early years
The Ballins belonged to the Jewish underclass in Hamburg, and the more the family grew, the worse its financial position became. The family moved “in the dismal zones in which the transition from the lower middle class into the proletariat can often not be halted”. Little is known about Albert’s childhood and youth. In later years he never talked about it and reacted to questions concerning his early years “in the most unfriendly way”, as his employees noted.

The boy’s schooling did not go beyond attending the academy of Professor Goldmann, an institution whose fine-sounding name today promises more than it could deliver at that time. Albert did not do particularly well at this school. He left it before he was even fifteen and joined his father’s business. It is reported that he was interested for a time in playing the cello. However, it is to be presumed that later friends tried with such anecdotal details to give a touch of middle-class propriety to what was in retrospect a dismal childhood. No one experienced Ballin ever playing music as an adult. In 1910, he once wrote about his youth in a letter to a friend: “I think you and I were never young. This involves freedom from cares – and in this respect we are both badly burdened.”

Starting into business on his own

When Samuel Joel Ballin died on September 17th 1874, his widow Amalia Ballin herself became part-owner of the company. Their two sons, Albert and his older brother
Joseph, were given power of attorney in 1875. They were supported by the previous partner Wilhelm Wolffsohn, who then left the firm in 1877. Joseph Ballin soon opted for another profession, that of jobber (he had a tragic end: he shot himself in 1909). The 20 year-old authorised signatory Albert Ballin thus became responsible for the management of the small company: in winter 1877 he applied to become prematurely of age, which he was declared on January 25th 1878. On August 16th 1879, he became co-owner of Morris & Co. Thus began his rise to become one of the most well-known Germans of his time.

In explaining Ballin’s success, mention should first be made of the external factors. The number of emigrants from Europe to America began to increase again from 1880. Some of the reasons for this were the improvement in the economic situation in the United States, bloody pogroms in various parts of Russia leading to an increase in the number of Jews wanting to emigrate and the expansion of the European rail network generally promoting mobility on the continent and making the port cities of Central Europe easier to reach.

Ballin succeeded in a special way in profiting from these developments, the consequences of which he clearly recognised – and that made the difference. He revolutionised emigrant business with relatively simple but highly effective means. Ballin was quick to appreciate that the indirect emigration hitherto operated by his father’s agency could not be expanded in the long run, so he decided to enter into the business of direct emigration himself and start up his own passenger line.

Baumwall and Vorsetzen, seen from the quay warehouse (1871)
Ballin can in this connection be regarded as an outstanding example of an entrepreneur as defined by the famous economist Joseph Schumpeter in his main work “Theory of Economic Development”. The Schumpeter entrepreneur succeeds in a process of “creative destruction” of the existing order with “new combinations” – such as introducing new services, transport methods and organisational forms. Implementing new combinations, according to Schumpeter, is “a special function and the privilege of people who are much less numerous than those who had the external possibility for this”. They are often people “who seem to lack every external possibility for it”.9

What were now the new combinations that Ballin realised?

In 1881, Ballin approached the nephew of the major Hamburg shipowner Robert Miles Sloman jr., Edward Carr (1835–1892), with an unusual proposal. Carr, who had started his own business two years previously, was to convert his two cargo ships. Unlike the otherwise usual transatlantic steamers, which carried passengers in first and second class and emigrants in steerage, Carr’s converted cargo ships were to restrict themselves to carrying emigrants. Here, incidentally, it becomes evident that “emigrant” is a class term. Also passengers emigrated. The dividing lines are thus actually fluid, and the apparently clear separation between passengers and emigrants is not as distinct as it seems at first glance.

The conversion was, according to Ballin, not all too complex: the spaces of the ships were to be divided up not into cabins but into large multipurpose rooms, which could serve as common rooms during the daytime and as dormitories at night.10 As compensation for the simple accommodation, all persons were to be granted access to the open...
Albert Ballin as a young man, by Friedrich Wilhelm Graupenstein (1882)
decks, hitherto a privilege for passengers in first and second class. It was argued that with the absence of cabins taking up space there would be more room for cargo — providing an additional source of earnings. For the return voyage from America to Hamburg, the ships could also be very easily converted into pure cargo vessels.

The passengers could now be offered a certain degree of comfort during the passage, and the price of 82 marks per person was well below that of the competition. Carr took up Ballin’s proposal, as it promised sustained high returns, particularly as Ballin guaranteed him full ships, i.e. 600 passengers per voyage, otherwise Morris & Co. would be obliged to make compensation payments. Ballin had in turn achieved his aim of establishing himself in direct emigrant business.

The implementation of Ballin’s ideas proved to be a complete success right from the beginning. After just a year, in 1882, Carr could expand his fleet from two to six ships, as Ballin sent him 12,200 emigrants, about 17 percent of the total Hamburg emigrant traffic. And their number on Carr’s vessels continued to rise, reaching 16,500 in 1883.

Ballin’s and Carr’s competitor, Hapag, carried about 53,400 persons with 76 departures to North America that year. Yet the success of the upstart made the highly esteemed Hanseatic gentlemen at the head of Hapag increasingly uneasy. They finally entered into a price war and in 1882 reduced Hapag’s passage prices from 120 to 90 and a year later even to 80 marks. Carr and Ballin responded by continually lowering their own prices. To prevent a hostile takeover, they also found a partner in Robert Miles Sloman & Co., with which Carr’s line merged to form Union-Linie. In these years, Ballin competed with Hapag from a position of strength. At the same time, he took the rivalry very personally; he is said to have secretly put up posters of Carr’s line on the Hapag office building in Deichstrasse at night.

In 1886, an agreement was at last reached under which the competitors formed a community of interests: Union-Linie was entitled to lower passage prices, while Hapag assumed the management of the passage service for both lines and undertook to allocate at least a quarter of all passengers to the former rival. However, a much more decisive factor for Ballin’s further career was a separate contract with Hapag, on the basis of which he became head of the passage department. Hapag had established this at the beginning of 1885, the increasing separation of cargo and passenger shipping now also being reflected in the company’s organisation.

On May 31st 1886, Ballin assumed the post of departmental head with a minimum annual salary of 10,000 marks and additional commission. The Hapag annual report for 1886 noted: “Of special importance is also the fact that the management of the passage business for both parties, as a result of an agreement with Mr Albert Ballin, has passed into our hands. A standard management has been created for this important line of business (...).”

Ballin initially remained owner of Morris & Co., but in 1888, when he joined the Ha-
pag executive board, he already withdrew from his father’s company, which then continued until 1907 without engaging in any significant business.

Marriage

Already a year after he had entered into the direct emigrant business, Ballin was in a secure financial position, so he could acquire Hamburg civil rights on October 17th 1882.16 This, not to be confused with citizenship, was available only to affluent men who regularly paid taxes and also a fee for acquiring the certificate as citizen.17

In 1883 at the age of 26 Ballin married Mari-anne Rauert, daughter of a medium-sized Christian cloth dealer, who had a business at the address “Am Alten Steinweg”. There was a Protestant wedding ceremony, but Ballin did not convert to Protestantism. His wife came from a respectable family, “good middle class”, and had the courage and far-sightedness to marry “below her status”, as it was known at that time. The Ballins’ marriage was without issue. In 1893, the couple adopted an orphan, Irmgard, also called “Peter”, a survivor of the cholera epidemic in Hamburg in 1892 and a relative of Mari-anne Ballin.

Ballin formed a close relationship with his brother-in-law Paul Rauert in subsequent years. Rauert was a well-known art collector and lover of the works of Emil Nolde and Karl Schmidt-Rottluff. Both painted him, Schmidt-Rottluff in 1911 and Nolde in 1910 – “with a single line”, which Nolde recalled in particular18 – and again in 1915.
Mai 1886

Es muss mit Ihnen Alb. Ballin von morgen abgeklärt werden.

Zwei

von Hamburg-Amerikanischen Pachtfahrts-Aktien-

Gesellschaft.

und

I nm Albert Ballin.

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1. folgender Zugang mit der Union vereinbart.

§ 1.

zu Vertragsbindung mit zwei griffen der Hamb-

gurt-Amerikanischen Pachtfahrts-Aktien-

Gesellschaft mit einer der ihnen Union und ihrer Tauglichkeit,

stützt auf aus 22. Mai getroffenen z. z. Protokoll

zumit der Hamburg-Amerikanische Pachtfahrts-Aktien-

Gesellschaft von Albert Ballin zum selbständigen

mit allen insb. vorder gegründeten Unionen geoffneter

und von Nord-Amerika. Zu Anfängen geofft von der von

von Hamburg-Amerikanischen Pachtfahrts-Aktien-

Gesellschaft contract in mit herkömmlicher Vereinbarung so die

für die Zufuhr für die Union.
A lawyer by profession, Paul Rauert was unshakeable in his determination to help many of his numerous Jewish friends after the National Socialists’ assumption of power.\(^{19}\)

The circumstances of Ballin’s marriage show that he neither disavowed nor paraded his Jewishness. He took only a moderate interest in the Zionism emerging in the 1890s and was indifferent to religion. In his later years it is said that, like many other acculturated Jews, he observed the Christian Christmas.\(^{20}\) He visited the synagogue of the German Israelite Synagogue Association at Bornplatz only seldom and had no connection with orthodox circles in Hamburg or Altona. But he was aware of matters of religious practice. Hapag ships thus also offered kosher meals for the numerous East European emigrants of Jewish faith.\(^{21}\) However, Ballin himself, like many other Hamburg Jews, was concerned to adapt himself as much as possible to his non-Jewish environment in order to avoid being disadvantaged. Yet orthodox Jews saw in such an attitude the danger that it also involved emancipation from Judaism. There was a certain justification for this, as in Ballin’s lifetime the overall share of Jews of the total population of Hamburg declined from four to one percent.

**Personality**

Ballin was of small stature. When he was young he had thick, dark and curly hair, which turned grey with time and thinned. He was certainly not what one would call an attractive man. But his dark-brown eyes, along with a sonorous voice, which had a Hamburg ring to it, more than made up for the less than handsome face.

The banker Carl Fürstenberg described the older Ballin as follows: “He was very small and his face furrowed by countless lines seemed to be formed of rubber, so he looked almost funny when you first saw him. You had to see the wonderful eyes of this person to feel the degree to which he combined kindness and amiability, acumen and roguishness.”\(^{22}\) Richard von Kühlmann, who was State Secretary of the Foreign Office (there was no foreign minister in the German Empire) from August 1917 to July 1918, came to a similar assessment: “The medium-sized man with slightly frizzy hair, who always held his head looking downwards and somewhat to one side, was anything but attractive. But nature had given
him a very charming voice. This voice, along with a tempered tranquillity of being and speaking and always with an appearance of amiability shining through, gave him something very convincing.\textsuperscript{23}

\textbf{Ballin} always dressed carefully. He distinguished himself with flawless manners and linguistic elegance, was of great sensitivity and could be superbly responsive to other people. A good friend of Ballin, Theodor Wolff, editor-in-chief of the “Berliner Tageblatt”, the largest supraregional German daily newspaper, wrote: “Unlike many other and less important German business leaders, he was not buoyed up by a sense of his own importance (…) [and, JG] had a perfect adroitness in relating to others, an unconstrained elegance, an instinctive tact.”\textsuperscript{24}

\textbf{But} Ballin was also an impulsive man and frequently swung between extreme moods. The ship engineer Blumenthal who worked for Hapag once stated: “Ballin always goes only first class or with his bare … on the rails.”\textsuperscript{25} He had an irascible temperament and easily lost self-control, which he mostly quickly regretted. Ballin was not resentful, but also expected this from others with whom he might have gone too far in one of his temperamental outbursts. Like all fast-thinking and fast-acting people, he tended to be impatient towards others.

In his work – and he worked a great deal, 16 hours a day, seven days a week – Ballin hated routine and frequently used unconventional methods. In important matters, he relied mostly only on his excellent memory. He surprised with ideas but not with readily formulated proposals and in meetings continually found new solutions at variance with general trains of thought.\textsuperscript{26} A close employee of Ballin, Erich Murken,

\textit{Albert Ballin with his family in North Africa (ca. 1900)}
writes: “Ballin was a mainly synthetic mind. Psychological analysis was more strongly developed in him than mathematical analysis. He was more a master of complicated situations than complex calculations and statistics.”

In view of these capabilities, Ballin was obviously sought after to head meetings. The Ballin critic Max von Schinckel – from 1897 member and from 1910 chairman of the Hapag supervisory board, the patrician with aristocratic leanings who obtained his aristocratic title in 1917 just promptly before the end of the monarchy – noted in his memoirs: “Everywhere he was given the chairmanship also in international conferences, and in the end if Ballin was unable to attend the British declined to come to a meeting as long as Mister Ballin could not chair it.”

Ballin always headed the negotiations with a quiet voice and sparing gestures, which he nevertheless used to great effect.

The well-known shipping editor Kurt Himer, who also worked for Hapag, describes Ballin as a “demonic” personality, who expressed himself in the spoken word and in actions in an incomparably livelier way” than in writing. Eduard Rosenbaum used Max Weber’s term “charismatic leader” to describe Ballin’s style of heading discussions.

Overall Rosenbaum, who knew Ballin well, portrays him as “man of action”, an assessment that probably best sums up Ballin’s nature.
Albert Ballin (ca. 1910)
4 Straub, Ballin, p. 18.
5 Wiborg, Ballin, p. 75.
6 Straub, Ballin, p. 19.
7 Wiborg, Ballin, p. 13.
8 Benja, Geburtstag, p. 13.
9 Schumpeter, Theorie, p. 119.
10 Cf. above Cecil, Ballin, p. 33.
11 Stubmann, Feld, p. 25.
12 Figures from Mosse, Juden, p. 435.
13 Stubmann, Feld, p. 25.
14 According to Himer, Geschichte, p. 10, Ballin attended a meeting of the supervisory board and executive board of Hapag for the first time on this day.
16 Staatsarchiv Hamburg (StA Hbg.), 332-7 Staatsangehörigkeitsaufsicht, A I f 160: Protocoll der Anmeldungen zur Erwerbung des Bürgerrechts 1882, p. 233.
17 In 1879 of the approx. 450,000 inhabitants of Hamburg only 22,000 possessed citizenship, with which the political rights were coupled (cf. Jochmann, Handelsmetropole, p. 81).
18 Zbikowski, Sammlung, p. 40.
19 Rosenbaum, Ballin, p. 258.
20 Schölzel, Ballin, p. 11.
21 According to Wigoder, Ballin, p. 44, this occurred at the initiative of Ballin; cf. however Kludas, Geschichte, p. 54: “At the suggestion of the Israelite relief association for the homeless, Hapag provides on all ships proceeding to North America an Israelite kitchen with its own crockery for kosher meals (…).”
22 Fürstenberg, Fürstenberg, p. 436.
23 Kühlmann, Erinnerungen, p. 214.
26 Stubmann, Feld, p. 120.
27 Murken, Verbände, p. VII.
28 Schinckel, Lebenserinnerungen, p. 269.
30 Rosenbaum, Ballin, p. 264 ff. – Eduard Rosenbaum, who emigrated to England in 1934, was active at the Chamber of Commerce from 1914.
Hapag before Albert Ballin

On May 27th 1847, Hamburg businessmen and shipowners met in a conference room at the Stock Exchange to found Hamburg-Amerikanische Packetfahrt-Actien-Gesellschaft. Ferdinand Laeisz, who was then just beginning as a shipowner, Ernst Merck, partner of the banking and trading firm H. J. Merck & Co., and Adolph Godeffroy, who had started his own business two years previously in Hamburg, were elected directors of Hapag at the first general meeting. They appointed the only 33-year-old Adolph Godeffroy chairman.

Over half a year later, on December 21st 1847, it was reported at the second general meeting of Hapag that “the management had finally agreed to the construction of three ships (…)”.31 These were the “Deutschland”, “Amerika” (later renamed “Nord-Amerika”) and “Rhein”, worth an overall 245,000 marks banco.32 The “Deutschland”, designed to carry 20 passengers in cabins and 200 in steerage, departed on her first voyage to America in the year of revolution 1848. In 1853, the general meeting declared “per majora” that “the passage to New York hitherto operated by the company with sailing vessels will in future also be provided with large transatlantic steamers, which are to be procured”.33 The two steamships ordered, “Hammonia” and “Borussia”, chartered to the French and British government during the Crimean War (1853–56), were available for Hapag’s own steamer service from Hamburg to New York only from 1856. The first German transatlantic steamship line was thus opened.34

Hapag then grew slowly but steadily (apart from the years of crisis 1857 to 1859). Godeffroy retired at the end of 1880,35 marking the end of an era. He left behind a gap that was initially not filled. At this time, the shipping company had no actual head. It was managed by a directorate of older Hanseatic gentlemen, who were not particularly receptive to technical innovations such as modern fast steamships. Moreover, the directors focused more on their own firms than on Hapag, which they managed more or less on the side.36 Business was accordingly bad, particularly because, as noted, Ballin and Carr became ever fiercer competitors of Hapag precisely at that time.

All this caused increasing dissatisfaction among Hapag shareholders. There were finally radical changes in the organisation of the shipping line in 1884–85: the old directorate transformed itself into a supervisory board, which was given a completely new...
team, and the former office heads, who had previously served as holders of a general commercial power of attorney, were appointed to the executive board (directorate). The company was thus undergoing a transformation at this time. That Ballin could succeed with his proposal in 1886 to set up a passage department for Hapag and Union-Linie under his management is also to be seen against this background.

The first German top manager

In his new position, Ballin soon attracted the attention of the influential Hamburg shipowner Carl Laeisz, son of Ferdinand Laeisz, one of the founders of Hapag. Carl Laeisz, who, like Ballin, did not belong to the old-established Hamburg plutocracy, became his mentor in subsequent years and saw to it in 1888 that Ballin moved up into the executive board of Hapag. Four years later, Laeisz then joined the Hapag supervisory board as deputy chairman and quickly became the dominating personality on it: “there was (...) nothing that happened that he had not sanctioned and approved”.

Ballin had a great affection for Carl Laeisz, although there was “also occasionally no lack of areas of friction”. When Ballin heard of the death of Laeisz on a voyage in 1901, he wrote to his mother: “(...) and our stay in Kobe was entirely overshadowed by the loss of my old Laeisz. I still cannot grasp the fact that I am to find his place empty on my return home.”

The commitment of Laeisz on behalf of Ballin showed special vision. For the first time, Hapag transferred important tasks to an employed manager. All his life Laeisz had his basis as a businessman in his own family

Photograph of the Port of Hamburg in 1868 – in the centre is Hapag's first loading and unloading facility, which was in operation up to 1888, and in front of the warehouse the raised draw-bridge, used for coming from shore on board the steamships.
company, despite his considerable involvement in the Hamburg economy. The same applied for Adolph Woermann, who apart from Laeisz was the most well-known Hamburg shipowner at the end of the 19th century. Ballin, on the other hand, built up “a shipping empire of its own kind”.42 The community of interests between Hapag and Carr-Linie was, according to Ballin’s biographer Peter Franz Stubmann, “essentially and in personnel terms more a conquest of Hapag by the authoritative men of Carr-Linie”.43 Along with Ballin, his confident Guido Wolff, hitherto head and partner of Carr-Linie, also entered the service of Hapag in 1886. Wolff was responsible for finances on the executive board of the shipping line until 1907.

The manager Ballin embodied a new social type, who stood for a change in company management and renewed the obsolete patriarchal structures of Hapag, which had fallen behind. The lawyer Heinrich Wiegand also took over as manager at the head of Norddeutscher Lloyd (North German Lloyd) in Bremen in 1892.

Kurt Himer notes that Ballin had a “natural appreciation of the advertising impact of
Hapag’s first own building in Deichstrasse 7, occupied in 1870
The Hapag administrative building, Dovenfleth 19–20
prestigious presentation”. Immediately after joining Hapag, he promoted the idea of giving its administration appropriate premises. He advocated a new building to replace the less attractive Hapag headquarters in Deichstrasse. Ballin succeeded, probably also because he could put forward sound economic reasons for his proposal, arguing that new reception rooms would make a much better impression on potential passengers.

A new administrative building on Dövenfleth was designed in 1889-90 by the architects Martin Haller and J. Eduard Ahrens. But already 10 years later, Hapag, meanwhile the largest shipping company in the world, needed a new home. Haller, this time along with Hermann Geissler, was again commissioned and persuaded Ballin to move the headquarters to the Alster. The town hall architects designed a building with neo-Renaissance elements, and in 1903 Hapag could move into its new premises after a construction time of three years.45

The edifice marked the beginning of monofunctional administrative buildings in the Hamburg city centre, which was then still a place where people lived and worked. It also served as handling room for passenger services. The entrance hall on Alsterdamm was where the first-class passengers were received and booked their passages, while the other travellers entered the build-
ing through the entrance at Ferdinandstrasse. The roof of the new headquarters was topped by a seven metre high bronze Neptune with trident and steeds galloping over the waves. This work by the then still unknown Ernst Barlach “cut a somewhat ridiculous figure well beyond the Alster”, in the words of the dedicated patron of modern art in Hamburg Gustav Schiefler, who was not alone in his opinion. The figures were melted down in the first world war. It is not known that anyone protested against this.

This administrative building also proved to be too small after a few years. Various architects including Franz Bach, who played a crucial role in the creation of Mönckebergstrasse from 1908, worked on expansion and conversion plans. Ballin finally commissioned Fritz Höger, who later designed Chilehaus. Höger’s neo-classicist design, which was revised again by the Berlin municipal building officer Ludwig Hoffmann, corresponded most closely to the self-confidence of Hapag at the zenith of its success shortly before the first world war, but, very much to Haller’s regret, did not retain much of the original character of the building. His old building was raised by a further storey to four floors, whereas the new section with the same external height was given...
an additional storey. On the other hand, the rooms there were a little lower. Both parts of the building were then connected with a single facade. The conversion begun in 1913 was not finished until 1921, so Ballin no longer experienced the completion of the project.

**Shipbuilding policy**

Immediately after Ballin had succeeded with his idea for a new company headquarters, he initiated the next major project in 1887, when he prompted the Hapag supervisory board and executive board to increase the company’s capital from 15 to 20 million marks for financing the construction of modern twin-screw fast steamships. The two steamers “Augusta Victoria” and “Columbia” were put into service two years later and the “Normannia” and “Fürst Bismarck” in 1890–91.

The “Augusta Victoria” required on her maiden voyage from Southampton to New York only seven days and thus broke a record right away. She was the first twin-screw fast steamship built in Germany, by the Stettin shipyard Vulcan. That the German Empress and sponsor was actually called Auguste Victoria, occurred to none of those responsible at Hapag in Hamburg. This error was corrected without further comment in 1897.

Right from the beginning, the “Augusta Victoria” departing New York
Ladies' room and light well of the "Augusta Victoria"
Victoria outclassed the single-screw steamships of North German Lloyd in all the relevant areas of size, speed and comfort. Along with the other newbuildings, she enabled Hapag to offer a weekly service to New York. This considerable expansion of Hapag's passenger transport catapulted the company to the top of the Atlantic shipping lines. The new vessels were given additional superstructure decks, and in the interior prestigious common rooms were installed, creating an upper-class environment for the social life on board.

For a brief time, Hapag participated in the contest for the “Blue Riband”, for the fastest Atlantic crossing from Europe to New York. The “Deutschland”, launched in 1900, was the first and only Hapag steamship to win this honour. Ballin had from the beginning misgivings because of the vessel’s inadequate cost-efficiency. Actually it very soon became apparent that the voyage at top speed caused extremely high energy costs. Moreover, passenger comfort was considerably impaired by strong vibrations. With this steamship, Hapag thus ended its pursuit of speed records and focused on offering passenger vessels that were as large and comfortable as possible. This concept was implemented in the construction of the sister ships “Amerika” and “Kaiserin Augusta Victoria”, commissioned in 1905 and 1906 respectively.

These two steamers were part of a comprehensive fleet renewal. Hapag purchased and built a total of 21 steamships in 1904 and...
1905. They could be financed because the shipping line had achieved significant profits during the Russo-Japanese war (1904-05) by transporting Welsh coal for the Russian fleet as well as with the sale of 16 old vessels to Russia.54 This was a risky undertaking, as the German Empire was neutral and Britain an ally of Japan. However, it generated high profits, coming to close on 38 million marks in 1905, far higher than the approx. 22 million marks in 1903.

These profits enabled Hapag to set new standards with the interior design of the new luxury steamships. Ballin won the well-known French architect Charles Mewes to design the interior of the “Amerika”. Ritz-Carlton assumed responsibility for managing an à la carte restaurant on the steamship. Another world innovation on the “Amerika” was a lift, which was used nearly two thousand times during the vessel’s maiden voyage. In the tweendeck the passengers could for a small surcharge also book cabins instead of the large dormitories. Hapag was the very first shipping company to offer this third class, which was extremely popular and used a great deal particularly by families. From it resulted later the tourist class.55

In the autumn and winter months, the capacity utilisation of Hapag’s passenger ships was low and the vessels were not profitable. Ballin thus conceived the idea of offering ship voyages no longer for transport but rather for rest and relaxation, education and fun. He had in mind a “pleasure trip” to
the Mediterranean and the Orient with well-organised shore excursions in various ports.56

The premiere came in January 1891: 241 “bold travellers” (as Ballin called them), well-heeled passengers from Germany and other countries, including 67 mainly English ladies, embarked on the “Augusta Victoria”. At that time in Germany longer tours – or even such educational trips – were still considered to be physically and intellectually too demanding for women. Ballin apparently did not share this opinion, as his wife Marianne was also on board.57 That Ballin himself went on the voyage and also headed it personally contributed considerably to the success of the entire venture. Ballin could also in this way (expand) “his circle of acquaintances in all parts of Germany and be-
came a very popular man in the best sense of the word.”58

The “Augusta Victoria” became the very first cruise ship, and Ballin had again discovered a gap in the market. From then on, Hapag offered regular “pleasure trips”, apart from to the Mediterranean and Orient also to the West Indies to the north. Precisely the latter were very popular in Germany – after all, Wilhelm II also cruised on the imperial yacht “Hohenzollern” off the Norwegian coast every summer.

In the following years, the cruise business claimed ever more resources and Hapag could soon no longer handle it just with the steamships withdrawn from liner service. The “Prinzessin Victoria Luise”, the first luxury vessel built specially for cruises, was

*The fast steamship “Deutschland” won the “Blue Riband” already on her maiden voyage in summer 1900*
thus launched in 1900. The previous year Ballin had written to the journalist Ernst Francke that Hapag had decided “to have a steamship built solely for (...) pleasure trips at sea. A large yacht is thus to be built for carrying neither cargo nor mail and designed only for accommodating first-class passengers. This, as mentioned, unique vessel will offer passengers a standard of comfort hitherto never reached on ships.”

With all the innovative commitment that he showed for prestigious passenger and cruise ships, Ballin, unlike his colleague Wiegand at North German Lloyd, put the focus at Hapag not on passenger traffic, but
on cargo business, which was less prone to crises.60

Already in 1893 Ballin had completed a decisive change in shipbuilding policy. In Hapag’s annual report it is stated: “The order for four powerful twin-screw steamships (...) is a step of great significance (...). These steamships, which can be prepared for accommodating about 2,500 steerage passengers and with full utilisation of their holds can load approximately 7,500 tons of heavy cargo, are with the use of the latest relevant improvements and inventions so economical in their operation that a speed of 13 miles per hour with a coal consumption of 55 or 60 tons per day is guaranteed for us.”61

The four new ships were named “Prussia”, “Phoenicia”, “Persia” and “Patria”. The “Patlatia” was also ordered a year later. These were combined passenger-cargo vessels capable of carrying either freight or passengers. Ballin thus took up his successful idea from 1881, but used this time advanced twin-screw steamships, which in previous years had already proved their worth at Hapag for passenger traffic. This was a complete success. Particularly on account of their low coal consumption, the “P steamships” quickly became the new main source of earnings for Hapag.62
The successful business idea was expanded in 1897 with the “large P steamships” “Pennsylvania”, “Pretoria”, “Patricia” and “Graf Waldersee”. These were four combined cargo and passenger steamships reaching a speed of 14 knots, and at 13,000 gross register tonnes (grt) they were the largest vessels in the world at that time. Johannes Merck, since 1896 Ballin’s executive board colleague at Hapag, notes in his memoirs: “With no single class of ships, neither previously nor subsequently, has Ballin so succeeded as with this.”

Ballin was again the driving force behind a change in shipbuilding policy at Hapag in 1910 with the start of the construction of giant ships of the “Imperator” class. The “Imperator” (52,000 grt), built at the Hamburg shipyard of Vulcan, was launched on May 23rd 1912, the “Vaterland” (54,000 grt) on April 3rd 1913 and the “Bismarck” (56,000 grt) on June 20th 1914, the latter two both built at Blohm & Voss. All three were quadruple-screw turbine vessels. Their tonnage, comparable with the giant containerships of the 1980s, shows the development Hapag had taken since its founding: it had opened its liner service in 1848 with a sailing ship of 538 grt, the “Deutschland”.

An important motive behind Ballin’s further change of course was that in 1907 the British White Star Linie had begun to build modern fast steamships of approx. 45,000
Their names “Olympic”, “Titanic” and “Gigantic”, like those of their German counterparts, indicate that the vessels were seen as symbols of national prowess and technical progress. Ballin himself was definitely aware of the significance of ship names. He actually wanted to name the new flagship of Hapag “Europa”, but Wilhelm II insisted on “Imperator”. Contrary to the usual practice, the steamship was then also the masculine “der” and not the feminine “die” “Imperator” and was thus the only “male” ship to ply the seas at that time.

The construction of the giant steamships was not universally accepted within Hapag: in particular the supervisory board chairman Max Schinckel, who managed the business of Norddeutsche Bank, the company bank of Hapag, along with Johannes Merck, who was responsible on the Hapag executive board e.g. for book-keeping, criticised Ballin’s financial practices. In 1913, Hapag had invested for the newbuildings of the “Imperator” class 70 million marks, almost half of its entire share capital. For Ballin, however, the crucial consideration was consolidating with the new ships Hapag’s leadership compared with the British competition. He was given backing in this respect by his close friend Max Warburg, who was the senior partner of the well-known family bank in Hamburg and had been on the Hapag supervisory board since 1911. In the latest literature it is also rightly pointed out that the construction of steamships was based on a correct assessment of the market.

Despite the internal discussions, the launch of the “Imperator” on May 23rd 1912 was an event of national importance. Ballin’s biographer Susanne Wiborg notes: “It was a day on which all facets of the significance, the special role of Hapag, became visible as in a prism.” On the same day, “Hamburger Correspondent” expressed the prevailing mood with the following words in its evening issue: “A brilliant festive day for
Hamburg, a day of triumph for German shipbuilding, has begun. The largest ship in world, an ocean giant of never anticipated dimensions, is to be handed over to its element. And the Kaiser himself has come to name the proud steamship. 

Awed by the size of the vessel, the Hamburg journalists found it difficult to find adequate comparisons. Hapag had already juxtaposed the “Kaiserin Auguste Victoria” and the tower of the Hamburg town hall in a brochure in 1906. Now the “Hamburger Fremdenblatt” wrote: “The length of the giant of 268 metres is really fabulous and cannot be sensualised with figures; one would have to pile twelve large houses up on top of one another to reach this height, one would have to put Cologne Cathedral almost once again on Cologne Cathedral to find an identical dimension.”

In 1913, after the first voyage of the “Imperator”, Hapag published a brochure in which the authors, all of them prestigious journalists, stylised the ship as a “bearer of German culture” and thus an important founder of national identity. Even verses of doubtful literary quality, such as the poem “Imperator” by Bernhard Reuter, breathe this exalted Wilhelmine Zeitgeist:

“Devised by German spirit, thou wert created
by German might,
And amazed the world sees a work,

First-class smoking saloon on “Kaiserin Auguste Victoria”
Colossal and free and proud and bold,
Proclaiming Germany’s unity and power”.

One Demetrius Hornicke struck a similar note in prose: “Thou art expression of the concentrated power of the people, herald of creativity, imperative will to consummation. Grasping thee in the innermost core means humbly and at the same time proudly recognising that German genius has expressed itself in thee.”

The interior of the “Imperator” (and also of the “Vaterland”) was designed by Charles Mewes, who had previously worked for Hapag. The fixtures and fittings he designed represented a last highlight of late 19th c. aesthetic expression, characterised by recourse to stylistic elements of nearly all artistic trends. For example, the smoking room on the “Imperator” was modelled on the Tudor house at the beginning of the 16th century and the indoor swimming pool installed for the first time on a ship imitated Pompeii models. All this was very much what Ballin had in mind. His taste in art, as noted by his biographer Lamar Cecil, was oriented to old forms and values and tended to be against innovations.
Schedules for the twin-screw fast steamships of Hapag for 1895–96
With such interiors, an almost perfect world of experience with smoking salons, ladies’ rooms, children’s playrooms, gyms, massage rooms, libraries, sheet music collections, music rooms, shops, etc. was created for the affluent passengers. This was the prerequisite for “meeting important cultural standards (…) as in a flourishing city”.76 But, as in every city, there were not only “good” quarters, which on the “Imperator” were represented by the first and second class, but also less privileged districts. However, the accommodation had clearly improved, particularly in the third class, as well as in steerage. The interior of the ship was divided up so that the rich and distinguished passengers were carefully screened to prevent them coming into contact with emigrants or cargo.

Hapag as supplier of tourism services

As noted, Ballin is regarded as the inventor of the modern cruise. In the years after 1891 he succeeded in expanding Hapag, which also called itself Hamburg-American Line from 1893, from a pure shipping line into a provider of tourist services.77 For this, however, it was not sufficient to focus only on the segment of affluent cruise ship passengers. Ballin therefore “democratised” the luxury on older ships that were no longer up to the highest standards. Their first class was now also made available to the less wealthy.
expand other areas of tourism in addition to pleasure voyages at sea. The annual report for 1904 describes this as follows:

“We have expanded our business to an area we have not yet served by setting up a General Travel Bureau. The great success enjoyed by the pleasure voyages at sea organised by us also prompted us to be active organising voyages on land, acting as agent for the sale of rail tickets, particularly for round trips, in short, all business serving the promotion of tourism. In order to establish this new company on the foundation of an already successful travel institute, we have concluded with Carl Stangen’s Reisebureau an agreement, on the basis of which this oldest and largest German travel bureau will be acquired by us on January 1st of this year.”

It was above all Ballin who was behind the acquisition of the travel agency. The crucial aspect for him was company concentration. At that time, the travel agency of Carl Stangen was the largest and most important in Germany, and Hapag’s acquisition of it was therefore an important step towards its expansion into a supplier of tourism services.

From 1910, the travel agencies of Hamburg-American Line, as they were called since the acquisition, sold exclusively the tickets for the airships of Count Zeppelin, approx. 42,000 up to 1914. Ballin thereby also became one of the pioneers of civil aviation business.

Hapag’s success as a supplier of tourist...
Launch of the "Imperator" on May 23rd 1912
After the naming speech for the “Imperator”
services depended on good public relations work. Ballin appreciated this and in this area prompted developments the effects of which are still noticeable today: in the 19th century companies and entrepreneurs were still to be equated with one another and a firm's character was largely represented by its founder or owner, who ensured more or less alone for its external presentation. The employed manager Ballin was one of the first to establish a press department in a German company. From 1900, Hapag had run a “literary bureau”, which focused on maintaining a positive image of the company and seeking cooperation with the press in Hapag’s interests.

The following episode characterises Ballin’s extraordinary appreciation of the effectiveness of advertising. When an employee indignantly informed him one day that in a large restaurant in Düsseldorf the elaborately designed picture of the “Deutschland” was hanging in the lavatory instead of in the hall, Ballin retorted: “Very right too, as then also everyone will naturally be bound to see it.”

The tasks of the “literary bureau” included organising the postcard and poster advertising, on which Hapag lavished considerable sums: in 1902 approx. 100,000 marks was spent on the poster advertising with a circulation of 10,000 to 15,000 per poster motif. These were designed by the top marine painters and still attract public interest today.

Emigrant halls

Emigrant business had again become very significant since the beginning of the 1880s and an important source of earnings for Hapag. However, when a serious cholera epidemic in Hamburg caused by catastrophic water hygiene conditions claimed over 8,600 lives within a very short time in summer 1892, the port of the city was closed for all East European steerage passengers. This probably occurred mainly because public opinion made Russian emigrants responsible for the outbreak of the epidemic. Hapag’s emigrant business came to a virtual standstill in these months.

In this difficult period, Ballin ensured with skilled negotiations that emigrant traffic could be resumed from 1893. Henceforth medical inspections and disinfection measures were carried out under state supervision at the border stations and in the transit stations and port cities of the German Empire.
The costs for this were borne mainly by Hapag and North German Lloyd.83

Already in the cholera year of 1892 Hapag had set up barracks on a site at Amerika-Kai provided by the state to accommodate a maximum of 1,400 emigrants in ten dormitories. However, the sanitary and hygienic conditions there were anything but exemplary.

When this site was needed for other purposes, Hapag built a new facility at Veddel, again on a state property. This comprised for example four dormitory and residential pavilions and was put into operation in December 1901. Eight provisional lodgings were added in 1905 and a further 18 quarters in pavilion form in 1907. There were then more than 30 buildings that could take up to 5,000 people at the same time on a demarcated fenced-in area of about 55,000 sq m.84 These persons were looked after by 180 Hapag salaried employees, including 28 interpreters.

The entire complex had at that time model character – today one would probably talk about a successful “public private partnership”. It differed essentially from the previous mass quarters that were like barracks. The sanitary conditions in particular had
Forward stairwell for the first class of the “Imperator”
improved, as the facility now had its own sewer system. The pavilions had apart from the dormitories each for 22 persons their own toilets and common rooms. There was a church with a larger Catholic and a smaller Protestant interior and also a synagogue on the site. Moreover, kosher meals were prepared in the facility’s own kitchens that could be eaten in separate halls.

Hapag had certainly not opted for the innovative concept of the emigrant halls, which were intentionally no longer called barracks, entirely disinterestedly. The halls represented perfect advertising for the shipping line. A model of the emigrant town was already presented in 1900 at the World Exhibition in Paris.

Before 1901, many emigrants who came to Hamburg had been victims of swindlers. Hamburg had a very bad reputation. The tricksters were so well organised in the city that they even had their own professional title, that of the “Litzer”. After the construction of the emigrant halls, emigrants could stay there for a modest price.

Emigrants usually travelled only once, but they wrote about their experiences to those coming after them and often themselves bought from their new home the tickets for following family members. The term “chain emigration” characterises this phenomenon very aptly: it was typical for the major waves of emigration since
the 1880s that initially relatively young men set off, mostly from East European countries to North America. These wrote to the relatives who had stayed home, which thanks to the improved communication possibilities was much easier than in the mid-19th century. Other family members then followed.

With the newly built emigrant halls, Hapag not only improved its corporate image. Another positive effect for it was reducing the financial risk in emigrant business. The US immigration regulations prescribed that persons who did not satisfy health conditions had to be returned at the specific shipping line's expense. To avoid this, there were four permanently employed doctors in the emigrant town to ensure medical supervision. Newcomers were examined, showered, disinfected and vaccinated. They were free to leave the facility before their departure.

With the emigrant halls as central component, Hapag established a more or less complete, smoothly functioning and profitable system in emigrant business. The shipping line’s numerous agents attracted the emigrants with “all-inclusive offers”: with the ship tickets they also purchased rail tickets for the trip in special trains from the border control stations to the port cities including accommodation and catering in the emigrant halls. A similar approach has already

*Third-class dining hall on the “Imperator”*
“Ocean voyage 6 days” by Jürgens & Bornemann (1897/1900) – one of the few Hapag posters using an allegorical presentation
Hamburg-America, by Hans Bohrdt (1902/1903) – Bohrdt, the favourite painter of Wilhelm II, was one of the distinguished marine artists of his time.
Berlin-Alexandria in 100 hours,
by Hans Bohrdt (1906/1907)
Pleasure trips at sea, by Felix Schwormstädt (ca. 1904) – the skilfully composed group scene stimulates the imagination of the observer and suggests the possibility of an “adventure” on board.
been noted in quite another connection, namely the complete organisation of cruises by one supplier.

For the emigrants, this full package meant a mixture of support and welfare on the one hand and tutelage on the other. Quite a few contemporaries, for whom the latter consideration carried more weight, also expressed criticism. For instance, the “Hamburger Echo”, the mouthpiece of the Hamburg Social Democratic Party (SPD), carried an article with the headline “Bathing at Ballin’s”. There it was stated: “The Lord protect you from the bath! This is the last good wish that the Jewish emigrant from Russia is usually given, and what is meant is: ‘The Lord protect you from Ballin and his hygienic control stations.’

That the emigrant halls – despite such criticism – represented the hub of emigration via Hamburg at the beginning of the 20th century is confirmed by the fact that about 113,000 of the 156,000 emigrants who departed Hamburg in 1907 were accommodated in the Hapag facility. The overwhelming majority of these persons, 94 percent, travelled to the USA. In 1913, Hamburg registered the highest number of emigrants, around 193,000. Hapag’s emigrant business then came to a complete standstill with the outbreak of the first world war.

Expansion of Hapag’s liner network

When Ballin joined Hapag in 1886, the company ran a mail steamship service from Hamburg to New York and a “West-Indian-Mexican Line”. The number of its lines had increased to a total of 67 by the eve of the first world war. They linked Hamburg with various ports in North, Central and South America, in South and East Asia, on the Persian Gulf and in Africa. There was also a seaside resort service as well as various coastal lines and Hapag routes that did not affect Hamburg.

Hapag had its own dock facilities not only in Hamburg but also in Cuxhaven, New
York and on the Caribbean island Saint Thomas to enable it to operate its global liner network. The key hub was the Port of Hamburg: in 1898 Hapag had agreed with the City of Hamburg that new expanded docks were to be built on the southern Elbe bank, Kuhwärder, and most of them leased to the shipping line. The new Kuhwärder facilities were inaugurated in 1903. Hapag then had a quarter of the entire roofed-over storage space in the Port of Hamburg.93

The expansion of the impressive Hapag liner network was accompanied by an enormous concentration process, in the course of which most Hamburg lines came under Ballin's influence. Hapag acquired many smaller lines and developed into a cartel-like structure. The situation incidentally was comparable at North German Lloyd, which followed a similar corporate strategy, though somewhat later.

In Britain liner shipping played a much less important role than in Germany, while tramp shipping, i.e. transporting above all cargo depending on the market situation between different ports, was more significant. This had an effect on the degree of company concentration, which was generally less for British shipping lines than for German carriers.94 The British liner companies were thus in a weaker position. A concentration process started among them only after 1902.

[The picture is contained in the printed version]
It began with the International Mercantile Marine Company founded by the American billionaire John Pierpont Morgan. This will be considered later.\textsuperscript{95}

Ballin's expansion policy did not meet undivided approval within the management bodies of Hapag. Johannes Merck and Max Schinckel were among Ballin's fiercest critics. Schinckel was of the opinion that "shipping lines serving special areas offer their shareholders better earnings than a brilliantly managed monopolising giant company".\textsuperscript{96} However, it should be observed that under Ballin's management Hapag continuously achieved enormous profits (except in 1892 with the cholera epidemic and the following year).

The cartelisation was criticised as an unfavourable form of organisation not only by Schinckel but also in the economic debate of these years. For instance, the economist Gustav Schmoller differentiated between "American" trust and "German" cartel at the conference of the "Association for Social Policy" in 1905, arguing that only the "right" cartelisation could create fairness. With this comparison, Schmoller naturally won the applause of the representatives of the steel works association and of the Rhine-Westphalia coal syndicate attending the conference.\textsuperscript{97} There had, after all, been a reorientation in German industry originating with heavy industry after Bismarck’s switch to a protective tariff policy in 1879. The free market model lost appeal. From then on, many entrepreneurs put their faith in a collective,
contractual order with an interventionist state. Ballin took another position, as he was a supporter of laissez-faire — except during the last years of his life.

We will now consider each of the main trades served by Hapag in more detail.

The North Atlantic trade – which always remained the central area of Hapag’s corporate strategy — offered only few expansion possibilities from the mid-1890s. Ballin therefore sought opportunities to set up new liner services apart from those to North America.

The key component of this expansion became East Asia business, particularly with China. The following events can be regarded as the most important stages in this. In 1897 the German Empire had occupied in a surprise attack the Bay of Kiaochow in China, which had a profitable hinterland; in 1898 Hapag opened a monthly cargo steamer service with its own tonnage from Hamburg and Antwerp to Penang, Singapore, Hong Kong, Shanghai, Yokohama and Kobe and took over Kingsin-Linie with its 13 steamers and the entire staff; and in the same year Hapag and North German Lloyd concluded an operating agreement for the mail steamship service from Hamburg/Bremen to East Asia and received an annual subsidy for this from the German government.

This cursory overview already shows how the interests of the German economy coincided with those of the German Empire in East Asia at the end of the 19th century. During the Boxer War in early summer 1900, Hapag and North German Lloyd were commissioned to transport the German military contingent to the theatre of war. Eight countries — Germany, France, Britain, Italy, Japan, Austria-Hungary, Russia and the USA — had decided to take joint military action against Chinese troops and Boxer forces resisting the increasing influence of the colonial powers in China.

At the beginning of 1900, the social movement of the “Boxers” had spread over extensive parts of North China. “Fists of Righteous Harmony” is one of the various translations of the Chinese denomination “Yihequan”. It underlined the influence of popular culture and religion, particularly various martial arts schools, on the members, who were mostly male farmers and agricultural labourers.

The intervention in China, which was condemned in the Reichstag by social democratic and left liberal politicians and was in some cases also criticised by representatives of the church, developed into a ruthless punitive campaign: thousands of Chinese were killed, areas devastated and cultural treasures plundered.

After the end of the war, Ballin decided in 1901 to go on a trip to the Far East. The annual report of Hapag noted: “The development of trading and shipping business in East Asia has motivated our director general Ballin to undertake an informative trip to China and Japan this January, which has already prompted us to decide to focus also on internal traffic between the East Asian ports, in which we were hitherto not involved at all.” In the same year, a liner service from Hamburg to Shanghai, Tianjin and Tsingtao, the capital of the “German protectorate
of Kiaochow”, was also initiated, and a joint service with North German Lloyd was set up on the Yangtse between Hankou and Shanghai.103

1900 and 1901 were crucial years for Hapag’s involvement in services to and from South America. This was when Hapag purchased de Freitas-Linie, which went to Brazil and the La Plata countries. It also concluded operating agreements with Deutsche Dampfschiffahrts-Gesellschaft Kosmos and Hamburg Südamerikanische Dampfschiffahrts-Gesellschaft.104 Here Ballin proceeded in a very skilled manner, negotiating discretely with his old friend Carl Laeisz, the chairman of Hamburg-Süd: “Laeisz had become an old man and no longer knew to provide the right resistance to Ballin’s clever advances. He was half attracted, half repelled. He then quietly sold his large H.S.D.G. shareholding for a high price to the Packetfahrt (...)”.105

After the conclusion of the operating agreement with Kosmos-Linie, Ballin soon succeeded in exerting a dominating influence on this line. Adolph Vorwerk had been chairman of the company’s supervisory board for a long time.106 Ballin was also a member of this. When Kosmos-Linie experienced difficulties after the severe earthquake that devastated Valparaiso in August 1906, Ballin knew how to use the situation to his advantage. He took up the “idea according to which the shippers or even the company were not served when one of the important shippers (...) [Vorwerk Gebr. & Co., JG] also provided the chairman of the supervisory board (...)”. Vorwerk then resigned from the supervisory board and Ballin was elected its chairman.107

The Hamburg Africa trade was dominated by Woermann-Linie and Deutsche Ost-Afrika-Linie around the turn of the century. Ballin was on the supervisory board of both lines. When North German Lloyd joined forces with Hamburg-Bremer-Afrika-Linie AG, a small line that had entered the West Africa trade in 1907, Woermann-Linie came under competitive pressure and in the same year entered into an operating agreement with Hapag, which acquired eight Woermann steamships for the West Africa service. Shortly afterwards, Woermann-Linie, Hamburg-Bremer-Afrika-Linie, Deutsche Ost-Afrika-Linie and Hapag agreed to set up a joint service to Africa.108 Adolph Woermann was appointed to the supervisory board of Hapag and remained on this up to his death in 1911.

However, there were not only the specified economic reasons that prompted Woermann-Linie, which up to then had been strictly concerned to maintain its independence, to form an operating agreement with Hapag: Woermann had come “into a whirlpool of political conflicts” in 1904 on account of his troop transport contracts with the German government.109 The uprising of the Hereros against German colonial rule in German South-West Africa, which was later joined by the Namas, began in January 1904. The colonial masters were concerned not just to crush this revolt. At the beginning of October 1904, the German commander-in-chief, Lieutenant-General Lothar von Trotha, ordered that every Herero was to be shot within the German borders.110 In 1911, there were only 15,130 of the formerly about 80,000 Hereros and 9,781 of the previously 20,000 Namas. In
percentage terms this meant that 80 percent of the Hereros and 50 percent of the Namas had lost their lives under German colonial rule at this time.\footnote{111}

Woermann, whose shipping line had a de facto monopoly for all military transport services to South-West Africa, was one of the major earners from this colonial war, in the course of which about 15,000 soldiers and more than 11,000 horses were shipped. Johannes Merck wrote in his memoirs that with the troop transports with his Africa lines Woermann “skimmed off the thickest cream of the milk – and this cream was very thick (...)”\footnote{112}

When the budget of the war was debated in the Reichstag in 1906, the Centre Party member Matthias Erzberger discovered that during the war Woermann-Linie had overcharged the government about three million marks for freight and had invoiced as much again for demurrage. The German government reacted to Erzberger’s criticism by cancelling the agreements it had made with Woermann-Linie and discontinuing payments to the line. Woermann himself became a persona non grata, and when the Kaiser visited Hamburg in 1908 the Hamburg Senate was informed: “The presence of the businessman Adolph Woermann is not desired by His Majesty.”\footnote{113} Yet Ballin belonged to those who came to Woermann’s defence and disputed the allegation that he had overcharged the German government.\footnote{114}

With the creation of the joint service to Africa, the extension of Hapag’s network under Ballin was largely completed. The shipping line focused on expanding its existing lines in subsequent years.\footnote{115}

\section*{Shipping diplomacy}

We have already noted how Ballin promoted a vertical and horizontal company concentration with Hapag taking over shipping lines and other firms. Ballin also initiated at national and international level agreements between shipping companies on rates, shipping lines and profit distribution. These “pools” or “conferences” can be regarded as cartels, as they involved forms of cooperation without any networking of capital.

As a young man, Ballin had used with Carr-Linie the possibilities that the free market offered him with every trick in the book. Now he strove to restrict this in the name of free competition and establish a front against newly founded competitors.\footnote{116} From the 1890s, the Atlantic passenger business developed “in the context of a network of compensatory agreements and demarcations”\footnote{117} – and Ballin played the key role in this from the beginning.

In 1892, Union-Linie, Hapag, North German Lloyd as well as the Belgian Red Star Line and Netherlands-America Steamship Company formed the North Atlantic Steamship Lines Association, the “parent cell of the later Atlantic Pool agreements”.\footnote{118} The five lines agreed on prices and dividing up steerage class traffic, of which Hapag and Union-Linie together received 28 percent (westwards). This share was much lower than that of North German Lloyd (46 percent). However, Ballin compensated for this by introducing a flexible factor that also took into consideration newbuildings of the individual shipping lines. With the agree-
1892 — NORDATLANTISCHER DÄMPFER
Cöln 23. Januar 19

Seyle
Bremen

Ch. Tallet
Paris

J. G. Roucblin
Rotterdam

Ad Storm
Hamburg

Dr. Eicher
Hamburg

A. Bosse
Hamburg

E. Brütscher
Antwerpen

Dr. V.
Meeting in Cologne of the North Atlantic Steamship Lines Association, founded in 1892
ment, Ballin succeeded – and this was what mattered for him – in including North German Lloyd as largest competitor on a contractual basis. Later the agreements were for a time also extended to include cargo traffic and the rates for cabin passengers.

The founding of the North Atlantic Steamship Lines Association marked the start of a series of ever larger conferences and ever more complicated price agreements: “In monthly pool conferences, mostly at a neutral place, (...) directors and holders of a general commercial power of attorney met to compare (...) the results of the business on the basis of exact statistics, to agree on rates and to bring about settlements.”

The situation changed fundamentally around the turn of the century: The pool formations hitherto relatively unheeded by outsiders became a political issue. This was prompted by the entry of the American banking, coal and steel magnate John Pierpont Morgan into the shipping business.

Morgan purchased the majority interest in the British Leyland Line in spring 1901 and acquired two more British lines, White Star Line and Dominion Line, in 1902. Morgan also controlled most of the railroads on the US east coast and wanted to link these with transatlantic shipping to create a large transport network under his control. This alarmed Ballin, who saw the cargo business of Hapag with the “large P steamships” and above all its independence jeopardised. He therefore entered into negotiations with Morgan. However, his Bremen colleague Wiegand was adverse to this initiative, particularly because North German Lloyd’s interests were different from those of Hapag: while the latter did its main business with cargo in Atlantic services, Lloyd carried chiefly passengers. However, Wilhelm II intervened personally and declared that North German Lloyd should also participate in the negotiations.

In February 1902, the two German shipping lines and the International Mercantile Marine Company (IMMC), as Morgan Trust called itself, agreed that the IMMC would not establish any services to Germany without the approval of the German lines, while Hapag and Lloyd undertook not to expand their business with Britain and Belgium. It was also agreed that Morgan would not participate with his capital directly in the two shipping lines. There was rather an agreement for a fictive participation, which involved 20 million marks for each of the two German companies. It was stated in an annual report of Hapag: “Our contract with International Mercantile Marine Co. determines that we have to pay this company annually a sum corresponding to our dividend, calculated on a share capital of 20 million marks, while it has to pay interest to us on the same capital amount at 6 percent.” The reaction of the German press to the agreement was more than appreciative: “it already bordered on self-satisfaction”.

From the financial point of view, the agreement with Morgan was a loss-making business for Hapag, which declared an average dividend of 7.5 percent between 1897 and 1913. In the eight years from 1903 to 1911, it transferred more than 1.5 million marks to the US company, while none other than Lloyd, which had originally been against the agreement, received on balance close on 4.6
million marks from the USA, as it made far lower profits than Hapag. An even more serious aspect, however, was that because of the agreement the British government decided to subsidise Cunard Line to protect it against a takeover by Morgan Trust. It was thereby the actual winner of the agreement. The contract with IMMC was cancelled in 1912. It had meanwhile become apparent that Morgan’s plan to acquire a monopoly of the Atlantic market with a shipping trust had failed.

More lasting results were achieved by negotiations that were held in February 1908 at Ballin’s initiative and under his chairmanship in England. These led to the founding of the North Atlantic conference. This resembled the North Atlantic Steamships Line Association of 1892, but was much more extensive as regards depth of regulation and number of members. A total of ten shipping lines, also including Cunard Line, and four associated lines concluded an agreement under which the steerage traffic from the North European and Atlantic ports to North America was newly regulated, and an agreement obliging the contractual partners for the first time to maintain minimum rates in cabin traffic. German and British as well as Belgian, Danish, French, Dutch, Austrian, Russian and all Morgan Trust lines were now united under one roof and Ballin had, according to the journalist and commentator on politics and current affairs Kurt Zielenziger, “achieved a goal of his life’s work”.

However, five years later, in October 1913, Hapag cancelled the agreements of the North Atlantic conference, “as the hitherto existing agreements did not do sufficient justice to the natural growth of our company”. The main reason for this step was the meanwhile completed change in ship-building policy with the construction of the new steamships of the “Imperator” class. Ballin had therefore demanded a larger share of the steerage pool, but this was rejected by the other members of the conference, particularly North German Lloyd. 1913 was then also seen as a year in which the rivalry between the two companies reached a peak of intensity.

Although Hapag and Lloyd could arrive at a settlement in spring and summer 1914, the practically concluded negotiations with the British and American lines came to nothing with the outbreak of the first world war. The previously made agreements between Hapag and Lloyd, envisaging first and foremost a community of interests of both companies for the North Atlantic, were now worthless, as the parameters had radically changed.

At the end of this chapter on Albert Ballin and the rise of Hapag, it should be noted again that when Ballin joined the line in
1886 as departmental head, it was, far overtaken by North German Lloyd, without actual leadership “in a state of stagnation”.\textsuperscript{132}

It came 22nd in the rankings of the world’s largest lines.\textsuperscript{133} Thanks to his striking ability to spot market opportunities, Ballin very quickly succeeded in reversing the situation. In 1897, on the company’s 50th anniversary, Hapag had become under Ballin’s management the largest shipping company in the world, a position it retained up to the outbreak of the first world war. Ballin’s outstanding contribution to Hapag’s success was also reflected in the fact that in 1897 he assumed the leading position of the three executive board members as “First Director” at Hapag and two years later was nominated director general by the supervisory board. Between 1885 and 1913, the number of Hapag steamships increased with newbuildings, acquisitions and mergers with other lines from 23 to 194, its tonnage rising from close on 55,000 to over 1,300,000 grt and share capital from 15 to 180 million marks.\textsuperscript{134}

32 The mark banco was up to 1873 the currency of invoicing of the Hamburg wholesale trade, the unit of payment of Hamburger Bank founded in 1619 — a currency that offered a secure basis and was not subject to erosion. It did not circulate as coin, but was covered by silver bars. Payment was made for the first time in the history of the German banking with “credit vouchers”, corresponding to our present giro cheques. The general means of payment up to 1867 was the mark courant and from 1871 the mark (1871: 1 mark courant = 1.2 mark and 1 mark banco = 1.5 mark).


34 Zielenziger, Ballin, p. 176.

35 This is noted in Himer, Jahre, p. 60.

36 Wiborg, Ballin, p. 21.

37 Herschel, Hapag, p. 39; Mathies, Reederei, p. 39, 130; Matthes, Hapag, p. 9.


39 Schinckel, Lehensrinnerungen, p. 266.


41 Albert Ballin to Amalia Ballin, March 31st 1901: Stubmann, Feld, p. 169.

42 Cecil, Ballin, p. 11; cf. Straub, Ballin, p. 151 and Wiborg, Ballin, p. 22.

43 Stubmann, Feld, p. 68.

44 Himer, Geschichte, p. 10.

45 Klemm, Verwaltungsgebäude, p. 160.

46 Ibid.


48 Schiefler, Kulturgeschichte, p. 475.

50 Klemm, Verwaltungsgebäude, p. 160.
52 Wiborg, Ballin, p. 28.
53 Prange, Entwicklung, p. 33.
54 Aagaard, Life, p. 3.
55 Wiborg, Ballin, p. 72.
56 Hamann, Traumreisen, p. 10.
57 Ibid., p. 14. – The passenger list is given in Hamburger Fremdenblatt No. 17 (January 21st 1891).
59 Albert Ballin to Ernst Francke, August 17th 1899: Stubmann, Feld, p. 176.
60 Petzet, Wiegand, p. 34.
62 Wiborg, Feld, p. 104.
64 Ahrens; Hauchild-Thiessen, Reeder, p. 55.
67 Ibid.; Straub, Ballin, p. 97.
68 Kludas, Geschichte, p. 186; cf. on the other hand Ritter, Kaiser, p. 139, who agrees with the critical comments of Schinkel.
69 Wiborg, Ballin, p. 96.
70 Hamburgischer Correspondent No. 260 (May 23rd 1912).
71 Hamburger Fremdenblatt No. 120 (May 24th 1912).
72 E.g. Wilhelm Doerkes-Boppard (Imperator auf See, p. 15).
73 Ibid., p. 24, 41.
74 Bracker, Dampfer, p. 67.
75 Cecil, Ballin, p. 100.
76 Turbinen-Schnelldampfer Imperator, p. 17.
77 Wiborg, Ballin, p. 39.
80 Klemm, Schifahrtsplakat, p. 51.
81 Cf. e.g. the accompanying volume “Hamburg und die Hapag. Seefahrt im Plakat”, published by Matthes and Prange, for the exhibition in the Museum for Hamburg History.
82 Wiborg, Feld, p. 97.
83 Groppe, Hamburg, p. 21 ff.
84 Groppe, Modellstadt, p. 34.
85 Guttmann, Schattenriß, p. 242.
86 Groppe, Modellstadt, p. 39; Wiborg, Feld, p. 152.
87 This is indicated e.g. by the Hapag circular No. 304 “To our agents!” dated June 18th 1906 (Archives of Hapag-Lloyd AG). There it is stated: “They [the Russian emigrants, JG] can leave the emigrant halls as they please to go shopping, to attend to various matters, or to visit the city, in short, they can do what they like as all other emigrants during their stay in Hamburg.” – My thanks to Ms Susanne Wiborg for this reference.
89 Groppe, Modellstadt, p. 46.
90 Hamburger Echo No. 242 (October 14th 1904).
92 Cf. Kludas, Geschichte, p. 218 ff., which includes the schedule of Hapag dated July 1914.
93 Wiborg, Feld, p. 126 ff.
95 Murken, Verbände, p. 599.
96 Schinckel, Lebenserinnerungen, p. 270.
97 Blaich, Kartellpolitik, p. 30 ff.
99 Seiler, Jahre, p. 49.
100 Pelc, Hamburg, p. 21.
101 Cf. recent literature on the Boxer War particularly Cohen, History and the items in the anthology "Koloni-
alkrieg in China", published by Leutner and Mühlhahn, which deal with the incidents, background and impact of the events.
102 Jahresbericht der Hamburg-Amerikanischen Packetfahrt-Actien-Gesellschaft (Hamburg-Amerika Linie) in
Hamburg für die am 29. März 1901 stattfindende ordentliche General-Versammlung der Actionaire: 54tes Ge-
schäftsjahr 1900, p. 5 (Archives of Hapag-Lloyd AG).
103 Cecil, Ballin, p. 75.
104 Murken, Verbände, p. 597 ff.
105 StA Hbg., 622-01/62 Familie Merck, II 8, Konv 2b: Meine Erinnerungen an die Hamburg-Amerika Linie
und an Albert Ballin 1896–1919 by Johannes Theodor Merck [manuscript fair copy 1920–1921], p. 86 ff.
107 Cf. with reference ibid., p. 39 ff.
108 Pelc, Hamburg, p. 22.
109 Stubmann, Feld, p. 139.
111 Drechsler, Aufstände, p. 139 ff.; different figures are given in Bühlner, Namaaufstand, p. 338. – On the ge-
nocidal colonial war against the Hereros and Namas, which lasted from 1904 to 1907 and represents in the general
history of modern genocide a decisive link between the early genocides with a low level of state organisation
and the bureaucratised crimes of National Socialism, cf. recent literature: Zimmerer, Herrschaft, esp. p. 31 ff.;
Bühlner, Namaaufstand, esp. p. 136 ff.; Böhke-Itzen, Kolonialschuld and the items in the anthology "Völkermord
in Deutsch-Südwestafrika", published by Zimmerer and Zeller.
112 StA Hbg., 622-01/62 Familie Merck, II 8, Konv 2b: Meine Erinnerungen an die Hamburg-Amerika Linie
und an Albert Ballin 1896–1919 by Johannes Theodor Merck [manuscript fair copy 1920–1921], p. 49.
113 Cf. with references Bühlner, Namaaufstand, p. 330 ff.
114 Stated by Ballin in his obituary for Woermann (Stubmann, Feld, p. 140); cf. Wegner, Hanseaten, p. 289 ff.
115 Pelc, Hamburg, p. 23.
116 Cecil, Ballin, p. 55; Straub, Ballin, p. 37, 41.
117 Cecil, Ballin, p. 12.
118 Murken, Verbände, p. VII.
119 StA Hbg., 622-01/62 Familie Merck, II 8, Konv 2b: Meine Erinnerungen an die Hamburg-Amerika Linie
und an Albert Ballin 1896–1919 by Johannes Theodor Merck [manuscript fair copy 1920–1921], p. 4.
120 Wiborg, Feld, p. 140.
121 Cecil, Ballin, p. 60.
122 Stubmann, Feld, p. 90.
123 Jahresbericht der Hamburg-Amerikanischen Packetfahrt-Actien-Gesellschaft (Hamburg-Amerika Linie) in
Hamburg für die am 30. März 1905 stattfindende ordentliche General-Versammlung der Actionaire: 58tes Ge-
schäftsjahr 1904, p. 8 (Archives of Hapag-Lloyd AG).
124 Cecil, Ballin, p. 63.
125 StA Hbg., 622-01/62 Familie Merck, II 8, Konv 2b: Meine Erinnerungen an die Hamburg-Amerika Linie
und an Albert Ballin 1896–1919 by Johannes Theodor Merck [manuscript fair copy 1920–1921], p. 140.
127 Wiborg, Feld, p. 143.
128 Wittbößi, Hapag, p. 66.
129 Zielenziger, Ballin, p. 186.
130 Hamburg-Amerika Linie (Hamburg-Amerikanische Packetfahrt-Actien-Gesellschaft) in Hamburg. Jahres-
bericht für die am 27. März 1914 stattfindende ordentliche Generalversammlung der Aktionäre. 67tes Geschäfts-
jahr 1913, p. 3 (Archives of Hapag-Lloyd AG).
131 Nathan, Schiffahrtskampf, p. 2.
132 Klein, Ballin, p. 561.
133 Cecil, Ballin, p. 36.
134 Figures from: Jahresbericht der Hamburg-Amerikanischen Packetfahrt-Actiengesellschaft in Hamburg für
die am 31. März 1886 stattfindende ordentliche General-Versammlung der Actionaire, 39tes Geschäftsjahr 1885
sowie Hamburg-Amerika Linie (Hamburg-Amerikanische Packetfahrt-Actien-Gesellschaft) in Hamburg. Jahres-
bericht für die am 27. März 1914 stattfindende ordentliche Generalversammlung der Aktionäre. 67tes Geschäftsjahr
1913 (Archives of Hapag-Lloyd AG).
“Little Potsdam” and Hamfelde

Ballin not only ensured appropriate premises for Hapag and its administration – he also put priority on a prestigious setting for his wife and himself.

After marrying in 1883, the Ballins moved initially to Moorweidenstrasse and then to Heimhuder Strasse in 1885 and to Badestrasse in 1902. Six years later, Ballin commissioned Werner Lundt and Georg Kallmorgen to build a villa at Feldbrunnenstrasse. These two architects, who at that time were regarded as particularly progressive, designed a residence adorned with columns, linking the reform architecture of the beginning of the 20th century with motifs from classicist country house style. Ballin, who actually shared the Kaiser’s conservative taste in art, also decided here for a break from historicism.135 The building, which has been protected as an historical monument since 1982, today accommodates the UNESCO Institute for Lifelong Learning.

In 1914, the British magazine “Daily Graphic” called the villa “Little Potsdam”.136 This shows what Ballin intended with its construction: apart from the Hapag headquarters, the private house of its director general was also to provide a representative atmosphere. Ballin wanted to have a building satisfying the highest requirements – and Villa Ballin offered him a perfect setting for social gatherings and dinners that he gave on behalf of Hapag. A lively social life was staged there offering guests opportunities for making political and business contacts.

Already in 1906 Ballin had purchased for 163,000 marks a country house in Hamfelde near Trittau, in which he spent mainly the summer months. He obtained the necessary capital for this by selling Nordsee-Linie and its five vessels for the seaside resort service. He had run this line as a private shipowner.

After moving into his country house, Ballin made enormous changes so that he could use it for entertaining guests. For example, he had installed hundreds of light bulbs in the surroundings of the house, illuminating the park for large-scale social events. As at this time there was still no electricity in the country, Ballin took power from a local distillery, which heated a boiler with 10,000 l of water for generating steam.

Ballin was an unsurpassed host: he was a gourmet par excellence, as well as a wonderful narrator, who could be cheerful, witty and charming. The rules of the house, put
up in the entrance hall, already show a special flair: “We ask our honoured guests in their movements and dispositions not to be restricted by considering us. We will strive to make our friends feel at home while staying with us by our avoiding pursuing them with a mother's loving care and treating them like children. What so often spoils German hospitality is the expectation that one has to stick together the entire day and be 'sweet' to one another. We do not expect our dear guests to behave nicely to us because they were invited, nor do we expect them to seek our society more often than they would prefer. Please dispose freely of cars, wagons, racing horses and rowing boats (as long as the supply suffices). We ask guests to determine themselves the time for the first breakfast and to give servants all relevant instructions. The second breakfast is usually taken jointly at 1. Afternoon tea at 4. Dinner about 7. 15 minutes before the beginning of the second breakfast and dinner the bell is sounded and a second time – as soon as it is served.”

The Ballins were visited by aristocrats from the diplomatic corps and army, officers, mostly commoners of the navy, bureaucrats who had risen into the nobility of office,
Silesian magnates, Rhine industrialists, Berlin bankers and journalists. Hamburg people “of family” were also frequent guests, but on their part refrained from inviting Ballin as a man who had gone up in the world. On the other hand, there were scarcely any artists – a clear difference to the Berlin salons of Aniela Fürstenberg, wife of the banker Carl Fürstenberg, who was a friend of Ballin.

Albert Ballin and the Kaiser

Ballin, according to Theodor Wolff, “surrounded Hapag with an unprecedented splendour of representation”. This impressed the Kaiser, who had a weakness for pomp. Ballin and Wilhelm II met for the first time in Cuxhaven before the maiden cruise of the “Augusta Victoria” in January 1891 (which we already mentioned). The Kaiser was just staying there and used the opportunity to inspect the first twin-screw fast steamship built in Germany. They developed a closer personal relationship in 1899 at the annual dinner of Hapag on the occasion of the Lower Elbe regatta, when Ballin sat at the side of the Kaiser.

From 1905, Wilhelm II came every year to the “fork breakfast” (today one would call this “second breakfast”) in Badestrasse, later then in Feldbrunnenstrasse. This was undoubtedly a very special honour for Ballin, as the monarch thereby broke with the tradition of Prussian kings not to visit apart-
ments of private persons. At this time, a set programme was established for the visits, which included for instance the following: Lower Elbe regatta with banquet, “Kaiserin Auguste Victoria-Jagd-Rennen” on Horn racing course, fork breakfast in Villa Ballin and finally on to Kieler Woche. From 1902, this was regularly attended by Hapag steamships, which served as floating grand hotels for the imperial guests. The considerable costs thereby incurred for Hapag were seen by Ballin – who never stayed an entire week in Kiel – as necessary investments for promoting the image of the shipping line.

In 1910, however, the programme had to be modified because of a boil in the imperial knee. The “Hamburger Neueste Nachrichten” reported that “the Kaiser arrived at the Altona main station [and not as otherwise at the showpiece station Dammtor, JG] on medical advice, as the monarch is to be spared every unnecessary climbing of steps in view of his knee injury.”

The “Hamburger Fremdenblatt” reported on a slide lecture on the newbuilding of a large cargo and passenger steamship, which
Ballin planned this time for the Kaiser in Feldbrunnenstrasse. Ballin was skilled at putting out reports such as this to the press, which then also avidly seized on them. His own perception of events is reflected in a notebook, in which he recorded special visits to his house:

“The Kaiser, who had said he was coming to visit on Monday June 20th for breakfast and to attend a slide lecture on the new ship [the later “Imperator”, JG] (Vulcan Yard No. 880-896), was suffering from a knee complaint. As a result, the entire Hamburg visit was cancelled.

On Monday 20 June received the message that the Kaiser did in fact want to come to us. On Wednesday 22 June 10 the Kaiser came, because of the better located terrain had gone up to Altona, from Altona by car to us. Breakfast 23 pers. H. M. Count Eulenburg Exc. Plessen v. Mueller v. Valentini Aide-de-camp v. Caprivi, Capt. v. Bülow Surgeon general Dr. Ilberg Envoy v. Treut-

In 1910, Ballin commissioned the artist-craftsman Georg Hulbe to make two chairs for the imperial visits, one featuring a crowned imperial eagle and Prussian coat of arms, the other Albert Ballin’s family coat of arms and that of Hamburg.
On closer examination, Ballin seems to have had a very singular relationship to Wilhelm II. Ballin was the first and most important of the “Kaiser Jews”. He was also one of the few businessmen who saw the Kaiser regularly, in the years up to 1914 about every two months at social functions and perhaps just as frequently to discuss business and political matters.

As Ballin had scarcely any contacts with the aristocrats dominating Berlin court society, his position at court depended entirely on his personal relationship with the monarch. For the Kaiser, Ballin—like the other “Kaiser Jews”—was an indispensable source of information, as he had experience in a field (in his case, business and particularly shipping) not possessed by any of these aristocrats. This was the main reason for the monarch’s interest in Ballin. He was also a man with the best contacts, who brought Wilhelm II in Hamburg or Kiel together with people who would have otherwise never worked their way through to the monarch. These also included the other “Kaiser Jews” such as Max Warburg or the entrepreneur and art patron James Simon. These were for Wilhelm II, whose world view had definite anti-Semitic tendencies, “in reality no genuine Jews at all”. “Genuine” Jews were for the Kaiser those who were critical of him. This shows the mindset that is always inherent in anti-Semitism. (“I define who is a Jew!”)

However, the relationship between Ballin and Wilhelm II proved to be a difficult one for various reasons. The monarch was an autocrat who could not bear criticism, and Ballin on his part scarcely tried openly to address controversial issues but rather contin-
"How the yellow peril really looks" (caricature from 1905)
ually came to the defence of Wilhelm II. In this respect, Ballin was in no way alone. Baron Friedrich von der Ropp, a German Baltic large landowner in Lithuania, wrote in retrospect: "We were all weak towards the Kaiser. No one wanted to spoil his childish-cheerful optimism, which tipped over into an almost bottomless depression when anyone criticised one of his pet subjects."

Generally considered, Ballin’s influence on the Kaiser was limited and has been overestimated by many commentators. Theodor Wolff notes in his memoirs: “Ballin exercised influence on the Kaiser in no great issue, in no important moment. (...) In no major project (...) Ballin was informed about what was happening, in such moments Wilhelm II never asked for his opinion (...)”

Apart from his “friendship” with Wilhelm II, Ballin attached great importance to his contacts with Reich Chancellor Bernhard von Bülow. He knew Bülow from the mid-1890s and met him frequently in Hamburg or Berlin. The Chancellor gives an unrestrictedly positive picture of Ballin in his memoirs, which were not without reason published only after his death, as he heaped harsh criticism on nearly every one of his companions: “I found few people so congenial, for few have I felt such sincere esteem.” Elsewhere it is stated: “Few people have done so much good in their life as Ballin. (...) He embodied as scarcely any other the bold, daring genius, always reasserting itself, always forward-thrusting, of the mightiest German port and commercial city, of the old and always young Hamburg.”

Bülow was dismissed as Reich Chancellor in July 1909. He had previously lost the monarch’s confidence because of the “Daily Telegraph” affair, in which he protected the Kaiser only half-heartedly against attacks from the Reichstag as a result of an unsuccessful interview. Ballin thought little of Bülow’s successor, Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg – at Hapag he would have been of use at most as librarian – and therefore repeatedly advocated Bülow’s return to the political stage.

Outside the government there were mainly members of two groups over which Ballin sought to exert political influence, on the one hand leading bankers such as Max Warburg or Carl Fürstenberg and on the other influential journalists such as Maximilian Harden, Theodor Wolff or Bernhard Huldermann, who became Ballin’s secretary in 1908 and five years later moved up into the Hapag executive board.

Ballin had a particularly steady relationship with Max Warburg, with whom he was in constant contact via a private telephone line. Ballin once described Warburg as “one of the cleverest and most patriotic men” he knew. Ballin was also closely connected with probably the most well-known journalist of the Wilhelmine Empire, Maximilian Harden. With his attacks that he continually delivered with the greatest acrimony on the person of the monarch and his entourage, Harden had earned the reputation of being one of the men in Germany most hated by Kaiser Wilhelm II.

The numerous social functions that Ballin continually organised were not an end in themselves. Rather, he used these opportunities to increase the influence of the business
community on government policy and acquaint important personalities with his views on economic and political issues. Apart from attracting the attention of the Kaiser, Ballin focused particularly on those government officials, bankers and journalists who were influential enough to receive his ideas and contribute significantly to their implementation. This privatisation of influence was characteristic for Ballin, who never strove for political power in the form of public office – and certainly not in his home city. As director general, he had long since grown beyond the confines of Hamburg, where the high society always treated him, the social climber, with a certain reserve.

Albert Ballin and his political influence

Ballin was rather sceptical about the work of the ubiquitous pressure groups in the German Empire. Although he belonged to and in some cases also promoted many of these associations, he otherwise played mostly a subordinate role in them.

Initially Ballin supported the “German Fleet Association”, which was founded in 1898. With over a million members, this was the national pressure group in the German Empire. Along with many figures in Hamburg, Ballin signed the invitation to the founding meeting of the association in Hamburg. He also played an important role in this for several years and in 1907 signed an appeal for funds, which yielded 60,000 marks. However, in subsequent years he criticised the noisy activity of this acclamation platform, which advocated a naval build-up and an imperialistic policy. He maintained that such propaganda would be difficult to bring under control after its original purpose had been achieved.

Ballin was also a member of the “German Colonial Society”, formed in 1887 from the merger of two associations. The members of this society (in 1914 there were 42,000) represented virtually all social classes of Germany at that time. With its professional PR in the form of advertisements, printed material, meetings, exhibitions and lectures, the association was an important agitation forum supporting colonial schemes of the government and plans for mail steamship subsidies and propagated a transoceanic German empire. Ballin, who did not consider colonies to be particularly profitable and was more concerned about fleet bases and branch locations, was with his views not always in harmony with the aims of the colonial society and thus did not play a particularly prominent role in it.

The situation was similar with the “Federation of Industrialists”, of which Ballin was also a member. This association had been founded in 1895 as a rallying point for manufacturing industry. In contrast to the “Central Association of German Industrialists”, which was oriented to heavy industry, most members of the federation – like Ballin – advocated free trade.

As director general of the globally active Hapag, Ballin naturally took a particularly keen interest in foreign policy. Diplomacy was a matter of the crown, the Reich Chancellor and the Foreign Office, and Ballin had good contacts to all three. The Reichstag with its parties, on the other hand, had little influence in this area. It is thus not sur-
prising that Ballin did not financially support any political party or belong to one.

Even if Ballin frequently criticised the formulators of government policy (particularly the top diplomats in the Foreign Office and their lack of understanding in business matters), he still accepted the aristocracy’s dominant role in this field. Ballin had little conclusive to say about how the state upholding German “world policy” would have to be constituted. This coincides with the opinion of his friend Theodor Wolff, who noted the difficulty of classifying Ballin politically: “He wanted to keep his ways as free as possible of obligations, and he was bothered by being required to choose a point of view. Although he set store by decency in every moral respect extending to touchiness, he did not consider politics according to principles and probably saw in the emphasis on general principles an unworldly pedantry.”

Ballin shared with the conservatives the aversion to changes aiming in the direction of a parliamentarisation of German constitutionalism (the Reichstag could criticise and control the government, but not withdraw its confidence from it and force its resignation). Ballin was also against a change to the three class franchise in Prussia, which up to 1918 divided up voters in various classes according to the level of their tax payments for the election of the House of Representatives and privileged above all aristocrats and large landowners, as well as affluent merchants. (The German Reichstag, on the other hand, was elected on the basis of “general”, free and direct suffrage; all men from the age of 25 had the right to vote.)

In 1907, Ballin advocated supplementing the German Reichstag with a body “in the form of professional affiliation of representatives of the major sectors, that is industry and of trade, in all its ramifications”. In this respect, he referred to Bismarck’s ideas for forming a business council in order to reduce the disadvantages of “party rule”. Already a year later, however, Ballin altered his position in the wake of the “Daily Telegraph” affair and showed sympathy for a strengthening of the Reichstag, although this did not last long.

In common with (most) liberals, Ballin advocated a free trade orientation of German foreign trade policy. This is scarcely surprising in view of the fact that American grain imports represented a vital part of Hapag’s overseas cargo business. Ballin held common ground with the liberals particularly on economic policy issues. In this area, there were also the greatest differences to the Reich Chancellor Bülow, who again pursued a stronger agricultural protectionist policy from 1900. On the other hand, Ballin had no time for (leftist) liberal demands for an expansion of the constitution with a government responsible to parliament. He even considered it to be dangerous because he claimed that it would be impossible to control its further progress.

The keynote of Ballin’s position on social policy was that, like most representatives of middle-class business interests, he showed no sympathies at all for organised labour. Ballin was a resolute opponent of social democracy and trade unions of any kind. Anyone who belonged to such or had gone on strike had no chance of finding employment at Hapag. Officers and captains also
had to undertake to have no contacts with trade unions or social democratic associations. All this strained relations between the Hapag management and salaried employees and workers, who, according to Susanne Wiborg, lived “in almost constant discord”. Yet Ballin definitely showed concern for social issues, although this had a paternalistic character – which was also typical for most middle-class business people. Immediately after joining Hapag, Ballin improved and supplemented health insurance and old age pensions for Hapag staff. The annual report for 1887 states: “We saw ourselves obliged at the beginning of the current year to set up an invalids, widows and orphans pension scheme for salaried employees of our company and have (...) thus established an institution which is not only a benefit for the salaried employees and has been lacking for a long time, but can also only be of use to our company.”

Ballin displayed a more flexible attitude than other employers in the major strikes in 1896–97 and 1906–07. However, he was also prepared to enter into negotiations within Hapag only excluding the trade unions. An important point was involved here. After all, the 16,700 port workers and seamen protested for eleven weeks in 1896–97 not only against miserable work conditions, low wages and their bad housing situation – they were also concerned about basic issues. However, the companies rejected arbitration proceedings because they saw the strike as a “power struggle”. The dispute also proved to be a failure for the workers; only in subsequent years did they succeed in achieving minor improvements.

In view of the industrial disputes in 1906 and 1907, Ballin decided to make concessions to Hapag employees. Various welfare institutions were expanded or newly set up, “namely the workers’ invalid fund, the workers’ provident fund, the savings fund for workers, the veterans’ foundation and the imprest fund, the first alone having about 14,000 members”. Hapag held a share of 50 percent in this. In 1909, Hapag began to build flats for its workers in the Hamburg district of Wilhelmsburg. Already in 1907 Ballin had the various institutions at Hapag combined into an own “social political department”, headed initially by E. Huben and then in 1912 by the lawyer Siegfried Heckscher.

Albert Ballin and the Admiral

Ballin disapproved of the strident propaganda of the “German Fleet Association”, but initially supported its call for naval expansion. Up to 1908, Ballin was one of the main supporters of the ideas of Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz.

Tirpitz was the driving force behind the planned expansion of the battle fleet that was made possible with ever more Naval Laws and was one of the fathers of German “world policy” envisaging a projection of German power overseas. As Secretary of State of the Imperial Naval Office, he had a close relationship with the Kaiser from 1897 and could thus link his own ideas with the latter’s dreams of a large fleet. The strategic planning of Tirpitz was based on the “risk theory”, according to which Germany could never build such a large fleet as that of the leading sea power Britain, but had to aim to
have a force capable of inflicting serious damage on the Royal Navy. This was to be implemented with a ratio of 2:3 in about 20 years. Tirpitz maintained that Germany could afford the enormous costs of naval expansion sooner than Britain. Once the desired ratio of 2:3 had been achieved, it would be highly improbable that the British would fight against the German fleet.

Around the turn of the century, Ballin advocated the ideas of Tirpitz on various occasions. In September 1899, he presented the Kaiser with a “paper on the necessity of the more rapid strengthening of our navy”. A few months later, he demanded in the “Hamburger Neueste Nachrichten”: “The German battle fleet must virtually stand behind every German vessel abroad!” He maintained that Germany’s prestige should be increased with a strong fleet also on the seas so that this alone would suffice without external application of force to avoid incidents such as the unjustified seizure of German merchant vessels by British warships. Ballin continued: “The German navy must adapt to the development of world policy and our business interests, and the patriotic deed of having put our fleet on a firm statutory basis will gain its true significance only if governments and parliament further build on this foundation also in line with the requirements of the time. This is now to occur with the new Naval Law, which intends to double our home battle fleet and also increase the number of our foreign-based ships. We in Hamburg, this vital gateway to world transport, through which more than half of the entire German sea trade passes, welcome this demand. We well know that one cannot do extensive business without costs, and so the strengthening of the fleet also requires considerable funds.” Shortly before Ballin had stated in the “Hamburger Correspondent” “that with our present wide-ranging business interests the status of Germany as a great power is dependent on the creation of a powerful war fleet. (...) It is also certain that a strengthening of our naval fleet also immediately promotes the development of our overseas trade.”

Never again did Ballin so expressly advocate a naval build-up in public as at this time.

Eight years later, he changed his position. The Bülow-Tirpitz “world policy” had lost

[The picture is contained in the printed version]
appeal, and German foreign policy again focused more on the European continent. Ballin now believed that Germany had meanwhile enough ships to protect its interests overseas, particularly as the expansion of Hapag’s network was completed with the formation of the joint service to Africa in 1907. Ballin was increasingly concerned with the dangerous consequence of continued naval expansion: a further deterioration of German-British relations.

**Albert Ballin and “big politics”**

It is thus not surprising that Ballin’s “first major political action” took him to London in June 1908. Ballin made the trip to meet Sir Ernest Cassel, one of the most influential bankers in London. Cassel, a Jew who had converted to Catholicism in 1881, originally came from Cologne. He had emigrated as a young man to England, where he had earned a great deal of money with clever financial transactions. In 1902 he was appointed private financial advisor to King Edward VII, with whom he was also friends. Cassel intended to discuss German-British relations with Ballin, who had become acquainted with him through Max Warburg. The discussion ended with Cassel proposing that Germany and England should try to resolve their differences via negotiations.

The “Daily Telegraph” affair in October 1908 mentioned above led to a further deterioration in German-British relations. Negotiations were resumed at the initiative of Ballin, who met Cassel for the second time on July 10th 1909. Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg, who was appointed Reich Chancellor four days later, was also interested in good relations with Britain. He considered a fleet agreement between both countries to be desirable, but was determined to conduct negotiations via normal diplomatic channels, as he mistrusted the semi-official link via Cassel and Ballin, who responded sensitively to this lack of confidence. From August 1909, Germany and Britain had their ambassadors discuss the fleet issue informally, without any results being achieved up to 1910.

Ballin again acted as an intermediary at the beginning of 1912. He resumed contact with Cassel and began to correspond with him. This led to Cassel travelling to Berlin on January 29th 1912 and along with Ballin holding a discussion with the Kaiser and the Reich Chancellor. On February 2nd, Cassel, who had meanwhile returned to Britain, sent a telegram drafted by him and by Winston Churchill (First Lord of the Admiralty), Lord Richard Burdon Haldane (the British Minister of War) and Sir Edward Grey (the British Foreign Secretary) to Ballin, who passed it on to the Reich Chancellor. This stated: “Inform confidentially that intention is possibly to send ministre de la guerre Berlin, (…)”. Close on two weeks later, the secret discussions between Haldane and Bethmann-Hollweg (on February 8th and 10th) and between Haldane, Wilhelm II and Tirpitz (on February 9th) took place in the Reich capital. The latter was not prepared to renounce the just announced German Naval Amendment, which – going beyond the original planning – envisaged in particular the construction of three more battleships in the next six years. Tirpitz agreed merely to hold out the prospect of an extension of the
construction times, a concession that seemed to satisfy Haldane.\textsuperscript{194} He in turn offered a political agreement, but not the neutrality agreement demanded by the “hawks” in the Imperial Naval Office, at court, in parliament and by the public at large. This would have obliged Britain to maintain a position of unconditional neutrality and thus enabled Germany to take a calculated risk in a war against France and Russia.\textsuperscript{195}

When he was back in Britain, Haldane soon met criticism, as the British naval experts reproached him for having overlooked the important point of crew strengthening that the Germans also planned. Although Ballin spoke several times with the Kaiser in the following weeks and was involved in further negotiations with Britain in mid-March,\textsuperscript{196} no settlement was reached, and in May 1912 the Reichstag accepted the Naval Amendment with the votes of the Conservatives, the Liberals and the Centre.

Ballin attributed the failure of the Haldane Mission, which was a serious blow for him, to the fact that the Kaiser and Chancellor had undertaken to deal with the issue themselves from the beginning to the end.\textsuperscript{197} Tirpitz was only indirectly involved and could thus much more easily contest the attempted rapprochement with Britain.\textsuperscript{198} However, Ballin himself also made no efforts at all to persuade Tirpitz to drop the Naval Amendment Act.\textsuperscript{199}
Ballin refrained in subsequent years from distancing himself clearly from Tirpitz. The most convincing reason for this is given by Ballin’s biographer Cecil: “But what Tirpitz had and what Ballin admired in the man were characteristics that were completely lacking in the rest of Berlin: resolution and ability.” When Tirpitz resigned in March 1916 after disagreements with Wilhelm II and Bethmann-Hollweg concerning unrestricted submarine warfare, Ballin wrote “that one has now let Tirpitz go is the peak of stupidity!”

Ballin and Cassel continued to work for an agreement between Britain and Germany even after the failure of the Haldane Mission, but in vain. The scope for this – in any case limited – had again considerably narrowed. Then in August 1914 the lights went out throughout Europe.
Wiborg, Ballin, p. 77.
Cecil, Ballin, p. 103.
Buchwald, Dorf, p. 205.
Straub, Ballin, p. 141.
Wolff, Marsch, p. 245.
Hamburger Neueste Nachrichten No. 144 (June 23rd 1910).
Hamburger Fremdenblatt No. 114 (June 23rd 1910).
Private archives of Heinz Hueber.
Stated by Otto Böckler, member of parliament of the anti-Semitic German Reform Party, in the Reichstag in 1904: “It has occurred that our highest offices are ballinised, that the aliens from Palestine and America have access up to the highest levels of the throne.” (Quoted in: Mosse, Wilhelm II, p. 189).
Art. Ballin, Albert, p. 374 ff. – The work was incidentally never offered for sale in bookshops, but could be ordered only direct from U. Bodung Verlag in Erfurt. Every person who bought a copy had to sign a statement with the following wording: “I am not of Jewish descent, have neither Jewish blood nor Jewish relatives. I undertake not to sell this work or give it as a present. I give my word of honour that I do not act as a front man for anyone.”
Mosse, Wilhelm II, p. 170; Matthes, Hapag, p. 13. – The expression “Kaiser Jew” was coined by the First State President of Israel Chaim Weizmann (cf. Pulzer, Beteiligung, p. 217).
Cecil, Ballin, p. 103.
Cecil, Ballin, p. 100.
On this cf. Schultz, Simon.
One of the few exceptions was Max Warburg, who openly contradicted this in his first discussion with Wilhelm II in 1903. In his notes, Warburg then also aptly concludes that the Kaiser was confronted by a task that he was incapable of handling (Warburg, Aufzeichnungen, p. 32).
Ropp, Gestern, p. 94; cf. the diary entry of Hildegard Freifrau von Spitzemberg, September 29th 1912: “Ballin loves the Kaiser, nevertheless he knows his flatus only too well and laments and very frankly admits these.” (Vierhaus, Tagebuch, p. 548).
Wolff, Marsch, p. 256.
Both also seem to have been related to one another, as in the family and descendant trees of the Hamburg Warburg family there is a connection of the Warburg family with the Ballins (cf. Ballin, Familie, p. 65). Quoted in: Schölzel, Ballin, p. 11 ff.

In 1908, the monarch declared that Harden was a "foul toad from the cesspool of hell, [a] blemish on our people" (quoted in: Cecil, Wilhelm II., p. 336).

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Cecil, Ballin, p. 122.

Pulzer, Beteiligung, p. 225.

Trepidorf, Ego, p. 123 ff.

Tirpitz, Weltanschauung.

Trepidorf, Ego, p. 109.

Straub, Ballin, p. 183.

Pierzenkemper, Gewerbe, p. 82.

The term originated in the 1880s. It was used in 1900 by Reich Chancellor Bülow, when he spoke in the Reichstag on the economic interests of Germany abroad and the possibilities of their protection (cf. Bülow, Denkwürdigkeiten 1, p. 415 ff.).

Wölff, Marsch, p. 272.

Cecil, Ballin, p. 109.

Quoted in: Goetz, Ballin, p. 57.

Also in the debates on the reform of the Reich constitution at the time of the Weimar Republic and on the constitutions of the "Länder" (states) after 1945 above all conservatives and right-wing liberals advocated a professional second chamber composed of representatives of the various areas of public and business life to restrict the influence of the parties.

Straub, Ballin, p. 111.

Mosse, Gesellschaft, p. 92.

Cecil, Ballin, p. 293.

Wiborg, Ballin, p. 52.

Also Cecil, Ballin, p. 295.


The active battle fleet was renamed “High Seas Fleet” in 1907 at the request of Tirpitz.

While crossing the Canal, however, Haldane was recognised by a journalist, so rumours soon circulated (Williamson, Politics, p. 254).

Cf. his record of the discussion with Haldane dated February 9th 1912, reproduced in: Tirpitz, Dokumente, p. 286–289.

Fischer, Griff, p. 29, then sees the course of the mission also less as a failed attempt at German-British rapprochement, “but as vehicle of the German objective on the continent”.


As stated by Grey on August 4th 1914, the day of the British declaration of war on Germany, looking out from his office on St. James Park in London, where the gas lamps were just being lit.
Albert Ballin and the “great seminal catastrophe of the 20th century”

Economic Expansion and Military Confrontation

The catchy phrase “great seminal catastrophe of the 20th century” was coined by the American diplomat and historian George F. Kennan. He thereby describes the first world war as an epochal change and at the same time focuses attention on the spectacular moment of the outbreak of war in July 1914.

When we consider the long-term causes of the war, particularly in the context of a Ballin biography, we are quickly faced with the question of the connection between economic expansion and military confrontation. In April 1915, Ballin wrote to a naval officer friend: “I am indeed regarded strangely in high circles and even with H. M. himself as anglophile, yet I am the only German who can rightfully claim to have been living with Britain in a war for supremacy in merchant shipping for 30 years. In this long time, I have taken away from the British, if I may use this bold comparison, one trench after the other and have continually attacked them as soon as I could summon up the means required.”

It is clear that there was already competition between Britain and Germany in merchant shipping before the naval arms race that started around the turn of the century. However, in 1914 with over 20.5 million grt the British merchant navy was still four times the size of the German and nearly as large as the entire merchant fleet of the rest of the world combined.

Like most of his contemporaries, including some Social Democrats, Ballin advocated the expansion of the diplomatic and economic power of the German Empire. Even if the martial language in the aforementioned letter - which is explained by the reproach continually raised precisely during the world war that Ballin was a friend of the British – may suggest otherwise, the head of Hapag was one of those who preferred a peaceful penetration into spheres of interest, all the more after 1908. Ballin thus differentiated himself from the aforementioned “hawks”, who considered German expansion in territorial terms and very deliberately allowed for the war option.

Already at an early stage, it was implied that Ballin’s “in part entirely preposterous ambition to outdo the British also provided a compelling reason for the war”, that “his activity and his profits were for the British alone reason enough to entertain hostile thoughts against Germany.” Recent bi-
“The terror of the British shipping companies” (caricature from 1906)
Plotographers also argue in this direction, though less emphatically, by for instance pointing out that “the rapid growth of Ha-pag contributed its part to increasing Ger-man-British tensions”.209

However, another factor was really decisive. Although Ballin occasionally stated that “under the government of Kaiser Wil-helm II (…) Britain suffered immense losses in overseas transport”,210 he nevertheless considered naval expansion to be the main reason for German-British rivalry, which is why he also advocated a settlement in this area. He shared this position with the German ambassador in London, Paul Graf Wolff Metternich, who wrote to Reich Chancellor Bülow in 1908: “I unfortunately cannot avoid alienating the Admiral [von Tirpitz, JG] in attributing the relationship of Britain to Germany to the real cause and not accepting his excuses. (…) It is not Germany's economic development that is leading to a deterioration of our relations with Britain year by year, but the rapid expansion of our fleet.”211

Ballin attributed German-British tensions to the failure of those princes, military people, diplomats and politicians who lacked a sense of objectivity in business matters.212 Indeed, for many of them – other than for Ballin – basically economic factors played only a subordinate role in their political activity. The crucial considerations for them were rather categories of psychology and prestige; they considered the growing power of the economy to be (still) relatively unimportant.213

Albert Ballin in July 1914

On July 15th 1914, the State Secretary in the Foreign Office, Gottlieb von Jagow, wrote to Ballin: “Dear Mr Ballin, excuse me if I disturb your spa treatment with these lines, but I refer to an issue that is also your constant concern, namely our relations with Britain. You will have read the articles of the Berliner Tageblatt on certain maritime agreements between Britain and Russia [in May 1914, the British Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey had entered into negotiations with Russia concerning a fleet convention, JG] (…). I do not need to go into more detail concerning the significance that the venture would have for us. A further reconcili-ation with Britain would then be scarcely conceivable for us. It thus seems to me to be very important to attempt again to prevent the matter.”214

Although the Reich Chancellery and the Foreign Office had frequently protested against Ballin’s unofficial diplomatic negotiations in the past, they now expressly called on his services. Ballin set off to London to warn the members of the British cabinet of possible German counter-measures against a British-Russian fleet agreement. However, the trip was ill-fated. It seems doubtful whether Ballin’s mission at this point of time was seriously meant in the first place, as he was sent by Jagow to London without ade-quate information for treating an issue of secondary importance.215 Besides the London Ambassador, Karl Max Prinz von Lich-nowsky, was not informed about the trip of Ballin, who on his part was obliged to ob-serve secrecy. Ballin had then also later, ac-cording to his secretary and biographer Bernhard Huldermann, the bitter feeling
that people had not been frank with him and taken unfair advantage of his friendly relationships with the top men in London.\textsuperscript{216}

The main problem with Ballin's discussions in London was the possibility of British neutrality in the event of a German-French war. Britain held the balance, but had moved ever closer to France since 1911. On the one side was the originally defensively oriented Dual Alliance between Germany and Austria conceived under Bismarck, which over the years had made German diplomacy increasingly dependent on the Habsburg Empire. This was strongly opposed to Russia in the Balkans. The situation came to a head with the assassination of the Austro-Hungarian heir to the throne on June 28th in Sarajevo, as Austria wanted to use the incident as an opportunity to undertake the long-expected military action against Serbia. On the other side, the Russian-French alliance had been so expanded in the previous years that in the event of war the armies of both countries were obliged to go immediately over to the offensive.

On July 23rd, Ballin and the British Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey and Lord John Morley, Lord President of the Council, met for a dinner given by the war minister Lord Richard Burdon Haldane. He later reported to Max Warburg that Grey and Haldane had assured him that Britain had no obligations of any kind to France in the event of war.\textsuperscript{217} Two days later, Ballin held a discussion with Winston Churchill, the First Lord of the Admiralty. The latter gives in his memoirs the content of the discussion as follows: "Then he [Ballin, JG] said, 'If Russia marches against Austria, we must march; and if we march, France must march, and what would England do?' I [Churchill, JG] was not in a position to say more than that it would be a great mistake to assume that England would necessarily do nothing, and I added that she would judge events as they arose. He replied, speaking with very great earnestness, 'Suppose we had to go to war with Russia and France, and suppose we defeated France and yet took nothing from her in Europe (…), only some colonies to indemnify us. Would that make a difference in England's attitude?' I stuck to my formula that England would judge events as they arose, and that it would be a mistake to assume that we should stand out of it whatever happened."\textsuperscript{218}

On July 27th, Ballin returned to Germany. He was convinced that Britain would remain neutral in a continental war if Germany did not annex any French territory. In an interview published two days later in the "Hamburgischer Correspondent", he even stated: "Britain has no reason and the highest circles in Britain, it is certain, see no reason for currently preparing for the event that Britain has to take part actively in an armed conflict."\textsuperscript{219} He thus misjudged the situation, which became more critical on the evening of the same day when the British ambassador in Berlin, Sir William Edward Goschen, informed Reich Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg that Germany could not count on British neutrality, as it would in all probability support Russia and France. A day later, Austria declared war on Serbia.

That Ballin misjudged the situation after his discussion in Britain was, according to his biographer Lamar Cecil, due to the "vagueness of the language that both sides took great pains in using in order to avoid
stating the facts precisely.” Later Ballin reproached himself for having been deceived by Britain and with his belief in British neutrality – which was based on wishful thinking – encouraged those responsible in Berlin in their attitude of carelessness. He never really recovered from this disappointment, as many who associated with him in those years noted. His good friend Carl Fürstenberg, for instance, remarked: “The feeling of responsibility to the fatherland was shocking for a fervent patriot like Ballin. (...) However clearly he would have liked to say that no German at that time would have been able to see through the dispositions of English policy, he continually considered that his report could have contributed to allowing the German statesmen to take a step closer to the abyss than they had done in any case. Albert Ballin was ruined by this inner tragedy. I saw him often enough during the war. He was completely changed, a psychologically broken man.”

Hapag in the first world war

Kennan’s “great seminal catastrophe” applies not only generally for the moment of the outbreak of war. It is just as applicable to the person of Albert Ballin, whose life’s work, Hapag, was destroyed by the first world war.

The situation for Hapag changed dramatically with the British declaration of war on Germany on August 4th. At the beginning of November 1914, the British Admiralty declared the entire North Sea a war zone and cut off the Channel and the North Sea between Norway and Scotland for German shipping. Tirpitz had always assumed that there would be a close-range blockade of German ports, against which he planned a thrust of the German fleet; he had ignored the possibility that Britain could deploy its fleet just as much for a long-range blockade beyond the range of German units (as now happened). The German battle fleet thus remained condemned mainly to inactivity in the North Sea.

After the outbreak of the war, Ballin was confronted mainly by two problems: looking after Hapag’s employees and concern about its vessels.

About half of Hapag’s 25,000 salaried employees and workers were called up at the beginning of hostilities. Some 4,000 who were stationed abroad or were in Entente ports when their ships fell into enemy hands were interned. However, the others continued to work, though on reduced pay, and handled office work or maintained Hapag ships in the Port of Hamburg. Several hundred office workers of the shipping company were also taken over by Reichseinkaufs-Gesellschaft. This had been established on August 26th at Ballin’s initiative and was concerned with securing imports of food for the civilian population. Ballin thereby sought to use Hapag’s existing business organisation in another way. Initially founded as a department of the shipping line, Reichseinkaufs-Gesellschaft developed up to January 1915 into a state trading company, then called Zentral-Einkaufs-Gesellschaft, which was moved to Berlin. It had a staff of over 8,000, and Hapag continued to function as one of its main purchasing agents. At the beginning of the war, only 80 of Hapag’s 175 steamships were in German ports.
Some of these were taken over by the navy as auxiliary cruisers or tenders. Ballin tried initially to charter out Hapag vessels lying in neutral foreign countries and later to sell them (those in the ports of the Entente countries had been immediately seized). However, he failed in these endeavours mainly due to the resistance of the naval staff, which reasoned that a sale of the ships would lead to an expansion of the Allied merchant fleet. Most of these vessels thus gradually had to be written off. Only nine of them were sold in the course of the war.223

In spring 1917, Ballin wrote a letter of complaint to the State Secretary of the Imperial Office of the Interior, Karl Helfferich. He had given his approval for the sale of some Hapag ships lying in the New York port only after their engines had been rendered unusable. Ballin claimed in his letter that Hapag, which had “at the outbreak of the war ships of about 1,500,000 tons (…) lost these except for a small number” and that this had happened “much less owing to seizures and sinkings in the services of the imperial navy than as a result of actions of our own government”.224 The sale did not eventuate and with the USA’s entry into the war in April 1917 all 35 Hapag vessels lying at anchor in US ports, including the flagship, the “Vaterland”, were seized.

Ballin’s efforts to achieve a war indemnity act in favour of shipping, which he advocated from August 1915, are also to be seen against this background. Although Hapag already received from the government two million marks monthly as loan, this sufficed only to cover the running costs, and lost ships could thus not be replaced. The government and the navy opposed Ballin’s project, but he found support in the Reichstag, in which above all his friend Gustav Stresemann championed Hapag’s interests.

Before the war, Ballin had still been sceptical about exerting political influence via the Reichstag, but now he tried to do exactly this. And, as shown by his efforts to have a war indemnity act passed, he no longer basically rejected state intervention, as he had done in previous years. This is certainly to be seen also against the background of the general trend towards the nationalisation of economic and social life, which under the pressure of the war occurred at a rapid pace, not only in Germany.

After very lengthy negotiations, the “law on the restoration of the German merchant fleet” entered into force on November 7th 1917. This envisaged cheap and in some cases also interest-free loans of 50 million marks. Subsidies for the reprocurement of merchant vessels were thus provided instead of an overall indemnity as the shipping lines had actually wanted.225

There were other reasons behind Ballin’s call for state support. He needed it in order to be able to hold his own against a competitor that had become increasingly powerful in the course of the war: Rhine heavy industry, in the person of Hugo Stinnes. From the 1890s, Stinnes had built up an extensive industrial group of his own, controlled and influenced companies, interrelated according to the principle of vertical concentration based on a division of labour. This concentration trend continued even during the war.226 When Stinnes died in 1924, his trust comprised 1,664 companies with a total workforce of about 600,000.
At the latest from 1915, Stinnes had also planned to play a leading role in German shipping – and thereby also exert a decisive influence on Hapag. He thus came into Ballin’s sphere. Ballin decided very reluctantly to cooperate with Stinnes, whose companies made high profits during the war, while Hapag vessels lay more or less without employment at anchor. Ballin thus preferred to have Stinnes as an ally and not as an opponent.

There were other reasons that motivated Ballin to cooperate with Stinnes: he had appreciated early on that only with a strategic alliance with leaders of heavy industry was it possible to cope with the expected difficulties after the war with the procurement of shipbuilding material, machinery and coal. Stinnes seemed indispensable to him for this. The rapid access to reliable supply sources was all the more important because Ballin expected for the immediate post-war period that “in my firm conviction after a short period of prosperity shipping has to suffer years of sterility”. As long as the war continued, it was vital for Ballin above all to develop new sources of revenues for Hapag, “so that its earning power is no longer connected to a single undertaking”. This was an important reason why he participated with Stinnes in the Romanian oil business in 1917–18. And at Ballin’s initiative and in cooperation with Walther Rathenau and Paul Reusch, Deutsche Werft AG, a joint venture of Hapag, AEG and Gutehoffnungshütte, was founded in mid-1918. Its abbreviation “GHH” was, incidentally, popularly also interpreted as “gehört hauptsächlich Haniel” (belongs mainly to Haniel).

In September 1916, Stinnes was appointed to the Hapag supervisory board. Originally Ballin had planned to expand this body right away with several prominent representatives of heavy industry. He thus wrote to Stinnes in March 1916: “As soon as Lloyd finds out that you have joined us, it will try in the person of Mr Hugenberg and some other big industrialist colleagues of yours from the Rhineland and Westphalia to create the counterweight. Would it not seem right to you in the interests of Hamburg-American Line (HAL) that we take some of your friends on the supervisory board (…)?” However, Stinnes opposed this idea.

Ballin did not find it easy to propose to the chairman of the supervisory board Max Schinckel the election of Hugo Stinnes to this body, as it would have meant including a new force to be taken extremely seriously in the hitherto relatively closed circle of the
Hamburg business world. He thus informed Schinckel in October 1915: "I pointed out to him [Stinnes, JG] that in the 30 years during which I was permitted to participate in the management of H.A.L. I threw out every new competitor from Hamburg and during these entire 30 years was never so obliging to a new applicant as to him."

The appointment of Stinnes to the Hapag supervisory board has to be seen against the background of a change in ownership occurring at this time in Hamburg shipping. At the beginning of 1916, Eduard Woermann, the half-brother of Adolph, decided to sell his stake in Woermann-Linie and Deutsche Ost Afrika-Linie. The shares were acquired by a consortium comprising Hapag, North German Lloyd and the company Hugo Stinnes. Ballin had heard at an early stage of Woermann's sales intentions, so he could frustrate the sole purchase of both lines by Stinnes, who now tried to offset his partial defeat by buying more Hapag shares, in which he invested a total of 4.39 million marks. Nevertheless, Ballin, who had still written concerned letters to Schinckel ("we are being sucked up") in February 1916, could prevent Stinnes acquiring a majority interest.

Stinnes' involvement with Hapag already ended in April 1921, when Max von Schinckel and Ballin's successor Wilhelm Cuno outmanoeuvred him by ensuring that he was not re-elected to the supervisory board of Hapag. Meanwhile the conflicting interests that had already loomed in the previous years had further intensified: Ballin had from the beginning feared that Stinnes would completely change the previous structure of the Hamburg shipping line sector, with a large group replacing the various lines, which had formed cooperative operating agreements, with Ballin calling the tune. This would then sooner or later also jeopardise the independence of Hapag. Ballin had therefore aimed to involve Stinnes in the manifold shipping company interests in Hamburg and so win his support for maintaining them. Schinckel and Cuno agreed with Ballin that the links of Hamburg shipowners to heavy industry, the necessity of which they certainly did not dispute, needed to be developed on a more modest scale than envisaged by Stinnes. Stinnes' withdrawal from the Hapag supervisory board and the sale of his Woermann shares to Hapag and North German Lloyd soon afterwards marked the end of his attempt to play a key role in German liner shipping, even if this was not immediately noticeable.

Political influence in wartime

Ballin's relationship to the Kaiser had cooled off since the outbreak of the war. Wilhelm II demonstratively omitted to congratulate him on his 60th birthday on August 15th 1917. Ballin met the Kaiser only five times in the four years between 1914 and 1918.

Ballin criticised to third parties the self-isolation of the monarch, who he claimed had increasingly become the "shadow Kaiser". He thus wrote in May 1916 to the head of the Naval Cabinet, Admiral Georg Alexander von Müller: "I can make absolutely no pretence to you of the fact that the isolation of the Kaiser is sorely felt in the
nation (...). I consider (...) that in the interest of our imperial master it is very desirable that he would have more personal contact and that the management would considerably improve, with the aim that more is said to the German people on the effectiveness of its Kaiser. A report from the headquarters that the Kaiser had received this or that personality in a long audience (...) etc. would completely suffice to guide the patriotic feelings into the right channel again and prevent them taking an unnatural way to the eastern headquarters.”240

Ballin alluded here to the fact that General Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg and his chief of staff General Lieutenant Erich Ludendorff, who had supreme command over all German troops on the Eastern front, were increasingly regarded by many Germans as “knights in shining armour”. After Hindenburg with Ludendorff as First Quartermaster General had assumed responsibility for the Oberste Heeresleitung (OHL, Supreme Army Command) in August 1916, Germany developed ever more into a military dictatorship. The political influence of the OHL considerably increased again with the resignation of Reich Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg in July 1917, mainly due to pressure from Ludendorff.241

Bethmann-Hollweg and Jagow belonged to the party of the “Anglophiles” and actually sought what Ballin also advocated: a rapprochement with Britain. Their dismissal thus weakened the party of the level-headed, to which Ballin also felt he belonged.245 Jagow’s “subsequent successor” Richard von Kühlmann, in whom Ballin had high hopes, tried to reach a settlement with Britain by negotiation, but failed due to the resistance of the OHL and the war aims movement, which was against a “rotten peace” and advocated extensive annexations of territory by the German Empire. Kühlmann had to resign in July 1918 after making a speech in the Reichstag expressing doubt about Germany’s prospects of a complete military victory. Ballin commented on this as follows: “One would sometimes like to ask how it is possible that we can refrain from no stupidity at all in personnel matters at the Foreign Office.”246

Before the war, Ballin had continually put out information on his meetings with top personalities from politics, particularly the Kaiser, to the press, but during the war he exercised political influence more on the quiet. Arndt von Holtzendorff played an
important role in this respect. Holtzendorff was head of fitting out at Hapag from 1898 and had proved to be a competent festive organiser at Kieler Woche. After the outbreak of war, he was given new responsibilities: he became the Hapag resident in Berlin and opened a discreet political lobby, initially in the restaurant of Hotel Kaiserhof and later in his apartment on Viktoriastrasse. Holtzendorff was superbly informed on all activities of Hapag in Berlin; at the beginning of his work with Ballin, he had agreed “that all departments, including managers, are instructed by you [Ballin, JG] in future to have all correspondence pp. with the local offices and ministries passed through me [Holtzendorff, JG]. Vice versa, the public authorities would also have to be requested to have on their part the communication with H.A.L. go through me by my being officially accredited by the relevant offices as authorised representative of H.A.L.”247 Practically every day Holtzendorff compiled detailed reports on his activity, which he sent to Ballin in Hamburg. When he was himself in Berlin, Holtzendorff wrote notes on the discussions that Ballin conducted there.248

There were regular gatherings in many places in wartime Berlin at which current policy was discussed in a social setting and over good food.249 Holtzendorff’s political evenings were held in particularly high regard. He wrote to Ballin in January 1915: “I heard subsequently from another gentleman a very interesting assessment from Delbrück [Clemens von Delbrück, from 1909 to 1916 Secretary of State of the Reich Department of the Interior, JG] of the political evenings with me. He told this gentleman that he actually now did not go out at all, but went particularly gladly only to these evenings, because they were always interesting and extraordinarily important for him. He stated that he always heard a lot of new things and items that were especially valuable for him, so he would consider it as a kind of neglect of duty if he declined. Dr. Naumann [the Reichstag member of parliament D. h. c. Friedrich Naumann, JG] had also recently said something similar and added that one could acquire a particularly great deal of special information at these evenings.”250

Holtzendorff saw his role as bringing people together informally as a seemingly disinterested go-between. He functioned as host, although Ballin, who only seldom appeared at his gatherings, held the strings.251 The journalist Ernst Jäckh, who took part even on the political evenings, reported: “(…) every Reich Chancellor, every Reich Minister (at that time called secretaries of state), every court marshal, every party leader (with the one exception that if Ballin participated personally he wanted to have no Social Democrats present), every allied ambassador, the leading businessmen and scientists, every person in an important position, met there the other, not all together, but alternately, because practice mostly confirmed the principle of having no more than the number of Muses for table talk, no fewer than the number of Graces, best of all Plato’s eight.”252
sion, Wahnschaffe [Arnold Wahnschaffe, head of the Reich Chancellery under Bethmann-Hollweg from 1909 to 1917, JG], told me the following nice story. One of his ‘secret agents’ had come to him and told him that for quite some time (…) political evenings had been held at the house of Mr v. Holtzendorff and asked whether he knew anything about them; after Wahnschaffe confirmed this, he added whether he also knew that precisely on these evenings there was enormous agitation against the Chancellor! Wahnschaffe then explained to him that he could not really imagine this, as he would have himself been repeatedly present on these evenings, whereupon the agent said, well these things always began when Wahnschaffe was away, at which Wahnschaffe said laughing that that was absolutely impossible, as he was always the last to go!”253

Albert Ballin’s attitudes to the war aims of the German Empire

During the entire war, according to Lamar Cecil, Ballin’s ideas concerning the war aims of the German Empire were determined by two principles: first, Germany needed to have unrestricted access to the seas for the future and had to be secured against a long-range blockade with carefully selected naval stations in Europe and overseas, and second, the peace terms would have to be such as to restore international harmony, the objective being a post-war partnership between Britain and Germany.254

Ballin’s hope that the “conclusion of peace (…) will be based on compromises” contrasted agreeably with the ambitious war aims as propagated by e.g. the “Pan-German Association”, the “core organisation of radical nationalism” (Thomas Nipperdey), but would be difficult to harmonise with the demand for naval stations in Europe and overseas.255

In January 1915, Ballin expressed himself for the first time in public on German war aims. He wrote in an article for the “Frankfurter Zeitung”: “The wet triangle’, as the mariners in my youth used to call the area of the North Sea extending between Heligoland and the river mouths. (…) The serious disruption bringing our overseas trade almost to a standstill can be achieved by the British fleet only by the fact that the area of the North Sea can be easily cut off, and the piratical pressure that Britain exercises today on the neutral Scandinavian countries and Holland would have been impossible if we had had a basis for our fleet corresponding to its significance and the fighting spirit of its valiant officers and crews. We must therefore seek to obtain a fleet base beyond the area of the North Sea that in future secures for us at least in this part of the world the same possibilities that Britain has and ruthlessly exploits.”256

That these two principles of Ballin were difficult to reconcile with one another but he himself did not want to admit this to himself is also shown by an entry in Wolff’s diary dated February 1915: “I ask Ballin why he in a New Year’s greeting, requested by Frankf. Ztg., advocated a port opposite England; whether in his opinion that would make impossible for all time the rapprochement that he finally desired. He says he does not fear the latter.”257 In his memoirs, Max von Schinckel accused Ballin that during the world war he wavered “between the demand for another basis for German
shipping, which had to be 'located beyond the wet triangle of the North Sea and to the Atlantic', which could mean nothing other than an annexation of northern France, and the demand for a peace at any price”.258 This also shows the incompatibility of the principles of Ballin, although his striving for a compromise peace was excessively stigmatized by Schinckel, who propagated much more radical war aims.259

On October 20th 1915, Ballin delivered a speech at the annual meeting of the “Association of Hamburg Shipowners” in which he again lamented the “lack of permanent bases for our navy outside the North Sea and Baltic”. He noted: “Germany can ensure no better for its future than if it strives first and foremost to acquire those maritime fleet bases that ensure a basic correction of the condition that we currently have to lament. This conviction that I stated already ten months ago has been connected with the assumption that our maritime requirements are to be satisfied in Zeebrügge. That is, of course, not the case. We need bases at the entrance and the exit of the Channel; we need strong bases overseas.”260

The organisation of the Port of Antwerp and its access path was of crucial significance. Ballin was of the opinion that this was to be put under the joint administration of a German-Belgian company. He spoke to Theodor Wolff of a “port commission, in which Germany would have the majority interest, so the port would in fact be under German administration”.262 This idea, according to the historian Fritz Fischer in his epochal book “Griff nach der Weltmacht” (“Germany's Aims in the First World War”), “henceforth formed a basic motif of German policy towards Belgium up to 1918.”263

Ballin also proposed putting the Belgian state railways under German administration.264 He said to Bethmann-Hollweg, “Put your hands on the railway, as in Luxemburg, and you create an economic link, but let the [Belgian, JG] king keep his crown, as he has indeed behaved very correctly.”265 Ballin pleaded for “bringing about a certain economic dependency (...), because otherwise Belgium would become the glacis of the British”.266 He also had in mind the conclusion of a military agreement.267 That the Belgians would never accept such far-reaching limitations of their sovereignty (and Britain’s resolve to declare war was stirred up precisely by the fate of Belgium) was something he failed to appreciate, as did most people in Germany in 1914–15.

Although Ballin opposed a direct annexation of Belgium, he was in July 1915 not prepared to sign a statement submitted to the Reich Chancellor by the historian Hans Delbrück and the former Secretary of State in the Reich Colonial Office Bernhard
Dernburg. This had been signed on July 9th 1915 by such influential intellectuals as Albert Einstein, Ludwig Quidde, Paul Rohrbach, Gustav von Schmoller, Ferdinand Tönnies, Ernst Troeltsch, Max and Alfred Weber, Theodor Wolff and Leopold von Wiese, who opposed “the incorporation or annexation of peoples who are politically independent and used to independence” and condemned means “that would lead us in a roundabout way finally to annexation”.268 These passages seemed to be misleading to Ballin. Moreover, he (whose signature would not have been seen as that of a private person, but would have represented Hapag in its entirety) feared to be “rendered invalid” for a later initiative if he already supported this statement – a position that seemed “strange” (not only) to his confidant Holtendorff.269

What were Ballin’s war aims for Eastern Europe?

In September 1917, Ballin wrote in retrospect to Hugo Stinnes that since the outbreak of the war he had been of the opinion “that our main war aim had to be to detach Russia from the Entente in order to form in as close a link as possible with Russia a bloc strong enough to win the respect of a British-French-American alliance.”270

On December 9th 1917, negotiations began in Brest-Litovsk between the Central Powers and the new Bolshevik government in Russia, which was concerned to consolidate its power in the interior of the country and had therefore proposed an armistice to all belligerents, which the Entente had however rejected.

Ballin criticised from the beginning the excessively harsh terms with which the Germans went into these negotiations. Already on December 13th, he wrote to Stinnes: “I am worried by the Russian peace negotiations. If we do not give up the idea to get Poland, Kirkland and Lithuania off the Russians, they will, as the situation is, also be required to make peace, but it will then not be the peace we require. We need a Russian Empire confidentially supporting us. We do not get that if we proceed to acquiring states by force. (…) I wonder sometimes why we experienced businessmen are not consulted on such matters. We would surely not do such stupid things!”271

But Ballin’s concerns fell on deaf ears, particularly at the German Supreme Command, which dominated in the second phase of the negotiations. As a result of the dictated peace of Brest-Litovsk (March 1918) and the Supplementary Treaty of Berlin (August 1918), a German eastern empire came into being, though only for a short time. Extensive parts of the former Tsarist Empire came under German authority, providing a specific basis for long-term goals that were then formulated by Hitler in the 1920s.272

Albert Ballin’s attitudes to submarine warfare

As reaction to the British long-range blockade, in February 1915 Germany declared the waters around Britain a war zone. German submarines were to set up a counter blockade there. As the U-boats on surfacing were without protection against the armament of merchant vessels, the German naval leadership ordered unrestricted submarine war-
fare, i.e. torpedoing the ships of hostile and neutral countries without warning. This caused a sharp protest from the neutral states, particularly the USA. In May 1915, a U-boat sank the British passenger steamship “Lusitania” with the loss of close on 1,200 lives, including many US citizens. In order not to worsen relations with the USA even further, Germany then discontinued unrestricted submarine warfare, but resumed it in February 1917. There had meanwhile been a dramatic deterioration in the supply situation, and the naval command had declared that with a resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare Britain would capitulate in six months.

In the first few months of the war, Ballin had initially advocated unrestricted submarine warfare. In October 1914, he enthused in a letter to his son-in-law Heinz Bielfeld: “The successes of the U-boats are indeed absolutely splendid and in my view change all theories about fleet expansion. What is the point of the super-dreadnoughts when a submarine suffices to do them in.”273 However, Ballin’s optimistic attitude began to fade in spring 1915 when he increasingly...
doubted that German submarines could really achieve such an effective counter blockade of Britain, as Alfred von Tirpitz in particular maintained.274

In February 1916, the pendulum swung back again, and Ballin again advocated unrestricted submarine warfare. He did this above all because he had gained the impression that the German public was becoming increasingly dissatisfied with the government because it did not use every available means to win the war.275 On February 17th, he wrote from Berlin a letter to Max Schinckel, in which he commented on public opinion concerning submarine warfare: “Here everything is submarine war; the people really couldn’t care less whether with or against America. A certain anarchy in politics is apparent, which, I fear, will also finally sweep away the leading statesmen.”276

From summer 1916, Ballin became increasingly concerned about the risk of the USA entering the war. He now again considered that unrestricted submarine warfare was out of the question. When on January 31st 1917 the German government informed Washington in a note that it would drop the restrictions that it had so far imposed on itself in the use of its weapons at sea, Ballin was horrified.277 The USA entered the war on the side of the Entente on April 6th 1917.

Ballin was extremely pessimistic in these months. He did not believe “in the political effect of the submarine war on the tough British and described conditions within the country as extremely alarming”. The resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare seemed to him to be hopeless after the USA’s entry into the war “on account of the increase in tonnage among our enemies with the putting into operation of our ships in North America and Brazil”.278 In August 1917, he complained to the former German ambassador in London, Paul Graf Wolff Metternich, in a letter: “It was the most fateful error and simply the sealing of our fate when unrestricted submarine warfare was declared on February 1st (...).”279

The historian Gerhard A. Ritter is correct in stating that “Ballin (…) (was) not a basic opponent of unrestricted submarine warfare if it could thereby actually force Britain to come round.” However, he adds that Ballin had early on warned against recklessly underestimating the fatal consequence of its resumption, the USA’s entry into the war.280 Ballin was aware of the economic power of the USA and then also warned in a letter to Hugo Stinnes in February 1917: “As our general staff underestimated Britain, it now underestimates America militarily and economically and in terms of its political significance.”281

But above all Ballin was one of the few that in 1916 had seen through the hollow catchwords of the advocates of unrestricted submarine warfare, designated by present researchers as “peak of irrationality”.282 He differed in this respect from industrial magnates such as Alfred Hugenberg or Hugo Stinnes.

Peace via Wilson

At the end there remained hope in Wilson. At the latest since the beginning of 1918, Ballin was convinced that a peace treaty could be concluded only via the American president Woodrow Wilson, as the United

Daß die Weihnachtsbriefe in diesem Jahr den gleichen Mittelpunkt, den Krieg und Leben, hätte nicht wie Kaiser den zweigleisig zu sein nie ein der Kriegsführung Krieg gestatten, den der gewiss, den früher dem Alten zugibt.

Hier ist über die gegeneinander Lage auch jetzt da die das der Abfahrt

Dr. Dietz, den z. General Holmann niedere.

Vergang und Dr. Dietz...
States had meanwhile replaced Britain as the leading power of the Entente.\textsuperscript{283} However, the military leadership was scornful of Wilson’s 14-point programme, with which he sketched the pattern of the future world peace on January 8th 1918, if it took note of the document at all (Ludendorff probably read it only in October 1918).\textsuperscript{284} Ballin had no time for such an attitude: “I have indeed never believed that the war could be ended militarily with a complete defeat of the entire world and today consider the situation to be extraordinarily alarming. The whole world is against us, and the prospect of a favourable peace is dwindling with every day.”\textsuperscript{285}

After the failure of the German spring offensive from March to July 1918 – in the first two weeks alone the Germans lost 230,000 men,\textsuperscript{286} the military defeat of Germany was finally sealed. But the German Supreme Command did not accept this until the end of September. “With the cowardice of a shirker” and from cold calculation Hindenburg and Ludendorff now shifted responsibility on to the new political leadership.\textsuperscript{287} Put under massive pressure by these military leaders, the first parliamentary government of the Empire headed by Max von Baden on October 3rd/4th 1918 requested Wilson, “to take in hand the establishment of the peace” and “bring about the immediate conclusion of an armistice (…)”. The Reich Chancellor accepted the 14-point programme “as basis for the peace negotiations”.\textsuperscript{288}

However, the situation had meanwhile radically changed. Victory over the German Empire and its allies had still been far off for the Entente at the beginning of 1918, but now it was within reach. On October 23rd, Wilson made complete German capitulation the precondition of an armistice. He also demanded that the German Empire give up its previous form of government. The end of Wilhelm II and the monarchy – at least in the form in which it had hitherto existed in the German Empire – was thus sealed. Ballin had this in mind when he wrote to Wolff Metternich two days later: “The war, which was completely contrary to the character of the high gentleman, has so worn him down that one could wish also in his interest only that he is enabled to withdraw into a cozy private life. (…) It would of course, be good if one (…) could bring the Kaiser into the position of a King of England enjoying mainly all amenities of royalty, without being burdened by responsibilities that he is completely unable to bear. But (…) it would in my opinion cost the German people very dearly if there is not a very fundamental change in this matter.”\textsuperscript{289}

Ballin broke with Wilhelm II already in September. At the request of Ludendorff, Stinnes had contacted Ballin. In two discussions, one in late August in Hamburg and the other in early September in Berlin, he urged Ballin to explain the seriousness of the military situation to the Kaiser and convince him of the necessity of an immediate change of chancellor and the swift conclusion of a peace treaty via Wilson. Ballin was thus confronted with high expectations.

The last discussion between Wilhelm II and Ballin, which was also attended by the head of the civil cabinet Friedrich von Berg, an ultra-conservative East Prussian country gentleman, took place at Wilhelmsöhöhe Palace near Kassel on September 5th. Ballin tried to convince the Kaiser of the urgency.
of a peace settlement, which he believed could be achieved only via the USA. Wilhelm II basically agreed, but was of the opinion that it was possible to wait with peace offers. Ballin also advocated the unblocking of trade with perishable food products. Other matters were apparently not considered during the discussion, most likely owing to the constant interventions of Berg, but also because Ballin, probably from reverence and shame, could not really speak openly to the Kaiser.

There are various reports from a third party on Ballin's discussion with the Kaiser apart from Ballin's own record.290 The comments of Count Bogdan von Hutten-Czapski, a liberal Prussian aristocrat of Polish nationality, who apart from his activity as officer also served as a kind of private secretary of top politicians, seem to be particularly reliable. Hutten-Czapski was present at Wilhelmshöhe Palace on September 5th and reported: “While I made a visit, I observed from the window how the Kaiser left the palace with Mr Ballin and Mr von Berg and went up and down with rapid steps in the front garden. The Kaiser made a very lively impression, while Ballin seemed to be very downcast. Mr von Berg spoke continually in between. This went on for some time. I had arranged with Ballin that I would see him in his hotel in the afternoon. When I entered his room, I met a completely broken man. Ballin told me that he had wanted to speak frankly to the Kaiser about the situation in the hostile capitals and in Germany. But Mr von Berg had continually interrupted, so he had not been at all able to tell the Kaiser everything that he had on his mind. The Kaiser did not seem to appreciate the seriousness of the military situation. He, Ballin, had now given up hope, because he saw that the Kaiser was also politically entirely under the influence of the extreme parties and Berg in particular. I told Ballin that I most deeply regretted that he had not insisted on speaking to the Kaiser in private.”

Some time later, Ballin presented to the head of the naval cabinet, Admiral Georg Alexander von Müller, a record of comments, which had actually wanted to present to the Kaiser. He continued to try also to exercise political influence. Ballin's comments, according to Fritz Fischer, presented “in exceptional acuteness the basic lines of German policy of autumn 1918”.292 Ballin called for a peace in the west via Wilson and the formation of a front against Bolshevism. He also advocated – he had always rejected a parliamentarisation of German constitutionalism up to then – a “rapid and wise modernisation (the expression is more correct and more harmless than democratisation) of Germany”. He clearly saw that such a reform had to precede the assumption of peace negotiations, “otherwise it seems imposed by the opponents and endangers the dynasty”.293

This development, which then took place in the following weeks, was to prove him only all too right.

The end

After these events, Albert Ballin’s last weeks were overshadowed by misery. His godson Eric Warburg recalled: “When I was in autumn 1918, shortly before the end of the war, in Hamburg one day on holiday, my father [Max Warburg, JG] and Ballin were as usual striding along Alsterdamm, the pre-
sent Ballindamm, and when Ballin saw me in uniform standing there, he burst out in tears because he of course knew that practically really everything was lost and feared that my age group would be sacrificed as last.”

Theodor Wolff met Ballin the last time in October 1918 in Berlin and reported: “Ballin was as cocooned in melancholy, he looked bad, his former so fresh brown facial colour was, as he could no longer travel through the sea wind, already long faded, the furrows had deepened.”

At the beginning of November 1918, Ballin was asked to head the peace negotiations. He wrote on November 2nd: “Stinnes had me informed that both the Centre and the Social Democrats wanted me to head the peace negotiations. I let him know that I wouldn’t back down, but would gladly have anyone else do it.” But this was no longer to be.

On November 4th, Kiel was in the hands of 40,000 rebellious sailors, soldiers and workers. Shortly afterwards, the protests also spread to Hamburg. Workers’ and soldiers’ councils formed all over in Germany. The Hamburg workers’ and soldiers’ council announced on November 6th that it had assumed power and two days later had a part of the Hapag building occupied.

Ballin took this development outwardly with composure. He left his office on November 8th at noon and headed a crisis meeting of the “Association of Hamburg Shipowners” in Mönckebergstrasse to find ways of resuming food imports in German ships and thus prevent further discontent among the hungry population. Ballin proposed continuing the consultations the next day, this time if at all possible under the chairmanship of a senator. After the meeting, he returned to the Hapag building to conduct a conversation with Eduard Rosenbaum from the Chamber of Commerce concerning the restoration of the German merchant fleet after the end of the war and general economic issues. Following this, there was apparently a major dispute with some of the occupiers of the building.

Ballin left the building and walked to Feldbrunnenstrasse, where he arrived about 4.30 pm. There he telephoned briefly with the legal adviser of the “Association of Hamburg Shipowners”, Peter Franz Stubmann. Marianne Ballin, who had probably expected her husband at the front door, was at this time apparently no longer in the villa. As previously planned, she wanted to spend the night with a woman friend of the family living on Mittelweg. It may be left open whether this was also “a domestic quarrel” that prompted her to leave the villa, as Johannes Merck suggests, and whether Ballin then encountered a person who blackmailed him and then reported that he was threatened with being shot the following day.

In any case, Ballin, who had up to then reacted with astonishing calm to all the events of the day, now lost his nerve. He withdrew, had a glass of water brought by his servant Karl Fischer in the hours of twilight and swallowed an overdose of tranquilisers. He had already for a long time been dependent on bromine, veronal and other drugs.

The anarchist writer Theodor Plievier described Ballin’s end in his documentary novel “The Kaiser went, the generals re-
mained” as follows: “And of Ballin’s giant perspective on the key cities of the five seas, on the shipping lines of his company, which spanned the globe like a net, remains nothing more than a last blinking look at the glass of water, which he conscientiously put back in its place. Then the light captured in the glass also went out.”\textsuperscript{301}

Still conscious and suffering severe pain, Ballin was dragged by his servant and a doctor who had been hurriedly called into the private clinic Wünsch on Mittelweg 144, where his stomach was pumped out. Yet he fell into a coma even before midnight and died on November 9th 1918 at 1.15 pm – about the same time as Philipp Scheidemann proclaimed the Republic from the balcony of the Berlin Reichstag.

The question as to whether or not Ballin committed suicide has been discussed many times. There was no autopsy, and the circumstances of his death were “intentionally obscured behind swathes of mist”.\textsuperscript{302} Quite a few contemporaries doubted that Ballin committed suicide, while many others were only a little surprised about this.\textsuperscript{303} Eduard Rosenbaum, one of the last persons with whom Ballin spoke before his death, came to the following conclusion, for which there is something to be said: “(…) he took more than the normal dose of his sleeping tablets because he was undecided whether he wanted a long or an eternal sleep.”\textsuperscript{304}

Ballin was buried in Ohlsdorf Cemetery on November 13th. The previous evening, Max Warburg had drafted an obituary, which is quoted in the biography by Peter Franz Stubmann: “Albert Ballin was a forceful personality. He had a strong will and strong and great penetrating mind and his heart was warm and strong. A brilliant businessman, talented with an almost visionary power and great imagination. He was more an artist than calculator, more painter than drawer. The abundance of qualities given to him on his path through life also generated in him many conflicts, which he honestly fought through. (…)"

The economic upswing in the last thirty years would be unimaginable in Germany without Albert Ballin. Among the many helpers whom we will lack with the reconstruction of the German Empire and on whom we greatly counted and were justified in counting, his name is mentioned first!”\textsuperscript{305}

Later, a simple boulder was set up on Ballin’s grave. The stone bears no inscription, only the name Albert Ballin.

The suffering did not stop for Marianne Ballin with the death of her husband, as a few weeks later, on December 7th 1918, her only 26-year-old daughter Irmgard died of Spanish influenza. She left behind three small children.
Quoted in: Huldermann, Ballin, p. 324.
Ritter, Kaiser, p. 142.
Pulzer, Beteiligung, p. 223.
StA Hbg., 622-0/62 Familie Merck, II 8, Konv 2b: Meine Erinnerungen an die Hamburg-Amerika Linie und an Albert Ballin 1896–1919 by Johannes Theodor Merck [manuscript fair copy 1920–1921], p. 154; the second quotation from: Pinette, Ballin, p. 36. Pinette’s dissertation dated 1938 should be taken with reservation, the assessment of Eduard Rosenbaum (Ballin, p. 272) being completely apt: “The book is not outright anti-Semitic, but it is written, to use Shakespeare’s term, ’with a vulgar heart’.” (King Henry IV, Part II, Act I).
Wiborg, Ballin, p. 86; similarly also Straub, Ballin, p. 214; Ahrens; Hauschild-Thiessen, Reeder, p. 54; Cecil, Ballin, p. 93 ff., p. 147 ff.
E.g. the record of Ballin dated July 15th 1909 on his discussion with Sir Ernest Cassel: Lepsius; Mendelssohn Bartholdy; Thimme, Politik 28, p. 207.
Straub, Ballin, p. 191.
Hildebrand, Reich, p. 308 ff.
Deutsche Dokumente, p. 82 ff.
Singer, Tod, p. 11.
Huldermann, Ballin, p. 301.
Warburg, Aufzeichnungen, p. 28.
Hamburgischer Correspondent No. 580 (July 29th 1914).
Cecil, Ballin, p. 182.
Fürstenberg, Fürstenberg, p. 554. Similarly also Heckscher, Ballin and Aagaard, Life, p. 21.
Cecil, Ballin, p. 187 ff.
Todesbescheinigung.

Jahr 1913
Nr. des Sterberegisters 467
Eingetragen beim Standesamt Nr. 3

1. Vor- und Zuname:
(bei Kindern ohne Namen,
Name des Vaters, ev. bei
unehelichen Namen der
Mutter.)

Albert Ballin

2. Datum der Geburt:
(bei todkranken Kindern
das Alter der Frucht.)

Jahr 1857
Monat August, Tag 15

3. Geschlecht:
Männlich

4. Stand, Geschäft:

5. Wohnung, Straße, Nr.
(eventl. Angabe des Stadtwesens, Hofes od. Kellers.)

6. Ort des Todes:
Privatklinik Hamburg, Ziegelweg 147

7. Tag u. Stunde des Todes:
9. November 1913, 14 Uhr Mitt.

8. Krankheit:
Maligne Schleimhautentzündung

Dass ich Oben genannte seit ärztlich behandelt, die Leiche gesehen und untersucht und an ihr keine der eingetretene Verursachung und keine Spur einer unnatürlichen Verursachung des Todes gefunden habe, bejahne ich


B. 14.

Arzt

Death certificate of Albert Ballin
Albert Ballin's last resting place in Ohlsdorf Cemetery
225 Wolff, Schwerindustrie, p. 2 ff.
226 Ibid., p. 7.
227 Feldman, Stinnes, p. 425.
228 Both quotations are from a letter of Albert Ballin to Hugo Stinnes dated January 14th 1918 (ibid., p. 472).
231 Albert Ballin to Max Schinckel, October 27th 1915: StA Hbg., 621-1/95 Firma HAPAG-Reederei, 659, p. 31.
232 Straub, Ballin, p. 238.
233 Feldman, Stinnes, p. 989; Detlefsen, Stinnes, p. 39.
235 Ibid., p. 7, 10.
236 Feldman, Stinnes, p. 679.
237 Detlefsen, Stinnes, p. 38.
238 Lewinsohn, Ballin, p. 698.
239 Wolff, Marsch, p. 276.
241 Cf. Wehler, Kaiserreich, p. 213: “The fall of Bethmann-Hollweg signalled that the OHL dictatorship, if not purposefully established, had in fact developed in some areas.” On the other hand, Ullrich, Großmacht, p. 529, maintains that “despite all the power concentrated in the OHL one (can)not say that there was a military dictatorship.”
242 Hildebrand, Reich, p. 342.
243 Cf. the diary entry of Theodor Wolff, July 12th 1917: “Ballin wants to see Bethmann tomorrow to advise him to resign.” (Sösemann, Tagebücher 1, p. 514).
244 Cf. the diary entry of Theodor Wolff, January 31st 1916 (ibid., p. 343).
245 Straub, Ballin, p. 249.
246 Albert Ballin to Hugo Stinnes, June 23rd 1918: StA Hbg., 621-1/95 Firma HAPAG-Reederei, 1472, p. 207.
247 Arndt von Holtzendorff to Albert Ballin, April 16th 1915: ibid., 1580, Vol. 23.
248 The documents are in the Hamburg State Archives (Signatur 1580: Korrespondenzen, Berichte und Aktennotizen aus der Tätigkeit des Berliner Residenten der Hapag, Arndt von Holtzendorff). These involve a total of 35 volumes covering the period from 1914 to 1924, thus also the years after Ballin’s death. Some of the reports were borrowed in 1942 by the “Reich Institute for the History of the New Germany”, a pseudo-scientific institution in the service of the Nazi propaganda, which became the centre of anti-Semitic German historiography and came only in 1991 in a roundabout way from the Berlin Federal Archives as deposit in the State Archives.
249  Cecil, Ballin, p. 215 ff.
251  Straub, Ballin, p. 216 ff., 240 ff.
252  Jäckh, Pflug, p. 189 ff.
254  Cecil, Ballin, p. 224 ff., 229.
256  Frankfurter Zeitung No. 5 (January 5th 1915).
257  Diary entry of Theodor Wolff, February 19th 1915 (Sösemann, Tagebücher 1, p. 168).
258  Schinckel, Lebenserinnerungen, p. 268.
260  The address was published in “Sächsische Industrie” 3/4 (1915/16), here p. 22 ff.
261  Fischer, Griff, p. 219 ff.
262  Diary entry of Theodor Wolff, February 9th 1915 (Sösemann, Tagebücher 1, p. 163).
263  Fischer, Griff, p. 222.
264  Cecil, Ballin, p. 226.
265  Diary entry of Theodor Wolff, December 3rd 1914 (Sösemann, Tagebücher 1, p. 128).
266  Albert Ballin to Theodor Wolff, July 13th 1915: Sösemann, Tagebücher 2, p. 800.
267  Cecil, Ballin, p. 226.
268  Quoted in: Sösemann, Tagebücher 1, p. 253.
269  Wolff, Marsch, p. 268 ff.; Albert Ballin to Theodor Wolff, July 16th 1915: Sösemann, Tagebücher 2, p. 892; diary entry of Theodor Wolff, July 18th 1915 (Sösemann, Tagebücher 1, p. 257 ff.).
270  Albert Ballin to Hugo Stinnes, September 6th 1917: StA Hbg., 621-1/95 Firma HAPAG-Reederei, 1472, p. 73. Cf. also Cecil, Ballin, p. 234, who points out that Ballin was involved in negotiations from November 1914 to the end of 1917 aiming at detaching Russia from the Entente.
271  Albert Ballin to Hugo Stinnes, December 13th 1917: StA Hbg., 621-1/95 Firma HAPAG-Reederei, 1472, p. 126.
272  Hildebrand, Reich, p. 370.
274  Cecil, Ballin, p. 233, 253 ff.
275  Ibid., p. 255.
277  Cecil, Ballin, p. 261 ff.
279 Albert Ballin to Paul Graf Wolff Metternich, August 27th 1917: Vietsch, Unverunft, p. 73.
280 Ritter, Kaiser, p. 156.
281 Albert Ballin to Hugo Stinnes, February 2nd 1917: StA Hbg., 621-1/95 Firma HAPAG-Reederei, 1472, p. 17.
283 Cecil, Ballin, p. 278.
284 Hildebrand, Reich, p. 373; Kolb, Frieden, p. 27.
286 Kolb, Frieden, p. 18.
287 Hildebrand, Reich, p. 376.
288 Quoted in: Kolb, Frieden, p. 27.
290 The record of Ballin on his discussion with the Kaiser is reproduced in Huldermann, Ballin, p. 375 ff.; on the other sources cf. Machtan, Abdankung, p. 148, 370.
292 Fischer, Griff, p. 554.
293 Record of Ballin for the discussion with Wilhelm II on September 4th 1918: Stubmann, Feld, p. 226 ff.
294 Warburg, Zeiten, p. 53.
295 Wolff, Marsch, p. 280.
296 Quoted in: Rosenbaum, Ballin, p. 298.
297 Wiborg, Ballin, p. 126 ff.; Cecil, Ballin, p. 287 ff. and Rosenbaum, Ballin, p. 298.
298 Stubmann, Feld, p. 262 ff.
299 StA Hbg., 622-01/62 Familie Merck, II 8, Konv 5: Nachtrag zu meinen Erinnerungen.
300 Cecil, Ballin., p. 213; Wiborg, Ballin, p. 87.
301 Plievier, Kaiser, p. 233 ff.
302 Straub, Ballin, p. 258.
303 Incl. Theodor Wolff (Marsch, p. 280), Max von Schinckel (Lebensorinnerungen, p. 269), Friedrich von der Ropp (Gestern, p. 100, 131) and Ernst Jäckh (Pflug, p. 191). On the other hand, Max Warburg (Aufzeichnungen, p. 69), Peter Franz Stubmann (Stunden, p. 17) and Bernhard von Bülow (Denkwürdigkeiten 3, p. 284) dispute that Ballin committed suicide.
304 Rosenbaum, Ballin, p. 299.
305 Erinnerungsworte an Albert Ballin: Stubmann, Feld, p. 124 ff.
The biography of Albert Ballin exercised a special fascination even in his lifetime. "Ballin. A royal businessman" by Adolf Goetz was published already in 1907, on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of Hapag and Ballin's 50th birthday. The authors of the next Ballin biographies, Bernhard Huldermann and Peter Franz Stubmann, both had close contact with Ballin and presented an admiring portrait of the man in their books, published in 1922 and 1926 respectively. However, this was rejected by other contemporaries who had also known Ballin personally.

Huldermann's biography was attacked particularly vehemently by Johannes Merck. In his "Memoirs", Merck did not spare Ballin criticism – to put it mildly – and referred continually to anti-Semitic stereotypes, which were (also) widespread among the Hamburg middle class of the 1920s. To cite two "comments": "But he was a Jew, for him business was always the main concern, German interests were basically of secondary importance." "A great character flaw of Ballin, perhaps a racial flaw, also something purely Jewish and therefore to a certain degree excusable in him, was his total lack of objectivity." Theodor Wolff commented on such attitudes as follows: "Ballin was not only a Jew, he was 'anglophile', so he was as a matter of course somewhat of an advocate of British interests, and that was even worse than the almost indubitable fact that none of his forefathers lay on the bear skins in the German forest." Werner Sombart, one of the most well-known economists of his time, also concerned himself with Ballin. To quote his work "The Jews and modern capitalism", published in 1911: "The old-style entrepreneur was still identifiable by his sector, whereas the new type of entrepreneur is entirely colourless. We cannot imagine Alfred Krupp producing anything other than cast steel, Borsig anything other than machines or Werner von Siemens anything other than electrical goods or that H. H. Meier headed anything other than North German Lloyd. If Rathenau, Deutsch, Berliner, Arnold, Friedländer, Ballin swapped their positions among one another tomorrow, it would probably not reduce their capability very considerably. Because they are all dealers, their coincidental area of activity is a matter of indifference."

Sombart was of the opinion that the European Jews had played a key role in the development of modern capitalism. With their existence as a wandering people, they had never developed a link with the soil, but
were all the more intensively focused on the abstract value of money and thus acquired an aptitude for capitalism such as they could never have achieved as a settled people. Sombart, who later expressed sympathies for National Socialism but distanced himself from its racial theories in 1938, harked back to the stereotype of the “eternally haggling Jew” and with his work opened the way to an explicitly anti-Semitic anti-capitalism.

The basis was thus laid for anti-Semitic agitation, as to be found in the “Semi-Kürschner”: “His eulogists – as the alleged best friend of Wilhelm had except for this Hohenzollern no true friends anywhere – compared him with Cecil Rhodes and Rockefeller, his enemies, and of those he had very many on the Elbe beach, called him the Jew Suess of Potsdam.” Ballin was also compared with Jew Suess in “Albert Ballin and German Politics” by Kaspar Pinette, published in 1938 and replacing the biographies of Huldermann and Stubmann that had been prohibited by the National Socialists.

During the Weimar Republic, Hapag had upheld the memory of Albert Ballin by naming its first post-war flagship after him. But the memory of Ballin was successively erased in the years after 1933. In October 1935, the “Albert Ballin”, which had last operated under swastika flag, was quietly renamed “Hansa” after a Nazi official had
complained about the ship’s name the year before.\textsuperscript{312} Although Hapag had delayed the renaming for a long time, in 1937 the “literary bureau” once founded by Ballin then actually managed not to mention the name Albert Ballin a single time in the anniversary publication “Hamburg-American Line. Yesterday and today – inside and outside”, published to mark Hapag’s 90th anniversary. On the other hand, the swastika banner was referred to “as shining symbol of regained national power and newly gained people’s community”.\textsuperscript{313} Marianne Ballin, who died in 1936, was fortunately saved having to take note of this. At least the former Kaiser in exile had recalled the director general and written to Marianne Ballin on her 80th birthday on December 16th 1934: “I will always honour the memory of this man who was devoted to me.”\textsuperscript{314}

\begin{quote}
Even if Albert Ballin, at least according to the journalist Wolf Schneider, never succeeded “unlike Werner von Siemens or Alfred Krupp (…) in anchoring himself in the German mentality”,\textsuperscript{315} numerous efforts were nevertheless taken after 1945 to offset the erasing of the memory of his person from public awareness undertaken by the National Socialists.
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
First, we may note the renaming of the previous Alsterdamm as Ballindamm in 1947. Ten years later – on Ballin’s 100th birthday, on which the Senate had a wreath placed on his grave – the German Federal Post Office issued a special stamp. Since 1989, Albert Ballin has also been remembered in the Hamburg town hall. His portrait was added as 65th relief medallion of famous Hamburg citizens in the entrance hall of the building. Mayor Ingo von Münch honoured him on this occasion as the most important man in the history of Hamburg shipping.\textsuperscript{316}
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
During the Nazi era, Ballin-Kai on Steinwerder, named by the Senate in honour of Ballin on his 25th anniversary at Hapag, was renamed Europa-Kai and Ballin House built in 1922–24 by Hans and Oskar Gerson Messberghof.\textsuperscript{317} In the recent past the people of Hamburg have again become aware of these designations with the name of Ballin. Some years after Hapag and North German Lloyd merged to form Hapag-Lloyd AG, the Hamburg administrative building, which had been largely undamaged in the second world war, was officially named Ballin House in 1997 on the occasion of the 150th anniversary of the founding of Hapag. And four years later, the state-of-the-art quay facilities of Container Terminal Altenwerder were named Ballinkai.
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
Stamp of the Federal Post Office (1957)
\end{quote}
The exhibition “BallinStadt – Emigrant World Hamburg” was opened in the Hamburg district of Veddel in 2007. This shows the role Hamburg played in the history of migration in the 19th and 20th century. The exhibition reconstructs at the former site three original residential and dormitory pavilions of the emigrant town, which was established at Ballin’s initiative and opened in 1901.

Finally – and this brings this biography to an end – in 2008 a Hamburg consortium pooled its commitment in a limited partnership named “Hamburgische Seefahrtsbeteiligung ‘Albert Ballin’” and could in this way succeed in ensuring that Hapag-Lloyd would remain as an independent shipping line based in Hamburg.

306 StA Hbg., 622-01/62 Familie Merck, II 8, Konv 2b: Meine Erinnerungen an die Hamburg-Amerika Linie und an Albert Ballin 1896–1919 by Johannes Theodor Merck [manuscript fair copy 1920–1921], p. 154, 191. Merck continually supplemented his notes after the fair copy with additional comments and material.
307 Wolff, Marsch, p. 248.
308 Sombart, Juden, p. 133 ff.
309 Schmoll, Naturschutz, p. 176.
311 Pinette, Ballin, p. 10.
312 The complaint is reproduced in Wiborg, Feld, p. 290.
313 Hamburg-Amerika Linie, p. 3.
315 Schneider, Ballin, p. 92.
316 Hamburger Abendblatt No. 208 (December 1st 1989).
317 Ahrens; Hauschild-Thiesen, Reeder, p. 66.
**Appendices**

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**Family tree (excerpt)**

Samuel Joel (Joseph) Ballin (1804–1874) ⚭ 1841 in second marriage with Amalia Meyer (b. 1825)

9 children (also 4 children from Ballin's first marriage), including

Albert Ballin (1857–1918) ⚭ 1883 Marianne Joachime Julie Rauert (1859–1936)

1893 Adoption of Emma Auguste Anna Kirchheim, who is given the name Irmgard

Irmgard Ballin (1892–1918) ⚭ 1910 Heinz Peter Karl Alexander Bielfeld (1886–1949)

3 children

Albert Heinz Herbert Bielfeld (1911–1937)

Harald Peter Bielfeld (1913–1944)


2 children

Heinz Peter Blasius Hueber (b. 1947)

Harald Nepomuk Hueber (b. 1948)
Albert Ballin and Hapag

1875  Ballin granted general commercial power of attorney at the emigrant agency Morris & Co.
1879  Ballin becomes partner of Morris & Co.
1881  Ballin begins to cooperate with Edward Carr and his shipping line
1886  Carr-Linie joins with Robert Miles Sloman & Co. to form Union-Linie
1886  Community of interests between Union-Linie and Hapag, which assumes responsibility for the management of the passage service for the two lines; Ballin appointed head of the passage department
1888  Ballin leaves Morris & Co., which continues to exist until 1907 in the commercial register; appointed to Hapag executive board
From 1891  Ballin expands Hapag from a pure shipping company into a supplier of tourist services
1892  Union-Linie, Hapag, North German Lloyd and the Belgian Red Star Line and Netherlands-America Steamship Company form the North Atlantic Steamship Lines Association: The lines agree on prices and dividing up steerage business
1897  Hapag is for the first time the largest shipping line in the world
1898  Opening of monthly cargo steamship service of Hapag to East Asia and acquisition of Kingsin-Linie
1899  Ballin appointed director general of Hapag
1900  Hapag acquires de Freitas-Linie serving South America
1901  Operating agreement of Hapag with Hamburg Südamerikanische Dampfschifffahrtsgesellschaft and Deutsche Dampfschifffahrtsgesellschaft Kosmos
1901  Hapag begins to participate in internal traffic between East Asian ports
1902  Hapag and North German Lloyd together conclude a contract with the American Morgan Trust (IMMC), which aims to achieve a monopoly for North Atlantic services
1905  Hapag acquires the travel agency of Carl Stangen and continues it as travel agency of Hamburg-American Line
1907–08  Woermann-Linie, Hamburg-Bremer-Afrika-Linie, Deutsche Ost-Afrika-Linie and Hapag agree on a joint service to Africa
1908  Founding of North Atlantic Conference: ten shipping companies and four associated lines conclude an agreement regulating e.g. steerage business from the North European and Atlantic ports to North America
1912  Termination of contract with IMMC
1913  Hapag cancels contracts of the North Atlantic Conference
1915  Ballin begins to advocate a war compensation law in favour of shipping
1916  Ballin decides to cooperate with the Rhine heavy industrialist Hugo Stinnes
1917  “Law on the restoration of the German merchant fleet” enters into force
1917–18 Hapag participates along with Stinnes in the Romanian crude oil business; Deutsche Werft AG, a joint venture of Hapag, AEG and GHH, is formed at Ballin’s initiative
There is neither a Ballin family archive nor a collection of papers of Albert Ballin. There are also no sources on Ballin in the Archives of the Hamburg Scientific Foundation, which was largely destroyed in 1943 and 1944. In the inventory on the company archives of Hapag-Reederei in the Hamburg State Archives it is pointed out that Bernhard Huldermann, who worked as Ballin’s private secretary, probably misappropriated some of the files. Huldermann could refer to the wish of Ballin “to order his literary estate and assess it to the best of his judgment” (Huldermann, Ballin, preface). Here and there Ballin documents continually crop up in second-hand bookshops. Ballin himself never kept a diary, and most of the Kaiser’s letters to him were destroyed already before November 9th 1918.

Unprinted source material on Albert Ballin can be found in the Political Archives of the Federal Foreign Office Berlin, in the Federal Archives Berlin, Freiburg and Koblenz, in the Archives of the Warburg Foundation Hamburg, in the Archives of Hapag-Lloyd AG Hamburg and in the Hamburg State Archives (on the last two cf. the relevant notes in this book), as well as in The Warburg Institute Archive London and in The National Archives London and The National Archives Washington. A comprehensive (although not quite up-to-date) overview of the archives is given in Cecil, Ballin, p. 301–305; there are also references in Ahrens; Hauschild-Thiessen, Reeder, p. 68.

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Ahrens, Eduard 29
Albert I., König der Belgier 101
Arn(h)old, Eduard (?) 117
Auerbach, Berthold 10
Auguste Victoria, German Empress 33, 76

Bach, Franz 30
Ballin, Amalia 10, 11*, 12, 25
Ballin, Irmgard 16, 18*, 19*, 76, 109
Ballin, Joseph 12
Ballin, Marianne 16, 18*, 19*, 20*, 35, 72, 108, 109, 119
Ballin, Samuel Joel (Joseph) 10, 11*, 12
Barlach, Ernst 30
Bassewitz 77
Bauer, Gustav 77
Bauernfeind, Theobald 77, 79, 84, 85, 86, 93, 98, 99, 100, 101
Berg, Friedrich 106, 107
Berliner, Joseph 117
Bielfeld, Heinz 76, 103, 105
Bismarck, Otto 58, 59, 81, 93
Blumenthal, Schiffsingenieur 19
Bohrdt, Hans 53*, 54*
Bornemann 52*
Borsig, August 117
Bosse, A. 62*
Bülow, Bernhard 79, 81, 83, 92
Bülow, Otto 76

Burchard, Johann Heinrich 77
Caprivi, Leo 76
Carr, Edward 13, 15, 24
Cassel, Ernest 77, 84, 85*, 86, 87
Cassel, Felix 85*
Cecil, Lamar 41, 86, 93, 100
Churchill, Winston 84, 93
Cuno, Wilhelm 97
Delbrück, Clemens 99
Delbrück, Hans 101
Dernburg, Bernhard 102
Deutsch, Felix 117
Ecker, Dr. 62*
Edens, Henning 7*
Edward VII., King of Great Britain and Ireland 85
Eggers 77
Einstein, Albert 102
Erzberger, Matthias 61
Eulenburg, August 76
Fischer, Fritz 101, 107
Fischer, Karl 108
Francke, Ernst 36
Franz Ferdinand, archduke of Austria 93
Friedlaender (?), Friedrich 117
Fürstenberg, Aniela 74
Fürstenberg, Carl 18, 74, 77, 79, 94
Geißler, Hermann 29
Gerson, Hans 119
Gerson, Oskar 119
Godfroy, Adolph 24
Goetz, Adolf 117
Goetz, Graf von 77
Goldmann, Professor 11
Goschen, Edward 93
Graupenstein, Friedrich Wilhelm 14*
Grey, Edward 84, 92, 93

Haldane, Richard 84, 85, 86
Haller, Martin 29, 31
Harden, Maximilian 79
Heckscher, Siegfried 82
Helfferich, Karl 95
Helmolt 63*
Himer, Kurt 20, 26
Hindenburg, Paul 98, 103*, 106
Hirsch, Samuel Moritz 10
Hitler, Adolf 102
Hofmann, Ludwig 30
Höger, Fritz 30
Holtzendorff, Arndt 98, 99, 102, 104
Holtzendorff, Henning 83*
Hornicke, Demetrius 40
Huben, E. 82
Hugenberg, Alfred 96, 104
Hulbe, Georg 76
Huldermann, Bernhard 79, 92, 117, 118
Hutten-Czapski, Bogdan 107

Ilberg, Friedrich 76

Jäckh, Ernst 99
Jagow, Gottlieb 92, 93, 98
Jürgens 52*

Kallmorgen, Georg 72
Kennan, George 90, 94
Krupp, Alfred 117, 119
Kühlmann, Richard 18, 98

Laërisz, Carl 25, 26*, 60
Laërisz, Ferdinand 24, 25
Lichnowsky, Karl Max 92
Ludendorff, Erich 98, 103*, 106, 108
Lundt, Werner 72

Max, successor to the throne of the Grand Duchy of Baden 106
Meier, Hermann Henrich 117
Mensing 76
Merck, Ernst 24
Merck, Johannes 38, 39, 58, 64, 77, 108, 117
Mewes, Charles 34, 41, 77
Meyer, Joseph 10
Morgan, John Pierpont 58, 64, 65*, 66, 67
Morley, John 93
Müller, Georg Alexander 76, 97, 107
Münch, Ingo 119
Murken, Erich 19

Naumann, Friedrich 99
Nipperdey, Thomas 100
Nolde, Emil 16

Ohlendorff, Heinrich 77
O’Swald, William 77

Peters, H. 63*
Pinette, Kaspar 118
Platon 100
Plessen, Hans 76
Plievier, Theodor 108
Predöhl, Max 77

Quidde, Ludwig 102
Rathenau, Walther 77, 96, 117
Rauert, Paul 16, 18
Reuchlin, J. G. 62*
Reuchlin, O. 63*
Reusch, Paul 96
Reuter, Bernhard 40
Rhodes, Cecil 118
Ritter, Gerhard A. 104
Rockefeller, John 118
Rohrbach, Paul 102
Ropp, Friedrich 79
Rosenbaum, Eduard 20, 108, 109
Sachse 77
Scheidemann, Philipp 109
Schiefler, Gustav 30
Schinckel, Max 20, 39, 58, 77, 96, 97, 98, 100, 101, 104
Schmidt-Rottluff, Karl 16
Schmoller, Gustav 58, 102
Schneider, Wolf 119
Schröder, Carl August 77
Schumpeter, Joseph 13
Schwarz, Direktor 77
Schwormstädt, Felix 55*
Seyde 62*
Siemens, Werner 117, 119
Simon, James 77
Singer, Kurt 7
Slovak, Robert Miles jr. 13
Sombart, Werner 117, 118
Stangen, Carl 44
Stinnes, Hugo 95, 96*, 97, 98, 102, 104, 106, 108
Strom, Ad. 62*
Strasser, E. 62*
Strasser, Mariette 76
Stresemann, Gustav 95
Stubmann, Peter 26, 108, 109, 117, 118
Süß Oppenheimer, Joseph 118
His was an unprecedented rise to the top from the thirteenth child of a poor Jewish emigrant agent to the "sovereign of shipping" and "friend" of the Kaiser. It is hardly surprising that Albert Ballin was one of the foremost figures of the Wilhelmine Empire. From the beginning, he attracted attention at Hamburg-Amerikanische Packetfahrt-Aktien-Gesellschaft, known as Hapag for short. Under its manager Ballin, Hapag became the largest shipping line in the world.

From 1907 until his tragic death on November 9th 1918, Ballin belonged to the board of trustees of the Hamburg Scientific Foundation, to which he also contributed in a special way. As a member of the expedition committee, he played a great part in the realisation of the large Pacific expedition to the Bismarck Archipelago and New Guinea (1908–10), which confirmed Hamburg’s reputation as a centre for science.

This biography sketches the unusual life of this man, who personified perhaps more than any of his contemporaries the prominence and power of the second German Empire but at the same time also experienced its limits and weaknesses.

The following titles have so far been published in the series "Patrons for Science" (in German):

VOLUME 1
The founders of the Hamburg Scientific Foundation

VOLUME 2
Sophie Christine and Carl Heinrich Lastner. A biographical approach to the times and issues of their lives

VOLUME 3
Eduard Lorenz Lenz-Meyer. A Hamburg merchant and artist

VOLUME 4
Hermann Franz Matthias Mutzenbecher. A Hamburg insurer

VOLUME 5
The brothers Augustus Friedrich and Gustav Adolph Vorwerk. Two Hamburg merchants

VOLUME 6
Albert Ballin

VOLUME 7
Ernst Friedrich Seelke. First chairman of the Hanseatic Appellate Court